

A Divided Korea and the Reunification Strategy

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Abstract

When the Soviet Union dismantled in the early 1990s, there was no significant disparity between Germany and Korea in terms of political options and the opportunity presented. However, the results were quite different. South Korea was not prepared to exploit the chance for the reunification of the Korean peninsula. A new environment for the reunification of the Korean peninsula emerged in the beginning of the 21st century. Although relations among the regional powers based on realism remain intact, the flexibility increases in politics as economic interdependence increases. The international order after the Cold War supports the reunification of the Korean peninsula and the internal situation within the Korean peninsula appears to be a dominant variable in shaping the reunification environment. The most important issue is to recover and strengthen the social Tao in the creation of a state of accord between the leader and the public in South Korea. It is recommended to prioritize the establishment of a strong Tao in order to prepare for the opportunities of the 21st century.

Key Words: Tao(道), reunification, buffer state, Korean peninsula, interdependence

Introduction

In the fall of 1990, Major General Von Schewen of the West German Army was summoned to the Headquarters of the Defense Department. When he arrived, he was promoted to Lieutenant General and ordered to take command of the entire East German Army. When he arrived in East Germany, there were only colonels in command because all the generals in the entire East German Army had retired. Secret documents safely stored in the cabinets of the political officers located next to the commanding officers of the regular Army became vital in understanding how the East German armed forces had worked. An important byproduct was to gain access to the list of people living in West Germany who had covertly sworn allegiance and loyalty to the East German government. General Von Schewen was invited to Seoul to share his experiences on German reunification and detail his role in the military integration of the former East-West antagonists.

General Von Schewen expressed his appreciation of the soldiers of the East German Army (both officers and enlisted soldiers) for the cooperation they gave throughout the difficult mission of bringing together the armies of a divided nation. The comparison between the Tiananmen Square protests in China of 1989 and the German reunification that took place in the same period is memorable and was given special mention. It was the unanimous opinion of East and West German officers involved in the process of German reunification, that if one unit had taken a tank out to protest in the streets of Berlin (possibly leading to a local and national breakout) or if some East German soldiers had resisted, the reunification of Germany would have been much different.

The East German officer corps actively supported the transition toward democracy.¹

National reunification is the most natural desire of all Koreans, however many in the South now believe that it is an unattainable goal. When the Soviet Union was dismantled (both physically and ideologically) in the early 1990s, Germany and Korea were equal in terms of the political options and the opportunities provided. However, the results were quite different.

One difference between the Korean peninsula and Germany is the geopolitical influence of China (an ally of North Korea in the Korean War in 1950). Even so, could we have taken a further step toward reunification if China had cooperated such as Hungary and Austria had done so with Germany? Probably it was not. South Korea was limited in the capability and the means to work toward reunification; in addition, it was also virtually unprepared to resolve the complexities relating to reunification in terms of external and internal variables.

This paper identifies the complexity of the Korean issue and investigates the reunification strategy of the Korean peninsula according to three variables: characteristics of the Northeast Asia regional situation, the features of the 21st century international relations, and the internal situation of the Korean peninsula.

¹-Dal R. Herspring, *Requiem for an Army: The Demise of the East German Military* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc. 1998), p. xi.

Complexity of the Korean Issue: Multi-variable Equation

It is difficult for a separated nation (such as the two Koreas) to coexist because the two countries are separated only by political agendas. There are no different, ethnic groups (such as in the case of the Czechs and the Slavs), historical backgrounds, cultures, or customs. It is unnatural for two countries that share the same history and roots to remain separate. This commonality makes it easy to misjudge how a simple direct approach could quickly reunify the Korean peninsula.

During the Korean War, Kim Il Sung assumed that reunification by means of military force could be achieved in less than three months. However, he did not foresee the rapid intervention and military commitment by the United States. Kim Il Sung was able to read the internal factors, but failed to examine the external ones.²

General MacArthur, the architect of the Inchon Landing, foresaw that North Korean formal resistance to the United Nations in Korea would end by Thanksgiving of 1950. However, he failed to predict the military intervention of the People's Republic of China.³ General MacArthur could make a precise judgment of the physical war-fighting capability of the new born China based on a rational assessment, but lacked the situational awareness of the regional factors reflected in the long history of Northeast Asia.

Mao Zedong was confident that the People's Volunteer Army (PVA) of China could completely drive the United States armed forces off of

²-Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 142.

³-William Stueck, *The Korean War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 107.

the Korean peninsula after the Marshal of the PVA, Peng Dehuai, led successful operations of the first and the second offensives to the 38th parallel. This miscalculation implies that Mao Zedong also lacked the ability to analyze the larger realities of the international order.

Former Secretary of State of the United States Henry Kissinger (an authority in the field of international relations) argues that General MacArthur should have stopped the advancement of the UN forces at the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. His logic is that the original purpose of the entry into the war by the UN forces was to drive the North Korean Army beyond and up to 100 miles further north of the 38th parallel as a disciplinary measure. According to Kissinger, the deviation from the original objective of a military and political compromise to one of total victory was the reason for the entry of the Chinese forces.⁴

It was deeply moving when General Paik Sun Yup (a veteran of the Korean War) recalled that “every piece of land we are standing on now was earned by blood,” a testament to the effort it took for the Korean Army and the UN forces to reach Pyongyang.⁵ Although it is counterfactual, it could have been almost impossible for the UN troops to stop along the Pyongyang-Wonsan (P-W) line, considering the surge of the counter-offensive that made so many sacrifices to reach there. However, some people opine that if the UN forces had stopped at the P-W line, that China might not have intervened.

All these military and political leaders failed to reach a conclusive end to the war because they approached the multi-faceted problems of the

⁴-Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1994), pp. 478-483.

⁵-*Speech by General Paik Sun Yup on the Anniversary of the Korean War in War Museum*, June 2009.

Korean peninsula with a one-dimensional mind.

Opportunity Does Not Wait for the Unprepared

South Korea was unprepared to exploit the opportunity for the reunification of the peninsula when the former Soviet Union was dismantled. While East Germany participated in the first free elections in March of 1990 that was followed by the reunification treaty between the two Germanys, the two Koreas had barely begun to talk on the matter of reconciliation, exchange, and non-aggression between the two. The two Koreas had been longtime antagonists and the beginning of the talks itself excited Koreans who wanted peaceful reunification, but also external observers who wished for a stable transition on the Korean peninsula.

Although North Korea officially participated in the dialogue of how to increase exchanges between the two Koreas, it in reality took measures to prohibit information flow into the North through various media from the South. The North feared the inflow of news from the outside world, believing that it would contaminate Northern society and threaten the existence of the regime. The two Koreas discussed and agreed on the exchange of letters between the peoples of both Koreas, but could not agree on the practical process. Through a long negotiation, what they eventually achieved was an agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression, and cooperation between the South and the North. The document was ratified and accepted by both governments, but no progress could be made in the implementation stage because the North did not want to move forward.

From the beginning, the two Koreas had different objectives in the dialogue: the North shrewdly attempted to evade the external pressure to open and change North Korean society after the demise of the Soviet Union, while the South naively expected some possible change in the North through dialogue. For the North Korean regime, the talk was only a means to let the world community perceive that the two Koreas were cooperating toward reunification. As a result, the North achieved objectives through the process of a dialogue between the two Koreas, whereas the South failed to exploit the historical opportunity for reunification after the collapse of the Iron Curtain.

Korea retains a tragic legacy from the war in 1950 when the North initiated a war against the South in an attempted reunification by military means. It took three years of sacrifice and cost the lives of millions on both sides until the belligerents agreed on an armistice at the point where the war had started. The experience of the Korean War provides a strong message that any attempt to achieve Korean reunification by military means is meaningless.

The reunification strategy of South Korea does not include the use of military force, but relies solely on peaceful means which is a long-term project. We have to wait until the North changes internally, although we wanted the North to hold free elections as East Germany did in 1990. However, this did not mean just waiting, but also shaping the environment and conditions for positive change internally as well as externally in the North. South Korea had devoted itself to internal security and invested less effort in shaping the environment and conditions for reunification. South Korea recognized that a historic chance for reunification passed by in the 1990s, now it cannot persuade the

North to move together toward reunification or request neighboring powers to support the movement. Although South Korea was unprepared to exploit the chance for change in the 1990s, this mistake must not be repeated in the future.

Investigating Reunification Strategy According to Three Variables

Northeast Asian Regional Situation and the Reunification Strategy

A buffer state is a relatively small state between two larger potentially rival powers. Korea was a typical buffer state during the era of Russo- Japanese War.⁶ In dealing with buffer states, great powers usually had three options: sanctioning the neutrality of the buffer state, agreeing on and initiating partition, or making decisions on whether or not to go to war against each other over the buffer state.⁷ The first method is to force the buffer state to maintain political neutrality while guaranteeing its independence. The second method is to control the state by slicing up the nation. The last method is to gain exclusive possession of the country by gaining victory over other potential suitors for the buffer state. The fate of the buffer state is left to the law of the jungle to be fought militaristically and politically in three different ways.

Korea is a state that has gone through all three examples of the

⁶-Seung-Young Kim, *American Diplomacy and Strategy toward Korea and Northeast Asia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 13, 20.

⁷-Michael Greenfield Partem, "The buffer state system in international relations," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (March 1983).

buffer state. Both the Russo-Japanese War and the Sino-Japanese War were fought to gain full control over the Korean peninsula by one of the neighboring powers. All three countries, Russia, Japan, and China, considered Korea a typical buffer state in the East Asian region.

The most serious problem is that such geopolitical distinction has continued throughout the 20th century. At the end of the World War II, the Soviet Union demanded the guarantee of the sphere of influence over the Far East that the Tsar of Russia had maintained until the Russo-Japanese War in return for participation in the Pacific Theater of Operations. The Yalta Conference accommodated these Soviet demands.⁸ The 38th parallel and the division of the Korean peninsula is the by product of the Yalta Conference agreement.

The Chinese Communist Army joined the Korean War to expel the U.S. presence in Korea to recover the influence it had in the hemisphere prior to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. The two cases had implications that both China and Russia thought of Korea as a buffer state. Such underlying motives are still present in neighboring states and are likely to resurface and influence many of the foreign policies of countries such as Japan, China, and Russia.

China is a rising and competing regional power with Japan. If Sino-Japanese relations in the 21st century develop into an amicable agreement, then this development will be beneficial to the process of the reunification of the Korean peninsula. However, if the relationship becomes antagonistic, then it could become an obstacle to the process of reunification. If North Korea does not abandon nuclear ambitions

⁸-Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1994), pp. 415-418.

and continues to challenge the international order, the reunification of the Korean peninsula will become more complex. If Korea does not have enough power to support the reunification agenda, then there exists a possibility that neighboring powers may intervene in North Korean matters similar to when they treated Korea as a buffer state in the 19th century.

The conclusion that the reason for the 60-year division of Korea is based on a single military dimension that includes maintaining the armistice and preventing North Korea from initiating war is not a realistic understanding of the problem as a whole. It is imperative to understand that the geopolitical issue remains unchanged and at the forefront of the division of the Korean peninsula.

One important concern is the rising regional economic interdependency. As economic interdependency grows, it is increasingly unrealistic to analyze relations among regional powers based solely on a traditional balance of power view. The concept of a buffer state becomes less dominant as the relations among regional countries move closer to a complex interdependence.⁹ In the same logic, it is expected that the ‘Teeth and Lips’ concept of Mao Zedong in the 1950s can be modified to be more flexible, although the security belt for China remains intact. One anonymous Chinese scholar argued years ago that China would not unilaterally support a North Korean initiated war on the Korean peninsula. China needs regional stability for continued economic development and any aggressive North Korean military policy is not in the interests of China. It became clear that China would

⁹- See Joseph Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts* (New York: Longman, 2003), p. 205 for “Complex Interdependence.”

not sacrifice its economic interests for the relations of “Teeth and Lips.”¹⁰

The International Order in the 21st Century and the Reunification Strategy

There is a need to understand the structure of the current international security system and its characteristics in order to understand the global security environment of the 21st century. Although some argue non-polarity as the nature of the international system,¹¹ most would agree that the security structure of the 21st century consists of the United States as the sole super power and several great powers in the system. There exists a need to review the characteristics of the system that may influence the regional order and the process of the reunification of the Korean peninsula. First, the United States (as the only remaining superpower) will identify the international order and national interests as the same; lesser powers will consider national interest as the primary concern of international relations. Second and consequently, it is inevitable for the United States to intervene in almost all major and minor conflicts in the world that may influence the international order. Probably, no conflict of various levels in the international community could be resolved without the influence of the United States. Third, the tendency to unilateralism by the U.S. will also increase as the role of the United States in international security increases. Contrary to that, lesser powers will tilt toward multilateralism for conflict resolution in the international community. Fourth, a remote possibility exists in the formation of two exclusive blocs

¹⁰- See Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas* (The U.S.: Basic Books, 2001), p. 240 for the change in the Chinese stance.

¹¹- Richard N. Hass, “The age of non-polarity,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/ June 2008.

as in the Cold War era as long as no country significantly challenges the military supremacy of the United States. However, temporary engagements as well as disengagements of nations will surface based on national interests and situational demands. Lastly, although there are various processes, it is inevitable that the value system that America adheres to will gradually spread throughout the international community.

To confirm the above characteristics, the Obama administration is trying to avoid the remnants of the foreign policies of the Bush administration that are criticized as unilateralism. Instead, the focus is on building stronger ties with allies and trying to find multilateral solutions to international conflicts. An example is the emphasis by President Obama on the role of the Six-Party Talks in regards to the North Korean nuclear issue. Although North Korea has become increasingly unpredictable, the response of the Obama administration remains prudent and patient; it is too early to form any conclusion about the U.S. strategy of the new administration toward North Korea. The position by President Obama on the global war on terrorism is a good indicator of future strategies.

President Obama announced in March 2009 that the United States would take a comprehensive approach to the global war on terrorism by Al Qaeda and its associates. It would apply so-called “smarter power” that includes an appropriate mix of hard power and soft power but the strategy to destroy all Al Qaeda forces in the area remains. Akin to the Marshal Plan after the World War II in Europe, the United States will provide economic support for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and support the increase of the capabilities of the local police force around the region to control the area of operations. Isolated terrorists will be destroyed

through military means. On the outset, the strategy seems soft and flexible; in reality, the strategy calls for the United States to grasp both soft power and hard power in a flexible application to situations and retain a strong military capability as a reserve for the decisive moment.

After the Korea-U.S. summit in June 2009, the two presidents announced that “there is a path for North Korea to take in which they are joining the world community” implying that the opportunity for peace and prosperity is still possible for North Korea.¹² The announcement can be interpreted that the U.S. policy toward North Korea is based on a comprehensive approach.

It is clear that the United States will make preemptive initiatives to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue rather than follow the past behavior of reacting after the fact to the moves of North Korea. At the same time, it seems that this comprehensive approach has a clear objective and does not deny the possibility of the use of military force as a last resort. In addition, the two leaders agreed, “Through our Alliance we aim to build a better future for all people on the Korean peninsula, establishing a durable peace on the Peninsula and leading to peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy.”¹³

The international security structure of the 21st century supports the reunification of the Korean peninsula based on the principles of democracy, human rights, and a market economy. Since Washington and Seoul share these principles, it is important to increase the traditional and strong ties with the United States to shape a more favorable envir-

¹²- *Obama and Lee Press Conference*, The White House, June 16, 2009.

¹³- *Joint Vision For The Alliance Of The United States Of America And The Republic Of Korea*, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, June 16, 2009.

onment in Northeast Asia for the reunification of the two Koreas.

The Internal Situation within the Korean Peninsula and the Reunification Strategy

The Basic Agreement between South Korea and North Korea¹⁴ described, “their relations, not being a relationship between states, constitute a special interim relationship stemming from the process toward reunification.” This statement has the implication that the two Koreas will temporarily coexist, but are bound to reunite. The end-state is already given in the conclusion that the separated nations are one in nature and origin.

The description that “a special interim relationship stemming from the process toward reunification”¹⁵ could be analyzed in two dimensions: one is for the non-military arena in which both Koreas can pursue reconciliation and cooperation, whereas the other is for the military arena in which both have to compete for survival and for reunification on their terms and by all means. The military arena between the two Koreas has two battlefronts; one is the conventional military competition and the other is politico-psychological warfare.

For the last 60 years the South Korean security strategy was to deter war, and preventive measures have been taken to prevent North Korea from initiating another war. Therefore, in every field, South Korea tried to avoid any move that might agitate North Korea and develop into a military conflict. As a result, the defense posture of the South was always

¹⁴-*Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea*, February 19, 1992.

¹⁵-*Ibid.*

one step behind that of North Korea in quality as well as in quantity, creating an arms imbalance between the two Koreas. Despite the military imbalance between the two Koreas, only the Korea-U.S. military alliance dissuaded the North from initiating another war.

The imbalance in the arena of the politico-psychological warfare has led to a grave and serious reality. South Korea has been exposed to the North Korean political psychological agenda for many decades because North Korea is a regulated society while South Korea is an open and free society. This imbalance has contaminated South Korean society ideologically to an extent that even the identity of the Korean society has been shaken. It is evident that the pro-North Korea politico-psychological influence is present in South Korea.

Sun Tzu describes such a reality in a world lacking “Tao”(道).¹⁶ Tao is what brings the thinking of the people in line with superiors and leaders in a modern society. Social Tao is the situation where the leader earns respect from citizens and where government policies are fully praised and supported by citizens. According to Sun Tzu, this social Tao is the most important factor in deciding the outcome of war, especially in a civil war.¹⁷ In essence, a country that lacks Tao cannot win a war no matter how powerful the army may be.

The most advisable course of military strategy is to prevent conflict. However, it is dangerous for a society to lose ground in a politico-psychological warfare because that influences the Tao of the society. Especially, the military will also fall in a civil war environment when Tao

¹⁶- Roger T. Ames, translated, *Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), p. 103.

¹⁷- *Ibid.*, p. 103.

is broken. Although the imbalance in military power can be compensated by the aid of a military alliance, the broken Tao cannot be fixed by external aid; a nation must fix the problem itself.

The generation responsible for the economic development of South Korea in the 20th century experienced the provocation and violence of armed North Korean agents. At the same time, they saved money in order to resurrect their families and the nation with the slogan, "Let's Construct While Fighting." This slogan had a greater meaning as it meant triumph in an ongoing competition with the North and that a unified Korea would realize the South as the superior system. In that period, citizens of South Korea actually fought to rebuild the country based on the ideals of democracy, peace, and national unity.

The vision of a unified Korea based on a free democracy started to lose its appeal when lives became comfortable and complacent as economic power reached a certain level that forgot the previous sacrifices. During that process, the national Tao was lost, too. South Korea must recover the determined and hard working nature of the generation that rebuilt South Korea because that is how to rebuild the social Tao in Korea society. If we do not have a strong will to carry on the mandate passed on by the previous generation and maintain the desire to achieve a unified democratic nation, the Korean peninsula will never unify under the name of democracy and freedom.

There are around 700 to 800 senior-level representatives in the current North Korean regime. These political elites are the puppets of Kim Jong-il. They follow every decision and move by the supreme ruler of North Korea. However, it is a reasonable speculation that even the highest officials of the North Korean government would not agree to let

their children live forever in the current state of North Korea; they would prefer their children to live in a society where freedom and human rights are guaranteed. The South must have a strong national will to convince and induce North Korea to change. We cannot achieve the grand history that reaches far beyond the horizon without an agreement by the people of North and South Korea to move forward.

The Northeast Asian regional situation remains an important variable. However, the degree of seriousness of the geopolitical concern among the neighboring countries will decrease as economic interdependence grows. The international order in the 21st century is different from the Cold War but still supports the reunification of the Korean peninsula. However, internal situation within the Korean peninsula appears to be a dominant variable in shaping the environment and conditions for reunification. The most important priority is to recover and strengthen the social Tao in South Korea in order to establish the national Tao throughout the Korean peninsula.

Three Principles to Rebuild the National “Tao” (道)

The strategic theory of Sun Tzu focuses on individuals and personal intentions because Sun Tzu believes that war (especially civil war) is a matter of human existence. He defines war a vital matter of state.¹⁸ In order to win a war, which is the vital matter of state, it was essential to lead the people in complete accord with the ruler. He explains that the status of Tao means that all the vectors of the people direct a singular objective of the leader physically as well as psychologically. By the same logic, the

¹⁸ - *Ibid.*, p. 103.

reunification of a country is a great matter of state in addition to being a matter of the people and personal intention. Sun Tzu argues that Tao is the dominant factor that estimates which side will win a war and that it determines which side will achieve national reunification on preferred terms.

Three principles are proposed to achieve the outcome. First is the principle of the objective. In order to lead the people into complete accord with the ruler, the ruler has to present his objective and the people must willingly accept it. In order for this objective to take effect, it must have a clear identity and a simplicity that is clearly understood.

In order to achieve a strong Tao for reunification, the government has to present the people a clear objective that can be easily identified in the conscientious acceptance of it. The goal of the reunified Korea must be a liberal democracy and a market economy, and guaranteed human rights. These make the best possible economic, political, and social environment based on the historical development of universal human values and civilization. This is also the just outcome of an ideological rivalry between the two Koreas that fought to identify which system is superior for Korea.

A strong national Tao will be established when every citizen moves toward the singular objective of an eventual reunified Korea based on a liberal democracy. The objective loses its value if it is not possible to tell whether the direction is toward a liberal democracy, a people's democracy, or a dictatorship. Citizens will be lost in a vast sea of political propaganda if the compass is unclear.

South Korea must announce its objective to the international community to gain help and support when it is required. The grand

project must be tasked to the next generation if reunification between North and South Korea cannot be immediately accomplished. We must dedicate the nation to educate and pass down national objectives and direction. Only then will the plan take shape to turn the vision into reality.

Second is the principle of the offensive. Just as a CEO must advertise products to gain a competitive advantage in a market, in order to gain a driving force that moves toward the objective, the South Korean government must propagandize the objective of reunification. We cannot achieve reunification based on a liberal democracy if we continue to maintain a defensive position against North Korea. South Korea must clearly define the vision of reunification to North Korea. Only when North Korean compatriots accept the free democratic system with their hearts and minds will a peaceful reunification be possible.

There is a memorable story about the fall of the Berlin Wall. There was a hole in the barrier that many East German people escaped through and one person wrote a witty remark as he was making his escape. "Mr. Honecker, if you become the last person to escape East Germany, please don't forget to turn off the lights." The leader of East Germany Erich Honecker would persist until the last person escaped East Germany. Only then would he also have to wave the white flag and turn off the lights when the inevitable happened. This showed the democratic spirit and desire for freedom among East Germans that made the reunification of Germany possible.

Tolerance for uniqueness and variety is a strength of an open society, however sometimes such a society crumbles and falls under the

constant propaganda of a uniformed society. South Korea must defend against the North Korean political-psychological warfare, and an offensive stance is the best way to defend against the proliferation of political propaganda. A comprehensive approach integrating various measures must be implemented to counter North Korean psychological schemes.

The last is the principle of concentration. South Korea must invest in the fields that contribute directly to the national objective in order to achieve maximum productivity with limited resources. It is inevitable that there will be an imbalance in the distribution of resources among different fields. However, we must invest in selected fields and support the establishment of a grand national Tao that embraces all seventy million Koreans. These actions will lead to the eventual reunification of a free and democratic Korea.

We must remain patient, but not miss the right circumstances and opportunities for reunification based on a liberal democracy. Sun Tzu stated, "Invincibility depends on oneself; vulnerability lies with the enemy."¹⁹ One of the characteristics of a civil war is that governments do not fall by an outer force but by internal factors. This implies that North Korea must fall internally for the divided Korean peninsula to reunite. That is the justification for South Korea to build a strong national Tao that moves the national objectives forward to a reunification based on a liberal democracy.

¹⁹ - *Ibid.*, p. 115.

Conclusion

North Korea has reacted unpredictably since it became isolated from the international community. Although the military threat has reached a critical point, the internal collapse of North Korea has perhaps already begun when observed from a long-term military-political view. South Korea should be prepared to shape the favorable environment and conditions for national reunification based on the strong national Tao in order not avoid the mistakes of the 1990s.

▪ Article Received: 8/18 ▪ Reviewed: 11/27 ▪ Revised: 12/7 ▪ Accepted: 12/8

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