

60th Anniversary of Korea Liberation: Current Status of Inter-Korean Relations and Future Direction

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to answer the questions of where we are in terms of Korean Peninsula's unification problem and where to and how we can improve in the future. To answer these questions, we should emphasize understanding duality (situation, structure), position of analysis (balanced perspective, nationalistic thought, future-oriented view), and division structure (territory, system, mentality) of the Korean Peninsula's problem. Where are we now? In terms of territorial unification, the formation of a peace regime in the Korean Peninsula is delayed albeit the antagonistic triangle system is mitigated. In terms of system unification, there is a paradigm shift from confrontation to cooperation, but the military detente is inadequate. In terms of mentality unification, Cold War consciousness has dissolved but the conflict among South Koreans is intensifying. On the whole, the present condition is analyzed as being shifted from competitive coexistence to cooperative coexistence. Then, what should we do? Our basic goal should be 'Building a Peaceful Korea.' Also, promoting 'Rainbow Strategy' and 'Balanced Cross Diplomacy' into practice is necessary. For the territorial unification, we need to form a peace regime based on trust and grand national strategy. For the system unification, we need to fulfill all the basic agreements on the two Koreas. For the mentality unification, we need to make a peaceful national reconciliation based on 'Rainbow Pluralism' and prepare for the life after unification.

Key Words: inter-Korean relations, characteristics of Korea Unification, peace Korea, "rainbow strategy," "cross balance diplomacy"

Introduction

The year 2005 was a very meaningful one, marking as it did the 60th anniversary of national unification, the fifth year after the signing of the June 15th Inter-Korean Joint Declaration and the 15th anniversary of German unification. The year, according to the September 19th Joint Statement of the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks, can also be considered the starting point of addressing North Korea nuclear issues and seeking peace in Northeast Asia.

Up until now, South and North Korea have made strenuous efforts to realize unification. Starting from the reunion of separated families in August 1971, more than 500 rounds of inter-Korean talks have been held. The South has become the second largest trading partner to the North, with a bilateral trade volume surpassing US\$700 million. Exchanges of citizens between the two Koreas continue to be active, with a total of 85,400 (81,470 from the South and 3,930 from the North) made from 1989 to 2004. The number of tourists to Mt. Kumgang has exceeded one million, and railroads and roads have been re-linked through the DMZ. Moreover, one of the long-cherished dreams of the Korean people has begun to be realized with 11 rounds of family reunion meetings already held and work underway to build a permanent meeting venue at Mt. Kumgang. In addition, the North shocked the South by making a sudden visit to the National Memorial Board one day before the August 15th Korean Festival, and by its holding of three big events in 2005: the June 15th Grand National Unification Festival; the August 15th Korean Festival; and the October 10th event to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Worker's Party. Additionally, the North not only agreed to form a single team at the 2006 Asian Games but also to discuss a peace regime in the process of resolving the North's nuclear issues.

Circumstances both internal and external to the Korean Peninsula have not been favorable. Internationally, Korea has had to

contend with ongoing historical and territorial disputes with China and Japan amidst rocky ROK-US relations. In terms of China, conflicts arose over its defining Koguryo as part of its minorities through the “Northeast Asia Project” officially launched in February 2002, and its inclusion of the ancient Korean dynasty as part of its own history. China also braced itself for a possible emergency in North Korea by preparing to make inroads into the Korean Peninsula through changing border guards at the Amnok And Tumen rivers from armed police to military forces in July 2003. In Japan’s case, absurd remarks by the country’s nationalist figures on the issue of its distorted history-textbooks continued. And disputes over Tokdo Island also continued, with the Japanese ambassador to Seoul even holding a press conference (in 2005) claiming Japan’s territorial rights over the island just one day before March 1, Korea’s National Independence Day.

Domestically, conflict within South Korea itself deepened, with disagreements between conservatives and liberals that began from the inter-Korean summit in 2000 eventually becoming full-blown, evidence of which can be found in the once again “separate” holding of celebratory events for March 1st Independence Day in 2003. Since Korean society is divided into “anti-nuclear and anti-Kim” conservatives, and “anti-war and anti-US” liberals, the two sides locked horns on every single issue including sending troops to Iraq, pulling US troops out of South Korea and abolishing the National Security Law. More recently, there was an occasion in which some lobbied to have the statue of General Douglas MacArthur removed, with the president—at the time on an official visit abroad—expressing his opposition.

Where does Korea stand now after 60 years of national independence and territorial division? In what direction are we heading? What are the reasons behind Korea’s current conflicts? Why have we not realized unification? How should we view the current situation and what actions do we need to take to achieve peaceful reunification?

These are all difficult questions with complex answers.

How Should We View the Current Situation?

Characteristics of Korea Unification: A Double-edge Sword

Is it possible to easily address crises surrounding the Korean Peninsula and build a peace regime as long as pending issues—like the North’s nuclear problem—are resolved? This does not appear to be so. This is because matters involving unification are not only linked to particular issues, like the North’s nuclear programs, but also to the essential issue of duality. Given that, it is crucial to clearly understand this duality in order to genuinely address unification matters.

Duality of Circumstances: Transitional Period

“Duality of circumstances” refers to the legacies of the post-Cold War and Cold War that continue to influence Korean unification. On the international front, the Cold War confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union based on ideology came to an end in the wake of the dismantling of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe. On the Northeast Asia front, however, China dreaming to become a “socialist country in the 21st century” and North Korea chanting for “our own style of socialist country” or “great leader style socialist country” to become a powerful nation, confirms that the ideological showdown between free democracy and communism is far from over.

In addition, on the historical front, matters involving the Korean Peninsula are affected by unfinished historical processes. The world has advanced from a nomadic society in pre-history, to an agricultural society in the Middle Ages, to an industrial society in modern times to our current information age. Put differently, our world has changed

from the [Mediterranean](#) age of medieval times, to a modern Atlantic age to our current Pacific era. From another perspective, the world went through an ideological conflict in the 20th century to arrive at a clash of civilizations or era of reconciliation in the 21st century.

In the meantime, “the Age of Extremes” of the 20th century, the Korean War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the early 21st century have forced us into having quite an extreme perspective¹ on many issues. Korean people suffered the tragedy of a fratricidal war during the Cold War and are still enduring the extreme conditions that result from living in a divided nation. Given the history of Korea, Korean people are apt to see things in black or white: it is either “me or you,” you are either “a friend or an enemy.” This extreme point of view arose out of a survival instinct, and it is what has stopped Korean people from considering various viewpoints under the framework of “us.” Moreover, as the United States—South Korea’s ally—declared its war on terror, defining North Korea along with Iraq and Iran as part of its “axis of evil,” our views toward the North have once again swung to the extreme.

Duality of Structure: A Strong Sense of Independence and Competition to Expand Influence from Four Surrounding Nations

“Duality of Structure” means that Korea unification is a matter that involves both Koreans and the international community, and a matter of maintaining or disrupting the status quo. It also implies the dual reality of North Korea being regarded as both a threat to the South’s security and a partner in unification.

Issues on the Korean Peninsula always become international

¹Michael Howard, translated by An Do Whan, *Invention of Peace* (Seoul: Jontong Gua Hyundae, 2002), p. 109; John Lewis Gaddis, translated by Kang Kyu Hyung, *The Shock of 9/11 and the US Grand Strategy* (Seoul: Seoul Publishing House, 2004), p. 158; Joseph S. Nye, Jr. translated by Hong Su Won, *Soft Power* (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 2004).

matters with the four surrounding nations' conflicts of interest often taking center stage, despite the fact they are Korean problems that should seemingly be handled by Koreans. From the perspective of Koreans themselves, issues on the Peninsula include such items as making Korea an "economic hub in Northeast Asia" and a "global hub" in the 21st century by transforming the nation into an independent and unified country after belatedly building a modern nation-state. Interestingly, these are tasks that were undertaken by almost all other nations during the 19th century.

Four countries have major interests in the unification of the Korean Peninsula and continually exert their influence over Korea as a way to reorganize the order of Northeast Asia and achieve their respective goals: the United States²—to keep its super power status in the 21st century; China³—to secure the groundwork for becoming a socialist powerhouse and maintaining regional hegemony in the 21st century; Japan⁴—to lay the basis for becoming the world's big power in the 21st century; and Russia—to reemerge as a big power by developing Siberia.

In addition, unification has a dual characteristic in that it involves two conflicting aspects at the same time: keeping the status quo to maintain the security of 45 million South Koreans, and destroying that balance to pursue peace and coprosperity for 75 million Koreans. Peacekeeping should be a priority over peacemaking as the former is based on firm security; peace making, which is based

²Walter Russel Mead, *Special Providence* (New York: Routledge, 2002); Henry Kissinger, *Does America need a Foreign Policy* (New York: Touchstone, 2002); Zbigniew Brzezinski, translated by Kim Myung Sup, *The Grand Chessboard* (Seoul: Samin, 2001); Samuel P. Huntington, translated by Lee Hee Jae, *Clash of Civilization* (Seoul: Kim Young Sa, 1997).

³Yeats Chung, translated by Lee Woo Jae, *China's Global Strategy* (Seoul: 21 Century Books, 2005).

⁴Yasuhiro Nakasone, translated by Park Chul Hee and O Young Whan, *Japan's National Strategy for the 21st Century* (Seoul: Sigongsa, 2001).

on reconciliation and cooperation, must be sought after in parallel.

It should be made clear that the South sees the North both as a partner for unification and an ideological competitor posing a threat to a free democracy. Of course, the North deleted the 5th clause on unification⁵ that detailed communizing South Korea in its revision of its old Constitution on April 9, 1992. Even so, the North inserted a new clause in the 11th article⁶ on how the Worker's party plans to "direct" the country. Accordingly, the North, a "great leader party-state regime," has stipulated the communization of South Korea⁷ in the preamble of the Rules of the party, indicating that national direction is changeable on the orders of the great leader.⁸ We should also keep in mind that "liberation children"—those who were born in the year of liberation—will turn 61—and that today's residents in the North regard the country as its nation not because they opt for communism but simply because they were born in a communist country. In fact, they account for 90 percent of the North's residents.

⁵The 5th article of Socialist Constitution (1972.12.27. revised), "The DPRK shall strive to achieve the complete victory of socialism in the northern half of Korea and reunify the country on the principle of independence and peaceful reunification based on democratic foundation by excluding outside forces," *Outline of North Korea 90* (Seoul: KINU, 1990.) p. 483.

⁶The 11th clause of the revised constitution (1992.4.9), "DPRK shall launch activities under the direction of the Worker's Party," *Outline of North Korea 2004* (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2004), p. 482.

⁷Rules of the Worker's Party (1980.10.13. revised), "The immediate goal of the Worker's Party is to achieve the complete victory of socialism in the northern half of Korea, national liberation and communization of South Korea. The ultimate goal of the party is to spread Juche ideology to every part of society and build a communist society," *Outline of North Korea 2004*, pp. 504-505.

⁸Jang Suk, *Study on General Kim Jong Il's National Unification* (Pyongyang: Pyongyang Publishing House, 2002); Kim Jae Ho, *Kim Jong Il's Strategy to Build a Strong and Rich Nation* (Pyongyang: Pyongyang Publishing House, 2000); Kim Chul Woo, *General Kim Jong Il's Military First Politics* (Pyongyang: Pyongyang Publishing House, 2000).

Analyzing Attitudes: Balance, Independence, The Future

Fierce debate over how to view North Korea and how to find ways to reconcile the two Koreas has been intense in South Korea since the June 15th Inter-Korean Joint Statement in 2000. At the same time, conflicts of interest among various countries, including the United States and North Korea, in the course of restructuring Northeast Asia have led to a deepening crisis on the Korean Peninsula (although they could be viewed as transitional pain in the seeking of a new agreement or order). With what attitude, then, should we view unification issues, and how should we solve them? Recognizing the intrinsic aspect of duality in circumstance and structure, we should strive to find an answer by embracing a balanced view.

A Balanced View

A balanced perspective, “not turning to the right hand or to the left”⁹ is required. Bearing in mind that unification issues are structural problems created out of a 60-year separation, extreme stances leaning to the far right or far left are not helpful at all in solving the issues. Conservatives and liberals should forge an agreement framework with mutual respect in order to put an end to the ever-growing vicious circle of confrontation and conflict perpetuated by the two extremes. As our creator gives us two eyes, we should look at both the right and left sides with both eyes. Seeing things with only one eye lacks perspective and the ability to see things three dimensionally. The same goes for North Korea and unification issues.

Despite the end of the Cold War in the 20th century, a post-Cold War has opened in the 21st century with the world’s center stage shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific; however, the Korean Peninsula still remains in the shadow of the Cold War era regardless

⁹ *Old Testament*, Joshua 1:7.

of these changes. In order to take a leap forward, development in the 21st century should reach beyond the anachronistic Cold War view and also refrain from a post-Cold War attitude that totally ignores the current situation. At the same time, however, we should deal with unification issues in line with historical trends and national missions.

Independent Thinking

As mentioned earlier, issues on the Korean Peninsula are both national and international ones, and as such, demand an independent way of thinking on the part of Koreans. International pressures and intervention will grow if the two Koreas fail to solve unification issues independently. As a result, the chances that unification will go against the national will can't be ruled out. North Korea insists on realizing unification "by ourselves," citing "national cooperation," as stipulated in the first clause of the 6-15 Joint Statement. The communist country has also continued to argue that "genuine national cooperation" means to push aside cooperation with foreign countries and address national issues based on national independence.¹⁰ An attitude that puts excessive emphasis on "Koreans first" overlooks the international aspect of unification issues. Therefore, we should seek a peaceful solution to unification by building cooperation not only with the North, but with the surrounding four countries.

In this sense, it is desirable to not choose between national cooperation and US-ROK cooperation, but to develop inter-Korean and US-ROK cooperation into complementary relations rather than confrontational ones. In other words, we can hardly accept the North's idea of national cooperation.¹¹ In addition, since US-ROK coor-

¹⁰ Sim Byung Chul, *One hundred Questions and Answers on National Unification* (Pyongyang: Pyongyang Publishing House, 2003), pp. 169-170.

¹¹ The North, in a New Year's editorial in 2005, suggested "three cooperative tasks" in national cooperation: abolish ROK-US-Japan cooperation with "national and independent cooperation"; address the withdrawal of the United States Forces in

dination is not appropriate in that Koreans may repeat a pattern of blindly following the United States, a new approach such as US-ROK cooperation is needed. We should not make the mistake of emphasizing one thing over the other between “national cooperation” and “outside cooperation” (US-ROK). Pursuing both attitudes in parallel should be openly suggested. Although inter-Korean cooperation comes above international cooperation (US-ROK) from the perspective of values, putting US-ROK cooperation above inter-Korean cooperation in the process of solving problems is potentially a better strategy.

A Future-oriented View

Clearly, a future-oriented view is required. Looking back on world history centering on the ocean, global civilization has moved westward. The middle ages from the 4th to 14th century evolved around the Mediterranean Sea. The modern era from the mid 16th century to 20th century following the renaissance and religious reformation is a time when civilization blossomed. In the 21st century, a new era of civilization has opened up, this time centered around the Pacific. In other words, the total amount of trade among Pacific countries started to exceed that of Atlantic nations in 1996. The Korean Peninsula was under control of the continental forces when the continent was strong, and became a subject state (colony of Japan) when the Pacific powers were dominant. When the continent and ocean confronted each other, the Korean Peninsula fell to a divided nation (the outcome of the showdown between the United States, Japan, and China, and the

Korea (USFK) and North Korea’s nuclear issues with “anti-war cooperation”; expand inter-Korea economic cooperation for “national coprosperity and benefits” by “patriotic cooperation for unification.” “Enhance the power of military policy by strongly uniting the whole party: Military and the people,” *Rodong Newspaper*, Jan. 1, 2005; Kang Choong Hee, *Three Projects for National Unification* (Pyongyang: Pyongyang Publishing House, 2005).

Soviet Union).

Therefore, Koreans in the Pacific era in the 21st century should no longer be caught between the continent and the ocean. Like the “Roman Empire,” a peninsula that led Europe and Africa centering on the Mediterranean Sea, Koreans should not only address peninsular issues through conciliation and peace, but also tackle unification issues with a determination to contribute to the peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia and the further development of humankind.

Subject of Analysis: Division of Korean Peninsula

How, then, did Korea become a separated state—a division that still grips the Korean people even in the 21st century? The division of the Peninsula was formed by three stages and a combination of three phases.

Territorial Division: The Formation of Hostile Dual Triangle Relations

In the 1st stage of the division, US and Soviet Union forces occupied South and North Korea, respectively, along the 38th parallel on August 15, 1945. On the international front, southern triangular relations of free countries consisting of the United States, Japan, and South Korea; and northern triangular relations of communist countries consisting of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, were formed, due to the ideological and military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the Korean War. As a result, a Cold War style structure of division, with dual triangular relations, was created. Accordingly, overcoming a state of division at this level means transformation from bilateral alliances and ideological confrontation to bilateral relations among the six nations and a multilateral regional security regime. Since South Korea

established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China in 1990 and 1992, respectively, now is the time to focus on normalizing North Korea's relations with the United States and Japan, and reorganizing the ROK-US, and DPRK, China and Russia alliance.

Regime Division: The Establishment of an Armistice Regime

In the 2nd stage of the division, a “regime (sovereignty/government)” was implemented. The Republic of Korea was established on August 15, 1948 and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on September 9. From the perspective of inter-Korean relations, Cold War relations of military confrontation characterized by an armistice, arms race, and state of truce were built due to the Korean War, the establishment of an enemy government, and several provocative acts. Therefore, overcoming the division at this level meant a shift from unification by absorption or force and communization through political/military conciliation/cooperation to new relations based on peaceful coexistence and unification by agreement. Implementing this task is a major element of the agenda to solve the state of division since South and North Korea already agreed to the July 4th Joint Statement in 1972, the Basic Framework of Inter-Korean Agreement in 1991, and the Inter-Korean Joint Statement in 2000.

Divided Minds: Confrontations between the “Enemy” and “Sworn Enemy”

Following the three-year-long war initiated by the North on June 25, 1950, the 3rd phase, “divisions of the mind (people/heart)” began. As such, at the national level, a Cold War-style ideological showdown—characterized by South Korea's National Security Law and anti-communist education, and North Korea's Criminal Law and ideological education—was strengthened. Accordingly, overcoming the division at this level means to seek diverse ways to restore unity by

developing a system where the two Koreas can accept each other and by implementing peace education. In other words, a system should be implemented in which laws and institutions are revised or abolished, peace education is offered, and the pain of separated families in the two Koreas is relieved.

At the personal level, seeing the other party as one's "enemy" or "sworn enemy" has been the prevalent way of looking at these matters in Korea. In this sense, overcoming the division means cultivating a sense of "partnership," that is, building a unified Korea by restoring mutual trust for ordinary citizens. Holding summit talks among trusted top decision makers is also vital to this process.

After enduring the three-stage division process, South and North Korea have continually repeated a cycle of conflict and self-inflicted wounds. North Korea has become a "lost land to be restored" for South Korea, while South Korea has become an "object for complete revolution" for North Korea. In the South, the "Yushin order," under the national slogan of anti-communism and authoritarian capitalism, has been intensified while in the North the "sole system or great leader socialism" based on *Juche* ideology has been consolidated. As a result, "hostile interdependence" was created and has taken root in inter-Korean relations. Thus, separation on the Korean Peninsula led by international political powers has resulted in physiological hostility due to the power game between the two Koreas and resultant fratricidal conflict, with the division only deepening owing to the political needs of both South and North Korea. Therefore, tiding over the division means addressing separation at the territorial, institutional, and individual level as a way to institutionalize peace and cooperation in Korea and lay the groundwork for peaceful unification.

Former President Kim Dae Jung pronounced three unification principles: non-acceptance of military provocation; excluding unification by absorption; and actively promoting inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. Issues involving the Korean Peninsula will have to

be solved through unification by agreement while going through various stages. Where then do we stand in the course of achieving unification by agreement? To grasp this, Table 1 shows the changing circumstances on the Korean Peninsula, specifying the documents of each stage, the characteristics of each regime, and the stage of peace building and unification. The landscape surrounding the Korean Peninsula can experience the following stages: conflictive coexistence,¹² competitive coexistence,¹³ cooperative coexistence,¹⁴ inter-Korean confederation, and unified Korea.¹⁵

¹² Conflictive coexistence means transitional circumstances keeping relations by balance of power. This comes as full-scale confrontation in every aspect including ideology, politics, military, economy, society, and culture, and is intended to deny the other party's existence. From the Korean War to the early 1990s, South and North Korea have maintained conflictive coexistence.

¹³ Competitive coexistence means circumstances where two parties agree to a non-aggression treaty or an expression equal to that. Subsequently, a substantive guarantee device is set up to maintain the coexistence while there is a lack of active cooperation between the two parties. Under this circumstance, there is limited exchange and cooperation in economy, society, and culture, while the state of confrontation remains unresolved in terms of politics, military, and ideology.

¹⁴ Under cooperative coexistence, two nations with independent political systems set a joint goal for achieving coprosperity. To this end, they actively cooperate with each other under interdependent relations. Namely, despite ideological differences, the two sides cooperate and exchange with each other in full swing in the areas of economy, society, and culture, and even cooperate in the areas of military and politics.

¹⁵ Moon-Young Huh, *North Korea's Stance on Dismantling Cold War Structure in the Korea Peninsular and South Korea's Policy Direction* (Seoul: KINU, 1999), pp. 5-11.

Table 1. Five Stages of Peaceful Unification

Stage Division	Conflictive Coexistence	Competitive Coexistence	Cooperative Coexistence	Con- federation	Unified Korea
Specified Document	Armistice Treaty	Inter-Korean Basic Agreement	Peace Treaty	National Charter	Unification Constitution
Regime Characteristics	Armistice Regime	Basic Agreement Regime	Peace Regime	De facto Unification	Unification
Peace and Unification Stage	Peace Keeping	Peace Making	Unification Making	Integration Building	Unification Completion

How Far Have We Come? From Conflictive Coexistence to Cooperative Coexistence

Territorial Integration: From Cold War Alliance to Post-Cold War Alliance

The Outcome: Easing Dual Triangular Confrontation and Securing the Two Koreas to the Status of Parties Concerned

Internationally, the Cold War order that caused Korea's division has collapsed since the world's order has shifted from a bi-polar to a single or multi-polar structure. During the Cold War, the international community was dominated by the US-led free camp and the Soviet Union-led communist camp. From the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc in the 1990s, the global community, while still led mainly by the United States, changed to a system where the European Union, China, Japan, Russia and others cooperate with and compete against each other in the fields of politics and economy, and science and technology. Consequently, military and security confrontation centering on ideology has shifted into competition centering on economy, and science and technology. In other words, amid the shift

from the industrial era to the information era, countries have competed to create high quality goods and services while intensifying mutual cooperation centered on certain regional blocks. In addition, non-traditional threats, including terrorism, guerrilla conflicts, and intelligence wars, have amplified. Terrorist attacks on the US Pentagon and the World Trade Center (WTC) on September 11, 2001 are examples of this trend. Such an international order in the post-Cold War era has posed hardship and threats to North Korea that were unimaginable in the Cold War era. In particular, the North—that had relied on socialist countries during the Cold War—suffered a setback both economically and diplomatically with China and Russia’s integration of capitalist systems. The North, albeit unprepared, must now cope with the abrupt shift to trade based on international market prices and hard currency settlement from past practices of prices favoring socialist countries and clearing settlement.

Consequently, at the regional level in Northeast Asia, the Cold War structure has eased to a certain extent. Best of all, once strong dual triangular confrontation has weakened. The East Asia order in the Cold War was in a confrontational mode with dual triangular relations: an opposition between northern triangular relations covering the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea; and southern triangular relations involving the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Since the 1990s, the northern triangle has been considerably diluted due to diplomatic ties established between South Korea and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (1990), South Korea and China (1992), the breakup of the Soviet Union (1991), and the death of President Kim Il Sung (1994). The South Korea government’s “northern diplomacy,” promoted since the late 1980s, has significantly contributed to this development. Moreover, East Asia countries have changed from hostile competition to conciliatory and/or cooperative competitive relations with each other. The four countries surrounding the Korean Peninsula strategically cooperate in some areas and

compete in others whilst consenting that regional order should be stable. In particular, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, cooperative relations rather than conflicts have been shown through the formation of anti-terrorism coalitions. Amid these trends, the security order of East Asia today has been influenced mainly by the United States, with China, Japan, and Russia exerting the most influence in politics, economics, and military to a certain extent. In the meantime, Japan and China have enhanced their national status while Russia is trying to restore its diminished influence.

From the perspective of Korea, South and North Korea tried to reclaim their lost status as parties concerned in solving Korean issues through three rounds of inter-Korean talks. The two Koreas, amid the US-China détente in the 1970s, attempted to open inter-Korean talks. With the firm Cold War structure of East Asia in dual triangular confrontation, however, the two Koreas used inter-Korean talks to strengthen their regime rather than as a means of overcoming the confrontational makeup by forming the “Yushin order” in the South and the “sole system” in the North. In the 1990s, South and North Korea resumed bilateral talks in a post-Cold War atmosphere. Eight rounds of high ranking inter-Korean meetings led to the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, the Additional Agreement, and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Suspicion over the North’s development of plutonium nuclear weapons, however, stopped further advancement. With Cold War confrontation dismantling internationally due to the break-up of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe’s socialist bloc, weakening dual confrontation in East Asia was not easy to accomplish. Since 2000, South and North Korea have recommitted themselves to improving bilateral ties “delayed by ten years” through the opening of inter-Korean talks from summit talks and through the June 15th Inter-Korean Joint Declaration in June 2000. Of course, this time the North’s nuclear issue was mainly sparked by HEU weapons

development. Seoul, however, has addressed “nuclear issues” and “inter-Korean exchange and cooperation,” not by linking the two but, by placing them side-by-side based on its improved national power. As a result, inter-Korean dialogue and relations have progressed continuously despite occasional ups and downs.

In any case, the summit talks have helped the two Koreas restore their status as parties concerned in the issues of the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, a turning point was made to transform an unstable regional order in East Asia into one based on conciliation, cooperation, peace, and prosperity. For all that the post-Cold War and the 21st century opened, in Northeast Asia, prior to the inter-Korean summit, the potential showdown between South and North Korea, and the United States and China worsened following the North’s launch of a Taepodong missile (August 31, 1998), its military engagement in Yunpyong Sea (June 1999), and competition to gain influence over the Korean Peninsula quietly continued. In this environment, South and North Korea were expected to agree to improve bilateral ties, help the North become part of the international community, and address WMDs gradually. The four surrounding nations, namely the United States, Japan, China, and Russia, vigorously welcomed the stabilization of the Korean Peninsula but were concerned about the sudden breakup of the status quo. In particular, China actively supported the development since it could reduce its economic assistance to the North and create conditions for developing three regions where three important palaces are located; the Clinton Administration held summit talks through exchanges with high-level officials from the United States and North Korea and almost agreed to and signed a missile treaty. Accordingly, at the national level, territorial integration has not yet made much progress.

Task: Delaying the North's Diplomatic Ties with the United States and Japan and Forming New Northern Triangular Relations

US-ROK Friction and the Failure to Form a Peace Regime

Lack of progress in normalizing the North's diplomatic ties with the United States and Japan has been a stumbling block to overcoming the territorial division. Since Kim Jong Il, head of the North's National Defense Committee in September 1998, was inaugurated, the North has actively sought to establish better ties¹⁶ with foreign nations under its vision of building a strong and powerful nation. Since the inter-Korean summit, US-DPRK ties have progressed significantly, with the North making a breakthrough in bilateral ties through a visit by Jo Myong Rok, head of the military's General Political Bureau, to the United States (Oct. 8-12, 2000), and US Secretary of State Madeline Albright's visit to the North (Oct. 23-25). However, then presidential candidate George W. Bush's victory canceled Clinton's visit to the North, pushing the issue of better bilateral ties back to square one. Indeed, from the time the Republican Party took control in January 2001, the atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula has chilled considerably. On top of this, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the first ever intrusion onto US territory, have led to a more stern policy toward the North and an aggravated situation on the Korean Peninsula.

In response, the North has tried to stabilize conditions on the Korean Peninsula to improve inter-Korean relations ever since then special envoy to South Korea Lim Dong Won's visit in 2002 (April 3-5). North Korea has also internally initiated its own style of reforms and open door measures by introducing the "7.1 Economic Adjustment Measures" and developing the "Sinuiju special economic zone (Sept. 12)," while also attempting to promote ties with Japan by

¹⁶Moon-Young Huh, *Characteristics of North Korea's Diplomacy and Possibility for Chang* (Seoul: KINU, 2001); Chun Hyun Joon et al., *The Guideline for Understanding North Korea* (Seoul: Pakyungsa, 2005), pp. 311-326.

holding summit talks. Chairman Kim announced a four-point Pyongyang declaration after a summit meeting with his Japanese counterpart Prime Minister Koizumi (Sept. 17, 2002). Such reform/open door measures failed in the wake of special envoy to the United States James Kelly's visit to the North (Oct. 2002), with his questions over development of HEU nuclear weapons and the arrest of China's Yang Bin (head of Sinuiju special economic zone) on October 4, 2002. Against this backdrop, the North has tried to restore relations with its former ally Russia since 2001, holding a summit meeting between Chairman Kim and Vladimir Putin. North Korea has also reacted to the tough policy of the United States by forming new northern triangular ties—in particular, strengthening relations with its ally China. As seen in the arrest of Yang Bin, the North and China maintain a high-level of military alliance although they have been somewhat lowered¹⁷ from their former “blood alliance” to “traditional friendly and cooperative ties.” In addition, North Korea has maintained a considerable level of amicable relations with Russia.

The South's government's conflicts with the United States stand in the way of effectively addressing the territorial division. The government in Seoul, while going through the Government of the People and the Participatory Government, has had friction with the Bush Administration over the US-ROK alliance and the USFK. In particular, the participatory government has faced discord with the Bush Administration over coordinating the US-ROK military relationship pending such issues as financial matters (including defense cost sharing with the United States), the firing of the Korean Service Corps [KSC] in the USFK and WRSA-K, and matters of trust that include sending Korea troops to Iraq and reductions in the numbers of the US troops based on Korea. In addition, the USFK's “strategic flexibility” and the participatory government's theory of

¹⁷ *Joongang Ilbo*, Sept. 21, 2005.

“a balancer in Northeast Asia” ran against each other. As well, Korea and the United States demonstrated fissure in traditional coordination among the United States, Korea and Japan toward the North by disagreeing on policies toward the North (nuclear issues, defector and human rights issues, the Kim Jong Il regime, a joint US-South Korean contingency plan, codenamed Operation 5029). Such a series of incidents revealed that dissolving the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula and creating a peace regime would not be easy.

Regime Unification

Outcome: Paradigm Shift and Progress in Inter-Korean Dialogue, Exchange, and Cooperation

The unification policies of the two Koreas resulted first in war, then in military engagement, then in talks and a conciliatory atmosphere, and ultimately in summit talks between the top leaders of the two countries. Let us look at changes in the unification policy of Korea. The policy can mainly be divided into three periods according to the attitudes of the North Korean regime. The first period,¹⁸ from separation to the 1960s, was to realize unification by the UN on the assumption of hostile relations between the two Koreas. The second period, from the 7-4 Inter-Korean Joint Statement in the 1970s to the 1990s, focused on creating conditions for unification and national development under the premise of establishing competitive relations between the two Koreas. The third period, from the June 15th Inter-Korean Joint Statement in 2000 up to now has concentrated on realizing independent unification and national prosperity based on inter-Korean cooperative ties. Changes in the North's unification

¹⁸ Moon-Young Huh, “North and South Korea's Peace Strategy,” *Korea Peace Strategy* (Seoul: KINU, 2000), pp. 52-60.

policy can be divided into largely two or six periods¹⁹ according to the conditions of each revolutionary force (the international, North Korea, and South Korea revolutionary forces), and the leadership's view toward the current situation. The first phase attempted to materialize unification by force based on a "revolutionary democratic base" (1945-53); the second proposed peaceful unification based on a "two method theory" (1954-61); the third approached revolutionary unification based on the Three Principles of National Unification and the Five General Principles of National Unification (1961-79); the fourth advanced propaganda for federated unification based on Ways to Establish a Democratic Confederate Republic of Koryo (1980-87); the fifth pursued coexistence unification based on the Ten General Principles of National Solidarity (1988-1997); and the sixth sought coexistence unification based on The Three Charters for National Unification²⁰ (1998-now). From a strategic perspective, the North's unification strategy has shifted from "revolutionary unification" to "coexistence unification to maintain the regime."

The interactions of both Koreas in terms of unification goals and policies have led to the following changes in inter-Korean relations. Politically, inter-Korean talks saw great progress, including the holding of an inter-Korean summit and various meetings. The historic summit (June 13-15, 2000) provided a chance to shift the paradigm of inter-Korean relations from conflict and confrontation to cooperative coexistence. The fact that top leaders from the two sides met and spoke together marked a historic milestone in the 55-year separation of the country. Both Koreas have held more than 500 rounds of talks since the holding of the first meeting in the 1970s.²¹ Of course, talks were suspended for a long time and there were occasions when meetings

¹⁹ Moon-Young Huh, "North Korea's Unification Policy," Yang Sung Chul et al., *North Korea Foreign Policy* (Seoul: Seoul Press, 1995), pp. 131-172.

²⁰ Jang Suk, *Study on General Kim Jong Il's National Unification*, pp. 79-105.

²¹ *Yonhap News*, Sept. 13, 2005.

showed the limitations of such dialogues when superficial rather than genuine negotiation occurred. In particular, a total of 74 rounds of meetings were held in each field from the launch of the participatory government, and in the process, “a new kind of negotiating culture based on substantive issues” agreed upon by Chairman Kim has been successfully established.²²

Economically, putting three economic cooperative businesses—the Gyeongui (Sinuiju-Seoul) and Donghae (East Coast) Railroad and Road Connection Project, the Mt. Kumgang tourism project, and the Kaesong Industrial Complex project—on track,²³ agreeing to promote a joint anti-flood project for the Imjin river, and adopting a four-point economic agreement have become the basis for achieving co-prosperity of the Korean people.

Socially and culturally,²⁴ exchanges have grown in quality and quantity while civilian level exchanges have been diversified to open a way for regime integration. Not only that, South and North Korea have started to jointly cope with national issues by raising questions over Japan’s distorted textbooks and territorial claims over Tokdo Island and by holding joint academic conferences and exhibitions of Koguryo to counteract China’s inaccurate versions of history. North Korea has also agreed to hold and institutionalize meetings of separated families permanently, despite the fact that the issue is somewhat of a burden to the North. In response, starting from the mid 1990s, the South has expanded and sustained humanitarian aid to the North to encourage stable inter-Korean relations.

Such improved relations have had a positive effect on the North

²²National Policy Briefing, July 4, 2005.

²³Ministry of Unification, “Outcome of Participatory Government’s policy toward the North and Future Prospects,” Aug. 26, 2005.

²⁴Exchange and cooperation in various fields including media, culture, religion, sports, and public health are believed to enhance mutual understanding and levels of trust.

as evidenced in its willingness to change itself voluntarily. North Korea has publicly stated the need for change, making the implementation of a new mindset to ease economic hardship a top priority in building a so-called strong country. The country has also begun to actively join the international community, establishing diplomatic ties with the European Union (EU) and promoting open door activities.

Task: Failure to Ease Military Tension and Continuing the North's Unification Front Strategy

On the military front, however, as seen in the two rounds of military engagement that occurred in the west sea (1999; 2002), progress in easing tension between the two Koreas has not been substantial. The battle which occurred in the west sea demonstrates a lack of flexibility in linking economic exchange and the cooperation policy to conciliation on security issues, despite the argument that the Sunshine Policy is a conciliation and cooperation policy based on strong security. In addition, citizens in Seoul who were overly optimistic about quick changes in North Korea thanks to the theory of "Change in North Korea," were disappointed to learn that Pyongyang had not really changed at all and were doubtful of the justifications of the government's conciliatory and cooperative policy in the wake of the two rounds of fighting. However, progress was made in this area when the two sides agreed to "make efforts to guarantee solid peace" on the Korean Peninsula and "share[d] the view of [the importance of] holding military working level talks" at the 16th Ministerial meeting (Sept. 13-16, 2005, Pyongyang).²⁵ The inter-Korean ministerial meetings, once limited to discussions on economic cooperation and social and cultural exchanges, started to expand into political and military fields.

²⁵National Policy Briefing, *Naver News*, Sept. 16, 2005.

In addition, the unification front operation steadily put forward by the North has posed an obstacle to improving inter-Korean ties and overcoming the regime division. A “national cooperation” theory has been suggested as the latest version of the unification front operation.²⁶ The North uses national cooperation in three different ways. First, it is used to protect the North from US pressure and to resolve security threats. This has been expressed as a policy to put distance between the United States and South Korea,²⁷ and includes an argument for “anti-US activities and withdrawal of the USFK.” Second, it is used to relieve economic hardship by relying on the Seoul government’s assistance and corporate capital and technology. This is put as a 6-15 implementation strategy calling for the “strict carrying out of the June 15th Joint Declaration.” Finally, from the unification front operation perspective, it is used to build a foundation for coexistence and unification by communizing Korea through creating pro-North forces in the South. This shows up as a unification front operation to “abolish the National Security Law and legalize Han Chong Ryun, a pro-North student organization.”²⁸ The fact that the North has attempted to normalize ties with the United States in return for abandoning its nuclear programs at the Six-Party Talks by leading bilateral talks between itself and the United States: energetically leading three big events in inter-Korean relations (June 15; August 15; October 10); and support for the US decision to move troops to Pyongtaek on the sidelines show that pulling the USFK out of Korea has been pushed ahead on the unification front operation level.

Taken together, the relationship between the two Koreas today,

²⁶Choi Ki Whan, *6-15 era and National Cooperation* (Pyongyang: Pyongyang Publishing House, 2004).

²⁷Kang Choong Hee and Won Young Soo, *6-15 Independent Unification Era* (Pyongyang: Pyongyang Publishing House, 2005).

²⁸Moon-Young Huh et al., *Strategy to Stabilize Peace on the Korea Peninsula* (Seoul: KINU, 2003), p. 149.

compared to what it was during the Cold War era, has changed dramatically, with major advancements made. Moreover, since then the inter-Korean summit, dialogue, exchange and cooperation have been considerably promoted. The consistent military confrontation between the two Koreas and the North's unification front operation has made it difficult to see the improvements made in inter-Korean relations as part of the conciliation and cooperation stage. Although the two countries have failed to make it to cooperative coexistence, they have managed to change from conflictive coexistence to competitive coexistence in reaction to changes in the post-Cold War period to overcome regime division.

Unification of Minds

Outcome: Easing the Cold War Mindset

South Koreans had negative attitudes toward the North in the Cold War era mainly due to the Cold War structure of the US-USSR confrontation, the pain of the Korean War, the North's continuous military provocation after the armistice treaty, and anti-communism education.

However, the South's perspective toward the North has changed radically. According to a KINU (1992-2004) survey, views toward the North have changed significantly since the beginning of the post-Cold War era. For instance, more than 80 percent of respondents surveyed in 1992 and 1993 showed positive perceptions toward the North. In addition, right after the summit in 2000, quite a few South Koreans had positive attitudes toward the North. There were even mentions of creating a fan club for Kim Jong Il (KFC). There are specific reasons for such an overwhelmingly positive response. In the early 1990s, wishful thinking seemed to be prevalent among the people in Seoul who wanted to see good progress in the future following the positive outcome that showed up in the post-Cold War atmosphere, including

the adoption of the Basic Agreement and the Additional Agreement. South Koreans, following the summit in 2000, were believed to be more positive in relation to the North out of their wish to end hostile relations and open an era of unification at the threshold of a new century.

The positive opinions of South Koreans can either be seen as striking a balance or being “broken up” according to how one views that matter. Since 1994, attitudes toward the North haven’t led to one side over the other moving from 6:4 to 4:6.²⁹ Accordingly, if society generally respects other views and opinions, the figure can be evaluated as a balance between the right and left. As South Korean society lacks tolerance in relation to other opinions, and extreme confrontation is prevalent, the result shows that the society is divided.³⁰ In any case, the post-Cold War following the breakup of the Soviet Union and communist bloc of eastern Europe; the conciliatory and cooperative policy of the 6th republic and various kinds of discussions; and active participation from the public, has contributed to the balanced view or, to put it differently, the “division” of society. However, follow-up measures of the inter-Korean summit in June of 2000 and several talks and projects including the Gyeongui and Donghae Railroad and Road Project have taken the post-Cold War establishment aback, shaking their sense of identity.

On the other hand, obtaining objective statistical data—i.e. North residents’ views toward the people in the South—is very difficult. However, it seems reasonable to assert that their perceptions toward the South, very negative during the Cold War, are changing

²⁹ Park Hyeong-Jung et al., *Engagement Policy toward the North and Ways to Create Conditions to Accept it in Domestic Politics* (Seoul: KINU, 2000), pp. 149-154.

³⁰ Moon-Young Huh, “How do we view North Korea? Is the country a partner for peaceful unification or an ideological enemy?” *Conditions for Korea Peace and Prosperity*, Doerae Research Institute Symposium Study Collection, Mar. 8, 2003, pp. 23-25.

gradually thanks to various kinds of aid and economic cooperative projects and exchanges after the summit in 2000. Of course, authorities in Pyongyang are known to control their residents through ideological education. According to defectors from the North, residents that heard about food and fertilizer assistance from the South secretly remarked that “compatriots are the only ones that we can trust” and began to realize that South Korea is better off.³¹

Task: Deepening Divided Opinion (South-South Conflict) and Ideological Patterns of Thinking

It is true that the division of public opinion has been worsening over policies toward the North, the unification formula, and US-ROK relations. For example, contentious issues include reciprocity,³² speed-adjustment,³³ and assistance to the North,³⁴ and conflicts have deepened since the 6-15 Joint Statement over a unification formula³⁵

³¹ Interview with North Korean defectors, Oct. 12, 2004.

³² Conservatives argue for thorough reciprocity or mechanical reciprocity based on a “tit-for-tat” method: treating others how I have been treated. Liberals insist on flexible reciprocity: a party in a superior position makes concessions first, “pre-emptive concessions,” to relieve the other party and to elicit concessions later. In short, conciliation between the two Koreas can be triggered by “grit effect,” a negotiating term to ease tensions gradually.

³³ Conservatives believe that military threat from the North and its intention to invade the South still exist. Accordingly they insist on keeping the basic framework of the National Security Law and military power in tact, not being swayed by a conciliatory mood on the surface, and taking time and gradual steps to form national consensus and mutual trust. On the other hand, liberals view US-Korea combined forces as a military threat to North Korea. They say that compared to military expenditure and combat capability, the North is in a weaker position and believe that conciliatory works in the South and North are belatedly occurring.

³⁴ The conservative camp argues that it is a wrong policy to continue “unilateral aid” to the North despite the difficult situation in Seoul without general public agreement. The liberal camp emphasizes that aid to the North is morally right considering the country’s hardships. Realistically, it retorts that aid can not only serve to cut down on the cost of keeping peace by reducing tension, but can also reduce unification costs in the future.

³⁵ Conservatives see the possibility that the independent sovereignty of South Korea

and USFK issues. The conflict over policy toward the North adding to existing ruling· opposition/ideological/regional conflict is believed to have aggravated the divisions in the South's society.

Continuing ideological patterns of thinking is considered a problem in North Korea. The leadership's pursuit of communization of the Korean Peninsula, residents' anti-imperial and anti-United States mindset, and fears about unification led by the South,³⁶ are such examples. According to defectors,³⁷ residents in the North also long for unification due to acute economic difficulties, and consider unification with the South as a cure-all for their hardships. North Koreans have even gone as far as saying that they hope the Korean Peninsula is broken by war if unification fails. Of course, unification in that case is led by North Korea. This extreme mindset comes from North residents' belief that they would be executed if the South unifies the Korean Peninsula by absorption. They who experienced the dictatorship of the proletariat have no other choice but to imagine unification led by the South as dictatorship of the bourgeois. Moreover, North residents have been wrongly informed by the authorities that East German people were killed at the time of unification and that even today they are treated as second class citizens.

will be in danger. They believe a unification formula could ultimately come down to a Koryo federation offered by the late president Kim Il Sung as a "low level of federation" that is based on a high level federation. In response, liberals think that a "low level federation" is similar to the South's inter-Korean confederation, thus a proposal worth researching. They stress that the 2nd clause of the 6-15 Joint Statement doesn't mean going right to the federated system, but rather finding common ground between the low level federation and inter-Korean confederation as a transitional nature of unification.

³⁶ Interview with North Korean defectors, Sept. 15, 2005.

³⁷ Interview with North Korean defectors, Sept. 14, 2005.

What, Then, Is To Be Done?

What should we do? We should at the very least prevent a re-occurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula. War does nobody any good. If possible, we should expand peace, and then national capacity, to realize unification. Let us now look at basic directions and detailed action plans.

Basic Directions: Establishing “Peace in Korea”

First, let us build “Peace in Korea.” To this end, philosophy and strategy on peaceful unification need to be re-established and worked on steadily. “Peace in Korea” not only helps us to get over the inherent duality of circumstances and structure of the Korean Peninsula, but also creates peaceful relations with the four surrounding nations and gives greater hope to society. To achieve this, a unification philosophy and peace strategy based on balanced perceptions and tolerance need to be drawn up. A unification philosophy and vision that encourages pluralism, coexistence and reconciliation, and peace, and moves both to establish rational security and build cooperative relations with the four neighbors, are the South government and citizens’ responsibility in the course of exchange and cooperation. Along these lines, a new way of pursuing unification not yet experienced by humanity should be presented.³⁸

Second, “forgive but don’t forget.” We should no longer hold on to the hatred, anger, and grievances that resulted from the Korean War and the history of conflict between the two Koreas. That being said, the reasons and background of this painful history should not be forgotten in order to prevent repetition of these events. In this context,

³⁸ This doesn’t mean unification by force as seen in communized Vietnam or unification by absorption as seen in capitalist Germany, but creative unification based on agreement.

it is better to take conservative views on the North's situation and its unification strategy toward the South, while taking on a new set of views in our responses to the North. It would also be more effective to take a goal-oriented attitude on how to realize an "ideal Korea" in a peaceful and democratic way, rather than concentrating on old practices, by analyzing the intentions of North Korea. Even though the North uses inter-Korean reconciliation and exchange and cooperation as a tool to achieve its unification front operation and North-style unification, we, South Koreans, should never give up our goal of conciliation and cooperation, as it is the only way to achieve national survival and prosperity at this current stage.

Third, the three pillars: international (US-ROK) relations, inter-Korean cooperation, and national harmony, which need to be developed, should be prioritized. Recent discussions over the North's nuclear problems and Korean peninsular issues are handled on the level of international or inter-Korean relations. Smooth solutions for those issues are not likely without enhancing national harmony and raising public awareness. Only if we are fully capable, developing the three pillars in parallel is very desirable. If our capacities are not sufficient, putting national harmony first, developing foreign relations (ROK-US) second, and improving inter-Korean relations later, in that order, is desirable. This is because resolving South-South conflict and achieving national harmony should come first to both help maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula and encourage the North's efforts to change. Policy toward the North without public support can stop, leading to confusion in the process of stabilizing peace on the Korean Peninsula and realizing peaceful unification. Accordingly, the government should fully consider the order of the three pillars in the course of pushing ahead with its unification policy. Recognizing that inter-Korean relations are unlikely to make big progress without US-ROK cooperation, policy coordination with the United States in advance is a good idea. At the same time, the government should

secure the neutrality of its government policy toward the North while building bipartisan cooperation in Seoul.³⁹

Detailed Action Plan: Rainbow Strategy

Mongolians call Korea “solongus,” meaning a “country of rainbows.” When I heard this, I was moved, because it conjured for me a vision of the “red” of the North, the “blue” of the South and the traditional multicolored jackets worn by our ancestors, all at the same time. According to the Bible, a rainbow consisting of seven colors—red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, and purple—is a symbol of “salvation.” These colors desperately need to be restored on the Korean Peninsula in all their glory, so that Koreans can give hope to others as an example of conciliation and coprosperity of cultures not the clash of civilization in the Pacific era of the 21st century.⁴⁰

³⁹ H. J. Kaack, former head of German Internal Department, mentioned two cases regarding bipartisan cooperation. One is the period before unification. Political parties taken to frequent power changes agreed, however, to a grand consent on a unification policy toward Eastern Germany. Accordingly, the Western government and congress made it clear that the subject to support is not the regime but the East Germans. But the West German congress argued that the eastern policy doesn't mean it recognizes countries within Germany, and the western government used opposition from the congress as a major negotiating card in its negotiations with East Germany. The other is the case after unification. The integration process of Germany has been done not by administrative branch, police and intelligence agencies but by various NGOs (social, civic and religious organizations commissioned by the government). Accordingly, since the 1990s, regime integration has gone well while social integration hasn't proceeded as expected. Taken from an interview with me in Korea – German workshop June 30, 2005.

⁴⁰ Rainbow colors can be interpreted in a political and economic aspect. According to international peace advocate John Galtung, blue means a free US style economy centering on market and capital; red a socialist old Soviet Union economy centering on state and power; green a third world economy centering on civil society and discussion; pink a mixed economy as in Canada and Europe; and yellow a mixture of blue and red for the Asian economies of South Korea, Japan, China, and Taiwan. John Galtung, Kang Jong Il et al., *Peace by Peaceful Means* (Seoul: Dulnyouk, 2000), pp. 305-330.

■ **Territorial Integration: Forming a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula based on the Recovery of Trust and Grand Strategy**

First, Korea's grand strategy should be set up by accurately analyzing ever-changing circumstances surrounding East Asia from a geo-political, geo-economic, and geo-cultural point of view in order to realize peace on the Korean Peninsula and peaceful unification, the long-held wish of the Korean people. Amid the shift from the solid dual triangular relations of the Cold War to that of the post-Cold War in East Asia, skepticism over the future of the Kim Jong Il regime started to emerge, with cooperation and checks between the United States and China taking place at the same time. Without Korea's independent efforts, war could break out leading to permanent division, a far cry from unification. The participatory government's Peace and Prosperity Policy is meaningful considering the possibility of deepening ever-growing hegemony in Northeast Asia and the chances of collapse of the cooperation and coexistence order. The participatory government has suffered setbacks in promoting the policy due to resistance to its "over-ambitiousness" from neighboring countries. This resistance includes opposition to the establishment of Korea as a "Northeast Asia hub" from China and Japan; opposition to "independent defense (diplomacy)" from the United States; and disagreement over allowing "thoroughly organized and planned defection" and banning paying tribute to "Kim Il Sung's 10th memorial service" from South Korea. Although the "theory of becoming a "balancer in Northeast Asia" has good intentions, it has not easily garnered support theoretically or realistically.⁴¹ Therefore, we should

⁴¹ Balancer is a diplomatic strategy that Britain adopted to keep balance of power and peace in the 18th century and 19th century under Pax Britannica when it emerged as the world power dominated by five structures, France, Germany, Russia, Australia in continent, and Britain in ocean, due to the industrial revolution and colonial expansion. In a historical and theological context, the balancer theory has the following problems. The direction is right. Structure and timing, however, matter. Currently, East Asia is dominated by six countries (South, North Korea,

draw up a unification policy based on a new grand strategy. The great US strategist Z. Brzezinski argues that the United States should execute a “grand chess board” strategy centering on security to lead the world in the 21st century as a superpower. Further, another strategist, Joseph S. Nye Jr., insists on handling three chess boards (the military chess board in the upper, in the mid, supranational in the lower level, respectively) with “smart power,” a combination of hard power and soft power. I believe the pursuit of hard power, soft power, and spirit power as a grand strategy in the process or after Korea is unified is the key to Korean survival. A unification policy based on such a grand strategy needs to be established.

Second, let us pursue a rainbow strategy and cross balance diplomacy. Rainbow strategy means the building of national power befitting our dignity and ambition and the reorganizing of relations with the United States to become more future-oriented in the 21st century. Based on this, we can draw a larger concentric circle by nurturing close relations with the North and develop ties with the three surrounding countries (China, Japan, and Russia) by employing cross-balance diplomacy. In the process, forgive the pain inflicted on us by those countries without forgetting and forge peaceful relations with them for the future. Therefore, our long-term diplomatic strategy is to build friendly ties with both the United States and China. Passively speaking, this is a situation where Korea shouldn't be forced to choose one over the other when China and the United States confront each other; aggressively speaking, this is a situation where the United States and China can regard a unified Korea as a major ally,

the United States, Japan, China, and Russia) not five nations. Five nation structures come when the two Koreas are united, and the unified Korea is ready to take a role as a balancer. Consider that the defense expenditure of the United States amounts to more than US\$400 billion, Japan US\$44.4 billion (2000), China US\$41.2 billion (2000), Russia \$58.8 billion (2000), and Korea \$14.8 billion (2003). The US defense expenditure is more than that of the rest eight countries combined, and Korea tops the bottom in East Asia.

with traditional friendly and cooperative ties.

Third, to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, the following changes should be made aggressively. In politics, changes should be made from political negotiation to peace negotiation, and in security, from absolute to joint security. In economics, discussions over the economic collapse in the North and the cost incurring from early unification should be shifted to talks on the North's potential for economic recovery and a development strategy for the Korean people. In society, medical and humanitarian aid including food and fertilizer needs to be changed to development assistance for the North's agricultural structure and medical system. In foreign relations, international coordination should be used only in certain issues in order to maintain a large framework for achieving the basic goal of institutionalizing a peace structure. In addition, building a Korea peace regime is closely linked to the changing status of the USFK and the finances of the US-ROK alliance. The USFK issue is connected to USFJ and is of keen interest to China and Russia. Accordingly, a peace treaty should be signed after the realignment of the US-ROK alliance is completed and should be carried out based on sufficient consultation and trust with the United States before and after the signing. The concept of a peace regime should be presented as a system that can contribute to restoring and maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula and as a way to further realize unification. Accordingly, the "permanent peace regime" mentioned in the 9-19 Joint Statement can be viewed as against unification and the term "peace treaty regime" should not be used as it is ambiguous.

■ **For Regime Unification: Full Implementation of the Existing Inter-Korean Agreement⁴²**

First, deepen discussion and research on the Composite State model. To make progress in regime unification, South and North

⁴² 7-4 Joint Statement, Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, and The 6-15 Joint Declaration.

Korea should lay the groundwork for peace and peaceful unification gradually by taking full advantage of the common ground of confederation and low level federation suggested by the South and North, respectively. To this end, the existing unification formula needs to be reviewed and discussed further. Such process can instill a new way of thinking among both Koreas that two different systems can coexist under the framework of a (free) democracy while not sticking to a capitalist-style or socialist-style unification regime. This would help narrow the physiological distance between the two Koreas by closing the gap between justifiability and the feasibility of unification.

Second, develop a unification policy focusing both on conciliatory cooperation and peaceful coexistence based on the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement.⁴³ To this end, an option to expand massive aid to the North to ease the country's economic hardship needs to be reviewed. In return, a call should be made for military leadership in the North to take action to ease tensions so that the basis for peace can be created in the short-term. Additionally, guarantees should be established so that growing economic power cannot lead to increasing military force to communize the Korean Peninsula in the mid- and long-term. In this context, South and North Korea should jointly formulate and push for an "economic development strategy for Koreans" and a "Korea peace plan."

Third, seek a new security policy for North Korea and the Korean Peninsula based on "common security" and "cooperative security."⁴⁴ There are two challenges regarding security issues. One is

⁴³ There was a time when the North actively argued for implementing the inter-Korean basic agreement. "In order to prevent war and guarantee solid peace, an agreement on conciliation, cooperation, nonaggression, and exchange should sincerely be implemented," Kang Sung Choon, *Embodiment of National Unification Philosophy revealed by Great Leader Kim Il Sung* (Pyongyang: Social and Science Publishing House, 1993), p. 72.

⁴⁴ On Man Kum, "Common security, cooperative security and peace keeping troops," Korea Military Academy, *Theory of National Security* (Seoul: Pakyoungsa, 2001), pp. 231-256.

to open a new era for peace and prosperity with the North, a country still clinging to its ideology, and the other is to settle peace in Korea and East Asia by overcoming the military buildup and technological hegemony of the four surrounding countries. This means a shift from a policy based on “absolute security” targeting unilateral security in the other’s territory, to a policy based on “reasonable sufficiency” to keep a proper level of military power and on “reciprocal joint security” to ensure mutual security.⁴⁵ At the same time, multi-diplomacy and cooperative security valuing negotiation and dialogue should be created for the six East Asia nations to resolve security issues transcending national borders. Accordingly, the Six-Party Talks shouldn’t be limited to addressing nuclear programs, but become a venue to build a multinational security consultative body guaranteeing the survival of North Korea and the peace and security of East Asia.

■ **Unity of the Heart: Preparing for Peaceful National Unity and Life after Unification**

First, we must respect diverse public opinions because excessive efforts to garner public consensus regarding policy toward the North run the risk of bringing about a uniform society. In fact, Korean society was overwhelmed by right wing inclinations under previous authoritarian regimes. That’s why a reactionary attitude thinking of uniformity as a yardstick of stability has reared its head as a response to the extreme “right and left polarization” that has shown up under the current democratic government. The direction to head for Korean society is to reach beyond polarization to the “pluralism of the rainbow.” As such, the government should approach inter-Korean dialogue and the Six-Party Talks by humbly accepting the reasonable criticism that emerged after the inter-Korean summit. It is clear that without harmony between governments and the current public,

⁴⁵ Moon-Young Huh, *North Korea’s Relations with China and Russia in the post Cold War Era* (Seoul: KINU, 1993), pp. 120-121.

reconciliation with the North and with anyone else for that matter seems highly unlikely.

Second, the ruling and opposition parties should create national unity by agreeing on a policy framework toward the North and resolving South-South conflict. The ruling party should discard its monopoly over conciliation and cooperation toward the North and garner support from the general public by giving credit to former governments for the outcomes of their conciliatory policies. The opposition party in its part should acknowledge the conciliation and cooperation policy as the appropriate direction for national survival, unification, and prosperity in the 21st century while offering its criticisms where valid.

Third, we should try to relieve fears that residents in the North have regarding unification issues. To this end, assistance, exchange, and cooperation with the North must be expanded and maintained, despite the fact that aid seems to be used to support the military for the short-term. If the North's military is maintained by support from the South, what would they think? After all, they are the ones with whom we will live. Therefore, putting forth efforts to become a lighthouse of hope to North Koreans is the only way to achieve true unity of the heart.

Conclusion

Reflecting on the past 60 years of liberation and separation, Korea was divided at the climax of ideological confrontation in the 20th century and started its modern history with a self-inflicted wound largely caused by foreign countries. While going through several difficulties at home and abroad, inter-Korean relations have developed from competitive coexistence to cooperative coexistence.

The next 10 years are very important. We should hope that we

will not face the tragedy of marking the 70th year anniversary of national separation in 2015. Clearly, the challenges on the road ahead are not easy ones to overcome. Chinese presidents Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin offered their cardinal rule “Do Kwang Yang Whae,” a strategy to develop power in darkness while hiding light, and Hu Jintao suggested China’s peaceful rise and development in response to the “China threat theory” while preparing for the 17th National People’s Congress in 2007, the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 World Expo to be held in Shanghai. Therefore, what would China desire from the Korean Peninsula and East Asia? On the other hand, according to political cyclical theory, the chances that the conservative era in the United States will last at least until 2015 are high. The US national security strategy, while shifting the weight from the European Union, the Middle East, and East Asia to Britain and Japan, has valued the geo-political importance of the Korean Peninsula less.⁴⁶ North Korea has also carefully executed a unification front strategy and federated unification. Two rounds of presidential elections are scheduled for 2007 and 2012 in South Korea.

Let us make the 70th year of national liberation the year for pursuing unification. Why should Koreans unify? One of our ancestors said that it is the duty of Koreans to fulfill the “world’s mission” by realizing unification, citing that Korea’s history is the history of affliction. Indian poet Tagore once prophesized many positive outcomes for Korea, despite the country’s being under the grip of colonial Japan.⁴⁷ To become a lighthouse to the world, we should pursue a policy of Peace in Korea. To this end, at the very least, an agreement that guarantees an inter-Korean conciliation and cooperation framework should be devised and efforts toward national unity should be pursued. We should strive to make Korean society

⁴⁶*International Herald Tribune*, Nov. 18, 2005.

⁴⁷Ham Suk Hun, *Korean History* (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1983).

healthy and prosperous but, at the same time, build a foundation for firmly establishing peace with surrounding countries to ensure Korea's success as a unified nation.