

Prospects for Regional Cooperation on Missile Non-Proliferation in Northeast Asia

Cheon Seongwhun

This paper aims to consider how to foster regional cooperation on missile non-proliferation in Northeast Asia. To do this, it is to shed theoretical and analytical light on the pending problem and to examine the issues faced. The author explains two factors which are of particular importance in generating the perception of mutual interests in cooperation and incentives for achieving it. As two examples in terms of incentives for cooperation, the North Korean nuclear problem and the issue of missile proliferation in Northeast Asia will be presented, in addition to factors to hinder multilateral cooperation. Finally, this paper will present four considerations in developing a regional missile non-proliferation regime: peaceful uses of missile technologies, security assurances, missile disarmament, and missile defense.

After the Cold War ended, a series of long-suppressed divisions have returned to haunt Northeast Asia. Historical distrust, deep-rooted animosity, traditional rivalry, territorial disputes, re-interpretation of history between China and Korea, Japan and Korea, and others, were previously submerged by the superpower confrontation. These divisions have now re-surfaced as sources of renewed tension. As regional countries have achieved rapid economic growth in recent decades, most have strengthened their defensive capabilities. China - the largest military power in the region - has restructured its military to compensate for quantitative losses with qualitative improvements; Japan, as the second largest economy in the world, fields the most advanced military forces in the region; and the United States maintains around 100,000 military personnel in Northeast Asia. There is little sign that military tension on the Korean Peninsula will attenuate. Despite an historic summit meeting in June 2000, North Korea has stubbornly insisted on bilateral military talks with the United States. Consequently, there has been no meaningful progress in reducing military tensions between the two sides. To make matters worse, the North is proclaiming that it has a nuclear deterrent capability.

Compared with Europe, a significantly different geopolitical situation prevails in Northeast Asia. There are divergent political systems and cultures, and considerable variations in the size of population, territory, and the levels of economic and military strength. Furthermore, many inter-state impasses remain unresolved, such as the North-South Korean division, the China-Taiwan issue, and the Japan-Russia territorial dispute. Some bilateral relationships do not even enjoy the full diplomatic normalization that permits a basic level of intergovernmental interaction.

While bilateral relations hold a certain shape, however incomplete, multilateral relations are comparatively far more nascent. There is no intergovernmental consultative mechanism to mediate the wide variety of tensions and conflicts in the region. There is virtually

no multilateral security cooperation at the governmental level and only modest “Track-II” activity. The CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific) only occasionally deals with Northeast Asian security issues and the NEACD (Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue) is largely inactive. The Four-Party Talks initiated by South Korea and the United States in 1996 are long defunct. The Six-Party Talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue offer no guarantee of success, facing a difficult problem and many uncertainties. Although the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) could become a vehicle for Northeast Asian security cooperation, the large number of states, vast geographical areas, and divergent interests of the members dictate that the ARF may be incapable of addressing Northeast Asian issues. The ROK government has proposed a Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) since 1994, but this idea has yet to gain support.

Theory and Practice of Multilateral Cooperation in Northeast Asia

Before considering how to foster regional cooperation on missile non-proliferation in Northeast Asia, it is useful to shed theoretical and analytical light on the pending problem and to examine the issues faced.

Incentives for Cooperation

Cooperation occurs in international relations “when states adjust their policies in a coordinated way, such that each state’s efforts to pursue its interests facilitate rather than hinder the efforts of other states to pursue their own interests.”¹ That is, security

¹ Steve Weber, *Cooperation and Discord in US-Soviet Arms Control* (Princeton:

cooperation takes place when nations recognize the existence of mutual interests in constraining their independent behavior such as arms buildup and proliferation, and consequently eschew independent decision-making and adjust their policies in a mutually coordinated way.

According to Alexander George, there are two factors of particular importance in generating the perception of mutual interests in cooperation and the incentives for achieving it.² These are:

- (1) The perception by a country that it is dependent to some extent on the other countries' behaviors to assure or improve an aspect of its overall security; and
- (2) The judgment that strictly unilateral measures of its own will either not suffice to deal properly with a particular threat to its security posed by the other states or are too expensive or risky to take. In fact, these perceptions and judgments are awareness of *mutual dependence* on each other for security, accompanied by feelings of *vulnerability*. As a result, mutual dependence and vulnerability arouse the perception of mutual interests in, and create the incentives for, cooperation among states.

The concepts of mutual dependence and vulnerability are refined by dissecting the nature of an issue with two criteria. They are (1) the *tightness* of mutual dependence and vulnerability in a particular security issue; and (2) the *centrality* of that issue - i.e., the importance for fundamental security interests.³ The former is similar to a relative security perception in relation to others, while the latter appears to be an absolute security perception with

Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 6.

²Alexander George, "Incentives for US-Soviet security cooperation and mutual adjustment," in A. George, P. Farley and A. Dallin (eds.), *US-Soviet Security Cooperation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 644.

³*Ibid.*, p. 645.

little consideration of others.

If the magnitude of potential damage that a country's action is able to inflict on others is substantial, mutual dependence and vulnerability to each other's action is very *tight*. If such a magnitude is modest or insignificant, mutual dependence and vulnerability is *loose*. The tightness or looseness of perceived national dependence and vulnerability in an issue area will influence the perceived seriousness of the problem and thus the strength of incentives for cooperation. Incentives for cooperation on an issue are also influenced by how central the issue is to the fundamental security interests of a nation. In general, the more *central* (or *peripheral*) an issue area is, the stronger (or weaker) are the incentives to develop a cooperative arrangement to reduce the security risk.

In sum, the tightness of mutual dependence and the centrality of a specific issue determines the strength of the incentives for cooperation, in order to minimize feelings of vulnerability associated with that issue. Having tightness and centrality as variables, all security issues can be classified into four different types as in the Table 1 below.⁴

Table 1: Four Types of Security Issues and Incentives for Cooperation

		Tightness	
		T	L
Centrality	C	Type 1	Type 3
	P	Type 2	Type 4

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 646-647.

- (1) Type 1 [C, T]: Issues of central importance and tight mutual dependence. Type 1 issues engage the most important security interests of nations and produce the strongest incentives for cooperation. There is, however, no guarantee that cooperative efforts will be successful or produce an effective outcome in this case. While the incentives for cooperation are strong, the centrality of a given issue may require compromise. Examples are crisis management situations involving tense and war-threatening scenarios.
- (2) Type 2 [P, T]: Issues of peripheral importance and tight mutual dependence. The Austrian State Treaty and the Incidents at Sea Agreement are examples.
- (3) Type 3 [C, L]: Issues of central importance and loose mutual dependence. The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties I and II in the 1970s are the examples.
- (4) Type 4 [P, L]: Issues of peripheral importance and loose dependence. Type 4 issues produce the weakest incentives for cooperation. Ironically, they may be easily agreed on because cooperation poses no risk to central security concerns and is barely constrained by tight mutual dependence. Examples are the 1963 Hotline Agreement, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and other confidence building measures.

Two Examples in Terms of Incentives for Cooperation

The North Korean Nuclear Problem

The North Korean nuclear problem is a Type 1 issue for both the DPRK and the United States. For North Korea, developing nuclear weapons is a matter of regime survival and is therefore the most central issue. Pyongyang insists upon direct bilateral talks with Washington, signaling that its position on the nuclear

issue is highly dependent on that of the United States. Although the United States tries to avoid direct talks with the DPRK, its national interests may be gravely affected by Pyongyang's nuclear defiance, thereby increasing Washington's perception of mutual dependence. To the United States, curbing proliferation of WMD is the most important security objective and thus the DPRK's nuclear ambitions have become a central security issue.

The North Korean strategy of brinkmanship further underscores the tightness and centrality of the nuclear problem. For North Korea, deliberate deterioration of the situation using brinkmanship is a carefully planned maneuver designed attempt to increase mutual dependence and promote the centrality of the nuclear issue. This has provided the United States with strong motivation to resolve the problem, a strategy that succeeded in the early 1990s. North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993, leading to direct talks with the Clinton Administration. Its arbitrary extraction of spent fuel rods from the 5MWe reactor brought former President Jimmy Carter to Pyongyang, and ultimately produced the Agreed Framework.

There is, however, no assurance that such brinkmanship would succeed again. In fact, the current crisis is worse than the early 1990s. North Korea has finally withdrawn from the NPT, irreversibly questioning the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. The North has claimed a previously unknown uranium enrichment program, further complicating the issue. Pyongyang has crossed a "red line" by reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods, enhancing its nuclear weapon capability. These aggravating elements increase mutual dependence and vulnerability of the North Korean nuclear problem and thus the incentive for cooperation may become strong. This issue has remained unusually hard and central, due to the renewed urgency and significance of WMD non-proliferation since the 9/11 terror. Repeated violation of international

agreements by the DPRK further adds to the difficulties of resolving the issue cooperatively.

Missile Proliferation in Northeast Asia

Regional missile non-proliferation in Northeast Asia displays different types of security issues, depending upon the bilateral relations, countries' geographic locations, and their missile capabilities. The complexities involved in missile proliferation are illustrated in the Table 2 below. While the Cold War confrontation in Europe reflected a simple bilateral division between the NATO and Warsaw Pact blocs, Northeast Asian regional rivalries are far more complicated. The multiple bilateral relationships each have their own unique characteristics and some are interwoven among themselves.

Table 2: Regional Rivalries and Missile Proliferation

		Tightness	
		T	L
Centrality	C	<NK — SK > <C — T > <C — J > longer-range < NK — J > longer-range	
	P	< NK — SK> <C — J > short-range < NK — J > short-range	<C — T>

Between North and South Korea, the missile issue is Type 1 for the South and Type 2 for the North. South Korea has been under the constant threat of North Korean short-range missiles deployed along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). In particular, cosmopolitan Seoul and its vicinities, with approximately one third of the South Korean population, are within the firing range of North Korean

short-range missiles. The proximity of the two sides makes even short-range missiles “strategic.”⁵ It is obvious that the DPRK short-range missiles, not to mention of longer-range ones, are an issue of tight mutual dependence and high centrality to the ROK. South Korean missile capabilities are not as advanced and North Korea has much less to lose from an inferior ROK missile attack. The issue is therefore largely peripheral for the DPRK. The tense inter-Korean rivalry causes the North Korean leadership to perceive mutual dependence and vulnerability of the missile issue as very tight.

Between China and Taiwan, the missile non-proliferation issue is Type 1 for Taiwan and Type 4 for China. Chinese missile forces — both short and longer ranges — are perceived by Taiwan as formidable threats. The missile issue is therefore central and tight for Taiwan. Conversely, when compared with China’s military might, Taiwanese missile forces would mean virtually nothing to China, making the issue peripheral and loose.

Between China and Japan, the regional missile proliferation issue is Type 2 for both countries in case of short-range missiles and Type 1 for both of them in case of longer-range missiles. Since short-range missiles do not reach each other’s territories, it cannot be a central security issue. Traditional rivalry between the two countries, however, is sufficiently sensitive to cause concerns about each other’s short-range missile programs, thus increasing tightness of the issue. Since longer-range missiles would be direct threats to each other’s national security, the issue also becomes central.

⁵ Similar to the Middle East, the proximity of the countries in Northeast Asia could make it difficult to negotiate a range limitation low enough to be militarily meaningful. Reuven Pedatzur, “Obstacles toward a regional control mechanism: Israel’s view of ballistic missile proliferation in the peace era,” *Contemporary Security Policy*, August 1995, p. 169. In fact, virtually all ranges of missiles could be “strategic” in Northeast Asia, in terms of being able to attack key political and military targets among the nations in the region.

Between North Korea and Japan, the missile proliferation issue is Type 2 for both countries in case of short-range missiles and Type 1 for both of them in case of longer-range missiles due to similar reasons as in the relationship between China and Japan.

Limiting Factors to Regional Cooperation

Many factors can hinder multilateral cooperation on missile non-proliferation in Northeast Asia. Some of them are inherent to the nature of the problem and difficult to change, while others are obstacles whose impact can be alleviated or even removed completely.

Firstly, Northeast Asia has multiple players. At least eight countries are potential members of any discussion on regional missile non-proliferation — China, Japan, Russia, the United States, North and South Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia. It is a common understanding in the formal theory of international relations that as the number of players increases, an issue becomes more complex and becomes harder to resolve. This *n-person game* situation, combined with other limiting factors examined below, makes it less feasible to reach a compromise that properly reflects the interests of all players.

Secondly, the overall bilateral relationships among the countries in the region will set the basic rules of the game. As Alexander George remarks, the state of the overall relations is always part of the context in which countries deal with a specific regional issue.⁶ Dissatisfaction with some aspects of the overall relationship will inevitably influence how a specific issue is perceived and handled by the countries. In general, as political and security con-

⁶ Alexander George, "Strategies for facilitating cooperation," A. George, P. Farley and A. Dallin (eds.), *US-Soviet Security Cooperation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 697.

ditions become more auspicious, a chance of success will be higher in achieving regional cooperation in missile non-proliferation.

Thirdly, the issue of missile non-proliferation in this region is by nature a complex agendum. Asymmetries between the countries concerned vary greatly. Geographical locations, populations, historical experiences, political systems, economic and military power, military doctrines and postures, and specific missile capabilities differ among the eight countries. Perceptions of cooperation and security dialogues also diverge. This region-specific complexity is a force multiplier to complicating the possibility of cooperation on missile non-proliferation.

In addition, there are other obstacles that constrain the abilities of the countries to perceive mutual interests for cooperation, or that complicate efforts at achieving a cooperative arrangement.⁷

The fourth factor is the security dilemma embedded in the anarchic international system. A security dilemma occurs when a measure adopted by one state to increase its security against possible encroachments by a hostile state is viewed by the other states as a threat to their own security, which requires them to take additional defensive measures of their own. These, in turn, could be viewed as aggressive by the first state, which may trigger its additional measures, and a vicious cycle of action-reaction arises.

Three types of negative results can be produced by the security dilemma:

- (1) Development of additional suspicion and distrust among the players, which exacerbates the security dilemma;
- (2) Encouragement of an arms race, complicating arms control

⁷The following is a modification of Alexander George's original contribution, reflecting characteristics of the Northeast Asian region. Alexander George, "Incentives for US-Soviet security cooperation and mutual adjustment," pp. 655-667.

efforts; and

- (3) Increasing tensions and misunderstandings, especially during a crisis, increasing the chances of an inadvertent war.

The fifth factor is the malignant image that has accumulated throughout the historical rivalry and is still vividly present in the minds of countries and people in the region. For example, painful memories of colonial rule in the previous century have remained a strong undercurrent of perceptions that influences policies among the countries. The unfortunate past makes cooperation difficult by creating an invidious image of a former enemy.

The psychology of the situation also aggravates cognitive biases because a country's perception and assessment of threats posed by an adversary are influenced by its general image of the opponent. In consequence, a fundamental attribution error can occur. When a country takes a hard line, others tend to explain that behavior as stemming from that country's innate hostility rather than as a reasonable response to a given situation. On the other hand, when a country behaves in a conciliatory manner, others tend to interpret that behavior as forced upon that country by the situation.

Historically shaped negative images of each other may impact on the possibility of cooperation in any of several ways:

- (1) Disagreements over an appropriate national image can call into question the scope as well as the desirability of cooperation with that country;
- (2) Deep-rooted mistrust of a country strengthens a tendency to regard cooperation with that country as fundamentally unstable;
- (3) Malignant image reinforces tendencies to favor unilateral policies for short-term benefits instead of cooperative arrangements yielding longer-term payoffs;
- (4) Constrains and reduces the attractiveness of reciprocity as a

- means of forming better relations;
- (5) Encourages and justifies more extreme forms of worst-case analysis and preparations; and
 - (6) Casts doubt on compliance with agreements and emphasizes the importance of strict verification.

The sixth factor is the impact of inherent uncertainties in the relations among the countries. Fundamental uncertainties are present for each country concerning the real intentions and future behaviors of others. Uncertainty as to whether a country might engage in cheating an agreement, fueled by historically shaped mistrust and negative images, may be a determining factor of other countries' judgment to join the agreement. Such a concern will place more emphasis on rigid verification and perfect compliance.

The seventh factor is the technological development that stimulates arms competition. Technology is a symbol of a country's prestige and superiority, and this trend will continue in the future. Motivations for technological achievements by the scientific community of a nation may further promote competition in the field. The logic of traditional rivalry is also relevant. If one side successfully tests a new weapon system, other rivals may be reluctant or unwilling to enter into a non-proliferation regime until they too have similar capabilities.

The eighth factor is one of domestic constraints. In general, domestic constraints affect the abilities of cooperation of the countries with democratic political systems. In these countries, obtaining political support for regional cooperation from within the administration, parliaments, and the public are inevitable pre-conditions for any multilateral cooperative efforts to be successful. Obsessed with domestic constraints, political leaders may be prevented from coming forward or unwilling to be progressive in a regional collaborative process.

Finally, alliance considerations are also an important factor for cooperation. As a derivative of the security dilemma, bilateral defense ties in a region may cause security concerns for other countries that are not part of the alliance. Measures to strengthen bilateral security ties could elevate tensions sharply and alert other nations. Deploying the intermediate-range cruise missiles in the Western Europe in the late 1980s was a good example. The US-Japan missile defense cooperation is arguably an obstacle to regional cooperation on missile non-proliferation in Northeast Asia.

Considerations for Creating a Regional Missile Non-Proliferation Regime

There are many considerations in developing a regional missile non-proliferation regime. Some of them are generic to any non-proliferation regime and others are specific to the missile issue. This paper will discuss four considerations:

- (1) Peaceful uses of missile technologies;
- (2) Security assurances;
- (3) Missile disarmament; and
- (4) Missile defense.

Peaceful Uses of Missile Technologies

Like nuclear energy, missile technologies are dual-use. Although many nations are willing to forgo the military applications of missiles, they remain eager to enjoy the scientific and economic benefits derived from missile technologies. This tendency is no different in Northeast Asia. In fact, the United Nations specifically confirmed that every nation was equally entitled to have access to the peaceful use of missile technologies. Furthermore, members of the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile

Proliferation stipulated the following principles:

- Confirmation of their commitment to the United Nations General Assembly resolution on international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for the benefit and in the interest of all states, taking into particular account the needs of developing countries (Resolution 51/122 of December 13, 1996);
- Recognition that states should not be excluded from utilizing the benefits of space for peaceful purposes, but that, in reaping such benefits and in conducting related cooperation, they must not contribute to the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and
- Recognition that space launch vehicle programs should not be used to conceal ballistic missile programs.

There are at least two ways to provide peaceful benefits to a country that has abandoned long-range missile development. The first is permitting the country to conduct research and development of basic technologies, thereby permitting it to have an individual space launch program. Japan successfully achieved this and South Korea is trying to follow suit. The second is to provide a nation with off-the-self launch vehicles without transferring the technologies. An example is the virtually concluded agreement between North Korea and the United States in late 2000, in which the DPRK was reportedly willing to give up its missile development program in exchange for three US-commissioned satellite launches per year at a foreign launch site.

One important criterion for facilitating the peaceful uses of missile technologies is whether a country possesses weapons of mass destruction. The military significance of missiles, regardless of their ranges, drops multi-fold unless they are equipped with WMD. If a country neither deploys WMD nor maintains such a program, and has credibly pledged to abandon WMD in the future, that country should not be a subject of “excessive pessimism” which

arises from the tendencies to seek absolute security.⁸ South Korea, abandoning all WMD options, is a good example that should not be an object of excessive pessimism.

Security Assurances

Having an effective means to counter security threats, including external missile threats, is an important motivation for the countries to develop ballistic missiles. The NPT could be a role model for the provision of security assurances. Nuclear weapon states currently provide two kinds of security assurances: positive and negative.

Positive Security Assurance

Just before the signing of the NPT, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain each declared to the U.N. Security Council “its intention, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.”⁹

The Security Council adopted this positive security assurance as Resolution 255 on June 19, 1968, just before the signing of the NPT.

⁸ Aaron Karp, “Ballistic missile proliferation and the MTCR,” in Jean-Francois Rioux (ed.), *Limiting the Proliferation of Weapons: The Role of Supply-Side Strategies* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992), p. 117.

⁹ Lewis Dunn, *Containing Nuclear Proliferation*, Adelphi Paper 263 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991), p. 43.

Negative Security Assurance

Since the first NPT Review Conference in 1975, some of the nuclear “have-nots” have expressed dissatisfaction with the adequacy of positive security assurances. Some are pressing for a specific negative security assurance that nuclear weapon states will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.¹⁰ Four of the permanent members in the Security Council — all except China — have made unilateral declarations with conditions, limitations, and exceptions.

At the 1978 U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, the Soviet Union announced that it would never use nuclear weapons against those states that “renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories.”¹¹ In the 1990s, however, Russia retreated from its previous no-first-use promise. The Defense Ministry confirmed that the new Russian military doctrine adopted on November 2, 1993 had abandoned the former Soviet pledge made by Leonid Brezhnev in 1982.¹²

The United States declared that it would not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state which is a party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding agreement not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the event of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies by a non-nuclear weapon state ‘allied to’ or ‘associated with’ a nuclear weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.¹³ A similar statement was made by Great Britain.¹⁴

¹⁰ William Epstein, *The Prevention of Nuclear War: A United Nations Perspective* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Gunn & Hain, Publishers, 1984), p. 30.

¹¹ *U.N. Document A/S-10/PV.5.*

¹² Serge Schmemann, “Russia drops pledge of no first use of atom arms,” *The New York Times*, November 4, 1993, p. A8.

¹³ *U.N. Document A/S-10/AC.1/30.*

¹⁴ *U.N. Document A/S-10/PV.26.*

France has given assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons, in accordance with arrangements to be negotiated, only to those states that have “constituted among themselves non-nuclear zones.”¹⁵

Only China retains an unqualified guarantee of no-first use. The Chinese government declared in 1964 that at no times and under no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons. It has also undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or nuclear-free zones. China continues to urge negotiations between all nuclear weapon states to conclude an international convention on unconditional no first use of nuclear weapons, as well as no threat to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear-free zones.¹⁶

There is one distinction between the NPT and a missile-non-proliferation regime. In case of the NPT, it was possible to categorize member states into two distinct groups - nuclear weapon state (NWS) versus non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS). For a missile non-proliferation regime, however, this type of black-and-white distinction is not feasible since most nations possess at least basic missile capabilities. Instead of missile weapon state (MWS) versus non-missile weapon state (NMWS), a useful classification would be full missile state (FMS) that has developed all ranges of missiles from short to intercontinental and incomplete missile state (IMS) that has small or medium range missile capabilities but not intercontinental ones. In Northeast Asia, the three nuclear weapon states happen to be FMS and the other five non-nuclear weapon states are IMS.

¹⁵ *U.N. Document A/S-10/PV.27.*

¹⁶ *Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Nuclear Testing, October 5, 1993.*

Since security assurances are something given by haves to have-nots, one simple criterion of providing security assurances in the missile area would be the existence of intercontinental missile capability. Among the five IMS, only North Korea possesses a medium-range missile capability. If the North abandons this capability the absence of the medium-range missiles will form an additional criterion.

As in the NPT, positive and negative security assurances could be provided to five IMS by the other three FMS as a missile security guarantor in Northeast Asia. The negative security assurance is an *ex ante* measure and the positive security assurance an *ex post* one as in the following:

- The United States, Russia, and China pledge not to use or threat to use certain ranges of missiles (intercontinental and/or medium) against five IMS in any circumstances;
- The three countries pledge that threat or use of certain ranges of missiles (intercontinental and/or medium) against five IMS would trigger diplomatic and military forms of assistance from the FMS.

Missile Disarmament

Missile disarmament is an essential component of any missile non-proliferation regime. As the most concrete way of physically reducing the missile threat, disarmament is the ultimate means of enhancing regional stability and peace. This could be achieved in two ways. On the one hand, according to ranges (short, medium, intermediate, and intercontinental), each nation is allotted Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)-type ceilings for each range, while excessive missiles are dismantled. An important element of this task will be an unprecedented international consensus on the definitions of the missiles according to their ranges.¹⁷ A Northeast-Asian version of the INF Treaty can be, would be, the first step in regional cooperation on missile non-proliferation.

On the other hand, regional nations must redeploy existing missile forces to less threatening postures. Proximities are different among the nations and so several bilateral arrangements, possibly within the context of the multilateral setting, could be formulated. For example, the following arrangements can be made between the concerned parties:

- (1) Locations of short- and medium-range missiles are adjusted in a less threatening way between North and South Korea and China and Taiwan; and
- (2) Medium-range missiles are redeployed in a less hostile way between China and Japan; Russia and Japan; North Korea and Japan; China and South Korea; Russia and South Korea; and among the FMS.

Missile Defense

Missile defense is a mixed blessing in curbing missile proliferation. As anti-missile technologies develop, missile defense becomes an increasingly plausible means to counter offensive missile threats. At the same time, however, missile defense is an act of proliferation of *defensive* missiles. The offensive missiles and the anti-missile missiles can be seen as the two dishes of a scale that

¹⁷ At present, there exist divergent definitions even within the US. According to the US Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, the SRBM (Short Range Ballistic Missile) has a range of 0-600km, the MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) 600-1,300km, the IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) 1,300-3,500km, and the ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) 3,500km and above, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2001/g010713-D-6570C.html>. For the US National Intelligence Council, the SRBM has a range of 0-1,000km, the MRBM 1,000-3,000km, the IRBM 3,000-5,500km and the ICBM 5,500km and above. National Intelligence Council, *Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015*. The INF Treaty defined the shorter-range missile as having a range of 500-1,000km and the intermediate-range missile as 1,000-5,500km. According to the SALT II Treaty, the range of the ICBM exceeds 5,500km. The Congressional Research Service defined SRBM with 70-1,000km, MRBM 1,000-3,000km, IRBM 3,000-5,500 and ICBM beyond 5,500km. Andrew Feickert, *Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries* (Washington, D.C.: The Congressional Research Service, March 2004).

must be leveled. As offensive missiles proliferate, the necessity for missile defense grows, while as the quantities of offensive missiles are reduced, the burden of missile defense will diminish. The ABM Treaty era has passed and both offensive and defensive missiles are set to become necessary components for national security. Ideally, the balance between offensive and defensive missiles should be set as low as possible.

It is clear that without substantial efforts to curb offensive missile proliferation in the region, interests of the parties in acquiring missile defense capabilities will grow in the coming years. Japan is very active in research and development of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in conjunction with the US missile defense efforts. Although unwilling to be a part of the US missile defense, South Korea shows strong interest in acquiring its own TMD system. Taiwan is also very active in expanding its missile defense capabilities.

Attempts by nations to develop missile defense can therefore cause defensive missile proliferation — a hybrid of traditional missile proliferation. One means to curb individual country's missile defense proliferation is to establish a region-wide missile defense system. Russia once proposed such an idea against non-strategic ballistic missiles in the European context.¹⁸ Investigating feasibility and desirability of a similar idea in the context of Northeast Asia should be a part of multilateral cooperative efforts at preventing missile proliferation from the region.

¹⁸ The Russian government presented the idea to Lord Robertson, NATO's Secretary General in February 21, 2001. Alexander Pikayev, "The global control system," *Missile Proliferation and Defenses: Problems and Prospects* (Monterey: The Center for Nonproliferation Studies, May 2001), p. 23.