

9/11 TERRORISM: WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE US AND KOREA

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Although it is too early to understand all the implications of the September 11 terrorist attacks on America, it is clear that the campaign against terrorism will influence domestic and international policies in the United States and many other countries, including the two Koreas. The most notable consequence of the terrorist attacks has been the building of a loose coalition of countries to seek and destroy the perpetrators. In this coalition, South Korea has played a relatively minor role. North Korea has formally condemned the terrorist act, but not supported the coalition, and by failing to provide more convincing support against terrorism, North Korea has further isolated itself in the international community. The anti-terrorism campaign has diverted American attention from Korean matters, further slowing the momentum of inter-Korean relations. If terrorism continues to be high on the international agenda, the two Koreas will have to adopt policies that more clearly define themselves in terms of the anti-terrorism campaign, and continue their dialogue despite events outside the peninsula.

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Enduring Freedom

The US-led campaign against international terrorism, underway for three months, is meeting with considerable success, although none of its major objectives has yet been achieved. Even though it is too early to assess the long-term impact of this campaign on American political and social life, the outlines of a new era are beginning to appear. The immediate shock and anger triggered by the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York and the attack on the Pentagon in Washington are subsiding. Because the perpetrators of the anthrax terrorism have not been identified, the American public does not know whether it constitutes a second-wave terrorism attack or a separate incident. Life in America seems to be getting back to normal for most people except for the inconveniences of tougher security measures at airports. But these measures, while only a small ripple in the life of 300 million Americans, reflect important issues and possible lifestyle changes that may have a fuller impact in the years ahead.

Let's begin with a few vignettes from the airport. During a recent trip to Los Angeles, a small manicure scissors was removed from my carry-on luggage by an airport security official. The sharp tip of the scissors was only a couple of centimeters long, hardly a likely weapon for a terrorist to wield, but the official was taking no chances. On the return flight I carried a nail clippers with a short pointed file attached. Once again, I was stopped. This time the official gave me the choice of throwing away the clippers or having the file attachment cut off. As it turns out, what one can carry on to a plane depends largely on the policies in place at each airport, and how each official interprets those policies. That is to say, airport security policies are still evolving.

Foreign-looking travelers encounter more serious inconveniences. In Los Angeles, I observed a family of four, who appeared to be of Middle Eastern origin, stopped for a "random" security check just before boarding the airplane. The father protested that this was the

fourth time his family had been searched, but the airline official simply replied that the family was chosen “at random” with no bad intentions, and that whatever may have happened elsewhere in the airport, this was the first time that this particular official had encountered the family and so he could hardly know whether or not they had been searched beforehand. It would hardly be surprising if this kind of treatment turned the family, and countless other travelers who feel they are being singled out for scrutiny, against Americans. The United States can hardly afford to make the whole world angry at it. Nor do most Americans want to see their individual freedoms curtailed. Therein lies a serious dilemma.

We are gradually formulating a list of items that cannot be carried on to planes, and we are getting an idea of the likelihood of being searched in various ways at various locations in the airport, but no detailed universal security measures have yet been adopted. Nor will it be easy to institute measures that are maximally effective in deterring terrorists while being completely fair to all air travelers. A case in point is the random search procedure. “Random” of course means that every passenger has an equal chance of being searched. Some airlines announce that their searches just before boarding are guided by an algorithm in the airline computer, and that security officials make no determination of who is to be stopped. Other airlines do not indicate what the search rationale is. For years airport security officials have stopped suspicious passengers based on “terrorist profiles” that have never been made public. Although random searches may be the only fair kind of searches, airplane hijackers hardly constitute a random sample of the population, as the recent 9/11 hijacking incidents suggest. Does the non-randomness of terrorists justify non-random searches? This is a difficult question to answer.

Although life in the United States has largely returned to normal, it will never be quite the same as before September 11th. Even though the shock has worn off, the gravity of the terrorist act will be a mile-

stone in American history. The experience has taught at least some Americans that they cannot live in wealthy isolation immune from the problems faced by other nations. Changes in American lifestyle and attitude are inevitable, but how great those changes will be is difficult to say at this point. An important factor influencing change is whether more serious terrorist attacks follow, creating the sort of siege mentality experienced by many Israelis. In the following pages some thoughts are presented on the definition and incidence of terrorism from the American viewpoint, some speculations about coalition-building to fight terrorism, a few brief comments on the 9/11 impact on US foreign policy, and finally some implications for Korea.

Profile of Terrorism

Patterns of Terrorism

What does terrorism mean to Americans? Since 1983, the US State Department has defined terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”¹ International terrorism, in contrast to domestic terrorism, is defined as “terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.” Whereas the immediate goal of a terrorist is to act upon a target, the broader goal, by definition, is to spread terror. The achievement of this broader goal may be an end itself, motivated by hatred, or it may be instrumental to other goals, such as the desire for political power. Since the defining goal is to create terror, the terrorist’s target must be symbolic and capture audience attention. Making a distinction between terrorist acts and other kinds of violence can be difficult,

1 US State Department, *Patterns of Terrorism*, 2000, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/>.

because terror is an audience reaction not a terrorist act. The intention to terrify must often be inferred. If an audience does not react to violence with fear, terrorism fails. To frighten an audience that has become accustomed to terrorist acts, novel or more extreme acts must be committed.

The State Department publishes terrorism statistics in its annual *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000*. According to this source, in the 1990s the average number of *international* terrorist attacks fluctuated within the range of 274-565. In the 1980s the average was slightly higher, fluctuating between 375-666. The number of attacks in 2000 was 423. By region, North America suffered from the fewest attacks: in 2000, not a single case of international terrorism was recorded. That same year, Latin America witnessed 193 incidents: Asia, 98; Africa, 55; Eurasia, 31; Western Europe, 30; and Middle East, 16.

Two things should be noted about these statistics. First, since 1989 attacks by Palestinians have not been included in the State Department international terrorism figures, since Palestine is not considered to be a separate state. The other notable point is that although Americans were sometimes the target of terrorism (as will be seen below), no international terrorism attacks occurred on American soil in 2000. Indeed the US has always been one of the safest havens from international terrorism.

Between 1995 and 2000, 62 Americans were victims of international terrorism; 19 of them were killed and 23 were wounded. American-owned buildings (mostly overseas) were attacked more frequently than people. In 2000 alone, 178 businesses; six military installations, three diplomatic installations, two government buildings, and 17 other targets were struck. These attacks occurred wherever international terrorist activity was high: 172 instances in Latin America compared to only nine in Asia, seven in Western Europe, six in Africa, four in Eurasia, and two in the Middle East. Bombings were the most popular means of attacking American targets (179 cases) followed by kidnap-

ping (21), armed attack (4), arson (2), and other means (4).

Comments on the Statistics

Americans and their property were the target of 37 percent of international terrorist attacks in the 1990s.² American targets are popular because they are ubiquitous and often easily accessible. The United States is also targeted for what it does. It supports governments that happen to have fierce enemies (most notably, the Israeli government with their Palestinian enemies); it stations military forces overseas; and it is the leading exponent of capitalism, which many people around the world consider to be a form of economic exploitation. The United States is also seen as the source of “decadent” Western values, especially in the form displayed by the American entertainment media.

Comparatively speaking, terrorism, even in a bad year, is not a major threat to life, limb and property. Each year, approximately 40,000 Americans die in automobile accidents. In most years, more Americans drown in bathtubs than are killed by terrorists.

Nor are terrorists particularly fearsome warriors. Most terrorists are not innovative. Bombing buildings, hijacking airplanes, and kidnaping people are well tested and relatively easy missions to accomplish. Terrorism follows fashions: for example, until September 11, airplane hijackings had been out of favor for a number of years.

The September 11 World Trade Center attack was atypical in a number of respects. The United States is generally immune to terrorist attacks. Most attacks do not kill many people. Most attacks occur in Latin America (pipeline bombings) and do not involve Middle Eastern agents, although several of the more destructive terrorist acts in recent years (Khobar Towers, embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, USS Cole) have been perpetrated by Middle-Eastern terrorists.

2 Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 57.

Collateral Damage

Most of the terrorist impact comes not from the direct damage accomplished by a terrorist attack, but by “collateral damage” in the form of social or political disruptions. Some of this damage is mediated by fear, as when a frightened citizenry retreats from its everyday activities. Other damage arises from confusion and social disorder. Still other damage can be attributed to over-reactions to terrorist acts. Terrorists realize that the immediate consequences of their acts will be almost negligible, but they count on audiences either to become fearful and refrain from doing what they usually do, or over-react and incur high costs or provoke other actors to violence, as Osama bin Laden hoped to do by stirring up anger toward the US counter-terrorism offensive. In this respect, terrorism is a win-win proposition. Terrorists get a lot of bang for their buck: in recent years the American government has spent approximately \$10 billion every year combating terrorism, far more than terrorists spend to perpetrate their acts of terror.

Terrorist Objectives

Terrorists seek many different goals. Some seek to gain leverage for future negotiations, for example by taking hostages. Others hope to disrupt social, political, or economic activities. Others set out to provoke stronger powers to engage in reckless counterattacks. Terrorism may also be used as a warning to deter an actor from taking future actions. Some of the more destructive terrorist acts seem to be motivated largely by hatred or revenge seeking. Terrorists may believe they are acting on religious principles, or serving as weapons of God. Frequently, terrorists seek publicity for their acts. And finally, it seems likely that some terrorists simply do this for a living: they are terrorists by occupation.

Psychologists have yet to discover a single psychological “terrorist

profile,” but it is known that most terrorists come from economically disadvantaged backgrounds. They have suffered, they are angry, and they are frustrated by their relative powerlessness against richer and stronger people. Many of them consider their terrorist acts to be a means of obtaining justice for the poor and powerless. The terrorist’s clandestine acts must by necessity be asymmetric to the more traditional means of influence employed by powerful actors.

Concluding Comments about Terrorists

What do the statistics tell us about international terrorism and how to combat it? First, it must be recognized that terrorism can be managed but never eliminated, for the simple reason that it is an easily performed aggressive response to the common emotions of anger and frustration. Because terrorists have an inexhaustible supply of targets and few time constraints, they can use the element of surprise to their great advantage. Not all potential targets can be protected from terrorists. In widely-cited testimony by the US General Accounting Office (GAO), other government agencies are warned against relying on “worst case scenarios to generate countermeasures or establish their programs.”³ The GAO suggests instead that only “credible threats” be prepared for, with the understanding that it is too costly to protect against all possible vulnerabilities, hence the value of consulting terrorism statistics to generate threat scenarios.

One important consideration in assessing the impact of terrorism is the role of audience reaction, which is necessary for terrorism to succeed. Audience (public) reaction to terrorist acts is directly shaped by how leaders react to terrorism and how terrorism is reported in the news media. The leaders and the media in effect do more to spread terror than do the terrorists. Part of the solution to terrorism may lie in

3 Norman J. Rabkin to a House Subcommittee on July 26, 2000.

shaping public opinion rather than in protecting public buildings.

Coalition-Building for Anti-Terrorism

Global Responses

The global community's responses to September 11 have been largely supportive of the US counter-terrorism campaign. Prime Minister Tony Blair has perhaps provided the strongest support, even surpassing President Bush in terms of defining the campaign against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda terrorists as a great battle, in the tradition of Churchill and Thatcher. Britain's unflinching support for the US-led anti-terrorism war is not a surprise because Britain has always been America's closest and most important ally. Prime Minister Blair's trip to New York and Washington in the days immediately following the September attacks was a special sign of the deep friendship between America and Britain.

Turkey was not far behind Britain in offering its support. Turkey indeed was the first "third power" to declare its willing participation in the terrorism combat. A half century ago, Turkey's decision to send troops to the Korean War enabled Turkey to be accepted as a NATO member. Turkey has once again proved that it would stand firm behind the United States combat terrorism. The Turkish government declared that it would send a contingent of its well-trained special forces to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan. The statement of support was firm and convincing, and the US felt grateful for Turkey's solid support.

The cooperation of Uzbekistan, which shares a border with Afghanistan, thus providing important logistical supply routes to freedom fighters in Afghanistan, was an unexpected boon. As a Muslim country and a former member of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan's

announcement was an encouraging sign that the coalition against terrorism would be diverse. For its assistance, Uzbekistan received the promise of much-needed US aid and foreign investment for its fragile economy. The country's top leaders went to great lengths to explain that Islam is not monolithic. For example, they pointed out that Taliban leaders confined their women to a cave-dweller's life, whereas Uzbekistan's leaders allowed their daughters and wives to live in harmony with modern technology and life styles.

In Asia the two countries most active in supporting the anti-terrorism war were Japan and Pakistan. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's stock value in Washington rose when he arrived in town to stand side-by-side with President Bush. More importantly, Japan passed a significant Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law on October 29, and Japan announced that its Aegis destroyers were available for deployment to trouble spots as a backup for the US air defense to prevent further terrorism. Pakistan was a wild card for coalition building. Without Pakistan's cooperation the course of the war in Afghanistan would likely have been far more costly for the United States. In Pakistan, pro-Taliban elements and Osama bin Laden followers staged demonstrations in the early days of the conflict, but President Pervez Musharaaf cast his lot with the United States against the Taliban, whose regime had formerly been supported in various ways by Pakistan. For his act of political courage or calculation, Musharaaf received promises of substantial economic aid from the United States and Japan. In the space of a fortnight, Musharaaf transformed himself from a military coup leader to a respectable participant in the global war on terrorism.

From the American viewpoint, perhaps the most interesting aspect of coalition building was how it brought in countries that have traditionally been competitors, if not adversaries, of the United States. The most notable cases are China and Russia. The EP-3 surveillance incident in the waters off China had recently poured cold water over the

US-China relationship. Yet at the Shanghai APEC meeting in November 2001, China publicly acquiesced to America's air strikes on Afghanistan. Given the fact that China has been the victim of the US air aggression (as illustrated by the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo operation and the EP-3 incident), China's acquiescence was an unprecedented gesture. The US entry into Afghanistan provides a caution to the Chinese, who are loath to accept US intervention in the "domestic" politics of foreign nations, but President Jiang presumably saw which way the wind was blowing and decided that China could benefit most by offering public support for the Bush counter-terrorism campaign.

Russian President Putin demonstrated his support by traveling to the Bush ranch in Texas. Putin proved himself an agile, worldly diplomat and political leader by casting off the image of the typically stiff Russian leader. His timing has been excellent. Pragmatism marks his every move, as he seeks to enhance Russia's image and power in the global community. What Russia can do for the war and in support of a post-Taliban Afghanistan is difficult to determine given the poor image of Russians in Afghanistan, but at relatively little cost Russia has emerged rather nicely in this new international arena on the coattails of the war on terrorism.

Coalition as Strategy or Tactic?

Critical questions about the anti-terrorism campaign are a continuing source of debate in the Washington, DC policy community. How long will the current coalition continue to work together and how effectively will it operate over the long term? Since the Korean War, the United States has often found it difficult to work with other nations on military matters. Even coalition successes such as Kosovo were marked by disagreements. As a matter of fact, many policy makers in Washington believe that unilateral action often serves the US interest better than

multilateral action. In this believe they are heeding the famous words of Lord Palmerston, a British leader of the nineteenth century, who said, "We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow."

It is widely recognized that the war on terrorism, which is much larger than the war in Afghanistan, requires new methods, virtually forcing the United States to become a team player rather than a lonely warrior. If the United States is to deal a blow to international terrorism, it must seek the assistance of other nations in information sharing, intelligence exchanges, control of terrorist financial transactions, the imposition of economic sanctions on terrorism-harboring regimes, and international police and security work. To fight a continuing war on terrorism, an anti-terrorism coalition must be seen as a long-term rather than a short-term tool. If the United States mismanages the coalition and becomes an arrogant conductor who does not consult with his orchestra members, the anti-terror symphony will create noise but not music, and the orchestra members will desert the music hall as soon as they have been paid.

Currently, the coalition seems to be reaching its immediate objectives of defeating the Taliban and eliminating the top leadership of the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, but some faint voices of frustration are beginning to make themselves heard, both in the United States and overseas. What happens to Afghanistan after the defeat of the Taliban has not yet been decided, and in fact the situation is too complicated to be solved by a single decision. The first Bush administration never figured out how to capitalize on its military victories in Iraq to eliminate threats posed by Saddam Hussein. And for that matter, the Clinton administration was able to freeze but not eliminate the North Korean threat. After Afghanistan, should the "Iraq problem" be tackled next? and then the "North Korea problem"?⁴ Many countries will desert the coalition if Washington turns its guns on other states that have links to

terrorism or are suspected of being potential sources of nuclear, chemical, or biological terrorism.⁵

Coalition building and maintenance require considerable work, not only on the part of the coalition leader, the United States, but by the other coalition members as well. For allies like Great Britain, Japan, and South Korea, 9/11 terrorism was a major test of their willingness to support and work together with the United States. Coalition success requires extensive military and intelligence cooperation, which must be based on a sense of mutual trust. The United States is wary of sharing critical intelligence information, even with its allies. And the allies do not always approve of American methods of pursuing terrorists. A great amount of trust and cooperation will have to be developed if any kind of coalition can be sustained for years to come to combat the ever-present and perhaps even growing threat of international terrorism. Many of those changes will have to be initiated by the coalition leader, the United States.

US National Security and Foreign Policy after 9/11

Immediate Responses to Terrorism

After September 11, opinions on how to combat terrorism were as plentiful in Washington as the falling leaves of autumn. Terrorism touched many people in many ways, and it raised a host of social, economic, political, and military issues.

In the US Quadrennial Defense Review Report, released on Septem-

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- 4 Richard Perle, "Next Stop: Iraq?," Speech at the Foreign Policy Research, November 30, 2001, www.fpri.org; David Sanger, "After the Taliban, Who? Don't Forget North Korea," *New York Times*, November 25, 2001.
 - 5 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, "Next Stop: Iraq?," *San Jose Mercury News*, December 2, 2001.

ber 30, 2001, the foreword includes the following statement: “On September 11, 2001, the United States came under vicious, bloody attack. Americans *died* in their *places of work*. They *died* on *American soil*. They *died* not as combatants, but as *innocent victims*. They died not from traditional armies waging traditional campaigns, but from the *brutal, faceless weapons of terror*. They died as the victims of war—a war that many had feared but whose sheer horror took America by surprise.⁶

This strong statement carries with it a number of implications for the direction of US policy in the near term. First, terrorism has become the number one foreign policy problem to be addressed. Second, homeland security has become a high priority domestic issue, even surpassing the state of the ailing economy. Not since the second World War has air, coastline and national border defense been of such concern to Americans. Third, the United States realizes that to defeat or contain terrorism it must cooperate not just with allies and friends, but with states it has previously had bad relationships with. Fourth, although fighting the war against terrorism is the first priority, the possibility that weapons of mass destruction could fall into the hands of terrorists means that counter-proliferation and non-proliferation policies must continue to be pursued. Fifth, the Bush administration believes that a variety of new legal measures need to be adopted, but some of these measures conflict with the traditional American values of individual freedom and rights.

The threat of terrorism, rather than lowering American morale, has drawn Americans together. Patriotism is high. American flags are fluttering everywhere. Young people are eager to join the armed forces. In Washington, Republicans and Democrats have found new ground to work together. In his assault on America, Osama bin Laden sowed a wind and reaped a whirlwind. But this may be only the first round in the battle between America and its terrorist enemies. Long-term

6 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, The United States of America, Department of Defense, September 30, 2001, p. III.

changes in American policies must be made to fight a continuing battle, and these changes are more complex and difficult than the changes that immediately followed September 11.

Long-term Responses to Terrorism

Terrorists are not constrained by national boundaries, nor do they have to maintain a large presence in any one place. They can operate with small isolated cells that communicate with each other in cyberspace. After planning for action, they can gather, “swarm” over a target, and quickly disperse to other countries.⁷ To combat terrorists, the United States, perhaps for the first time in its history, has to pay attention to its long-term relationships with countries in every region of the world. Unquestionably, long-term US security and foreign policy needs to be adjusted and to cope with international terrorism and address other security concerns.

First, the United States needs to cultivate educational and cultural exchanges as a basis for anti-terrorist cooperation. Second, it follows that so-called “regionalists” or “area specialists,” with their local contacts and special skills in language, cultural understanding, history, and local knowledge, must play a more important role in policy formulation and implementation. For example, after 9/11 many agencies of the US government eagerly sought specialists in Afghanistan.

Third, the traditional American focus on Europe and Northeast Asia must be broadened. US power must be projected to all regions of the globe. But this does not mean US troops should be everywhere. A more effective form of power projection is in the form of political, economic and social “soft power.” In particular, the United States must pay more attention to the nations in south Asia and to the former Soviet republics, some of which have large Muslim populations. The

7 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.), *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001).

India-Pakistan nuclear confrontation must also be closely monitored.

Fourth, the United States will want to maintain a robust capability to project its military power around the globe. To do this, better cooperation is needed with diverse countries, including military host agreements and joint training exercises. Also, the US military must reorganize itself to fight a new kind of enemy.

Fifth, America's allies must also make long-term adjustments to combat global terrorism. Their military forces must be able to keep the peace in their neighborhoods, and fill any vacuum created when US regional forces are called away for duty elsewhere. Better intelligence sharing is also needed.

The consequences of the September 11 terrorist attacks were truly terrible and terrifying. But by rising to meet challenges, the United States will become a stronger nation, gaining valuable experience in working more closely with other nations, thus honoring the pledge to pursue globalization, not just Americanization.

Implications for Korea

South Korea

The 9/11 terrorist attacks cannot help but influence events on the Korean peninsula. For South Korea, the new US focus on terrorism jeopardizes President Kim Dae Jung's sunshine engagement policy toward North Korea, a policy that has very much monopolized the president's attention. Of course the sunshine policy was in trouble long before the terrorist attacks, but in two respects the new US focus on terrorism directly complicates President Kim's engagement plans. First, to the extent that engagement includes the provision to North Korea of non-humanitarian aid, the United States may object that this aid is going to support a potential enemy (remembering that North Korea is

still on the US list of states supporting terrorism). Second, the United States is unlikely to devote many diplomatic resources in the near future to promoting inter-Korean engagement, because those resources will be focused elsewhere.

Devoted as it is to furthering the sunshine policy, President Kim's administration did not become one of the strongest supporters of the anti-terrorism campaign. This is hardly surprising, because North Korea has severely criticized the US anti-terrorist response and those nations that support it. President Kim understandably does not want to jeopardize South Korea's already rocky relations with North Korea. These relations had cooled considerably within several months of the June 2000 inter-Korean summit, although North Korea's reasons for drawing back have never been made clear. After the terrorist attacks, the United States shifted some of its regional forces from East Asia to Middle East and reinforced US forces in South Korea with some new weapons. This reinforcement, coupled with a heightened state of readiness of South Korean troops, angered North Korea, putting frost on top of snow (*solsang kasang* in Korean) in inter-Korean relations.

North Korea

North Korea's response to 9/11 was made at two levels. The official government response, made for foreign consumption and not necessarily reflecting the sentiments of the North Korean leadership, was constrained. On September 12, the North Korean foreign ministry called the attacks a "very regretful and tragic incident" [chigukhi yugamsuropgo p'igukchokin], and reminded the foreign community of North Korea's position of "opposing all forms of terrorism and any support to it."⁸ On October 5, North Korea's representative to the United Nations said that the terrorist attacks "greatly

8 Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), <http://www.kcna.co.jp>, September 12, 2001.

shocked the international community and were a very regrettable and tragic incident.”⁹

Two days after the attacks, the North Korean domestic audience, which has been taught to hate the United States as the ring leader of Western imperialists, was informed the domestic radio network of the 9/11 attacks, which were described not as terrorism but as “unprecedented surprise attacks” [supkyok sagon]. The broadcast went on to quote various international news media reports on the incident, including the statement from the *Washington Post*, taken out of context, that the United States “brought international isolation on to itself by practicing arrogant foreign policies” and suggesting that the “root of this incident lay in Bush’s unilateral foreign policy of putting only US interests above all else.”¹⁰ Subsequent domestic reports on the US campaign in Afghanistan have played up the civilian casualties of the war, while the official coverage has warned that as a consequence of the US response, “the world faces another war.”¹¹

The US-North Korea relationship, such as it is, has always been marked by suspicion and hostility. Since the advent of the second Bush administration, which has less patience with the benighted policies of the North Korean regime than did the Clinton administration, relations have worsened. The US anti-terrorism campaign is likely to further worsen relations with North Korea. In a recent issue of the prestigious journal *Foreign Affairs*, former Secretary of Defense William Perry suggested that the next wave of terrorist attacks might involve weapons of mass destruction. Surely North Korea was mentioned.¹² In the minds of many people, North Korea is intimately linked to such weapons.

When all is said and done, North Korea, despite its formal protests

9 According to the South Korean news agency, *Yonhap*, October 6, 2001.

10 *Korean Central Broadcasting Station (KCBN)* in Korean on September 14, 2001.

11 See for example *KCBN* on October 8, 2001 and *KCNA* on October 9, 2001.

12 William Perry, “Preparing for the Next Attack,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2001, pp. 31-45.

against international terrorism, shares with the terrorists a hatred of the United States and a willingness to resort to asymmetric warfare to counter American military power. The North maintains an arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, and perhaps a few nuclear weapons as well. It follows a policy of seclusion and secrecy to protect its authoritarian regime. In short, it is the very type of state that would seem to support the idea of terrorist attacks against its adversaries, even if it has not engaged in such attacks in recent years.

North Korea is also affected by the 9/11 terrorist incident insofar as it depends on foreign aid to feed its people and rejuvenate its economy. As the world turns its attention to rebuilding Afghanistan, there will be fewer resources to aid North Korea. In the past, the North Korean regime has staged provocative incidents to attract attention to its demands, and may do so in the future if attention is shifted to another region.

The US military assault on the Taliban and terrorists in Afghanistan also poses an indirect military threat to North Korea. The successful intervention of US forces to alter the government of a foreign state opens the door (once again) to the possibility of an American military intervention in North Korea. Although this possibility may seem remote to most Americans, it is probably a very real threat to the North Koreans. To deter such a threat, they have adopted a more belligerent attitude toward the United States.

As a failed state, North Korea needs political and economic support from other nations in order to maintain some semblance of ordinary life. The anti-terrorism campaign has not only worsened its relationship with the United States, but also its tenuous relationship with Japan because of Japanese support for the anti-terrorism campaign. Nor is the anti-terrorism campaign, for which both China and Russia have offered their support, endearing North Korea to these two traditional supporters. It would seem that 9/11 has further isolated North Korea. Only South Korea, for which inter-Korean relations are more

important than the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan, might be willing to come to North Korea's aid, but this is the very direction in which North Korea refuses to look.

At the outset, the United States declared that a nation was either for or against the anti-terrorist campaign—there could be no fence sitting. It is too early to tell how long and strong the impact of 9/11 will be, but in the coming months and years, both Koreas will have to consider how they fit into a somewhat altered world order.