

# ENGAGEMENT POLICY, NORTH KOREA, AND PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

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In this paper, recent developments in the North Korea security problem are first discussed in order to examine the Clinton Administration's policy of engagement toward North Korea and the Perry report. William Perry's concept of "Preventive Defense" and its possible future role in the security strategy of the US is then analyzed. The possibility of cooperative security with North Korea is discussed as well. Finally, the author's view on the future of the security environment on the Korean Peninsula is presented.

Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, North Korea poses one of the acute security dangers and foreign policy problems facing the United States and its allies of the Republic of Korea and Japan in Northeast Asia. Stalinist North Korea, which is isolated but has survived the worldwide collapse of communism, has the ability to build nuclear bombs and intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach targets in South Korea, Japan and the portions of the United States. The Perry Report, submitted to the White House and U.S. Congress in mid-

September and released in unclassified form to the public on October 12, 1999, calls for steps to engage Pyongyang diplomatically and economically, and the classified version reportedly contains a strategy to prepare for possible military confrontation and conflict.

The stakes are high and getting higher for North Korea and the United States because the question of a peninsula-wide war or regional peace and stability is at issue. Although there are no guarantees that diplomacy will work, it is still worth trying because the costs of any future military clash on the Korean peninsula would be heavy. It is prudent therefore to give diplomacy a chance to succeed before resorting to the use of force, or even the threat of its use, to settle the issues of North Korea's ambitious nuclear and ballistic missile developments program. This paper will proceed in several steps. First, the nature and recent developments of the North Korean security problem will be clarified. Second, the U.S. Clinton Administration policy of engagement toward North Korea, in the form of the Perry report and its recommendations, will be examined. Third, the concept of "Preventive Defense" will be identified as the roadmap proposed by William Perry as a new strategy for America in the post-Cold War world. Fourth, the possibility of promoting cooperative security with North Korea will be explored. Finally, some concluding observations and future prospects on the Korean peninsula security will be drawn.

## **I. The North Korean Security Problem**

Five years after a landmark nuclear deal between the United States and the DPRK, the North Korean nuclear weapons program continues to remain frozen even if there are still lingering suspicions. The underground construction site at Kumchang-ri, for instance, was targeted for inspection by the U.S. on the grounds that it might yield evidence that the North was not living up to the 1994 agreement.

Under the terms of the Geneva Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994, the DPRK has agreed to freeze its nuclear program at the Yongbyon complex. This was in exchange for the United States providing the two light-water reactors (LWRs) that would yield less weapon-prone spent fuels. North Korea was also promised a supply of heavy oil until the completion and delivery of at least one of the two LWRs to be handed over to the North. (Kihl and Hayes, 1997) Pyongyang's missile program has, however, made the North Korean security problem more acute in recent years.

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was founded as an agency to implement the terms of the Geneva Agreed Framework. KEDO has been instrumental not only for delivering heavy oil to North Korea but also in arranging for the construction of the two LWRs, following the signing of the Supply Agreement with the DPRK. KEDO has encountered financial problems in raising the necessary funds for heavy oil, but it has been slowly and steadily moving on after the ground-breaking ceremony of the plant site in Sinpo in August 1997.

Meanwhile, North Korea's successful launching of the Taepodong I ballistic missile over Japan into the Pacific on August 31 of 1998 has generated acute security concerns in Japan and the United States. Japan is worried about an unpredictable North Korea. The DPRK has acquired the capability to target cities like Tokyo with missiles tipped with chemical or biological—if not nuclear—weapons. The Japanese decision to participate in U.S. research and development of a theatre missile defense (TMD) system in East Asia is a direct result of the DPRK missile test in August 1998. The passage of revised U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines for cooperating in the event of an outbreak of military conflict in Japan's National Diet in 1999 was boosted by the perception of threat that the Japanese public felt as a result of the North Korean test-firing of its long-range missile.

The U.S. resolve to develop the TMD system was stimulated by a

concern that the DPRK planned to launch a second Taepodong missile. The U.S. Congress appropriated additional funds to develop the missile defense system and the pace of testing of the system has been stepped up. In February 1999, in his Annual Report to Congress and the President, the U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen called for the development of missile defense as soon as possible to protect the U.S. against missiles from so-called rogue states. The aims of this missile defense system are the following: to strengthen U.S. security relationships, to enhance the collective deterrence of missile attacks, to provide for effective missile defenses for the U.S., allies and friends, to share the burden of developing and fielding TMD, and to enhance inter-operability between the U.S., allies and friends.

According to testimony before the U.S. Congressional hearings on the DPRK missile capability on October 27 of 1999 by Joseph Bermudez, a senior researcher at Janes' Intelligence Review, the DPRK holds one to five Taepodong 2 missiles. Bermudez also said that the DPRK also has 50 to 70 Nodong missiles, and five to ten Taepodong-1 missiles, which can hit Japan. The report added that the expert also said that the DPRK has produced 750 to 1150 missiles in total, and that 300 to 400 of them have been exported overseas. Of these 25 have been used for experiments, and 425 to 725 have been already deployed.<sup>1</sup>

The TMD, which is designed as an anti-missile shield, can be reassuring for those countries that do not possess missiles, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. It could also provide double insurance for those states like the U.S. that are in possession of missiles. For its part, the U.S. wants to neutralize the threat of missile attack from North Korea and other so-called rogue states. China, however, regards the TMD as a profound new challenge. In the Chinese view, TMD could be the catalyst for a missile and anti-missile arms race leading to strategic instability in Northeast Asia.

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1 "Military Expert Tells House of Representatives that DPRK has one to five Taepodong 2 missiles." *The Asahi Shimbun*, October 28, 1999.

The U.S., Japan and South Korea have a common strategic interest in developing an anti-missile shield that can protect all of Northeast Asia, although South Korea announced that it would not join the U.S. and Japan for the joint research and development of TMD. The Kim Dae Jung Government in Seoul may appear to be less concerned about the missile threat posed by the North. But its strategic calculus may be to woo Beijing. By not participating in the TMD South Korea is able to respond to China's concern about the TMD and avoid taking a step that would appear to be an unfriendly move against the PRC.

If it works, a TMD system might neutralize the threat posed by tactical ballistic missiles, whether generated by North Korea or China.<sup>2</sup> If a TMD included Taiwan, it could herald the end of China's threat of launching missiles across the Taiwan strait, as it did in 1996. If Taiwan was integrated into a Japanese-U.S. missile defense arrangement in Northeast Asia, Taiwan would move farther away from China towards a field of influence dominated by Japan and the U.S.. China would perceive that as a significant step in a Taiwanese bid for independence to be supported by Japan and the U.S., both of which have an interest in containing the rise of China.

## **II. Engaging the Stalinist North: The Perry Report and Its Recommendation**

Engagement is one of the U.S. foreign policy initiatives undertaken by the Clinton Administration, especially toward the former communist or hostile countries, in the post-Cold War era. The Clinton Administration presented America's grand strategy in Two important documents of national security and foreign policy: "A National Security

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2 However, TMD when deployed may be vulnerable if China were to deploy multiple warhead rockets or to deploy a strategic bomb arsenal that would overwhelm TMD defenses.

Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, February 1996," and "A National Security Strategy for a New Century, May 1997." These documents assert that the world has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, but that American leadership is still essential to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the new international environment.

The three central goals for America, as the first document identifies, are the following: (1) to enhance its security via engagement, (2) to promote America's economic revitalization; and (3) to promote democracy abroad via enlargement. The three core objectives of American strategy, according to the second document, are the following: (1) to enhance America's security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight and win, (2) to bolster America's economic prosperity, and (3) to promote democracy abroad.

To achieve these strategic objectives, the United States will remain engaged abroad, the report underscores, and work with partners, new and old, to promote peace and prosperity. "We can—and we must—use America's leadership to harness global forces of integration, reshape existing security, economic and political structure, and build new ones that help create the conditions necessary for our interests and values to thrive."

The ROK government of President Kim Dae Jung adopted its own form of an engagement policy toward North Korea under the title of the "Sunshine" policy. (Kihl, 1998). There is a slight difference in emphasis and nuance between the U.S. and ROK versions of engagement policy. The U.S. engagement policy has resulted from the strategic concern for finding an alternative to the policy of containment, which was the dominant paradigm of the now defunct Cold War in global politics. The ROK engagement policy, on the other hand, is a formulation of the ROK Government of President Kim Dae Jung intended to entice North Korea to abandon its self-imposed isolation and to interact with the outside world and to move toward peaceful

coexistence and unification with the South. The engagement policy of Kim Dae Jung is based on a position of strength vis-a-vis North Korea.

Seoul's "Sunshine" policy is perceived by the North Korean regime as posing a "threat" to the existence of socialism and the continued rule of the Kim regime. On that basis Pyongyang's response to Seoul's initiative on improving inter-Korean relations has been lukewarm and often hostile. Soon after Kim Dae Jung's inaugural, Pyongyang proposed a high-level official meeting in Beijing to discuss fertilizer delivery and related issues. At the Beijing meeting held in April 1998, the Kim government invoked three principles and guidelines for negotiation with its counterpart in the North. The three guidelines, as subscribed to by the Seoul negotiator at Beijing talks, were the following: the separation of politics from economics, the reciprocity rule, and the linkage of issues for negotiation. The week-long talks in Beijing failed, however, on the question of Seoul's insistence that Pyongyang reciprocate the South's foreign aid by agreeing in principle to establishing a meeting place for reunion of separated families. The North considered that discussion to be too sensitive and political in nature.

Seoul's "Sunshine" policy initiative toward North Korea is based on the assumption that no top-down reforms are likely to be opted by the North Korean regime and that only bottom-up pressures for reform and change can work inside North Korea in the long run. The policy question for the Seoul government is how to induce Stalinist North Korea to open its doors and carry out reform by softening the regime's hard-line stance on inter-Korean relations. In this attempt Seoul decided that it is better for the North to initiate the change by itself from within. The ultimate objective is to bring about enough pressure for change inside the North that could result in its giving up of the system itself.

In contrast, the U.S. engagement policy toward North Korea is based on the rule of reciprocity. Critics see the ROK engagement as a policy of one of one-way rather than two-way giving. For this reason

they charge that Kim Dae Jung's sunshine or engagement policy is a mark of appeasement or accommodation with the communist North.

The recently released Perry report offers a current look at the intentions and direction of the U.S. policy on engagement. On September 12, U.S. and DPRK negotiators meeting in Berlin agreed that the DPRK would suspend long-range missile tests in exchange for a lifting of U.S. sanctions. A few days later, on September 14, former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry presented his report on the new North Korean Policy initiative to the U.S. Congress. The creation of the position of "North Korea Policy Coordinator" was done at the insistence and instigation of the Congress.

The U.S. Congress observed the growing gap between North Korea's threatening actions and the administration's representations that North Korea's behavior was accommodating key American interests. Accordingly, on October 19, 1998, the Congress passed H. R. 4328, the Fiscal Year 1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act (PL 105-277), mandating "a full and complete interagency review of United States policy toward North Korea." Section 582 (e) of that Act stated,

"Not later than January 1, 1999, the President shall name a 'North Korea Policy Coordinator,' who shall conduct a full and complete interagency review of United States policy toward North Korea, shall provide policy direction for negotiations with North Korea related to nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other security related issues, and shall also provide leadership for United States participation in KEDO."

The President named former Secretary of Defense Dr. William Perry to that position. On October 12, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings were held with Mr. Perry as witness. This was followed by U.S. House International Relations Committee hearings in the subsequent week. U.S. lawmakers expressed serious concern about the Perry Report recommendations and the Clinton Administration announced lifting of economic sanctions on the DPRK to see how it would affect



the future regional peace and security in Northeast Asia.

### *Review and Preview of United States Policy Toward North Korea*

The U.S. Department of State has made the complete text of the unclassified version of the Perry report available to the public. The document is entitled "Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations, on October 12, 1999." Because of its timeliness and importance, we need to examine the content of the Perry report which has been accepted by the Clinton Administration and also reacted to by the Congressional Republican Party leadership. Whether the policy recommendations of the Perry report will be carried out beyond the Clinton Administration term which ends in 2000, however, remains to be seen. The outcome of the U.S. presidential election in November 2000 will have a significant bearing upon the continuity or change in the U.S. policy toward North Korea.

The core of the Perry report is "a two-path strategy" called "A Comprehensive and Integrated Approach" that is focused on U.S. priority concerns over the DPRK's nuclear weapons—and missile—related activities. To address this issue the first path involves a new, comprehensive and integrated approach to U.S. negotiations with the DPRK. The U.S., under this plan, "would seek complete and verifiable assurances that the DPRK does not have a nuclear weapons program." The U.S. "would also seek the complete and verifiable cessation of testing, production and deployment of missiles exceeding the parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the complete cessation of export sales of such missiles and the equipment and technology associated with them." The expectation is that this step, when negotiations are successful, "would lead to a stable security situation on the Korean Peninsula, creating the conditions for a more durable and lasting peace in the long run and ending the Cold War in East Asia."

In making this recommendation of "A Comprehensive and Inte-

grated Approach," devised in close consultation with the governments of the ROK and Japan with their full support, the Perry review team considered several alternative policies but rejected them as not acceptable. They rejected the policy of maintaining the status quo on the ground that "it was not sustainable" even if the U.S. wanted to. It also examined the alternative policies of "undermining the DPRK" and "reforming the DPRK" but rejected them on the ground that this strategy "would at best require a long time to realize" and the DPRK would at the same time proceed with its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. The other remaining alternative rejected by the review team is "Buying" the U.S. objectives, by agreeing to compensate for the DPRK's foregone earnings from its missile exports. This alternative was rejected on the ground that it "would only encourage the DPRK to further blackmail."

The Perry report policy review starts from a new assessment of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. The report mentions that deterrence on the peninsula remains strong and stable, but that North Korean nuclear weapons acquisition and missiles will undermine this relative stability. Therefore, the U.S. policy focus must be to end DPRK nuclear weapons and missile activities. The report notes that three constraining factors exist on any U.S. policy toward North Korea. These are the following: (a) one cannot assume that the North Korean government will change, (b) the risk of a destructive war will dictate prudence and patience, and (c) the 1994 Agreed Framework has been effective (because it) prevented fissile material from being produced.

After noting the respective perspectives of the key actors, including the U.S. Congress, the ROK, Japan, the PRC and the DPRK, the report mentions a list of six key findings of its review team.

1. DPRK acquisition of nuclear weapons and continued development, testing, deployment, and export of long range ballistic missiles would undermine the relative stability of deterrence on the Peninsula, a precondition for ending the Cold War.

2. The United States and its allies would win a second war, but the destruction would be catastrophic. The U.S. must pursue its nuclear weapons/ballistic missile objectives without weakening deterrence or increase the probability of DPRK miscalculation.
3. If the United States can cooperate with North Korea to end DPRK nuclear weapons-and ballistic missile-related activities, the U.S. should be prepared to establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK and join in the ROK's policy of engagement and peaceful coexistence.
4. Unfreezing Yongbyon is North Korea's quickest and surest path to acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Agreed Framework should be preserved and implemented by the United States and its allies. The Agreed Framework's limitations are best addressed by supplementing, not replacing.
5. No new U.S. policy towards the DPRK will succeed if the ROK and Japan do not actively support it and cooperate in its implementation.
6. A successful U.S. policy will require steadiness and persistence even in the face of provocation. (It will) require sustained policy beyond the term of this Administration. (However,) congressional involvement is essential.

The review of these key findings has led the team to follow a recommended approach that "the U.S. should have as its goal normalizing relations with North Korea at a markedly faster rate, but North Korea needs to take steps to address U.S. concerns." However, as the report underscores, "it is not certain that the DPRK will be willing to forgo these programs and to work with us cooperatively to reduce the threat on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, the U.S. with its allies should be prepared to protect our own security."

The report moves on to examine some of the questions "not immediately addressed by the review. Those are less germane to the U.S. new policy toward North Korea. These include the ROK family reunification policy, Japanese kidnapping cases, drug trafficking and other

concerns for the U.S., chemical and biological weapons that can best be addressed multilaterally, and the U.S. forces non-withdrawal from Korea. The report then discusses some “advantages of the proposed strategy” that will draw on U.S. negotiating strengths, like the full support of U.S. allies and building on the Agreed Framework.

The Perry Report emphasizes the following five points:

- \* First, adopt a comprehensive and integrated approach to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons-and ballistic missile-related programs, like Mutual Threat Reduction (MTR), Threat Containment and Coercive Deterrence.
- \* Second, create a strengthened mechanism within the U.S. Government for carrying out its North Korea policy by appointing senior official of ambassadorial rank to coordinate policy on the DPRK.
- \* Third, continue the Trilateral Coordinating and Oversight Group (TCOG which is led by a senior official from the three countries of the U.S., the ROK and Japan) to ensure close coordination with the ROK and Japan.
- \* Fourth, take steps to explore with Congress ways to create a sustainable, bipartisan, long-term outlook towards the problem of North Korea.
- \* Finally, fifth, prepare for dealing with the contingency of DPRK provocation in the near term, including the launch of a long-range missile (though recent developments may make this less pressing.)

A need has arisen for a fundamental policy review, according to the Perry report, because of recent developments of the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile capability and increased Japanese concern over North Korean missiles. It also mentions the change in leadership of the DPRK and collapse of its economy, as well as change in ROK policy toward North Korea, i.e., the engagement policy, and China’s sharing of U.S. concerns over the North.

The final section of the Perry Report offers some “concluding

thoughts of the North Korea Policy Review team" with three observations. North Korea may send mixed signals concerning its response to MTR and that many aspects of its behavior will remain reprehensible even if we embark on this negotiating process. There are mixed feelings that the United States should recognize certain provocative behavior of the DPRK and that could force the U.S. to reevaluate current aid. The Year 1999 may represent, historically, one of our best opportunities to deal with key U.S. security concerns-working with our allies-for some time to come.

Since the underlying assumption of the Perry recommendation is mutual threat reduction (MTR), its success depends on the DPRK giving assurances that it will refrain from further test firings of long-range missiles as the U.S. undertakes negotiations on the first path. This assurance was given by Pyongyang which announced that it would not engage in test-firing of its missiles while the negotiations are underway. On the second path strategy, in case the negotiations are not proceeding satisfactorily, the report recommends the measures "to act to contain the threat" that the U.S. has not been able to eliminate through negotiation. The specific details of this measure are not shown in the "unclassified" version of the Perry report.

There is no way of knowing what the content of the classified version of the Perry report entails. Yet, according to the press account, the classified version of the report recommends that "the U.S. and its allies seek peaceful coexistence with the DPRK rather than seek to undermine or reform it."<sup>3</sup> The rationale behind this recommendation is clear. At a U.S. Senate hearing on October 12, Perry warned, "If we simply ignored them, if we simply tried to seal them off, they could still proceed with a missile and nuclear weapons program that could develop on a short time scale."<sup>4</sup>

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3 Jonathan Wright, "Perry Recommends Coexistence with North Korea," Reuters, Washington, October 13, 1999.

4 George Gedda, "Report: N. Korea Nuke Ability Vast," the Associated Press,

### *"North Korea Advisory Group" Report*

On November 3, 1999, the House International Relations Committee Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman released an alternative Republican version of the report, the U.S. House of Representative "North Korea Advisory Group" report to the Speaker of the House. This committee was not asked to make specific recommendations as part of the report. But its findings reinforce the Perry report although with differing emphasis: "Does North Korea pose a greater threat to U.S. national security than it did five years ago?" The 9-member committee "found that North Korea is continuing its activities to develop nuclear weapons." "Remarkably, North Korea's efforts to acquire uranium technologies, that is, a second path to nuclear weapons, and their efforts to weaponize their nuclear material do not violate the 1994 Agreed Framework. That is because the Clinton Administration did not succeed in negotiating a deal with North Korea that would ban such efforts. That is "inexplicable and inexcusable," so the report noted. The three-main points of the advisory group report are the following:

- \* First, the American people need to know that there is significant evidence that North Korea is continuing its activities to develop nuclear weapons.
- \* Second, the American people need to know that North Korea can currently strike the United States with a missile capable of delivering a chemical, biological, or possibly, nuclear weapons.
- \* And third, the American people (may not) know that the United States has replaced the Soviet Union as the primary benefactor of North Korea with some \$645 million in aid over the past five years.<sup>5</sup>

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Washington, October 12, 1999.

5 "Gilman Releases North Korea Report," Wireservice, Washington, D.C. November 3, 1999.

In the name of American people's right to know, the partisan position on the next year's presidential campaign themes and agenda have been put forward by the Republican Party leadership in the U.S. Congress. The North Korean security problem is likely to capture the attention and imagination of American people in the coming political season of electoral contests in the year 2000.

### III. "Preventive Defense" and Coercive Diplomacy

The concept of preventive defense underlies the general thrust of the Perry Report released on October 12, 1999 that recommends a new course of action for the U.S. policy initiative toward North Korea. This report was prompted by the growing danger and security threat posed by the North Korea's "ambitious" nuclear weapons and missile development program. The concept of Preventive Defense was first introduced by William J. Perry, in 1996, when he was Secretary of Defense but further elaborated in his co-authored book (with Ashton B. Carter) published in 1999.<sup>6</sup>

*Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America*, by William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter (Harvard University Professor and Perry's former assistant), is the blueprint of how the U.S. proposes to deal with the international security issue in the 21st century. The security environment in the post-Cold War era is different because the world has changed with the demise of the former Soviet Union. The book opens with an interesting prologue on "Four Trips to Pervomaysk: Preventive Defense at Work." It discusses how "Ukraine: a state born nuclear" has managed in March 1994 to dismantle its "missile silos turned to dust" and eventually "from silos to sunflowers" with the help of the U.S.

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6 William J. Perry, "Defense in an Age of Hope," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 6 (1996); Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999.

Clinton Administration policy under the congressionally funded "Project Sapphire, the Nunn-Lugar Program." "Our tale of four visits to Pervomaysk illustrates the paradox brought about by the end of the Cold War. On the one hand, the familiar threat of imminent global nuclear war ended when the Soviet Union ended. But the result was not a world guaranteed free of risk for U.S. security. At Pervomaysk, a new and unfamiliar danger—an unprecedented surge of nuclear proliferation in the heart of Europe—took the place of the familiar military threat." (p. 8)

The post-Cold War world has other Pervomaysk: other dangers (not threat which is more imminent and well defined, perhaps, but unless attended in timely and effective manner, they might become Cold War-scale threats). "A new strategy, with new tactics like those of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program that provided U.S. DOD aid to Ukrainian denuclearization, is needed to identify these dangers and apply U.S. influence to avert them. We call this strategy "Preventive Defense." "Like preventive medicine, Preventive Defense seeks to forestall dangerous developments before they require drastic remedies. Preventative Defense is about both grave dangers to U.S. security and great opportunities to safeguard it."

In chapter one, discussion centers around how the security question has changed "from deterrence to prevention," the need for "strategy in the absence of a major threat" and how to go about "heading off the dangers of the 21st century." "Preventive defense (the authors argue) is a defense strategy for the U.S. in the 21st century that concentrates national security strategy on the dangers that, if mismanaged, have the potential to grow into true A-list-scale threats to U.S. survival in the next century, bringing the current era to an abrupt and painful end. These dangers are not yet threats to be defeated or deterred; they are dangers that can be prevented." (p. 14) Some of these dangers are identified as follows: (each of these five dangers is addressed as separate chapter in the book).<sup>7</sup> (a) "Weimar Russia"—that Russia might descend into



chaos, isolation, and aggression as Germany did after WWI; (b) "Loose Nukes"-that Russia and the other Soviet successor states might lose control of the nuclear legacy of the former Soviet Union; (c) "Tension with a Rising China"-that China could grow hostile rather than becoming cooperatively engaged in the international system; (d) "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction"-that weapons of mass destruction will proliferate and present a direct military threat to the United States; and (e) "Catastrophic Terrorism"-that "catastrophic terrorism" of unprecedented scope and intensity might occur on U.S. territory.

In chapter four the book discusses "North Korea's WMD Programs, Standing at the Brink in North Korea: The Counterproliferation Imperative." The U.S. was on the brink of war with North Korea in 1994. "A reprieve" with Jimmy Carter's personal diplomacy and Agreed Framework, however, saved the day. Dr. Perry has had an opportunity to test his concept of "Preventive Defense" on North Korea in the course of 1999 when he traveled to North Korea as presidential envoy on a fact-finding mission.<sup>8</sup> The book closes with the following interesting "Epilogue."

"On November 23, 1998, while putting the finishing touches on this book, we found ourselves in Washington again" when Perry was

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7 The following are six substantive chapters of the book. Chapter one: pursuing Marshall's vision with Russia and NATO; chapter two: Project Sapphire, the Nunn-Lugar Program, and Arms Control; chapter three: dealing with a Rising China; chapter four: standing at the brink in North Korea: the Counterproliferation imperative; chapter five: a false alarm (this time): preventive defense against catastrophic terrorism; and chapter six: the threat within: shaping a force for the future.

8 Incidentally, this is the content of chapter three, dealing with a rising China, addresses: "Speak Softly...But Carry a Big Stick," "CBG (Carrier Based Group) Diplomacy" and "Following Through." Why and How the U.S. Should Engage More with China?" Four specific measures are noted: first, the US should work to deepen and broaden the defense-to-defense relationship; second, the US should work with China to stabilize the Taiwan question; third, the US should seek to engage China's neighbors; and fourth, the US should encourage China to greater participation in counterproliferation and other global security regimes." (p. 105)

sworn in as U.S. Special Adviser and Policy Coordinator for North Korea. Two weeks later Perry received a briefing by General John Tilelli (commander of U.S. Forces in Korea and of the US-ROK Combined Forces Command) on OPLAN 5027, the plan for the defense of South Korea against a North Korean invasion, followed by his meetings with various government leaders in South Korea, Japan, China, etc.

The book ends with the following prophetic notes: "We agreed with President Clinton and his advisers, and with many members of Congress, that a continuing weapons of mass destruction program in North Korea would rob us of the time needed for Kim Dae Jung's engagement policy to work. Unless a solution to the problem can be found, the situation could easily end up in a confrontation like that of the summer of 1994. Can a Preventive Defense approach be found that will avert a return to the summer of 1994? If so, can it be practiced in this complex region with its many players? And can the regime in Pyongyang be persuaded to give up its weapons of mass destruction ambitions without a destructive war? The answers to these questions are far from clear. They are the next challenge for Preventive Defense." (p. 221)

The concept of "Preventive Defense" as applied to the North Korean security problem in the Perry Report, in so far as its recommendations are concerned, seems to be more closely related to the theory of coercive diplomacy than either defense or deterrence. It is unclear what the classified version of the Perry Report contains in specific details. Yet, as it will be alluded to in the next section, the thrust of the recommended measures to bring about "peaceful coexistence" and "normalization of relations" in the Perry report reflect diplomatic solution and settlement of the outstanding disputes between the two countries by means of negotiation and bargaining, which is the essence of diplomacy.

In the book the authors make the point that "(A)s a guide to national security strategy, Preventive Defense is fundamentally different

from deterrence: it is a broad politico-military strategy, and therefore it draws on all the instruments of foreign policy: political, economic, and military. In making this claims the functions of defense and deterrence have been merged with that of diplomacy. There seems to be confusion, however, as to the differentiated roles and tasks. For instance, the authors assert that "(B)ut the role of the U.S. DOD is central: the department's contacts with its counterpart militaries in Russia, China, and Europe will influence their views of themselves and thus their propensity to threaten U.S. interests." "The Defense Department resources and technology are critical to countering loose nukes, proliferation, and terrorism. And the DOD has an enormous stake in the success of Preventive Defense, since the price of failure is nothing less than the emergence of new A-list military threats against which it would have to respond." (p. 18)

If so, a more clear division of tasks is needed between defense and diplomacy. If defense is the domain of DOD, diplomacy should be left to the domain of foreign policy, in order to be effective and efficient in achieving the national goals. The Perry Report, at least in its unclassified version, contains numerous references to and recommended measures for the Clinton Administration undertaking diplomatic initiatives toward the DPRK under the guise of "preventive defense" rather than the more concrete measures of defense and deterrence against the North Korea's growing security problem.

#### **IV. Promoting Cooperative Security Arrangement?**

It is no accident, in retrospect, that Dr. William Perry responded to the call for serving the U.S. government once again. This time he accepted the presidential appointment as U.S. Special Adviser and Policy Coordinator for North Korea. He was charged with the task for reviewing the security situation and making policy recommendations

to the President and Congress. For just over eight months Perry and his team traveled back and forth to East Asia to carry on consultations with the allies and friendly countries. One of the trips that his team made was to Pyongyang in May 1999 as presidential envoy on a fact-finding mission.

In his congressional testimony in October 1999, Dr. Perry stated that his visit had four objectives. These were (1) to make meaningful contact with senior North Korean officials, (2) to reaffirm the principles of the nuclear restraint that had been established in the Agreed Framework, (3) to explore whether the DPRK had an interest in going down a path to normalization, and (4) to explore whether the DPRK was willing to forgo its long-range missile program. All of these goals except the last one were attained, according to Perry, but he added that his "ultimate goal was to terminate North Korean missile exports and indigenous missile activities inconsistent with MTCR standards, but that suspending long-range missile testing was the logical first step." "The answer to our proposition was not clear in our Pyongyang meetings, but the DPRK subsequently agreed to follow-on meetings to discuss this issue further."

Will the DPRK respond to the multilateral diplomacy of promoting cooperative security arrangement on a regional basis? Whereas the bilateral forum of negotiation between the U.S. and the DPRK may address the nuclear and missile threat issues, the multilateral forum of the regional security dialogue can also be exploited and utilized. It is no coincidence that, whereas the Four Party Talks in its sixth session meeting in Berlin failed to make substantive progress, the U.S. and DPRK negotiators met separately afterward to work out the delay of the North Korean test firing and launching of the Taepodong II missile. This agreement laid the ground work for the finalization and a timely release of the Perry Report in mid-September.

It is interesting to note that the U.S. and DPRK will hold another round of the Berlin talks on November 15 and plan to resume the

dialogue started on September 7-12, 1999. "The two sides will continue exploring ways to improve relations, while addressing the concerns of both sides," according to an announcement by the U.S. State Department.

There have been several attempts to promote multilateral security dialogue in the Northeast Asia region. Unfortunately, the DPRK has not been involved actively, whether in the official or at the non-governmental levels. The DPRK has not engaged in the security dialogue or the regional forums. Hopefully, now that the US-DPRK bilateral negotiations are making some headway, it will be possible to engage the North Korean participation in the dialogues on regional security and arms control and disarmament.

Real engagement will require that the DPRK become involved in dialogue with its Asian partners. South Korea has over the years attempted to attract the DPRK to engage in such a forum. At the first senior officials meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF-SOM), which was held in Bangkok in May 1994, the ROK proposed the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) to improve the security environment in Northeast Asia by enhancing and implementing confidence-building measures among the countries in the region.

The region of Northeast Asia is beset by such chronic and destabilizing elements in the security environment as North Korean nuclear issues, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the potential danger of an armed conflict across the Taiwan Straits, and the military build-up and arms race.

Taking into account such an unstable security environment of the region, it is NEASED's objective to search for ways to maintain regional peace and stability through confidence-building efforts by way of a multilateral security dialogue at a sub-regional level. The six countries concerned in the region, namely, South and North Korea, the U.S., Japan, China and Russia, are to be involved in the process.

The Second ARF Meeting recommended that all ARF countries

enhance dialogue on security perceptions on a bilateral, sub-regional and regional basis. NEASED, if inaugurated, is expected to animate exactly such dialogues in the Northeast Asia, serving the purpose of the ARF. NEASED would not substitute the existing bilateral security arrangements in the region. It should rather complement it. NEASED is yet to be launched, however, because North Korea rejects the idea, arguing that it has no formal bilateral relations with the U.S. and Japan. Through close cooperation with the other four countries, though, the Korean government has made continued efforts to entice North Korea's participation in the dialogue with no success.

At the non-governmental-level, the multilateral security dialogue in the Northeast Asian region has already been operational. The Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), which is affiliated with the University of California at San Diego, has played an important role in organizing the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) since 1993. Senior Officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense and scholars from the ROK, the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia participated in NEACD to discuss ways to promote confidence-building measures in the region. North Korea was invited to participate in this dialogue, but it has yet to involve itself in a full plenary session. It participated at the preliminary discussion held in San Diego in July 1993.<sup>9</sup>

Following a meeting in Seoul by representatives of some two dozen strategic studies centers from ten countries in the Asia-Pacific region (Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the United States), November 1-3, 1992, it was decided that there was a need to provide a more structured

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9 The First NEACD was held in San Diego in October 1993, the Second in Tokyo in May 1994, the Third in Moscow in April 1995, the Fourth in Beijing in January 1996. Thereafter, the Fifth session was held in Seoul in September 1996, the Sixth in New York in April 1997, the Seventh in Tokyo in December 1997, the Eighth in Moscow in November 1998, and the Ninth session was to be held in Beijing in September 1999.

process of a non-governmental nature "to foster greater regional confidence building and security cooperation through dialogues, consultation and research." The result was the establishment of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), with the adoption of the Kuala Lumpur Statement, on June 8, 1993, and the CSCAP Charter in Indonesia, on December 16, 1993. Since then, the CSCAP has played a role in enhancing regional security dialogue via "a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process on Asia-Pacific security matters."<sup>10</sup>

CSCAP member countries have increased from ten to seventeen, as of 1999, to include New Zealand, Russia, North Korea, Mongolia, the European Union, China and Vietnam. Its goal is to consolidate its links to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). CSCAP activities are guided by a Steering Committee composed of representatives of all member committees that have been established in each of the member countries. The CSCAP Steering Committee meets twice a year: in June, in Kuala Lumpur, and in December in one of the other member countries. The Steering Committee is co-chaired by a member from an ASEAN Member Committee and a member of a non-ASEAN Member Committee. CSCAP also hosts a General Meeting periodically to examine a wide-ranging security issues: two such meetings took place thus far, the first in Singapore, in September 1997, and the second in Seoul, in December 1999.

Working Groups are the primary mechanism for CSCAP activity. Five groups have been established thus far. They are: (1) Comprehensive and Cooperative Security Working Group, (2) North Pacific Working Group, (3) Confidence and Security Building Measures Working Group, (4) Maritime Cooperation Working Group, and (5) Transnational Crime Working Group. It is noteworthy that the DPRK sent its delegates to the Eleventh Steering Committee Meeting in Kuala

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10 Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Seoul: CSCAP Korea, 1999, p. 2.

Lumpur, on May 29, 1999, which had a wide-ranging discussion on three topics on Regional Security Dialogue: "U.S.-China Relations and Security in Northeast Asia," "Strengthening Security in Southeast Asia," and "Developments in Kosovo: Implications for Asia-Pacific Security."<sup>11</sup> Unfortunately, the DPRK did not send its delegates to the subsequent meetings held in Seoul, December 2-4, 1999.

What is needed in the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue is a consultative forum to create and foster the favorable conditions for security cooperation among the countries in the region. Without the security dialogue first, no institution can be established to develop a regional framework for peace on a step-by-step basis. Multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia can proceed on the basis of the following principles among others: respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-aggression and no threat or use of force; non-intervention in internal affairs; peaceful settlement of disputes; peaceful coexistence; and democracy and respect for human dignity.

The conditions favorable for regional cooperation can be created by first removing mutual distrust and building mutual confidence. This process will help nurture the habits of regional consultation and establish the patterns of regional cooperation. The following specific measures are generally recommended: exchange and discussion of defense white papers; provision of data to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms; regular meetings of defense officials; and exchange of mutual visits of military personnel and of naval vessels. These will help enhancing transparency. The emphasis is placed here on preventive diplomacy, and particularly conflict prevention. It seems clear that the DPRK considers its participation in the multilateral security dialogue premature and not conducive to defending its national security interests at this time.

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11 *Ibid.*, pp. 4-8.



## **V. Conclusion**

This paper has addressed the question of the U.S. perception of the security danger and threat posed by the North Korea's ambitious program of proliferating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Whereas the DPRK adheres to the model of realism, seeking to enhance its national power through strengthening its military capability and preparedness, the United States has employed a new policy of diplomatic engagement and strategy of preventive defense in addition to its conventional military strategy of defense and deterrence. U.S. ground forces are deployed along the DMZ to deter and checkmate the North Korean invasion across the DMZ by providing a tripwire role. Whether and how well the new North Korea policy that is based on the Perry report recommendation will bear its intended fruit is difficult to say and will remain to be seen.

The Perry report and its recommendation outlines which concrete measures the U.S. engagement policy of the Clinton Administration toward North Korea can take. The concept of "preventive defense" underscores the Perry recommendation on what the U.S. can and should do to address the security problem posed by the threat of North Korea's ambitious program of weaponization of the ballistic missiles with the nuclear warheads. "Preventive defense," according to Ashton Carter and William Perry, is "a guide to national security strategy (that) is fundamentally different from deterrence." Yet, a nation's defense policy must be based on the solid foundation of deterrence.

Unlike deterrence, preventive defense "is a broad politico-military strategy, and therefore it draws on all the instruments of foreign policy: political, economic, and military," so the authors of Preventive Defense insist. (p. 18). One gets the impression that defense policy and foreign policy must be merged under the rubric of "preventive defense." Whether "preventive defense" can take the place of America's foreign policy or grand strategy, however, is disputable at best. In

the words of Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, the grand strategy "charts a nation's response to the uncertainties of an anarchic world" by taking into account "the challenges of the international system as well as the constraints and pressures of domestic society." (Rosecrance and Stein, p. 4) Preventive defense, unless deterrence is underscored, will amount to nothing more than another variation and form of diplomacy.

What the U.S. can do toward North Korea, under the Clinton Administration policy of engagement and the Perry recommendation based on the concept of "preventive defense" strategy, is nothing more or less than the variation of "coercive" diplomacy or "preventive" diplomacy. In these endeavors U.S.-DPRK negotiation and bargaining is following the established rules and norms of diplomatic practices.

Since it requires the two to tango diplomatically, however, the key variable is Pyongyang's intention and willingness to cooperate. That remains unclear and uncertain at best. For an engagement policy initiative to be successful, it must be reciprocated in kind and be embraced either explicitly or tacitly by its target country. There is no indication, as yet, that Pyongyang is inclined to go along with the engagement policy offered by either the U.S. or the ROK. In fact, Pyongyang is downright hostile toward the Seoul government's "Sunshine" policy, calling it a disguise for an "absorption" policy. Pyongyang also criticizes Washington's moves on lifting sanctions as inadequate and inconsequential.

From Pyongyang's perspective, the Clinton Administration's engagement policy must be accompanied by a set of prerequisites that include the following: a peace treaty to replace the armistice agreement, U.S. troop withdrawal from the South, the diplomatic normalization and exchange of ambassadors between the two capitals, etc. What Pyongyang demands, in short, is a bilateral channel of normalizing US-DPRK relations rather than the multilateral diplomacy that cooperative

security via regional security forum will entail. The latter avenue is something that the U.S. liberal institutionalism is geared for to accomplish in the end. What North Korea demands from the U.S. is normalization of diplomatic relations, not the implementation of the "Preventive Defense" strategy or cooperative security strategy.

Consequently, the DPRK is continuing to resist the pressures introduced by U.S. deterrence strategy and coercive diplomacy. The verdict is not in yet. The success or failure of the U.S. engagement policy, substantiated by Perry's "preventive defense" strategy, toward North Korea will depend on the diplomatic front of successful bargaining and negotiation between the two sides. It will also depend on the domestic base of political support in the United States and political leadership in each of the two parties to the continuing deadly conflict.