

## The Present Situation and the Prospect of North Korean Ideology

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Since the death of Kim Il Sung many opinions have been expressed about the prospects for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They contain two major points.

The first, a short-term question, is whether Kim Jong-il can fulfill the power succession, and the key to this is whether or not there exists a power struggle among the North Korean leadership group. Since Kim Il Sung's death, however, it is obvious that Kim Jong-il's authority has been outstanding; there is no evidence to rationalize the view that anyone in the leadership group might be challenging him. The second point, a middle- to long-term question, is whether the regime will be able to maintain its stability after Kim Jong-il's power succession.<sup>1</sup> Whether a substantial conversion of political line or policy in the direction of pragmatism (hereafter called reform) can be accomplished successfully is the key of this question, because many views

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The views in this article are completely personal and do not have any connection with any organization or government.

1 In this article, short term refers to the time it takes to establish the Kim Jong-il administration. It may be one or two years. The middle term is the time it will take the policies of this administration to be realized and the results to appear to the people. This could be about five years. Long term would mean after the turn of the century.

agree that without such reform, the current North Korean leadership group cannot maintain the regime over the long term.

This article examines North Korean ideology, especially the possibility of its reorganization, as an important factor with a vital influence on reform. As a due process to such discussion two questions should be examined. One, is it possible to perform partial reform, limited to the economic field, without ideological reorganization? The second question is whether the leadership group might arbitrarily manipulate ideology—if so, there would be no need to examine it as an independent factor.

The answer to the first question is that the North Korean economic and political administration systems are connected so indivisibly that it is not realistic to think of such partial reform. The only possible way might be through so-called open economic policy, in which the basic management system of the economy is maintained and only external relations are changed. However, in such policy Pyongyang would not be expected to introduce foreign capital in full scale—yet that will be vital for reconstruction of the economy. Regarding the second question, of course the North Korean ideology was created by the leadership group but that does not necessarily mean the leaders can change it as they like. After permeating among the people, ideology attains an independence. If the leadership were to present a new ideology or fundamental policy that contradicts the extant ideology, unless they could convince the people the reason they could lose their legitimacy.

## **North Korean Ideology in the Post-Kim Il Sung Era**

### **The Characteristics of the Extant Ideology System**

The North Korean ideology, which has been explained in various ways, could be described by three points: it has been organized under the name of *juche* thought, its main purpose is to maintain the so-called *suryong* system, and it defines the basic nature of North Korea as the “democratic base” for South Korea.

*Juche Thought*

When we say that North Korean ideology is the system of *juche*, there are two aspects. The first is that North Korea insists upon the *juche* system. According to their explanation, the system is organized according to (1) the philosophical principle of *juche* which is the core of the system, (2) the socio-historical principle of *juche*, and (3) the guidance theory. The second is that aspect which has come to be organized over a historical process.<sup>2</sup>

According to the aim of this article, which considers historical change, it might be better to consider *juche*-ism through the latter aspect. The historical development of *juche* thought consists of three phases as follows.

In the first phase, North Korea started to insist in their policy line upon *chajusung* (independence) vis-à-vis other countries. They did not claim they had their own ideology system different from Marx-Leninism; they insisted that they were applying the Marx-Leninist principle in their own situation. In the 1960s, the *juche* line was further systematized under the slogan, "*Juche* in ideology, *chaju* in politics, *charip* (self-reliance) in economy, *chawi* (self-defence) in military."

In the second phase Pyongyang developed its own ideas such as "the construction process of socialist society" and other philosophical concepts. They asserted that they were the successors to Marxism-Leninism and had overcome its historical limitations. In 1967 Kim Il Sung created his own definition of the "transition period" to communist society. At the same time, he also made up the concept of the *suryong* (supreme leader). In the early 1970s he presented a series of works about his ideas on the nature of human beings, which later came to be called "*juche* philosophy." His son Kim Jong-il systematized these ideas as

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2 For the process of forming *juche*, see Jong-Sok Lee, *A Study of the Korean Workers Party* (Seoul: Yoksapipyongsa, 1995 [In Korean]).

more of a theoretical system in his 1982 article, "On Juche Thought."

In the third phase a very peculiar concept emerged, the "socio-political life" or "socialism in our own style." North Korea tried to demonstrate that these ideas are completely different from the socialism of any other country. Mainly Kim Jong-il presented the ideas in his articles of the middle 1980s, in particular "On Some Questions on the Edification of Juche." It is obvious that the aim of reorganizing juche like this was to insist upon the difference between it and international socialism, which was in decline at that time.

#### *The Suryong System*

North Korean ideology serves to justify not only the North Korean regime in general but also its unique ruling structure, which I term the *suryong* system.<sup>3</sup> The top leader, called the *suryong*, is expected to guide the party and the people. This is different from Leninism in which the party is the most important guiding vanguard.

The *suryong* system was initiated overtly in 1967 after Kim Il Sung and his anti-Japanese partisan group had acquired exclusive power, purging the Kapsan group from the leadership group. It was established substantially by Kim Jong-il in 1974 when as the successor of Kim Il Sung, he started to convert the style of activity and organization of the Korean Workers Party (KWP).

In North Korean ideology, various rhetoric has been cooked up to justify the *suryong* system. In the 1970s a certain idea was presented about human beings: although human nature consists of *chajusung* (self reliance), *changjosung* (creativity), and *uisiksung* (consciousness), these aspects could be consolidated properly

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3 For the process and concept of the *suryong* system, see Masayuki Suzuki, *North Korea: Resonance socialism and tradition* (Tokyo: Toukyoudaigakusyuppankai, 1992 [In Japanese]).

only under the condition that one accept and obey the guidance of the suryong because each person is a social entity.<sup>4</sup> In the 1980s as mentioned, the theory of socio-politico life was introduced. According to this idea people could have socio-politico life, which is eternal and more valuable than limited physical life, under the condition that they accept and obey the guidance of the suryong, because the suryong is the core of socio-politico life. In the 1990s Confucian ethical ideas such as loyalty or filial piety, which were very traditional concepts in Korean culture, were utilized to support the suryong system. Everyone should be not only a loyal vassal but, further, a dutiful child of the suryong who gives the people not only infinite benevolence but also socio-politico life. It was insisted that the people should pay greater attention to the suryong, who grants socio-politico life, than to their own parents who give physical life, because socio-politico life is more valuable than physical life.

The suryong system is realized in North Korean politics in the following forms. The first is the necessity for a successor to the suryong. The suryong is a human being so his life cannot be eternal, but for any society to continue eternally it needs a suryong. That means the suryong should be succeeded by an appropriate person. The second is the absoluteness of the suryong's guidance. People should obey and make the maximum effort to carry out orders from the suryong as well as those from the party. The party concretizes the suryong's guidance into the form of policy. Even until death, people have no rights before having completed the mission given by the party. Third is the infallibility of the party line. On the condition that the suryong

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4 Kim Jong-il said, "The people as the masses are the creator of history, but they cannot play the role as the subject of development of society and history without correct guidance. . . . Only by accepting the appropriate guidance of the party and the suryong, the working class and the people as the masses can develop the serious and complicated struggle for reconstructing nature and society, realize the liberation of the nation and the class, build socialist and communist society successfully and manage them correctly." Kim Jong-il, *On Juche Thought* (Pyongyang: Korean Workers Party Publishing House, 1982 [In Korean]).

is holy and that the party substantializes the suryong's guidance into policy, every extant line and policy must be consistently correct. If any mistake were to be recognized officially, it would mean that such conditions are also wrong, so in no way can North Korea recognize its own mistakes.

*The Democratic Base*

North Korea has from the time of its birth defined itself as the democratic base for South Korea, that is the base by which South Korea will be democratized. Born as a country divided from its Southern brother, Pyongyang needs to deny the legitimacy of the Seoul government in order to maintain its own legitimacy. Surely, there is some change in North Korean line regarding South Korean revolution, in particular during the 1990s. North Korea has insisted repeatedly that the principle of "one nation, one state, two systems, two governments" should be the basis of unification of Korea. In this stage, it is controversial whether democratizing South Korea has any real substance in North Korean policy. Nevertheless, in spite of such change of real policy, the leadership group and the people have shared the identity of their regime that the word "democratic base" might symbolize. It was imprinted in the regime and the people at the time of the birth of the DPRK.

Through the 1970s when partisan activities of Kim Il Sung group started to be regarded as the root of North Korean revolution the word "base" was added to impart the image of partisan base.<sup>5</sup> The slogan, "Keep the style of the anti-Japanese partisans in daily life, on the production line and in study," was

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5 Haruki Wada used the expression "partisan state" for such tendency. Haruki Wada, *Kim Il Sung and the Anti-Japan War in Manchuria* (Tokyo: Heibonsya, 1992 [In Japanese]).

said to be proposed by Kim Jong-il, and it signifies the intention to reorganize the entire society under this image.

The self-definition as democratic base has had significant influence on internal and external policy in North Korea. For internal policy it has promoted the construction of the power base, not only in the military field but also in culture or the economy, by which North Korea could democratize South Korea. It has also convinced the people that the country was in an emergency situation under threat from international imperialism, so that they should accept not only strong control and mobilization by the government but also a low standard of living. Regarding external policy, this self-description has been pushing North Korea to be superior—at any cost—to the South in the international realm; it has also led to the policy of rendering Seoul's international position as low, and the stability of the South Korean government as weak, as possible.

The self-definition as democratic base has given a great advantage to the Pyongyang leadership group towards keeping themselves in power. It also formed a policy toward South Korea based on zero-sum-game thinking, which in turn has strongly influenced the leadership group.

### **The North Korean Ideology after the Death of Kim Il Sung**

For two years after the death of Kim Il Sung, among ideological articles carried in North Korean media it has been difficult to find any indication of significant change. A non-Kim Il Sung phenomenon that many expected would be inevitable has not happened, at least so far. Here is the present situation in each of the aspects mentioned above.

#### *Morality-oriented Tendency of Juche Thought*

Moral factors, the insistence upon which has been stepped up since the beginning of the 1990s, are being pushed even more frequently now. Political factors are mentioned relatively less

frequently. One example: Kim Jong-il recently declared collectivism to be "the essential concept."<sup>6</sup> He explained it as the root of socialist society, the essence of socialist ideology, the opposite of individualism (the nuance of which here is close to egoism), placing greater priority on the interests of the whole than on that of the individual. He could be interpreted as saying that socialism as a political concept will change to a more universal moral concept through the renunciation of egoism. Another example can be seen in his insistence, trying to prove the need to maintain the extant policy lines, upon the obligation of morality.<sup>7</sup>

*Substitution of Suryong with Ryongdoja*

After Kim Il Sung's death, Kim Jong-il, who is not called *suryong*, is executing the roll of *suryong*. He has been called *ryongdoja* (a superior leader) since the autumn of 1993 when Kim Il Sung was still alive.<sup>8</sup> Although the concept of the *ryongdoja* is not established in North Korean ideology as a specific position or role as is the *suryong*, regarding its function and roll it has been mentioned in almost same way as that with which *suryong* has been identified by the North Korean media since that time. Especially recently, *ryongdoja* and *suryong* are almost completely substitutive. For example, instead of "Great Suryong Comrade Kim Il Sung," frequently used is "Great Ryongdoja Comrade Kim Jong-il." With the exception of *suryong*, every title that had been used for Kim Il Sung is used today for Kim Jong-il.

Why, then, is Kim Jong-il not called *suryong*? The idea of the *suryong* system has not been renounced. Kim Jong-il repeatedly

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6 Kim Jong-il, "Giving priority to ideological activity is the indispensable request for the achievement of great socialism," *Rodong Shinmun*, 21 June 1995.

7 Kim Jong-il, "Respecting Veterans of the Revolution is the Noble Obligation of the Revolutionary," *Rodong Shinmun*, 25 December 1995.

8 For the process in which Kim Jong-il became to be called "Ryongdoja," see Takashi Sakai, "Kim Jong-il: The Road to Power," *Kaigaijijou*, Vol. 43, No. 2, February 1995 [In Japanese].



insists that suryong is the top brain of the revolution and that maintaining loyalty for the suryong from one generation to the next is for a revolutionary the highest expression of morality.<sup>9</sup>

Ryongdoja might only be a temporary name for the transition period of power succession; Kim Jong-il will probably be called suryong when he is elected to general secretary of the party and as president of the DPRK. Of course, being elected to such positions does not necessarily mean *being* the suryong, but the suryong, which is an ideological position, may reveal its power in real politics *through* such positions. In fact, in the Kim Il Sung era the position of president was explained as that position of state in which the position of suryong was embodied.

*Emphasis on Military Affairs*

After the death of Kim Il Sung, North Korea believes it is in an emergency situation and seems to have strengthened its self-perception as a militarily based entity. The main reason may be that Kim Jong-il is ruling the country as chairman of the National Defense Committee and the supreme commander of the Korean Peoples Army (KPA).

Such tendency could be expected to bind the people more tightly, so the North Korean leadership group may be enjoying the effect of this perception especially in this stage at which social control could well loosen due to the power succession and, more significantly, the serious economic difficulties.

It is thus possible to say that the leadership has need to emphasize military affairs in order to maintain internal tension due to the improvement of relations with the United States, which has traditionally been a major enemy. Pyongyang's recent military provocations might be a typical example of such policy. In fact, since this spring the Northern media has reported many

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9 Kim Jong-il, "Respecting Veterans of Revolution is the Noble Obligation of the Revolutionary."

meetings all over the country at which young men and women expressed a strong desire to join the KPA. Also, the “democratization” policy toward South Korea has been persistent, even if not so aggressive as in the past. The negative stance against South-North dialog and severe criticism against the Kim Young Sam administration are expressions of such line.

## **Possibilities of Reorganization of North Korean Ideology**

### **Reorganization Scenarios**

Were there to be any reorganization of North Korean ideology, what kind of change would occur? The most important condition would be to keep a consistency between old and new ideologies. Thus any reorganization that would require clear self-criticism of the North Korean extant leadership group or substantial criticism of past line or policy cannot be expected. For any leadership group, an ideology reorganization—certainly requiring exactly such criticism—would be difficult, but it would be especially difficult for Pyongyang because the regime has been supported by a myth of infallibility. Of course if the leadership were to change then such a limit would need no consideration. In this article, however, the possibility of reorganization of North Korean ideology will be examined under the condition that the extant leadership group stay in power.

Placing this condition is not merely for saving discussion. In fact, it is not expected that any new leadership group that would deny the authority of Kim Jong-il could long maintain its position. Following are four unlikely models of new leadership.

- Maintaining the present leadership group eliminating only Kim Jong-il but maintaining the authority of Kim Il Sung
- Maintaining the Korean Workers Party but eliminating Kim Jong-il and denying the authority of Kim Il Sung
- Maintaining the socialist system and dismantling the party
- Maintaining a North Korean regime without socialism

Concerning model 1, it would be difficult to say that Kim Jong-il is wrong but Kim Il Sung was correct because in the propaganda disseminated since the 1970s or at least since 1980 when Kim Jong-il appeared in public the authority of both leaders has been integrated. Kim Il Sung repeatedly expressed his absolute trust in and praise for Kim Jong-il.

Model 2 is also not to be expected for a similar reason: the authority of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il and the authority of the KWP have been thoroughly integrated in the propaganda that the KWP was founded and established by the two men, and that the *raison d'être* of the party is to realize the *suryong* ideology.

Model 3 would also be difficult to realize because the historical limit of Marx-Leninism has already been announced in the propaganda. It is also trumpeted loudly that North Korean-type socialism is correct and should be protected because their leaders are great. Without the authority of the two leaders and the party, it might be impossible to justify a socialist system in North Korea.

In model 4 it is difficult to explain, if the systems of both sides are the same, why the Korean peninsula should be divided. North Korea would lose its legitimacy. Through the democratic-base concept, the North Korean people keep a same-nation feeling of togetherness with the South Koreans.

It might therefore be said that once any of the above models were to be realized—and the possibility cannot be eliminated completely—the leadership would not stand long and political confusion could not but increase until the collapse of the whole regime. Under such conditions, and according to the present situation of North Korean ideology outlined above, three scenarios might be assumed as forms of future reorganization of ideology in North Korea.

*Enforcement of the Mass Line*

The first scenario is to enforce the "mass line." Although this has never been realized in real experience, it has the potential to expect and to encourage the initiative of the masses. In North Korean society there could be two concrete methods for enforcement of the mass line. The first is political, through the function of representative organizations such as Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) or the various local People's Assemblies, as the constitution describes. The function of those organizations is to supervise all administrative organizations, and they have been retained legally—but in actuality that function has been completely ignored. For example, the SPA has not held session even a single day since the death of Kim Il Sung. If this function were really to be carried out, some of the problems of bureaucratism in the administration system—which Kim Il Sung criticized repeatedly—might decrease and the efficiency of carrying out policy might increase.

The second way, in the economic sphere field, would be to retain the functions of the party committee of each enterprise so that they could realize the authority to manage themselves under the principle of "Tae-an style" of business administration, a collective management through the party committee by the enterprise director, chief managerial staff, and labor representatives. Real control, however, seems to be handled by the party secretary group who are supposedly selected by party committee but who in fact are subordinate to the upper party hierarchy. If the party committees, in which representatives of labor are included, were to gain real power then the workers might end up with better incentives.

Such methods would not contradict the extant North Korean ideology. Both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il have insisted upon the need for enforcement of the mass line, especially to exterminate bureaucratism—which, they said, can only ruin the foundation of the socialist system. Of course, this way has its limit

because ultimately the idea of the mass line might contradict the idea of guidance by the *suryong*. The authority that each representative organization could have would be limited to planning and to checking details; the administrative organizations would execute the policies decided by the upper organizations. Certainly this would not be a thorough way, but it might significantly change the overall system which has been so rigid and closed.

*The Road to the Moral State*

The second scenario is the way to the "moral state." Moral state, not an expression in North Korean ideology but the author's own term, means a state in which legitimacy is established upon morality, a more universal concept than any specific ideology. In North Korea, changing to a moral state would mean that the idea of socialism or *juche* would diffuse and lose real influence over society, and the ideas from Confucian ethics would become a more important factor for maintaining social integration. As mentioned above, some indication of such tendency can be seen established even in recent works by Kim Jong-il.

In this scenario there might be two sub-scenarios, because the political implications of such Confucian ethics are so vague that opposing interpretations would be possible.

The first sub-scenario is the way in which these Confucian ethics would be separated from real politics and policy would become free from any ideological spell. Policy would be more realistic and pragmatic. In this case, the role of the top leader, whoever he is or whatever he is called, could only be symbolic. Also, the role of the party would decrease. On the other hand, the role of so-called technocrat group would increase.

The second sub-scenario would be to go the more mystical way in which rather emotional factors are emphasized such as mysticism or nationalism. It might be called the road to a

religious state. In this case, the top leader could keep absolute power, supported perhaps by the "greatness" of his personality or by some more mystical idea rather than the concept of the *suryong*. Nevertheless, even in such case it is possible that the North Korean economy might shift to step up foreign relationships and bring in outside capital through exploitation of domestic labor source coordinated with the leadership group.

*Regression to Original Juche Thought*

The third scenario would be for the present *juche* system, eliminating surplus ideological decorations such as Confucian and mystical ideas, to be reorganized to its original posture in which *chajusung* (self-reliance) is the core. Symbolically that would mean to go back to the situation before 1967.

In this case, *juche* would be regarded as the system of creative performance of the Marxism-Leninism principle applied to the actual conditions in North Korea. The concept of *suryong* would be renounced. Under such situation it would be less difficult to enforce the idea of mass line mentioned above. Also the tendency to pragmatism might increase, at least to a point greater than exists now.

**Possibilities for the Reorganization Scenarios**

These scenarios are theoretical, but the possibilities of their actually being realized is a different problem. First, positive and negative factors common to those scenarios will be examined, then specific factors in each scenario and their respective chances of coming about.

The most important positive factor is that the North Korean leadership group needs something new by which it can increase the efficiency of the whole system and enforce the mobilization of the masses, because it has no effective way to settle recent serious economic difficulties. Neither is Kim Jong-il's charisma enough to integrate and mobilize the people for socialist con-

struction, especially compared with how powerfully Kim Il Sung did. It must also be pointed out that the leadership group, at least a part of it, seems to recognize that they need some change for survival and development of the regime.

On the other hand, there are negative factors. First of all, the resistance of people who by reform would lose their vested interests should be considered. The second factor is that there is an established belief within the North Korean leadership group that if the party central command system were to loosen even a single notch, it would inevitably introduce the collapse of the whole socialism system, as per the lesson with international socialism. Third, North Korea has historically always hesitated to introduce reform even though they had the theoretical possibility and the opportunity to do so. Finally, it should be mentioned that there is no social foundation to request or support any ideological reorganization as Christian society did in Eastern Europe.

Regarding specific factors and possibilities in the mass-line scenario the most serious point would be that all the bureaucrats of the party and administrative bodies might form an opposition league and resist the implementation of the new line in order to protect their common interests. Such resistance would seem to be so strong that the necessity of reform would be ignored.

In the moral-state scenario, each sub-scenario should be examined. While the pragmatic line would be the most suitable for pushing reform, the leadership group might be anxious that they lose their ideology to integrate the people. They have no experience to rule without it. Of course, it might be said that granting the dream of development and prosperity would be preferable to enforcement of empty ideological control, but the problem would be to convince the leadership. It would seem a big risk for them to choose such a course, and the attitude of Kim Jong-il might be an important negative factor; although his personality is not clear it is difficult to imagine that he would agree to decrease his power.

On the other hand, in the mystical-way scenario the resistance of bureaucrats may be relatively weak. Only some of the technocracy, scientists, or people with much contact with the outside might resist such a line, but they would seem to have little influence on ideological affairs even if they would be expected to play an important role in the nation's future development. Although it might seem that choosing such a line might not to be able to solve North Korea's basic problems, the idea itself might be adaptable to the political culture in North Korea where democratic politics have never in history been realized.

In the original-juche scenario, there is a serious difficulty because it would deny almost everything that Kim Jong-il has done since he became the successor of Kim Il Sung in 1974. In fact, converting original juche to the present style has been one of Kim Jong-il's most important achievements. It could only damage his authority, and not only his but also the authority of everyone who has been working with him. This must be a vital point to the leadership group, so it is very difficult to expect this scenario to be employed by the present leadership.

## **Conclusion**

The conclusion of the above considerations is that the possibility of any reorganization of North Korean ideology, by which reform of North Korean politics would be encouraged or at least allowed, is extremely low. Even if any reorganization were to happen, the only way might be to take a rather non-rational approach. Here might be the only way for Pyongyang to achieve its so-called soft landing, if such a thing is possible, realizing economic development and changing its political system to an authoritarianism system like the way in which South Korea succeeded. However, this process would certainly be accompanied by serious difficulty such as intensification of social instability. North Korea would be unable to succeed without almost



a miracle such as South Korea realized in its “miracle on the Han River.”

Because North Korean ideology lacks flexibility, it is almost impossible for the leadership group to reform the system significantly and successfully, even if they know they need it and want to do it. If they would try to proceed by force, serious confusion might occur due to the contradiction between *juche* and the new policy line. Certainly, any country employing a new line might experience some conflict with the existing line, so this is not a fair way to predict the failure of a new policy. In fact, as we all know, China has been going forward with substantial reform even with serious difficulties such as the Tienanmen affair. But North Korea is not China. The Pyongyang regime seems unable to withstand such a crisis. China does not need to be anxious about being absorbed by Taiwan, whereas North Korea does need to worry about being swallowed by Seoul. It is thus natural that the North Korean leadership is more insecure than is the Chinese.

It is thus reasonable to estimate that the North Korean leadership group will avoid reform until the end of its regime.

As an additional consideration, the sustainability of North Korean regime will be examined very briefly. On this point, the most important factor is regime support by the people. Simply speaking, the regime may face serious instability even in the middle term, because it is natural for the people to expect at least some change of the system in the post-Kim Il Sung era. As mentioned, however, the leadership will shun it. Especially, the start of the Kim Jong-il administration might be the very moment when the people begin to feel frustration about the rigidity of the regime. (If this idea is correct, it may explain why Kim Jong-il did not rise to the position of state president and general secretary of the party. He needs time to prepare something new.) Surely, aid from outside may ease such frustration, but whatever aid North Korea might be presented with will only be symbolic unless the country changes its system visibly. Actually, it could

become difficult for North Korea to obtain such aid if frustrations explode in one form or another and the human rights problem is posed in full scale. If the regime loses support from the people completely then nobody from the outside would, nor probably should, support it.

As an extension of the above context, the people of concerned countries should recognize the need to discuss the collapse of the North Korean regime. The discussion should cover three points as follows. The first is how to deal with various situations that would be occur in the process of the collapse. Such contingencies would not be limited to a military invasion by the North. For example, an uprising in the North Korean area bordering South Korea might create a serious dilemma. Another point is how to proceed with the process of reunification. There are many serious problems not only concerning the basic method to integrate both areas but also rather detailed problems, such as how to deal with the rights of old landlords in North Korea, and how and whom to punish among those who engaged in state terrorism inside and outside the area. A third point is what relationship should be established between unified Korea and other countries. These problems are too serious and complicated to be solved instantly by a limited group of people. Especially, under some urgent situation which may happen even in the near future, it would be difficult to keep discussions cool and prudent. These discussions should start, therefore, as soon as possible by many people from various fields, not only those of politics and economy but also religious, ethics, history, etc.