


Study Series 16-05



South and North Korean Integration and North Korea's Adaptability: From the Perceptive Point of View

Kim, Soo-Am
Kim, Sun-Hwa
Park, Juhwa
Song, Joung-Ho
Lee, Sang-Geun
Jeon, Youn-Suk
Huh, Moon-Young
Hyun, Inae
Hong, Sukhoon

Study Series 16-05



South and North Korean Integration and North Korea's Adaptability: From the Perceptive Point of View

Kim, Soo-Am
Kim, Sun-Hwa
Park, Juhwa
Song, Joung-Ho
Lee, Sang-Geun
Jeon, Youn-Suk
Huh, Moon-Young
Hyun, Inae
Hong, Sukhoon

South and North Korean Integration and North Korea's Adaptability: From the Perceptive Point of View

Printed August 2016

Published August 2016

Published by Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU)

Publisher President, Korea Institute for National Unification

Editor Strategy and Public Relations Team, Planning and Coordination Division

Registration number No.2-2361 (April 23, 1997)

Address 217 Banpo-daero(Banpo-dong), Seocho-gu, Seoul 06578, Korea

Telephone (82-2) 2023-8038

Fax (82-2) 2023-8298

Homepage <http://www.kinu.or.kr>

Design/Print Handesigncorporation (82-2) 2269-9917

ISBN 978-89-8479-844-1 93340 : Not for sale

340.911-KDC6 / 320.9519-DDC23 CIP2016020682

Copyright Korea Institute for National Unification, 2016


All KINU publications are available for purchase at all major bookstores in Korea.

Also available at the Government Printing Office Sales Center

Store (82-2) 734-6818; Office (82-2) 394-0337

South and North Korean Integration and North Korea's Adaptability: From the Perceptive Point of View

This is a translated version of the Korean report published in January 2015. The analyses, comments and other opinions contained in this paper are those of the authors' and do not necessarily represent the views of the Korea Institute for National Unification.

The background of the page features a pattern of thin, wavy, horizontal lines that create a sense of movement and depth. A horizontal band of a slightly darker shade of gray runs across the middle of the page, serving as a backdrop for the title text. The overall aesthetic is clean and modern.

**South and North Korean
Integration and North Korea's
Adaptability: From the
Perceptive Point of View**

CONTENTS

1. Introduction	8
A. Purpose of Study	8
B. The Concept of North Korea's Adaptability	10
2. North Korean Defectors' Perception on Inter-Korean Institutional Integration	16
A. Survey Outline	16
B. Perception on Unification	17
C. Perception on Life Satisfaction and Identity	18
D. Perception on Integration of Political System	19
E. Perception on Integration of Economic System	21
F. Cross-Analysis of Major Indicators	24
3. Direction of Inter-Korean Institutional Integration from Perceptive Point of View	32



Introduction

1. Introduction

A. Purpose of Study

Previous studies on inter-Korean integration have proposed the basic frameworks for the integration of system in each sector in the context of institutional integration. In particular, the researchers have mainly dealt with the details of integration for each sector - which forms of system will be applied to the integration in the institutional integration process. However, the studies on a specific strategy for integration and an action plan on how to actualize the framework have still been relatively scarce. To effectively pursue the inter-Korean integration at the time of unification, a detailed integration strategy and an implementation plan are required with the consideration of South Korea's domestic capabilities, the level of institutionalization of South and North Korea, North Korea's capabilities, and international capabilities.

In order to establish the effective strategy to promote integration and an action plan, one must bear in mind the North Korean factor - one axis of integration. However, the existing studies in inter-Korean relations have mostly adopted the approach of objectifying North

Korea in an inter-Korean integration research. To design an effective strategy to pursue the inter-Korean integration and action plan, it is necessary to thoroughly scrutinize North Korea's capabilities, while setting North Korea as the subject of integration. Above all, previous studies rarely consider how the North Korean people will respond to such system when pursuing the inter-Korean integration. Accordingly, engineering an efficient strategy for the inter-Korean integration requires an approach reflecting the perspective of North Korea's adaptability – how the North Korean people, as a partner of integration, would think of the institutional integration such as liberal democracy, the market economy, and the rule of law and how they will respond to them. On that note, this study examines the inter-Korean relations with the North Korean factor at the center.

The study dealt with the perception on North Korean defectors to analyze North Korea's adaptability toward inter-Korean integration from the viewpoint of perception. While it would be ideal to conduct a survey on North Koreans directly, that was not a feasible option given the current inter-Korean relations. Therefore, the study takes an indirect method by conducting the survey of North Korean defectors' perception based on structured questionnaires. In other words, the research indirectly examines North Korea's acceptability at the individual level by analyzing North Korean defectors' understanding of systems for each sector and the level of adaptability for each period in their settlement process in the South Korean society.

B. The Concept of North Korea's Adaptability

Currently, Korean unification and inter-Korean integration are pursued based on two core tenets – the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the Korean National Community Unification Formula. In pursuit of the inter-Korean integration based on these two precepts, institutional integration is sought by peaceful means of the inter-Korean agreement according to the liberal democratic basic order. This study aims at approaching the inter-Korean institutional integration from the two perspectives – agent and system – under the premise of gradual and peaceful unification.

First is the agent of integration. Inter-Korean integration will be pursued with the South and North Korean authorities and people of both sides as agents. Introducing a new perspective of North Korea's adaptability to inter-Korean integration requires an approach of setting the North Korean authority as an agent. Moreover, when applying the perspective of adaptability in the inter-Korean integration, the North Korean residents should also be designated as main agents.

Second is the method of institutional integration. The institutional integration largely divides into 'transplantation' type and 'convergence' type. When a heterogeneous agent and the system are integrated as the superior system, "transplantation" type can be introduced among various forms of institutional integration. As the inter-Korean integration is pursued based on the liberal democratic

basic order, the study postulates the transplantation type as a means for institutional integration.

Since this study attempts to newly probe into the inter-Korean integration issue by applying “adaptability” concept,” the concept of “adaptability“ is arbitrarily defined.

First, in terms of systems, North Korea’s adaptability to the inter-Korean integration signifies to what the extent North Korea is capable of accepting integration. Therefore, the type and characteristics of the North Korea’s political and economic systems at the time of institutional integration will determine the North’s adaptability.

Second, regarding perception, North Korea’s adaptability to the inter-Korean integration is the issue of North Korean people’s perception on inter-Korean institutional integration. In short, the study postulates that the agent of adaptability is the “North Korean people“ and the ground to measure the adaptability is “perception. “

The study defines that the North Korea’s adaptability to inter-Korean integration at the perceptual level is composed of two factors - understanding and satisfaction (appreciation) when the inter-Korean integration is sought applying the transplantation type.

First, it is the adaptability to understand the new system. When new systems are transplanted, the North Korean people will encounter the issues of understanding the disparate systems and norms. The adaptability in terms of understanding is the issue of to what extent North Koreans – who have lived under the different political and


economic systems and institutions - will understand and accept the new system. The adaptability in terms of understanding will mainly be centered at an individual basis.

Second, another factor in North Korea's adaptability to the inter-Korean integration at the perceptual level is the issue of how much the North Korean people will be satisfied and empathized with the inter-Korean institutional integration during the process of transplanting new system. As agents of integration, the North Korean people will determine the level of satisfaction on the result of institutional transplantation in relation to their interests. Satisfaction - adaptability in terms of perception - relates to the "expectation" that the North Koreans have for their lives under the new system. The adaptability to the inter-Korean institutional integration from the perspective of satisfaction and appreciation will rest on the degree of congruity between expected benefits from integration and the actual resulting benefit. The awareness on equal opportunity and participation rate will function as the main factors in determining the North Koreans' adaptability to the inter-Korean integration from the perspective of satisfaction.

<Table 1> Operational Arbitrary Definition of the Adaptability Concept

Composition	Variable	Evaluation Factor
System level	Political System (Institution)	• Type and characteristics of North Korea's political system at the time of integration
	Economic System (Institution)	• Type and characteristics of North Korea's economic system at the time of integration
+		
Perception level	Level of Understanding	• The level of understanding of the political and economic system at the time of integration
	Level of Satisfaction (Appreciation)	• Expectations for integration vs substantial outcome in life - High level of satisfaction (appreciation) ↔ outcome > expectation - Medium level of satisfaction (appreciation) ↔ outcome = expectation - Low level of satisfaction (appreciation) ↔ outcome < expectation
		• equal opportunity and participation rate
		• the level of identity formation

Source: written by the author



2

**North Korean Defectors'
Perception on Inter-Korean
Institutional Integration**

2. North Korean Defectors' Perception on Inter-Korean Institutional Integration

A. Survey Outline

The study applied an indirect research method with the use of structured questionnaires targeted for North Korean defectors in order to analyze the North Korean people's adaptability to the inter-Korean integration from the perceptive point of view. The questionnaire largely consists of perception on unification, life satisfaction and identity, perception on integration of the political and economic systems.

The 2015 survey on perception of North Korean defectors was conducted for 14 days from September 15th to 28th. The target was 240 North Korean defectors currently living in South Korea. Especially, the sampling was done by means of minimizing the deviation of the period of stay in South Korea to record the pattern of the changed awareness depending on the period of their stay in the South. After having gone through editing, codifying, and input, the collected data was analyzed using the statistical analysis software, SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) version 18.0.

B. Perception on Unification

1) North Korean Defectors' Necessity for Unification and Behavioral Analysis

An outcome of the survey targeting the North Korean defectors suggests that they perceive unification as categorically necessary and that this notion is reinforced when one is older and economically worse off. It is revealed that the people who have stayed longer in South Korea after escaping North Korea and are in decent economic conditions relatively tend to view the economic cost of unification negatively.

2) North Korean Defectors' Perception on Reason for Unification and Unification Benefits

North Korean defectors still view that unification is an obviously necessary task that Korea has to achieve as one nation. And they tend to take more of a realistic consideration on unification as they reside longer in South Korea. Also, defectors believe that the unification will benefit the North Korean regime and its people more than South Korea and that unification is a must for individual benefits. They also have a shared view that it requires at least ten years after unification to narrow the gap in the living standards between South and North Koreans.

C. Perception on Life Satisfaction and Identity

Overall, the study shows that the North Korean defectors are relatively content with their lives in South Korea. Nevertheless, it is note-worthy that their level of satisfaction declines as their settlement period in South Korea gets lengthened. Moreover, the older they get, the higher the satisfaction rate is. Since people in their 40s have a comparatively low level of satisfaction, there need to be further studies to trace the additional factor behind this trend.

As roughly 30 percent of defectors reports a feeling of unease and negative perception on building a fellowship with South Korean, some works need to be done to address this issue. Above all, it should be noted that as North Koreans stay longer in South Korea, their uncomfortable sentiments over South Koreans also increase.

The percentage of North Korean defectors who find themselves different from South Koreans still remains higher than those with negative views on South Koreans or on building a fellowship with them. It is revealed that while the majority of defectors report the affirmative response of their identity as Korean nationals (73.3%) or have pride as Korean nationals (89%), about 30 percent of them have yet to form their identity. Interestingly, the longer the people reside in South Korea, the lower their national pride is.

Relatively fewer people have a feeling of discomfort on Korean ethnicity as a whole compared to South Koreans. Nonetheless, those

who view the Korean race negatively are slightly higher than those who have the perception of discomfort. Moreover, the difference of thought between North Koreans and South Koreans is higher than between North Koreans and the whole Korean race. And the older defectors get, the higher the negative view of identity becomes. In the aspect of pride, they have a higher national pride as one ethnicity than as Korean nationals.

D. Perception on Integration of Political System

1) North Korean Defectors' Level of Understanding and Appreciation of Political System

While North Korean defectors tend to understand better about the political system as they reside in South Korea longer, the overall percentage of defectors who understands the political system is about 50%. The level of the understanding on the multiparty system and administration change is roughly 70%. However, their understanding of the opposition parties' critiquing role is lower than 15%. Men tend to understand the political system and institutions relatively better than women do. While the defectors show a preference of the strict legal order, they reportedly have the weak perception on the rule of law. Foremost, about 13.8% of them still assert that they could use violence to attain their goals. Similarly, more defectors favor an order over

protests and tend to have a poor understanding of the critical role of civic groups. With regard to the actions in the political system, the overwhelming majority of North Korean defectors understands the right to choose a candidate but they comparatively tend to have the low level of recognition of the candidates. Their participation rate in the political system is recorded higher at 75% than the South Korean public.

2) Prediction of North Koreans' Perception on Integration of Political System

Seventy percent of defectors estimated that most North Korean people will find it difficult to understand the democratic system in the process of inter-Korean institutional integration. In detail, around 58% of defectors replied that North Koreans will have problems understanding the electoral system and for the party system, 71% replied with a pessimistic view. To sum up, the defectors made a projection that North Koreans will find it difficult to understand the party system more than the electoral system. Nonetheless, it was forecast that defectors will struggle to embrace the party system irrespective of their age and the period of settlement. Hence, there needs to be a specific plan to raise the level of understanding of the party system in the political integration process in the future. The number of people who view that North Korean people will be

politically discriminated are more or less equal with those with contrasting views. However, given the possible prediction that North Koreans will have more difficulty understanding the party system than the electoral system, more priority should be given to facilitation of comprehending the party system in the inter-Korean integration process of the political system, and an action plan should be established accordingly.

E. Perception on Integration of Economic System

1) North Korean Defectors' Level of Understanding and Appreciation of Economic System

On the whole, the study showed that the North Korean defectors understood about 57% of the economic system in South Korea and that it took more than 10 years for them to grasp the economic system of the South. And the result suggested that the positive views on one's own capabilities such as employment and the negative views under the capitalist system were reported almost equally. More women tended to evaluate themselves negatively than men. About 62% of them reported some difficulty in acquiring the capabilities – higher than the evaluation result on capabilities. Still, 65% of them positively responded that they were capable of living off by their own income. The survey demonstrated that the defectors enjoyed somewhat stable

employment status when they settled in South Korea for more than ten years.

On the relation between competition and the social development, the overwhelming majority of 80% turned out to agree with the competition. Men were more inclined to positively regard the correlation between capabilities and remuneration than women. While 70% assented to the view that diligence will make oneself better off, the rate dropped to 54% for those who have lived in South Korea for more than 10 years. Conversely, 60% affirmed that people are impoverished because they do not work assiduously. Also, only 44% regarded laziness as a cause of failure. On the correlation between the private ownership system and diligence, the number of positive views and negative views were more or less the same. And 57% agreed to the correlation between the value of work and diligence.

52% of North Korean defectors held the view regarding the corporate management that the workers should have more rights to decide. However, approximately 10% agreed to the view that the labor strike cannot be justified for the cause of wage increase and the improvement of labor conditions. A similar number of people answered positively and negatively on equity and efficiency of private-owned enterprises. More people negatively viewed the correlation between corporate profits and individual gains at 55%, little more than those who affirmed it. The North Korean defectors predominantly (87%) responded that companies and the riches do not

pay enough taxes relative to their assets. Lastly, they predominantly responded that the government should place corporations under its control.

By and large, roughly half of the defectors still had a dissenting view of companies. Particularly, they regarded negatively the amount of taxes paid by corporations.

2) Prediction of North Koreans' Perception on Integration of Economic System

North Korean defectors overwhelmingly responded that in the event of unification, North Korean people would accede to the private ownership system. And 64% of defectors estimated that they will face difficulties in understanding the private ownership system despite the overwhelming majority of North Koreans agreeing on the private ownership system. And 68% of defectors said that the North Korean people will struggle with an employment after unification. And more strong view of North Korean defectors was reported on the prospect of grappling with a job even after unification. However, 61% of them estimated that North Koreans will receive the substantial benefits that they expected.

F. Cross-Analysis of Major Indicators

1) Rationale for Unification

Overall, the respondents in their 40s or over preferred the permanent peaceful division compared with those in their 30s or less and women tended to favor the permanent peaceful division more than men. However, such tendency prominently was observed when the defectors stayed in South Korea for more than four years.

2) Action for Unification

Mainly, North Korean defectors have shown a behavioral pattern to work actively for unification, and this tendency appeared strongly irrespective of gender or age. Also, the study suggested that this had nothing to do with the period of socialization in South Korea. Generally, men valued the rationale but have not showed a big difference when compared with the instrumental reason. This inclination has been witnessed consistently regardless of the duration of their stay in South Korea. Nevertheless, as for women, the researchers observed the statistical difference according to the duration of their stay in the South. In the onset of settlement, they evidently prefer the rationale, but the instrumental reason gains weight around those who have lived in South Korea for 7 to 9 years.

3) Benefits of Unification

Male defectors reckoned that the benefits of unification that reach South and North Korea will be even whereas female defectors considered that the North will benefit more from the unification than the South. While they all regarded that unification will profit North Koreans more than South Koreans, women are more inclined to hold this view than men. Finally, men respondents said that unification will bring more benefits to men than women.

4) Life Satisfaction

The survey results indicated that the people in their 50s or over had the highest level of satisfaction in life. These people had meaningfully higher level of satisfaction in life than those less than 30 and in their 40s. One interesting aspect of this study is that defectors who have lived in South Korea for more than 10 years felt less satisfied except for those in their 40s. However, it is noteworthy that even if the life satisfaction rate of defectors who have lived in South Korea for more than 10 years significantly diminished, they still place themselves above the average. In general, an accurate interpretation of their life satisfaction rate is that North Korean defectors are highly satisfied with their lives and that the group of people who have lived in South Korea for more than 10 years have comparatively shown a low satisfaction rate.

5) Identity of South Korean Society

North Korean defectors take pride as a South Korean national more than the average and the researchers could not observe the difference in the level of national pride according to gender, generation, and length of stay in South Korea. Such responses from the defectors have the positive aspect since they themselves feel that they are well assimilated into the South Korean society without feeling a sense of resistance. In all variables, they do not feel uncomfortable living with South Koreans, and feel that their thoughts are not different from those of South Koreans. Moreover, they have maintained the high level of pride as South Korean citizens since their arrival. The findings have the positive implications in overcoming the heterogeneity between North and South Korean people after unification.

6) Living under Democracy

The defectors who have lived for four to six years in South Korea showed statistically meaningful results - more knowledgeable with democratic life and more adaptable to democracy than those who have lived for three years or less in South Korea. No difference was recorded in the knowledge of and adaptability to the democratic life for those who have lived longer. In terms of gender, men are easily adaptable to the democratic life better than women. In the case of men,

their adaptation to the democratic life generally enhanced as they lived longer in South Korea.

7) Democratic Values

Largely, the male defectors had a better understanding of democracy than women did. For men, the understanding of party politics did not vary by the duration of their stay in South Korea. On the contrary, meaningful change in understanding the party politics was observed among the female defectors who have settled in South Korea for more than 10 years. Also, it is noticeable that respondents who are less than 30 and have lived in South Korea for more than 10 years have the best understanding of party politics. The survey suggested that they generally have no problem in understanding the multiparty system - the elementary system in democratic politics - despite the fact that they had previously lived under one-party rule of Workers' Party of Korea in North Korea.

North Korean defectors at large hold an authoritarian political attitude. They favor a society operated under the strict legal order and oppose behaviors, protests, and demonstrations that contest the government policies. Their authoritarian attitude has remained unchanged regardless of the duration of their stay in South Korea. Interestingly, women show a stronger authoritarian attitude than men, defying the conventional wisdom on genders.

These defectors take a negative view on expressing thoughts that oppose the majority and voicing criticisms against the government policies. Such view has more or less persisted even with the longer duration of their stay.

To conclude, while the defectors have a high level of understanding of the party system and procedural democracy, their knowledge of anti-authoritarianism and freedom of expression is weak. They have become educated with democratic values in the early days of their arrival in South Korea and no specific change has been recorded afterward. Education was observed, if any, mainly among the younger generation with those younger than 30. And educating them took minimum of 7 years and maximum of over 10 years.

The survey results on North Korean defectors' democratic values imply that the policy is required to let them learn and embrace the democratic values. Their stance on freedom of expression and anti-authoritarianism is especially very stubborn and therefore, some difficulty is expected in educating North Korean residents about the values of freedom of expression and anti-authoritarianism after unification. In particular, a special focus is needed in the conflict management after unification as the anti-authoritarian attitude on freedom of expression is the core value of democracy that is deeply connected with everyday life. Lastly, the survey outcome, which demonstrated that women held more authoritarian view and had a more negative view on freedom of expression than men, will be

effectively used in determining the subject and contents of education.

8) Living under Capitalism

As North Korean defectors have stayed longer in South Korea, they have had more stable work experience and showed confidence on their skill-sets and education related to employment. However, their actual self-evaluation of employment capability has not risen. North Korean defectors are expected to struggle with adapting to the South Korean society where freedom of occupational choice is guaranteed and various vocational trainings take place. However, such training is mainly concentrated in the early stages of their settlement when the defectors lack confidence in employment education. Therefore, there should be a vocational training for those who have comparatively high confidence in vocational training.

Contrastingly, the knowledge on the economic system and the level of their income showed no difference. The fact that the number of defectors making a living with their own income has not increased depending on the duration of their stay in South Korea suggests that the defectors still suffer from the economic hardships.

9) Understanding of Capitalism

The North Korean defectors' overall understanding of the value of labor and the competitive system is above the average. That is, the

defectors seemingly have a high level of understanding of the value of labor and the competitive system even in the initial stages of their arrival in South Korea.

The defectors, in general, disagree with the capitalistic distributive justice. Also, it is notable that the longer defectors reside in South Korea, the less they agree on the capitalistic distributive justice. Therefore, a policy interest is required as the result implies the possibility of difficulty in reaching an agreement on distributive justice between South and North Korea people after unification.

The assent to the private ownership system was recorded the highest among the capitalist value system.

10) Prediction of North Koreans' Level of Understanding Capitalism after Unification

North Korean defectors estimated that North Koreans will have a hard time understanding capitalism to some degree after unification. This concern did not differ according to gender, duration of stay in South Korea, and generation.

3

Direction of Inter-Korean Institutional Integration from Perceptive Point of View

3. Direction of Inter-Korean Institutional Integration from Perceptive Point of View

North Korean defectors answered that institutionally, they have been familiarizing themselves with the democratic political system. The study revealed that the longer they stay in South Korea, the better they grasp the political system. They also well understand the multiparty system and the administration change. Also, in the gender context, political education for citizens should be programmed considering the gender characteristics that male defectors have a better understanding of the political system.

Above all, on democratic values, the level of defectors' appreciation of anti-authoritarianism and freedom of expression was very low while they showed a high level of understanding of the party system and democratic procedures. This result connotes that there are rooms for North Korean defectors to progressively appreciate the democratic values and that it will take more time for them to fully embrace the democratic values. In the same context, North Korean defectors responded that North Korean people will face some difficulty in learning the democratic values. Especially, considering their stubborn view on freedom of expression and anti-authoritarianism, it is

expected that ultimately North Korean residents, too would have a hard time educating themselves with these values. Particular attention is needed for the conflict management after unification since the two values - freedom of expression and anti-authoritarianism - are the crux of democracy ubiquitous in everyday life. Finally, the outcome that female defectors are more tilted to the authoritarian attitude and have a negative view on freedom of expression will be useful in mapping the target and content of education.

Among the capitalist values, North Korean defectors were appreciative of 'values of labor and development through competition,' 'merit-based society,' and 'efficiency of the private ownership system' but showed a strong sense of resistance to 'distributive justice based on merit.' Their consent to 'merit-based society,' 'efficiency of the private ownership system,' and 'distributive justice based on merit' generally dwindled as they stayed in South Korea longer. The possible interpretation of this trend is that the lives of defectors under the capitalist system have not substantially improved. The facts that their actual employability has not been improved corresponding to their determination and that they cannot make a living by themselves may cause the skeptical views of the capitalist values. In relation to this, the defectors predicted that North Koreans will struggle to understand the capitalist values after unification in contrast to the political system.

The results suggest that North Koreans who have lived with the socialist view of equality may have a low level of appreciation on

competition, capability, and distributive justice and that therefore, there needs to be a detailed integration strategy to promote these values. In this context, a specific action plan should be established considering North Koreans' perception and valuation of liberty and equality. Also, the core component to be considered is how to properly combine growth and welfare.

An implementation strategy for the inter-Korean integration of the economic systems should be established by examining the experiences of North Korean defectors. While the survey result demonstrated the defectors' confidence in acquiring knowledge through education, their actual employability has not improved depending on the period of their stay in South Korea. This trend gives a lesson on how to provide a vocational education to North Koreans in the unified Korea where the freedom of occupational choice is guaranteed. First, there should be various measures to strengthen their confidence in employment in the initial period of their settlement when North Koreans lack confidence in employment. And there also should be a differentiated vocational training for the group of people with relatively high confidence in vocational training after having gone through socialization under the unified Korea.

Also, an integration strategy should be designed in consideration of the North Koreans' understanding of the political and economic system at the time of integration. For example, there should be a thorough examination and analysis on which informal institutions that North

Koreans have used to address the needs for daily necessities and which institutions that the enterprises, farms, etc. have operated under. Also, the studies are required to get a grip on what perceptions, understanding, and capabilities that North Koreans have regarding the newly-introduced institutions. Such preparation will allow the two Koreas to figure out what institutions and in which order should be integrated into the inter-Korean framework.

Establishing the implementation strategy with the consideration for the North Koreans is as essential as the content of integration and implementation plan. Above all, North Koreans' participation is the most crucial element in elevating the North Koreans' level of satisfaction for the inter-Korean institutional integration. Accordingly, in the institutional integration process, voluntary participation and willingness of people from the North should be guaranteed to boost the level of satisfaction and formation of identity. The integration process should utilize North Koreans' potentials, respect their dignity, and inspire them to find their ego and value, recognizing themselves as active beings. There should be a room for North Korea to have autonomy in renovating themselves in the inter-Korean integration process. Emphasizing only the 'efficiency' of the institutional integration would cause the adverse effects in North Koreans' formation of identity as citizens of unified Korea. For the efficient identity formation in the process of inter-Korean integration, it is essential to make efforts to subjectify North Koreans in addition to enhancing the

‘efficiency‘ of integration.

Next, from the identity aspect, North Koreans shared a sense of fellowship with South Koreans at a rate of 70 percent. Defectors generally answered to the question of identity as a South Korean national with a high level of identification. This result has positive implications on the prospect of overcoming heterogeneity between South and North Koreans after unification. However, the possibility cannot be ruled out that North Korean defectors may have responded in line with the social desirability under the recognition that they are a minority in society and are the center of the attention from various sides. In that regard, the positive and negative views of North Korean defectors on political discrimination after unification were recorded similarly. Therefore, more detailed and thorough evaluation will be necessary when compared with the existing perception of adjustment or maladjustment caused by discrimination and prejudices. And according to the result, pride as a South Korean national tended to fade for those with longer settlement period. This suggests the necessity to draw a meticulous implementation strategy and operate an education program with the consideration of identity aspect in the process of inter-Korean integration.

North Korea’s adaptability to the inter-Korean integration will primarily begin from the friendly perceptions of North Koreans on unification. The result of survey on North Korean defectors indicates that they believe that the North Korean government and its people will

benefit more from unification than the South Korean counterparts. It is vital to formulate a promotion strategy on the unification issue with the reflection of defector's perception that unification will bring more profits to North Korea. It is necessary to actively emphasize that unification is not a mere growth engine but a bonanza for North Koreans.

North Korean defectors' opinion on unification benefits strikingly diverges between genders. In terms of the national interests of unification, male defectors replied that South Korea and North Korea will have more or less equal benefits while female defectors responded that North Korea will benefit more than South Korea. Therefore, it is necessary to reflect the differences of perception between genders in framing a strategy for forming the South-friendly attitude as well as integration strategy for North Korean residents based on this survey result.

South and North Korean Integration and North Korea's Adaptability: From the Perceptive Point of View

Past research on South and North Korean unification in terms of systemic integration has been about proposing a basic framework for systemic integration in various fields. In particular, researches have mainly dealt in detail about the different types of institutions that integration may happen in by focusing on the process. Future research on South and North Korean integration must also keep in mind the North Korean element and consider the matter of adaptability by North Korea. Furthermore, it must establish a development strategy and action plan that can achieve a systemic integration that bears in mind the North Korean element. The purpose of this study is to examine the adaptability of North Korea regarding a Korean integration from a systemic and perceptive level. First, in the systemic level, the report will focus on presenting a basic classification of change through a literature review of existing researches and introduce a basic direction for assessing North Korean adaptability. Second, in terms of perception, a method of surveying North Korean defectors through a structured questionnaire will be adopted to indirectly assess the adaptability of North Korean citizens regarding an integration of South and North Korea.