

Study Series 15-01



# Tasks and Implementing Strategies of the "Trust-Building" Policy

Park, Young-Ho  
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# **Tasks and Implementing Strategies of the “Trust-Building” Policy**

This is a very abridged version of the Korean monograph published in 2014.  
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# **Tasks and Implementing Strategies of the “Trust-Building” Policy**



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**1**

# Research Objectives



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## 1. Research Objectives

“Laying the foundations for a peaceful unification” is one of the four administrative priorities of the Park Geun-hye administration.<sup>1)</sup> The three main strategies for implementing this policy are “watertight security,” “Trust-building Process on the Korean Peninsula,” and “trust-based diplomacy.”<sup>2)</sup> The watertight security is a strategy concerning national defense, while the trust-building process is a strategy for dealing with North Korea and unification matters. Lastly, the trust-based diplomacy is a strategy concerning foreign affairs. Policy objectives can be efficiently realized only when these strategies concerning national defense, unification and foreign affairs have a mutual influence on each other and are interconnected. The common concept linking these three strategies is “trust.”

President Park Geun-hye introduced the concept of a trust-based policy for the first time in August 2011 through an article published in *Foreign Affairs*.<sup>3)</sup> She suggested that the fundamental reason behind

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1) Other administrative priorities include “economic revival,” “happiness for the people,” and “cultural enrichment.” Cheong Wa Dae, “Administrative Priorities of the Park Geun-hye Administration,” [http://www1.president.go.kr/policy/assignment04.php?ass\\_sub\\_No=2](http://www1.president.go.kr/policy/assignment04.php?ass_sub_No=2). (Date Accessed May 28, 2013)

2) Cheong Wa Dae, “Policy principles,” <http://www1.president.go.kr/policy/principal01.php>. (Date Accessed May 28, 2013)

the collapse of genuine efforts by two Koreas to reconcile and the failure to break the vicious cycle of confrontation between the two is due to lack of mutual trust.<sup>4)</sup> Arriving at the conclusion that lack of trust is the fundamental obstacle to inter-Korean relations demonstrates that the Park administration intends to approach the problem not only based on principles, but also by addressing the very core of the issue. Therefore, President Park has emphasized that “in order to transform the Korean Peninsula from a zone of conflict into a zone of trust, South Korea should adopt a policy that induces mutually binding expectations between two Koreas based on global norms.”<sup>5)</sup>

Such was the philosophy behind the Trust-building Process on the Korean Peninsula, an initiative for North Korea and unification policies designed to implement the Park administration’s goal of “laying the foundations for a peaceful unification.” The following three were set as the policy objectives: (a) a development of inter-Korean relations, (b) a peace establishment on the Korean Peninsula, and (c) the laying of the groundwork for a peaceful unification. These goals are to be attained by promoting a balanced approach, formulating North Korea policies that are constantly evolving, and cooperating with the international community.<sup>6)</sup> Here, the concept of trust embodies

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3) Park Geun-hye, “A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust Between Seoul and Pyongyang,” *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 5 (2011), pp. 13-18.

4) *Ibid.*, p.14.

5) *Ibid.*, p.14.

6) Ministry of Unification, “Trust-building Process on the Korean Peninsula,” (August 21, 2014), p.10.

the relationship between two Koreas not only on a bilateral level, but also on national and international levels. In other words, trust is “the very foundation that enables the advancement in inter-Korean ties, the establishment of lasting peace on the Korean peninsula and the laying of the groundwork for a unified Korea. At the same time, it serves as social capital and infrastructure that empower us to push forward our North Korea and diplomatic policies with popular support of the Korean people and through international cooperation.”<sup>7)</sup>

The *July 4 Joint Communiqué*, which is the first document agreed upon by South and North Korea, states the “Three Principles for Unification” along with agreements to ease tensions, foster an atmosphere of mutual trust and not to slander or defame each other. Since the time the South Korean government proposed that the South and the North pursue an open door policy as to fulfill one of the “Three Principles of Peaceful Unification,” which was declared on August 15, 1974 by the then President Park Chung-hee; and that they proceed with a sincere inter-Korean dialogue and realize multilateral exchange and cooperation in order to recover mutual trust, the importance of trust-building has never been overlooked in the process of South Korea implementing North Korea policies.<sup>8)</sup> Trust is often described as a philosophical

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7) Ibid, p.5.

8) The other two are to conclude a non-aggression agreement to establish peace, and North and South free elections based on population ratio. Office of Inter-Korean Dialogue, Comparison of South and North Korea Proposing Unification/Dialogue (1945-1986) (in Korean) (Seoul: Board of National Unification, 1986), p. 156.

concept not only concerning policies on North Korea or unification, but also encompassing an entire range of state affairs, including national defense, unification, and diplomacy.<sup>9)</sup>

However, inter-Korean relations have experienced numerous ups and downs for a long time, and despite efforts put into improving bilateral relations, establishing peace and laying the foundations for unification, the relations did not make as much progress as expected. Besides, North Korean nuclear issue has emerged as a dominant agenda in inter-Korean relations since the early 1990s. In fact, there are many specific tasks that need to be carried out in order to advance inter-Korean relations, establish peace in the Korean Peninsula and lay the foundations for unification. Over the past few years, progress in inter-Korean relations has stalled and North Korean nuclear issue, the resolution to which is imperative to establish peace on the Peninsula, have in fact worsened. Furthermore, much effort is needed to expand domestic and international capacity to establish the foundations for unification.

As it is evident from the results of the last 40 years of inter-Korean dialogue and contact as well as the current state of affairs, it is difficult to assess the outcomes of policies on North Korea and unification on a short-term basis. We know by experience that often inter-Korean relations suffer a setback after some progress has been made. In

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9) Park Hyeong Jung, Cheon Seong-whun, Park Young-Ho, et al., *Trustpolitik: the Park Geun-hye Administration's National Security Strategy - Theory and Practice*.(Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2013), pp.15-16.

addition, objectives of North Korea and unification policies cannot be easily achieved in the short term. From 1970 to 2014, there were approximately 640 cases of inter-Korean contacts and dialogues.<sup>10)</sup> Nevertheless, the fundamental nature of military confrontation has remained unchanged. Despite sporadic cases of reconciliation and cooperation, structural conflict and hostility still persist. To date, North Korea has responded negatively to South Korea's policies such as the "Dresden Initiative," not to mention the trust-building process.

After Kim Jong-il's death in December 2011, a third-generation succession took place in which Kim Jong-un ascended to leadership in a monolithic leadership system. Since forth, the development of "nuclear weapons and missile"—the legacy of the Kim Jong-il regime - has become both an official core strategy and a means of national defense. Kim Jong-un stipulated North Korea as a "nuclear-weapons state" in the DPRK Constitution and adopted a "*byungjin* line of nuclear development and economic construction (a policy pursuing the development of both nuclear weapons and economy at the same time)" as a strategy for national development, more aggressively strengthening North Korea's nuclear deterrence.

Meanwhile, Northeast Asia has been witnessing the relative decline of the United States, once the only superpower, and China expressing assertive foreign and defense strategies based on its rapidly

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10) Ministry of Unification, "Inter-Korean Dialogue Statistics," <http://dialogue.unikorea.go.kr/home/talk/statistics/list>. (Date Accessed October 10, 2014)

growing economic might. The region that is most sensitive to changes in Sino-U.S. power dynamics is the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, disputes between China and Japan and between South Korea and Japan over territory and history have further affected the environment surrounding South Korea’s policies on North Korea and unification. Issues on the Korean Peninsula are becoming more internationalized, and bilateral and multilateral relations among Northeast Asian states have become very complex. There is no evidence that the Kim Jong-un regime’s aggressive policy on South Korea has shifted, and the debate on the actual stability of the regime is still ongoing. In addition, there are many problems in South Korea’s economic, political and social capacity to normalize inter-Korean relations and lay the foundations for a peaceful unification.

Under such circumstances, there will be numerous obstacles to materializing sustainable peace in the Korean Peninsula through a new paradigm for North Korea and unification policies, and to implementing strategies to realize a “new Peninsula” that would yield a happy unification by laying the foundations for a peaceful unification. In order to develop inter-Korean relations and create a strong foundation for unification, policies on North Korea and unification must be promoted based on long-term strategies for national development. Meanwhile, to normalize inter-Korean relations, denuclearize North Korea, establish peace on the Peninsula and lay the foundations for unification, the Park administration’s policy on North Korea and

unification, which is presented as the “Trust-building Process,” must be implemented and executed in earnest. Moreover, the trust-building process must develop into a sustainable policy that transcends limitations of time, space, and the surrounding environment. According to the Ministry of Unification, the trust-building process is a “new approach” that seeks to comprehensively undertake North Korean issues by adopting the benefits of past policies on North Korea.<sup>11)</sup> In order for this “new approach” to yield successful results and emerge as a sustainable North Korea and unification policy, it will need to be consistently improved and developed. The trust-building process proposes “an evolving North Korea policy” as one of its principles for carrying out policies. According to a national survey on what should be the Park administration’s priorities for the forthcoming tasks, a majority of people think that a “formulation of a unification policy that is sustainable regardless of changes in administration” is the most imminent task concerning unification.<sup>12)</sup> Among the many factors that affected German unification, a consistent application of *Ostpolitik* irrespective of changes in administration, that is, alterations in its political inclination between the left (SPD) and the right (CDU), is thought to have had a very significant impact.<sup>13)</sup>

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11) Ministry of Unification, “Trust-building Process on the Korean Peninsula,” p.26.

12) The next is to “resume economic cooperation and improve inter-Korean relations,” “strengthen unification diplomacy towards neighboring countries,” “resolve the South-South conflict between the conservatives and the progressives,” “expand promotion on the benefits of unification to the South Korean people.” *Dong-A Ilbo*. July 27, 2014.

In consideration of these problems, the objectives of this research are to present specific tasks and implementation strategies to accomplish core tasks of North Korea and unification policies, such as the normalization of inter-Korean relations, North Korea’s denuclearization, and the establishment of peace on the Peninsula, and the laying of the foundation for unification. This research also seeks to present an “integrated approach” that will make it possible to carry out the aforementioned tasks in a comprehensive, multi-faceted and concurrent manner. The term “trust-building policy” used here refers to North Korea and unification policies that aim to normalize inter-Korean relations, denuclearize North Korea, establish peace in the Korean Peninsula and lay the groundwork for unification by building trust between the two Koreas and at national and international levels based on the understanding of the trust-building process, the core concept of which is “trust.”<sup>14)</sup> In the process of implementing policies on North Korea and unification, trust should bring about an accumulation of inter-Korean trust and incorporate a “domestic trust-building process” that would alleviate “South-South conflict (social conflict within South Korea)” and broaden policy consensus. It should also encompass an “international trust-building process” whereby South Korea’s

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13) *Chosun Ilbo*. December 19, 2013.

14) To add, the Park Geun-hye administration’s “trust diplomacy” is a “strategy that includes policy means” the vision of which is “the trust-building process and Northeast Asian peace and cooperation” by establishing sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia through trust diplomacy.”



policy earns the trust of the international community.<sup>15)</sup> The importance of trust building has been emphasized throughout the policies on North Korea and unification formulated by past administrations. In many ways, the agreements on reconciliation, non-aggression, and exchange and cooperation set forth in the Joint Communiqué are ultimately processes in which inter-Korean trust is built and are tasks that can be achieved through accumulated trust. Therefore, the “trust-building policy” presented in this research is meaningful in a sense that it can serve as a sustainable and continuous policy on North Korea even after the changes in governments in the future.

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15) Park Young-Ho, “The Park Geun-Hye administration’s North Korea Policy: the Trust-building Process and its Tasks,” *Seminar at the Korean Peninsula Forum* (Academic Conference on the Korean Peninsula Forum, May 10, 2013), p. 20.

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# 2

## Methodology and Scope

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## 2. Methodology and Scope

This research reviews and analyzes official and unofficial resources on the Park Geun-hye administration's North Korea and unification policies as well as secondary analyses, relevant literature and theories. Moreover, it also utilizes analyses and assessments of government policy results. This report also draws from relevant international political theories of cooperation, analyses conducted by think tanks, speeches given by the U.S. government officials, the National Assembly's resources on public hearings, and other domestic and international primary and secondary literary sources.

Second, this research is carried out under the supervision of the Korea Institute for National Unification's (KINU) research fellows in partnership with experts from academia and other research institutes. In order to create synergy effects, researchers had frequently gathered to review the progress of the research and held conferences and workshops to facilitate coordination. When the research is completed to a certain extent, the researchers are asked to present some of their findings at major Korean academic consortiums, including the Korean

Political Science Association and the Korean Association of International Studies.

Third, in order to boost the accuracy and effectiveness of policies studied in this research and to increase their proximity to the policymaking environment, meetings and advisory consultations are held with relevant government policymakers and experts as this research is carried out. Policymakers are to take part in the assessment process in order to increase relevance of the research to actual policies.

Fourth, international cooperation is critical to resolving problems on the Korean Peninsula. In this respect, consultations, debates, and meetings are jointly held with experts on the Korean Peninsula from overseas, and their comments and feedback will be reflected in the research.

This research presents detailed tasks and implementation strategies of the trust-building process by fields. Whereas the trust-building process is a North Korea and unification policy envisioned by the Park administration, the paradigm of “trust” is undoubtedly an important discussion point to develop a sustainable policy in order to continuously advance inter-Korean relations in the future. This is the reason why previous administrations had always emphasized the importance of trust in their policies concerning North Korea and unification. Given that continuously reinforcing and improving the South Korean government’s policies on North Korea and unification will boost their effectiveness and ultimately bring the Koreas a step closer to unification,

the Park administration will need developmental reinforcement measures based on policy planning. In addition to maintaining consistency and continuity in the policies, it is important that they are flexible and adaptable enough to accommodate possible changes in the structural order of the Peninsula and Northeast Asia.

This research paper is structured as follows. An introduction of the first section is followed by section II, which reviews and analyzes the domestic and international environment surrounding the implementation of the “trust-building policy,” that is a set of policies on North Korea and unification. An understanding of the surrounding environment provides true context of policy implementation. Section III discusses the theoretical framework of the trust-building process in the context of improving and developing the policy. This section maintains the trust-building process as its main framework, while reflecting how it has evolved through a discourse on “unification bonanza” and “unification preparation.” This section also critically assesses the achievements of the trust-building process. Section IV presents specific tasks and implementation strategies of the Park Geun-hye administration’s four core policy tasks for North Korea and unification policy: (1) normalization of inter-Korean relations, (2) North Korea’s denuclearization, (3) establishment of peace on the Peninsula, and (4) the laying of the foundations for unification. Policy objectives can be seen as the core policy tasks. In order to achieve unification, these policy tasks should be addressed not only during the Park administration, but also throughout

the administrations to come. The specific tasks are subtasks or measures to achieve the core policy tasks and will be presented in three phases for every area. The last section concludes by presenting a roadmap for an integrated implementation measure that will allow the specific tasks to be linked in a comprehensive, multi-faceted, and concurrent way. Such an integrated implementation measure is based on strategic visions of the four core policy tasks: normalization of inter-Korean relations, North Korea’s denuclearization, establishment of peace on the Peninsula, and the laying of the foundations for unification. The implementation of the specific tasks is presented in three phases and proposed by integrating domestic, inter-Korean, and international perspectives.



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# 3

## Policy Tasks and Implementation Strategies



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### 3. Policy Tasks and Implementation Strategies

#### A. Implementation Strategies for Normalization of Inter-Korean Relations

##### 1) Near-term (phase one): inter-Korean trust-building

The first phase involves inter-Korean trust building. Specific tasks that can be implemented in the first phase are those that can be immediately promoted or those that are already in progress. As presented in the Park administration's trust-building process, they are tasks that can be implemented without putting too much constraints on the trust building process between two Koreas. These include humanitarian aid projects and the sustainable operation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. As for tasks that can be implemented immediately, humanitarian aid and exchanges in the social and cultural fields can be expanded.

Linking aforementioned policy tasks with the Park administration's four specific tasks, the following discussion points can be made. To begin with, they may belong to some parts of the five implementation plans

projected in the administration’s priorities. Specifically, they overlap with the tasks of “seeking a consistent resolution to humanitarian problems” and “expanding reciprocal exchange and cooperation.” In particular, genuine humanitarian aid for the vulnerable groups, including infants and pregnant women, can be expanded and carried out irrespective of political circumstances. Although issues concerning separated families, prisoners of war, and abductees to the North have been somewhat affected by changes in inter-Korean relations, these tasks need to be addressed more proactively in this phase. In particular, reunions of separated families have been arranged on a number of occasions and given that they address the humanitarian needs of both North and South Koreans, it can be said that promoting reunions of separated families is a worthwhile task even if it requires compromising other issues. Regarding sociocultural exchanges, academic and religious exchanges are relatively easier to pursue given its apolitical and noneconomic nature.

In reviewing the list of tasks stipulated in the basic framework for developing inter-Korean relations, among the five core tasks of “advancing inter-Korean relations through the trust-building process,” the efforts to resolve humanitarian issues should take priority. In particular, efforts to improve North Korea’s human rights and providing humanitarian aids to the North Korean people—tasks that were not included in the list of policy tasks of the Park administration—could be promoted in the first phase. The resolving of inter-Korean

humanitarian issues, which is the first pillar of the three proposals President Park Geun-hye made in her *Dresden Initiative* in the hope of laying the groundwork for peaceful unification, can also be promoted during this phase. To provide a specific example, the “1,000 Days Package Project,”—a joint project with the UN that gives nutrition and healthcare to pregnant women and infants of up to two years of age—is the mature version of previous humanitarian support that could be implemented immediately.

Meanwhile, it is difficult to discuss North Korea’s nuclear weapons issues in earnest in the near-term. Regarding North Korea’s nuclear issue, it is appropriate to approach them by adhering to the principle of “zero tolerance to North Korea’s nuclear weapons development” and by alternating “pressure” and “dialogue” in cooperation with the international community as stated in the National Security Strategy.<sup>16)</sup>

## **2) Midterm (phase two): stabilization of inter-Korean relations**

The second phase involves stabilizing inter-Korean relations. Specific tasks for this phase include further developing the tasks which have been launched in the first phase while expanding them to new areas of tasks. The expanding of humanitarian aid and of sociocultural exchanges presumed to have been carried out in the first phase, together with the development of the Kaesong Industrial Complex,

16) Cheong Wa Dae, “National Security Strategy for a New Era of Hope.” pp. 57-60.

could be an important project. In addition, once inter-Korean relations are stabilized, this enables South Korea to pursue apolitical and non-military projects in earnest, particularly those concerning economic cooperation and North Korea’s development. This is because economic cooperation and North Korea’s development projects could be regulated and implemented under inter-Korean agreements when inter-Korean relations are stabilized, as it would be possible to prevent armed clashes and manage conflicts. Therefore, the May 24 measures could be lifted during the second phase and new modes of economic cooperation, such as the resuming of Mt. Kumgang tours, could be sought. It would also be possible to initiate political and military talks at the elementary level.

Among the Park administration’s policy tasks, two subtasks—the “establishment of inter-Korean channels of dialogue and compliance of existing agreements” and the “expansion of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation”—could be promoted at this phase. In particular, establishing a regular channel of communication and continuing inter-Korean dialogue could function as basic means to manage stable inter-Korean relations. Moreover, the Park administration could promote new tasks for economic cooperation, and two of such tasks are the co-development of North Korea’s natural resources and the promotion of a “Green Détente” via agricultural and environmental cooperation. Towards the latter half of the second phase, a “Vision Korea Project” could be launched. Through this project, the government could build

social infrastructures such as electricity, transportation and communication, which would boost North Korea's self-sufficiency. This project would also encourage North Korea to join international financial institutions and promote new forms of economic cooperation that would support its special economic zones.

Concerning the core tasks stated in the basic framework for developing inter-Korean relations, tasks such as institutionalizing the implementation process of inter-Korean agreements and further enhancing mutually beneficial exchange and cooperation could be promoted in the second phase. Such tasks are attempts to institutionalize inter-Korean relations according to international norms through the continuous implementation of existing agreements and the routinized channels of dialogue which have been carried out in the first phase.

During this phase, public infrastructures could be built to promote co-prosperity of two Koreas as mentioned in the Dresden Initiative. During this stage, South Korea could build agricultural complexes and infrastructures including transportation and telecommunication in North Korea. Meanwhile, South and North Koreas could jointly develop underground resources in the North. In addition, ROK-DPRK-Russian economic cooperation could be promoted through the Rajin-Khasan project, while ROK-DPRK-China economic cooperation could be carried out in and around the Sinuiju region. Moreover, to restore homogeneity among North and South Korean people, projects to restore the homogeneity of language and culture, lifestyle, etc. could

be carried out during this phase.

Lastly, the “establishment of a virtuous cycle of inter-Korean ties and North Korea’s denuclearization”—a task stated in Korea’s National Security Strategy—could be pursued in the second phase. It is difficult to improve inter-Korean relations without any progress in North Korea’s denuclearization, while North Korea’s denuclearization cannot be achieved without improved inter-Korean relations. Therefore, Seoul is capable of promoting this task in the second phase only when inter-Korean relations continue to improve to some degree developing relatively continuously.

### **3) Long term (phase three): normalization of inter-Korean relations**

The third phase involves steps to normalize ties and presents a long-term vision for inter-Korean relations. In this phase, going beyond the stage of stabilization and institutionalization, inter-Korean ties enter into a stage of normalization, and factors which potentially cause structural conflicts are removed. Therefore, humanitarian aid, sociocultural exchange and economic cooperation which have been promoted in the first and second phases would not only continue, but both Koreas will have opportunities to expand these further into political and military spheres. Thus, during the third phase of inter-Korean relations, there could be discussions on resolution to North Korean nuclear issue and disarmament of conventional weapons. This period corresponds to the “reconciliation and cooperation” phase presented

by the National Community Unification Formula and provides a direct foundation for Korean unification.

Of the Park administration's policy tasks, problems related to trust-building in political and military affairs could be directly addressed. Seoul and Pyongyang could put into practice measures such as halting military provocations and recognizing mutual systems. Additional agreements on political and military fields, such as reducing conventional weapons and opening a Seoul-Pyongyang exchange and cooperation office, could be reached. In particular, discussions on resolving North Korea's nuclear problems could be held at inter-Korean and international levels, and as a result there could be discussions on nuclear dismantlement in the process of unification.<sup>17)</sup>

The core tasks in the basic framework for developing inter-Korean relations include resolution to North Korea's nuclear problems and establishment of sustainable peace on the Peninsula. These could be addressed in the third phase. Although inter-Korean and international cooperation to resolve the nuclear problem could be carried out in the second phase, the actual progress would be made only after inter-Korean relations are normalized. In particular, because North Korea's nuclear issue is linked to the survival of the regime, it is only resolved when measures of trust are taken at the political and military levels. The resolution to North Korean nuclear problems, the establishment of

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17) Regarding details of military trust-building and the process of resolving North Korea's nuclear problem, refer to Ha Young-sun and Cho Dong-ho, *North Korea 2032: Resonance Strategy for Advancement* (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2014), Chapter 4.

sustainable peace, and measures, building military trust which are mentioned in the National Security Strategy, would only be possible when inter-Korean relations are normalized and institutionalized to a certain degree.

## **B. Implementation Strategy for Denuclearization**

### **1) Near-term measures**

- (A) Establishing a denuclearization strategy task force and reviewing a denuclearization strategy

Considering the diverse aspects of North Korea's nuclear issues, there are no expert groups or organizations that are equipped with a full-range of knowledge required to resolve the issues. At the minimum level, collaboration between academia and policymakers in the fields of North Korea, ROK-U.S. relations, U.S., China, nuclear non-proliferation, and nuclear engineering is needed to understand the North Korean nuclear issue and establish an effective denuclearization strategy. Considering the crucial need to resolve the North Korean nuclear issues, we suggest to set up a nuclear policy research center where experts in relevant fields work together in order to create synergy. There is also an option of forming an ad hoc task force where experts on North Korea, international politics, regional politics,



international security, nuclear non-proliferation, and nuclear power could closely work together. When forming such a task force is impossible, the alternative is to form a network of experts.

One of the top priorities of the denuclearization task force will be to conduct an overall review of South Korea's denuclearization strategy. Specifically, redefining the denuclearization policy objectives would be important. This will have the effect of preventing the spread of pessimism within South Korea regarding the prospect of North Korea's denuclearization, while reconfirming the objectives of denuclearization. As well as reaffirming the ultimate goal of denuclearization, it will simultaneously have the effect of addressing feasible phased objectives at the time when denuclearization seems realistically difficult to achieve.

The objective of denuclearization of North Korea is to achieve a "complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (hereinafter CVID)" of North Korea's nuclear program. Because of North Korea's repulsion towards the term, some believe that the use of the term "CVID" should be restrained. However, since Pyongyang agreed to the September 19 Joint Statement, which includes similar expressions, such a precaution is unnecessary.

Although the ultimate objective is the denuclearization of North Korea, most view this objective as something almost unable to achieve given the current state of affairs. Thus, a phased denuclearization plan is inevitable and the following steps should be taken as a starting point: halt nuclear tests, freeze nuclear activities, close and disable nuclear

facilities, reopen to IAEA investigation, report nuclear facilities and activities, and totally abort nuclear development program. Most of these measures have already been agreed upon in the February 13 Agreement (2007), October 3 Agreement (2007), and February 29 Agreement (2012), and thus they should not be impossible objectives to accomplish depending on the results of inducements, and political negotiation.

(B) A “mini-Grand Bargain” through South-North Korea’s senior level talks and informal Six Party talks

The most urgent agenda regarding the North Korean nuclear issue is to freeze North Korea’s nuclear activities. This involves ceasing operations of the Yongbyon plutonium and enrichment facilities, the nuclear tests and the launch of long range missiles, and reviving the September 19 Joint Statement and February 29 Agreement system. Consequently, this will prevent the strengthening of North Korea’s nuclear capability and fourth nuclear test.

It has been estimated that North Korea’s weapons-grade plutonium increased fourfold from 10-12kg in 1990 to as much as 50kg—an amount capable of making 5-8 nuclear warheads. North Korea is currently constrained in its ability to produce additional plutonium. Even in such limited circumstances, North Korea feels compelled to conduct further nuclear tests to improve its nuclear weapons capacity, boast the strength of the Kim Jong-un regime and elevate military tension on the Peninsula.

It is also assessed that if the Yongbyon enrichment facility becomes fully operational, North Korea would be able to produce highly enriched uranium that could yield more than one nuclear weapon per year. Another crucial task is to put a halt to North Korea's highly enriched nuclear program, as Yongbyon enrichment facility was recently expanded and there is a high possibility that another secret enrichment facility exists. Should its nuclear material stockpile increase through the enrichment process, North Korea would use the surplus of nuclear materials and be more motivated to conduct further nuclear tests to strategize its highly enriched uranium nuclear weapons. The Kim Jong-un regime has the tendency of legalizing nuclear armament, continuously increasing its nuclear capability and seeking the regime's legitimacy through nuclear armament. It seems that North Korea will not easily comply with the freezing of its nuclear activities.

Given such circumstances, South Korea is facing a serious nuclear threat where a crisis management strategy rather than normal nuclear negotiations is required. Inter-Korean relations are intertwined with numbers of complicated issues including the North Korea's demands for lifting the May 24 measures and resuming Mt. Kumgang tourism, unceasing military provocations by the North, South Korea's demands for freezing the nuclear program, and establishing the DMZ World Peace Park.

As demands conflict multilaterally, a "mini-package deal" is necessary to single-handedly manage issues such as inter-Korean matters, North

Korea’s nuclear program, North Korea-U.S. relations, and so on. For this, it is necessary to simultaneously hold South-North senior level talks, unofficial talks among six-party talk representatives, and North Korea-U.S. talks. North Korea desperately needs lifting of sanctions and economic cooperation for the development of its economy. South Korea adamantly demands the mitigation of North Korea’s nuclear issue, and the termination of nuclear tests and military provocations. The U.S. also strongly calls for freezing of nuclear activities. A package deal would encompass these variety of demands.

## 2) Mid-term Measures

### (A) Resolving new challenges for North Korea’s nuclear program

New challenges have come to attention as North Korea’s spent nuclear fuel storage capabilities have improved, and with the construction of its enrichment facility and light water reactor. This new nuclear issue might give the impression that we are accepting North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons as a *fait accompli* and that we are overlooking it. Yet, the situation might grow out of proportion if we do not devise a counter-measure before it is too late

First is the safety issue surrounding North Korea’s nuclear facility. For power generation, North Korea has practically abandoned graphite moderated reactors, and is pushing forward to construct light water reactors. Yet, building a light water reactor is complicated and requires

highly sophisticated design and construction. Considering the level of North Korea's nuclear technology, the common belief among pundits is that the safety of North Korea's light water reactor cannot be guaranteed. In preparation of an event in which North Korea stubbornly pushes for the construction and operation of a light water reactor while pursuing its dismantlement, it is necessary to plan measures to ensure the facility's safety. This will require coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Second, "nuclear security" measures must be set in place to prevent any proliferation of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment that North Korea already has in large quantities. Because North Korea absolutely needs nuclear weapons and materials, there are some evaluations that the chances of attempts to proliferate them overseas is low. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that some internal factions might engage in illegal trafficking as the regime's control loosens, or that the regime might sell a portion of its nuclear stockpile to foreign countries or illegal groups for the purpose of acquiring foreign currency. To prevent this, we need to reinforce our nuclear security system. We could also demand North Korea to strengthen its "nuclear security" or provide aid to do so. Utilizing the "Northeast Asia Nuclear Security Dialogue Mechanism" that President Park Geun-hye proposed at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit is also an option.

Third, there are serious problems with North Korea's nuclear

strategy, especially with its command and control and operations doctrine of nuclear weapons. Although it is highly likely that North Korea already possesses a nuclear arsenal, there is no information known about its doctrine or command and control. It is severely hazardous to leave this issue as it is because North Korea’s nuclear control system possibly lacks minimal responsibility or systematic structure. All nuclear states have an elected commander-in-chief who is accountable to one’s own people and has the final authority on the use of nuclear weapons. Because of North Korea’s *suryong* system, the decision may solely rely on Kim Jong-un’s impulsive actions or misjudgment. It seems a checks and balance system for such scenarios does not exist. The venturous and provocative traits of the Kim Jong-un regime and the uncertainty of nuclear weapons usage are completely different security challenges compared to ones before weaponization.

(B) Developing a “Korean model of denuclearization” through five-party talks

Although all members of the six-party talks pursue a denuclearized North Korea, there remains no consensus on the strategy or methodology, and even though there was a red tape agreement, it has not entered into force. Without an effective denuclearization model, holding North Korea-U.S. nuclear talks and six-party talks is mere waste of time. Various denuclearization solutions and models have been implemented for the past 20 years but all ended in failure because they were all

mimicking the models that were applied elsewhere.<sup>18)</sup>

Meanwhile, North Korea sees the denuclearization of Iraq and Libya as lessons of failure that led to regime collapse, and demands to be recognized as a *de facto* nuclear weapons state following the model of India and Pakistan. Recent events in Ukraine may add to the North Korea's list of lessons of failure.

A new "Korean model of denuclearization" is most likely to be a combination of Ukraine's exchange between security and economy, Libya's mediation and political big deal, and South Africa's model grounded on change in the regime and the security environment. South Korea must refer to historical precedents of denuclearization while formulating a creative "Korean model of denuclearization." A new denuclearization solution should be based on the September 19 Joint Statement but should include the details such as sanctions and compensations, role allocation, execution timeline, and execution guarantee system. With this, the five parties should reach an agreement, then move on to strike a package deal with North Korea at the six-party talks.

### 3) Long-term Measures

(A) Developing a parallel road map of denuclearization, trust-building process, and Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative

18) Park Hyeong Jung et al., *Devising a Unification Policy for North Korea in Preparation for Unification*.

The new denuclearization solution includes ▲ inter-Korean relations improvement, ▲ establishment of a peace regime on the Peninsula, ▲ Northeast Asia security cooperation, ▲ North Korea-U.S./Japan relations improvement, ▲ economy and energy aid to North Korea, which are also the basic designs of the September 19 Joint Statement.

The Park Geun-hye administration's denuclearization initiative is also very complex. The administration's North Korean nuclear policy, Trust-building Process, Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative have a different policy target but share common objectives and methodologies, and building a virtuous cycle system would maximize the policy's effectiveness. A Trust-building Process and NAPCI without denuclearization stand unstable and would only be a policy design that lacks sustainability. Thus, by executing in parallel the three policy designs mentioned in the table at the end, we must maximize synergy, and ensure the stability and consistency in achieving the objectives.

The denuclearization of North Korea should be approached in a way that includes improvement of North Korea-U.S. relations, establishment of a Korean peace regime and a Northeast peace and cooperation entity.<sup>19)</sup> If there is balanced progress in these initiatives, such progress creates a synergy effect. However, acute imbalance may

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19) Such cases of multilateral processes can be found in the following: Baek Young-chul, et al., *Korean Peace Process* (Seoul: Konkuk University Press, 2005); Park Young-Ho, et al., *Study on Establishing Infrastructure for Korean Unification Diplomacy* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2008); Kim Kyuryoon, et al., *Strategy and Task for a New Vision of Peace* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2009); Cho Min, et al., *Study on a Grand Unification Plan* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2009); Korean Peninsula Forum, *Inter-Korean Relations 3.0: Peace and Cooperation Process on the Korean Peninsula* (Seoul: Korean Peninsula Forum, 2012).



impede progress in other fields.

In particular, it is important for North Korea to have security guarantee as the key factor in a creating a comprehensive solution. North Korea regards nuclear weapons as its vital means for regime survival. If Pyongyang feels that its security and political and economic compensations are insufficient, its cooperation for denuclearization would be very unlikely. Thus, North Korea would accept a phased and detailed political and economic compensation package, along with measures that guarantee its security.

(B) Promoting denuclearization and pushing forward the provision of light water reactor for inter-Korean energy cooperation

In the long term, we need to provide a light water reactor to the North to promote complete denuclearization of North Korea and for the sake of the energy policy of a unified Korea. The light water reactor provision as per the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea was void due to North Korea's alleged nuclear enrichment development activities in late 2002. Since then, South Korea and the U.S. have not even considered the possibility of providing a light water reactor to Pyongyang. Furthermore, because North Korea's nuclear program is committed to development of nuclear weapons, there are arguments that even peaceful usage of nuclear power should not be permitted.

On the other hand, North Korea is preoccupied with possessing a light water reactor. Pyongyang believes that having a light water reactor is the only solution that will ensure self-sufficient energy generation, and that it must be acquired because it is a diplomatic achievement of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. For nuclear cooperation, normalizing diplomatic relations and concluding nuclear agreements are the prerequisites which give North Korea another political and diplomatic motive to normalize diplomatic relations with the U.S. and at the same time conclude a nuclear agreement through the light water reactor provision process. Lastly, receiving the light water reactor would be a victory of North Korea’s nuclear diplomacy and symbolizes the submission of the U.S.

For Seoul and Washington to accomplish complete denuclearization of North Korea, the six-party talks should be held first and the reinitiation of providing a light water reactor should begin after rudimentary progress in denuclearization. In reality, South Korea and the U.S. have difficulty to decide on providing North Korea a light water reactor due to domestic political reasons. As an alternative, the South Korean government proposed the provision of directly providing 2 million kilowatts on July 12, 2005, which also did not go far due to political and technical issues.

South Korea and the U.S. have reflected North Korea’s assertive demands in the six-party talk statement.<sup>20)</sup> The fifth clause of Article 2 of the February 13 Agreement (2007) reaffirms Article 1 (discuss

providing a light water reactor at the appropriate time) and Article 3 (reaffirm South Korea's proposal of providing 2 million kilowatts of electricity) of the September 19 Joint Statement and agrees on cooperation for economic, energy, and humanitarian aid to North Korea.

However, the U.S. still holds a negative stance on providing a light water reactor. Washington defines the "appropriate time" mentioned in the September 19 Agreement as when ▲ all North Korean nuclear weapons and programs have been removed, ▲ the IAEA verifies removal, ▲ North Korea complies with the safety measures of the NPT and IAEA, and maintains transparent and cooperative attitude, ▲ and ceases proliferation of nuclear technology. Yet, North Korea conflicts with this by adamantly sticking to its stance of "receive the light water reactor and form trust first, return to the NPT, conclude the IAEA safety measures agreement later and finally destroy its nuclear armament."

There is a possibility that North Korea will agree to rudimentary denuclearization measures—suspending nuclear activities and authorizing surveillance of it—depending on South Korea's political, diplomatic, and economic concessions. But North Korea will most likely refuse complete return to the NPT, dismantling the nuclear enrichment and reprocessing facilities and nuclear weapons. In this stalemate, the

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20) Article 1 of the September 19 Joint statement (2005) states that North Korea has a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. At the time parties expressed respect for this article and agreed to discuss the provision of a light water reactor to the DPRK at an appropriate time.

provision of light water reactor would be the best leverage at the negotiation table and must be actively utilized.

## **C. Implementation Strategy for Establishing Peace on the Peninsula**

### **1) Near-term Tasks**

#### **(A) Expand humanitarian aid to North Korean people**

One significant axis of the Trust-building Process is the humanitarian aid towards the North Korean people. This is specifically elaborated in the President Park’s speech in Dresden in early 2014.<sup>21)</sup> As a first step in building inter-Korean trust, expanding humanitarian aid towards North Korean people would be most useful. Actively seeking options to regularize reunion of separated families, and expanding privately-led nutrition support projects towards infants and toddlers to the government level are also necessary. As originally planned, humanitarian aid should be provided regardless of political circumstances or North Korean response. From Seoul’s perspective, expressing its willingness to build trust with North Korea would be a crucial point for the success of the trust-building policy.

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21) The so-called “Dresden Initiative” has presented a guideline for the present South Korean government’s policy on North Korea and unification. Regarding the main contents and meaning of the Dresden Initiative, refer to Korea Institute for National Unification, *The 1st KINU Unification Forum: the Dresden Initiative and a Happy Unification* (in Korean) (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2014).

(B) Phased lifting of the May 24 measures and resumption of  
Mt. Kumgang tourism

After the sinking of the ROKS *Cheonan* and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island during the Lee Myung-bak administration, exchanges with Pyongyang were almost cut off, and even today, very limited engagement takes place. We cannot expect any advancement of relations not to mention the establishment of peace on the Peninsula. The first measure towards establishing peace would be to have an exit strategy for the May 24 measure that was put into effect after the sinking of ROKS *Cheonan*, and resume inter-Korean economic activities in accordance with the principle of separation between politics and economy. In this sense, it is very fortunate that the Kaesong Industrial Complex continues with operations after being pushed to the verge of closure. This should be used as the base model for institutionalizing South-North economic exchange. Though Pyongyang must show “expression of regret” in some form, we would have a smoother process if Seoul takes the initiative in showing its will to improve relations first.

Mt. Kumgang tourism has a special meaning in South-North relations. While the Kaesong Industrial Complex symbolizes economic cooperation, Mt. Kumgang tourism is also recognized as a critical indicator of relations between the two Koreas. Resuming tours would display both domestically and internationally the South Korean

government’s willingness for improvement in relations, a very meaningful political gesture at this time.

### (C) Forming the DMZ World Eco-Peace Park

The DMZ Peace Park can function as another foundation for the development of South-North relations. The government has the determination to make the Peace Park a “new model of peaceful cooperation in which the South, North, and the international community participate, a landmark of world peace.”<sup>22)</sup> Furthermore, through this project, the government aspires to “create a Korean model that resolves conflict and dispute, provide an opportunity to expand globally the values of peace and cooperation,” and, in the long term, develop the DMZ Peace Park into “a global eco-peace belt that connects Asia and Europe.”<sup>23)</sup>

However, despite this initiative, there is no shortage of realistic obstacles against promoting the DMZ Peace Park. Under international law, the DMZ is administered by the United Nations, neither South nor North Korea; before coordination between the two, coordination with the UN must first take place. Afterward, coordination with North Korea must follow, and domestic disputes regarding the location will have to be resolved. In summary, as there are many obstacles, the resolve of the government would be important.

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22) Ministry of Unification, “Trust-building Process on the Korean Peninsula.”

23) Cheong Wa Dae, “National Security Strategy for a New Era of Hope.” (in Korean), pp. 69-70.

#### (D) Forming a South-North Joint Military Committee

If the DMZ World Eco-Peace Park can be pursued, then the next step would be the relaxing of the military tension and the building of trust. The government should hold South-North military talks on a regular basis, with the objective of forming a Bilateral Military Committee. The endstate of peace on the Korean Peninsula is the termination of military hostility; in this respect, building military trust through regular military talks could be the first step.

The Joint Military Committee could handle overall issues for decreasing military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Establishing hot lines between both militaries, observing each other's exercises, restraining military drills in the NLL and the DMZ areas, and, as trust-building measures, bilateral excavation and returning of remains of the Korean War KIA and MIA could be pursued.

### 2) Mid-term Tasks

#### (A) Linking denuclearization and the peace regime

As previously pointed out, in order for peace on the Korean Peninsula to be realistically and systematically established, the North Korean nuclear problem must be solved in any way possible. However, as previously noted, North Korea has a different view from the U.S. and South Korea in the order of denuclearization and peace regime. If peace is the goal, rather than maintaining "denuclearization followed

by peace regime,” a policy of staged implementation of denuclearization and peace regime should be reviewed. For example, a simultaneous announcement of freezing of the North Korean nuclear program and the forming of a Korean Peninsula peace forum could be considered as an initiative. Considering that North Korea’s current nuclear capabilities mean that they can make 2-5 new nuclear weapons every year, freezing them at current levels is in and of itself a great accomplishment that could serve as a starting point for the future development of relations.<sup>24)</sup> In the long term, if North Korea returns to the NPT and agrees to IAEA inspections, the possibility of documented and systematized Korean peace regime could be discussed. The important thing is to bring North Korea to the negotiating table.

#### (B) Improving DPRK-U.S. and DPRK-Japan relations

The most consistent demand from North Korea as far as a Korean Peninsula peace regime goes is the normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations. North Korea has demanded a North Korea-U.S. peace agreement that could replace the armistice agreement, and argued that since South Korea is not a party to the armistice, South Korea should be excluded from this process. North Korea argues that withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Korea is a critical component of North Korea-U.S. peace agreement, and maintains this as an important strategy for regime

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24) Regarding North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, refer to Kim Dong-soo, et al., *North Korea’s Nuclear Program and Capacity Assessment in 2013* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2014).



survival after the Cold War.

The U.S. during the Clinton administration, simultaneously pursued denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as well as normalization of relations through improved political and economic ties between North Korea and the U.S., and held the position that four-party talks in the late 1990s should transition the armistice system to a peace regime. It is known that the Bush administration had some interest in establishing a peace regime or signing a peace agreement, and this interest extended to the point where “the declaration of end of war in the Korean Peninsula” was discussed as a possibility. However, with the acceleration of the North Korean nuclear program, and the U.S. policy of denuclearization and non-proliferation, the North Korea-U.S. relations have been exacerbated, with no visible signs of improvement at present.

Much like the South-North relations, the most fundamental problem in the North Korea-U.S. relations lies in the lack of trust between the two parties. Providing a friendly environment in which the two parties could begin to build trust on small matters is important in DPRK-U.S. relations as in inter-Korean relations. Here, the role of the South Korean government is important.

Although not as important as that of North Korea-U.S. relations, the improvement of North Korea-Japan relations cannot be ignored. Although Japan is not a major stakeholder in the Korean Peninsula peace process, it is a stakeholder in a Northeast Asian peace regime,

and thus, the improvement of North Korea-Japan relations is an important variable in peace in Northeast Asia. As North Korea is showing a prospective attitude on the issue of Japanese abductees as it strives to improve relations, North Korea-Japan relations show possibilities of significant improvement.

### (C) Strengthening and repositioning the ROK-U.S. alliance

One of the greatest domestic concerns in the process of peace or peace regime on the Korean Peninsula is the potential negative impact on the ROK-U.S. alliance. In particular, if the Korean Peninsula peace regime brings about fissures in the ROK-U.S. alliance as North Korea strongly demands the withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Korea, it could be a catalyst for security risks on the Korean Peninsula. While the repositioning of the bilateral alliance is inevitable in the process, Seoul should be delicate not to hamper the essence of the alliance. The U.S. should understand that the Korean Peninsula peace regime could reduce the burden on U.S. North Korea policy, and in the long term, support the war on terror as it has a synergy effect with the Northeast Asian multilateral security cooperation system.<sup>25)</sup> In conclusion, the government’s position is that even if the establishment of the Korean Peninsula peace regime leads to some changes in the ROK-U.S.

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25) Lee Sang-hyun, “Constructing a Peace regime on the Korean Peninsula: Issues, Tasks, Prospects, Peace regime and the ROK-U.S. Alliance,” (in Korean) *Korea and International Politics*, vol. 22, no.1 (Kyungnam University Institute for Far East Studies, 2006), pp. 251-252.

alliance, there should be no changes to the fundamentals such as the continued presence of U.S. Forces in Korea. This stance should be maintained throughout the process of the Korean Peninsula peace settlement.

The relationship between peace on the Korean Peninsula and the ROK-U.S. alliance is more important from the perspective of domestic consensus. The perception of ROK-U.S. alliance and the U.S. Forces in Korea is one of the critical issues in the domestic political terrain; deriving a national consensus would be a good measure of success for the Korean Peninsula peace regime.

#### (D) Opening and regularizing inter-Korean summits

If the international environment is shaped with progress in denuclearization in North Korea, and North Korea-Japan/U.S. relations develop, Seoul can continue with its line of effort and willingness to establish peace on the Peninsula by opening inter-Korean summit talks. The summit meetings took place twice already; if a third one is held, then both Koreas could discuss the regularization of summit meetings. If that takes place, then inter-Korean relations could be assessed to be stable, and the establishment of a peace agreement would be much more feasible.

If the international conditions improve and the inter-Korean summits are routinized, it would be desirable to have a Northeast

Asian summit, such as the six-party talks, to discuss security issues of Northeast Asia. South and North Korea are the most important stakeholders in the Korean Peninsula peace agreement, but the opinions of other neighboring countries cannot be ignored. Because of this, a forum for discussion in the form of “Northeast Asia Six-Party Summit” should be created, and meaningful results be yielded.

### **3) Long-term Tasks**

#### **(A) Establishing Korean Peninsula peace forum**

The September 19 Joint Statement, which was an opportunity for earnest discussion on a Korean Peninsula peace regime, states that a tentatively named “Korean Peninsula Peace Forum” is to be established as a separate organization to coordinate overall issues, as a means to attain permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. Afterwards, with North Korea’s nuclear provocations, inter-Korean relations deteriorated, and not a single meeting was held before the idea was scrapped. In this context, the idea of “Korean Peninsula Peace Forum” can be suggested as an alternative in the current situation, since there is no sign that the six-party talks are about to resume.

The tentative Korean Peninsula Peace Forum includes four parties: South and North Korea, the U.S., and China. These countries are deeply involved in the current armistice system, and thus they can discuss a broad range of issues of peace and security on the Korean

Peninsula. If bilateral talks such as South-North military talks can take place simultaneously within the framework of four-party talks such as the Korean Peninsula Peace Forum, this becomes ideal. Military and disarmament issues including the North Korean nuclear issue could be addressed.

Washington has expressed its interest in declaring the end of war on the Korean Peninsula during the Bush administration, and during the Clinton administration showed interest in a Korean Peninsula peace regime; the U.S. will participate in the forum at the request of the South Korean government. In addition, with the mounting skepticism on the validity of President Obama's "strategic patience" policy, a change in North Korea policy could be expected in the near future. China maintains the position that dialogue between stakeholders should continue in order for South and North Korea to gradually build trust and alleviate tensions, and is urging North Korea to improve relations with the South. Furthermore, as China continues to argue that a peaceful resolution through six-party talks is necessary for the North Korean nuclear issue, China has no reason to refuse to participate if the Korean Peninsula Peace Forum takes place. However, it should be emphasized that even within the forum, direct dialogue and negotiation between North Korea and the U.S., as well as discussion on normalization of relations, should take place.

## (B) Arms control and disarmament

If the Korean Peninsula Peace Forum is established and attains some positive outcomes, then it would be desirable for minimum level of arms control or disarmament to take place concurrently or as a consequence. In particular, it is believed to have effectiveness if disarmament measures take place at the same time as confidence building measures.<sup>26)</sup> Even though it may sound unrealistic, considering that an agreement was made in the 1992 “Basic Agreement” between South and North Korea, and that a military subcommittee and working level talks were held, possibilities are still there. In fact, if accomplished, no other method can be more effective in achieving genuine peace on the Korean Peninsula. On the foundation built by the short-term task of confidence building measures, the long-term task of military talks should be accomplished for earnest discussion of disarmament to take place.

## (C) Changing the armistice system to a peace regime

From an institutional perspective, the final stage of settling peace

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26) Confidence building measures mean measures that can be taken so that both parties are considerably free from the possibility of a surprise attack from the other, such as exchange of information on the military in order to achieve general awareness of combat power and positions, and awareness of the other side’s combat readiness by being modified of and observing training. Arms control measures refer to measures that recognize current level of armament, but place limitations on their use, position, and operation. For example, expanding the DMZ so that the disproportionately positioned forces in the front can be moved to the rear for both South and North Korea would decrease the possibility of armed conflict during armistice, and could be an effective measure in preventing war. Han Yong-sup, “Conditions of Building a Korean Peninsula Peace regime” (in Korean), *North Korean Studies*, vol. 1, no.1 (2005), pp. 34-35.

on the Korean Peninsula would be the transition from the armistice system to a peace regime. At this stage, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and other necessary agreements for normalization have already occurred, meaning that the only remaining task for permanent peace on the Peninsula is the transition. It is a legal instrument that, with the conclusion of the armistice agreement, transitions from armistice to peace, by signing a peace agreement. South and North Korea, the U.S. and China may have different opinions on the parties to that agreement; it would be desirable to clarify that the parties are South and North Korea, but open to channels for the U.S. and China to participate in order to reinforce its effectiveness, taking the form of “2+2+UN Security Council.” Signing this peace agreement would not mean the settlement of peace on the Korean Peninsula. Even if a systematic device is set up, without the will of the user, it will be useless. The will of the South and North Korea to settle peace on the Peninsula based on trust will be the most important variable in determining its future.

(D) Establishing an organization to manage the Korean Peninsula peace agreement

A minimum level of regulatory measures after the peace agreement is also necessary. It is preferable to have four committees to follow up on the peace agreement, and to review replacing and developing the

existing armistice system as follows. The Military Armistice Commission could be replaced as a South-North Military Control Committee, centered on the South and the North, and the Korean Peninsula Peace Guarantee Committee, backed by the U.S. and China. Furthermore, a Korean Peninsula Prosperity Committee is newly formed with participation from South and North Korea, China, U.S., Japan, and Russia, in order to reinforce the peace regime on the Peninsula through prosperity and ensure that no neighboring country is left out. Furthermore, the monitoring role performed by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission could be performed by a UN peace monitoring group.<sup>27)</sup>

#### **D. Strategy for Laying the Foundation for Unification**

##### **(1) Phase 1 (Near-term): Preparation of the foundation for unification**

###### **(A) [Domestic] Refining and developing a plan for unification**

Although the Park administration stated that it would succeed the National Community Unification Formula (as mentioned above), it needs to propose more concrete plans for the unification. The Korean National Community Unification Formula (KNCUF), a unification formula presented by Roh Tae-woo administration in the late 1980s

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27) Huh Moon-young, et al., *Strategies to Establish a Denuclearized Peninsula and a Peace Regime* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2007), pp.102-103.



and the National Community Unification Formula (NCUF), a successor to the former formula, presented by Kim Young-sam administration should both reflect the significant changes of the 21st century. On the internal front, formulas should reflect the waning enthusiasm among South Koreans for unification. The conventional nationalism based on the belief that Koreans form an ethnic group that shares a unified bloodline and therefore should reunify is losing ground. Since South Korea developed into a liberal democracy, issues regarding North Korea and unification often ignited a fierce debate between the progressives and the conservatives. If unification preparations start off without reaching a general consensus, such a fierce debate might divide older and younger generation. On the external front, the world now portrays different power dynamics compared to that in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the U.S. was the sole superpower in a unipolar world: G2 era has emerged with the rise of China and with the decline of the U.S. When the NCUF was first introduced, North Korea was clearly diplomatically isolated as a result of the Cold War and a success in the policy toward the North. However, we are now, at the period with many uncertainties considering that North Korea is constantly seeking out ways to improve its relations with its neighbors including Russia while maintaining special ties with China. Although leaders of the U.S. and China currently support the vision of the united Korea, it is still likely that the U.S., China and the other stakeholders in the region come into conflict surrounding plans for unification.

Therefore, a successor to the NCUF should be supplemented and developed upon (expanded application of the concept of “Korean” or, tentatively, the Korean Peninsula Community Unification Formula) the NCUF, which fully reflects the internal and external changes over the last 20 years as well as the current inter-Korea relations.<sup>28)</sup>

The NCUF laid its foundation on self-determination but its successor should not only base itself on self-determination but also pursue happiness for the people. The Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation (PCUP) should not limit their work to drafting the unification charter but should further flesh out a new plan for unification - concrete and tangible action plans—most importantly, after building internal consensus. While the NCUF presents the values of autonomy, peace and democracy as principles for unification, its successor should hold the vision of a united Korea formed amidst individual-communal and national-international balance and win public support by including other values such as equality and welfare.

(B) [Inter-Korean] Humanitarian aid and interaction in sports  
(Paralympics) and culture

In the speech given at Dresden, Germany, President Park offered to

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28) Regarding the necessity and direction on refining and developing unification options, “Unification - Realizing an Inter-Korean Community,” *Inter-Korean Relations 3.0: Peace and Cooperation Process on the Korean Peninsula* (Seoul: Korean Peninsula Forum, 2012); Yun Young-kwan, “Unification’s Challenges and the Path to Recovery: Philosophy, Strategy, and System,” Yun Young-kwan, *Korean Unification* (Seoul: Neulum Plus, 2013).

continue humanitarian assistance along with building the infrastructure that supports the livelihood of people and enabling ordinary South Koreans and North Koreans to recover a sense of common identity. Moreover, the PCUP presented its plan for providing health care support for pregnant women and infants in North Korea at the second meeting (October 13, 2014). Humanitarian assistance not only easily garners domestic support and international cooperation but also contributes to the unification by improving the lives of North Koreans and accordingly, reaching a general consensus. Therefore, it should be implemented as soon as possible and continue regardless of the inter-Korean political situation.

In addition, exchanges in culture and sports—all of which could promote genuine people-to-people contact—should be encouraged. Three North Korean top leaders (Hwang Pyong-so, Choe Ryong-hae, and Kim Yang-gon) paid a surprise visit to the closing ceremony of the 2014 Asian Games. Their unexpected visit could be interpreted as Pyongyang seeking a turnaround in relations amid its deepening international isolation; others interpreted it as their willingness to expand sports exchanges.<sup>29)</sup> For instance, holding a soccer match between South and North Korea after the Asian Games or carrying out exchanges in sports for the disabled could be the starting point of the exchange of people between both sides. We should especially push

29) Sung Ki-young, "Hwang Pyong-so's Visit to South Korea and Comments on Prospective Negotiations with North Korea," (KINU Online Series CO 14-14, October 6, 2014).

ahead sport events for the disabled since it is highly likely that North Korea, which faces fierce condemnation for its poor human rights records, may willingly participate in the event.

(C) [International] Northeast Asian multilateral talks

The U.S. and China have publicly supported both the Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative and the Trust-building Process pursued by the South Korean government. It is necessary to hold a multilateral dialogue in Northeast Asia to address the Park administration’s vision on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, North Korean issues, and unification plan. In the meeting held in the U.S. in June 2013, President Obama and President Xi Jinping reached a consensus on the importance of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The two countries have oscillated between cooperation and conflict on various issues but both have maintained their firm stance on the need to stabilize and denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. The time is ripe to launch governmental or semi-governmental networks which address North Korean issues and the unification of the two Koreas, through three party talks including South Korea, the U.S. and China, or extend multilateral consultation to Russia or Japan. The PCUP has put forth a plan to draw “Seoul Declaration on World Peace” and co-host an international conference to discuss the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula, both as part of celebrating the

70th anniversary of national liberation. As long as it does not arouse the North's provocations by facilitating its isolation within the international community, issues regarding nuclear weapons, human rights and unification should be dealt through multilateral consultations.

**(2) Phase 2 (Mid-term): Forming the foundations for unification**

(A) [Domestic] Advancement in unification studies and establishing a network among civic-government-academia

President Park called on the PCUP to act as a prudent and accurate navigator in the path to a unified Korea. As a control tower responsible for laying the foundation for unification, the Committee should lead the advanced research on unification and establish a network that connects the private sector, the government, and the academia. If research and preparation on unification to date have been carried out by separate organizations and entities, it is now important to share their respective projects and outcomes to form a comprehensive picture. Moreover, institutions, which are working on North Korean issues and unification, are not only physically located far away from each other, but they have often competed, rather than cooperated, to receive more funding and human resources. In this respect, it is necessary to consider a fundamental alternative such as restructuring or merging relevant institutions.

(B) [Inter-Korean] Public infrastructure construction and the Korean homogeneity project

After launching humanitarian assistance, it will be necessary to implement measures to build infrastructure that supports the livelihood of people and recovers a sense of common identity. To this end, it is important to build domestic consensus but also acquire North Korea’s cooperation. Once humanitarian assistance programs are firmly rooted, it is highly likely that favorable climate to be created for building infrastructure and recovering a sense of common identity. It is imperative that the push for these projects should be further strengthened considering that they would be free of criticisms directed on the past cooperative projects that allegedly helped the North Korean regime.

(C) [International] Northeast Asia’s joint statement

If the Dresden Initiative was proclaimed in a third country solely by South Korea targeting North Korea and the international community, from now on, it will be important for South Korea to present its vision for Korean unification and the North Korea issue to neighboring countries including the U.S. and China, in the form of a joint statement. If the aforementioned multilateral summit is carried out and an agreement is reached, such consensus should be documented, announced to the international community to expand a global consensus on the North Korea issue and Korean unification. A Northeast Asian joint statement should include member states’ collective resolve to carry out

three proposals presented in Dresden while promoting member states' participation in North Korean issues, instead of toughening North Korea's international isolation. Once the joint statement is launched, compared to the past when unification was discussed in a bilateral setting (eg. discussing North Korean nuclear issue only with China and human rights issues only with the United States), unification issues will be dealt through multilateral dialogue including South Korea, the U.S., China and other neighboring countries.

(D) [International] Internationalizing the Kaesong Industrial Complex and acknowledging outward processing zones

The internationalization of Kaesong Industrial Complex, which was proposed as the complex reopened, should be actively pursued. Also, the Kaesong Industrial Complex should be recognized as an outward processing zone (OPZ) in the ROK-U.S. and ROK-China free trade agreements. When foreign as well as South Korean businesses operate in the Complex and the goods are exported to neighboring countries, the mutual dependency between North Korea and the international community will inevitably increase. If North Korea entirely relies on South Korea and China when it comes to investment and trade, North Korea would perceive its weakness against South Korea and China and accordingly carry out threats and provocations. Also, South Korea and China would not willingly take North Korea as their trustworthy economic partner. However, if neighboring countries

establish economic relations with North Korea, North Korea will reduce its concerns on exclusive dependency and take a step closer to opening its doors.

### **(3) Phase 3(Long-term): Completion of a foundation for unification**

#### **(A) [Domestic] Setting forth an integrated Northeast Asia vision and advancing research**

The South Korean government should promote a comprehensive study on Korean unification and Northeast Asian integration, and should take the lead in establishing a network among relevant research organizations and researchers. Until now South Korean researchers led the studies on unification, but recently U.S. researchers have been actively engaged in research on North Korean instability and unification scenarios. The former focuses on institutional and the value of unification and integration while the latter puts emphasis on ROK-U.S. or UN-led military operations and stability operations in response to a crisis situation.<sup>30)</sup> From now on, discussions and studies must focus on the effects unification will have on Northeast Asia, and options of integrating Northeast Asia as Germany’s unification contributed to European integration.

In the case of the Park Geun-hye administration, it is pursuing

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30) For example, Bruce W. Bennett, *Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2013); Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer Lind, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” *International Security*, vol. 36, no. 2 (2011).



cooperation on soft issues and proposing a Northeast Asian vision that aims to set the process in motion rather than short-term accomplishments. Specifically, the “Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative” works on the major premise of cooperation through trust and trust through peace and prosperity, and elaborates trust-building options of 1) dialogue, 2) perceiving the need for cooperation, and 3) sharing a future vision of Northeast Asia. It pursues to drive a cooperation convention based on consensus among Northeast Asian countries and devises a long-term, sustainable cooperation framework.

While discussing an active use of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and other Asia-Pacific cooperation bodies in order to consider non-traditional soft security agendas, the objective is to also give weight to civil-level cooperation and have concurrent top-down and bottom-up approaches. Furthermore, efforts will be made to induce North Korea to participate, and cooperate with Northeast Asian countries including the U.S., as well as the ASEAN and the European Union.

In the future, the Korean government should go beyond offering an abstract initiative for Northeast Asian cooperation, and give a specific vision for “integration of Northeast Asia through unification of the Korean Peninsula.” Furthermore, research in and out of South Korea should be pursued to build a virtuous cycle between Korean unification and Northeast Asian integration. Current studies on East Asia are focused on the rivalry between U.S. and China and China and Japan,

territorial disputes between China and its neighbors, and the North Korean nuclear program;<sup>31)</sup> however, with active discussion on regional integration linked with Korean unification, research on international cooperation and international organizations and norms in the context of East Asia may be accelerated.

(B) [South-North/International] South-North, China-Japan,  
South-North-Russia-Japan energy/logistics infrastructure

It is important to obtain neighboring countries’ support for Korean unification through projects to make the Korean Peninsula the center of logistics and energy in Northeast Asia. The conventional view was that China is a country that seeks economic growth with a stable Korean Peninsula while using North Korea as a buffer zone, and that Japan is a country for the status quo concerning that a unified Korea would be a strong country. However, China, Japan, the U.S. and Russia all pursue economic growth and regional stability in Northeast Asia, including the Korean Peninsula. China sees stable neighbors as a necessary condition for growth, and desires the development of the three northeastern provinces; Japan continues to seek a new source to revitalize its economy. The U.S. seeks to continue its economic

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31) Victor Cha and David Kang, *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” *International Security*, vol. 23, no. 4 (1999); Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 3 (1993).

momentum through peaceful management of the rise of China, and Russia desires to realize the development of its Far East by exporting resources to East Asia.<sup>32)</sup> Thus, the “North Korea risk” must be overcome, and the projects involving South Korea-North Korea-China, and South Korea-North Korea-Russia must be realized. However, rather than an energy and logistics project that excludes Japan and the U.S., the goal should be to build a network that connects continental and ocean powers. Amidst the conflicts between the U.S.-Japan and China-Russia,<sup>33)</sup> concerns of polarization are emerging; South Korea must take the lead in drawing cooperation between the two powers, preventing in advance any conflicts of interests surrounding the Korean Peninsula, and diversify energy import and goods export routes.<sup>34)</sup>

(C) [International] A Northeast Asian security cooperation organization

An international environment which encourages economic and security cooperation among neighboring countries including the U.S.

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32) Regarding the neighboring four countries' concerns and measures to alleviate them, refer to Park Jong-chul, et al., *International Benefits of Korean Unification toward East Asia and Surrounding Countries* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2012).

33) Dimitri K. Simes, “Reawakening an Empire,” *The National Interest*, July 1, 2014; Walter Russell Mead, “Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 93, no. 3 (2014), pp. 69-79; David Kerr, “The Sino-Russian Partnership and U.S. Policy toward North Korea: From Hegemony to Concert in Northeast Asia,” *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 49, no. 3 (2005), pp. 411-437.

34) Regarding the US-Russia rivalry in Asia's markets following the shale gas resolution, refer to “A New Map, Defined by Gas,” *New York Times*, June 11, 2014; Robert D. Blackwill and Meghan L. O'Sullivan, “America's Energy Edge,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 93, no. 2 (2014), pp. 102-114.

and China is critical in the process of achieving Korean unification. Furthermore, in order to achieve not only a unification of political systems between the South and North, but also a unification of culture and ideology based on development of North Korea and economic integration, investment and placement of foreign corporations are imperative. To this end, establishing a Northeast Asian security cooperation organization should be a long-term task for the Korean government.

Many are seeking to apply the European multilateral security experience to East Asia. In fact, the Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative shows many similarities with the Helsinki Process. Europe in the 1970s and East Asia in the 2010s have in common regional conflicts, security dilemmas, a divided nation, and different ideological systems; the Helsinki Process and the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative are similar in that they discuss overarching agendas for the easing of regional tensions and increasing of peace and security. In particular, another commonality is that the goal is gradual but sustainable cooperation security, rather than short-term establishment of a multilateral cooperation organization.<sup>35)</sup>

First, the circumstances where the power transition from the U.S. to China is taking place are more unfavorable than the détente period during the Cold War in terms of pursuing multilateral security cooperation. Currently, the U.S. and China respectively pursue

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35) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Northeast Asia Peace and Security Initiative: Overcoming the Asia Paradox and towards a Northeast Asia of Peace and Cooperation," p. 13.

maintenance and revision of the status quo and compete with each other for hegemony in East Asia.

Second, East Asia today only has bilateral security relationships, such as the ROK-U.S. alliance or the DPRK-China alliance. In the Cold War Europe, there were two large multilateral security cooperation organizations: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

Third, the level of mutual trust between South and North Korea is not at the same level as that between the former West and East Germany.

Fourth, East Asian countries today have clear differences in their security perceptions. The European countries of the 1970s found the cause of security threats in the security dilemma; the East Asian countries of 2014 find the cause of security threats in the belligerence of another.

Therefore, a Northeast Asian security cooperation organization could be realized by referring to the European experience in the past, and designing a new multilateral security cooperation initiative that reflects the 21st century's East Asian situation. A multilateral dialogue process should begin by identifying agendas that reflect the interests and understanding of neighboring countries and perceive the aforementioned differences in surrounding environment of the system, region, and country.

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# 4

## Conclusion

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## 4. Conclusion

The actual execution of the integrated implementation strategy that this study proposes will be influenced in its actual execution by the changes in the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia, and international environment; changes in North Korean politics and the reaction from the North Korean regime; policy cooperation with other countries; domestic political and economic situations; and the will and capability for policy execution.

However, if strategies and specific measures to accomplish policy objectives ensure suitability with support of the will and capability of policymaking groups such as the people, the government, and the National Assembly, then regardless of changes in power, it can be used as a sustainable holistic system for North Korea and unification policies in the policymaking and execution of the government.

In conclusion, this study emphasizes that policies on North Korea and unification need to be executed as a national development strategy, not only in the short term, but also in the mid-to-long term. Since dialogues and contacts began between South and North Korea, and

since exchanges in people and materials, South-North relations have developed with many ups and downs. We have experienced policy results that differed under different perceptions. What the people demand now is for the government’s North Korea and unification policies to develop into a sustainable policy, and be steadily pursued towards the accomplishment of policy objectives. The West German experience of pursuing a consistent and sustained policy regardless of changes of governments from the left to the right is greatly instructive. Germany and the Korean Peninsula have different conditions for unification, but we must have confidence that we can improve and develop South-North relations, and build a strong foundation for unification. This resolve must, in making and executing policy, be supported by a strategic initiative towards elements of national development, including unification, foreign affairs, security, and economics. It is hoped that the tasks in various areas proposed by this study will be reflected in actual policies, in consideration of various elements of future policy environments.



**<An Integrative Approach: A Roadmap linking the normalization of inter-Korean relations - North Korea's denuclearization -Establishing Peace on the Korean Peninsula - Establishing a foundation for unification>**

		Normalization of inter-Korean relations	North Korea's denuclearization	Establishing Peace on the Korean Peninsula	Establishing a foundation for unification
p h a s e  1	D o m e s t i c	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide humanitarian aid: 1,000 Day Package Project, etc.</li> <li>• Maintain and further develop Kaesong Industrial Complex</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish a T/F for denuclearization strategy, and review the strategy as well as promote a phased denuclearization</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expand humanitarian aid for North Korean people</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Upgrade existing plans for unification (e.g. Unification Plan for an Inter-Korean Community, tentatively named)</li> </ul>
	I n t e r - K o r e a n	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Make efforts to resolve problems concerning separated families, prisoners of war, and abductees</li> <li>• Promote the exchange of people in cultural, arts, academic, religious, and sports related fields</li> <li>• Lift May 24 measures gradually and take appropriate actions for the attacks on ROKS Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Islands</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hold high level inter-Korean talks and normalize inter-Korean dialogues</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lift May 24 measures in gradual steps and resume Mt. Kumgang tours</li> <li>• Develop the DMZ World Eco-Peace Park</li> <li>• Launch talks for military confidence building, promote an inter-Korean military joint committee</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide humanitarian aid as well as cultural and sports exchange (Paralympics)</li> <li>• Establish infrastructure for the livelihood of the people and create a foundation to promote projects to restore national homogeneity</li> </ul>
	I n t e r n a t i o n a l	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Make efforts to improve human rights in North Korea</li> <li>• Cooperate on North Korean nuclear issues</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote a "mini-Grand Bargain" via unofficial Six Party Talks: include inter-Korean issues, North Korean nuclear issue, and DPRK-U.S. issues</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expand DPRK-U.S. / DPRK-Japan contact</li> <li>• North Korea accepts the international community's general norms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote Northeast Asian multilateral talks and ROK-U.S.-China strategic dialogue</li> <li>• Actively promote unification diplomacy</li> </ul>

		Normalization of inter-Korean relations	North Korea’s denuclearization	Establishing Peace on the Korean Peninsula	Establishing a foundation for unification
P h a s e  2	D o m e s t i c	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Continuously expand humanitarian aid</li> </ul>	-	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Accelerate unification research and form a civic-government - academic network</li> </ul>
	I n t e r - K o r e a n	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Completely lift May 24 measures</li> <li>Establish infrastructure in North Korea: transportation, telecommunication, etc.</li> <li>Initiate economic cooperation projects and institutionalize exchange and cooperation                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agricultural complexes, underground resources, Rajin-Khasan and Sinuiju projects, etc</li> <li>Launch an inter-Korean office</li> </ul> </li> <li>Restore homogeneity in language, culture, and lifestyle</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pursue the resolution of new nuclear challenges: address safety of nuclear facilities, prevent the outflow of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment, prepare a response to North Korea’s nuclear strategy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Link denuclearization with a peace regime</li> <li>Host and regularize inter-Korean summits</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establish infrastructure for the livelihood of the people and begin in earnest project to restore national homogeneity</li> </ul>
	I n t e r n a t i o n a l	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Gradually expand the Kaesong Industrial Complex</li> <li>Promote a virtuous cycle of inter-Korean relations and North Korea’s denuclearization</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop a “Korean Model of Denuclearization” through the five-party talks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improve DPRK-U.S. and DPRK-Japan relations</li> <li>Consolidate and reposition ROK-U.S. alliance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Internationalize the Kaesong Industrial Complex and acknowledge outward processing zones</li> <li>A Northeast Asia Joint Statement: support for North Korea, and Korean Unification</li> </ul>

		Normalization of inter-Korean relations	North Korea's denuclearization	Establishing Peace on the Korean Peninsula	Establishing a foundation for unification
P h a s e  3	D o m e s t i c	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Promote denuclearization, Trust-building Process on the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative in parallel</li> </ul>	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Present a vision for Northeast Asian integration and accelerate research</li> </ul>
	I n t e r - K o r e a n	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establish political trust: hold inter-Korean summits, open a Seoul-Pyongyang representative office</li> <li>Establish military trust: discuss reduction of conventional weapons and exchange of military information, observe joint exercises</li> <li>Formulate a Korean economic bloc                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Begin in earnest North Korea's comprehensive development</li> <li>-Liberalize trade and investment/passing of people and telecommunications</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Arms control and disarmament</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establish infrastructure to help the livelihood of the people and expand projects to promote national homogeneity</li> </ul>
	I n t e r n a t i o n a l	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>North Korea gives up its nuclear weapons, establish a verifiable system</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Complete the promotion of North Korea's denuclearization through inter-Korean energy cooperation and the provision of light water reactors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Launch the Korea Peninsula Peace Forum</li> <li>Transform the armistice into a peace regime</li> <li>Establish an organization to manage the peace regime on the Korean Peninsula</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Construct infrastructure for ROK                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- DPRK - China - Japan, ROK - DPRK - Russia - Japan energy and logistics</li> </ul> </li> <li>Northeast Asia's security and cooperation organization                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia</li> <li>- Northeast Asia's collective security</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

## Tasks and Implementing Strategies of the "Trust-Building" Policy

The Park Geun-hye administration has set "laying the foundation for a peaceful unification" as one of the four administrative priorities. The objectives of this research are to present specific tasks and implementation strategies to realize core tasks of North Korea and unification policies, such as the normalization of inter-Korean relations, North Korea's denuclearization, and the establishment of peace on the Peninsula and the foundations for unification. This research also seeks to present an "integrated approach" that will make possible to carry out the aforementioned tasks in a comprehensive, multi-faceted and concurrent manner. The "trust-building policy" refers to North Korea and unification policies that aim to normalize inter-Korean relations, denuclearize North Korea, establish peace in the Korean Peninsula and lay the groundwork for unification by building trust between the two Koreas and at national and international level.