

# Peace-keeping in the Korean Peninsula: The Role of Commissions



Gabriel Jonsson



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*Gabriel Jonsson*

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
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# Peace-keeping in the Korean Peninsula: The Role of Commissions

- The analyses, comments and other opinions in this monograph are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Korea Institute for National Unification.



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
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
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## Acronyms

|                |   |
|----------------|---|
| <b>AA</b>      | Armistice Agreement                                   |
| <b>ASMZ</b>    | <i>Allgemeinen Schweizerischen Militärzeitschrift</i> |
| <b>BDA</b>     | Banco Delta Asia (Macau)                              |
| <b>Capt.</b>   | Captain   |
| <b>CBM</b>     | Confidence Building Measures                          |
| <b>CIA</b>     | Central Intelligence Agency                           |
| <b>CNN</b>     | Cable News Network                                    |
| <b>CPV</b>     | Chinese People's Volunteers                           |
| <b>CRS</b>     | Congressional Research Service (US)                   |
| <b>CSS</b>     | Center for Security Studies (Switzerland)             |
| <b>DIA</b>     | Defence Intelligence Agency (US)                      |
| <b>DMZ</b>     | Demilitarized Zone                                    |
| <b>DPRK</b>    | Democratic People's Republic of Korea                 |
| <b>EU</b>      | European Union  |
| <b>FOIA</b>    | Freedom of Information Act (US)                       |
| <b>GDP/GNP</b> | Gross Domestic Product/Gross National Product         |
| <b>GP</b>      | Guard Post  |
| <b>IAEA</b>    | International Atomic Energy Agency                    |
| <b>JOT</b>     | Joint Observer Teams                                  |
| <b>JSA</b>     | Joint Security Area                                   |
| <b>KAL</b>     | Korean Airlines                                       |
| <b>KBS</b>     | Korean Broadcasting System                            |
| <b>KCIA</b>    | Korean Central Intelligence Agency                    |
| <b>KCNA</b>    | Korean Central News Agency                            |
| <b>KPA</b>     | Korean People's Army                                  |
| <b>KPA/CPV</b> | Korean People's Army/Chinese People's Volunteers      |
| <b>KSC</b>     | Korean Service Corps (South Korea)                    |
| <b>MAC</b>     | Military Armistice Commission                         |
| <b>MDL</b>     | Military Demarcation Line                             |
| <b>MITs</b>    | Mobile Inspection Teams                               |

|                 |  |
|-----------------|--|
| <b>Napsnet</b>  | Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network (US)       |
| <b>NK, N.K.</b> | North Korea  |
| <b>NLL</b>      | Northern Limit Line                                  |
| <b>NNITs</b>    | Neutral Nations Inspection Teams                     |
| <b>NNRC</b>     | Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission              |
| <b>NNSC</b>     | Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission               |
| <b>NPT</b>      | Non-Proliferation Treaty                             |
| <b>OPCON</b>    | Operational Control (South Korea)                    |
| <b>PSI</b>      | Proliferation Security Initiative                    |
| <b>ROK</b>      | Republic of Korea                                    |
| <b>SIPRI</b>    | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute     |
| <b>SNCC</b>     | South-North Coordinating Committee                   |
| <b>TS</b>       | Team Spirit  |
| <b>UN, U.N.</b> | United Nations                                       |
| <b>UNC</b>      | United Nations Command                               |
| <b>UNC/MAC</b>  | United Nations Command/Military Armistice Commission |
| <b>UNSC</b>     | United Nations Security Council                      |
| <b>US, U.S.</b> | United States  |

## *Preface*

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This monograph is the research outcomes of Professor Gabriel Jonsson who studied for a year as a guest researcher at our institute, KINU.

This study investigates how the armistice has been maintained and contributes to research on inter-Korean relations through a review of whether the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) have fulfilled their original tasks and whether they have contributed to securing peace in relation to the main actors (China, North Korea, South Korea, and the U.S.) in the Korean issue. Although there is much literature on inter-Korean relations, the Commissions are normally given limited attention. This is the reason that the present study is important and special since it gives an in-depth analysis of the important tasks of the Commissions and the contributions to secure peace based on assessments of the work of the Commissions.

I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to my colleagues at the KINU, Dr. Kim Kook-Shin and Dr. Park Hyeong-Jung who reviewed the manuscript and provided valuable comments. It is my hope that the present publication will provide the international

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community a reference point for understanding the work of the Commissions and its contributions to peace that provide further implications for the security and future of the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia.

Suh Jae Jean  
President  
Korea Institute for National Unification

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In addition, I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Staffan Rosén at Stockholm University, Head of the Korean Department at the Institute of Oriental Languages, for his invaluable assistance during the course of the project. I have drawn great encouragement for the project from seminars held at the Korean Department. I also wish to express my thanks to the retired Swedish Colonel Klas Gröndahl, who served in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) 2000-2002, and Lieutenant Colonel Reto Senn, who in 2006 was Defence Attaché at the Swiss Embassy in Stockholm and who served in the NNSC 1995-1996, for their kind advice and assistance. The former Defence Attaché, Colonel Jong Won Shin, at the Republic of Korea Embassy in Stockholm and his successor, Colonel Sukjoon Yun, have been of great help in gathering material. Officials at the Swedish Foreign Ministry and the War Archives in Stockholm have been very helpful in acquiring material. The staff at Bibliothek am Guisanplatz in Berne have also been helpful.

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In South Korea, I wish to especially thank the President of the Korea Institute for National Unification to publish this monograph. As a guest researcher, I benefited greatly from my affiliation with the Institute in terms of collation of relevant material and in establishing valuable contacts. I also wish to thank my wife, Lee Hee-Sook, and my daughter, Rebecka Ye-mi, for their extraordinary patience towards me during the preparation of this book. Thank you one and all.

Gabriel Jonsson  
Stockholm, Sweden  
December 25, 2009



Chapter 1

# *Introduction*



Peace-keeping in the Korean Peninsula

## 1.1 Purpose

It is well known that North and South Korea have maintained tense relations since the Korean War (1950-1953) formally ended with an Armistice Agreement signed on July 27, 1953.<sup>1</sup> The war caused an estimated 1.8 million combat casualties. Around three million civilians were killed, wounded or missing, that is, roughly a tenth of the entire population of both sides at the time. Both parts of the peninsula were devastated. The front line slanted across the 38th parallel very close to where it had all begun. The war strengthened the antipathy that had developed between the two states.<sup>2</sup>

Ever since the two states were founded in 1948, both have claimed to be the sole legitimate Korean government. The South Korean scholar Seong-Ho Jhe (2000) quotes the words written a long time ago by a foreign journalist after his visit to the Demilitarized Zone

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<sup>1</sup>- At the first session of the armistice negotiations on July 10, 1951, the UN Senior Delegate intended to discuss only military matters. The Communists did not mention the issue to sign a peace treaty during the entire period of negotiations. At the 39<sup>th</sup> session, the United Nations Command declared that the delegation's tasks was to work out a military armistice agreement and not to write a peace treaty. From Lee, e-mail, February 19, 2009.

<sup>2</sup>- Columbia University, *Text of the Korean War Armistice Agreement* (<http://news.findlaw.com/scripts/prINTERfriendly.pl?page=/hdocs/docs/korea/kwarmagr072753.html>); Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 9-10. The agreement appears in pp. 542-565 and has been checked against Kim (ed.), *The Korean DMZ - Reverting beyond Division* (Seoul: Sowha Publishing Co., 2001), pp. 241-267 for the sake of consistency. Maps referred to in the agreement do not appear in any of the texts checked. For the agreement in Korean see Kim, "Chôngjôn hyôpchông," in Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoë p'yôllam: che 7 chip (2004-2006)* (Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu: kunjôngwi yôllakdan, n. p., 2006), pp. 9-26. For an overview of the 158 rounds of armistice negotiations July 10, 1951-July 19, 1953, see Lee, *JSA - P'anmunjôm (1953~1994)* (Seoul: Tosô ch'ulp'an Sowha, 2001a), pp. 269-300 (Korean) and pp. 301-359 (English). To the author's knowledge, the only post-World War II war with a higher number of casualties is the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict that broke out in 1998.

(DMZ): “An invisible war now continues on the Korean peninsula.” While noting that it was distressing that these words remained valid, Jhe also quotes the American President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945): “Peace can only succeed in a place where there is will to observe peace and effective power to enforce peace.”<sup>3</sup>

With this background, this study investigates how the armistice has been maintained. The focus is on how the Armistice Agreement’s peace-enforcing organs have worked. According to the agreement, the armistice is implemented and supervised by the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) respectively.<sup>4</sup> Although there is a vast body of literature on inter-Korean relations, the Commissions are normally given scant attention, in spite of their important tasks. To the author’s knowledge, no scholarly study has been made of their contributions to secure peace, although there is an abundance of studies on how to create peace on the Korean peninsula.

The study aims to contribute to the literature on inter-Korean relations by investigating whether the MAC and the NNSC have fulfilled their original tasks and whether they have contributed to securing peace in relation to the main actors in the Korean issue - the US, South Korea, North Korea and China. Great consideration is given to the impact of the Cold War on the Commissions’ work. Whether the Commissions have had any possibilities to promote a peaceful

---

<sup>3</sup> Foster-Carter, “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: History,” in *The Far East and Australasia 2008* (London: Europa Publications, 2007). p. 555; Jhe, *Hanbando p’yonghwa ch’eye-ūi mosaek: pōpkyupōmchōk chōpgān-ūl chungsim-ūro* (Seoul: Chip’yōng sōwōn, 2000), pp. i, 421.

<sup>4</sup> Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 24, 41.

development by undertaking action on their own is also analyzed. The analysis is based both on the Commissions' work and on assessments of the work.

## 1.2 Theoretical Framework

In order to analyze the empirical materials, three theoretical frameworks are applied. Firstly, the terms of the Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung (1996) "negative peace" and "positive peace" are referred to. Galtung's definitions are: "Peace is the absence/reduction of violence of all kinds" versus "Peace is nonviolent and creative conflict transformation." He also refers to negative peace "as absence of direct violence" and to positive peace "as the presence of symbiosis and equity in human relations" and "absence of structural and cultural violence." Structural violence refers, above all, to exploitation, which means that the topdogs get much more out of the interaction in the structure than the underdogs. Cultural violence refers to such aspects of culture as religion and ideology, language and art, and empirical and formal science that can be used to justify or legitimize direct violence such as killings.

In Galtung's view, "positive peace is the best protection against violence" and "peace of any kind breeds peace of any kind." In contrast, "violence of any kind breeds violence of any kind." Positive peace is also referred to as a "... cooperative system beyond 'passive peaceful coexistence', one that can bring forth positively synergistic fruits of the harmony." Galtung has two peace concepts: "Peace = direct (positive) peace + structural peace + cultural peace" is the static one. The more dynamic one is "Peace is what we have when creative conflict trans-

formation takes place nonviolently.” The latter refers to a system characteristic, that is, a context within which certain things can happen in a particular way. The test of peace is in the ability to handle conflict, that is, transforming the conflict by handling it creatively.<sup>5</sup>

Secondly, the American scholars I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman (1982) present the “game theory.” It argues that a “zero-sum” situation, referring to the view that what one side gains the other side loses, characterizes a conflict before negotiation starts. The aim of negotiations is to change that view and to change the points of dispute into something that both parties can benefit from. The key to change from a zero-sum to a non-zero sum situation is known as Homans’s theorem. It says: “The more the items at stake can be divided into goods valued more by one party than they cost to the other and goods valued more by the other party than they cost to the first, the greater the chances of successful outcomes.” Negotiations are also affected by toughness and softness, that is holding out and giving in. Toughness and softness must be separated for discussion, but each must be kept in mind while the other is being analyzed.

The significance of trust and credibility in negotiations is included. Trust is one of the main characteristics of a fruitful negotiation, but it involves the paradox between being friendly and cooperative and trying to maximize its own benefits. No party to an agreement can be completely trustworthy since that would put it at the mercy of the other’s deception. On the other hand, to be completely untrustworthy would also be impossible: that would destroy the possibility of any

---

<sup>5</sup>- Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 1996), pp. 2, 9, 14, 30-33, 61, 196-9, 265.

agreement. Credibility may be created by establishing a verifiable record of events, including the use of independent sources of information or even of the other party's sources. A common view among negotiators is that good personal working relationships can have a positive impact on a negotiation and a negotiator's credibility. Zartman and Berman write: "Contacts away from the bargaining table in a relaxed atmosphere may contribute to the creation of good working relations."

Thirdly, the American scholar Christopher S. Mitchell (1995) argues that any third party that plans to intervene in a protracted regional conflict has to base a conflict reduction strategy on creating or enhancing "positive" symmetries. The expression refers to equalities in the nature of the conflict that reduce and settle rather than escalate or exacerbate it.<sup>6</sup>

The concepts of negative peace and positive peace are applied to the development of inter-Korean relations that form the context in which the MAC and the NNSC have conducted their work. In particular, the concepts are the basis for evaluating to what degree it is possible to talk of peace. The criteria are the number of incidents, how serious they were considered to be and the number of casualties. Consequently, the application of the concepts deals with explicit military tension, with the exception of the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1992-94, that created tension which, however, cannot be estimated by

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<sup>6</sup>- Mitchell, "Asymmetry and Strategies of Regional Conflict Reduction," in *Cooperative Security: Reducing Third World Wars* (eds I. William Zartman and Victor A. Kremenyuk, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995), p. 40; Zartman and Berman, *The Practical Negotiator* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 12-14, 27-9. Original quotations of Homan's theorem and from Mitchell.

the same criteria. The game theory and positive symmetry are applied to explain the parties' handling of crises. Trust and credibility are used to evaluate how they have affected the Commissions' work.

### 1.3 Method

The study follows a chronological account owing to the organization of the empirical material. Such an approach gives an overview of the Commissions' work, what the major themes were during each decade, and allows comparisons of assessments of the work as well as of the number and types of armistice violations. Consequently, the approach is both chronological and thematic. Whether there have been any deviations from patterns identified is investigated. Characteristics that refer to the whole post-1953 period are recorded in Chapters 6 and 7. The data presented refer to what actually has happened or been discussed, and not considerations behind actions taken or evaluations made afterwards of what could or should have been done. Assessments in the literature are evaluated.

Since the development of inter-Korean relations is an extremely broad and complex issue, the study only includes such issues as are relevant for analyzing the Commissions' work and for identifying characteristics. Throughout the study, the incidents investigated are the most significant ones, as recorded in the literature.<sup>7</sup> Incidents were

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<sup>7</sup>- Violations are recorded by Fischer, *CRS Report for Congress: North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-2007* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 20, 2007) and by Kim, "Hyujôn ihu ssangbang chôngjôn hyôpchông wiban," in Hapch'am ponbu chôngbo, op. cit., 2006, pp. 189-228 from 1953-2006. Incidents included in the present study have been checked against these works. The works are quoted when supplementing data recorded elsewhere.

also selected to present the response of the other side, to find out who was behind armistice violations and to enable comparisons to be made to find out whether there has been any continuity in patterns of violations or not. In order to judge the combatants' views of each other, which party called meetings is carefully recorded.<sup>8</sup> When detailed data of armistice violations are lacking, their types are recorded.

In the case of recurring issues raised in the MAC, the basic arguments are recorded in the text during each relevant period. The occasions when the same issues have been repeated appear in the chronology in Appendix IV that records important dates.

The author mainly applies a qualitative method to discover the main characteristics of each theme raised, but in the case of recurring issues this method is combined with a quantitative method to discover trends both during one decade and throughout the decades. Cross references are made to find out whether the opinions presented are representative or not and whether developments differ over time or not. The greatest possible effort has been made to present a balanced view of developments by presenting the views of both sides.

## 1.4 Sources

The starting point for the study is the 1953 Armistice Agreement presented in Chapter 2 and referred to elsewhere whenever relevant. In this way, the strengths and weaknesses of the agreement are identified on the basis of assessments in the literature and the author's opinion. With the exception of a few recent articles from the Korean Central

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<sup>8</sup>- For a complete record see Appendix X, pp. 684-5.

News Agency, one article from a journal, letters addressed to the UN Security Council and statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, materials from Korea, whether in Korean or in English, are all from South Korea. However, since the main sources on armistice violations from the South Korean Ministry of Defence published in 1989, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2006 record both parties' views, such a situation is not regarded as a weakness.

In addition, other books in Korean and articles in Korean journals that include both parties' opinions have been used, but this study could not have been completed without extensive use of materials in Swedish issued by the Swedish NNSC delegation from 1953-2008. Despite attempts to acquire materials from the Czech and Polish embassies in Stockholm and searches through the Internet, the author has failed to find information published by the two countries. However, since materials published by the Swedish and Swiss NNSC delegations contain data on all member countries and assessments refer to the whole Commission, such a situation is not regarded as a problem.

Data on armistice violations are supplemented mainly by publications by South Koreans who have served in the MAC, reports by the Swedish NNSC delegation and publications by the Swiss NNSC delegation, most of which are in German. In this way, a representative sample of views on armistice violations as well as the development of inter-Korean relations that affect the Commissions' work are presented.

The reports by the Swedish delegation, a Swedish study from 1985 and studies from 1993, 1997 and 2003 in which Swiss officers who have served in Korea have published both the history of the NNSC and their own experiences are indispensable sources on the Commission's work. A few officers from both countries have written

books or articles published in journals, newspapers and on the Internet. The author has carried out interviews with a few Swedish officers and one Swiss officer. The books issued by the South Korean Ministry of Defence also contain data on the NNSC, but they are more important for information on the work by the MAC. Other materials normally only contain assessments of the Commissions' work, not data on what they have actually done. With regard to major armistice violations such as the 1968 Pueblo incident and the 1976 axe murder, a few books published by American scholars and one officer who experienced developments during the latter incident are important but are supplemented by other materials in English and Korean that contain the views of both sides.

Data on inter-Korean relations often appear in the works referred to, but a few studies in English and Korean that deal with political aspects, including the demilitarized zone and legal dimensions of the establishment of a peace regime since the 1990s as well as what such a regime would mean, are also used. Works referred to include the author's book from 2006, studies by the South Korean scholar Seong-Ho Jhe and the former advisor to the United Nations Command/Military Armistice Commission James Munhang Lee, annual publications by the Korea Institute for National Unification from 2005-2008, the work by the American scholar Chuck Downs (1999) and other books and articles in journals and newspapers.

## 1.5 Organization and Scope

Chapter 2 presents the foundation and organization of the MAC and the NNSC and their work during the 1950s.<sup>9</sup> The starting point

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<sup>9</sup>- An earlier, abridged version of this chapter was published with the same title

is the 1953 Armistice Agreement, which is often referred to throughout the study. Then follow accounts of the Commissions' work. Armistice violations raised in the MAC are analyzed. In this way, patterns at meetings are traced, and whether there were any deviations or not from those patterns are investigated here and elsewhere. All translations of quotations from German, Korean and Swedish throughout the study are the author's. For the sake of convenience, a few maps are recorded in Appendix I.

Chapter 3 analyzes developments during the 1960s. Issues raised at MAC meetings are investigated, but the emphasis is on analyzing armistice violations. The work by the MAC and the NNSC is investigated. Great attention is devoted to North Korea's seizure of the USS Pueblo in 1968 as one of the most well-known armistice violations.

Chapter 4 deals with the 1970s. The NNSC's work is presented. North-South dialogue, armistice violations and issues raised in the MAC are investigated. Of armistice violations, the 1976 Panmunjom axe murder and the North Korean tunnels discovered under the DMZ are the best known and are therefore given most attention.

Chapter 5 analyzes the 1980s. Issues raised in the MAC and armistice violations are investigated with emphasis on major ones such as the 1983 Rangoon bombing and the 1984 shooting incident in Panmunjom following the defection of a Soviet citizen. North-South dialogue is included.

Chapter 6 investigates developments during the 1990s. First,

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in *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, vol. 15, no. 2 (2006), pp. 112-138.

the state of North-South affairs, reactivation of dialogue and the North Korean nuclear issue are analyzed. Then follows a more detailed investigation of the appointment in 1991 of a South Korean general as Senior Member of the United Nations Command/Military Armistice Commission, North Korea's withdrawal from the MAC in 1994 and its expulsion of the Czech Republic from the NNSC in 1993 and Poland from the Commission in 1995. A section on armistice violations concludes the chapter. Owing to the 1991 Basic Agreement, the nuclear issue and the fact that the creation of a peace regime was raised and discussed at the four-party talks held in 1997-99, more attention is devoted to inter-Korean relations than in previous chapters.

Chapter 7 presents the state of North-South affairs, the work of the MAC and the NNSC, armistice violations and the main developments in inter-Korean relations in the political and military area since 2000. An assessment of the Armistice Agreement from 2000 is included. Here, too, more attention is given to inter-Korean relations due to the expansion of contacts following the inter-Korean summit held in June 2000, the opening of military talks afterwards and major security issues raised up to June 2009, when the study ends. As in Chapter 6, inter-Korean relations will not be dealt with in detail.

Chapter 8 presents the general conclusions. The importance of the work by the MAC and the NNSC is assessed, followed by a discussion of peace-keeping on the Korean peninsula that includes the issue of how to officially end the Korean War.

## 1.6 Korean Names and Terminology

Korean names are transcribed according to the McCune-Reischauer system. However, Korean scholars' preferred spellings are followed when they have published in English or when their names appear in works by other scholars that are not in accordance with the McCune-Reischauer system. Spellings have in some cases been checked against business cards. Names of the South Korean presidents Syngman Rhee (1948-1960), Park Chung Hee (1963-1979), Chun Doo Hwan (1981-88), Roh Tae Woo (1988-1993), Kim Young Sam (1993-98), Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003), Roh Moo-hyun (2003- 2008) and Lee Myung-bak (2008-) are written in accordance with international praxis. The same applies to the North Korean leaders Kim Il Sung (1945-1994) and Kim Jong Il (1994-), as well as Panmunjom (P'anmunjōm), the latter, however, with exceptions made in quotations from Korean and in the bibliography in works in Korean. Spellings of ports of entry follow the original in the Armistice Agreement but the McCune-Reischauer system elsewhere. The same is the case with the islands in the West Sea (Yellow Sea) controlled by South Korea and the United Nations Command (UNC).

“UNC” is used in the text to refer to the body as such, while it is labelled “UNC/MAC” when meetings of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) are referred to since it is one component of the MAC. The other side of the MAC is the Korean People's Army (KPA)/Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV), which is referred to as “KPA/CPV” both in the context of their work and about participation in meetings. For the sake of variation, the latter is also labelled “the South” and the latter “the North” when MAC meetings are referred to. The two Koreas are

labelled “North Korea” and “South Korea,” but when the official names “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)” and “The Republic of Korea (ROK)” are used in the literature, they are used also in this work.

Chapter 2

*The Foundation of  
the MAC and the NNSC and  
the First Turbulent Years*



Peace-keeping in the Korean Peninsula

## 2.1 Introduction

The starting point here is the 1953 Armistice Agreement. The first section presents in particular the paragraphs that define the tasks of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). Some basic data on the agreement are recorded. Otherwise, relevant paragraphs are presented in contexts when the parties have referred to them. The following sections give an account of the Commissions' work from 1953-56 and their interaction. The implementation of the agreement was strongly affected by the political environment in which it took place. Consequently, three issues of equal importance are investigated. First, what was the legacy of the Korean War? Second, were the agreement's provisions followed or not? Thirdly, how did the policies pursued by North Korea, China, South Korea and the United States affect the Commissions' work?

In order to analyze these complex and interrelated issues, data are presented on such issues as armistice violations raised at MAC meetings and assessments of the Commissions' work. Evaluations of the Armistice Agreement are included. In the case of both the MAC and the NNSC, great consideration is given to the Commissions' composition and the impact it had on their work. Equal attention is given to the policies pursued by both parties and the interaction between them, in order to present a fair and balanced view of developments.

With this background, the following section deals with the end of NNSC inspections in 1956 due to the suspension by the United Nations Command (UNC) of the paragraphs in the Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Commission. Why the paragraphs were sus-

pended, how the suspensions were enacted and what policies North Korea, China, South Korea and the United States pursued to meet the new situation is investigated. In particular, the impact on the NNSC is analyzed.

The next section focuses on the decision by the UNC in 1957 to dismantle the agreement by cancelling the prohibition on rearmaments, how the decision was implemented and how it affected the Commissions' work. Armistice violations are also investigated here. Finally, attention is devoted to the North's demand for a withdrawal of American troops from South Korea raised in the MAC and the parties' view of the NNSC following the 1956-57 events.

## **2.2 The Foundation and Organization of the MAC and the NNSC**

The Korean War ended with an Armistice Agreement signed by General Nam Il for both the Korean People's Army (KPA) and the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) and Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, Jr. for the UNC on July 27, 1953. The UNC was founded on July 24, 1950, on the basis of the July 7 UN Security Council resolution to integrate the UN combat units into one organization. Previously, on July 15, South Korea had transferred operational command to the US. While North Korea argues that it is an agreement signed with the US which had capitulated to the North, it is in reality an agreement signed by military commanders.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>- Columbia University, *Text of the Korean War Armistice Agreement*; Frisk, "NNSC:s arbete på gränsen mellan Nordoch Sydkorea," lecture at Stockholm University, November 22, 2006; Kim, "Yuengun saryôngbu (UNC)," in Hapch'am chôngbo

Although the signing of the Armistice Agreement should have caused joy and optimism, the author has found two cautious statements made by high-ranking American officers at this time. Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor; Commanding General, United States Eighth Army, declared: “There is no occasion for celebration or boisterous conduct. We are faced with the same enemy, only a short distance away, and must be ready for any move he makes.” General Mark Clark, one of the cosigners, stated after having signed:

“I cannot find it in me to exalt in this hour. Rather, it is a time for prayer, that we may succeed in our difficult endeavor to turn this Armistice to the advantage of mankind. If we extract hope from this occasion, it must be diluted with recognition that our salvation requires unrelaxing vigilance and effort.”<sup>11</sup>

The South Korean President Syngman Rhee (1948-1960) had opposed any armistice which would leave Chinese Communists in northern Korea. The Swiss Colonel Urs Alfred Mueller-Lhotska, who served in the Swiss NNSC Delegation 1994-96, writes (1997): “If necessary, he was even ready to continue fighting alone against North Korea.” Since the South Korean government regarded the Armistice Agreement as a perpetuation of national division, it refused to sign.

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ponbu, *Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoë p’yôllam: che 7 chip (2004-2006)*, 2006, p. 3; Pak, “Nambuk p’yônghwa hyôpchông-gwa Hanbando p’yônghwa,” in Han’guk inkwôn chaedan, *Hanbando p’yônghwa-nûn kanûngha ga?: Hanbando anbo chilsô-ûi chônghan-gwa p’yônghwa ch’êje-ûi mosaek* (Seoul: Tosô ch’ulp’an arûk’e, 2004), pp. 226, 231-2. The July 7, 1950, UN Security Council resolution is recorded in Jhe, *Hanbando p’yônghwa ch’êje-ûi mosaek*, 2000, p. 458 (English) and p. 459 (Korean).

<sup>11</sup>- Kirkbride, *Panmunjom: Facts About the Korean DMZ* (New Jersey and Seoul: Hollym International Corp., 2006), p. 87; TI & E Office of the Support Group, UNC MAC, APO 72, *The Team Behind the Armistice: the story of The Support Group, UNC MAC* (Tokyo: Daito Art Printing Co., n.d.).

However, following strong pressure from the US, South Korea declared that it would agree to the agreement and observe it on condition of signing a mutual defence treaty and the provision of economic and military assistance. According to Mr. Sven Julin, Head of the Swedish NNSC delegation March 1998-June 1999 (2000), it was a major mistake by South Korea not to sign since it led North Korea to believe that the South was unwilling to bring the war completely to an end.<sup>12</sup>

The Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 1, stipulates the establishment of a Military Demarcation Line (MDL). A Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) would be established through the withdrawal of both sides two kilometres from this line which, in 2003, was marked with 1,292 signs at intervals of 500 metres along the 250-kilometre-long zone. The DMZ shall serve "...as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities." Paragraph 6 states: "Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the demilitarized zone." Paragraph 10 does not allow more than 1,000 persons to enter either side of the zone at any one time "...for the conduct of civil administration and relief..." Also, "The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission."<sup>13</sup>

A Military Armistice Commission (MAC) was set up "...to super-

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<sup>12</sup>- Jhe, *Hanbando p'yŏnghwa ch'eje-ŭi mosaek*, 2000, p. 33: fn. 21; Julin, "NNSC och dess förändrade roll under 1990-talet," lecture at Stockholm University, March 22, 2000; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *Swiss Mission to Korea in the Change of Times 1953-1997* (Zurich and Prague: Translawia, 1997), pp. vii, 17-18. The Heads of the NNSC delegations are recorded in pp. 689-695.

<sup>13</sup>- Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 1, 6, 10; Ha, "Chôngjôn hyŏpchông ch'eje-wa yuensa-ŭi yŏkhal," *Ch'ŏnsa* 5 (2003.6), no. 5, p. 2; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 54.

vises the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.” The MAC shall “supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary” through its ten Joint Observer Teams. The teams “... shall be composed of not less than four nor more than six officers of field grade...,” half of which shall be appointed by the Commanders of each side. The MAC “...is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone and in the Han River Estuary” on condition that “...not more than half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.”

The MAC “...is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.” Also, “When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.” Finally, “When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides.”

The MAC shall have ten senior officers, five of whom to be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the UNC and five jointly by the Supreme Commander of the KPA and the Commander of the CPV. Three of the five members from each side should “...be of general of

flag rank.” The other two “... members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.” As a Commission comprised of hostile parties, the MAC does not have a chairman. The UNC established its headquarter in Tokyo on July 24, 1950, but it was moved to Seoul on July 1, 1957, to be able to implement its tasks more efficiently.<sup>14</sup>

Between December 1953 and 1964, the UNC/MAC consisted of two American generals and one each from South Korea, the United Kingdom and Thailand. As a non-signatory of the Armistice Agreement, South Korea did not immediately participate in the MAC. However, since the US government and the UNC requested South Korea to take part in the MAC at a time when it handled such post-war issues as dealing with displaced people and excavating corpses, a South Korean representative was dispatched on December 20, 1953. An army general took part in the Commission on March 3, 1954, replacing one of the original three American generals.

In order to reduce the American dominance and to respond to North Korean criticism of the US in the MAC, since June 1964 the UNC/MAC has had one American major general as Senior Member, one major general and one brigadier general each from South Korea, one British brigadier and one colonel from the UNC Liaison Group consisting of the Philippines and Thailand. The KPA/CPV originally had three North Korean and two Chinese officers, but since late 1954 there have been four North Korean officers and one Chinese officer. In 1985, the KPA/CPV consisted of one KPA major general as Senior

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<sup>14</sup>- Columbia University, *ibid.*, Paragraph 19, 20, 23(a), (b), 24, 25(b), (d), (e), 26, 27, 28, 29, 30; Kim, “1960 nyōndae kunsā chōngjōn wiwōnhoe-wa ‘chōngjōn ch’ēje,’” *Yōksa-wa hyōnsil* 50 (2003), p. 169; Kim, *op. cit.*, 2006, p. 3.

Member, one KPA and one CPV major general each and two KPA senior colonels. In 2000, the UNC/MAC consisted of two American and two South Korean officers each, one British national and on a rotation basis one representative from Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, the Philippines or Thailand. In 2006, New Zealand and Turkey also supplied representatives to the MAC on a rotation basis.<sup>15</sup>

A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) was established “...to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in Sub-paragraphs 13(c) and 13(d) and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.” The MAC shall in turn “Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.” The NNSC shall also:

“Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13(c) and 13(d) of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in Paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any

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<sup>15</sup>- Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *Historik över de neutrala ländernas övervakningsskommission i Korea* (Försvarets Läromedelscentral, n.p.,1985), p. 19; Ha, op. cit., pp. 41, 43; Julin, op. cit.; Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, p. 171; Kim, op. cit., 2006, p. 4; Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), p. 220.

secret designs or characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition.”<sup>16</sup>

Paragraph 13(c) prohibits “...the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel ...” But “...replacements of units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea...” are permitted. “Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis.” The rotation policy permits “...no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service...” to enter into either North or South Korea in any month. In addition:

“Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.”<sup>17</sup>

The ports of entry are in the North, Sinūiju, Ch’ōngjin, Hūngnam, Manp’o and Sinanju and in the South, Inch’ōn, Taegu, Pusan, Kangnūng and Kunsan. Paragraph 43 states that the teams “shall be accorded full convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map (Map 5).” According to *Time* (March 1955), during the armistice talks a much debated issue was how to enforce the truce terms that banned any rearmaments. The UN proposed “...that neutral truce teams have

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<sup>16</sup>- Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 25(g), 36, 41, 42(c).

<sup>17</sup>- Columbia University, *ibid.*, Paragraph 13(c).

the right to inspect any place in Korea at any time by land or air.” However, since the Communists refused to permit free inspection, truce teams could only operate at five check points on each side which the parties chose themselves.

Paragraph 13(d) prohibits:

“...the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type.”<sup>18</sup>

In order to justify such replacements, “...reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the MAC and the NNSC; such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being replaced.” The NNSC shall through its Inspection Teams “...conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.”

The NNSC shall have four senior officers, two to be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the UNC, that is, Sweden and Switzerland, and two by the neutral nations nominated by the KPA/CPV, that is, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The term “neutral nations” refers to “...those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea” (but Sweden had supported the South with a field

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<sup>18</sup>- Columbia University, *ibid.*, Paragraph 13(d), 43; *Time*, “End of a Farce,” March 14, 1955 (<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/article/0,9171,807074,00.html>); Mohn, *Krumelur i tidens marginal* (Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt & Söner, 1961), p. 330.

hospital). To implement its tasks, the NNSC shall be “...provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams...” Each team would have four officers, half of which from each side.<sup>19</sup>

The MAC shall “Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of Panmunjom...” whereas the NNSC shall “Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.” Panmunjom had been the name of a village, located along the main highway to Kaesŏng and P’yŏngyang, where the armistice was negotiated (reportedly due to the Chinese participation, the original name Nŏlmuili became in Chinese characters Panmunjom). It was located in North Korea’s part of the DMZ when the MDL was drawn and the building where the armistice was signed remains. Since the UNC repeatedly requested a relocation of the MAC conference site on the MDL, North Korea finally agreed to relocate it 800 metres away to Kanman-dong village, located astride the MDL.

The official name of the MAC conference area is the Joint Security Area (JSA). It is about 800 metres in diameter but is far better known as Panmunjom (as it is generally called in this book). The JSA was established on the basis of “The Agreement of the Military Armistice Commission Headquarters Area, Its Security and Its Construction” approved at the 25th MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC, held on October 19, 1953. Security of the JSA shall be guarded by both sides but “...the total number of security personnel from each side” shall “...not exceed five (5) officers and thirty (30) enlisted men at any time.” The MDL runs across the JSA, including the buildings of the MAC and the NNSC where the conference tables are symbolically

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<sup>19</sup>- Columbia University, *ibid.*, Paragraph 13(d), 37, 40(a), (b); Julin, *op. cit.*

divided into two halves by the borderline, that is, microphone cables. Panmunjom is often referred to as “the symbol of national division.” As Panmunjom has served since 1953 as a place for contacts between North and South Korea, it is also labelled “a spot for dialogue.”<sup>20</sup> In the author’s experience from visits in 1984 and 2006, Panmunjom is the only place in South Korea where it is possible to feel the tension created by the division.

### 2.3 NNSC Inspections Fail

Ten fixed teams of the 20 NNSC inspection teams had the task of inspecting the above ten ports of entry referring to ports, airports and railway stations. There were also ten mobile inspection teams stationed in Panmunjom, ready for ad hoc inspections. Due to the large number of inspection teams, the Swedish delegation at first had 75 members. The Swiss delegation had 81 members, whereas the Czech and Polish had 300 men each. The reason was that Czechoslovakia and Poland wanted to take care of supply services and communi-

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<sup>20</sup> Ch’oe, “P’anmunjôm-ül t’onghan Nambukhan kyoryu,” in *DMZ III - chôpkyông chiyôg-ûi hwahae hyômnyôk* (Chông et al., Seoul: Tosô ch’ulp’an Sohwa, 2002), p. 85; Columbia University, *ibid.*, Paragraph 25(a), 42(a); Hapch’am ponbu chôngbo, *Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoe p’yôllam: che 5 chip* (Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu: kunjôngwi yôllakdan, n. p., 2001), p. 217; Kim (ed.), *The Korean DMZ - Reverting Beyond Division*, 2001, pp. 308, 309, 313; Kim, “Pundan-ûi sangjing kongdong kyôngbi kuyôk (JSA),” *Kukpang Chônôl* (2004), no. 11, pp. 44, 45; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoe p’yôllam: che 2 chip* (Kukpang chôngbo ponbu: kunjôngwi, n. p., 1993), p. 30; Lee, “History of Korea’s MDL & Reduction of Tension along the DMZ and Western Sea through Confidence Building Measures between North and South Korea,” in Kim (ed.), *ibid.*, 2001(b), pp. 106-107; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *op. cit.*, p. 66. “A spot for dialogue” is quoted from Ch’oe, *ibid.* The October 19, 1953, Agreement is recorded in Korean by Kim (“Chôngjôn hyôpchông,” 2006, pp. 53-5).

cations themselves. In contrast, Sweden and Switzerland chose to rely on support from the armistice's parties.<sup>21</sup>

The first meeting was held on August 1, 1953. At this time, there was hope that the "temporary" ceasefire within a few months would be replaced by a political solution, that is, formal peace. In fact, the Armistice Agreement was intended to be a temporary agreement. Since preparations for the teams' travel plans to and from the ports of entry, security measures, relations with the two sides, weapons - the Swedish and Swiss officers did not want to carry weapons while the Czech and Polish wanted to - and so on were difficult, the Commission was not ready to dispatch the teams until all the problems were solved on August 12. The completely unarmed teams began their work a week later. Daily meetings were held throughout August onwards but from February 1954 twice a week, after the most complicated procedural matters had been solved. Since June 1954, meetings were held at least once a week with the presidency rotating.

The inspection teams that in August were dispatched to North Korea were prevented from undertaking their tasks, in violation of the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 43, guaranteeing "...full convenience of movement..." However, the agreement contains neither a proper mechanism for overseeing compliance nor effective means for enforcing sanctions for violations, disabling any counteraction. According to Mueller-Lhotska (1997), only the Manp'o railway station and the

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<sup>21</sup>- Bruzelius, "Korea - krig och stillestånd: Svenska insatser 1950-1978," *Jorden Runt* 50, no. 11 (1978), p. 599; Grafström, *Anteckningar 1945-1954* (Stockholm: gotab Stockholm, 1989), p. 1123; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., p. 24; Weilenmann, *Die neutrale Überwachungskommission in Korea: Hat sie ihren Auftrag erfüllt?* (Männedorf, 2004), p. 50.

Sinŭiju port “...showed a limited traffic”. “Controls were only possible if announced two hours in advance; checking was done on the basis of transports announced by the North Korean authorities because original documents could not be examined.” Consequently, surprise inspections could not be made. Also, “The results of the ‘prepared’ inspections - some four transport trains were checked weekly at Manpo - were always in precise conformity with the data reported by North Koreans” (Swiss and Polish teams inspected). In the port of Sinanju, where traffic had been inactive since the Armistice Agreement had been signed, the teams’ only task had been, in his words, to “show the flag.”<sup>22</sup>

According to the account by the Swedish NNSC member Karl Axel Schön (2000) from Ch’ongjin in August 1953, which is the earliest the author has seen of the NNSC’s work when he, another Swedish member and some Swiss team members went for a walk over to the harbour, they were forced after just a couple of hundred yards to return by their orderlies. Also, “every team had a North Korean officer

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<sup>22</sup> Bailey, *The Korean Armistice* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 172; Bettex, “Die Geschichte der neutralen Ueberwachungskommission (NNSC) für den Waffenstillstand in Korea (1953-1983),” in Kyung Hee University, Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, *The Swiss Delegation to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Panmunjom (Korea) 1953-1993* (Seoul: Handa Prints, 1993), pp. 18, 22; Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 43; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., pp. 22-3; Lee, *Toward a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula: A Way Forward For The ROK-US Alliance* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, May 2, 2007), p. 5; Lidin, “Armistice in Korea: Personal memories,” *Orientaliska studier*, no. 121 (2007), p. 184; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, pp. 28, 33; Park, “Armistice Agreement and Peace on Korean Peninsula,” *Korea Focus* 6 (1998), no. 6, p. 77; Rihner, *Auszüge aus: Schlussbericht Oberst-divisionär Rihner, 1. Schweizer Delegationschef 1954* (Clarens, Januar 1954), p. 25, in Birchmeier (ed.), *Quellensammlung zur Geschichte der Schweizerischen und Polnischen NNSC Delegationen in Panmunjom - Korea* (Bern: Schaffhausen, 2003); Theolin, “NNSC håller sitt 3000:e möte i Panmunjom” (<http://www.mil.se/int>, March 20, 2007). “Prepared” and “show the flag” are quoted from Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 33. “Temporary” is quoted from Theolin. For a contemporary experience from Sinŭiju see, p. 566.

as an “aide” and a soldier to clean the quarters.” At the next meeting, the Czech and Polish members brought up the incident as a violation of the Armistice Agreement, but the only consequence was that members had to report to the liaison officers in advance when planning extended walks or excursions. He points out that “..., in the beginning, it was very unclear exactly what and where we were supposed to inspect.” The team usually advised one of the aides that they wished to make an inspection at a specific time.

The aide then advised the liaison officer about jeep transport at the correct time. Strict control was imposed: “Every vehicle carried at least one armed aide or soldier, and liaison officers and interpreters accompanied every inspection.” When making the first inspection on August 20, the team was at the airport not permitted “...to investigate whether there even was a usable landing strip.” It “...only gave the railroad station a perfunctory glance...” The first report to the NNSC headquarters in Panmunjom read: “Nothing to report.” The inspections of the railroad station always gave the same reply.

At the inspection of the fishing harbour made on August 24, the team found that the limits of their inspection area had been properly located: they ran along some of the cliff formations surrounding the harbour. Although the NNSC team supervised the Manp’o railroad station, there were three bridges across the border to Manchuria, one of which, a railroad bridge, was outside their control area. He quotes the opinion “Either side is able to illegally bring in troops and equipment without any limitation - if they wish to do so!” Since the Armistice Agreement does not contain any mechanism for enforcing sanctions for violations, there was no way to prevent this violation. He reflects on the Commission’s task: “We ought to view our supervisory duty in a

sensible way. It was really nothing more than a symbolic gesture but nonetheless of immense importance, as our mere presence in the unsettled country had a calming influence both in the North and the South.”<sup>23</sup>

Considering Schön’s writings, compatriot NNSC officer Olof G. Lidin (2007) writes unsurprisingly that the Commission’s members had called themselves in the North “supervised supervisors.” According to the Swedish Major General Paul Mohn (1961), it was not until October 8 that the Chinese and North Koreans reported on minor troop rotations. They did not report on munitions referring to insignificant spare parts until November, but it was unclear whether those fell under the Armistice Agreement or not. While all imports in the South could be checked, controls could only be made in the North at random among overall trade: checks became inefficient and illusory from the very beginning.

During Mohn’s term in office from July 1953 to May 1954, there was no traffic at all in Ch’ôngjin, Hûngnam and Sinûiju. The harbours were blocked by mines and the airport was used only by the planes the inspection teams had used. However, particularly in Ch’ôngjin, railway traffic was active and the Swedish team members saw on a few occasions large boxes of Czech or East German origin. But the Czech and Polish members strongly refused inspection of the railroad station, arguing that it was not located along the border. At Manp’o, trains from China entered over a bridge and came to the control area but then left the area and continued through a tunnel that went in a circle before it arrived at the railway station where the inspection team started its work. On

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<sup>23</sup>- Schön, *Korea in My Heart* (New York: Vantage Press, 2000), pp. 129, 132-6, 142.

the way, reloading could freely be made in the tunnel. At Sinūiju, inspections had to be announced to the KPA/CPV liaison officers almost an hour in advance, but when the team came to the railway station it was usually empty. If a train was there, a Swiss or Swedish member occasionally urged the inspection of a wagon, but the Czech and Polish ostentatiously turned their backs to demonstrate their dislike.<sup>24</sup>

The account by Sven Grafström, Head of the Swedish NNSC delegation, from his visit to Sinūiju on November 12, 1953, confirms that Schön's writings not were a one-time event: "... as little happens in Sinuiju as in the other ports of entry in the North." When the whole inspection team, consisting of around 30 persons with interpreters and liaison officers, inspected the railway station, they saw a large number of boxes of apples. He then expressed his team's wish to cross the bridge over the Yalu River as tourists but was refused twice with the same motivation: "It is a border here." At the inspection at the second railway station, they saw scrap on the platform and in open railway wagons.

*Time* writes (March 1955): "To bypass the railway check point at Sinuiju, on the Manchurian border, the Communists built a new spur line two miles away, over which illegal arms roll unhindered from Manchuria." Announced land transports to the ports of entry were controlled. The North was also slow in providing information. Owing to these circumstances, the Swedish delegate at the 37th NNSC meeting said: "In the North, the inspection teams have seen and heard

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<sup>24</sup> Bailey, op. cit., p. 176; Lidin, op. cit., pp. 181, 198; Mohn, op. cit., pp. 337, 383-4, 391. Original quotation marks.

nothing.” Consequently, the UNC’s confidence in the NNSC fell. Unsurprisingly, the Swedish NNSC officer Rolf Rembe writes (1956) that he and his team had nothing to inspect during a visit to Ch’ongjin in May 1954.

According to the former international relations advisor of UNC/MAC, James M. Lee (2001b), there was “... strong evidence that North Korea had shipped illegal weapons, military aircraft, through places other than the designated ports of entry in North Korea.” Also, “...the NNSC, which was established as proposed by North Korea and China in lieu of the MAC inspection, turned into a defunct agency [within] less than a year due to the sponsors’ subterfuge and obstructions.” Under such conditions, only four of the ten mobile teams were brought into action from July 27 until the end of 1953. Following a Swiss proposal presented by the NNSC to the MAC on November 28, the number of mobile teams was reduced from ten to six. The North accepted the proposal at the 31st MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on December 1. A Swedish officer working in North Korea at this time confirmed to the author that inspections could not be made.<sup>25</sup>

Another statement confirming the difficulties of carrying out inspections was made by the Head of the Swiss NNSC Delegation in 1953-54, Colonel Paul Wakker, in his final report:

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<sup>25</sup> Bettex, op. cit., p. 18; Bruzelius, op. cit., p. 599; Grafström, op. cit., pp. 1184, 1185; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoë p’yôllam: che 4 chip* (Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu: kunjôngwidan, n. p., 1999), pp. 23, 494; Lee, op. cit., 2001(b), pp. 79, 117; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., p. 27; Rembe, *Kallfred i Korea* (Stockholm: Natur och kultur, 1956), pp. 93, 96, back cover; Swedish officer, telephone interview, June 20, 2006; *Time*, op. cit., March 14, 1955. Original quotation marks from Bruzelius, *ibid.*, and in the second quotation from Grafström, *ibid.*, p. 1185.

“Checks at the railway stations had to be announced two hours in advance. At the time when the inspection group arrived at the station, the station was mostly empty, or when there was a train and the Swiss or the Swedish demanded to inspect it, the Czechoslovaks and the Poles refused on the grounds that according to the Head of the station the train did not contain any military equipment. ... Prior to and after the station inspections intensive railway traffic could be heard.”<sup>26</sup>

Whereas there is complete concurrence in the literature that inspections could not be made in North Korea, opinions are more divided on inspections in South Korea. Försvarets Läromedelscentral (Textbook Center of the [Swedish] National Defence Force) writes (1985): “The southern side reported quickly and probably fairly.” On the other hand, it also points out that the Syngman Rhee government from the beginning had a negative opinion of the NNSC, which it did not regard as a neutral organization. According to Mueller-Lhotska (1997), in South Korea inspections took place and reports were made on the massive UN troop rotations as well as the replacements of combat material for the armed forces to the UNC, in accordance with the Armistice Agreement. It was no easy task. Schön (2000) writes that since 80 tons of goods arrived every day just in Pusan, it was impossible to make detailed inspections. Instead, the teams had to use and trust the information provided and limit their work to random checks.

But Mueller-Lhotska also notes that in spring 1954, issues of evaluation, the engagement of mobile inspection teams and differences between inspection routines in the North and the South led to permanent controversies within the NNSC that made its work in Panmunjom

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<sup>26</sup>- Quoted in Uner, “Aus der Geschichte lernen?: Problematische Erfahrungen der Schweizer Korea-Mission,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, December 27-28, 1986. Original quotation marks.

even more complicated. The Swedish-Swiss efforts to implement unified inspection routines in accordance with the Armistice Agreement had failed: the work had become entirely dependent on the information the North and the South chose to supply. On April 14, 1954, restrictions similar to those that had been implemented in the North were imposed in the South. No original documents were shown any longer and inspections of rotation of personnel as well as of replacements of combat material could only be made following applications. Consequently, "...the NNSC was deprived, in the South as well, of its active and independent role in supervising the Armistice Agreement."<sup>27</sup>

According to the then Swiss NNSC Member Lieutenant Gottfried Weilenmann (2001), the UNC was not particularly interested in inspections. It knew that hardly any inspections took place in the North but had only made scant protests. Also, the UNC was aware that no inspections could be made in Ch'ôngjin, Hôngnam and Sinanju but had nonetheless agreed to these ports of entry. The KPA/CPV knew that Kangnûng had no international airport but had nonetheless agreed to make it a port of entry. It was also aware that the UNC could station large quantities of non-identified munitions on several South Korean islands and, above all, on the Japanese island of Kamino, 55 kilometres to the south of the peninsula but did not do anything about it.

According to Grafström, in November 1953 the UNC was notoriously careless about handing in reports on the bringing in and out of combat materials. Cooperation between the UN liaison officers and

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<sup>27</sup>- Bettex, op. cit., p. 18; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., p. 23; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., pp. 28-9; Schön, op. cit., p. 142; Weilenmann, op. cit., 2004, p. 29.

the inspection teams did not work well. Consequently, it was difficult for the Swedish and Swiss NNSC teams in particular to evaluate the statistics. In sharp contrast, Lidin writes (2007) that the supervisors initially "...had access to everything."<sup>28</sup> That the teams faced restrictions in both Koreas indicates that the war legacy undermined the implementation of the Armistice Agreement; it did not contribute to eliminate the basic causes of conflict but only prescribed how to handle the post-war situation.

In addition to the hardships due to the restrictions imposed on its work by both parties, the NNSC also suffered from internal conflicts. The first occurred as early as August 1953. At the 13th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on August 20, the North claimed that the South had obstructed the North Korean and Chinese Red Cross teams' work in prisoner-of-war camps on Kōje Island, Yōngdūngp'o and at Imjin River-Bridge, in some cases with violence. It requested the engagement of three mobile inspection teams with officers from all four member nations. The UNC/MAC agreed to dispatch the teams at the 14th MAC meeting proposed by the South and convened on August 21. The teams were dispatched the same day.

The task for the teams that comprised about 30 men each was to clarify the alleged obstructions by the UNC in violation of the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 57 that regulates the Red Cross teams' work with regard to the repatriation of prisoners of war. On August 28, two of the teams returned to Panmunjom and on August 30 the third team returned. The Czech and Polish members regarded the North's

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<sup>28</sup>- Grafström, op. cit., pp. 1190-1191; Lidin, op. cit., pp. 193-4; Weilenmann, *Einsatz in Korea 1953/54* (Wettingen, 2001), pp. 35, 49.

accusations as justified, but the Swedish and Swiss did not; no joint report was submitted to the MAC in October, but two separate ones were. When the 28th MAC meeting requested by the KPA/CPV was held on November 18, the North protested that the South had deliberately obstructed its work at the three camps, but the UNC/MAC refuted this view as groundless.

In September, when a Swedish NNSC member was walking around in Pusan harbour, he found a large number of crates. After asking, his team was informed by the Americans that 106 grenade throwers were stored in 318 crates but had not been reported. The Swedish/Swiss side and the Czech/Polish side had different opinions regarding the time of arrival. The investigation requested by the former showed that the grenades had arrived before the armistice was signed. Consequently, Sweden and Switzerland argued that no violation had taken place, but Czechoslovakia and Poland opposed this view; no joint report was submitted to the MAC.<sup>29</sup>

On October 12, the UNC/MAC requested the NNSC to send a mobile inspection team to Ŭiju airport, south of the Yalu River. The purpose was to investigate intelligence received immediately after the armistice had been signed that North Korea had secretly put jet

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<sup>29</sup>- Columbia University, *op. cit.*, Paragraph 57; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 26, 31; Mohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 355, 357, 361-2; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-7; Rihner, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-9. Yôngdûngp'o is located in Seoul. The study by Kukpang chôngbo ponbu [Defence Intelligence Headquarters] records (pp. 21-235) dates of all MAC plenary meetings and is, together with Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu [Joint Intelligence Headquarters], *op. cit.*, 1999, pp. 7-436, the main source for the main contents of records from MAC protocols 1953-1992. All MAC meetings referred to in this study are plenary meetings unless otherwise recorded. Types of issues raised in the MAC, 1953-1990, are recorded in Appendix VIII, pp. 672-681.

fighter planes in transport containers and brought them into its territory from China. The Czech and Polish members asked how such a transport had been possible and refused to dispatch an investigation team. They argued that one side could reject a dispatch of mobile inspection teams, but such a viewpoint was a clear violation of the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 28, on observations and inspections of violations outside the DMZ. Although the NNSC held several meetings at the request of the UNC/MAC Senior Member, since Czechoslovakia and Poland supported North Korea, the dispatch of the team was delayed. Prior to the dispatch, a complaint from the Czech and Polish members on a formal mistake in the request was refuted by having the original wording immediately investigated.

When the eight-man team and its assistants arrived on October 15, the Swedish and Swiss members wanted to inspect the whole airport to find out whether the planes had been there since the war or had been brought in afterwards. In contrast, the Polish and Czech members just asked the Airport Commander if they could see the containers in the airport buildings. The Commander confirmed that there were neither any airplanes nor any parts to assemble brought in after July 27. The team was then driven around the airport for 25 minutes. The Swedish and Swiss members saw well camouflaged jet and propeller planes that, according to Mueller-Lhotska (1997), were Russian MIG airplanes. The members wanted to inspect them closely but were told that they were military secrets and could not be inspected. When they asked to see the aviation journals to find out how and when the planes were brought in, they were refused: the documents were secret. A request to inspect the southern part of the airport behind a hill was also rejected.

Following five days of quarrelling, on October 21 the team inspected the whole airport but did not find anything. No aviation journals or planes could be inspected. Inspections of containers were refused. On October 28, the team had to return to Panmunjom without knowing where the planes had come from. Yet, according to Weilenmann (2001), thanks to the dispatch, the KPA/CPV had learnt how attentive the Swedish and Swiss members were; no similar actions followed. The Czech members suggested that the NNSC should submit a joint report to the MAC that the fighter planes had been there during the war, but the Swedish and Swiss refused to meet this demand. Consequently, in spite of jointly made conclusions that the Armistice Agreement had not been violated, no report was elaborated to the MAC. The Swedish and Swiss members claimed that only the aviation journal could have definitely freed North Korea of the charges, but the Czech and Polish members opposed this argument, claiming that the charges had only concerned containers.<sup>30</sup>

The difficulties the NNSC had to conduct its work did not end with these two incidents. Shortly after the second one, at the North's request, an investigation of an illegal ammunition dump of the UN troops in South Korea was resultless: no weapons were found in the place determined by coordinates. In January 1954, the UNC requested the NNSC to investigate at some carefully marked places in North

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<sup>30</sup>- Columbia University, *ibid.*, Paragraph 28; Lee, "Segye-esô kajang mujanghatoen 'pimujang chidae': P'anmunjôm-en 'simp'an'-i ôptta" ([http://www.donga.com/docs/magazine/new\\_donga/9804/nd98040170.html](http://www.donga.com/docs/magazine/new_donga/9804/nd98040170.html)), pp. 6-7; Mohn, *ibid.*, pp. 360-361; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 27; Petitpierre, "Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Mitwirkung schweizerische Delegierter bei der Durchführung des am 27. Juli 1953 in Korea abgeschlossenen Waffenstillstand-sabkommen (vom 26. April 1955)," p. 33, in Birchmeier (ed.), *op. cit.*; Rembe, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-6; Weilenmann, *op. cit.*, 2001, p. 12.

Korea whether prisoners of war were detained and engaged in forced labour in violation of the armistice. North Korea refused the proposal, with support from Czechoslovakia and Poland. Since the UNC threatened countermeasures, it was impossible to dispatch a Mobile Inspection Team. In February, the North unilaterally cancelled the relevant agreement clause. On February 12, the KPA/CPV informed the NNSC that it would no longer let the Commission make investigations on its territory “... based on defamatory accusations...”

Also after the fighter plane incident the UNC/MAC protested that North Korea had continuously introduced new models of fighter planes outside the ports of entry into its nine airports and air force bases and requested dispatches of NNSC inspection teams. But the Polish member opposed this proposal, arguing that the UNC was transforming the NNSC into an affiliated institution. Since the voting on dispatches ended with the outcome 2-2, the proposal was rejected. In fact, as Mohn (1961) points out, the composition of the NNSC led to constant deadlocks. On February 11, the NNSC had reported on the introduction of fighter planes into North Korea. The South Korean government quoted North Korean defectors and claimed that 300 MIG planes had been introduced in violation of the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 13(d).<sup>31</sup>

Since the UNC's requests for mobile inspections in North Korea were denied on six occasions by the Czech and Polish delegations

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<sup>31</sup>- Knüsli, “Die Schweizer Korea-Mission,” in Kyung Hee University, op. cit., p. 127; Lee, *ibid.*, 1998(a), p. 7; Mohn, *ibid.*, p. 331; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 27; Pak, “1950 nyōndae Migug-ūi chōngjōn hyōpchōng ilbu chohang muhyo sōnōn-gwa kŭ ūimi,” *Yōksa pip'yōng*, no. 63 (2003), p. 46; Weilenmann, op. cit., 2004, p. 12.

between November 29, 1953 and February 12, 1954, the Swedish Major General Paul Mohn, at the 105th NNSC meeting held on February 17, did not let their one-sided and improper acts pass unnoticed and asked:

“Under what circumstances will the NNSC be allowed to send Mobile Inspection Teams to the territory controlled by the North Korean and Chinese side? Am I to understand that the side itself has to acknowledge the violation before a Mobile Inspection Team is allowed to go out? Should that be the case, I think that both sides could scrap Paragraph 28 of the Armistice Agreement right away.”<sup>32</sup>

## 2.4 Violations of the Armistice Agreement

North Korea clearly violated the Armistice Agreement by severely restricting the inspection teams' work, but the UNC also violated it. Already at the third MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on July 30, it was agreed that military police should be used in the DMZ instead of civilian police who in contrast, are, as we have seen, permitted according to Paragraph 10. At the fourth meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC held on July 31, it was agreed "... that civil police would be armed only with rifles and pistols" but automatic rifles were not included. Subsequently, both sides began continuously to bring in so-called DMZ police to the zone. They were not police but combat personnel wearing armbands; in the end, the DMZ came to lose its real meaning. Later, combat soldiers also entered the zone. According to the South Korean scholar Seong Ho Jhe (1997), immediately after the

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<sup>32</sup>- Downs, *Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy* (Washington: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1999), p. 106; Lee, *ibid.*, 1998(a), p. 7.

armistice North Korea began to build a second iron railing fence south of the zone's northern boundary to gain even an inch of land and to occupy favourable heights in case of sudden attacks. This was done in violation of the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 3 that defines the northern and southern boundaries of the zone.<sup>33</sup>

Militarization could not be legally prevented; whereas the Armistice Agreement defines the obligation of general demilitarization, there are no concrete provisions prohibiting the installation of military facilities in the DMZ. The borderline between what is allowed and what is forbidden is thus unclear: many combat campsites, concrete barriers and the like have been established. Both parties claimed at the July 31 fourth MAC meeting that the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 13(a), requiring the withdrawal of all military forces, supplies and equipment from the DMZ, except as otherwise provided, within 72 hours after the agreement became effective was followed. However, according to Jhe (2000), such hazards to the safe movement of MAC personnel as demolitions, minefields and barbed-wire entanglements were not, as stipulated, removed from the DMZ within 45 days after the 72-hour period had ended. In contrast, Lee (2001b) writes that both sides withdrew all the hazards.

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<sup>33</sup>- Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 3, 10; Jhe, "Pimujang chidaenae-ûi p'yônghwa kujo pangan," *Kukpang nonjip* 38 (Summer 1997), p. 136; op. cit., 2000, p. 78; Kim (ed.), op. cit., 2001, pp. 271, 272; Lee, *ibid.*, 1998(a), p. 15. The agreements reached at the July 30 and July 31, 1953, MAC meetings are recorded in Korean by Kim (op. cit., 2006, p. 33). The only comparable reference to the DMZ the author has seen is in Mueller-Lhotska and Millett (op. cit., p. vi). Professor (and Colonel) Allan R. Millett writes that the only similar border he had seen after the "Iron Curtain" between the two Germanys disappeared, was on the Golan Heights between Syria and Israel.

Mohn (1961) records, although without giving any details, that hundreds of violations of the Armistice Agreement, almost exclusively flights over the other side's territory, took place during his time in office in July 1953-May 1954 but hardly any were admitted. The absence of an impartial referee in the MAC contributed to this pattern. The retired South Korean General Lee Sanghee (2007) points out the absence of an institutional mechanism in the Armistice Agreement to determine violations and to deter or rectify them as a limitation of the agreement. Yet Mohn emphasizes in the first evaluation the author has seen of the MAC that it has succeeded better than expected in maintaining peace, mainly thanks to the DMZ that reduced the possibilities for frictions and misunderstandings.<sup>34</sup>

Unlike Mohn, studies by the South Korean Defence Intelligence Headquarters (1993) and Joint Intelligence Headquarters (1999) record that other kinds of violations also took place. Already at the second MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on July 29, the North protested that immediately after the armistice had entered into force on July 27, the South had fired automatic weapons and cannons against the North. On July 28, military airplanes had intruded into the North's airspace three times. At the third meeting convened on July 30, the North protested that a military airplane had violated its airspace and pursued reconnaissance activities on July 29. Also when the fourth meeting was held on July 31, the North complained about the South's

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<sup>34</sup>- Columbia University, *ibid.*, Paragraph 13(a); Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 9; Jhe, *ibid.*, 2000, pp. 79-80, 82: "Chôngjôn hyôpchông-e kwanhan yôn'gu - kinûng chôngsanghwa-mith silhyosông hwakbo pangan-ûl chungsim-ûro," *Chôllyak yôn'gu* 11, no. 1 (2004), p. 100; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(b), p. 100; Lee, *op. cit.*, May 2, 2007, p. 6; Mohn, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

reconnaissance flights by one airplane in the DMZ on two occasions.

Later, at the seventh meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on August 4, the South submitted a written reply of its investigations of the protests against armistice violations up to July 31. That neither of the studies record the contents should indicate that the accusations were refuted. On the other hand, at the eighth meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on August 5, the South for the first time admitted a violation, apologized and promised to punish those responsible after the North had complained that 34 cleaners had crossed the MDL (no. 1). The North also protested that an airplane from the South had flown in the vicinity of Kaesŏng on August 3.<sup>35</sup>

At the ninth meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on August 8, the North complained that four military airplanes between August 4 and 6 on seven occasions had violated its airspace. The North made its first admission of a violation; the South asserted that on August 6 two of seven unarmed workers, while removing communication lines, had by mistake crossed the MDL (no. 1). The North expressed regret but also pointed out that on August 7 two jeeps from the South had entered into its territory close to Panmunjom. The South admitted the incident (no. 2). It also stated that the cleaners who had crossed the MDL had received “appropriate punishment” [but how is not recorded]. In fact, the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 13, prescribes

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<sup>35</sup>- Hapch'am chŏngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 7, 8, 9, 11; Kukpang chŏngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 21, 22, 23, 24, 478. For the sake of convenience, admissions made are onwards recorded by (no. ). Violations claimed by both parties against the Armistice Agreement, 1953-1994, types of violations against the Armistice Agreement claimed by the KPA/CPV against the UNC 1953-1993, and types of violations against the Armistice Agreement claimed by the UNC against the KPA/CPV, 1953-1991, are recorded in Appendix V-VII, pp. 664-671.

that “...the Commanders of the opposing sides shall...” (e): “Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this armistice agreement are adequately punished.”

When the eleventh meeting requested by the UNC/MAC took place on August 13, the South announced that the outcome of its investigation was that the claims made by the North at the July 29 and August 5 meetings of shootings and violating airspace, respectively, were groundless. At the 12th meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on August 19, the South admitted the introduction of two M-1 guns into the DMZ raised by the North at the previous meeting (no. 3). [Non-exemplified] punishment had been enforced. At the 15th meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC held on August 28, the South, with regard to the August 8 meeting, admitted that one of its planes had violated the North’s airspace (no. 4).<sup>36</sup> Within a month after the armistice had been signed, the North had admitted one violation and the South four violations.

In 1953, incidents were also raised at MAC secretary meetings. At the 29th meeting held on August 25, the South admitted the protests made by the North on August 13 and 21 at the 17th and 25th meetings against crossings over the MDL and noted that the perpetrators had been imprisoned (no. 5). In contrast, the North denied the South’s accusation of crossings over the MDL raised on August 20 at the 24th meeting. When the 31st meeting took place on August 27, the North denied the South’s protest against border crossings from August 25. At the 43rd meeting convened on September 10, the South

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<sup>36</sup>- Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 13(e); Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 11-12, 13, 14; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 24, 25, 478.

asserted that its investigation of the North's accusation of intrusions by fighter planes of its airspace at the 34th meeting held on August 31 had concluded that they were untrue, but it admitted the crossings of the MDL by military personnel raised at the 42nd meeting convened on September 9 (no. 6). When the 53rd meeting took place on September 23, the South admitted the North's protest made at the 42nd meeting convened on September 9 that guards had crossed the MDL (no. 7). At the 54th meeting held on September 24, the South claimed that its investigation of the North's protest against intrusions by fighter planes at the 19th meeting convened on August 15 had shown that they were false.

When the 57th meeting was held on September 28, the South admitted the North's protest against an intrusion of its airspace by a fighter plane made at the 17th MAC plenary meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC convened on September 7 (no. 8). At the 65th secretary meeting held on October 8, the South asserted that its investigation of the North's claim at the 45th meeting convened on September 12 that a fighter plane had intruded into its airspace had concluded that it was false. When the 74th meeting took place on October 19, the South claimed that its investigation of the North's claim at the 66th meeting held on October 9 that a fighter plane had intruded into its airspace showed that it was incorrect. At the 79th meeting convened on October 24, the South asserted that its investigation of the North's claim at the 69th meeting held on October 13 that a fighter plane had intruded into its airspace concluded that it was false. When the 81st meeting took place on October 27, the North asserted that the South's claim at the 58th meeting held on September 29 that a guard had crossed the MDL

showed that it was not correct.<sup>37</sup> Although there were many denials, the South again admitted four violations. The number indicates that Mohn's evaluation was not entirely correct.

Airspace intrusions were repeatedly raised in late 1953. At the 84th meeting held on October 30, the South asserted that its investigation of the North's claim at the 69th and 74th meetings convened on October 13 and 17, respectively, that fighter planes had intruded into its airspace showed that it was false. When the 86th meeting took place on November 3, the South claimed that its investigation of the North's protest at the 73rd meeting held on October 17 that fighter planes had intruded into its airspace concluded that it was incorrect. At the 89th meeting held on November 16, the South asserted that its investigation of the North's protest at the 77th meeting held on October 22 of intrusions into its airspace showed that it was not correct. When the 92nd meeting took place on November 23, the South claimed that its investigation of the North's protest at the 76th meeting convened on October 21 of intrusions into its airspace concluded that it was false.

At the 93rd meeting held on November 30, the UNC/MAC asserted that its investigation of the North's protest at the 89th meeting of intrusions into its airspace by a military fighter plane showed that it was incorrect. When the 96th meeting took place on December 16, the South denied the North's protest made at the 89th meeting of intrusions into its airspace. The North admitted at the 97th meeting convened on December 23 the South's protest made at the 29th MAC plenary meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on November 21 (no.2).

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<sup>37</sup> Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 27, 236, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 254, 255, 256, 257, 259. What party called the meetings is not recorded.

On November 16, a North Korean company officer equipped with a pistol had crossed the MDL into the camp of India's contingent of the custodian forces, where weapons were prohibited.<sup>38</sup> The South asserted that its investigation of the North's protest made at the 88th meeting convened on November 11 that a military plane had intruded into its airspace showed that it was incorrect. At the 98th meeting held on December 30, the South denied the North's protest at the 93rd meeting convened on November 30 against airspace intrusions.<sup>39</sup> In contrast to the above, only one admission was made in late 1953.

Armistice violations continued to be raised at MAC plenary meetings. At the 30th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV convened on November 28, the North protested that the South, on November 16, had fired trench mortars into the northern part of the DMZ. The South refuted the protest by claiming that the joint investigation had shown that shells had exploded by the forces of water and air, which was not an armistice violation. At the 33rd MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on December 18, the South refuted the North's claim that three KPA soldiers who had defected through Panmunjom three months after the armistice was signed were detained by force. On November 19, when the 91st MAC secretary meeting took place, the soldiers had requested protection, which they were provided with.

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<sup>38</sup>- India was chair of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) in charge of repatriating prisoners of war in which also Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Poland participated. Repatriation of 22,000 prisoners began in September 1953. The NNRC was dissolved on February 22, 1954. From Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 51(b); Downs, op. cit., p. 90; Reuterswård, "NNRC - Vad var det?: Repatrieringskommissionen i Korea 1953-54," *Yoboseyo* (December 1975), no. 4, pp. 13, 15, 17.

<sup>39</sup>- Downs, op. cit., p. 103; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 32, 255, 256, 257, 258, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 479.

The North claimed that they had defected due to being absent without leave and requested their return, but the South refused; the soldiers had participated on the South Korean side in the war but had been imprisoned and forced to join the KPA.

The South admitted the North's protest against the crossing of the MDL on December 12 by a soldier equipped with a camera and mentioned that the violator had been reprehended [but how is not recorded; no. 9]. The North pointed out that this intrusion violated the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 7, which states that no one is allowed to cross the MDL without permission from the MAC. It also violated Paragraph 9, which only permits persons working in "...civil administration and relief" and who are "...specifically authorized..." by the MAC to enter the DMZ. At the 35th MAC meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on January 10, 1954, the North protested that 302 planes had violated the North's airspace up to the end of 1953. The South claimed that among the 116 cases raised up to January 3, 12 took place due to non-attention, 95 were groundless and nine were under investigation. When the 37th meeting called by the UNC/MAC took place on January 23, the South claimed that among 130 cases of airspace violations, 116 were false while 14 were admitted.<sup>40</sup> Although the level of admissions was only ten percent, the fact that the South made incomparably more admissions than the North remained.

At the 42nd meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on May 13, 1954, the North protested that three officers from Colombia had crossed the MDL on May 11 in violation of Paragraph 7 and 9 and

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<sup>40</sup>- Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 7, 9; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 24, 25, 26, 27; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 32, 33-5, 479; Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), p. 206.

taken photos.<sup>41</sup> The South admitted the violation at the 43rd meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on May 22 and claimed that [non-identified] “appropriate measures” had been taken against the officers, who had crossed due to non-attention (no. 10). At the 44th meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on July 14, the South protested against the North having fired automatic weapons at a civilian police patrol boat in the DMZ on the Han River estuary on July 7. The North asserted that a first joint observation team (JOT) had concluded that the accusation was groundless. The South rejected, on the basis of a JOT investigation, the claim that two members of the Counter Intelligence Corps had on June 1 intruded into the North’s territory.

When the 45th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV took place on August 3, the North claimed that on July 29 two armed soldiers had crossed the MDL, shot at its civilian police and wounded one, but the South claimed that investigations made by a second JOT showed that there was insufficient evidence. At the 48th meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on October 6, the North claimed that three American intelligence officers had on August 11 made an armed attack across the MDL. One of them was killed. The South claimed that a JOT investigation had concluded that there was insufficient evidence.<sup>42</sup> Clearly, the meetings increasingly developed into a “zero-sum game”

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<sup>41</sup>- Colombia was one of the 16 allied nations that contributed troops to the UNC during the war. The other were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. From Kim, *op. cit.*, 2006, pp. 3, 6. For data on their contributions see Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, “Purok III. Han’gukchôn ch’amjônguk sogae,” in Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 2006, pp. 52-60.

<sup>42</sup>- Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, pp. 31-2, 33, 34, 36; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 38, 39, 40, 41.

and the number of admissions fell markedly.

Also in 1954, violations were raised at MAC secretary meetings. At the 99th meeting held on January 5, the South declared that the North's protest at the 96th meeting convened on December 16 against airspace intrusions was groundless. At the 108th meeting held on April 16, the South denied the North's protest against air intrusions. In contrast, when the 110th meeting took place on May 4, the South admitted the North's protest at the 106th meeting held on March 19 against border crossings by military police (no. 11). At the 113th meeting held on June 18, the North criticized the South for denying the intrusion into its airspace on May 18 which had been protested at the 111th meeting held on May 19. But when the 116th meeting took place on September 15, the South admitted protests from the North against violations of its airspace on three occasions (no. 12).

At the 117th meeting held on September 29, the South denied the North's charge that its civilian police had kidnapped and detained personnel working with border markers along the MDL. In contrast, at the 119th meeting convened on November 1, the South admitted one of the 16 cases of airspace violations that the North had charged at the 116th meeting held on September 15 (no. 13). At the 122nd meeting held on December 21, the North denied the South's protest at the 121st meeting convened on December 15 that civilian police had threatened personnel from the South's joint observer teams. At the 123rd, 124th and 127th meetings convened on January 3, January 21 and February 14, 1955, the parties accused each other of airspace violations.<sup>43</sup> Notably, more admissions were made at the secretary

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<sup>43</sup>- Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 265, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272.

than at the plenary meetings. However, the secretary meetings had also increasingly developed into a zero-sum game, indicating that no party wished to show any sign of weakness.

On January 4, 1954, it was decided that MAC plenary meetings would be in permanent recess until one party requested a meeting. The first spy case was raised at the 40th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on April 7, 1954. The KPA/CPV Senior Member, Lieutenant General Yi Sang-cho, criticized the infiltration of armed spies from the UN forces (US Army) and South Korea in violation of the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 12, which states: “The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this armistice agreement is signed.”

Infiltrations were said to have taken place on April 3 and 4. North Korea asserted that on April 3, led by a US Army officer, five South Korean soldiers from the Munsan Secret Intelligence Service armed with carbine rifles had crossed the western front of the MDL in the middle of the night. But when they were about to infiltrate into the North, they were detected. In the following fight, one South Korean soldier was killed and another was caught alive. Lieutenant General Yi criticized that the UNC/MAC inspection team had unilaterally left the room when the Joint Observer Teams (JOT) held a meeting to investigate the incident.

The North asserted that on April 4, five soldiers from a South Korean intelligence unit who had received an order to kidnap North Korean citizens had landed at Ponghwari on the southwestern coast of

the Hwanghae province around midnight, but they were detected and two soldiers were caught alive. The UNC/MAC Senior Member argued that the evidence presented by North Korea was insufficient to prove that the soldiers belonged to the UN forces and rejected the claim. North Korea asserted that armed spies dispatched by South Korea had in the JOT inspection certainly proved their crimes. Consequently, UNC members had left the JOT meeting midway. In order to at least stabilize the armistice, infiltrations of armed spies had to cease.<sup>44</sup> Regardless of whose version of the incident was correct, the fact that spy incidents were raised at this MAC meeting indicates that the cautious evaluations made when the Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27, 1953 were not unfounded. That only “negative peace” followed the armistice indicates how strongly the war legacy affected the parties.

At the 50th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on November 22, 1954, North Korea for the first time made political proposals. Since the consent of MAC was required to cross the border line, it was suggested that exchanges for non-military purposes of divided families, North-South trade and culture would be permitted beginning January 1955. A few crossing points along the DMZ were proposed. When the 51st meeting requested by the UNC/MAC took place on December 8, the South responded that free North-South exchanges as a political issue were outside the Commission’s jurisdiction. As noted by Lee (2007), since the Armistice Agreement was made between military commanders, it cannot exceed military aspects. South Korea’s govern-

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<sup>44</sup>- Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 171; Columbia University, *op. cit.*, Paragraph 12; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, p. 37; Lee, *op. cit.*, 1998(a), p. 2. KPA/CPV and UNC/MAC Senior Members are recorded in Appendix XI-XII, pp. 686-8.

ment rejected the proposal for passage through the DMZ for free North-South exchanges for non-military purposes that was repeated at the meeting.

At the 52nd meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on December 14, the North mentioned that it had suggested preliminary talks to discuss North-South exchanges in mail and communications matters and proposed that representatives should be allowed to pass through the MAC Headquarter's Area and be offered a meeting place. The proposal was made after the North Korean Minister of Communication on December 1 had suggested to his South Korean counterpart that such talks should be held in Panmunjom on December 17. Although the issue lay outside its jurisdiction, the MAC would, if the two Koreas agreed to meet, provide a meeting place, but none took place due to the opposition of the South Korean government. Later, at the 78th MAC meeting requested by the KPA/CPV convened on October 11, 1957, the North suggested the opening of a few trading routes through the DMZ to enable trade between the two Koreas. The South responded that the issue lay outside its jurisdiction.<sup>45</sup>

The above-mentioned James M. Lee (1998a) asserts that the North began to make political proposals in the MAC after the Geneva Conference that was held between April 26 and July 5, 1954, in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 60, prescribing that "...a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by

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<sup>45</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, p. 38; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 42-3, 55; Lee, *ibid.*, 1998(a), p. 11: *Panmunjom, Korea* (Baltimore: American Literary Press, Inc., 2004), p. 189; Lee, op. cit., May 2, 2007, p. 7; Wigforss, *Rapport avseende verksamheten vid Svenska Övervakningskontingenten i Korea* (Panmunjom, November 17, 1957), pp. 1-2.

representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.” had ended in failure, although it knew that it would fail. The ulterior motive was to propagandize the idea that, due to the presence of American troops in South Korea, reunification could not be accomplished.

The Geneva Conference was held after a five-month delay against the schedule fixed by the Armistice Agreement. Apart from South Africa, which chose not to come, all the other 19 countries that took part in the Korean War participated in the conference that aimed to peacefully solve the Korean question (but also dealt with Indo-china).<sup>46</sup> The UN side prescribed a central role for the UN to resolve the Korean issue, but North Korea, China and the Soviet Union argued that the UN as a war party was unsuitable as a mediator. South Korea requested in line with its population figures two-thirds of the seats in a pan-Korean legislative body.

In contrast, North Korea proposed to establish a nation-wide Commission with equal representation. North Korea and its allies urged the withdrawal of all foreign troops prior to elections, but the UN side wanted UN troops to remain until Korea had reunified. Since no compromise was reached on the role of the UN, the terms to hold national elections and the status of foreign troops, the Korean phase of the conference ended in failure on June 15. In a joint declaration, the UN side stated that continued negotiations were meaningless and that

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<sup>46</sup> In addition to 15 of the 16 allied nations enumerated on p. 49: fn. 41, North Korea, South Korea, China and the Soviet Union participated. From Gerring, “Sverige och den koreanska frågan under vapenstilleståndet,” *Kungl Krigsvetenskapsakademins Handlingar och Tidskrift* (1978), no. 4, pp. 137-8.

the Korean issue should be transferred to the UN. According to the South Korean scholar Pak Myōng-nim (2004), on June 15 North Korea's Foreign Minister Nam Il suggested that the two Korean governments should be the parties of a peace treaty to turn the armistice into a state of peace.<sup>47</sup> That the conference failed shows that the intention to make the Armistice Agreement a temporary one had turned out to be an illusion.

Since the Armistice Agreement does not deal with the status of personnel who have crossed the MDL, a precedent for the return of military personnel was first established at the 48th MAC meeting and the 118th secretary meeting held on October 6, 1954. According to Lee (2001a), after the armistice had been signed, in 1953-54, due to misunderstandings of the MDL's position, 65 guard soldiers from South Korea, the US and other allied nations had by mistake crossed over into North Korea, but they had been returned within three-four days through meetings of Joint Observer Teams. The North Koreans repatriated US Marine Lieutenant Colonel Herbert A. Peters, who had made an emergency landing in the North on February 5, with his light aircraft but did not ask for a receipt and an admission of violating the Armistice Agreement. This situation took the UNC by surprise because it had listed him as "killed in action." The MAC channel thus became the way for repatriating military personnel, but whereas incidents of border crossings fell dramatically after 1954, aircraft incidents continued to occur.

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<sup>47</sup>- Columbia University, *op. cit.*, Paragraph 60; Gerring, *ibid.*, pp. 137-9; Lee, *op. cit.*, 1998(a), pp. 11-12; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *op. cit.*, p. 31; Pak, *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 225. The sixteen-nation declaration is recorded in English and in Korean in Jhe (*op. cit.*, 2000, pp. 489-491).

After the 1954 incident and consistently until 1962, North Korea returned military personnel who had inadvertently crossed the MDL within a week to ten days. In some cases, a receipt for the returnee was not requested, but in most cases the UNC tendered a simple receipt and/or a letter that admitted armistice violations. The UNC also returned military personnel from the North routinely for simple receipts, without demanding an admission of violations. On August 17, 1955, a US Air Force T-6 aircraft had by mistake crossed the MDL in an exercise flight and was shot down by North Korea. Captain Charles W. Brown was killed but Second Lieutenant Guy Hartwell Bumpas survived. At the 65th MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on August 21, the South protested against the North's "barbaric act." In reply, the North asserted that the airplane had intruded to spy, as witnessed by Bumpas, and that the shooting-down was a justified act. The North announced that it would return both men and the aircraft wreckage without asking for a receipt and an admission of violating the Armistice Agreement, but in 1958 they stopped returning wreckages. The two men and the aircraft were returned on August 23, 1955.<sup>48</sup>

Previously, on February 5, 1955, US Army RB-45 reconnaissance aircraft had been attacked by North Korean MIG fighters in the sky over international waters in the West Sea outside Chinnamp'o in the first attack on such planes, but the incident ended safely. Among the six Mobile Inspection Teams that at the request of both sides were

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<sup>48</sup> Downs, op. cit., pp. 110-111, 303: fn. 50; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, p. 45; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 41, 48; *Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoë p'yôllam: che 3 chip* (Kukpang chôngbo ponbu: kunjôngwi, n. p., 1997), p. 247; Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), p. 121: op. cit., 2004, p. 121. The first quotation has original quotation marks.

dispatched to investigate the incident and prove whether prohibited munitions had been introduced or not, four made two different reports while the two others made a joint one. On June 16, 1956, at 120 kilometres from Wōnsan, a US Navy P4M reconnaissance aircraft was attacked in the sky over international waters. One of the crew was severely injured, but the plane returned safely. Required receipts were relatively straightforward, as in the case of US Captain Leon K. Pfeiffer, who had piloted a F-86 fighter-plane but was shot down in North Korea on March 6, 1958.

At the 82nd MAC meeting requested by the KPA/CPV convened on March 10, the North complained that two F-86 fighters on March 6 had crossed the MDL and intruded into its airspace. Punishment of those responsible was urged. The South admitted the intrusion by mistake of the planes during their routine protection flight but severely criticized the North for having shot down one plane without any warning and requested the return of the missing pilot and punishment of those responsible for the attack that the North argued was made in self-defence (one plane escaped; no. 14). The North rejected the claim that the plane had intruded by accident and regarded the incident as a pre-planned, serious hostile act. Although the Armistice Agreement does not contain any paragraph saying that the Commander of either side or the MAC Senior Members must submit a document admitting the crimes of violators and tendering an apology for the crimes committed, the pilot was returned but without the plane as a result of the 174th secretary meeting held on March 17 after the UNC/MAC secretary had signed the following receipt:

“I duly received from the Korean People’s Army/Chinese People’s Volunteers side together with his personal belongings the following pilot of the United Nations Command side who crossed the Military Demarcation Line in violation of the Armistice Agreement to intrude into the air above the territory under the military control of the KPA/CPV side and was shot down on March 6, 1958.”<sup>49</sup>

Other kinds of armistice violations were also raised in the MAC. At the 53rd meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on February 9, 1955, the North claimed that a military reconnaissance plane and a formation of eight military planes had crossed the MDL and carried out [non-defined] hostile actions, but the South refuted the claim. Among the North’s 398 accusations of MDL crossings made up to February 8 the same year, 384 had been investigated, 358 of which had proved groundless. When the 54th meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on February 10, the South admitted that a small, unarmed transport plane on January 20 had intruded into the North’s airspace due to inclement weather but criticized the attack on it (no. 15). Whether unarmed or not, the North asserted that the intrusion in itself was a hostile act. At the 59th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV convened on June 14, the North asserted that on June 2 armed personnel from the South had crossed the MDL and carried out [non-defined] hostile acts in which two of them were killed. The South claimed that they were engaged in normal work when they were deliberately killed and protested the act as non-human.

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<sup>49</sup> Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 111, 303; fn. 50; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 60-61; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 56-7, 285; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 53, 121; *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 22, 55, 121; Weilenmann, *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 12. Original quotation marks. Chinnamp’o is now called Namp’o.

At the 63rd MAC meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV convened on August 6, 1955, the North claimed that on July 22 two armed vessels from the South had intruded into its territorial waters and seized three fishing boats with 20 fishermen. Another armed vessel had seized one fishing boat with 12 fishermen. The South denied the accusations.<sup>50</sup>

At the 128th MAC secretary meeting held on March 8, 1955, the North denied the South's charge of four airspace violations made on January 3. The South admitted one of the eleven accusations of airspace violations made by the North on January 21, but it denied the charge by the North of airspace violations on February 14 made at the 53rd plenary meeting held on February 9 (no. 16). At the 130th secretary meeting held on April 25, the South admitted one of the 12 cases of airspace violations made by the North at the 129th meeting convened on April 8 (no. 17).

When the 133rd meeting took place on June 20, the North denied the South's claim of three airspace violations made at the 129th meeting held on April 8. At the 143rd meeting held on October 18, the North refuted the South's protest against airspace violations made at the 139th meeting convened on September 6. The South denied the North's charges of 15 airspace violations made at that time. At the 145th meeting convened on December 20, the South admitted that a helicopter on December 7 had violated the North's airspace and protested against the North's non-human act of firing at it (no. 18). The North refuted the accusations of airspace violations made at the

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<sup>50</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 38, 39, 43; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 43, 45-6.

143rd and 144th meetings held on October 18 and November 29 respectively.<sup>51</sup>

Whereas the data on armistice violations so far recorded are largely from MAC protocols, a report from 1955 by the Republic of Korea, Office of Public Information, contains some of the results of the interrogations by the Ministry of Home Affairs in charge of the police, the Intelligence Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Provost Marshal General Headquarters of captured North Korean agents, defected soldiers and refugees [but how the work was conducted is not explained]. The Ministry of Home Affairs interrogated 29 agents, who were divided into seven cases between September 21, 1954, and June 25, 1955 [date lacking in the first case]. Violations included introduction of a variety of combat material from mainly the Soviet Union outside the ports of entry, widening of existing military airfields and construction of new ones nation-wide.

Reports by the Joint Chiefs of Staff included 28 surrendered soldiers divided into 26 cases between January 17, 1954 and June 21, 1955. The Joint Provost Marshal General Headquarters recorded 41 cases of 42 soldiers captured between September 26, 1953 and June 22, 1955 [dates lacking in two cases], six cases of six spies captured between September 1953 and May 5, 1955 and three cases of three civilian refugees who escaped between March and May 20, 1955. Statements by soldiers, spies and refugees reveal the same kinds of violations as stated by agents. Data on military strength confirming the military build-up are recorded, but figures on the number of soldiers differ somewhat in the statements recorded by the Joint Provost

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<sup>51</sup>- Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 271, 272-3, 274, 275, 277, 278.

Marshal General Headquarters.<sup>52</sup>

Armistice violations were raised at MAC secretary meetings in 1956 as well. At the 150th meeting held on February 11, 1956, the two sides accused each other of airspace violations. At the 152nd meeting held on April 14, the South denied the North's charges of airspace violations on March 2 and March 23 respectively and that civilian police on March 30 had fired rifles towards the North at the 151st meeting held on April 4. When the 153rd meeting took place on July 6, the South admitted the North's accusation of a violation of its airspace by one of its planes on June 15 (no. 19). At the 155th meeting held on October 5, it was announced that the investigation resulted in both sides accusing each other of the responsibility for the shooting incident on September 20 between civilian police along the MDL in the vicinity of border-marker no. 0634.<sup>53</sup> Again, it is obvious that the zero-sum game continued unabated, but in 1955-56 the South made five admissions of armistice violations.

## 2.5 The NNSC between the Two Camps: “A Mission Impossible”

Besides the inspection issue, internal tension within the NNSC and armistice violations, developments after the Korean War were also affected by the negative American opinion of the Commission. Unsur-

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<sup>52</sup>- Office of Public Information, Republic of Korea, in *For Immediate Release*, September 5, 1955, (n. p.), pp. 1-26. Considering the massive destruction caused by the war, imports of combat materials from the Soviet Union must have been of the utmost importance for North Korea to strengthen its military power.

<sup>53</sup>- Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 279, 280.

prisingly, the US expressed immediately after the Armistice Agreement had been signed a sceptical opinion of the Commission's composition: Czechoslovakia and Poland, as satellite states of the Soviet Union, were just obstacles to the United States' military activities. Notably, Mohn (1961) writes: "The Cold War got a new front straight through our Commission." Also, "We should have shown the world that cooperation was possible. Instead, we had entangled in sterile discussions..." He laments this "profound fiasco."

According to the American scholar Fred Charles Iklé (1999), the US had placed great hopes on the NNSC during the armistice negotiations: "In their eyes it was an essential element of the armistice agreement that they had to win in order to prevent North Korea from violating the prohibitions against an arms build-up." Also, "The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was meant to make sure that the hard-won peace in Korea would last." But the NNSC soon turned out to be for the Americans "worse than useless." "It could do nothing about North Korea's arms build-up in violation of the truce agreement, but it inhibited the U.S. response." The NNSC "...was neither neutral (because Communist Poland and Czechoslovakia together had half the votes), nor supervisory (because the North Koreans could easily block all relevant access)." On December 2, 1954, the Swedish representative pointed out in the UN General Assembly the disadvantage for the Commission of having an even number of members but with no result (cf. p. 39).<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Iklé, "The Role of Emotions in International Negotiations," in Berton et al., *International Negotiation: Actors, Structure/Process, Values* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 337-8; Mohn, op. cit., p. 375, 388-9; Pak, op. cit., 2003, pp. 43-4; Petitpierre, op. cit., p. 61.

According to Weilenmann (2004), since the Czech and Polish guides in the southern ports of entry took photos of UNC troops and units, they kept a good record of all troops in the area. Since Czech and Polish officers, while waiting for the neutral nations' inspection teams' (NNIT) jeeps at military sites, recorded the inscriptions on military limousines, they could easily conclude which large units generals who took part in the work and departed from there belonged to. Through the normal work of the NNIT:s, the Czech and Polish officers received from the UNC copies of all documents of imports and exports as well as of arriving and departing ships and airplanes.

The American scholar Chuck Downs (1999) records that the Swiss member had reported at the 107th NNSC meeting held on February 23, 1954 that the Czechs and Poles "were all too eager to inspect all sorts of goods which did not even remotely have any connections with combat materials." They requested "time-tables, manifests, and other documents relating not only to combat materiel, but to all shipments in the South." The conclusion was that the NNSC gave the Communists "an insight into the movement of all cargo in the South's ports of entry."

Mohn (1961) records that in Pusan he had observed both on land and on board the port's captain's motor cruiser that the Polish freely took photos of warships as well as of merchant ships without being admonished by the accompanying American military police. Rembe (1956) concurs with Iklé's view by writing that "...the Commission now, at the turn of the year 1953-54, is more a tool for the Communists' interests than an impartial body between the two sides." In contrast, "...the Swedish and Swiss came here to represent objectivity."<sup>55</sup> While this study confirms that Czech and Polish

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<sup>55</sup>- Downs, op. cit., pp. 107, 302: fn. 41; Mohn, *ibid.*, p. 381; Rembe, op. cit., p. 31;

officers sided with North Korea, it is at present virtually impossible to prove whether the Swedish and Swiss actually were objective or not.

Iklé's view also concurs with that of Lee (2001b), who writes: "... the NNSC from its inception has never been a truly neutral body." Another weakness has been the absence of a "... referee for any decision making," Lee writes:

"The Czech/Polish delegations openly supported the North Korean and Chinese communists side, doing everything in their power to hamper proper function and operation of the NNSC. They regularly vetoed proposals for inspections and investigations in North Korea, whereas they often conducted intelligence collection activities in the ROK which is completely outside the purview of the NNSC."<sup>56</sup>

Lee also refers to the 68th MAC meeting called by the South held on February 14, 1956, when the UNC/MAC Senior Member said: "...the evidence accumulated by our side over a period of more than 29 months indicated clearly, and without dispute, that the value of the inspections teams (NNITs/MITs) has been completely, willfully and systematically destroyed by the Czech/Pole delegations..." He quoted Major General Mohn who, when the 87th NNSC meeting took place on January 15, 1954, had expressed the opinion that the NNSC "...should apply one system of inspection in North Korea and another in South Korea."

The monthly reports differed between Czechoslovakia and Poland versus Sweden and Switzerland. The Polish interpreter Jan Hajdukiewicz, who had sought asylum in the US on September 9,

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Weilenmann, op. cit., 2004, p. 30. Original quotation marks from Downs.

<sup>56</sup>- Lee, op. cit., 1998(a), p. 6: op. cit., 2001(b), p. 117.

1953, was the first man to point out the intelligence work by the Czech and Polish officers at a time when the American opinion was that both delegations carried out activities, including espionage, which harmed the UN. The American opinion became even stronger after the Soviet military intervention in Hungary in 1956 had ended that crisis.<sup>57</sup>

In addition to the difficulties the NNSC experienced in conducting its work, throughout 1954-1955 North Korea's military build-up was the major factor affecting developments, although the North asserted that it had followed Paragraph 13 (d) prohibiting rearmaments and that no material had been brought in from abroad. At the 39th MAC meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on March 18, 1954, the North protested that the South had brought in operational airplanes and armored vehicles etc. to establish four new divisions in violation of Paragraph 13(d). The South responded that the establishment of new divisions is not included in the Armistice Agreement. It argued that it had reported on the introduction of operational materials and military personnel more than 700 times but the North had only submitted three correct reports. Both sides accused each other of obstructing the inspection teams' work.

At the 41st meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on April 20, 1954, the North claimed, on the basis of reports from Czech and Polish NNSC members, that the South had brought in combat materials and had obstructed the inspection teams' work. The South asserted that it had followed the Armistice Agreement by not bringing in combat

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<sup>57</sup>- Downs, *op. cit.*, pp. 107, 302: fn. 39; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, p. 50; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(b), p. 117; Pak, *op. cit.*, 2003, p. 44; Rembe, *op. cit.*, p. 87; Weilenmann, *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 30. The first quotation has original quotation marks.

materials. It protested against the one-sided reports of the Czech and Polish members who were accused of having obstructed the Commission's work by deliberately interrupting investigations and assisting the North to bring in weapons.<sup>58</sup> Clearly, the internal conflicts of the NNSC also affected the MAC, where the zero-sum game continued.

In 1954, the South Korean government accused North Korea that, since the NNSC had been unable to conduct inspections in the North, the risk that rearmaments would destroy the power balance was high. Prime Minister Pyun Yung Tai wrote to the UNC Commander, General John E. Hull, on September 2, 1954:

“We expected Chinese Communists to withdraw from Korea in advance of UN forces, but what is actually happening is the reverse: U.S. divisions departing from Korea are leaving a huge gap hardly to be filled by ROK units which, in fact, do not exist even in paper-planning. While North Korea is bristling with airfields that did not either exist or operate during hostilities, but are now in full trim with jet fighters and bombers, ready on them, the few airfields in South Korea will soon go to weeds if they fail to get proper attention.”<sup>59</sup>

Due to the North's rearmaments, South Korea and the US wanted to dissolve the NNSC and cancel the Armistice Agreement in order to be free to modernize the combat forces and restore the military balance. The South Korean National Assembly unanimously passed a resolution that supported a dissolution. However, in the author's opinion, the South Korean-American position was contradictory; on October 1, 1953, they had signed a Mutual Defence

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<sup>58</sup>- Bruzelius, op. cit., p. 599; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 29, 30; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 36, 37-8.

<sup>59</sup>- Bailey, op. cit., p. 174; Downs, op. cit., pp. 107-108; Lee, op. cit., 1998(a), p. 7. Original quotation marks.

Treaty that obligated the US to come to South Korea's defence only in the event of an external armed attack and guaranteed the permanent stationing of American troops (cf. p. 19). Weapons and equipment were also brought in; the South Korean scholar Choi Cheol-Young (2004) points out that both sides thoroughly neglected Paragraph 13(d). The Defence Agreement entered into force on November 17, 1954 and has since remained unaltered.<sup>60</sup> Considering Paragraph 13(d), rearmaments must be regarded as the most serious armistice violation committed by both sides after the armistice had been signed. However, the paragraph is unrealistic; how is it possible to make a distinction between replacements and rearmaments and without taking technological developments into consideration? The paragraph was doomed to fail.

The NNSC could not prevent rearmaments. Weilenmann (2004) notes that it was outside the mandate to prove the state of munitions and points out that the NNSC had to rely on data provided by the UNC and the KPA/CPV. Yet, the inspection teams fulfilled their tasks correctly. In his opinion (2006), since the inspection teams did not check what he labels as “losses” in terms of destroyed, damaged,

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<sup>60</sup> Bruzelius, op. cit., pp. 599-600; Lee, *ibid.*, 1998(a), p. 7; Choi, “Nambuk kunsajök habüi-wa Han'guk chôngjön hyöpchông-ti hyoryök,” *Sönggyungwan pôphak* 16 (no. 2), 2004, p. 495; Quinones, “South Korea's Approaches to North Korea,” in *Korean Security Dynamics in Transition* (Park, Kyung-Ae and Kim, Dalchoong, eds, New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 22. The Defence Treaty is recorded in Korean by Jhe, op. cit., 2000, pp. 492-3. Pak (op. cit., 2004, pp. 244-5: fn. 32) argues that the treaty from a legal point of view is an armistice violation since the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 13(c) prohibits troop enforcements and Paragraph 13(d) prohibits rearmaments and the treaty, Paragraph 2 stating “The parties will independently or jointly or on the basis of self-reliance and mutual assistance continuously undertake and strengthen appropriate measures to prevent military attack” collide with each other.

worn-out or used-up munitions, inspections were meaningless. The American Lieutenant Colonel, William T. Harrison, (2002) also expresses a negative view of inspections:

“The difficult inspection language in the Armistice was doomed from the start because of the equal number of inspectors and the veto power each belligerent had. That portion of the Armistice cannot be seen as a success. However, it is hard to imagine an alternative that would have worked any better.”<sup>61</sup>

A difficulty recorded by Mohn (1961) was reports of spare parts that the Armistice Agreement had excluded. Consequently, the KPA/CPV and the UNC quarrelled about how to count them. Weilenmann (2004) makes the important point that the Armistice Agreement did not prohibit manufacturing munitions (it did not include dual-use products such as explosives and fuses either). In spite of these limitations, he wrote in 2001 that the NNSC, during 1953-54, had contributed to the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement by creating a sense among the war combatants that someone was supervising them and by serving as a legal instance, in spite of the absence of a referee (cf. Schön, pp. 29-30). The latter task was performed by investigating violations of the Armistice Agreement but, as we have seen, such cases very extremely few. The inspection acted by their mere presence as policemen or border guards.

On April 15, 1954, the UNC Commander stressed in a letter to the NNSC that the most serious violations of the Armistice Agreement

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<sup>61</sup>- Harrison, *Military Armistice in Korea: A Case Study for Strategic Leaders* (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, April 9, 2002), p. 28; Weilenmann, op. cit., 2004, pp. 10, 11: “Korea, der degradierte Auslandseinsatz,” *ASMZ*, no. 6 (2006), p. 15. Original quotation marks from Weilenmann, *ibid.*, 2006.

were committed by North Korea and the Czech and Polish delegations, in particular in their refusal to dispatch mobile inspection teams to the North. The Swedish and Swiss NNSC members did not oppose the content but the Czech and Polish rejected it. On April 16, the Commander delivered a message to the US Ministry of Defence stating that implementing the Armistice Agreement in North Korea was impossible, that since the NNSC could not conduct its work in the North there were sufficient grounds to dissolve the Commission and, finally, that if the two parties do not want a new war, a dissolution would not cause much harm to the agreement. The Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 13(d), Paragraph 17 regarding cooperation and support by MAC with the NNSC, Paragraph 28 concerning violations outside the DMZ and, finally, Paragraph 41 on the responsibilities and power of the NNSC were declared invalid. An end to NNSC activities in South Korea was requested.<sup>62</sup>

The US Ministry of Defence responded to the April message by stating, first, that if there were progress at the Geneva Conference, an amendment of the Armistice Agreement's provisions on the NNSC would be considered. Second, at a time when Sweden and Switzerland requested a dissolution of the NNSC and if North Korea and China did not have an intent to reorganize the NNSC as a more productive and efficient organization, a dissolution would also be considered. Third, as long as the Geneva Conference continues, an expulsion of the NNITs from South Korea should be deferred.

Immediately before the message had been sent, on April 14-15,

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<sup>62</sup>- Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 13(d), 17, 28, 41; Lee, op. cit., 1998(a), pp. 7-8; Mohn, op. cit., pp. 359-360; Petitpierre, op. cit., pp. 36-7; Weilenmann, op. cit., 2001, pp. 25, 35; *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 10, 11, 44.

1954, “the Swiss Federal Council approached, in agreement with the Swedish government, the US and Red China governments, asking them whether the NNSC could not be dissolved with regard to the utterly inadequate conditions under which the mandate had to be fulfilled”, but there was no direct answer. Previously, on March 29 the Swedish and Swiss representatives had formally expressed their dissatisfaction to the UN. On April 5, they announced that inspections had been completely ruined. Later, on June 11, 1954, the UNC Commander, General John E. Hull, recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the NNSC be abolished since it was used by the Czech and Polish members “to compile detailed intelligence data” and was harassing the UNC with “unfounded accusations and Communist propaganda exercises.” Due to the opinion that the NNSC inspections severely obstructed the UNC’s military activities, from this time onwards the US government worked to suspend the inspection teams by persuading the Swedish and Swiss delegations to end their work.<sup>63</sup>

On June 12, on the occasion of the Geneva Conference on Korea, during a courtesy visit to the Swiss Federal Council, the Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou En-lai “... stressed the importance of the NNSC as a significant body that maintained armistice in Korea and could not be dissolved since it constituted ‘an island of contacts in a sea without contacts’” In contrast, the American General and Head of the US Delegation in Geneva, Bedell Smith, declared on June 18 to the Council “... his unambiguous conviction that the NNSC could be dissolved

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<sup>63</sup> Downs, op. cit., pp. 107, 302; fn. 40; Ha, op. cit., p. 45; Lee, *ibid.*, 1998(a), p. 8; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., p. 29; Pak, op. cit., 2003, p. 44. The statement of the Swiss Federal Council appears in Petitpierre, op. cit., p. 58. Original quotation marks from Downs.

without any harm to the armistice cause” at a time when the South suspected the North of secret armaments (air force). The North wanted to use the freedom of the NNSC inspection teams in the South as much as possible to its own advantage; it attached great importance to the Commission. The South did not want uncontrolled North Korean armament without NNSC inspections. On the other hand, a dissolution of the NNSC would give a free hand to its own rearmament at a time when the Americans, on the basis of aerial observations, accused the North of importing military equipment at other places than the designated ones.

Considering the different American and Chinese views of the NNSC and the Council’s own wish “...to help preserve peace, the Federal Council decided to leave the Swiss NNSC Delegation in Korea but to adjust its staff to the topical requirements.” On September 13, 1954, Mao Zedong declared to the Swiss Minister when the latter presented his credentials that “...he hoped Switzerland would not withdraw its Delegation but that he considered a reduction in the number of its members feasible.” In contrast, in July the South Korean Prime Minister, Pyun Yung Tai, had told the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea that his government “no longer regarded the armistice as binding.” The South Korean government organized violent anti-NNSC demonstrations during August, above all in Pusan. At this time, popular opinion had been aroused against in particular the Czech and Polish NNSC members.

On August 1, shots were fired by unknown people at the Czech delegation in Pusan. A few days later explosives detonated in the barracks of the Communists’ inspection teams in Kunsan. In Inch’ôn, several hundred people demonstrated and marched towards the in-

spection teams' site. In another act of opposition, protest letters addressed by pupils were sent to the NNSC headquarters in Panmunjom. As large-scale, popular anti-NNSC demonstrations took place in all large cities in August 1954, the Commission's relative freedom of movement ended in the South at a time when, as we have seen, restrictions similar to those implemented in the North had been imposed in April the same year. At the NNSC's request, the Americans strengthened their protection of the inspection teams. According to Rembe (1956), since freedom of movement was curtailed inspection team members were put in quarantine. For security reasons, NNSC personnel were moved in helicopters instead of jeeps and buses.<sup>64</sup>

At the 45th MAC meeting held on August 3, 1954, the North protested against the anti-NNSC demonstrations and attacks on barracks and requested punishment of those responsible. The South responded that it had actively supported the NNSC and its inspection teams. At this time, in response the North implemented some relaxations for the inspection teams to emphasize the differences between the two sides. Members were invited to attend various events such as the almost weekly bus tour to Kaesŏng to go to the theatre, cinema or parties. In contrast, according to Lidin (2007), since NNSC members in the South "...could not take a step without being supervised," the situation became the same as in the North. "Supervision and control became restricted because security had to come first. The control at the

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<sup>64</sup>- Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 174; Bettex, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19, 20; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *op. cit.*, p. 23; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, pp. 29-30, 32; Petitpierre, *ibid.*, p. 60; Rembe, *op. cit.*, p. 100; Sandoz, "La Délégation Suisse dans la NNSC et son environnement géopolitique," in Kyung Hee University, *op. cit.*, p. 216. The second quotation has original quotation marks.

ports of entry had reached a dead end from where they could not move - north or south. In fact, it became somewhat easier to move about in the north than in the south!”

Meanwhile, in Panmunjom the atmosphere within the Commission had improved. On September 22, 1954, it submitted its first joint monthly report to the MAC. The NNSC had to compare the findings of its inspection teams with reports submitted by both sides on rotations of troops and replacements of materials and to evaluate them through its joint Analytic Branch. The evaluations had to be submitted to the MAC.<sup>65</sup>

From November 1954 onwards, the US Eighth Army, responsible for the security of NNSC family members, drastically restricted the inspection teams’ freedom of movement (as well as for family members). Contacts with the South Korean civilian population and business trips by land were prohibited. Since many South Koreans regarded the teams’ Czech and Polish members as spies who supplied the North with important military information, on November 22 the government invited the Czech and Polish delegates to leave the South within a week, but this demand was not met; the UNC was obliged under the Armistice Agreement to protect the NNSC. Inspection was only permitted from a closed helicopter at previously fixed points. Reasonable inspection became impossible. Such a situation becomes clear from the report by the then Head of the Swiss NNSC Delegation, Fritz Real, in February 1956:

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<sup>65</sup>- Bailey, *ibid.*, p. 174; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *ibid.*, p. 23; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 39-40; Lidin, *op. cit.*, p. 198; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 24; Rembe, *ibid.*, p. 101.

“The helicopter whose windows were covered by dark material that prevented all view flew approximately 50 meters above the harbour facilities. Above a specific area where the inspections were to be carried out, the helicopter’s door was opened a bit by the accompanying American officer to allow the inspectors a view of the wharfage. The helicopter circled for a while, then the doors were closed again, and the helicopter returned to the team’s compound. Therewith, the inspection was completed.”<sup>66</sup>

This new situation had become evident already in March 1955 at a time when news had reached South Korea that North Korea, in violation of the Armistice Agreement, had at its disposal new Russian MIG airplanes. *Time* (March 1955) quotes US intelligence stating that the North had “...moved in more than 400 aircraft, including at least 150 MIG-15 jets...” In June 1955, South Korea’s Air Force in a quasi counter-move aimed at preserving the military balance began to fly its own squadron of American jets in front of the NNSC’s very eyes.

At the 60th MAC meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on July 5, 1955, the South, quoting two defected North Korean pilots, criticized the North for having brought in large quantities of operational aircraft and combat equipment in violation of the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 13(d), and the Czech and Polish NNSC members for being non-neutral. The South urged the North to deliver without delay an accurate account of all combat materials and combat aircraft introduced since 1953 to the UNC, to immediately provide the NNSC with correct reports on combat material as well as troop rotations and to immediately cease the illegal introduction of additional combat material and combat aircraft. The North denied the defections and asserted that combat material had been introduced on a large scale,

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<sup>66</sup>- Bailey, *ibid.*, p. 174; Bettex, *op. cit.*, p. 19; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 32; Petitpierre, *op. cit.*, p. 40. Urner, *op. cit.* Original quotation from Urner.

rearming South Korea in violation of the Armistice Agreement, but the South claimed it had faithfully observed Paragraph 13(d).

At the 61st meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on July 14, the South protested that the North, in collusion with the non-neutral Czech and Polish NNSC members, had deliberately hindered inspections and violated the Armistice Agreement by building up its combat forces. The statement referred to “The extreme difference between the inspection and control measures in the South as opposed to those in the North...” The North protested that the South defamed the Czech and Polish members and planned to demolish the NNSC that worked for the peaceful reunification of Korea.<sup>67</sup> The UNC statement sharply contradicts the restrictions on inspections that the South at that time had imposed.

The period between August 1954 and July 1955 was dominated by the issue of dissolving the NNSC. However, already in April 1954, Major General Mohn had strongly advocated an abolition of the Commission. On December 3, the Swedish UN Ambassador declared in the United Nations General Assembly’s Political Committee that Sweden may have to reconsider its participation in the NNSC unless the Korean question is solved soon. The Ambassador said:

“For a small country like Sweden, an indefinite prolongation of our supervisory task creates substantial administrative and other difficulties and it does not seem particularly satisfactory to man such a broad supervisory mechanism with a large number of qualified people, when it in reality is

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<sup>67</sup>- Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 46-7; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Principal Documents on Korean Problem, vol. II* (Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 1960), pp. 1134-1140; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 32; *Time*, op. cit.

impossible for them to implement the task, that such a body naturally is expected to do.”<sup>68</sup>

The Czech and Polish NNSC members protested vehemently against the statement at the Commission’s meeting held on December 8. Their contrary opinion was that the NNSC was now a body that could make decisions on all important issues. The purpose was to underline that the NNSC must not be dissolved. At this time, the UNC did not show much interest in the Commission whereas the KPA/CPV had shown increasing appreciation of the NNSC. On December 25, the UNC announced in a letter to the NNSC that military troops and equipment would no longer pass in and out at Kunsan, Seoul and Kangnŭng from January 1, 1955. On January 31, the UNC Commander proposed to the US Ministry of Defence that since the NNSC severely obstructed the UNC’s activities, the Commission should be abolished.

Around New Year 1954-1955, the South Korean chief of police had encouraged Czech and Polish NNSC members to leave the country “peacefully” since their personal safety could not be guaranteed. The South Korean view of the Korean problem at this time was that it could only be solved by force and that the Communists used the armistice to gain time. On March 19, 1955, South Korea’s Foreign Minister “...called on the United Nations to declare explicitly that the armistice had lost all validity...” The opinion was “...that, while the UNC had faithfully observed its terms, North Korea had flagrantly violated them, ‘particularly by the illegal introduction of combat aircraft.’” South Korea protested that it had been made impossible for

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<sup>68</sup>- Bailey, op. cit., p. 176; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., pp. 23-4. Original quotation marks.

the NNSC to work in North Korea and demanded that the Commission be abolished and that the Inspection Teams leave the country.<sup>69</sup>

Yet, on January 27, 1955, when the Swiss Federal Council suggested a staff reduction, the US and China had responded positively, in spite of their different positions. At this time, the Swiss government had sent an aide-memoire to the American and Chinese governments to request the abolition of or at least a reduction in the size of the NNSC. The US favoured abolition, but China wanted to reduce the size of the NNSC. Kangnŭng and Taegu in the South had now been paralysed by the UNC, and Ch'ŏngjin and Hŭngnam in the North had hardly any traffic at all of troops and combat material.

On April 13, the head of the Swedish delegation proposed at the 189th NNSC meeting that all fixed teams should be withdrawn. His opinion was that "inspection at the field had brought no results and could without trouble be made from Panmunjom." Consequently, although Czechoslovakia and Poland still did not want to reduce the Commission, the NNSC at its 193rd meeting on May 3 suggested in a letter to the MAC a preliminary withdrawal of the fixed inspection teams from Kangnŭng, Kunsan, Ch'ŏngjin and Hŭngnam and a transformation of the remaining six teams into sub-teams with at least two members in accordance with Paragraph 40(a).

After long hesitation, the MAC at its 66th meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on August 29 basically accepted the proposal but without waiving the different opinions on the status of the NNSC. The South needed more time than the North to decide since it was the

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<sup>69</sup>- Bailey, *ibid.*, pp. 174-5; Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 494; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *ibid.*, p. 24; Petitpierre, *op. cit.*, p. 41. "Peacefully" is quoted from Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *ibid.*

party that wanted to dissolve the NNSC, although a dissolution would benefit the North. The opinion was that it “...had loyally followed the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and therefore had units with obsolete equipment while the North’s units had been greatly strengthened due to the lack of control to the north of the DMZ.”<sup>70</sup>

During the summer and fall of 1955, it became increasingly difficult for the NNSC to conduct its work in South Korea. Due to “security concerns” - the UNC was responsible for personnel safety - movement of freedom was heavily curtailed; in the end, it became impossible to walk outside the enclosed camps without permission. In July, the South Korean Chiefs of Staff demanded that the NNSC be disbanded and South Korea be permitted to develop military strength equivalent to that of the North. They threatened to take military action against North Korea before the imbalance became worse. On August 5, the acting Foreign Minister requested the NNSC to leave the country by midnight on August 13, complaining about failed inspections in the North. If not, protection from encroachments against the personnel could not be guaranteed. The NNSC delivered the South Korean demand to the MAC for “appropriate measures” and declared that it would remain to implement its task. The UNC again stressed that it had to protect the NNSC teams. Thus, clashes took place between demonstrators and UNC guards, injuring numerous people.

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<sup>70</sup>- Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 40(a); Försvarets Läromedelscentral, ibid., p. 24; Kim (ed.), op. cit., 2001, pp. 346-7; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 49, 395; Lee, op. cit., 2001(b), pp. 117-118; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., p. 34. The Swiss government’s aide memoire appears in Petitpierre, op. cit., p. 63. The August 29, 1955 Agreement on Reduction of Neutral Nations Inspections Teams is recorded in Kim (ed.), ibid., 2001, p. 349 and in Korean by Kim, op. cit., 2006, p. 73. Original quotation marks.

At the same time, the South Korean government again organized large-scale anti-NNSC demonstrations directed in particular at the Czech and Polish members in the five ports of entry. Between August and December, altogether nine million people reportedly took part in these demonstrations. The demonstrations continued and were followed by a media campaign until early December. In connection with the demonstrations, in September-October, hundreds of anti-NNSC protest writings were again sent from schools to the NNSC headquarters in Panmunjom. Thanks to firm advice from the US to the Syngman Rhee government, the demonstrations ended in early December. According to Mueller-Lhotska (1997), in November the NNSC reacted to the changed situation regarding control activities and evaluation reports to the MAC. Previously, it was reported that the rotation of military personnel as well as the import and export of combat materials had taken place in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, but now the Commission stated that "...no violation of the Agreement had been found by the evaluation." In this way, the message was "...that actual control had been replaced by an arithmetic-statistical control of the figures provided by both war parties."<sup>71</sup>

Within the NNSC, Sweden and Switzerland supported the US-South Korean proposal to dissolve it, but the argument was that the Commission was inefficient and therefore unnecessary. Due to the growing difficulties of performing its tasks, Sweden was willing to leave the NNSC in 1956; after 1953, it had in the words of Julin (2000),

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<sup>71</sup> Bailey, op. cit., p. 175; Downs, op. cit., p. 108; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *ibid.*, p. 25; Knüsli, op. cit., p. 132; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(b), p. 118; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, pp. 34-5; Pak, op. cit., 2003, p. 44. "Security concerns" and "appropriate measures" are quoted from Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *ibid.*

become “a mission impossible.” However, both countries opposed the US policy to persuade them to leave the NNSC; the opinion was that a voluntary withdrawal would cause tension in their relations with communist countries, not least China and the Soviet Union. Instead of reducing the NNSC’s activities, they therefore suggested that the MAC should be given a greater role. In spite of American pressure exerted through the Swedish Embassy in the US, Sweden and Switzerland refused to withdraw. Instead, it was decided to reduce the inspection teams by one in both North and South Korea. Unlike the US, both China and North Korea wanted the NNSC and the Armistice Agreement to remain and were supported by the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia; a status quo would make it possible to exert influence on developments in the South.

At this time, it was possible for North Korea to simultaneously point out “the clearly stated aggressive South Korean plans to unify Korea by military force” and praise itself to “be the truly peace-loving people that in cooperation with the neutral nations worked for a final solution of the Korean issue.” Notably, at the 69th MAC meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on February 25, 1956, the North praised the NNSC for its efforts to maintain peace on the Korean peninsula.<sup>72</sup>

On September 5, 1955, the “Fix-Teams” were withdrawn from Ch’ôngjin and Hûngnam in the North and Kangnûng and Taegu in the South: ports of entry were reduced to Inch’ôn, Pusan and Kunsan in the South and Sinûiju, Sinanju and Man’o in the North. The

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<sup>72</sup> Bruzelius, *op. cit.*, p. 600; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *ibid.*, p. 25; Julin, *op. cit.*; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, p. 50; Pak, *ibid.*, 2003, p. 45. Original quotation marks.

remaining teams became “subteams” and were reduced. Since some teams were withdrawn, the Swedish delegation was reduced and consisted, on December 6, of 36 men (cf. p. 26). In October, the Swedish member suggested that all inspection teams should be withdrawn from ports of entry to camps in the DMZ. The Swiss delegation supported the proposal, but Czechoslovakia and Poland were against it, as were the North Korean and Chinese MAC members.

However, work soon became overshadowed by accidents. First, on November 7, when an American helicopter crashed in Kunsan, three Polish delegates died. Second, in January 1956 a helicopter crashed in Pusan and the Head of the Swedish Delegation died in a car accident. Consequently, safety issues during transports and compensation for accidents became more important. This focus raised the issue of the NNSC’s credibility at a time when inspections had become formal routine work. Meanwhile, the UNC had accused the KPA/CPV, in cooperation with the Polish and Czech NNSC members, of having sabotaged the Armistice Agreement. The UNC intended to withdraw support to the inspection teams in the South which should return to Panmunjom. The opinion was that “the useless northern teams” should simultaneously be withdrawn, but it wished to maintain the Armistice Agreement.<sup>73</sup>

In February-March 1956, Sweden and Switzerland proposed to further reduce personnel; the Commission’s work was dependent “...on the two parties’ arbitrary decisions.” As Jean-Paul Dietrich, Member of the Swiss NNSC Delegation 1986-87, points out (1994), the Com-

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<sup>73</sup>- Bettex, op. cit., pp. 17, 21; Downs, op. cit., p. 108; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *ibid.*, pp. 26, 28, 41; Lee, op. cit., 2004, p. 130. Original quotation marks.

mission's main problem was that its mandate was to supervise the work of the parties to the Armistice Agreement while it was at the same time subordinated to those parties. In a Memorandum to the Chinese, Czech and Polish governments, the Swiss Federal Council recommended dissolving the remaining six fixed inspection teams but maintaining the mobile teams.

Since the NNSC could not verify the mutual charges of violations of the Armistice Agreement, the Commission "...found itself in a permanent cross-fire of criticism by the armistice parties." The Council's suggestion was that "...the parties had to bear sole responsibility for the correctness of their evaluations presented to the NNSC." On March 10, the Swedish government proposed a compromise: all fixed teams would be temporarily withdrawn from the ports of entry to Panmunjom while the NNSC would be allowed to engage on its own initiative the mobile teams beyond the DMZ, if necessary. At the same time, the KPA/CPV emphasized that it had always loyally followed the Armistice Agreement and put the whole blame for the past controversies on the UNC.<sup>74</sup>

## 2.6 NNSC Inspections End in 1956

As we have seen, the difficulties for the NNSC to conduct its work had grown. On May 31, 1956, the UNC/MAC Senior Member, US General Robert G. Gard, declared at the 70th MAC meeting called by the South that the validity of all provisions in the Armistice Agree-

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<sup>74</sup>- Dietrich, "Der Beitrag der Schweiz zur Friedensförderung in Korea: Vier Jahrzehnte in der Überwachungs-kommission," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, February 10, 1994; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *ibid.*, p. 26; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

ment "... regulating the activities of the NNSC and its Inspection Teams in South Korea, was suspended." Paragraph 13(c) prohibiting reinforcements of military personnel, Paragraph 28 on inspections of reported violations of the Armistice Agreement outside the DMZ, Paragraph 42(c) on supervision and inspection by Neutral Nations Inspection Teams of reported violations at the ports of entry and outside the DMZ and, finally, Paragraph 43 on the freedom of movement of personnel stationed at the ports of entry were suspended. However, Paragraph 13(d) prohibiting introduction of combat materials for rearmament would continue to be observed.

According to Mueller-Lhotska (1997), General Gard, wrote a letter ordering the NNSC to stop its inspections in South Korea within ten days. "This measure was justified by violations of the Armistice Agreement by the North and the obstructive attitudes of the Polish and Czechoslovak NNSC representatives." In contrast, the general said at the 70th MAC meeting: "The United Nations Command, on the other hand, has faithfully observed the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, and has fully cooperated in the inspections made by the NNSC teams in the territory under United Nations Command control" [but no reference was made to the above restrictions imposed by the UNC]. Since the Armistice Agreement had come into effect up to June 1955, the North had submitted 162 combat material reports that "...still notably omit all reference to aircraft and compare unfavourable with the 1,969 reports submitted by the United Nations Command during the same period."<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>75</sup>- Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 13(c), (d), 28, 42(c), 43; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, p. 51; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit., pp. 1176, 1177; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 36. During the first year of the

General Gard asserted that the NNSC had failed to conduct its work due to the non-cooperative attitude of the KPA/CPV in the North and the abnormal activities of the Czech and Polish teams in the South. In North Korea, the Czech and Polish teams had often vetoed the UNC/MAC's proposals for inspections or had cooperated with the northern side disabling inspections. The North referred to the South's hostile attitude towards the NNSC and the obstruction of its work and argued that a demolition of the Commission would be a step contrary to transferring the armistice into a state of permanent peace and a peaceful solution of the Korean issue. The North also quoted the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 61: "Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides" and Paragraph 62: "The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides" that both were violated with regard to the suspension of the provisions pertaining to the NNSC.

At the 71st MAC meeting proposed by the North held on June 4, the KPA/CPV Senior Member again claimed that the request violated Paragraph 61 and 62. He attacked the South for deliberately obstructing the inspection teams' work in the ports of entry and for

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armistice, the UNC had reported 287,343 permanent arrivals of personnel and 362,122 departures. The North's figures were 12,748 versus 31,201 - 'ridiculous' figures', according to the UNC. Between July 28, 1953, and May 31, 1955, the UNC reported the movement of 16,141 of its combat aircraft but the Communist side none. From Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

violating Paragraph 13(d). The UNC/MAC responded that it had continued to work to obtain the North's cooperation to implement the armistice. The previous request to the North to provide the MAC and the NNSC with corrected reports on the introduction of combat materials and combat aircraft, to cease introducing combat materials and combat aircraft in violation of Paragraph 13(d) and to remove all the combat materials and combat aircraft imported was repeated. The North insisted that the South should withdraw its May 31 statement and declared its support for the Swedish government's proposal of March 10 for a temporary withdrawal of the inspection teams. The South opposed this view; the difficulties of the mobile inspection teams caused by the attitudes of their Czech and Polish members that disabled policing of Paragraph 13(c) and 13(d) were expected to remain. In fact, according to Lee (2001a), mobile inspection teams had been dispatched ten times to North Korea between July 1953 and May 1956, but the parties had never agreed on investigation results to report to the MAC.<sup>76</sup>

On June 5, the NNSC sent a letter to the MAC in response to the South's statement of May 31 and to the North's acceptance of the Swedish proposal of June 4, saying that it had unanimously agreed to provisionally withdraw the inspection teams. This withdrawal would not change the legal status of the NNSC. At the 72nd MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on June 7, the North asserted that the

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<sup>76</sup>- Columbia University, *ibid.*, Paragraph 61, 62; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 50; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 51-2; Lee, *op. cit.*, 1998(a), p. 9; *op. cit.*, 2001(a), p. 198; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *ibid.*, pp. 1190-1193; Pak, *op. cit.*, 2003, p. 46. The full statement from May 31 is recorded in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *ibid.*, pp. 1174-1186.

withdrawal would be temporary. However, it regretted that the Commission's proposal was made under pressure from the UNC/MAC and claimed that the South had rejected the proposal to rearm South Korea and threaten world peace.

The South responded that the North had obstructed the work of the NNSC and pointed out that it had used the Commission as a measure to cover its armistice violations. Consequently, the North was responsible for the suspension of the Commission's work. The North proposed that both sides of the MAC should make clear to the NNSC that "There should be no change in the function and authority of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and its inspection teams which are inseparable parts and parcel of the Armistice Agreement."<sup>77</sup>

In addition:

"The withdrawal of the inspection teams both from the north and the south are temporary measures. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has the right to dispatch the inspection teams again to stations at the designated ports of entry in case either side of the parties of the Armistice Agreement brings a well-founded charge against any violation of the Armistice Agreement by the other side."

The position of the UNC/MAC was:

"Our side is gratified to note that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has unanimously recommended to the Military Armistice Commission the expeditious withdrawal of the Neutral Nations Inspection Sub-teams stationed in the territory under the military control of the United Nations Command side and the KPA/CPV side. The United Nations Command side agrees that the Military Armistice Commission authorizes this withdrawal."<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>77</sup>- Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 52-3; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *ibid.*, pp. 1193-5. Original quotation marks.

<sup>78</sup>- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *ibid.*, pp. 1195-6.

The UNC/MAC representative maintained the view expressed on May 31 since the North did not accept the recommendation of the NNSC for the withdrawal of inspection teams without raising [non-exemplified] unacceptable conditions. The MAC failed to reach a joint attitude with the NNSC; the June 5 letter was not observed. Consequently, after General Gard had told the NNSC members in a letter on June 8 that the suspension of any of its activities would become effective on June 9 and that the inspection teams in Pusan, Kunsan and Inch'ôn were to be simultaneously withdrawn to the DMZ, controls of military enforcements ended, making both sides free to rearm without any interference.

At an extraordinary NNSC meeting held between midnight and 1 a.m. on June 9, the Commission agreed to withdraw all inspection teams in the North from Sinŭiju, Manp'o and Sinanju and in the South from Inch'ôn, Pusan and Kunsan. Thanks to the single telephone line available in the Swiss camp, the order was immediately forwarded. The withdrawal of the inspection teams to Panmunjom began with the Czech and Polish teams stationed in Pusan the same day the decision was made. Withdrawals from the North took place on June 10-11. The teams arrived in Panmunjom on June 12. The sub-teams delivered to the Executive Secretary reports on the withdrawal. Documents that had belonged to the teams were simultaneously handed over. At the Secretaries' Meeting, the reports and documents were examined by the four Secretaries.

In spite of the withdrawal, at the 260th NNSC Plenary Meeting held on June 14 the Czech member stressed that the Commission would continue to safeguard peace and that it had played a very important role in this respect since 1953 (cf. pp. 29-30, 68). On June 9,

the Swiss delegation was reduced from 96 men to 14 and in September to 12. The Swedish team was reduced to eleven men on August 18. About the same time, Czechoslovakia and Poland had around 25 men each (cf. pp. 26, 81).<sup>79</sup> The Czech evaluation largely concurs with the previous ones but the Commission's limited resources and its difficult position between the rival parties imply that this contribution should not be overvalued.

According to Mueller-Lhotska (1997), "The way the suspension was realized by the South constituted a violation of the internationally observed courtesy minimum." In fact, when the UNC told the NNSC that the above restrictions on its work would be effective from June 9, the NNSC Secretariat had only four hours to act. Such a situation caused irritation; not least the Czech and Polish members used the occasion to complain about how the UNC treated the delegations and the whole NNSC.

Mueller-Lhotska points out that the NNSC "became a 'Commission without Supervision' and thus also *without a mission*; its function was essentially reduced to a purely symbolic institutional presence." On the other hand, he notes that this presence aimed to manifest "... the vital importance to both parties of the 1953 Armistice Agreement" but also that "Since the May-June 1956 events the NNSC's activities have lacked the basis of the armistice parties' mutual agreement." The Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation, Colonel Tore

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<sup>79</sup>- Choi, op. cit., p. 494; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., pp. 26-7; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *ibid.*, pp. 1196-8; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., pp. 36-7; Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, *Partly Verbatim Record of the 260th Plenary Meeting* (Panmunjom, June 14, 1956), pp. 1, 8; *Partly Verbatim Record of the 261st Plenary Meeting* (Panmunjom, June 21, 1956), p. 2.

Wigforss, pointed out the symbolic importance in his report for March-November 1957 to the Foreign Ministry: “At present, however, the North as well as the South seems willing to maintain the Commission which, if nothing else, symbolises that the Armistice Agreement remains enforced.” When the teams were withdrawn to Panmunjom and reduced, the NNSC became incapable of conducting inspections. From now onwards, the work would instead mainly consist of analytical work, that is, evaluations of reports on the rotation of personnel submitted by both sides and falsified combat materiel reports submitted only by North Korea.<sup>80</sup>

The evaluation made by Sven Grafström, head of the Swedish NNSC delegation in 1953, that “If a party [of the Armistice Agreement] wishes to dabble in imports and exports [of combat materials], the NNSC will be unable to prevent it neither to the north nor to the south of the 38th parallel” had turned out to be entirely correct. Grafström had also expressed the opinion: “In order to effectively control what goes out and comes in at least one hundred or so inspection sites on both sides would certainly be needed instead of five” (cf. p. 23).

Supporting his view is that, as recorded by Weilenmann (2004), more than 99 percent of the land border and the coastal line were outside the control of the ten inspection teams. In North Korea, none of the major places for imports, including the main port Namp’o, P’yongyang airport and most of the border stations with China and the Soviet Union, were ports of entry. Since the inspection teams could only work in the five ports of entry that were unfavourably located,

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<sup>80</sup>- Downs, op. cit., p. 109; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *ibid.*, pp. 26-7; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, pp. 37, 40, 135; Wigforss, op. cit., pp. 0, 7. Italics in the original.

only rudimentary supervision could be carried out. He also points out that the UNC as well as the KPA/CPV wanted a weak and symbolic system for supervision of troop rotations and replacements of combat materials; human and material means were limited.

Downs (1999) writes on monitoring: “How the parties of the armistice agreement brought themselves to believe such a system might actually work is, in hindsight, a mystery. They must have had a great deal more faith in the other side than history concludes was justified.” Notably, Weilenmann (2004) records that “The Armistice Agreement is basically based on blind confidence.” But, as Mohn (1961) points out, the parties trusted neither each other nor the neutral nations.<sup>81</sup> The opinions expressed by Downs, Weilenmann and Mohn concur with the account of post-war developments and imply that the parties had wanted to conclude the war but afterwards did not work to fulfill it for fear that it would be to their disadvantage.

As noted above, South Korea along with the US had wanted to dissolve the NNSC. On June 18, 1956, the South Korean National Assembly unanimously passed a motion that appealed to the UNC to dissolve the NNSC and to expel it from the Korean peninsula, including “No-Man’s-Land” Panmunjom. The opinion was that the NNSC as a neutral organization had prevented South Korea’s rearmament and had to be eliminated but, while the UNC denied the usefulness of the NNSC, it did not formally request its dissolution. On the basis of international law, the UNC’s opinion was that the situation had changed since the Armistice Agreement was signed to the extent that imple-

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<sup>81</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, p. 106; Grafström, *op. cit.*, pp. 1148-9; Mohn, *op. cit.*, p. 329; Weilenmann, *op. cit.*, 2004, pp. 7, 20-22, 24, 26, 28.

menting its provisions had become inconsistent with its own self-preservation. Meanwhile, the North showed great interest in the NNSC's further existence.

The Swiss NNSC member raised in June 1956 the question why the UNC had not noticed Paragraph 13(d) regarding replacements of combat material. The US General Lyman L. Lemnitzer from the UNC expressed the opinion that a modernization of military equipment in South Korea should be initiated by evading the agreement; he would prefer a complete cancellation of Paragraph 13(d). On July 26, the NNSC presented a draft letter regarding the Commission's status and competence to the MAC. In the discussions that followed, the Czech and Polish members' opinion was that as long as the war parties acknowledged the Armistice Agreement, the NNSC's legal position was secured. But the Swedish member did not want to express his view prior to consultation with the Swedish and Swiss governments.

The NNSC delegation was not informed of the ensuing talks that were held between Stockholm and Berne. The Swedish government hesitated to support the Swiss initiative and Swedish support failed in the NNSC. Consequently, the Swiss NNSC member did not pursue the issue any more; an opportunity to clarify the legal contents of the mandate following the May-June events and to redelimit the NNSC's competence was lost. In November 1956, an NNSC mobile inspection team was requested by the North to investigate the incident on November 7 when two South Korean F-51 fighters by mistake had crossed the MDL in order to test whether the South was willing to reactivate the NNSC or not. The South refused the request and the UNC showed no interest at all in reassuming NNSC inspections. Not unlike the restrictions imposed on freedom of movement in 1954, in

summer 1956 NNSC members were for a few months put under “house arrest” by the UNC in Panmunjom. They were not allowed to leave the area except to visit American hospitals or make official trips, but in the latter case the permission of the South Korean authorities was required. The UNC lifted the restrictions in the summer of 1958 and completely abolished them in 1970.<sup>82</sup>

## 2.7 The UNC Cancels Paragraph 13(d) in 1957

As noted above, military incidents had been raised several times in the MAC. On November 7, 1956, the two planes which had crossed the MDL were attacked by North Korean aircraft. One was shot down. Owing to this incident, the KPA/CPV demanded the 73rd MAC meeting held on November 10. The North then asserted that the planes were armed and that it was a serious incident provoked by the South. On the other hand, the South claimed that the planes were unarmed. Also, it was an exercise flight that had lost its position owing to bad visibility. Subsequently, the plane was shot down in cold blood by the North without any possibility to defend itself. This shooting-down without even a warning was a violation of the armistice. The South requested the return of the airplane and the pilot and punishment of those responsible. No agreement was reached, but the following day North Korea urged the NNSC to dispatch mobile inspection teams

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<sup>82</sup> Benckert, *Slutrapport: Viktigare tilldragelser inom den neutrala övervakningskommissionen under tiden november 1956-mars 1957* (n.p., March 1957), p. 2; Department of State, Outgoing Telegram: *RE Korea*, n. p., July 2, 1957; Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), p. 121; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., pp. 37-9, 63; Sandoz, op. cit., p. 216. Original quotation marks.

to establish that the plane was armed.

At the extraordinary NNSC meeting held on November 12, Poland and Czechoslovakia were for the dispatch but Sweden and Switzerland were against; no decision was made. No agreement was reached either when the Commission convened its 283rd plenary meeting on November 15. At an extra-ordinary meeting held the following day, it was decided that the NNSC would inform the armistice parties that no agreement had been reached to dispatch a mobile inspection team. At the 157th MAC secretary meeting convened on November 20, the dead pilot and the destroyed aircraft were returned after a receipt had been handed over.<sup>83</sup>

According to the South Korean scholar Kim Bo-Young (2003), the suspension of the NNSC's work in 1956 had been made in advance to prepare for stationing "more modern and efficient weapons" referring to such dual-capacity weapons as guided missiles with the capability to load nuclear warheads in South Korea. However, already on January 31, 1955, the UNC Commander had suggested a dissolution of the NNSC and a cancellation of Paragraph 13(c) and (d) to the US Ministry of Defense (cf. p. 66). He asserted that, even if all the other 15 countries who had taken part in the Korean War to assist South Korea did not agree, the US should even act unilaterally to accomplish these targets. On February 5, the US Army expressed its full support for the proposal, but the Ministry of Defense argued that from a political and legal point of view such a unilateral act was not at all desirable. The meeting held on February 24 by the 16 countries that

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<sup>83</sup>- Benckert, *ibid.*, pp. 2-3; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 53, 280; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), p. 121.

had dispatched troops to South Korea expressed support for rearmaments.

At the South Korean government's National Security Council meeting held April 21, the UNC Commander argued that since the Soviet Union openly brought new weapons into North Korea outside the ports of entry, the longer Paragraph 13(d) were maintained, the more disadvantageous it would become for the US. But in the end, the US administration failed to reach any agreement; it was easy to agree that Czechoslovakia and Poland were "hostile countries" but to prove the North's armistice violations to rationalize the dissolution of Paragraph 13(d) was no easy task.<sup>84</sup>

On May 14, 1957, the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced at a press conference that the Americans would bring atomic warheads to South Korea to meet the Syngman Rhee government's request. The final step towards dismantling the Armistice Agreement was taken at the 75th MAC meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on June 21. The South then unilaterally declared that it would suspend Paragraph 13(d) "... until military balance was restored and the northern side proved by actions its intention to observe the provisions of the AA"; a stumbling block for introducing new weapons was removed. It claimed that the North had violated Paragraph 13(d) by bringing in combat materials not mentioned there and by introducing equipment that in terms of capacity and style were entirely different from those they had when the armistice was signed, without reporting and outside the ports of entry.

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<sup>84</sup>- Kim, op. cit., 2003, p. 179; Pak, op. cit., 2003, pp. 46-8. Original quotation marks. Recall that the 16 allied nations are enumerated on p. 49: fn. 41.

The UNC informed the NNSC about its decision the same day. Reporting to the NNSC ceased. For replacements of combat material, discontinuation was definitive but for the rotation of military personnel temporary. At the MAC meeting, the KPA/CPV regarded the declaration as “non-valid” and asserted that the UNC, by the introduction of large amounts of new weapons, was rearming South Korea in violation of the Armistice Agreement, which it urged the UNC to observe. No party could unilaterally amend the agreement. According to Colonel Tore Wigforss (1957), the North accused the US of being a warmonger and through the assistance of the Syngman Rhee “clique” of trying to make South Korea an American colony and a base for nuclear weapons. The South regarded these accusations as groundless. Downs (1999) writes [without saying when] that the North Koreans vociferously accused the UNC of “wrecking the armistice agreement and incapacitating the NNSC and its inspection regime.”

At the 76th meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on June 26, the North again accused the US of making South Korea a base for nuclear weapons. It criticized the conclusion of the mutual US-South Korea defence agreement in 1953 and claimed that the US was planning a permanent division of Korea. The North asserted that the unilateral cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) was a severe armistice violation and requested a withdrawal. The South responded that the MAC was not a proper forum to discuss political issues. At the 77th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on July 28, the North again criticized the rearmament of South Korea and urged, to the author’s knowledge, for the first time a withdrawal of the American troops. The South pointed out that the North from the beginning had not reported the introduction of combat materials to the NNSC. Until the North observed Paragraph

13(d), the South could depart from the obligations to follow it.<sup>85</sup>

At the 78th meeting held on October 11, the South accused the North of being responsible for the current state of affairs in the Korean Peninsula. The North argued that peace had not been secured because the US had not withdrawn from South Korea. Considering these counter-accusations and previous accounts of the MAC meetings, it is not surprising that Wigforss (1957) writes that the atmosphere during the meetings, 113 of which were held between 1953 and 1959, should be regarded “as close to hostile.” His compatriot Brigadier-General Sven Tilly in his report for November 1957-May 1958 to the Foreign Ministry even described the atmosphere as “extremely hostile.” In the report for March-December 1959 to the Foreign Ministry, the Swedish Major General Karl Ångström wrote: “The meetings are characterized, especially by the northern side, by great savageness with personal and insulting attacks. There is no objective discussion of facts.”

According to Lee (2001a), the North’s pure anti-American political propaganda comprised 65-70 percent of their Senior Member’s speeches in the late 1950s. In 2004, he wrote: “During the period between 1958 and 1964 North Korea utilized more than 70% of the meeting time to dispense slanderous political propaganda and threats to the U.S. and the ROK.” In contrast, “During the first four years of the Armistice, North Korea utilized about 34% of meeting time for this purpose.” To the author’s knowledge, at the 56th MAC meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on March 22, 1955, the South for the first time had

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<sup>85</sup> Bruzelius, *op. cit.*, p. 600; Downs, *op. cit.*, p. 109; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, pp. 53-4; Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, pp. 179-180; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 54-5; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40; Wigforss, *op. cit.*, pp. 0, 1. Original quotation marks.

pointed out that the North abused the Commission for propaganda purposes. At the 58th MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC convened on May 25 the same year, the South again pointed out that the North called meetings for propaganda purposes but also to criticize the South.<sup>86</sup> Whether true or not, the evaluations show that the trust and credibility necessary for successful negotiations were absent in the MAC.

Regarding the cancellation of Paragraph 13(d), the Czech and Polish members argued that the NNSC had to prevent a new war by condemning the UNC/MAC action as a violation of the Armistice Agreement and a threat to peace. On the other hand, the Swedish and Swiss representatives argued that the Commission as a neutral body with a mandate from both parties could not work without being united in this case and asserted that the issue lay outside its mandate. In the end, no agreement was reached; the NNSC failed to become "...a kind of war parties' court of arbitration...". Notably, at the 324th Plenary Meeting held on July 25, 1957, the Polish member expressed the opinion "...that the activity of the NNSC constitutes a very important factor in the cause of preserving peace in Korea" (cf. pp. 29-30, 68, 87).

After the UNC had ceased to report on combat material, the Swedish-Swiss opinion was that only reports on personnel would be evaluated and forwarded to the MAC, a proposal which Czecho-

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<sup>86</sup>- Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, p. 172: table 2; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 44, 45, 55; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), p. 150: *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 158; Tilly, *Viktigare tilldragelser inom den neutrala övervakningskommissionen november 1957-maj 1958* (Panmunjom, May 27, 1958), pp. 0, 7; Wigforss, *ibid.*, pp. 0, 2; Ångström, *Rapport avseende verksamheten vid Svenska Övervakningskontingenten i Korea mars 1959-december 1959* (Panmunjom, December 31, 1959), pp. 0, 2.

slovakia and Poland opposed. In the autumn, the NNSC delivered two separate reports for June on combat material and personnel respectively to the MAC. But from July onwards reports only covered evaluations of personnel. In November, Czechoslovakia and Poland signed the reports also for August-October.<sup>87</sup>

The cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) further reduced the NNSC's tasks. In the words of Mueller-Lhotska (1997): "Its essential role now consisted of a mere symbolical presence aimed at manifesting the vital importance to both parties of the 1953 Armistice Agreement." The official weekly meetings every Tuesday at 10 a.m. at the NNSC Headquarters continued to be held, but sessions only lasted for two to four minutes. Documents that were formally correct but had practically no contents as to their real aim were approved according to established standards. At the meetings, an agenda was adopted, the records of the preceding session were approved, the number of records on replacements of combat materials or the rotation of personnel were taken into account and the date of the next session was decided. Once a month it was also said that the reports "had not proved any violation of the Armistice Agreement," meaning that both sides' data had been correct from an arithmetical viewpoint. MAC members from both sides attended the official meetings as observers. The approved minutes and adopted declarations were handed over to the MAC and delivered to the NNSC archive at its Headquarter.

Following the meetings, the Chairmen of each delegation could invite the Heads of the delegations and their Alternates to take part in

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<sup>87</sup>- Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., p. 29; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., p. 40; Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, *Partly Verbatim Record of the 324th Plenary Meeting, Panmunjom* (July 25, 1957), pp. 1, 2; Wigforss, *ibid.*, pp. 3-5.

an informal meeting in the part of the NNSC building that North Korea maintained. Despite occasional ideological differences, these talks were held in a friendly atmosphere that enabled a reasonable solution to pending issues. Through the daily meetings of secretaries in the NNSC building, important contacts between the UNC/MAC and the KPA/CPV were sustained; good mutual relations could be established across the MDL. Until 1957, the implementation of the Analytic Branch was an important task of the secretary. The rotating secretaries had to verify the reports that the war parties delivered once a month and present the results to the Heads of Delegations for approval. When supervision activities ended, the Secretaries' activities were more or less reduced to purely administrative work such as preparing sessions and editing documents. The work has since been routine.<sup>88</sup>

In December 1957, the UNC informed the MAC that the South would face the threat of military action by North Korea, which had superior conventional weapons, by stationing nuclear weapons in South Korea. In January 1958, UN and South Korean troops carried out the joint military exercise "Snow Flake" close to the DMZ. Now 280-mm nuclear guns were employed for the first time. On January 29, it was reported in the press that the UNC had stationed nuclear weapons in South Korea. The weapons were Honest John missiles and "atomic artillery." On February 3, artillery pieces and Honest John missiles were shown without any hesitation to the public at a big troop parade at the First Army Headquarter close to Seoul. On May 1, exhibition

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<sup>88</sup>- Bettex, op. cit., p. 25; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, pp. 40, 70-71. Original quotation marks after the first quotation. The author's readings of numerous NNSC reports confirm that work has been routine.

firing of the missiles and atomic artillery took place at the central front lines.

Following the press report, the KPA/CPV called the 80th MAC meeting held on February 1. The North vehemently criticized the South for having violated the Armistice Agreement, including making South Korea a base for nuclear war as one aspect of its preparations for nuclear war that was the reason for cancelling Paragraph 13(d). The South responded that it firmly observed the Armistice Agreement and that the only way to maintain military balance was to replace old-style weapons with brand-new ones. As at the 77th meeting, the UNC/MAC claimed that it had the right to depart from the obligations to follow Paragraph 13(d) since the North did not observe it (but the South would observe all other paragraphs). The North again protested that the unilateral cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) was in violation of the Armistice Agreement, which it still regarded as non-valid. At the 84th meeting requested by the UNC/MAC convened on July 2, 1958, the North criticized the US for rearming South Korea by introducing large quantities of nuclear weapons and combat materials.<sup>89</sup>

On February 3, the KPA/CPV had submitted a letter condemning the introduction of nuclear weapons and missiles in South Korea to the NNSC. It was demanded that the NNSC should “carefully observe the UNC’s criminal activities.” The Czech and the Polish delegate suggested that the NNSC should “express its concerns regarding the current situation and expect a rapid improvement.” The Swedish-

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<sup>89</sup> Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *op. cit.*, p. 29; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 58; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 55-6, 57-8; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 40; Pak, *op. cit.*, 2003, p. 41; Tilly, *op. cit.*, p. 3. Original quotation marks.

Swiss view was again that the issue lay outside the mandate. At an extra meeting held on February 4, the Czech member emphasized the flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement. In his opinion, it was the Commission's task to analyze each justified claim regarding violations of the agreement from both sides. The Polish member shared his view. The Czech member also wanted the NNSC to inform the MAC of its views. The joint Swedish-Swiss position was that the NNSC should formally acknowledge having received the letter and then put it in the files. Since the Swiss side regarded the issue to be outside the Commission's area of competence, no decision was made and the meeting was adjourned for one week.

At the second meeting held on the same issue, the NNSC members repeated their strict positions, but the Swedish-Swiss side wanted to further investigate the Czech proposal to send a letter. This meeting, too, was adjourned for one week. At the third meeting, the Swedish member declared that he could not support the submission of a letter for the same reason as before. The Swiss member thought that the NNSC could inform the MAC of having received the letter on the condition that no comments were made. After the Czech member had worked out such a letter proposal, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Switzerland decided to send the letter but Sweden abstained. However, it turned out that the Swiss member had made an almost similar proposal as the Czech member to find a solution acceptable to all parties. Eventually, the letter was forwarded to the MAC without any comments - it just said that the NNSC had "considered" the received letter.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>90</sup>- Edebäck, *Rapport avseende verksamheten vid Svenska Övervakningskontingenten i Korea oktober 1958-mars 1959* (Panmunjom, March 19, 1959), p. 8; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *ibid.*, pp. 29-30; Tilly, *ibid.*, pp. 3-4. Original quotation marks.

In 1958, another crisis arose on February 16. A South Korean civilian airplane with 34 passengers was hijacked by five North Korean agents during a flight from Pusan to Seoul. At the 81st MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on February 24, the North argued that it was not a problem to be raised in the MAC but to be solved between the two states' authorities. It maintained this position at the 82nd, 83rd and 84th meetings held on March 10, March 20 and July 2 respectively, the first requested by the KPA/CPV and the two latter by the UNC/MAC. The South requested a prompt return of the plane and the passengers. A return of the plane was also urged at the 82nd, 83rd and 84th meetings. After the plane reportedly had landed safely in P'yŏngyang on February 17, 26 passengers were returned on March 6 through Panmunjom after the UNC had admitted a violation of the Armistice Agreement and provided a receipt (no. 20). Eight anti-communists were killed on suspicion of being spies. When the South raised the return of the plane on the anniversary of the hijacking, the North referred to its previous responses and considered the issue terminated.

At the 85th meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on July 14, the North accused the South of having violated the Armistice Agreement by establishing a "guided missile base" close to the DMZ and introducing brand-new weapons such as Honest John missiles and atomic artillery, obstructing peaceful re-unification. An immediate withdrawal of nuclear weapons was requested. The South responded that new weapons introduced after the cancellation of Paragraph 13 (d) would not be withdrawn since the North, by rearming, had violated the agreement. As at the 80th meeting, modernization of equipment was defended by arguing that it was necessary to maintain military

balance. In a missive letter from the KPA/CPV Senior Member to the NNSC, the base was regarded as “a hostile and provocative act from the UNC.” Hopefully, “the NNSC would pay attention to this armistice violation.” Subsequently, the Czechs and Poles wanted the NNSC to assert the agreement in some un-specified way. The Swedish and Swiss members argued that the NNSC should not discuss politics but that the MAC was the correct forum for raising such violations.<sup>91</sup>

The UNC/MAC repeated its non-withdrawal of new weapons at the 91st MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on December 19. The North accused the South of establishing a “guided missile base” by having introduced Matador missiles in mid-December to make South Korea an outpost for a regional nuclear war. The South protested that the North had obstructed the inspection teams’ work and after the armistice was signed had illegally introduced then non-existing fighter planes as well as weapons on a large scale. As long as Paragraph 13(d) was not observed, the South would not follow it either. The KPA/CPV Senior Member, Major General Kang Sang Ho, had pointed out in a letter to the NNSC that the introduction of missiles was particularly serious since it took place at a time when the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) had just been withdrawn. On October 28, the withdrawal of around 200,000 CPVs was completed, but in accordance with the Armistice Agreement the Chinese MAC members remained in Kaesông.

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<sup>91</sup>- Edebäck, *ibid.*, pp. 6, 8-9; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, pp. 59-60, 61-2; Kim, “Hyujôn ihu ssangbang chôngjôn hyôpchông wiban,” in Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 2006, p. 226; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 56-7, 58, 60-61; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), p. 121; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *op. cit.*, p. 41; Pak, “Pukhan-ûi hyujôn hyôpchông wiban sarye-mit t’onggye,” *Pukhan* (July 1995), p. 118; Pak, *op. cit.*, 2003, p. 42; Reuterswård, *Rapport avseende verksamheten vid Svenska Övervakningskontingenten i Korea maj-oktober 1958* (Panmunjom, October 13, 1958), pp. 3, 5, 6. Original quotation marks.

The Czech and Polish NNSC members wanted the letter that requested the Commission to pay serious attention to the violation "...and take corresponding measures" first to be handled and then passed to the MAC. The Swedish-Swiss view was that the issue, like the Honest John missiles and "atomic artillery" mentioned above, lay outside the Commission's mandate.

Previously, after North Korea had announced on February 5 and China on February 7 that the CPV would leave before the end of 1958 and had expressed the hope that all foreign troops should leave Korea, the North had in February-March attempted to use the NNSC as a "political platform." The US clarified that the allied nations did not intend to withdraw the UN forces from South Korea prior to reunification. On February 19, the NNSC received through the KPA/CPV a joint statement by the North Korean and Chinese governments made the same day stating that all Chinese troops would be withdrawn before the end of the year. The Czech and Poles spoke positively about the North's good intentions, but the Swedish and Swiss opinion was that such statements were political and should not be made in the NNSC. It was decided to put the statement in the files. When the KPA/CPV on March 14 proposed that the NNSC should "...supervise and inspect..." the withdrawal, the Czech member was positive but the proposal was rejected by the Swedish and Swiss members. The Polish delegate then suggested that the issue should be removed from the agenda "... since the discussion was fruitless." In the end, the issue was withdrawn.

In spite of the difficulties the NNSC had had to conduct its work, when the Commission celebrated its fifth anniversary on August 1 the Polish chairman emphasized "the significant contribution by the

NNSC to reduce tension in the Far East” (cf. pp. 29-30, 68, 87, 97). In contrast, the Swiss delegate questioned the NNSC’s existence owing to the opinion that its functions had been reduced to its mere presence (cf. pp. 88, 98).<sup>92</sup> Consequently, the significance of the Commission’s work should not be overestimated.

## **2.8 The North Urges Withdrawal of American Troops in 1958-59**

For the North, the withdrawal of Chinese troops was “... evidence of the northern side’s peaceful and the southern side’s aggressive intentions.” The UNC just regarded the withdrawal as observing one part of the UN Resolution adopted on February 1, 1951, that condemned China as an aggressor and called for a withdrawal of the Chinese forces. Afterwards, the main issue within the MAC became a withdrawal of the American troops but, as we have seen, that demand had already been raised on July 28, 1957. The American troops in South Korea were regarded as the major obstacle for re-unification. In contrast, in 2004 the South Korean scholar Hwang In Kwan argued that since both Koreas have struggled for self-survival by presenting proposals beneficial towards themselves, they share responsibility for the maintenance of division: “The main enemy to unification is therefore the two sovereign Korean states.”

In 1958, a withdrawal was requested six times. When the 88th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV took place on October 27, the

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<sup>92</sup>- Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., p. 30; Pak, *ibid.*, 2003, pp. 41-2; Tilly, op. cit., pp. 5-6. Original quotation marks.

North, while mentioning the promised withdrawal of Chinese troops, urged a withdrawal of the UN troops as one way to peaceful re-unification. At the 93rd meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on January 3, 1959, the North asserted that the American troops obstructed re-unification.<sup>93</sup>

The South rejected a troop withdrawal at the 81st meeting held on February 24, 1958, by claiming that it was not an issue for discussion by the MAC. At the 88th meeting, it argued that a troop withdrawal should be discussed at a high-level political conference. In 1959, a withdrawal was urged seven times. At the 103rd meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on June 10, the South repeated its claim from the 88th meeting and argued that the MAC did not have the authority to discuss the issue. It clarified that the troops were stationed to defend South Korea and would remain as long as there was an invasion threat. The North's uncompromising attitude at the 1954 Geneva conference had obstructed peaceful re-unification (cf. pp. 54-5). At the 107th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on September 10, the UNC/MAC declared that the UN troops were in South Korea to help to protect the citizens' freedom and to achieve peaceful re-unification.

While the troop withdrawal issue caused controversies, the Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation, Brigadier-General Carl Reuterswärd, wrote in his report for May-October 1958 to the Ministry of Foreign

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<sup>93</sup> Bruzelius, *op. cit.*, p. 600; Edebäck, *op. cit.*, p. 6; Hwang, "Yôngse chungnip t'ongil pangan-ûi yuyongsông: t'ongil sôngsasik'il hwanggûm-ûi chungganch'i," *T'ongil Han'guk* (2004), 9, pp. 76-7; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 59, 61, 62; Sjöberg, *From Korea and Suez to Iraq: Half a Century of United Nations Conflict Management* (Lund: Sekel Bokförlag, 2006), p. 163; Ångström, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

Affairs that work was mainly routine and of limited scope. His successor, Brigadier-General Allan Edebäck, expressed the same view in his report to the Foreign Ministry for October 1958-March 1959.<sup>94</sup>

In 1957, too, armistice violations were raised at MAC secretary meetings. At the 159th meeting convened on May 6, the KPA/CPV rejected the South's claims that on April 3 the North's civilian police had crossed the MDL, intruded and then escaped and that personnel entering the DMZ for work had not worn armbands. At the 161st meeting held on June 28, both parties accused each other that personnel who had entered the DMZ had not worn armbands, but at the 162nd convened on August 3, the North claimed that its investigation had concluded that its personnel in the DMZ had worn armbands.

When the 164th meeting took place on August 31, the South denied the North's claim that two spies on August 23 had intruded into the North and attacked civilian police from the Chinese Army under patrol. One was killed. The captured man was an American spy who had come from Taiwan. At the 165th meeting held on November 4, the South asserted that its investigation of the North's protests at the 160th meeting convened on May 13 against kidnappings by three armed vessels of fishermen on April 27 and at the 163rd meeting held on August 8 against kidnappings by armed vessels of seven fishermen on August 5 had shown that they were false. At the 166th meeting held on November 27, the North claimed that personnel from the South on November 17 and 20 had crossed the MDL to conduct espionage. Among the arrested, four were crew members from the North kid-

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<sup>94</sup>- Edebäck, *ibid.*, pp. 1, 6, 9; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, pp. 77, 82, 84, 85, 86, 92; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 56, 59, 67, 69; *NNSC Chief Delegates - List Updated April 14, 1997*; Reuterswård, *op. cit.*, pp. 1, 8.

napped by the South. The North requested the return of 155 crew members and fishing boats. The South responded that its investigation had concluded that the accusations were false. At the 179th meeting convened on May 29, 1958, the South claimed that its investigation had shown that the North's accusations made at the 177th meeting held on April 22 that a special attack corps had conducted espionage in the North's territory and that shooting incidents had been deliberately created in the DMZ were groundless.

When the 182nd meeting took place on June 25, the South denied the North's charges that on June 19 it had attacked with armed vessels in the West Sea fishing boats and kidnapped their fishermen. They also denied that it had used the fishermen to conduct espionage in the North and that the US, by continuously introducing nuclear weapons etc. into South Korea, had rearmed the South. At the 192nd meeting convened on April 21, 1959, the North claimed that on April 4 spies from the South had intruded into its part of the DMZ where they were arrested, but the South rejected the claim. At the 194th meeting held on June 20, the North asserted that on June 13 spies from the South had intruded into its territory, but the South denied the charge. At the 195th meeting convened on July 21, the South denied the North's claim that on July 3 personnel from the South had intruded into the North's territory for the purpose of espionage, where they were arrested by civilian police. Finally, at the 199th meeting held on December 23, the North asserted that its civilian police on November 29 had arrested personnel from the South conducting espionage, but the South denied the claim.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>95</sup>- Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 281-2, 283, 286, 287, 290, 291, 292.

## 2.9 The Parties' Views of the NNSC following the 1956-57 Events

As we have seen, South Korea had originally showed a negative attitude towards the NNSC. However, Colonel Bo Benckert, Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation, wrote in his report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from November 1956-March 1957 that at a reception he had spoken with the South Korean Defence Minister who was very positive towards the Swedish contribution. Colonel Tore Wigforss wrote in his report from March-November 1957 that in July 1957, the South Korean Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Jae Hung Yu, had expressed his appreciation of Sweden's contribution to the NNSC to the Swedish delegate. In his view, a probable contributory factor to the changed opinion was the Swedish-Swiss joint policy to oppose the Czech-Polish attempts to make the NNSC condemn the South's cancellation of Paragraph 13(d), as described above.

Previously, there had been hardly any contacts between the Swedish NNSC delegation and South Korean officers, but in July 1957 the whole Swedish and Swiss delegations were invited to a dinner held in Seoul by the South Korean Chief of Army. In October the same year, the Heads of the Swedish and Swiss delegations were invited to Taegu as guests of the South Korean government and army. Besides writing that both parties wanted the NNSC to remain, not least since its presence symbolised that the Armistice Agreement was still in force, Wigforss pointed out that the knowledge that there is a neutral commission within the area that would become the first war zone if hostilities were renewed was a restraining factor for any aggressor. He also notes that a reason for the North to maintain the Commission may

have been that it could be used as a propaganda platform to reach out to world opinion.

His successor, Brigadier-General Sven Tilly, wrote in his report to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs from November 1957-May 1958 that on December 27, 1957, President Syngman Rhee's organ *The Korean Republic* officially confirmed South Korea's positive attitude towards the Swedish and Swiss work in the NNSC through the editorial headline "Friends of Freedom."<sup>96</sup> This re-evaluation of the NNSC is striking.

Tilly also wrote that KPA/CPV members unofficially on several occasions had expressed their appreciation of the NNSC and said that it was the only obstacle to the outbreak of a new war. The UNC had roughly the same opinion but restrained itself to mentioning the Swedish-Swiss contribution as a peace-keeping factor and an obstacle to using the NNSC as a propaganda platform. Both sides often invited each other to parties and entertainment. Study tours and excursions were made in both Koreas, but some official and semi-official visits had already taken place between March-November 1957. Considering the writing "Contacts away from the bargaining table in a relaxed atmosphere may contribute to the creation of good working relations" quoted in the Introduction (p. 6), such contacts were probably important to ease tension and secure peace.

In 1958, visits to South Korea by the Swedish and Swiss delegations included Ihwa Women's University, Seoul National University, art exhibitions and palaces and temples in Seoul. Swedish members

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<sup>96</sup>- Benckert, op. cit., p. 8; Tilly, op. cit., pp. 0, 8; Wigforss, op. cit., pp. 0, 7, 9-10. Tilly records the editorial in Swedish on pp. 8-9.

were also invited to get some orientation about the military. In South Korea it was possible to travel freely without permission and escort, but in North Korea NNSC representatives were always escorted by armed personnel and could only talk with official people. Tilly noted that it was evident in P'yŏngyang, particularly at the War Museum which stressed American soldiers' atrocities, that the propaganda created hatred. He pointed out that the impression from the museum was very depressing, but also that at present both sides considered the NNSC to be the major factor contributing to peace. In his words, "The NNSC work is not burdensome, but very responsible."

In his report to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs from May-October 1958, Brigadier-General Carl Reuterswård wrote that the KPA/CPV, the Czech and Polish NNSC members whenever possible emphasized the Commission's contributions to secure peace and stability. Even the UNC/MAC and South Korean authorities, despite realizing that the NNSC had no real function, presumably considered that the Commission, through its mere presence, was a sign that the Armistice Agreement remained in force and wanted it to remain. He expresses the opinion that the NNSC as a symbol probably still fulfilled a task. In his report from October 1958-March 1959, Brigadier-General Allan Edebäck expressed the same view.<sup>97</sup> The repeated positive evaluations imply that the NNSC enjoyed trust and credibility that

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<sup>97</sup>- Edebäck, *op. cit.*, p. 10; Reuterswård, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 8; Tilly, *ibid.*, pp. 7, 9, 10; Wigforss, *ibid.*, p. 8. It is clear from consecutive reports by the Swedish NNSC delegation that Swedish and Swiss members regularly continued to make rather similar tours to both Koreas until the early 1990s but Czech and Polish members did not visit South Korea outside the DMZ until the 1980s. The tours almost certainly promoted peace by enhancing understanding and developing working personal relationships.

were lacking in the MAC (cf. p. 97).

While positive notions of the NNSC were expressed, during May-October 1958 infiltration attempts over the MDL by agents from both sides reportedly took place at least twice a week. These incidents were investigated by Joint Observer Teams (JOT:s) dispatched by the MAC. [Non-defined] acts of violence and shooting within the DMZ investigated by the JOTs were estimated to take place on average once a month, but the investigations rarely brought any results; the North's team members denied the most obvious facts. They often claimed that an act of violence which the South on good grounds had accused the North of being responsible for was an act of provocation from the South.

Between October 1958 and March 1959 [non-defined] acts of violations and shootings within the DMZ that were investigated by JOTs were estimated to occur on average once a month, but again investigations seldom brought any results since the North's team members often denied the most evident facts. From March-December 1959 South Korean agents were reportedly active in the North. The South accused the North of having built fortifications in a certain defined area within the DMZ, but the South was not allowed to inspect it. It also accused the North of having fired at an American military airplane over the East Sea and of having placed floating mines along the South Korean coast, but the North denied any knowledge in both cases.<sup>98</sup> Clearly, the zero-sum game continued. That incidents were repeatedly raised reconfirms that the war had only been replaced by

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<sup>98</sup>- Edebäck, *ibid.*, p. 7; Reuterswård, *ibid.*, p. 4; Ångström, *op. cit.*, p. 3. Original quotation marks.

negative peace.

The defection from North Korea in the vicinity of Panmunjom on October 17, 1958, by a guard, Kim Yōng-ch'ōl, who fled after having shot his superior officer with a pistol caused a dispute. The South's suggestion in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 27, to dispatch a JOT was rejected. At the 185th MAC secretary meeting held on October 20, North Korea remained silent. On October 21, it confessed that its investigation had shown that the guard during ordinary service had shot three times at 'a moving body that could not be confirmed' and said that guards had been requested to pay appropriate attention to prevent a recurrence. Consequently, the North asked why a joint investigation should be needed. No reference was made to the defection. The South's proposal in accordance with the Armistice Agreement to jointly report to the MAC was rejected; there was no obligation to jointly convey the findings made by one side.

Although an article published on April 20, 1959 in *The Korea Times* contained critical statements about North Korea made by a Swiss NNSC member after a study tour to P'yōngyang, no controversial issues were discussed within the NNSC during March-December; meetings were routine. Czechoslovakia and Poland pointed out the negative views expressed at one meeting. The Swiss member explained that his delegation rejected the article and that the member had to take his own responsibility: the statement should not harm the whole group. The Swedish member briefly regretted the incident.

Another incident took place when a Czech professor in an article in the North Korean press had "cited" statements which the Swedish and Swiss delegates he had met at a party arranged by the Czech NNSC

delegation had not made. The statements were rejected as groundless. Both sides regretted that the article had been published. Owing to these two incidents, North Korea cancelled study tours to P'yongyang. Meanwhile, the NNSC continued to send monthly reports to the MAC based on data provided by both sides on the rotation of personnel and, in the case of the KPA/CPV, also on combat material.<sup>99</sup>

Between May-October 1958, the KPA/CPV as well as the Czech and Polish NNSC members repeatedly emphasized the role of the Commission to preserve peace and stability in the Korean peninsula (cf. pp. 29-30, 68, 87, 97, 105). Even the UNC/MAC and the South Korean government, in spite of the opinion that the Commission hardly had any real function, probably considered that its mere existence emphasized that the Armistice Agreement remained in force and that continuation of its work was desirable. Since the NNSC, following the suspension of Paragraph 13(d) on June 21, 1957, was no longer a stumbling block for rearmaments by the UNC and the South Korean government, the South came to regard the Commission as a useful body. In addition, the South feared that a dissolution would be a propaganda victory for the North. The NNSC became a symbol of peace and its presence a stabilizing factor between two armies ready to fight. Remarkably, in spring 1959, President Syngman Rhee recognized in an interview with Radio Lausanne the work of Sweden and Switzerland in the NNSC.

Ångström wrote (1959) that the UNC, the KPA/CPV and the Czech and Polish NNSC members “emphasized that the mere

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<sup>99</sup>- Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 27; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., p. 31; Lee, op. cit., 2001 (a), pp. 205-206; Ångström, *ibid.*, pp. 4, 5, 6. Original quotation marks.

existence of a neutral commission within the demilitarized zone is a factor promoting peace.” Without the NNSC, hostilities between the parties could cause open violations over the border far more serious than the armistice violations that did take place. In other words, the Commission still had a task to fulfill. That the NNSC had little to do was a good sign and evidence that the degree of tension should not be overvalued. During September-December 1959, Swedish and Swiss members made around ten study tours arranged by the South Korean liaison officer to, for instance, the High Court, National Museum and universities as well as to cement and textile factories. In contrast, contacts with North Korea were limited to the KPA/CPV Senior Member and his staff. Such contacts had gradually decreased and were in the autumn of 1959 limited to official welcome and farewell parties.

Owing to the reorganization of the Swedish delegation, it was further reduced in November 1959 to nine men. The other NNSC delegations were also reduced whereas the Swiss delegation had nine members in December, and Czechoslovakia and Poland had ten each (cf. pp. 26, 81, 88).<sup>100</sup>

## 2.10 Conclusions

The 1953 Armistice Agreement is a comprehensive document containing provisions for its implementation and supervision. At first glance, it is a document that ideally could have led to the signing of a peace treaty. However, after the war, mutual distrust greatly under-

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<sup>100</sup>- Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *ibid.*, p. 31; Knüsli, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-4; Reuterswärd, *op. cit.*, p. 7; Ångström, *ibid.*, pp. 5, 6.

mined its significance. The pursuit of a “zero-sum game” basically characterized MAC meetings during the first post-war years. Such a situation was gradually reinforced to the detriment of implementing the armistice.

Both the KPA/CPV and the UNC violated the agreement, above all by rearming but also by agreeing to put military police in the DMZ and instigating incidents in the zone. Reinforcements were also made in the DMZ, but there were no legal provisions to prevent such a development. The North immediately imposed restrictions on the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams’ work to supervise the rotation of military personnel and introduction of military equipment into the five ports of entry. However, the UNC also hindered work in the five ports of entry from spring 1954 onwards. The South regarded the NNSC as a hinder to rearmaments, making it militarily inferior to the North. In addition, Czechoslovakia and Poland were regarded as satellite states of the Soviet Union, obstructing implementation of the armistice. The Commission’s work was often hampered by the internal split between Czechoslovakia and Poland in the north and Sweden and Switzerland in the south. The Commission’s work in 1953-56 became “a mission impossible.”

On May 31, 1956, the UNC/MAC suspended the armistice’s paragraphs pertaining to the NNSC. Inspection Teams were withdrawn to Panmunjom, where they then evaluated both parties’ reports of the status of military equipment and forces. However, after June 21, 1957, when the UNC/MAC cancelled Paragraph 13(d) prohibiting military reinforcements, the South only reported on forces. In 1957, the agreement’s supervisory mechanisms had largely ceased to exist; real politics had made the original provisions impossible to implement. Yet, the NNSC still contributed to securing peace and after

the 1956-57 events a dissolution was no longer on the agenda.

Owing to the difficulties for the NNSC to conduct its work, a dissolution had been suggested by the South as early as 1954. A dissolution of the NNSC was the dominating issue in 1954-55. Sweden and Switzerland had been largely positive towards the idea of a dissolution whereas Czechoslovakia and Poland were strongly against it, as were China and North Korea. China's policies contributed in 1954 to securing the Commission's further existence. By reducing the NNSC's mandate, the South could more easily accept the Commission. From 1957 onwards South Korea, which had not signed the Armistice Agreement fearing that it would perpetuate national division but had agreed to observe it, regarded the NNSC as a body contributing to securing peace, as the UNC also did.

The tension between the war combatants greatly affected the MAC, which was more and more transformed into a body not for peacefully discussing armistice violations but for presenting each side's own views, including propaganda. The absence of an impartial referee to determine violations hampered its work. Initially, mainly the South admitted armistice violations but the number then fell. Incidents raised include aerial overflights, border crossings and spy cases; the war was only followed by "negative peace."



Chapter 3

*Rising Tensions  
on the Korean Peninsula  
during the 1960s*



Peace-keeping in the Korean peninsula

### 3.1 Introduction

As we saw in Chapter 2, the suspension of NNSC inspections on May 31, 1956 and the cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) prohibiting rearmaments on June 21, 1957 were the two main events that undermined the implementation of the Armistice Agreement. Another characteristic was repeated armistice violations raised at MAC meetings which developed into a “zero-sum game.” Also, the Korean War was only replaced by “negative peace.”

Against this background, one main purpose of Chapter 3 is to find out whether developments during the 1960s differed from earlier ones or not. In section two, data on rearmaments are recorded, including the role of the NNSC. Political developments in and around the Korean peninsula are briefly included. How rearmaments were raised at MAC meetings is subsequently investigated. Since the presence of American troops in South Korea is closely related to rearmaments, the troop withdrawal issue is also analyzed on the basis of MAC meetings. Militarization of the DMZ is another related issue investigated in the section, but the account only aims to present basic data on this well-known issue.

Most attention is devoted to armistice violations. The third section begins by presenting explanations of violations and some data on them. Then violations committed on land raised at MAC meetings are investigated through a chronological account. The fourth section focuses on the repatriation of officers: In addition, investigations of joint observer teams are compared with developments during the 1950s. The fifth section analyzes violations at sea and in the air raised at MAC meetings. Data on the number of armistice violations are

included here. In both sections, opinions on the incidents that are regarded as particularly serious are recorded and evaluated. The sixth section deals with the work by the MAC and the NNSC. Data on armistice violations are also recorded in the analysis of the NNSC's work, although in more general terms than in sections 3.3-3.5. Some controversial issues that were raised within the NNSC are also investigated.

Since North Korea's seizure in January 1968 of the USS Pueblo is an armistice violation that has since received considerable attention, the seventh section is devoted to this issue but begins by investigating the January 1968 North Korean commando Blue House raid to assassinate President Park Chung Hee (1963-1979). The account mainly analyzes how these events were handled in the MAC and, in the Pueblo case, through US-North Korea talks. Since the Pueblo incident is one of the most investigated armistice violations, the account focuses on its main characteristics but gives more attention to the role of the NNSC during the crisis than normally. The impact on US-North Korea, US-South Korea and inter-Korean relations is included in the analysis. Explanations of the Pueblo incident are presented and evaluated.

### **3.2 Rearmaments and Withdrawal of American Troops raised in the MAC**

According to the South Korean scholar Kim Bo-Young (2003), the most serious violation of the Armistice Agreement during the 1960s was that of Paragraph 13(c) and (d): both personnel and weapons were brought in. In the author's opinion, such a situation reflects

President Franklin D. Roosevelt's statement: "Peace can only succeed in a place where there is will to observe peace and effective power to enforce peace" quoted in the Introduction (p. 3). North Korea's hard-line policies towards South Korea, the strengthening of the US-South Korea alliance due to the South Korean Army's participation in the Vietnam War and the modernization of the South's armed forces caused rising military tension in the Korean peninsula. Due to the Sino-Soviet conflict, North Korea launched the principle 'Self-Defence in National Defence.' North Korea's opinion was that the signing of The 1960 US-Japan Military Defence Treaty and the normalization of South Korea-Japan relations in 1965 would cause a serious threat through the formation of a military alliance between South Korea, the US and Japan.<sup>101</sup>

Tension between North Korea and the Soviet Union due to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the Russians were criticized for having compromised peace, are one reason for the hard-line policy towards South Korea. Another reason was the direct intervention of the US in the Vietnam War. Consequently, the North introduced the four military lines in 1962 and the three revolution theories in 1965 that together led to a hard-line policy towards South Korea.<sup>102</sup> The

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<sup>101</sup>- Hasselrot, *Bilaga: Generalmajor B Hasselrots slutrapport efter tjänstgöring som chef för svenska delegationen i neutrala övervakningskommissionen i Korea och medlem i NNSC* (n. p., September 24, 1965), p. 9; Kim, "1960nyönda: kunsu chöngjön wiwönhoe-wa 'chöngjön ch'ejje," 2003, pp. 178-9, 191.

<sup>102</sup>- Kim (ibid., 2003, pp. 191-2) does not say what the three revolutions refer to. However, Foster-Carter writes in "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea: History" (p. 548) that the Korean Workers' Party's Central Committee in February 1974 launched the "Three Great Revolutions": Ideological, technical and cultural. There can hardly be any doubt that the three revolutions had the same meaning before, although the author has seen no previous reference. Original quotation marks.

four military lines that were implemented from 1963 onwards refer to a) armament of the whole population both ideologically and militarily, b) fortification of the whole territory by installing military facilities, c) elevation of the quality of the entire military forces through ideological and technical training and d) modernization of the armed forces by introducing brand-new weapons and modern technology. Subsequently, North Korea's military expenditures in the officially announced national budget were raised from 12.5 percent in 1966 to 30.4 percent in 1967. As in the late 1950s, in winter 1961-62 the main target of the North Koreans was apparently, according to the Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation, Major General Åke Wikland, a withdrawal of the American forces from South Korea. The opinion was that an American troop withdrawal would solve all problems.

In South Korea, Brigadier General Park Chung Hee seized power through a coup d'état on May 16, 1961. North Korea interpreted the coup as an act encouraged and engineered by the US and therefore perceived the new military government as a potential threat to its security; it signed Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union on July 6 and China on July 11 the same year. South Korea recognized the strengthening of the northern alliance through the signing of these treaties as well as the reinforcement of the North's national defence power after the Cuba crisis as a direct threat. Therefore, South Korea aimed to simultaneously pursue economic development and national security by normalizing relations with Japan and dispatching troops to Vietnam.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Ch'oe, "P'anmunjöm-ül t'onghan Nambukhan kyoryu," pp. 88-9; Kihl, *Politics and Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in Contest* (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1984), pp. 48, 50; Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, pp. 191-2; Ko, "Pukhankun-üi 'hwaryök unban

Kim (2003) notes that since the supervisory task of the NNSC had become paralyzed there were no longer any systemic measures to prevent reinforcements of military power that were speeded up throughout the 1960s. Rearmaments were the main reason for military tension in the Korean peninsula during the latter half of the 1960s. On the other hand, Major General Wikland wrote in his report for winter 1961-62 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the task of the NNSC, without any exaggeration, could be labelled an “impartial eye” at the border line between the Eastern and the Western blocks at a point so infected that violations against the armistice could be brought to the fore very rapidly. Authoritative observers had certified that the significance of the NNSC as an “observation agency” at the front could not be questioned; through its mere presence in the DMZ, the NNSC reduced tension. The similarity with the positive evaluations in Chapter 2 is striking.

In 1961, the Swedish officer Bror-Johan Geijer wrote that the NNSC was one of the few remaining signs that the Armistice Agreement remained in force. He argued that a neutral commission ready to act had a role to play due to the severe tension between the two Koreas. However, on October 16, 1961, relations between the NNSC and the KPA/CPV deteriorated for the first time due to conflicts with North Korean drivers in the Swiss Camp. Consequently, the UNC prohibited North Korean drivers from driving to the Swedish-Swiss camp.

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sudan' hyŏnhwang-gwa kwaje,” in Kim (ed.), *DMZ IV - ch'ŏn kŭrigo, cho, hang, t'an, chŏn* (Seoul: Tosŏ ch'ulp'an Sohwa, 2001), p. 154; Lerner, *The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002), p. 109; Wikland, *Slutrapport efter tjänst som kontingentschef för Swedish Group Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea (N.N.S.C), Underbilaga H 1*, p. 2 (n.p., March 1, 1962). Original quotation marks.

Instead, visitors should be brought by vehicles from the southern side of the Joint Security Area. Subsequently, there were no visitors by KPA/CPV members to the Swedish-Swiss camp. The KPA/CPV did not accept any further invitations and social activities across the demarcation line were frozen until the 1980s. Not until January 24, 1989 did the Deputy Head of the Swedish delegation succeed in bringing both parties' MAC secretaries, colonels from the CPV and the Republic of Korea and the NNSC alternates to a luncheon in the Swedish camp. For the first time since 1961, North Korean and Chinese officers then crossed the border.

Major General Sven Uggla, Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation, wrote in his report for September 1963-March 1964 to the Chief of the Army that both parties of the MAC pointed out the Commission's great importance. That representants of four countries were on both sides of the border and could meet and socialize over the border as well as attend MAC meetings probably somewhat lowered tension. This was important not least since the North regarded the US forces not as UN troops but as American invaders. However, in the case of a major conflict, the NNSC would not be helpful.<sup>104</sup> The evaluation supports the author's opinion that the Commission's significance should not be overvalued.

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<sup>104</sup> Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *Historik över de neutrala ländernas övevakningsskommission i Korea*, pp. 31, 42; Geijer, "Något om svenskarna i Panmunjom," *Joboseyo* (1961), no. 1, p. 30; Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, p. 181; Mueller-Lhotska, *Swiss Mission to Korea in the Changes of Tim: 1953-1997*, pp. 66-7; *NNSC Chief Delegates - List Updated April 14, 1997* Uggla, *Till: Chefen för armén, Stockholm 90* (Panmunjom, March 26, 1964), pp. 0, 1; Werner, *Månadsrapport januari 1989* (n. p., January 31, 1989), p. 3; Wikland, *ibid.*, *bilaga 1*, pp. 1-2, 6. Original quotation marks.

The military build-up repeatedly caused tension at MAC meetings. At the 114th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on February 11, 1960, the North criticized “the US imperialists for bringing nuclear and guided weapons into South Korea” and urged a withdrawal of them. The military build-up was a severe challenge for peace. The UNC/MAC referred to its cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) at the 75th MAC meeting held on June 21, 1957; the South had rearmed only to maintain relative military balance and the weapons brought in were only for defence purposes. The same arguments were basically repeated six times in 1960. At the 116th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on March 15, the North urged the South to cancel war preparations. At the 131st meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on November 29, the North asserted that it had worked for a peaceful solution of the Korean problem. On the other hand, the American troops obstructed reunification by rearming South Korea and by making it an outpost for nuclear war planned for a second war. Accusations of war preparations were made altogether five times in 1960-1961.

When the 134th meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on January 24, 1961, the North criticized the South “for bringing in each kind of new weapons and setting up them in the DMZ and for implementing the exercise Sôrho Operation for a nuclear attack.” The South claimed that from the very beginning it had fully observed Paragraph 13(d) and pointed out that the North had on numerous occasions violated it. It refuted protests against the exercise and claimed that military exercises were an issue not mentioned in the Armistice Agreement and should not be raised in the MAC.<sup>105</sup> That the

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<sup>105</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoe p'yôllan, che 4 chip*, 1999,

North had accused the South of war preparations five times supports the opinion that tension had risen and indicates that the level of “negative peace” had increased greatly.

Rearmaments were raised four times in 1962, once in 1963, twice in 1964 and twice in January 1965. When the 151st meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on April 28, 1962, the North criticized the South, for having recently introduced six naval vessels, including four landing craft despite its protests at the previous meeting it had called on April 3. The UNC/MAC referred to the statement made by the North Korean General Chief of Staff, Kim Ch’ang-pong, on February 7: “The Korean People’s Army is incomparably stronger than it was during the Korean War.” The statement was regarded as clear evidence of the North’s disregard of the Armistice Agreement by rearming. When the 158th meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on October 17 the same year, the North again asserted that the US Army was creating an outpost for nuclear war in South Korea and planning for a second war.

At the 199th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on January 22, 1965, the North asserted, regarding South Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War: “The UN side is enlarging warfare in the whole of Asia and as a reward for sending 2,000 Korean troops to death to internationalize the war plans has provided the Korean Army with 27 new patrol vessels and military equipment,” thus violating Paragraph 13(d). The UNC/MAC responded that the troop dispatches was not an issue to be dealt with in the MAC. Thanks to the dispatch of South Korean troops, US military aid rose from \$350 million in 1966 to \$1,750

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pp. 94-8, 109, 112-113, 123; Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, p. 179; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoë p’yôllam, che 2 chip*, 1993, pp. 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 85, 86, 87. Original quotation marks.

billion in 1967.<sup>106</sup> This extraordinary increase confirms that the US regarded South Korea as an increasingly important ally.

The KPA/CPV had accused the UNC of war preparations once in 1964, but in 1965-66 such accusations were raised seven times. In 1965-66, the parties raised rearmaments at eleven meetings. At the 215th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on October 8, 1965, the South claimed that the North had from the beginning violated Paragraph 13(d) and submitted its first report on operational materials on October 6, 1953, but the South on July 28. There had been no fighter planes on July 27 but, according to defecting pilots, up to September 20, 80 MIG planes had been brought in.

When the 236th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV took place on December 16, 1966, the North criticized the South for bringing in fighter planes, including nine F-5A fighters, and naval destroyers from the US. The South claimed that they were for defence purposes in accordance with the cancellation of Paragraph 13(d). Also, "If your side had not first violated Paragraph 13(d) and then continued to do so for four years, our side would not have needed to bring in any brand-new weapons at all."<sup>107</sup> Obviously, no side wished to admit any responsibility for rearmaments but only wanted to discredit the other side: mutual distrust continued unabated throughout the 1960s.

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<sup>106</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 126, 158, 163, 164; Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, p. 180; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 88-90, 92, 93, 99, 110, 111, 112. Original quotation marks. In 1966, North Korea dispatched about 50 pilots and almost 300 advisers to Vietnam and increased material support (Lerner, *op. cit.*, p. 117).

<sup>107</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 165, 179, 186, 187-8, 189, 197; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 112, 114, 120, 121, 124-5, 126, 130, 131.

In 1967-69, rearmaments were raised at seven meetings and accusations of war preparations at five (the issues concurred three times). When the 277th meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC took place on September 5, 1968, the North criticized the South for rearming by introducing hundreds of military airplanes. The South claimed that the North had begun to rearm immediately after the signing of the Armistice Agreement in the form of brand-new weapons as well as offensive weapons and referred to its cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) in 1957. The South's opinion was that North Korea had not signed the Armistice Agreement to guarantee peace but only as a planned political and economic strategy to get a period of grace so as not to face obstruction from military opposition by the UNC troops. Whether it is true or not, this opinion confirms that the war was followed only by distrust, supporting the cautious evaluations made when the armistice was signed (cf. p. 18).

At the 284th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on January 28, 1969, the North protested against the US introducing large quantities of weapons into South Korea to train for war. The South criticized the North for rearmaments that led to the cancellation of Paragraph 13(d). The KPA and three per cent of the population were rearmed. The military was rearmed with Soviet-made AK-47 machine-guns and large-calibre cannons. The North possessed submarines and over 500 MIG-planes that it did not have when the armistice was signed.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>108</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 222, 223, 237-8, 246, 259; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 133, 134, 139, 144, 145, 148, 149, 150, 153, 156. Original quotation marks. Data presented at the 284th MAC meeting is another indication that imports of combat materials from the Soviet Union were of the utmost importance to raise North Korea's military power (cf. p. 61: fn. 52).

As in the late 1950s, the KPA/CPV urged a withdrawal of American troops from South Korea in the MAC. At the 120th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on June 25, 1960, the North claimed that the troops obstructed re-unification. By bringing in combat materials, the South was preparing for war. The South claimed that it was a waste of time to discuss these stereotype assertions. The KPA/CPV repeated the first argument at the 129th meeting it had called held on October 25, 1960. When the 121st meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV took place on July 8, the North claimed that, to achieve peace in the Korean peninsula, the American troops who obstructed reunification should immediately be withdrawn. Later, at the 260th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on January 20, 1968, the North claimed that, due to the “American imperialists,” there was no re-unification.

At the 122nd meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on July 19, 1960, the North requested an immediate withdrawal of the troops; their presence increased tension and the risk of war. The South responded that a troop withdrawal was not an issue for the MAC, an argument that was repeated at the 129th, 137th and 138th meetings. On the last occasion, the UNC/MAC referred to the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 60, recommending holding a high-level political conference to settle the issue. A troop withdrawal was urged once more in 1960.

At the 136th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on March 2, 1961, the North argued that the American troops created a war atmosphere by rearming South Korea. When the 137th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV took place on March 8, the North claimed that foreign troops must be withdrawn in order to peacefully resolve the Korean issue, but instead South Korea was rearming in preparation for new

war provocations. At the 138th meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on March 21, the North asserted that if the American troops were withdrawn, peaceful re-unification would be achieved. At the 142nd meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on June 24, the North accused the UNC of making "... new war preparations..." by bringing in brand-new weapons and combat units and urged an end of these policies. A withdrawal of US troops was requested, but the UNC responded that they were stationed in South Korea to prevent a new invasion.

When the 149th meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on January 26, 1962, the South claimed that the UN troops would remain in South Korea as long as there was an invasion threat. Finally, at the 285th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on March 11, 1969, the UNC/MAC asserted that the UN troops protected South Korea and repeated the opinion expressed at the 149th meeting.<sup>109</sup> Obviously, the parties' positions on American troops were, as with the rearmaments issue, diametrically opposed, perpetuating the zero-sum game. On the other hand, the North only raised the demand for a withdrawal five times in comparison with 14 times from 1957-59. War preparations were raised along with the troops issue five times.

Kim (2003) points to the militarization of the DMZ as another main point of dispute throughout the 1960s (cf. p. 19). Previously, as Lee writes (2001b): "Both sides generally complied with the major provisions of the Armistice Agreement pertaining to the DMZ for the first ten years, from 1953 to 1963." The DMZ was "a real buffer zone"

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<sup>109</sup>- Columbia University, *Text of the Korean War Armistice Agreement*, Paragraph 60; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 102-103, 114, 115, 222, 223; Kim, *op. cit.*, 2003, p. 180; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 74, 75, 78, 80-81, 84, 88, 154.

for about ten years but from the summer of 1959 North Korea began to fortify its checkpoints in the DMZ. These checkpoints were built to provide early warnings of attacks from the enemy, to supervise violations of the armistice and to observe the South's movements. In addition, "From 1963-1965, the North Koreans constructed extensive fortifications and introduced well-armed military forces armed with heavy and automatic weapons into their part of the DMZ in gross violation of the pertinent provisions of the Armistice Agreement" that only allowed single-shot rifles or pistols. Between 1963 and 1965, North Korea built strategic military camp sites to connect the checkpoints. They were connected by underground tunnels and covered with planted trees. As of 1965, most checkpoints had become fortifications. Combat troops equipped with heavy and automatic weapons and even tanks were occasionally brought into the zone.

The South responded by reinforcing its bunkers and trenches and from 1965 stationing military troops armed with heavy and automatic weapons in self-defence. However, the former international relations advisor of the UNC/MAC, James M. Lee (2000), points out that while the North Korean fortifications and camp sites were well camouflaged, the South's defence camps were situated above ground with the South Korean flag and UN flag flying above them. In order to prepare for North Korean intrusions, from the early 1960s South Korea began to build iron railing fences in connection with the Southern Boundary Line, depending on the topography, that were far to the north of the line (cf. p. 41). Consequently, according to the above Seong-Ho Jhe (1997), the two kilometres of the DMZ north and south of the MDL, as it had been defined in the Armistice Agreement, hardly existed any longer in 1997. The distance between the two

Koreas had shrunk to less than four kilometers, at some places just 700-800 metres. The South Korean journalist Yi Hae-yong (2003) also notes that the DMZ had become far narrower since 1953. In 2003, it was commonly recognized that there were hardly any places left where the DMZ was four kilometres wide.<sup>110</sup>

As the DMZ became militarized, in 1964 Premier Kim Il Sung decided, according to the American scholar Mitchell B. Lerner (2002), to increase assaults on South Korea. In March 1965, he emphasized in a speech to the Korean Workers' Party's Political Committee that more intelligence activities, including guerrilla attacks, were necessary to accomplish the policy targets. Subsequently, spy training centres were set up. Notably, Kim's policies were controversial: Lerner writes that some members of "...an emerging group of moderates..." within the party "...who demanded greater spending on light and consumer industry and more balanced industrial development" advocated ending "...the extensive application of resources toward fomenting rebellion in South Korea." In contrast, a hard-line wing consisting mainly of military leaders wished to raise defence expenditure and focus on heavy industry instead of consumer products.

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<sup>110</sup>- Jhe, "Pimujang chidaenae-tü p'yônghwa kujo pangan," 1997, pp. 136-7, 138; Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, p. 181; Lee, *op. cit.*, 1998(a), p. 15: "MDL-tü yônhyök-kwa DMZ haesang-esô-tü kinjang wanhwa-rül wihan Nambuk-kan silloe kuch'uk panghyang," in Kim (ed.), *DMZII - hoengjök pundan-esô chongjök yôn'gyôl-lo* (Seoul: Tosô ch'ulp'an Sohwa, 2000), p. 90: "History of Korea's MDL and Reduction of Tension along the DMZ and Western Sea through Confidence Building Measures between North and South Korea," 2001(b), pp. 80, 100, 101; Park, "Nambukhan GP sangho ch'ôlsuhae pimujang chidae 'pimujanghwa'haja," *Sindonga* (August 2005), p. 233; Yi, *Pimujang chidae-rül ch'aja-sô: DMZ chôngjôn 50nyôn, hyujônson pundan hyônjang pogosô* (Seoul: Nunpit, 2003), cover, pp. 12, 21. The South Korean scholar Suh Jae Jean confirmed to the author that the DMZ is not any more four kilometers wide (e-mail, September 11, 17, 2007).

When large-scale North Korean intrusions began in 1967, the UNC established mine zones around South Korea as a preventive measure but many mines remained from the war. According to the South Korean scholar Choi Kang (1997), mines, including personnel mines, are indispensable for South Korea's defence. In 1999, the Ministry of National Defence presented materials from a parliamentary inspection of the government offices according to which 1,125,000 mines were buried south of the MDL. The South Korean journalist Hahm Kwang Bok (2004) records the same number. Among them, 75,000 were planted around rear military bases. While noting that there was no way to find out how many mines North Korea had, it most likely had the same number as South Korea. In 2001, among the estimated 1.2 million mines in South Korea, only about 68,000 had been located outside the DMZ in rear areas.

According to the South Korean scholar Chae-han Kim (2000), since mines were buried for defence, South Korean military authorities reportedly kept some record of their position, but it was unknown whether the North Korean did. For both sides, many mines had been washed away by floods. Some of them were in the upper streams of the Pukhan River. Kim wrote in 2006 that the estimated number of mines in the DMZ exceeded one million [but did not explicitly say to what part of the zone the number refers.] Besides mines buried for strategic purposes, there was also a non-confirmed mine zone amounting to 69 square kilometres; the precise number and the position of mines were unknown.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>111</sup>-Cho, "Chiroe p'ihae!: Chuhanmigun-do Han'guk chôngbu-do na mollara," *Sindonga* (March 2003), p. 448; Choi, "Hanbando-esô-ûi chökpôphan chiroe sayong-ün pojangtwaey-ya handa," *Tongil Han'guk* (1997.10), p. 99; Feigenbaum,

### 3.3 Armistice Violations on Land

According to Kim (2003), alleged armistice violations by both sides included, besides insignificant ones such as not wearing arm-bands, in order of frequency: bringing in heavy and automatic weapons, shootings in the DMZ and constructing fortifications and military camp sites. The number of armistice violations rose; the UNC recorded 88 provocations from the North against the MDL in 1965 and 80 in 1966 but 784 in 1967 and 985 in 1968. Most of these incidents occurred along the part of the MDL controlled by the US Army. Since in 1968 shootings took place from the strategic military campsites that had been built to support intrusions, the DMZ became, to quote Kim (2003), “a battle-place for both sides.” Kim points to the militarization of the DMZ as the main reason for these frequent shooting incidents. At the 117th MAC meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on April 19, 1960, both sides accused each other of dispatching spies. When the 119th meeting called by the UNC/MAC took place on May 19, the South had accused the North of repairing and constructing bunkers and military camp sites. It also protested against the refusal to dispatch a joint observation team (JOT) to investigate them. The North claimed that, since the Armistice Agreement does not prohibit construction of buildings in the DMZ for civilian police, the request to dispatch a JOT

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“Korea United: North & South Set Aside Differences to Demine” ([http://www.maic.jmu.edu/journal/5.1/Focus/keith\\_F/keith.html](http://www.maic.jmu.edu/journal/5.1/Focus/keith_F/keith.html)); Hahm, *The Living History of the DMZ: 30 Years of Journeys in the Borderlands* (Seoul: Eastward Publications, Inc., 2004), pp. 5, 188, 191; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, p. 232; Kim, “Win-win-üi DMZ,” in Kim (ed.), op. cit., 2000, pp. 33-4; DMZ *p'yônghwa tapsa: Nambuk p'yônghwa-wa Namnam hwahae-rül wihae* (Seoul: Tosô ch'ulp'an Orûm, 2006), pp. 8, 59, 93, 211; Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, pp. 181-2; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(b), p. 100; Lerner, op. cit., pp. 114, 115. In 2004, the author saw a warning sign for mines at the hill Paekhwasan in the small town T'aean.

was foolish; the issue was an internal one. Notably, at the 210th MAC secretary meeting convened on June 24, the South admitted the North's claim that on June 18 one shell had fallen on the North's territory in a major armistice violation (no. 21). At the 211th meeting held on July 6, the South protested that on June 24 two armed soldiers from the North had crossed the MDL, one of whom was killed, but the North asserted that the protest was fabricated. When the 220th meeting took place on November 5, the South denied accusations made by the North on September 28 and October 4 of shooting incidents in the DMZ.<sup>112</sup>

At the 235th meeting held on July 26, 1961, the North claimed that the fifth Joint Observer Team had concluded that spies from the South had intruded into the northern part of the DMZ, but the South argued that these incidents were fabricated by the North. When the 250th meeting took place on September 15, 1962, the South asserted that its investigation of the North's protest made at the 249th meeting convened on August 14 against a shooting incident in the DMZ had concluded that it was false. At the 252nd meeting held on December 11, the South denied the North's protest made at the 251st meeting convened on October 27 against a shooting incident in the DMZ. At the 253rd meeting held on January 10, 1963, the South rejected the North's claim that more than the jointly agreed 35 guards had been brought into the Joint Security Area.

When the 179th plenary meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC took place on November 16, 1963, the South accused the North of

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<sup>112</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 98, 99; Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, pp. 178, 182; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 73, 295-6, 298. Original quotation marks.

having killed a South Korean captain and wounded a UN soldier who had taken part in a patrol controlling border posts. Shootings took place with automatic weapons that are prohibited in the DMZ. The North denied any knowledge of the incident. At the 181st meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on December 26, the North accused the South of having crossed the border with a patrol from the US Army Intelligence Group and firing shots on December 17. The North then killed one soldier in self-defence and captured another. Again, the South denied any knowledge.<sup>113</sup> The rising number of incidents shows that North-South tension had risen; “negative peace” characterized the state of affairs more than during the 1950s.

At the 307th secretary meeting held on January 12, 1966, the South asserted that the North’s protests against the introduction of machine guns into the DMZ and shooting and arson incidents in the zone were groundless. When the 312th meeting took place on March 11, the South claimed that the North’s accusations of deliberate shootings in the northern part of the DMZ and the introduction of machine guns into the zone were groundless. At the 315th meeting held on April 29, both parties accused each other of arson incidents and the introduction of heavy firearms into the DMZ. When the 226th plenary meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on May 26, the North claimed that on May 17 more than 300 rounds had been fired into its part of the DMZ. On May 18, four armed personnel from the South had crossed the MDL, intruded into the North’s territory and fired automatic rifles.

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<sup>113</sup>- Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 102, 103, 302, 306, 307, 308; Uggla, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

When the 227th meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC took place on July 22, the South denied both incidents and blamed that they were deliberately fabricated. The South claimed that, in a planned incident on May 27, armed personnel from the North had intruded into the UNC's part of the DMZ, violating the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 6 prohibiting hostile acts within the DMZ and Paragraph 7 prohibiting unauthorized crossings of the MDL. The two South Korean soldiers who repelled the attack were wounded. One North Korean soldier was killed. The North asserted that the incident was fabricated. At the 318th secretary meeting held on August 12, the South refuted the North's protests against the introduction of machine guns into the DMZ.

On October 21, armed North Korean agents crossed the MDL in broad daylight and at the western front of the DMZ ambushed a South Korean Army food transport vehicle and then returned. In the attack, six South Korean soldiers were killed, three were severely wounded and one was kidnapped. Notably, the UNC regarded this incident as the most serious armistice violation so far. It immediately protested against the incident by telephone and started an investigation. However, before it was over, the KPA/CPV had called the 231st MAC plenary meeting convened on October 25. Before the UNC had protested against the act, the North claimed that the UNC had driven four tanks into the DMZ and fired hundreds of shells into the North's part of the DMZ. The North entirely denied the October 21 incident.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>114</sup>- Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 6, 7; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 189, 192; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 126, 127, 129, 325, 326-7, 328; Lee, op. cit., *JSA - Panmunjôm (1953~1994)*, 2001(a), pp. 147, 148.

At the 241st meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on February 10, 1967, the South protested that on February 3 armed personnel had crossed the MDL on the eastern front. One of the intruders had been killed at an observation post. The North claimed that on February 2 their civilian police had been attacked, denied the protest and showed a US-made carbine as evidence of the South Korean infiltration. Then it turned out that the gun had been stolen in the October 21 attack. When the UNC/MAC Senior Member sharply protested, the North Koreans were much confused. Not only was the attack confirmed but the claim against the South had turned out to be false and the handling of weapons to be a mess. At the 245th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on April 18, the North criticized the South for having laid mines in the DMZ, but the UNC/MAC refuted this accusation at the 246th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV convened on April 22.

At the latter meeting, the North asserted that on April 20 trench mortars had been fired into its part of the DMZ, but the South claimed that there were no traces of any such action. At the 247th meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC convened on May 26, the South protested that on May 22 armed personnel from the North had intentionally crossed the MDL and thrown hand grenades into two front-line units of the US Second Army Division, killing two soldiers and wounding 19 before they escaped. This was the first such attack since July 1953. Many pieces of evidence had been found besides, but the North denied all knowledge. Previously, on April 28, four intruders had crossed the MDL and on April 29 attacked a checkpoint in the South with hand-grenades. In a counterattack, one intruder was killed and two were wounded but one escaped. The North claimed that these

incidents had been fabricated by the South to conceal the fact that it had introduced heavy weapons into the DMZ and carried out [non-exemplified] hostile acts against the North; these protests were false.

At the 249th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on June 13, another carbine was shown to support the allegation that South Korea had dispatched soldiers into North Korea but it also turned out to have been stolen from the same vehicle on October 21, 1966; the North Koreans lost credibility. When the 256th MAC meeting requested by the UNC/MAC took place on December 12, the South claimed that there had been 181 cases of armed intrusions across the MDL into the South since January 1967, but the North did not admit any cases. In response to the North's armed infiltrations, a special unit of the South Korean Army had reportedly around September 3 crossed the MDL and caused severe damage to North Korean military installations. One South Korean soldier had died in the attack. In November, 12 South Korean soldiers from a special corps had blown up a Korean People's Army divisional headquarters without sustaining any casualties.<sup>115</sup>

On March 22, 1967, the only case known to the author of an alleged North Korean double agent began when Lee Su-gun falsely defected as a journalist in Panmunjom while the 242nd MAC meeting was taking place. Lee was vice-president of the only North Korean news agency, Korean Central News Agency. The North protested at

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<sup>115</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 209-210, 211; Kim, *op. cit.*, 2003, pp. 183, 184; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 133-4, 136, 137, 138, 141; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 40, 147-8; *Panmunjom, Korea*, 2004, pp. 164-5; Rolf, *Månadsrapport för maj 1967* (Panmunjom, June 1, 1967), p. 1; *Vance Mission to Korea, February 9-15, 1968: Final Report*, p. 6. Original quotation marks.

the 333rd MAC secretary meeting held on March 23 that he had been kidnapped, but the South emphasized that he fled voluntarily. Although warmly welcomed in 1967, he was sentenced to death in a court on May 10, 1969, for, among other things, having gathered data on South Korea and forwarded a coded message to the North Korean embassy in Moscow via Hong Kong. He did not appeal against the sentence and was eventually hanged on July 3 the same year.

In South Korea, Lee was supervised by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). During his trial, he confessed that he had been dispatched to South Korea to spy, implying that the “defection” had been arranged, but at the time of his defection South Korea claimed that he was a real defector; he was praised and utilized for anti-North Korean propaganda. The only personal accounts the author has found of a meeting with Lee Su-gun after his defection, recorded by James Lee, contradict the view that he was a real defector; James Lee’s opinion during their meeting was that he had not changed at all. At this meeting, Lee Su-gun said: “The US has come to South Korea to attack North Korea again and launch war.” When asked why he had defected, Lee Su-gun replied that it was inevitable due to his personal troubles.

In January 1969, Lee had tried to return to North Korea via Hong Kong and Saigon, but he was arrested at Saigon Airport by the South Korean Embassy Counsellor, Lee Dae-Ung, on his way to Cambodia; the CIA had informed the KCIA, which ordered the arrest. On February 1, he was brought back to Seoul. About two weeks later, he was condemned in a public statement by the KCIA as a North Korean double agent who had escaped from South Korea to return to North Korea via Cambodia. Counsellor Lee testified in 1999, based on KCIA

data, that he was not a returning double agent. James Lee (2004) records his personal view that, if he had been a double agent, he would at least have superficially cooperated with the KCIA on some of its anti-North Korea propaganda programs rather than completely rejecting their request for support. If he had planned to return to North Korea, as accused by the court during the trial, it would have been far easier to travel via Japan than via Cambodia, a neutral state where he may have wanted to live.<sup>116</sup> To the author's knowledge, at present Lee Su-gun is not considered to have been a double agent.

In 1967, the UNC's approach, as it had suggested on October 28, 1964, was that unless one side presented the other with a proposed agenda, the MAC would meet no more than once a month and no less than once every six months. North Korea rejected the proposal and called the 253rd MAC meeting to be held on August 16, 1967, to unleash anti-American propaganda in line with a campaign by the Korean Workers Party at the time. The North requested another meeting immediately afterward for the same purpose, but since no serious armistice violation was alleged, the UNC delayed the meeting for a week and demanded an agenda. The North Korean's response to this apparent delaying tactic was to show force. On August 28, armed infiltrators were sent across the DMZ in broad daylight to attack the US 76th Army Engineer Battalion at the UNC/MAC advance camp. One American soldier and two South Korean soldiers were killed and 12

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<sup>116</sup>- Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 332-3; Lee, "Yi Su-gun, chôngmal ijung kanch'ôp iônna" ([http://www.donga.com/docs/magazine/new\\_donga/nd9802/98020170.html](http://www.donga.com/docs/magazine/new_donga/nd9802/98020170.html)), pp. 10, 13; *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 174-6; Sergel, *Månadsrapport för juni 1969* (Panmunjom, July 8, 1969), pp. 7-8; Yi, "Nambuk pundan-gwa P'anmun-jôm-ûi silch'e," *Pukhan* (July 1994), pp. 55-6. Original quotation marks.

Americans and nine South Koreans were wounded. Since the advance camp served the MAC and the NNSC, the attack was regarded as the most serious armistice violation so far (cf. p. 138). Its purpose was to force the UNC to come to the table.

The issue was raised at the 254th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on September 8. The UNC/MAC protested and demanded an investigation by a joint observer team (JOT). The North Koreans refused to agree to a JOT investigation since it had no authority outside the DMZ itself and argued that the UNC had intruded into the northern part of the DMZ. They showed carbines and explosives as evidence. However, the UNC/MAC claimed that they had been stolen during the October 21, 1966 attack, but no conclusion was reached. The UNC/MAC's call for an NNSC investigation was also rejected since the Czech and Polish delegates refused to permit an investigation of a violation that the Commission had specific responsibility for.<sup>117</sup> The parallel with the obstruction tactics pursued during the years 1953-56 is obvious.

The American military intelligence analyst Richard A. Mobley records (2003) that in 1967 the US intelligence community identified a) North Korea's commitment to re-unification under communist rule, b) diminished hopes of an internal revolution in the South, c) a stagnating economy versus a booming one in the South, d) embarrassment over the inability to deter and match the South Korean commitment to support the Vietnam War and e) wishes to undermine the American presence in the South as an explanation of the rising number of attacks

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<sup>117</sup>- Downs, *Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy*, pp. 101-102; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., p. 45; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 139, 140; Yi, ibid., July 1994, pp. 56-7.

on American and South Korean forces along the DMZ. On the other hand, according to Kim (2003), it is unclear whether the hard-line policy towards the US aimed to raise tension and start war or, as North Korea asserts, to meet the US hard-line policies towards the North and its war provocations. In the author's view, both explanations could be valid, but it is extremely unlikely that either party aimed to launch a new war, although in the MAC the North had accused the South of war preparations altogether 24 times throughout the 1960s.

Kim also notes that throughout 1968, incidents involving the intrusion of armed spies and clashes along the MDL were more frequent than in any other year. On 186 days, serious incidents took place mainly within the DMZ. The death toll was 145 South Korean soldiers, 18 American soldiers and 35 civilians. The numbers of wounded were 240, 54 and 16 respectively. In addition, 312 armed North Korean intruders were killed.<sup>118</sup> Negative peace reached a peak.

Lee (2001b) records that between 1966 and 1968, North Korea launched armed attacks on UNC/South Korean guard posts in the DMZ on 244 occasions, causing the deaths of 260 South Korean soldiers, 34 US military personnel, 58 South Korean civilians and 549 North Korean infiltrators. The number of the wounded was 409 South Korean soldiers, 105 US military personnel and 69 South Korean civilians. Lee (2001a) points out that when major incidents were raised in the MAC between 1966 and 1969, more than 70 percent of the North Korean speeches consisted of political propaganda (cf. p. 96).

According to Downs (1999), between January 1966 and De-

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<sup>118</sup>- Kim, op. cit., 2003, pp. 184, 191; Mobley, *Flash Point North Korea: The Pueblo and EC-121 Crises* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2003), cover, pp. 11-12.

ember 1969, 75 US and 299 South Korean military personnel, 80 South Korean civilians and 647 North Korean infiltrators were killed in North Korean actions directed against the South. In addition, 111 US and 550 South Korean military personnel as well as 91 South Korean civilians were wounded at a time when North Korea had waged armed attacks against American and South Korean forces in and near the DMZ on more than 280 occasions. In fact, Mobley writes that the years 1967-69 are sometimes called the “Second Korean War.” Downs explains the escalation of violent acts against the UNC and South Korea by North Korea by its realization in the mid-1960s that its efforts to foment revolution in South Korea and force a withdrawal of American forces had failed miserably. The timing of the violence concurred with rising US involvement in the Vietnam War. Notably, Lee (2004) argues that the main reason for North Korea’s failure to achieve national re-unification by taking over South Korea, either militarily or politically, was the presence of the American forces.<sup>119</sup>

The far higher level of negative peace in the 1960s is indisputable. Along with the expression “Second Korean War,” such a situation gives credibility to the opinion that an invisible war took place in the Korean peninsula, as quoted in the Introduction. However, it is virtually impossible to determine whether Lee’s opinion is correct or not, but the American forces were a very important factor.

On April 13, 1968, North Korea proposed to hold the 266th MAC meeting on April 17 but without providing any agenda. On April

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<sup>119</sup>- Downs, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-119; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), p. 153; *op. cit.*, 2001(b), p. 101; *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 60; Mobley, *ibid.*, p. 8. Original quotation marks. For casualties from North Korean armistice violations, 1953-1991, see Appendix IX, pp. 682-3.

14, at about 11 P.M., shortly before Premier and Supreme Commander Kim Il Sung's birthday, North Korean infiltrators crossed into the UNC Headquarters Area and ambushed from two sides a truck with six security UNC guards who would be replaced at Panmunjom around 800 metres south of the place (cf. p. 138). The guards, who only carried pistols, were attacked with hand-grenades and more than 200 shots fired from machine guns. Two US and two South Korean security guards were killed and two US soldiers were severely wounded. The wounded soldiers reported the incident.

On April 15 at 6 A.M., the UNC strongly protested the incident by the direct telephone at Panmunjom. The UNC immediately requested an investigation by a joint observer team, but the North Koreans retorted at the 266th MAC meeting held on April 18: "No provision of the armistice agreement permits that either side shall misuse the joint observer team in an attempt to cover up its criminal acts." Major General Pak Chung Kuk responded to a UNC message protesting the refusal to investigate the incident that "it has nothing to do with our side." Admiral John V. Smith stormed: "What I do not want to hear from you is a tirade of loud, irrelevant North Korean Communist double-talk such as you are accustomed to dispense when you are backed into a corner." Attempting to block the UNC/MAC's final statement, General Pak threatened a walkout if the South made a long and "improper" final statement. The UNC/MAC ended the meeting that went on for seven-and-a-half hours without a break by condemning North Korea's increasing violence since January, especially the April 14 ambush. No solution was reached.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>120</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 135-6, 305: fn. 39; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, p. 431; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 46-7: *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 27-8. Original quotation marks.

At the 269th MAC meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on May 2, 1968, the UNC/MAC warned that it would inevitably take suitable protective measures on the assumption that North Korea, on the basis of Kim Il Sung's speech and the acts of dispatched spies, had started new forms of intrusions and would continue to do so.<sup>121</sup> The North responded at the 270th meeting called by the KPA/CPV and convened on May 17 that "the UNC from May 1-16 in the DMZ had initiated gunfire on 46 occasions, firing 1,760 shots, and claimed that three South Koreans spies were arrested on May 6." At the 283rd meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on December 30, both sides gave the other responsibility for the high level of tension during 1968. The North claimed that "during the year the UNC had brought in far more armed personnel and every kind of weapon into the DMZ than last year and had by sea and air made all kinds of war provocations." The UNC/MAC claimed that "during the year, North Korea had sacrificed more than 320 armed spies and had committed every kind of armed spies intrusion, armed raid etc."

However, after 1968 the number of spy intrusions and battles in the DMZ fell. According to Mobley (2003), the number of incidents in the DMZ was 542 in 1968 (462 in 1967) but fell to 99 in 1969. The

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<sup>121</sup>- Kim (op. cit., 2003, p. 183) does not say what speech he refers to but at the Korean Workers' Party Fourth Congress held on October 5, 1966, Premier Kim Il Sung in a policy speech directed a campaign of violence against the UNC and South Korea. North Korea regarded US aggression against Vietnam as one against itself and would "...conduct a more resolute struggle against the common enemy, US imperialist aggressors and will do everything to support the people of Vietnam." Finally, "...North Korea's revolution will not be completed without liberating South Korea." From Lee, op. cit., 2001(b), pp. 100-101. In a speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in December 1967, Kim Il Sung "...said that the North would support Southern revolutionaries." From Mobley, op. cit., p. 13.

number of killed South Koreans fell from 81 (75 in 1967) to five and of Americans from 14 (16 in 1967) to five. Commentators explained the dramatic decline as a result of the continued purge of party officials and the stark failure of the 1966-68 infiltration campaign. The campaign had neither reduced popular support for the South Korean government nor forced the US to abandon Seoul. On the contrary, it had encouraged the South's population to rally behind the government and the US to raise its presence and military spending on South Korea and Seoul to strengthen its counter-infiltration capability. A reduction of violence would deny the US and South Korea the opportunity to benefit from the North's military threat.<sup>122</sup>

On October 30, 1968, at about 2 p.m., North Korean commandos boarded an armed speed-boat in Wōnsan harbour destined for South Korea. At about 11.30 p.m., the commandos landed in the Ulchin-Samch'ōk area on South Korea's eastern shoreline, but the author has found no explanation why the Navy could not locate them. The operation would have been far more difficult to conduct from land. At this time, the UNC had built a steel-wire zone consisting of a 2.5 metre-high, steel-lattice fence with control posts at 200-300-metre intervals immediately south of the DMZ from the west to the east coast to prevent new infiltration raids after the January 1968 North Korean assassination attempt on President Park Chung Hee. It was difficult to pass both under and over the fence. In front of it were troop mine fields. Behind it were high, manned observation posts equipped with radar, infra-red equipment etc. from which the view across to North

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<sup>122</sup> Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, pp. 183-4; Kukpang chōngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 146, 147, 152; Mobley, *ibid.*, pp. 148-9. Original quotation marks.

Korea was good. Most of the surrounding forests were cut down. Owing to the assassination attempt, for three years most of the areas along the MDL were kept deforested to improve the range of vision and to remove possible hiding places for agents from North Korea. Deforested areas were burnt in spring and fall to completely remove possible hiding places.

By November 2, some 120 commandos, divided into 15-man teams, had landed in the vicinity in the largest armed intrusion into South Korea since the end of the Korean War. In the early morning of the next day, a commando group entered the remote farming village of Kosu-dong and assembled all the 40 or so villagers on the pretext of taking photographs. Instead, the villagers were subjected to propaganda speeches exhorting them to support the Communist cause in North Korea. Actually, Lee (2001b) points out that one objective of North Korea's campaign of violence against South Korea between 1966 and 1969 was "to carry out the South Korean Revolution with an ultimate goal of national unification under their terms" (cf. p. 147). In the author's opinion, such an objective indicates a profound lack of knowledge about South Korea.

The commandos delivered counterfeit South Korean currency and forced the villagers to sign application forms for membership of Communist organizations allegedly existing in the South. A farmer who returned home observed what was going on and tried to escape, but the commandos caught him and killed him in front of the villagers, warning them that anyone who did not cooperate would suffer his fate. Despite this threat, a 17-year old villager wrote a message saying "We have a number of well-armed North Korean commandos just arrived in our village. We need your help right away" and gave it to a

woman who sold eggs in the village. She hid the message in her socks and delivered the message to the police about 6.5 kilometres away. When South Korean army and police units soon arrived at the village, a gun battle broke out and three commandos were killed. Two commandos were apprehended and provided data about the infiltration methods. A large number of young officers from their unit had received special insurgency training in techniques of ambush, night raids and T'aekwōndo for around three months before being dispatched. The commandos were all members of the 124th Army Unit belonging to the Reconnaissance Bureau of the North Korean Ministry of People's Armed Forces, the same unit that had provided the men who had attempted to assassinate President Park Chung Hee.<sup>123</sup>

The UNC/MAC requested the 282nd MAC meeting held on December 10. At the beginning of the meeting, the South charged the North with having conducted the “most serious violations of the armistice agreement” by infiltrating commandos into the Ūlchin-Samch'ōk area “to murder, torture, and kidnap in a ‘suicidal’ attempt to coerce South Korean citizens to support North Korean communism.” Of 120 commandos, 107 were killed or committed suicide and seven were apprehended. Casualties were also high for the South: 47 South Korean soldiers and 23 civilians were killed. No other incident recorded in this chapter caused as many casualties.

The UNC/MAC described the subversion, terrorism, kidnapping, theft and murder that the North Korean commandos had com-

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<sup>123</sup>- Downs, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-2; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(b), p. 80; *op. cit.*, 2004, pp. 40-41; Mueller-Lhotska, *op. cit.*, p. 54; Sergel, *Månadsrapport för december 1968* (n.p., December 31, 1968), p. 6; Yi, *op. cit.*, 2003, pp. 128-9. Original quotation marks from Lee, *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 40-41.

mitted against innocent civilians. Major General Gilbert H. Woodward provided photographic and film evidence that showed the infiltration area, testimony of local civilians, the atrocities committed and the bodies of the commandos. The 30-minute film showed civilians reporting to the authorities, atrocities committed and killed North Korean infiltrators. The two captured commandos described their training, mission and actions in detail. They asserted that as soon as they had landed, they realized for the first time that South Koreans did not make any uprising or revolutionary struggles and that anti-communism was strong. Both now condemned the Kim Il Sung regime.

Major General Pak Chung Kuk stated that the commandos described by the UNC/MAC were an “uprising of South Korean patriots and revolutionary guerrilla units” and asserted that such accusations had nothing to do with the Armistice Agreement; the issue should not be raised in the MAC. A map of South Korea was shown, depicting nation-wide uprisings but it was an object of laughter from both the South and the attending press. The UNC/MAC responded that there was no support in South Korea for the North Korean cause, as the acts of civilians in the area had shown. It would be a great miscalculation to underestimate “...the will and determination of the United Nations Command to maintain peace in Korea...”<sup>124</sup>

The Ulchin-Samch’ok incident differs from other armistice violations by its scale; it is the second incident in this section after the August 28, 1967 attack on the US 76th Army Engineer Battalion at the UNC/MAC advance camp considered to be particularly serious. The

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<sup>124</sup> Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 142, 305: fn. 51; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), pp. 42, 44: *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 41-2; Sergel, *ibid.*, December 31, 1968, pp. 15, 16. Original quotation marks.

October 21, 1966 armed ambush of a South Korean Army food transport vehicle stands out as the most serious armistice violation so far (cf. pp. 138, 143). The higher level of “negative peace” during the 1960s is indisputable.

On March 15, 1969, a nine-man UNC patrol came under fire while replacing poles south of the MDL, work it had informed the North about in advance. In a reportedly well-prepared attack, one soldier was killed and three were seriously wounded. Following exchanges of fire, the wounded men could be brought to the rear after seven hours. But the helicopter that was to carry them away crashed soon after departure due to engine trouble. The whole crew of eight men died. The attack was reported as American infiltration by the North to the UNC Joint Duty Officer in the Conference Area 15 minutes after exchanges of fire had ceased. The joint officer’s task was to supplement the MAC secretariat by receiving and sending the secretariat’s messages as well as serving as a contact organ between the two sides 24 hours a day. In P’yôngyang, the helicopter was reported to have been shot down over North Korean territory, although no exchange of fire took place at the crash. The South regarded the incident as a response to its exercise “Operation Focus Retina” to be held on March 17-20 that the North had criticized at the 285th MAC meeting it had called held on March 11.

The South’s investigation of the incident clearly showed that the North lay behind it. Major General Karl Sergel, Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation, in his monthly report for March 1969 to the Army Chief, regards the incident as a very serious violation of the Armistice Agreement; it is the fourth such incident recorded in this section. Not only had the South, as required, notified the North on March 12, but

the patrol had been visible the whole day; the South was upset. At the 286th MAC meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on March 17, the UNC/MAC severely criticized the KPA/CPV for the March 15 incident and demanded assurances that it would not interfere with the activities of the UNC work party, but the North failed to provide any such assurance. Instead, the KPA/CPV replied that if there had not been any military provocation against us under the pretext of repairing the MDL markers, no question would have been raised regarding the markers.

At the 288th meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC held on April 5, the incident was discussed in detail, but the North did not provide any guarantees to meet the requests to improve security. Since the South had informed them in advance, it regarded the North's attack as a deliberate act of aggression. At the 289th meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on April 10, the North protested that on April 7 an armed group of more than ten men with light machine guns and automatic weapons had attacked a guard post on the western front of the DMZ and first fired more than 500 rounds of machine-gun fire and then over 100 shots with howitzers and trench mortars in a deliberate criminal act. The North urged a confession, an apology and punishment of those responsible. The South protested that the North on April 7 had shelled an UNC guard post and fired 150 rounds with heavy machine guns and that it had acted only in self-defence but there were no casualties. Which side had started to fire first caused an argument: the meeting lasted for eleven hours and 38 minutes without a break, which was the longest MAC meeting ever. During the last one-and-a-half hours, both sides stared silently at each other.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>125</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 262, 264; Kukpang chôngbo

Before the UNC/MAC at the 289th meeting presented its plan to reduce tension within the DMZ, it pointed out that [non-exemplified] modest and well-adjusted defensive measures had been undertaken. but now the North as the aggressive party had to take the first step to reduce tension. The four-point plan aimed to a) immediately prevent attacks against the UNC and infiltration attempts into South Korea, b) remove all prohibited weapons, equipment and personnel from the DMZ, c) reduce North Korea's armed forces that had been augmented in violation of Paragraph 13(d) prohibiting rearmaments and d) cease public polemical and war-mongering talks. If the North responded positively, the South would do so too, but the North made no response nor any comment.

A North Korean infiltration attempt by sea took place on March 15-16, 1969, when seven North Korean agents landed at the small port of Chumunjin on the east coast in darkness. Four of them wore South Korean uniforms and seized in an alleged police raid on a restaurant four civilian identification cards. Then they went to the police station and killed the head of the police. Two other policemen were captured and brought to their rubber dinghy, but one escaped and informed the Home Land Reserve Force, which sank the boat just outside the harbour. The whole crew drowned. The mother ship was reportedly not hit but owing to its surprise over the shooting it could

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ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 154, 155, 402; Lee, op. cit., 1998(b), pp. 2, 3: *ibid.*, 2001 (a), p. 143; *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 80-81; *NNSC Chief Delegates - List Updated April 14, 1997*; Sergel, *Månadsrapport för mars 1969* (Panmunjom, March 31, 1969), pp. 1, 2, 5, 15; *Månadsrapport för april 1969* (Panmunjom, April 30, 1969), p. 8. The shortest MAC meeting was the 62nd called by the KPA/CPV held on July 16, 1955, which only lasted seven minutes. From Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, p. 47.

not rescue the crew and departed for North Korea. The incident was briefly raised at the 286th MAC meeting held on March 17, but the UNC/MAC then only knew partly about it. At the meeting, the North accused the South of having begun firing. “Operation Focus Retina” was regarded “...as a flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement.” The South protested the incident and responded that the exercise was defensive and was only conducted because of North Korea’s aggressive policies towards South Korea. When on March 18 the well-equipped rubber dinghy and the seven bodies were salvaged, the incident became known.

Subsequently, the UNC/MAC called the 287th MAC meeting to be held on March 26. The South protested the operation and showed seized equipment such as uniforms, weapons and ammunition as evidence. The North refused to inspect the equipment and denied that it had anything to do with the incident. On the contrary, the whole incident was regarded as “...an internal South Korean affair that had nothing to do with the Armistice Agreement or the MAC.”<sup>126</sup> Once more, the “zero-sum game” had been repeated.

### **3.4 Repatriation of Military Personnel**

As mentioned on p. 55, repatriation of military personnel who had crossed the MDL first took place in 1954, when a precedent for the return was established. The issue became far more complicated after September 5, 1962, when a fight broke out during a Ch’usôk (fall

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<sup>126</sup> Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, p. 261; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, p. 154; Sergel, *ibid.*, March 31, 1969, pp. 3, 15-16; *ibid.*, April 30, 1969, pp. 11-12.

harvest holiday) celebration. According to Downs (1999) and Lee (2001a), six North Korean soldiers approached South Korean soldiers at the MDL and asked them to join their party. This experiment in fraternal commemoration by drinking led to an exchange of gunfire in which three North Koreans were killed and two wounded. A few South Korean soldiers were also injured. North Korea requested the return of the two wounded officers and the bodies of the three soldiers, but the UNC only returned the bodies after an investigation by Joint Observer Teams (JOT) on September 7. Instead, it informed North Korea that the two officers had chosen to remain in South Korea.

On September 27, when the 156th MAC meeting requested by the UNC/MAC was held the South claimed that six armed soldiers had crossed the MDL and intruded into its territory. When they approached the South's soldiers who were weeding, fighting and shooting broke out. After one South Korean was wounded, an exchange of fire occurred in which three North Koreans were killed and three wounded. One had escaped while the other two received medical treatment. The South referred to the joint investigation which had proved the North's illegal act. The North claimed that the South's guards had crossed the MDL and kidnapped and killed its guards who were on patrol. This was in violation of the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 6, prohibiting hostile acts within the DMZ, Paragraph 12, requiring "... a complete cessation of all hostilities..," Paragraph 14, urging that "...ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side..." and Paragraph 17, giving responsibility for complying with and enforcing the agreement to the respective Commanders. The South Korean Defence Intelligence Headquarters (1993) records the North's

opinion that this serious incident could have led to war.<sup>127</sup> It is the first incident the author has noted about which the opinion was expressed that it could have led to war, but this was only from one source, making it hard to assess.

At the 157th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on October 5, the North requested the immediate return of its officers, but the UNC/MAC repeated that they would be kept detained and that they had requested to live in South Korea. The KPA/CPV Senior Member, Major General Chang Chung Hwan, then reminded the UNC/MAC of the promise made during the JOT investigation to return the officers as soon as treatment was over, repeated the request for their return and, following a new refusal, angrily warned them:

“I declare to you that if your side continues to behave in such a manner instead of returning our personnel at an early date, such lenient treatment as was given to 2nd Lt. Bumpas who could go back to your side after being shot down through our self-defence measures when he intruded into our territorial airspace will no longer be accorded to your side, which incessantly commits provocative acts in violation of the Armistice Agreement. Our side will call your side to account for [those two North Korean officers] until your side returns our personnel.”<sup>128</sup>

At the 158th meeting held on October 17, the North repeated its request for the return of the two detainees, but the South refused since they had deliberately intruded into its territory as trained spies. The

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<sup>127</sup>- Columbia University, *op. cit.*, Paragraph 6, 12, 14, 17; Downs, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-112; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 129-130; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 91-2; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), pp. 119-120.

<sup>128</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, p. 112; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 130, 131; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), p. 120. Original quotation marks. Lee records the statement in Korean.

demand was repeated at the following meetings, but only one who wanted to meet his family was returned after the UNC at the 177th meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on August 20, 1963, had suggested that he should be returned the following day.

The threat made at the 157th meeting was implemented on May 17, 1963. Captain Ben W. Stutts and Captain Carleton W. Voltz, who were flying an inspection tour with an unarmed US Army helicopter OH-23, became disoriented, flew over the Han River estuary and were forced down in North Korea around 9 a.m. At the 168th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held the same day, Major General Chang claimed on the basis of incoming reports that “a US military aircraft had intruded into North Korea’s airspace and received necessary punishment,” referred to a possible trial of the pilots as “criminals” and refused to discuss the incident further. The UNC/MAC demanded the return of the pilots, but North Korea wanted an apology. No progress was made at the eight meetings held up to August 20, six of which were called by the UNC/MAC. On November 6, the UNC Commander, General Hamilton H. Howze, wrote to the KPA Commander Kim Il Sung, asking him to cooperate in the early settlement of the incident. In his reply on February 17, 1964, Kim alleged that the pilots were engaged in “military espionage.” To obtain North Korea’s leniency, the UNC would have to admit the “grave criminal acts,” guarantee that no such “criminal acts” would be perpetrated in the future and strictly abide the Armistice Agreement.<sup>129</sup>

On March 5, General Howze sent a letter to Kim Il Sung and

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<sup>129</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, p. 112; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 146, 148; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 92-3, 97, 98, 99, 100; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 122, 123.

formally apologized for the incident, guaranteeing that the UNC would act to prevent a recurrence of such incidents, and promised to adhere to the terms of the Armistice Agreement. On March 23, Kim noted Howze's apology and told the KPA/CPV Senior Member to settle the issue. Since no further action had been taken by May 5, the UNC/MAC Senior Member proposed a private meeting to be convened in Panmunjom. The first private MAC meeting held on May 8 did not bring a positive result. Major General Chang just repeated the conditions for the release of the crew. At the second meeting convened on May 15, he insisted that the UNC/MAC Senior Member, Major General Cecil E. Combs, sign a "receipt document" before discussing procedures to release the pilots. Prior to their release at the 269th MAC secretary meeting held on May 16, Major General Chang proffered a prepared receipt that had been prepared by North Korea in Korean and English which was a confession that General Combs signed (no. 22):

"Admitting the crimes of espionage and illegal intrusion by Captain Ben Weakley Stutts and Captain Carleton William Voltz, the U.S. pilots, who were captured by the self-defence measure of the Korean People's Army while they were committing espionage act, after illegally intruding into the air over the northern part of the Democratic Republic of Korea across the Military Demarcation Line in violation of the Armistice Agreement upon the orders of the 8th U.S. Army headquarters on May 17, 1963, and guaranteeing that it will not commit such criminal acts and will strictly abide by the Korean Armistice Agreement in the future, the United Nations Command hereby receives Captain Ben Weakley Stutts and Captain Carleton William Voltz, U.S. Army pilots, from the Korean People's Army side."<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>130</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 112-113; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, p. 313; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), p. 127. Original quotation marks. Lee records in Korean the letters of November 5, 1963, February 17, March 5 and March 23 on pp. 123-7 and the May 15 "receipt" on p. 129.

As we have seen, in 1958 Joint Observer Teams (JOT:s) had been dispatched by the MAC to investigate infiltration attempts across the MDL. On November 20, 1962, the North Korean Army attacked a UNC observation post on the western front of the DMZ with Soviet-made hand grenades. One American soldier was killed and another wounded. The UNC did not suggest dispatching a JOT investigation but started its own. Since the UNC had not originally suggested a JOT investigation, the incident became an occasion for North Korea to incapacitate the JOTs. At the 160th MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on November 29, 1962, the South presented splinters of hand grenades as evidence of the attack and protested against the act. The North Koreans argued that the claim was completely manipulated and that the incident took place among South Korean enlisted men. When the South protested again, the North Koreans argued “When there are JOTs, why did you not suggest a joint investigation but unilaterally drew your own conclusion?” The South responded that there was clear evidence of the North Korean attack and asked why a JOT investigation was needed, arguing that it would only delay the holding of a MAC meeting.

By 1967, JOT meetings had become infrequent because the North Koreans did not usually consent to investigations of UNC allegations; of 40 suggestions to meet, only one was accepted. Prior to the meeting held on April 6-7, 52 meetings had been held to investigate incidents that reportedly had occurred in the DMZ (the previous one took place in 1965). North Korea had proposed 45, 22 of them to investigate alleged South Korean espionage infiltration to the north across the MDL that all were denied by the UNC.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>131</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 104, 302: fn. 31; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, p. 94;

The April 1967 meeting was held because North Korea demanded an investigation of the “diabolical atrocities” the UNC had allegedly committed on April 5. The task for the JOTs was to find out the facts behind an incident in which three North Korean guards (of five) who by mistake had crossed the MDL located under an American guard post had been killed on the UNC side of the DMZ, 900 metres from the Joint Security Area. According to the UNC JOT, three Army soldiers had crossed the MDL and proceeded to a point 20 metres south where an alert UNC work party doing routine work had fired on the soldiers who were killed. From concealed positions along the MDL, North Korean army soldiers fired automatic weapons at the UNC when it attempted to withdraw to its assigned guard post. The soldiers retrieved one of three soldiers killed and dragged him to a point 7-8 metres north of the MDL. A fourth North Korean soldier had been killed in the exchange of fire that ensued and another was wounded. No UNC soldier was killed. The North Korean JOT could not accept the UNC version. Like the NNSC, the JOT did not have an umpire who could break the deadlock and give his judgement when investigation results differed, hampering the work of both organs. The UNC JOT Senior Member was willing to meet his North Korean counterpart to work on a joint report but added that the UNC would file its report with the MAC unilaterally if the North Koreans did not wish to meet again.

On April 7, North Korea’s JOT Senior Member claimed that the UNC had fired on and killed North Korean Army “civil police” who were on a routine patrol north of the MDL. The UNC had sub-

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Lee, *op. cit.*, 1998(a), pp. 3-4; *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 133.

sequently removed the bodies from the north to the south in an attempt to prove that North Korean army personnel had intruded across the MDL. The UNC rejected the North Korean version and declared that it would submit its evidence to the MAC unilaterally. The North Koreans stated that they would do so too. The UNC allowed a North Korean work party to cross the MDL to retrieve the bodies of the soldiers and the North Korean JOT to supervise the work. No receipt was asked for returning the killed North Koreans. A few days later, North Korea held a state funeral in P'yŏngyang for the soldiers. The North's media accused US forces of "murdering" North Korean DMZ "civil police." At the 243rd MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on April 8, North Korea accused the South of the April 5 attack and the South the North in accordance with established practice.<sup>132</sup>

### 3.5 Armistice Violations at Sea and in the Air

Armistice violations also took place at sea. The Armistice Agreement applies to the opposing naval forces which "...shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea." But no agreement was reached on "...what constitutes the territorial sea around the Korean peninsula..." Neither is the territorial sea defined in the Armistice Agreement, nor is any formula defined to resolve disputes regarding overlapping waters contiguous to the two sides. Instead, in Paragraph

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<sup>132</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 104-105; Hapch'am chŏngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 204; Kukpang chŏngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, p. 135; Lee, *ibid.*, 1998(a), pp. 4-5; *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 133-5, 136-7. Original quotation marks.

15 the term “...the water contiguous to...” is used; it has become one of the major factors of tension in the West Sea.<sup>133</sup>

According to Lee (2001b), in 1958 the UNC and the Republic of Korea established the Northern Limit Line (NLL) to prevent fishing boats from sailing into fishing grounds north or east of the five islands Paengnyōngdo, Taech'ōngdo, Soch'ōngdo, Yōnp'yōngdo and Udo. In fact, beginning in 1957, many South Korean fishing boats had been seized by North Korean patrol vessels in the waters along the coast. North Korea was not informed since the line was set up for operational purposes and was classified confidential for some time. Yet, in spite of being contested, between 1953 and 1994 the NLL issue was never discussed at MAC meetings. The UNC has not charged North Korea with simple crossings of the NLL.

From 1958 to 1967, naval incidents in the West Sea that involved alleged South Korean fishing boats or naval vessels' intrusions into coastal waters north of the NLL generally took place in the vicinity of the five islands under UNC control. On such occasions, the standard UNC response was that the locations of North Korea's charged violations were within the waters contiguous to the South Korean islands if within three nautical miles of them or that they were in international waters if beyond that distance. In fact, during the armistice negotiations North Korea and China had insisted on inserting 12 nautical miles if the territorial sea was to be numerically defined.

Throughout the 1960s, North Korea claimed its exclusive rights

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<sup>133</sup>- Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 15; Downs, *ibid.*, p. 119; Lee, op. cit., 2001(b), pp. 87-8.

to fish in territory that extended 12 nautical miles from its shores whereas South Korea claimed three nautical miles. An important fishing ground is situated more than three miles from North Korea's shore, just to the north of the MDL on land. Fishermen from South Korea were attracted to fish here, but North Korea regarded their fishing as an infringement of its jurisdiction over the fishing grounds. North Korea sent patrol boats and occasionally fired shore batteries to harass the fishermen, who often were lost at sea or abducted. To protect the fishermen, South Korea sent its naval vessels to escort fishing boats to the northern fishing ground, leading inevitably to confrontations.<sup>134</sup>

In the early 1960s, North Korea began to accuse South Korean naval vessels of having violated the Armistice Agreement between the three and 12 nautical mile line from the North Korean coast and the five islands controlled by the UNC. At the 202nd MAC secretary meeting held on March 22, 1960, the South denied the North's claim made at the 201st meeting convened on February 5 that a patrol craft escort on January 19 had intruded into the North's territorial waters and escaped. At the 123rd plenary meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on July 27, the North accused a UNC naval vessel on July 22 of having utilized the fog to intrude and fire on a North Korean police vessel on patrol before disappearing. The South claimed that it was a service ship delivering food stuffs and supplies which had not intruded into the North's territorial water. One man was shot to death by the North.

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<sup>134</sup> Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 119-120; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), pp. 92, 96-7; *ibid.*, 2001(b), pp. 87, 88-9; *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 94.

The North criticized South Korea at the 124th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV convened on August 3 for an incident on July 30 when the South's naval vessel K.E. no. 72 had attacked and seized a North Korean patrol vessel in the East Sea. It urged the return of the vessel and its crew and punishment of those responsible. The UNC/MAC explained that the North's police vessel had fired first and that the ship had been sunk in self-defence. Four surviving North Koreans would be returned if they so wished. At the 214th secretary meeting convened on August 11, the South claimed that its investigation had concluded that the North's protests made on July 19 against intrusions of fishing boats were groundless. At the 128th plenary meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on October 6, the North again urged the return of the vessel and the dead bodies from the July 30 incident. The South responded that it had not yet salvaged the vessel, but the fishermen were returned in September-October.<sup>135</sup>

At the 193rd meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC convened on November 13, 1964, the South denied the North's accusation concerning seven violations of its territorial waters since October 21 made at the 192nd meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on October 28. At the 195th meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC convened on December 14, the South declared that its investigations had concluded that all the North's protests against violations of its territorial waters made at the 193rd and 194th meetings were false (the 194th held on November 24 was called by KPA/CPV). At the 228th meeting proposed by the

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<sup>135</sup> Kim, *op. cit.*, 2003, p. 185; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 75-6, 77, 293, 297; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), p. 132; *ibid.*, 2001(b), p. 89. Lee (*ibid.*, 2001a) records that six North Korean crewmen were rescued and returned whereas Kim notes that there were only four survivors.

KPA/CPV convened on August 5, 1966, the North claimed that on July 29 the South's naval destroyer no. 202 and patrol vessel no. 56 had intruded into its waters in the East Sea and fired at fishing boats. The North urged punishment of those responsible, an admission and an excuse. Also, measures should be taken to prevent a recurrence. The South asserted that nine naval vessels camouflaged as fishing boats had attacked a South Korean patrol vessel and tried to seize it, but the attack had been repulsed and the ships had escaped.

At the 248th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on June 1, 1967, the North claimed that on May 27 more than ten naval vessels from the South had for 20 minutes fired more than 700 shells along the North's coast of the South Hwanghae province. The South claimed that the shelling was in self-defence since the North had fired first on the open sea at three patrol vessels during a routine patrol tour. When the South had responded, firing ceased. At the 277th meeting convened on September 5, 1968, the UNC/MAC claimed that a North Korean intelligence vessel on August 20 had become disabled during an espionage mission near Cheju Island. The UNC/MAC displayed photographs of the vessel, the dead and captured North Koreans, their equipment and weapons, including an 82mm recoilless rifle, a 40mm rocket launcher and several anti-aircraft machine guns. The "agent boat" carried the flags of both Koreas, Japan and China to cover its true identity. The North deflected charges of espionage by showing no interest in the return of its own vessel or crew.<sup>136</sup> Thus, in the case of armistice violations at sea as well, the zero-sum game was repeated.

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<sup>136</sup>- Downs, *op. cit.*, pp. 138, 305: fn. 45; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, pp. 160, 189-190, 210; Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, p. 185; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 108, 137, 150. Original quotation marks.

Throughout the 1960s, the capture of fishing boats and the kidnapping of fishermen were also frequently raised at MAC meetings. Previously, in May 1955 and in December 1958, North Korea had declared through its broadcasts that “to ease the hardships of South Korean fishermen it permits free fishery within the North’s waters.” However, at this time, the capture of fishing boats was no major issue; owing to the poor state of the North Korean navy there were hardly any between 1953 and 1957, but in November 1957, 56 South Korean fishing boats were captured for the first time since 1953. These boats were inspected by North Korean naval authorities. For propaganda purposes, if there were fishermen on them, they were well treated and, if necessary, boats were repaired and returned. On the other hand, if there were refugees from North Korea among the crew, they were not returned. In 1958, nine fishing boats and 54 fishermen were captured, but the first kidnapping of ten South Korean fishermen had taken place on May 28, 1955.

In 2007, altogether 3,696 fishermen had been abducted since 1953, but 3,267 had been returned while 428 remained in North Korea (one of the four who had defected is not included). The total number of abductees was 3,795, 480 of whom had not been returned. In accordance with previous practice, North Korea did not confirm the existence of abductees. The number of abductees rose from 35 in the 1950s to 227 in the 1960s. However, since some fishermen did not report or record their names, they are not included among abductees, making the statistics incomplete. According to North Korean defectors and returnees, there are many abducted South Koreans in the North whose names, as well as the circumstances of their abduction, are not known to South Korean authorities. The reasons for not returning

abductees were that North Korean authorities found their knowledge and manpower useful to them. For instance, some abducted South Koreans were reportedly engaged in spy and espionage training or broadcasts to South Korea. In 1993, about 20 unidentified South Korean abductees worked as spy instructors at the “Centre for Revolutionizing South Korea” in P’yŏngyang.<sup>137</sup>

At the 132nd MAC meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on January 4, 1961, the North accused the South of kidnapping on December 19 “[two] fishing boats and after the passage of two weeks returning 28 persons but detaining the other ten” and demanded the immediate return of all detained personnel, cargo and belongings. The UNC/MAC explained that “the Communist vessels were armed and the detained personnel are remaining in accordance with their free wishes” and argued that it had rescued the boats since there was a risk of them sinking. The non-returnees remained of their own free will, whereas cargo as well as belongings had been returned.

A similar situation developed at the 229th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on October 11, 1966. The North asserted that “a North Korean fishing boat which had returned to Ullŭng Island had been kidnapped by force by a naval vessel.” The UNC/MAC response was

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<sup>137</sup>- Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, pp. 187, 188, 190; Kim et al., *White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2007* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2007), pp. 261-3, 264-5, 267-8, 269; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2000, p. 87; *op. cit.*, 2001(a), p. 92; Lim et al., *White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2006* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2006), p. 251. Original quotation marks. A list of the 434 fishermen abducted and detained in North Korea between 1955 and 1987 appears in Lim et al., *ibid.*, pp. 298-311. Fishermen comprised 3,692 of the 3,790 abductees which include the dead but not unconfirmed reports of people kidnapped from third countries. For data on the other 51 abductees, divided into crew of Korean Airlines (12), naval personnel (22) and [non-specified] others (17) see *ibid.*, pp. 297, 312-313.

that “the fishermen who had come to the South had chosen freedom in accordance with their hopes.” In 1961, the parties repeated their positions at the 133rd meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV convened on January 13. Later, the boat was returned. At the 134th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on January 24, the South declared that two fishermen had asked to remain in South Korea but the North argued that the South had prevented them from returning by threats.<sup>138</sup>

At the 139th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on April 11, the South protested that on April 7 “the North had captured six torpedo boats and 43 fishermen and demanded the return of the boats and the fishermen.” The North asserted that “the UNC naval destroyer no. 706 had intruded to capture fishing boats and then fired 300 shells.” The kidnapping was denied; the issue led to charges of offense and defence from the two sides. At the 140th meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on April 22, the South protested the North’s capture of torpedo boats and demanded “cooperation from both sides for peaceful fishing.”

The North responded that the incident was not kidnapping but “the fishermen had crossed the border to the North of their own free will.” The North raised kidnappings by the South of fishermen at the 153rd meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on July 10, 1962. On June 26, an anti-submarine ship had seized a fishing boat from the North and kidnapped eleven fishermen. The North urged the return of the boat, the fishermen and their belongings. The South declared that the incident was under investigation and that the North would be

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<sup>138</sup>- Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, p. 112; Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, pp. 187-8; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 79, 128.

informed of the result when available. At the 154th meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC convened on July 20, the South announced that in accordance with the fishermen's wishes they would be returned along with their equipment. In contrast to most incidents, a solution was reached.

At the 155th meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on August 29, the North claimed that the South on August 7 had kidnapped fishing boats, but the South rejected the claim. At the 167th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on May 3, 1963, the North claimed: "An armed South Korean group had intruded in West Sea waters close to the north of Kakhoedo [Island] and attacked fishermen, killing two and kidnapping one." The South responded that its investigation of the incident that took place on April 25 showed that the North's claim was false. When the 168th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV took place on May 17, 1963, a verbal battle occurred due to an exchange of fire after a North Korean spy ship had crossed the NLL to the west of Yônp'yông Island. When the UNC/MAC argued "since the spy ship had violated the NLL, we fired," North Korea asserted "Our naval vessel never crossed the Northern Limit Line", which it regarded as the MDL at sea. At the 217th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on November 4, 1965, the South criticized the North for having kidnapped more than 100 fishermen in the West Sea on October 29. When the 220th meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on January 5, 1966, it was announced that all but two of the 104 fishermen had been released.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>139</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 127, 128; Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, pp. 188, 189: fn. 67; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 82, 90, 91, 97, 122, 123; Yi, "Pug-úi yoksim, Nam-ti chosim...NLL-ün puranhada," *Sindonga* (May 2006),

After 1967, offense and defence was followed by arguments as to whether the fishing boats were armed or not and the issue of the intrusion of armed spy ships. On January 19, 1967, a South Korean naval patrol escort boat, PCE-56, which had a crew of 40, was fired on without any warning by the North's shore batteries while it was escorting fishing boats. It sank at a location 3.5 to 5.1 miles off the coast and 39 seamen died. At the 239th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on January 21, the South charged the North Koreans with having fired at and sunk a naval vessel on "peaceful, non-hostile duty." The UNC/MAC claimed that it was one of the North's most serious armistice violations and requested an investigation by the NNSC in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 28, on the dispatch of the Commission to investigate armistice violations outside the DMZ [but Downs makes no further reference to the NNSC]. The North claimed that the boat had illegally intruded into its territorial water and bombarded the shore numerous times, and that it had acted in self-defence.

According to Downs (1999), the KPA/CPV Senior Member, Major General Pak Chung Kuk, claimed that the patrol boat had "illegally intruded into our coastal waters...and overtly committed a vicious hostile act by suddenly opening fire and showering scores of shells on our coastal area." He claimed that the North's shore batteries took "due self-defence measures" and warned against similar naval or air intrusions into its coastal waters or airspace. To maintain peace, the South Korean government transferred the escort mission from its navy to its maritime police. In the late 1960s, the capture of fishing boats

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pp. 165-6. Original quotation marks.

and kidnappings of fishermen had become especially serious; whereas only one-two boats had been captured during the years 1961-66, the number rose to 67 in 1967, when 352 fishermen were kidnapped. In 1968, 100 fishing boats and 805 fishermen were kidnapped. South Korea regarded the kidnappings as a way to train spies. Only 60 fishing boats and 482 fishermen were returned. However, after 1970 the number of kidnapped fishing boats fell dramatically to six-seven per year after tension decreased thanks to the holding of the North-South dialogue.<sup>140</sup>

Armistice violations also took place in the air. At the 200th MAC secretary meeting held on January 15, 1960, the South asserted that its investigation had concluded that the claim made by the North at the 113th plenary meeting convened on December 4, 1959 that a fighter plane had violated its airspace was groundless. The claim was also rejected at the 201st meeting convened on February 5, as well as the protest made on January 15 against crossings of the MDL by military airplanes. When the 207th meeting took place on May 26, the South admitted its violation of the North's airspace on May 2 (no. 23). At the 214th meeting convened on August 11, the South claimed that its investigation had concluded that the North's protest made on June 21 against intrusions of its airspace was groundless. When the 216th meeting took place on September 6, the South admitted the North's protest made on August 13 that fighter planes had intruded into its airspace (no. 24). At the 217th meeting held on September 16, the

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<sup>140</sup>- Columbia University, *op. cit.*, Paragraph 28; Downs, *op. cit.*, p. 120; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 199-200; Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, pp. 189-190; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 133, 426; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), p. 105. Original quotation marks.

South admitted the North's protest made on September 6 that two F-86 fighters on September 2 had intruded into the North's airspace and then disappeared (no. 25). Both incidents had taken place due to inattention.

At the 218th meeting held on October 11, the South claimed that the North's protest made on September 16 that a military aircraft on September 13 had intruded into its air space was groundless. At the 220th meeting convened on November 5, the South denied the North's claim made on October 11 that fighter planes had intruded into its airspace. At the 232nd meeting held on April 7, 1961, the South admitted the protest made by the North at the 229th meeting held on March 10 against an airspace violation by a military airplane that had taken place due to an error (no. 26). When the 164th plenary meeting requested by the KPA/CPV took place on March 8, 1963, the intrusion on February 25 by the UNC military plane P-2V was contested; the North claimed that it had intruded into its airspace while the South regarded the assertion as groundless. At the 171st meeting called by the UNC/MAC convened on June 14, North Korea accused the UNC of having committed violations of its air territory 694 times since the armistice was signed in 1953.<sup>141</sup>

When the 182nd meeting requested by the KPA/CPV took place on January 16, 1964, the North reported that on January 14 two UNC F-86 fighter planes had intruded as far as Kaesŏng, one of which was shot down in self-defence. Remains of the plane were shown as evidence. One of them flown by a South Korean pilot who was killed

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<sup>141</sup> Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, p. 185; Kukpang chŏngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 72, 95, 98, 293, 295, 297, 298, 301, 302.

was shot down close to the Swedish NNSC camp. The North accused the South of having crossed North Korean territory by airplane on five occasions on January 14 and 15. The South denied the crossings with the exception of the shot-down plane that was said to have navigated wrongly during a routine exercise due to a radio error (no. 27). The pilot was returned on January 17. As was the case with regard to the 171st meeting, the US argued that such incidents were inevitable since its main air bases and Seoul were too close to the DMZ.

When the 186th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV took place on August 19, the North protested that the military aeroplane L-19 on August 14 had intruded into its airspace for reconnaissance purposes and then disappeared. On August 15, the UNC/MAC admitted the intrusion by declaring that it was due to a mistake and mentioned that the pilot was sentenced to penal servitude [but how is not recorded; no. 28]. At the 193rd meeting held on November 13, 1964, the South admitted the North's protest made at the 192nd meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on October 28 that on October 20 the military airplane H-21 had intruded into the North's airspace and returned, but claimed that it was caused by mistake (no. 29). At the 196th meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on December 19, the South declared that its investigation had rejected the North's claim from the 195th meeting held on December 14 that the military airplane RB 50 had crossed the MDL and then escaped.<sup>142</sup> Notably, in deviation from the established pattern at meetings, the UNC made seven admissions of violations in 1960-64.

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<sup>142</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 151, 154; Kim, ibid., 2003, p. 185: fn. 55, 56; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 104, 105, 108, 109, 110: *Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônoe p'yôllan, che 3 chip*, 1997, p. 248 ; Uggla, op. cit., p. 2.

According to Kim (2003), at the 197th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on December 30, the North blamed the UNC for having made armistice violations during 1964 in the air 17 times, in the sea 164 times and on land 18,064 times, which amounted to 11,761 more cases than in 1963. The UNC/MAC responded that the incidents were purely fabricated by North Korea and only admitted five violations on land and one at sea [which are not recorded]. Kim also records that between 1953 and the 218th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on November 30, 1965, the North had accused the UNC/MAC of 35,127 armistice violations, 88 of which were admitted. Among the 4,714 violations raised by the UNC/MAC to the North, only two had been admitted. The Swedish Colonel and Deputy-Head of the NNSC Delegation from April-October 1965, Helge Nyberg, records (1968) statistics from the MAC: the North had accused the South of 17,909 violations during 1964 but the South had made only 1,295 charges. These numbers were the highest ever. Nyberg also records that in 1964 the UNC/MAC had admitted 83 violations but the North only two.

In comparison, North Korea, using statistics from the MAC quoted by the South Korean scholar Park Hon-ok (1998) had during the years 1953-60 committed altogether 628 armistice violations, 538 of them on land, eleven at sea and 79 in the air. Considering the two sides' different figures, it is not surprising that of the 214 MAC meetings held up to September 15, 1965, 151 had been proposed by the KPA/CPV. Of the 300 secretary meetings convened up to August 27, 1965, 186 had been requested by the North. Park also records that North Korea committed altogether 7,544 armistice violations during the years 1961-1970, of 7,476 of them on land, 57 at sea and eleven

in the air.<sup>143</sup>

At the 206th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on May 3, 1965, the North protested that the military airplane RB-47 on April 28 had intruded into its air space for reconnaissance work. The South protested that two MIG-17 fighters had approached the plane 90 miles from the North's territory over open sea (East Sea) and without warning fired at it during a routine reconnaissance tour. At the 208th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV convened on May 21, the North claimed that the military airplane L-19 on May 18 had intruded into its airspace in violation of the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 16, requiring air forces to respect the airspace over the DMZ and over the area of Korea controlled by the other side. As a spy plane, it was shot down in self-defence and the pilot killed. The South asserted that the plane was on a routine tour but diverged from its route for some unknown reason. When, following signals, the plane began to change course, it was attacked. The South admitted the armistice violation, promised non-recurrence and urged the return of the plane and the pilot (no. 30).

The UNC/MAC Senior Member, Major General William Yarborough, signed a confession of the violation at the 209th MAC meeting called by the South held on May 2. The pilot would be returned after the meeting. Finally, at the 324th secretary meeting convened on November 23, 1966, the South admitted that on November 21 an aircraft had by mistake briefly intruded into the DMZ.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>143</sup>- Hasselrot, op. cit., p. 4; Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, pp. 185-6, 191; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 110, 120, 122, 323; Nyberg, *Koreaminnen ad usum Delphini* (Östersund: AB ÖPE-Tryck, 1968), pp. 6, 44; Park, "Armistice Agreement and Peace on Korean Peninsula," p. 78.

<sup>144</sup>- Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 16; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 170, 172, 173, 174; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 115, 116-117, 329.

On April 14, 1969, North Korea proposed to hold a MAC meeting on April 18. On Kim Il Sung's birthday, April 15, two North Korean MIG planes shot down an unarmed US Navy Lockheed EC-121 Constellation reconnaissance plane with cannon and machine-gun fire. However, according to Mobley (2003), few details of the shooting-down are publicly known. The crew of 30 Navy personnel and one marine were all killed, but only two of the corpses were discovered on April 18 by the Soviet fleet and were turned over to American naval vessels along with equipment. Kim (2003) regards the incident as the most serious airspace violation in the 1960s. Mobley (2003) writes that the shooting-down was deliberate and adds: "To be precise, it was premeditated murder." Both evaluations appear to be correct.

According to Major General Karl Sergel, Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation, North Korea wanted to use the shooting-down to mark its independence and insult the US superpower as well as to undermine South Korea's confidence in the US. Mobley records that one school of thought argues that the shooting-down took place due to internal power rivalries in North Korea; the partisan generals presumably needed to show quick and spectacular results to support their takeover of anti-South Korea operations. The Blue House raid and the seizure of the *Pueblo* had served this purpose. Downing a US aircraft provided "...a dramatic demonstration of North Korean capability against the overwhelmingly more powerful United States." Both explanations seem to be entirely plausible.

The EC-121 that had departed from a US airbase in Japan at 7.00 a.m. and was scheduled to land at Osan Air Base south of Seoul had, as directed, been flying a routine reconnaissance track parallel to

North Korea over the East Sea 50 miles from the coast, instead of the usual distance of 40 miles. It was shot down at 13.47-13.49 p.m and was reported missing at about 2.00 p.m. Previously, the aircraft had received a stern warning not to enter within 50 nautical miles of the North's airspace. Downs (1999) records that the plane was 90 miles from the coastline when shot down. President Richard Nixon was shocked and noted that the downing "was a complete surprise in every sense of the word and therefore did not give us the opportunity for protective action that I would have taken had it been threatened." At 3.55 p.m., Radio P'yŏngyang claimed that North Korea had shot down a US aircraft that had intruded into its airspace, but the US position was that the aircraft never even approached it. At 4.20, North Korea requested to hold a MAC meeting on April 18, which the UNC/MAC accepted.<sup>145</sup>

After considering the options, the US, as in the Pueblo case, excluded military retaliation but military preparedness, in particular at all air bases, within the DMZ and along the coasts in South Korea, was raised immediately. According to Lee (1998), since the US was deeply involved in the Vietnam War, the estimation was that it could not pursue a new war. However, aircraft were moved from Japan to South Korea and aircraft in Japan were put on alert. Naval ships were redirected from Vietnam as well as from other places to the East Sea. Nuclear and diesel submarines were also moved into the operating area to provide early warning and to support post-strike search-

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<sup>145</sup> Downs, *op. cit.*, pp. 126, 146; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *op. cit.*, p. 46; Kim, *op. cit.*, 2003, pp. 184-5; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), pp. 47-8, 49; *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 50; Mobley, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104, 105, 106-110, 112, 161; Sergel, *op. cit.*, April 30, 1969, pp. 1, 8. Last quotation original.

and-rescue operations. These task groups arrived on April 20. Efforts to normalize US-China relations also explains the lukewarm response.

Although President Park Chung Hee had criticized the shooting-down as a preplanned act directed against the US and South Korea to provoke war, he did not oppose the American policy to reject retaliation. Finally, according to Mobley (2003), as in the Pueblo affair, American forces in Korea were largely a bystander, although they were put on high alert. Meanwhile, the North Korean Defence Minister had congratulated the airmen involved.<sup>146</sup>

At the 290th MAC meeting held on April 18, the KPA/CPV Senior Member, Major General Ri Choon Sun, first referred to alleged routine armistice violations within the DMZ and did not mention the shooting-down of the EC-121. Instead, 17 minor incidents were raised such as firing from its checkpoints in the DMZ against the North Korean ones to provoke a new war. The UNC/MAC Senior Member, Air Force Major General James B. Knapp, did not respond to the accusations but charged North Korea with shooting down the unarmed aircraft while on a routine flight. Downs (1999) records that he pointed out that the flight path was 90 miles from the North Korean coast and similar to the flight path of innumerable previous missions.

At this time, North Korean media reported that shooting down the EC-121 was “a retaliation action against shootings by the US Army in the DMZ.” The act was regarded by the UNC as pre-planned, or in

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<sup>146</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, p. 146; Lee, “Hanggong moham, haek chökchae chôn’okki kkaji tongwôntoen tokki manhaeng sakôn: ”chô pirô môgûl namu-rûl challa pôryô” ([http://www.donga.com/docs/magazine/new\\_donga/9801/nd98010260.html](http://www.donga.com/docs/magazine/new_donga/9801/nd98010260.html)), p. 10; *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 48-9; Mobley, *ibid.*, pp. 117-120; Sergel, *ibid.*, April 30, 1969, p. 7.

the words of Mobley (2003), a “calculated act of aggression” unjustified by international law. Major General Knapp advised Major General Ri to admit that North Korea had shot down the aircraft over international waters and to reassure the UNC/MAC that it would act to prevent similar incidents in the future. Major General Ri responded:

“You have just referred to a brigandish aggressive act of the U.S. Government which illegally dispatched a large-sized reconnaissance airplane on 15 April last for the purpose of conducting reconnaissance of the interior of our country. I, first of all, ask you: What country owns the EC-121 large reconnaissance airplane you have talked about?”<sup>147</sup>

Since the UNC/MAC did not respond, the question was repeated. On the third occasion, Major General Knapp and his party walked out of the conference room, as it had been requested to do by the Nixon administration if North Korea was not sincere. According to Sergel (April 1969), the purpose was to emphasize how serious the UNC/MAC’s protest was and to prevent the North from making propaganda statements in front of the world press. Radio P’yŏngyang reported that the EC-121 incident was “retaliation against firing by the US Army in the DMZ.” Notably, Mobley records: “To this day, North Korean media laud both the seizure of the *Pueblo* and the shooting-down of the EC-121 as major accomplishments!” President Nixon, in a clear show of resolve, ordered two aircraft carriers into the East Sea and more F-4s into South Korea “...to protect US reconnaissance flights” that were resumed on May 5 but were made farther away from North Korea and less frequently.

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<sup>147</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, p. 147; Kim, *op. cit.*, 2003, p. 187; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 49-50; Mobley, *ibid.*, p. 131; Sergel, *ibid.*, April 30, 1969, p. 9. Original quotation marks.

On April 23, North Korea issued a “DPRK Government Statement” that charged the US with intruding “deep into the territorial air of the DPRK to conduct hostile acts of espionage.” It objected, “On April 18, Nixon described it as if it were their right or a matter of course to conduct reconnaissance activities against our country, and said that reconnaissance flights against our country would continue in the future too.” Finally, it warned, “If the reconnaissance planes of the U.S. imperialists intrude into the territorial air of our country, we will not sit with folded arms, but will take resolute measures to safeguard our sovereignty.”

While no MAC meetings were held for four months after April 18, informal contacts were maintained through the NNSC: Sergel points out that the main role played by the Commission at this time was to maintain North-South communication, a role that was not prescribed in the Armistice Agreement. On July 25, departing Major General Knapp had invited the NNSC delegations to lunch to present his successor. On the anniversary of the Armistice Agreement, July 27, the delegations were invited by the KPA/CPV Senior Member to dinner in Kaesông. At the 291st MAC meeting held on August 14, Major General Ri criticized the UNC/MAC for walking out of the April 18 meeting and said that the EC-121 incident had nothing to do with the “main subject” of the meeting North Korea had called.<sup>148</sup>

A new incident took place on August 17, 1969, at about 10.45 a.m.. An unarmed American observation helicopter (OH-23) on a

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<sup>148</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 147-8; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, p. 156; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), p. 50; *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 50; Mobley, *ibid.*, pp. 112, 132, 139; Sergel, *ibid.*, April 30, 1969, p. 10: *Månadsrapport för juli 1969* (Panmunjom, July 31, 1969), pp. 4, 5. Original quotation marks.

routine training mission, with a crew of three men, crossed the neutral, demilitarized Han River estuary at the western end of the DMZ with no MDL projected into it and entered the North's airspace, where it was shot down. An UNC joint duty officer immediately informed North Korea that an American helicopter could unintentionally have crossed into the North. Later the same day, North Korean radio reported that the North had shot down an American helicopter over its own territory. According to the helicopter's own radio message, it had lost its orientation, was shot down and forced to land. An investigation made by the UNC showed that the crossing was due to the helicopter pilot having mistaken two landing places.

At the 292nd MAC meeting called by the South held on August 21, the UNC/MAC Senior Member said he had requested the meeting to discuss this "accidental, inadvertent, and purely unintentional" armistice violation and to make arrangements for the return of the personnel and the helicopter. The UNC was willing to study any North Korean proposal to effect the release of the US personnel involved in the accident. Major General Ri claimed that the UNC was preparing for a new war and accused it of distorting the facts of the incident. He rejected the view that the incident had taken place as a result of inattention since the weather had been clear that day and the border line between the Han River and Kanghwa Island from which it had departed was clear. Instead, the UNC had deliberately illegally infringed upon its sovereignty and infiltrated a military aircraft deep into its territorial airspace, where it was shot down by North Korean forces in self-defence. He criticized the UNC for its "failure to apologize" for its "criminal act." When the UNC/MAC reiterated its position, Major General Ri retorted, "Go back, consult with your commander and

come back to this table when you get unmistakable instructions to give a clear-cut answer.” No solution was reached.<sup>149</sup>

At the 293rd MAC meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on August 29, the South asked North Korea to provide information about the physical condition of the three-man crew. Major General Ri reported that two were “seriously wounded,” that one was “slightly wounded” and that all were receiving medical treatment. After the UNC/MAC Senior Member had repeated his willingness to consider any North Korean proposal for the return of the wounded men, Major General Ri responded in his closing statement regarding the return:

“Your side should state its real aim for having flown the military aircraft into our territorial air, frankly admit the criminal act of having dispatched the military aircraft into our side and seriously violated our sovereignty in flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement, apologize to our side for it, and submit a document guaranteeing in a responsible manner that you will not commit such violations of the Agreement again. If your side writes and submits such a document, following the past practice, we will be ready to consider your request as far as the return of your pilots who are in our hands is concerned.”<sup>150</sup>

On September 2, the UNC responded through the hotline at Panmunjom to the North Korean demand as follows:

“With reference to your statement at the close of the 293rd MAC meeting we are prepared to submit the document to your side simultaneous with release to us of the three crew members of the OH-23 helicopter. The document would accord with the facts as we have stated them. It would declare that the helicopter was on a military mission, and that it became

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<sup>149</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 148-9; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 268; Lee, *ibid.*, 2004, p. 52, Sergel, *Månadsrapport för augusti 1969* (Panmunjom, August 31, 1969), p. 10. Original quotation marks.

<sup>150</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, p. 149; Lee, *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 52-3. Original quotation marks.

lost and therefore flew into your territory. It would acknowledge the helicopter violated the airspace under the control of the Korean People's Army and violated the Armistice Agreement. It would contain an expression of regret and a statement that measures will be taken to prevent a recurrence of an incident of this kind.”

The UNC argued:

“It is preposterous to think that a three-man, unarmed helicopter would have flown into your territory willfully or with any hostile intent. We know this, you know it, and the whole world knows it. If you wish to propose the language of a statement which accords with the facts as we have stated them, we will be prepared to consider a written proposal from your side. In the meantime, if you continue to detain the crew members and if there is a deterioration in the condition of the wounded, the responsibility in the eyes of the American public and the world is yours. We await your reply.”

The UNC/MAC complained at the 294th MAC meeting it had called held on September 4 that the North Koreans at the previous meeting had not provided terms or conditions for the release of the crew. Major General Ri reiterated that North Korea would consider returning the crew upon receipt of a document. He stated:

“Your side should frankly admit the criminal act of having dispatched the military aircraft into our territorial airspace, flagrantly violating the Armistice Agreement and seriously infringing upon our sovereignty, apologize to our side for it and write and submit a document guaranteeing in a responsible manner that it will not commit again such violations of the Agreement.”<sup>151</sup>

He warned that “the UNC should not confuse this ‘document’ with the receipt to be written in the case of the receipt of the pilots.” While the issue remained unresolved, on October 18, North Korean

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<sup>151</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 149-150; Lee, *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 53-4. Original quotation marks.

intruders at 9 a.m. ambushed a UNC police truck in the DMZ's US second division sector about 100 metres from the Southern Border Line, presumably with handguns, automatic weapons and hand grenades. All four American soldiers aboard who were returning from maintenance of an observation post were killed. The UNC regarded the attack as the most serious one since the March 15 border incident (cf. p. 152). The UNC/MAC called the 296th MAC meeting held on October 23 and charged the North Koreans with the armed attack, committed in broad daylight. The South urged that North Korea admit its crime, punish those responsible and apologize to the UNC/MAC. Major General Ri ignored the charge by merely stating that North Korea had nothing to do with the incident. which, as we have seen, is a regularized pattern of behaviour.

Six private meetings were held between the MAC Senior Members to negotiate the language of the document North Korea demanded with regard to the helicopter incident. When the fifth meeting was held on November 24, a final agreement was reached on a text. Notably, all meetings had been held in the NNSC conference room. On December 3, 1969, when the final meeting took place, the UNC/MAC Senior Member signed the "document of apology" North Korea had demanded and the crew members were released (no. 31).<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>152</sup> Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 150-151, 306; Grönvall, *Månadsrapport för oktober 1969: Bilaga 3* (Panmunjom, November 4, 1969), p. 3:1; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 271; Lee, *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 54-5. Original quotation marks.

### 3.6 The Work of the MAC and the NNSC

The Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation, Sven Ugglå, points out in his report for September 1963-March 1964 that the atmosphere was harsh and insulting at the five MAC meetings that were held from September to January; the parallel with evaluations recorded in Chapter 2 is clear. The Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation, Major General Ingemar Bratt, wrote in his report for September 1964-March 1965 to the Chief of the Army: "The MAC meetings had from the very beginning degenerated into demagogic shows, above all from the North, with accusations and counter-accusations of "violations," that is, various kinds of violations of the Armistice Agreement." Also, "There were no attempts to agree with the opposite side or to accept its opinions. New accusations written in advance were read or previous accusations were repeated." In brief, "Within the MAC there are no contacts between the parties, only antagonism."

The Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation, Major General Birger Hasselrot, pointed out in his report for March-September 1965 to the Chief of the Army that the general opinion about the MAC was that it did not function as a body to settle disputes to maintain the Armistice Agreement. The atmosphere at the meetings was unfriendly. However, his successor, Major General Carol Bennedich, wrote in his report for September 1965-March 1966 to the Chief of the Army that the tone and the atmosphere at the MAC meetings had improved considerably, an opinion that was shared by the South. On the other hand, in particular the absence of a chairman obstructed the Commission's work. The successor, Major General Bertil Hård af Segerstad, wrote in his report for March-September 1966 to the Head

of the Swedish Army that the atmosphere at MAC meetings remained the same but was still acrimonious.

In contrast to the recorded opinions, Kim (2003) notes that the MAC did not function as a body to resolve disputes and the main provisions of the Armistice Agreement had been suspended as early as the 1950s or did not work. However, as the only channel for raising important armistice violations, the Commission nevertheless helped to prevent the outbreak of a new war. Downs (1999) writes that if the MAC had not existed, the actions instigated by North Korea between January 1966 and December 1969 might have caused more casualties. The above account supports Kim's opinion about its peace-keeping role, but it should be noted that Kim writes that throughout the 1960s Panmunjom was "a place for verbal battles in the Cold War squeezed between East and West."<sup>153</sup> There can be no doubt that the Commission's work was hampered by such battles; the peace-keeping role of the MAC should not be overvalued.

The NNSC continued its work with a reduced mandate. The report by Major General Arne Hallström, Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation, for March-September 1964 to the Army Chief confirms that

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<sup>153</sup>– Bennedich, *Slutrapport: Bilaga 1: Generalmajor Carol Bennedichs slutrapport efter tjänstgöring som chef för Svenska Delegationen i Neutrala Övervakningskommissionen i Korea och medlem i NNSC under tiden 25/9 1965-27/3 1966* (Panmunjom, March 24, 1966), pp. 0, 1, 3; Bratt, *Slutrapport: bilaga 1* (Panmunjom, March 15, 1965), pp. 0: 3; Downs, op. cit., p. 119; Hasselrot, *Slutrapport* (Panmunjom, September 24, 1965), pp. 1, 2: op. cit., p. 4; Hård af Segerstad, *Slutrapport: Bilaga: Generalmajor B. Hård af Segerstads slutrapport efter tjänstgöring som chef för Svenska Delegationen i Neutrala Nationers Övervakningskommission i Korea och Member i NNSC under tiden 18/3 1966-24/9 1966* (Panmunjom, September 23, 1966), p. 1: 1, 5; Kim, op. cit., 2003, pp. 175, 193; *NNSC Chief Delegates - List Updated April 14, 1997*; Uggla, op. cit., p. 2. Original quotation marks from Kim, *ibid.*, p. 175. "Violations" is quoted from Bratt, *ibid.*, p. 3.

many armistice violations were committed by both sides. The North's accusations against the South fairly regularly concerned a) bringing in heavy weapons and automatic weapons into the DMZ, b) permission for civilians without identification to enter the zone, c) implementing provocative exercises within the zone such as setting fire to land at random, d) crossings over the MDL, e) storing prohibited materials such as mines within the DMZ, f) setting fire at random that spreads to forests into the North's territory, g) sending naval ships into the North's territorial waters and h) dispatching airplanes into the North's airspace.

The South regularly presented records containing similar kinds of accusations against the North. Repatriation of four South Korean citizens kidnapped on July 14, 1962 was urged but in vain. The North routinely said that it would investigate accusations, but at MAC meetings they were as regularly denied. Orally presented accusations by the South concerned firing on an easily identified vessel in the Han River Estuary, firing against a civilian police patrol on June 11, 1964, fortification works within the DMZ and the introduction of automatic weapons into the zone. In accordance with section 3.2, both sides occasionally raised the issue of changes in armament levels since the armistice was signed. They had both made changes and continued to modernize their military forces. The NNSC had virtually no insight into North Korea's military policies whereas developments in South Korea could to some extent be followed through the press. However, he concludes that the military situation had presumably not changed in any significant way during the reporting period. The most important issue that remained from his predecessor's time in office was resolved on May 16, when two American helicopter pilots were released (cf. pp. 158-9). The work was as routine as ever.

Since the reports from both sides on the introduction of military personnel and from the North also on combat materials could not be checked, they had no real value. Yet both the North and the South wanted the Commission to continue. In Hallström's view, no party had any plans to make a military attack on the other side. At the same time, there was distrust of the other side and its intentions. Consequently, both sides wanted neutral witnesses that could tell the world what was going on. Members of the NNSC were the only personnel who could pass the MDL and thereby maintain normal friendly relations across the border. In this way, other impressions and tempers than the rather unfriendly ones that characterized MAC meetings were no doubt conveyed.<sup>154</sup> The NNSC thus continued to help to secure peace.

In March 1965, Major General Bratt wrote in his report that the MAC regarded "the NNSC as a contact surface within a big area with inadequate contacts" and its existence as significant. Contact activities were perhaps the most important task for the Commission. Through good internal contacts and with both sides of the MAC a platform and a suitable "climate" for other and more important tasks was created. He wrote:

"There has been a remarkable will among all NNSC members through good consensus to seek to solve problems and reduce tension. In particular this mediating role, unofficially and privately, seems to have given the NNSC a good reputation and convinced those who were previously sceptical about the Commission's justification."<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>154</sup>- Hallström, *Slutrapport* (n. p., September 26, 1964), pp. 0, 1-2; 3-5; *NNSC Chief Delegates - List Updated April 14, 1997*.

<sup>155</sup>- Bratt, op. cit., pp. 6, 7, 8. "Climate" is quoted from *ibid.*, p. 8. The first quotation has original quotation marks.

His compatriot Chief of Staff, Major General Carl-Eric Almgren, argued the same year that Sweden had helped to create relative stability in Korea since 1953. In a state of tense relations between the parties, even such a limited channel of communication as the NNSC was no doubt significant. Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Poland as well as the armistice parties entirely shared this view.

Major General Hasselrot wrote in September 1965 that since the MAC did not function as a body to settle disputes, it was important to note that both parties within the MAC had repeatedly emphasized the significance of the NNSC as a body contributing to secure peace. Although the NNSC, due to the restrictions imposed on its mandate, could not verify reports on personnel and equipment - the latter still only from the North - it could play an important role besides the Armistice Agreement in unofficial meetings and direct contacts with the two sides' representatives in the MAC.

On the other hand, he pointed out that at the 205th MAC meeting held on April 9, the UNC/MAC Senior Member, Major General William Yarborough, had accused the North of preventing the NNSC from working in accordance with the Armistice Agreement. This statement caused concerns within the Czech and Polish delegations; it was inappropriate that the Commission's limited activities were raised in the MAC and that it had been done in a way that did not correspond with historic realities. Following informal internal meetings and direct contacts between the Czech and Polish delegates and Major General Yarborough through the mediation of the Swedish member, the dispute was removed from the NNSC agenda. In addition, a letter from the KPA/CPV Senior Member to the NNSC containing correct accusations against the UNC of having brought in F-5 jet fighters and

Nike-Hercules missiles and demanding that the NNSC therefore should take necessary measures led to a number of official and unofficial Commission meetings. The NNSC agreed to send a reply to the North admitting receipt of the letter. A missive containing a transcript of the reply would be sent to the South for information.<sup>156</sup>

Major General Hasselrot's report for March-September 1965 also confirms that many armistice violations took place. Since late June the number of incidents along the MDL and within South Korea had risen markedly. There were espionage attempts on land and at sea as well as infiltration attempts by saboteurs and political instigators. In several cases, exchanges of fire occurred with casualties on both sides. Accusations by the North against the South included bringing in F-5 jet fighters ("Freedom Fighters") and Nike-Hercules missiles, a visit by the nuclear submarine "Snook" in July, flights over its airspace, hijacking of North Korean fishermen and claims that the UNC delayed MAC meetings.

From the South, accusations included agents and sabotage activities, that a report of all 2,245 "missing persons" since the war had not been released, that American planes had been fired on over international waters and that personnel had been sent to South Korea in a miniaturized submarine for espionage. In accordance with sections 3.3-3.4, these accusations were generally dismissed as groundless. They were often regarded as "spiteful propaganda." For instance, Major General Yarborough wrote in a newspaper article published in *The Stars & Stripes* on June 18, 1965 about MAC meetings: "I have

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<sup>156</sup> Almgren, "Ur min synpunkt sett," *Joboseyo* (March 1965), no. 1, pp. 10-11; Hasselrot, op. cit., pp. 1, 2; op. cit., pp. 3, 4; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, p. 114.

been fighting an ideological war at Panmunjom - sending artillery back in the form of propaganda to show the advantages of a free society over a slave society.”<sup>157</sup>

Major General Bennedich wrote in his report for September 1965-March 1966 that work on the one hand had been routine. On the other hand, the Polish delegate with support from his Czech colleague had attempted to make the NNSC condemn the building of the “Freedom House” in the Joint Security Area (JSA) that was completed on September 30, 1965, in response to the North’s “Peace Pagoda” built in November 1964 to beautify the area and to declare the introduction of weapons into South Korea an armistice violation.

The apparent reason for this attempt was that on February 3 and March 3, 1966 under Chinese pressure, the KPA/CPV had sent harshly formulated letters to the NNSC; the building and the introduction of weapons were regarded as hostile and criminal acts. In the case of the Freedom House, when the 215th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on October 8, 1965, the North had criticized the construction of the “Freedom House,” which it considered an act to use the JSA as a place for propaganda. On October 19, the Polish and Czech NNSC members expressed their joint opinion in a letter to the UNC/MAC that “everything that can be considered to discredit the northern side should immediately be removed, since it is incompatible with the Armistice Agreement.” The UNC/MAC Senior Member replied on October 25 that “he well understands that the KPA/CPV must be jealous but that he had not been able to find anything that discredits them and encourages them to try to understand that the

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<sup>157</sup>- Hasselrot, *ibid.*, pp. 5, 22, 23. Original quotation marks.

building was erected to beautify the JSA.”<sup>158</sup>

At the 216th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on October 26, the North again protested against the “Freedom House” and “propaganda” materials displayed there. Many photos of Korean War scenes were displayed as well as manufactured products to show South Korea’s economic growth. The South responded, as it had at the previous meeting, that the house was built to beautify the area and to provide a resting place for tourists and therefore not an issue for the North to protest against. Subsequently, for more than two years at MAC meetings, North Korea criticized the house for being what they considered “anti-Communist hostile propaganda” in terms of both the name and the exhibits, but these were removed in September 1971 when the building was turned into an office for North-South dialogue. In 1970, North Korea demolished the Peace Pagoda and built the large two-storey building P’anmungak on the same hill where the pagoda had been located immediately to the north of the MAC conference building. There were no anti-US and South Korea exhibits in and outside P’anmungak.

Concerning the introduction of weapons, the following eight meetings and many informal contacts, on March 8, 1966 the NNSC for the first time submitted a letter to the KPA/CPV expressing different opinions on the issue. Nonetheless, Major General Bennedich noted that both parties were clearly positive towards the NNSC’s presence and work. In 1966, he emphasized that the NNSC delegates were the only people who could talk both formally and informally with both

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<sup>158</sup> Bennedich, *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 6; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *op. cit.*, p. 32; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 179; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, p. 120; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 170. Original quotation marks.

parties, thereby easing tense relations; their invisible work was important. In contrast, owing to the tense atmosphere, the parties in the MAC never met outside the official meetings, disabling the informal exchanges of opinions.<sup>159</sup>

His successor, Major General Bertil Hård af Segerstad, wrote in his report for March-September 1966 that on April 23, May 26 and July 22 the NNSC had received letters from the KPA/CPV Senior Member about the introduction of weapons into South Korea. Following six meetings, the Commission decided on May 31 to reply in a similar way as to the letters received in February-March. The third letter was replied to in exactly the same way at the second meeting held on August 2. However, the Polish delegate firmly declared that his consent to the letters was only to prevent the Commission from falling into a “deadlock” there was a marked tendency to seek consensus. While the first two letters were being handled, work was negatively affected by the informal tourist visit by the Swedish Ambassador to China, Lennart Petri, to South and North Korea April 18-24.

After having spent one day in Panmunjom that included a dinner at the Swedish NNSC Delegation, on April 24 Petri travelled via Kaesông and P’yôngyang back to Beijing, as requested by the Swedish Foreign Minister. South Korea’s government sharply criticized his journey via Panmunjom, which it termed a “breach of the Republic of Korea’s sovereignty.” The Ambassador had made no report to the South Korean government when he departed, but the Swedish govern-

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<sup>159</sup> Benedich, *ibid.*, pp. 3, 5: “Från morgonstillhetens land: Vid och omkring Pan Mun Jom,” *Joboseyo* (September 1966), no. 3-4, p. 16; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, p. 179; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, p. 121; Lee, *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 170-171. Original quotation marks.

ment informally replied that it had notified the MAC and added that the procedure “is regarded as being adequate.” However, the Swedish government had failed to specify whether it had notified the UN side or the Communist side. The South Korean Foreign Ministry argued that the MAC, as a non-political organization, had nothing to do with the Korean government in such matters as the entry and exit of a foreigner. Consequently, he should have left South Korea in the usual way at a port of exit. According to the Swedish ambassador to Japan, who was accredited to South Korea, Ambassador Petri had no political intention to cross the MDL. Regret over the incident was expressed on May 6 by the Swedish ambassador to Japan to the South Korean Foreign Minister. Notably, Major General Hård af Segerstad writes that initiated observers argued that the Swedish group still enjoyed unchanged confidence in sensible and well-informed circles in spite of the incident.

During summer 1966, infiltrators and agents were active in and around the DMZ as well as along the coasts. Yet, with the exception of increased watchfulness against such activities, no signs of military escalation were observed. The tone between the parties was spiteful and mutual accusations of preparing for a new war were made. These accusations were generally similar to those raised during recent years and were without exception rejected by the other side. He concluded that it had repeatedly been confirmed that the NNSC had an important role to fulfill through its presence in Panmunjom. The different NNSC delegations’ ability, albeit within a limited area, to make inspections and evaluations as well as to serve as a contact body was also important.<sup>160</sup> In brief, during the 1960s, unlike the 1950s, there was consensus

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<sup>160</sup>- Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., p. 32; Henriksson, *PM med anledning av*

among the armistice parties that the NNSC was important for maintaining the armistice.

After the NNSC in March 1969 had received a letter from the KPA/CPV for the second time the same year protesting against rearmament in the South and “Operation Focus Retina”, which was considered to be “the most outrageous violation” of the Armistice Agreement, a meeting was held to deal with the issue on March 25. Letters with a similar content had been received regularly since 1959, the previous one on April 2, 1968. That letter had referred to “illegal” rearmaments in South Korea but also contained such expressions as “US imperialist aggressors” and “South Korean puppet army” etc. that the Swedish and Swiss delegates found offensive. Their proposal was to send the letter back to the addressee without discussion, but a compromise was reached with the Czech and Polish members to acknowledge receipt to the addressee and inform the MAC about it. At the March 25, 1969 meeting, the Czech and Polish members condemned the South’s rearmaments as dangerous for peace, but the Swedish and Swiss members emphasized the NNSC’s incompetence to express any opinion on different views on Paragraph 13(d) prohibiting rearmaments. Eventually letters were sent to acknowledge receipt and inform the MAC without any comments.

After a third letter from the KPA/CPV on rearmaments had been received on April 9, the Swedish and Swiss members at the meeting held on April 22 refused to sign a letter to the MAC because the

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*ambassadör Petris besök i Korea april 1966* (Panmunjom, May 4, 1966), pp. 1, 2, 3; Hård af Segerstad, *op. cit.*, pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8: *PM angående ambassadör Petris utresa ur Sydkorea 24/4 1966*, (n. p., May 12, 1966), pp. 3, 4: *Bilaga 2; The Korea Times*, “Korea, Sweden At Odds Over ‘Illegal Exit,’” May 4, 1966. Original quotation marks.

KPA/CPV letter contained insulting remarks. The fourth and sixth similar letters received on August 12 and December 19 respectively were both handled in the same way as the second one, the sixth on December 23. Notably, when the KPA/CPV in March changed its Senior Member, the KPA repeatedly emphasized the importance of the NNSC's work as a peace-keeping body.<sup>161</sup>

### 3.7 The 1968 Blue House Raid and Pueblo Incident

On January 18, 1968, 31 North Korean commando soldiers from the 124th Army Unit infiltrated across the MDL into the part of the DMZ controlled by the UNC. They were disguised as members of the South Korean 26th Army Division. They cut a hole in the newly erected barrier fence along the southern boundary of the DMZ with the mission to attack the presidential mansion (Ch'ōngwadae; Blue House) in Seoul to kill President Park Chung Hee. Around 2.00 p.m., the commandos encountered four South Korean woodcutters on a hill close to Pōpwōn-ni village in P'aju county about 6.5 kilometers south of the DMZ. They detained the woodcutters, asked them about South Korea, including the way to Seoul and the location of checkpoints, and told them they were “members of a group which would unify the country.” The infiltrators held the woodcutters for five hours before releasing them with the threat of execution if they informed anyone about their encounter.

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<sup>161</sup>- Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 13(d); Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *ibid.*, pp. 32-3; Grönvall, *Månadsrapport för december 1969: Bilaga 2* (Panmunjom, January 6, 1970), p. 2:2; Sergel, op. cit, March 31, 1969, pp. 16-17: op. cit., April 30, 1969, p. 12: op. cit., August 31, 1969), p. 13. Original quotation marks.

Nonetheless, the woodcutters reported the incident to the national police when they returned to their village about two hours later (note the similarity with the Ūlchin-Samch'ōk raid, p. 148). Since it was hard to believe that such a large group could cross the DMZ unnoticed, the story was dismissed. While the search for the commandos began where the encounter had taken place, the group moved quickly toward Seoul. The final advance toward the Blue House began around 9 p.m. on January 21. Just before that, the police at a checkpoint had urgently reported the infiltrators as suspects to the Chongno police station. About 800 metres from the Blue House, they came under police fire and split into smaller groups, fanned out and retreated north. During the next three days, skirmishes between the infiltrators and South Korean police broke out in and around Seoul. Only one of the 31-man group was captured whereas 29 men were killed or committed suicide. One man escaped to North Korea. In the skirmishes on the streets of Seoul, 31 South Koreans were killed and 44 were wounded.

The only survivor, Lieutenant Kim Sin-jo, took a UNC investigative team to the southern boundary barrier fence and showed them where the commandos had cut the hole in the DMZ. He also confirmed that the purpose of the mission had been to assassinate the president and said “I’ve come here to cut off the throat of Park Chung-hee.” Lieutenant Kim was released after one year of intense interrogation by South Korean authorities. Notably, Lerner (2002) quotes an anonymous general who, on August 16, 1968 in *The New York Times*, claimed that “An infuriated ROK population demanded retaliation, and only extreme American pressure prevented North Korean President Kim Il Sung from sparking a second Korean War.”

“Few people,” recalled an American general, “realize how close we came to war on January 21.” James M. Lee (1971) points out that war did not break out since the signatory powers of the 1953 Armistice Agreement wanted to maintain the status quo, not start a new war.<sup>162</sup> The Blue House raid was the second incident after the September 5, 1962 exchange of gunfire along the MDL that could have caused a new war (cf. pp. 156-7). Lieutenant Kim’s account indicates that the assassination attempt was sanctioned by the North Korean government, presumably with the purpose of creating instability.

On January 22, the UNC requested a MAC meeting to be held the next day. The UNC accepted the North Korean demand to meet one day later. On January 23, a North Korean Navy patrol boat forcibly boarded and illegally seized in international waters off Wõnsan an American intelligence vessel, the USS Pueblo, that had departed from Japan on January 8 with a 83-man crew. According to the South Korean journalist Yi Chõng-hun (2006), the Pueblo had been detected the day before by a patrol aircraft when it was 11.8 nautical miles off the North Korean coast, but it sailed rapidly away towards Japan. Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery (1970) calls the seizure “...a flagrant act of piracy.”

The Pueblo, built in 1944, was scheduled to return to Japan on February 4 but, according to Lerner (2002), the mission had under-

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<sup>162</sup> Downs, op. cit., pp. 121-2; Lee, *Han’guk t’ongil munje-e issõ-sõ kunsya chõngjõn wiwõnhoe-ga kajin’in yõk’har-e kwanhan yõn’gu* (Seoul: Hanyang taehakkyo taehak-wõn, 1971), p. 15; “Wigi-õi 1968nyõn” ([http://www.donga.com/docs/magazine/new\\_donga/9804/nd98040170.html](http://www.donga.com/docs/magazine/new_donga/9804/nd98040170.html)), p. 2; op. cit., 2001(a), pp. 17-18; Lee, “What would Jesus do to North Korea” (<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/JB27Dg01.html>), February 27, 2008; Lerner, op. cit., pp. 60, 249: fn. 46. Original quotation marks, except the first quotation from Lerner, *ibid.*, p. 60. In 2008, Kim Sin-jo (67) was “...a faithful disciple of Jesus” (Lee, *ibid.*, February 27, 2008).

estimated its risks. His view is shared by Gallery, who writes that the Pueblo was regarded as a “minimal risk mission.” However, the Naval Security Agency had sent a warning to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the mission might not be a “minimal risk” as they had declared it to be, but the warning only reached the lower staff levels and none of the chiefs. Lerner records warnings made by the North Koreans, among which the one given on January 20 at the 260th MAC meeting requested by the KPA/CPV is worth quoting:

“It is quite obvious that if one continues, as you have done, the provocative act of dispatching spy boats and espionage bandits to the coastal waters of the other side under the cover of naval craft, it will only result in disrupting the armistice and inducing another war....We have the right to make a due response to your thoughtless play with fire. We will fully exercise our rights.”<sup>163</sup>

According to Lerner, the warning had not been reported to Washington when the Pueblo was seized. He also records that the officers and the crew were “... somewhat unprepared.” There were also problems in communications and defence. Gallery writes “...that no one on the Pueblo had ever given serious thought to the idea that they might be boarded and captured.” He regards the failure to “...conceive of piracy as being an even remote possibility” as the main blunder with regard to the Pueblo debacle.

The ship that lay still in the sea would, according to Mobley

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<sup>163</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 122, 304: fn. 7; Gallery, *The Pueblo Incident* (New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1970), pp. 2, 12, 13; Hong, “Wigi sog-ûi chôngjôn hyôp-chông - P’uebûllo sakôn-gwa P’anmunjôm tokki sarhae’ sakôn -,” *Yôksa pip’yông* (no. 63), 2003, p. 59; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, p. 143; Lee, *ibid.*, 1998(c), p. 2; Lerner, *ibid.*, pp. 1, 17, 27, 61; Yi, *op. cit.*, May 2006, pp. 161, 169. Original quotation marks except the first quotation from Gallery.

(2003), sample the electronic environment of North Korea's east coast, determine the nature and extent of North Korean naval activity, conduct surveillance of Soviet naval units in the Tsushima Straits, determine Soviet and North Korean reactions to an overt intelligence collector, report the deployment of Soviet and North Korea units and, finally, evaluate its own capabilities. Lerner records that the two main objectives were to monitor and collect North Korean and Soviet electronic communications such as radar, sonar and radio signals and to study naval activity off the ports of Ch'ôngjin, Sôngjin, Mayangdo, an island with a submarine base below Sôngjin, and Wónsan, all of which were among the North's largest ports.

Gallery describes the Pueblo as an electronic intelligence ship with a mission "to snoop as close as the law allows to an 'adversary's' coast and gather data on radar and radio transmissions." Kim (2003) regards the Pueblo incident as the most serious armistice violation at sea during the 1960s. According to the South Korean scholar Hong Seuk-Ryul (2003), the seizure of the Pueblo caused fears of a new war. Gallery (1970) quotes US Admiral Grant Sharp, who said with regard to the failure to act after the capture: "It might have resulted in another major Korean war." Lee (1998c) points out that for the UNC this incident, along with the Blue House raid, was the most serious since 1953.<sup>164</sup> The Pueblo affair became the third incident after the September 5, 1962 exchange of gun fire along the MDL and the Blue House raid that could have caused a new war.

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<sup>164</sup> Gallery, *ibid.*, pp. 2, 13-14, 94; Hong, *ibid.*, pp. 57, 60; Kim, *op. cit.*, 2003, pp. 184-5; Lee, *ibid.*, 1998(c), p. 2; Lerner, *ibid.*, pp. 1, 17, 62, 68, 72-3, 92; Mobley, *op. cit.*, pp. 25, 55. "Adversary's" and the final quotation are original from Gallery, *ibid.*, pp. 2, 94.

According to Downs (1999), on the afternoon of January 23, a North Korean patrol torpedo boat approached the American intelligence vessel more than 16 nautical miles from the coast. In fact, Lerner points out that the Pueblo was ordered to stay 13 nautical miles from the coast at all times. In contrast, Hong writes that the North Koreans claimed that the Pueblo's position was 7.1 nautical miles from the coast, in violation of the 12-mile territorial water limit. Using international signal flags, the North Koreans requested the Pueblo's nationality. Upon identifying herself as American, the North Korean vessel signalled: "Heave to or I will open fire." The Pueblo's response was: "I am in international waters. Intend to remain in the area until tomorrow." An hour later, three more North Korean patrol craft approached the Pueblo. The leading torpedo boat signalled: "Follow in my wake - I have a pilot aboard." After North Korean boats had taken up positions alongside the Pueblo and fired warning shots, armed North Korean sailors boarded her. At the same time, there were also MIG planes in the air above.

At 1.45 p.m., the Pueblo radioed Yokosuka naval base that North Koreans were on board. When North Korean marines boarded the Pueblo, the crew began to urgently destroy secret materials. When at 2 p.m., the captain, Commander Lloyd Mark Bucher, ordered the engines stopped, the leading North Korean patrol boat turned and opened fire. The other torpedo boats also raked the ship with machine-gun fire. Fireman Duane Hodges died from his wounds and four men were wounded. At 2.10, the Pueblo reported being "requested" to sail to Wönsan, where she would be taken into port within six hours of being boarded. At 2.32, Commander Bucher reported that he was going off the air; the Pueblo had surrendered without a fight.

North Korea released a photo that showed the ship's officers and crew in a forced march with their hands in the air. Although the American reaction was anguished, few advocated war, not least since the US was hard pressed in Vietnam, a weakness that North Korea sought to exploit. The South Korean public was irritated that concern for the crew overshadowed the assassination attempt on President Park Chung Hee and the deaths of innocent civilians.<sup>165</sup>

According to Hong (2003), most US officials believed that the Pueblo had been captured on the open sea, but they were not completely confident that it had been outside North Korea's territorial waters during the operational period of January 10-21.<sup>166</sup> Lee (2001a) records the exact position as 39 degrees 25 minutes North, 127 degrees 54 minutes East, that is on the open sea at least 16 nautical miles from the coast. Notably, Lerner (2002) records that Commander Bucher asserted in 1970 that if he had been informed about the Blue House raid, he would have kept the Pueblo much further out from Wonsan. But Lerner also writes: "The navy and the Johnson administration insisted that the Pueblo had been in international waters for the entire mission." Hong argues that the seizure was a great insult to the US Navy,

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<sup>165</sup>- Downs, op. cit., pp. 122-3; Gallery, *ibid.*, p. 116; Hong, *ibid.*, p. 59; Lerner, *ibid.*, pp. 2, 68, 76, 81; Mobley, *ibid.*, p. 40. Original quotation marks.

<sup>166</sup>- The issue is still debated: on January 23, 2008, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA: <http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm>) reported in "U.S. Forgets Pueblo Lesson" that the Pueblo while spying on military and state secrets had intruded into North Korean territorial waters up to 7.6 miles from Yô Islet near Wonsan. The U.S. imperialists claimed that the Pueblo was seized in the "open sea" [original quotation] and did not commit an espionage act. KCNA wrote the same day in "U.S. Urged to Draw Lesson from "Pueblo" Incident" that at a visit to the ship, the chief of the P'yôngyang mission of the Anti-Imperialist National Democratic Front, Jo Il Min, stated that "... "Pueblo" is historical evidence proving before the whole world the victory of the DPRK in the confrontation with the U.S. to protect its national sovereignty and dignity."

which had not suffered a seizure in international waters since 1815 when the British navy seized the USS *President* outside New York.

On January 24, four meetings on how to handle the crisis were held in the US. Opinions among high officials were divided between those who advocated retaliation, including the kidnapping of North Korean ships, and those who preferred negotiations. The US government chose the latter, not least since the country was involved in the Vietnam War; it was clear that the US could not expect to win the war, which had led to a nation-wide anti-war movement. Nonetheless, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *Enterprise* that was heading for Vietnam was immediately brought into the area to put pressure on North Korea. According to Mobley (2003), "...the United States prepared for war while seeking to avoid it. The build-up was costly because it diverted assets needed in Vietnam. Naturally, the DPRK urged the United States to end the military pressure." Two other aircraft carriers were also brought into waters close to the Korean peninsula and fighter planes were moved from Japan to bases in South Korea. On January 28, there were, including planes on ships, 155 fighter planes in the Korean peninsula and the surrounding waters.<sup>167</sup>

At the 261st MAC meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on January 24, the US made it clear that it was deeply concerned about the January 21 commando attack. The UNC/MAC Senior Member, Rear Admiral John V. Smith, first focused on the assassination attempt on President Park Chung Hee. He charged North Korea with killing and wounding South Korean civilians and national police officers on the

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<sup>167</sup>- Hong, *op. cit.*, 2003, pp. 59-60; Lee, *op. cit.*, 1998(c), p. 5; *op. cit.*, 2001(a), p. 19; Lerner, *op. cit.*, pp. 60, 82, 86, 239; fn. 1; Mobley, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

basis of the report by the Ministry of National Defence and the confession of the apprehended commando Kim Sin-jo, which was included in the video shown. The Admiral emphasized that North Korea bore official responsibility for the attack on the Blue House and quoted from a speech by Kim Il Sung on December 16, 1967, in which he had said: “We must accomplish the South Korean revolution, unify the fatherland in our generation and hand down a unified fatherland to the coming generations. We must quickly make all conditions ripe for the realization of the unification of the fatherland” (cf. p. 147: fn. 121).

When the Pueblo incident was subsequently raised, the UNC/MAC charged North Korea with having illegally seized the ship in international waters. It urged the immediate return of the ship and its crew and an apology for the illegal seizure. Admiral Smith then delivered the American government’s official message to North Korea:

“The events of last year, and especially the last few days, have put a new complexion on the situation in Korea. The North Korean regime has embarked on a campaign of provocation, sabotage, and assassination in violation of the Armistice Agreement and international law. The Republic of Korea and the U.S. threaten no one. If the North Korean regime persists in this campaign, which can only endanger the peace in this area, the responsibility of the consequences will rest with the North Korean regime.”<sup>168</sup>

The KPA/CPV Senior Member, Major General Pak Chung Kuk, a member of the Korean Workers Party Central Committee, flatly denied the assassination charges. He said that the perpetrators were in fact “South Korean people who are rising up against the US imperialist

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<sup>168</sup> Downs, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-4; Kim, *op. cit.*, 2003, pp. 183, 186; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 18-19. Lee (*ibid.*, 2001(a), p. 19) records the message in Korean. Original quotation marks.

aggressors.” The “South Korean people, who have risen up in the anti-U.S. patriotic struggle,” he dissembled, “are carrying the fight to the Blue House located in the heart of Seoul.” He claimed that the “patriotic struggle of the South Korean people” had nothing to do with the Armistice Agreement. He said that North Korea could unify the country in a generation referring to the “unanimous desire” of the 40 million Korean people “to wipe out the U.S. imperialist aggressors.”

The general claimed that US President Lyndon Johnson had visited South Korea in October 1966 to provoke a new war. He claimed UNC military provocations against North Korea had been more frequent, extensive and vicious every day and charged “US. imperialist aggressors are massacring South Korean people who are out for the unification of the country and nation.” He insulted his UNC counterpart by calling him a “mad dog” and asserted that President Johnson would “meet the same fate as that of Kennedy.” About the Pueblo, he accused the US of the “most overt and serious aggressive act on infiltrating an armed spy ship of the U.S. imperialist aggressor navy into our coastal waters on January 23” and elaborated that:

“Around 1215 hours, your side committed crude aggressive act of illegally infiltrating the armed spy ship of the U.S. imperialist aggressor navy equipped with various weapons and all kinds of equipment necessary for espionage activities into our coastal waters off Wonsan in the vicinity of 39 degrees 17 minutes North, 127 degrees 46 minutes East. The armed spy ship...intruded further deep into our coastal waters and committed intolerable provocation against our side. Our naval vessels which were carrying out their routine patrol duty in our coastal waters returned the fire of the piratical group which intruded deep into our coastal waters and insolently made resistance, thus, killing and wounding several soldiers of the U.S. imperialist navy and capturing 80-odd of them alive.”<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>169</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 124-5; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 20-21. Original quotation marks.

The general finally demanded that the UNC admit the “aggressive act” committed by the US Navy “armed spy ship,” apologize for it, severely punish those who were responsible for it and assure that it would not commit such provocation again. North Korea reiterated the same demand in public and private sessions of the MAC while the Pueblo negotiations went on. Admiral Smith regarded this distorted version of the incident as an intention to divert attention from the assassination attempt of President Park Chung Hee and the seizure of the Pueblo. Major General Pak responded that the UNC could not evade discussion of the Pueblo’s espionage attempts and urged that the UNC/MAC Senior Member return with an answer to the North’s charges at the next meeting.

Admiral Smith reminded him that an official communication from the US government had already been presented that was intended for immediate transmission to Kim Il Sung. Meanwhile, only two days after the Pueblo had been seized, Radio P’yôngyang announced that Commander Bucher had presented a written confession that his ship:

“spied on various military installations ... along the east coast areas and sailed up to the point 7.6 miles off Yo-do...intruded deep into the territorial waters of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and was captured by the naval patrol craft of the Korean People’s Army in their self-defence action...and we only hope...that we will be forgiven leniently by the Government of the DPRK.”<sup>170</sup>

The swift confession surprised the US. The prevailing opinion was that it probably came due to torture. While the general opinion in the US was for diplomatic action, domestic pressure mounted for

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<sup>170</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, p. 125. Original quotation marks.

retaliation. Considering the game theory, the likely evaluation was that the tense situation created an opportunity to reduce tension through negotiations. Moreover, South Koreans were uncomfortable about American powerlessness against a third-rate power. Prime Minister Chung Il Kwon urged massive retaliatory action and warned that a lukewarm US attitude would encourage North Korea to mount a new war, but the US excluded retaliation since it might have endangered the crew.

On January 26, President Park Chung Hee ordered the First Army into full combat status. In February, the National Assembly passed a resolution expressing “national indignation” at President Johnson’s decision to resolve the issue through MAC talks. On February 8, President Park Chung Hee denounced moving the Enterprise to the south, arguing that it should have gone north toward Wōnsan. He argued that the US should have closed Wōnsan Harbour until the North returned both the ship and the crew. If unsuccessful, the US should have gone in to take the Pueblo by force; neither the Soviet Union nor China would have interfered. South Korea’s leaders were also appalled that the US had not retaliated for the Blue House raid on January 21 either, as they themselves had desired (cf. p. 203).<sup>171</sup>

To reduce tension, special envoy Cyrus Vance was sent to Seoul to meet with the South leaders between February 12 and 15. The mission secured President Park Chung Hee’s agreement not to retaliate for the Blue House raid or impede the Panmunjom talks, providing they did not drag on for months. Owing to American priorities in the

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<sup>171</sup>— Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 126, 146; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), p. 26; *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 12; Lerner, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-2; Mobley, *op. cit.*, p. 76. Original quotation marks.

Vietnam War, President Johnson was cautious. Retaliation might also have endangered the crew. His first step was to ask the Soviet Union to put pressure on North Korea for the release of the *Pueblo* and its crew but Moscow declined. Subsequently, pressure was raised with a limited call-up of air units and presentation of the American case at the UN. In a speech held moments before the UN Security Council met on January 26, the President had pledged that he worked for a diplomatic solution while preparing militarily for “any contingency that might arise in Korea.” North Korea’s piracy was labelled a “wanton and aggressive act.”

The US Ambassador to the UN, Arthur Goldberg, called on the Security Council to act immediately lest the US be forced to seek “other courses which the UN charter reserves for Member States,” an indirect reference to military action. He pointed out in the Council that the *Pueblo* had all the time stayed at least 13 nautical miles from the North’s coast. The Ambassador asserted that a North Korean submarine that had intercepted the *Pueblo* had reported its location in international waters and recommended that the Security Council promptly call for the safe return of the ship and her crew. The Soviet Ambassador responded on behalf of North Korea that the dispatch of a spy ship into the North’s territorial waters had violated national sovereignty as well as international law. The detention of the vessel was within the jurisdiction of North Korea and not an issue for the Security Council. The meeting was adjourned without having reached any result.<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>172</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 126-7, 130; Hong, *op. cit.*, 2003, pp. 59-60; Lee, *op. cit.*, 1998(c), p. 5; *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 11-12; Mobley, *ibid.*, pp. 76-7. Original quotation marks.

According to the Swedish NNSC Delegation's report from March 1968, owing to the US demand to return the Pueblo expressed at the January 24 MAC meeting and the subsequent military build-up, the delegation realized that the situation had become very urgent. The impression was that the Americans were serious and that it was important to make the North Koreans realize how urgent the situation was. On January 26, Delegation Chief, Major General Gunnar Smedmark, contacted his Swiss colleague, Major General Pierre Barbey, who expressed the same views. Major General Barbey also based his opinion on a previous statement by the UNC Chief of Staff that the North Koreans should not believe that the US, in spite of the war in Vietnam, lacked resources to pursue a war in Korea too.

The Czech and Polish members were informed the same day after the NNSC meeting. Both members had contacts with Major General Pak in Kaesŏng the same day and their respective embassies in P'yŏngyang the following day. On January 26, Admiral Smith in a letter urged the NNSC members as mediators to try to find out the health status of the Pueblo crew and the names of the killed and wounded. The request was directed to the Czech and Polish members. The Czech member announced that the general was willing to discuss the issue if he would only be given an explanation why the ship had operated in North Korean territorial waters. On January 27, the members declared that North Korea was willing to negotiate over the Pueblo if the Americans would stop "shaking fists" and demanded direct negotiations through the joint duty officers without going through the NNSC. North Korea threatened that if military power was mobilized to get the ship and the crew back, the KPA would respond militarily and the US would only get dead bodies in return, but it

would accept negotiations on the issue. It also declared that the crew were in very good shape.<sup>173</sup>

On January 29, the Swedish and Swiss members told Admiral Smith that the time was ripe for negotiations; the opportunity should not be hindered by procedural issues. The admiral declared on the same day that the UNC was willing to negotiate. On January 31, North Korea announced that the Pueblo issue could be resolved through the MAC. On February 1, the US State Department declared that it accepted North Korea's proposal to handle the case through US-North Korean talks held under MAC auspices; such talks had been an objective for the North.

Since the private negotiations were guided throughout the whole process by the US State Department, not the UNC, causing severe protests from South Korea, NNSC participation was covered up, as was the North's demand that the role of the NNSC to create contacts should not be mentioned. On February 2, the first US-North Korea private meeting at the General level was held in the NNSC conference room (a staff officer and a translator also took part). The US had requested closed meetings, 29 of which altogether were to be held. Admiral Smith stated the US position that the Pueblo had not entered the North's territorial waters, offered no resistance and that the crew had committed no illegal act. In the interests of both sides, the immediate return of the ship and the crew was urged. Major General

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<sup>173</sup>- Lee, *ibid.*, 1998(c), p. 6: *op. cit.*, 2001(a), pp. 28-9; *NNSC Chief Delegates - List Updated April 14, 1997*; Swedish Group NNSC, *Slutrapport H:10, Underbilaga H 4: NNSC och krissituationen i Korea med anledning av den nordkoreanska raiden mot presidentpalatset 21/1 och Puebloincidenten 23/1* (n. p., March 10, 1968), p. 1: *Slutrapport H:10, Underbilaga H 2 till underbilaga H 4: NNSC och krissituationen 18/1-23/2 1968* (*ibid.*), pp. 1-3. Original quotation marks.

Pak tried to draw out the complete UNC position on the issue by politely and repeatedly asking: “Please tell me all that you want to tell me.” The Pueblo’s mission was referred to as “the most flagrant violation of the armistice agreement” in the first such statement the author has seen by a Korean People’s Army general. The crew were labelled “aggressors and criminals.”

Admiral Smith reiterated that the Pueblo was in international waters all the time, made no resistance and violated no law. His remark that the Pueblo did not belong to the UNC was exploited by the North Koreans, who later insisted that these private talks were actually US-North Korea bilateral negotiations rather than talks between MAC senior members. When Admiral Smith asked for the names of the dead and wounded, Major General Pak declined and said: “I have not yet been instructed to inform your side of it.” The general urged the UNC to admit the intrusion and make an apology. Remarkably, both Downs (1999) and Lee (2001a) point out that the discussions in the closed-door sessions were devoid of the usual propaganda, in sharp contrast to the above accounts of the MAC. Lee argues that since there were no people who could hear the propaganda, it would have no effect to make any propaganda but just waste time.<sup>174</sup>

At the second meeting held on February 4, Major General Pak complained that the US not only failed to apologize for the intrusion by the Pueblo but also threatened North Korea by deploying “war ships, fighters and bombers in the East Sea [the Sea of Japan].” The general told the American representative to “eliminate the atmosphere

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<sup>174</sup>- Downs, op. cit., pp. 128-9; Kim, op. cit., 2003, p. 186; Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), pp. 19, 29-30, 32-3; Lerner, op. cit., p. 143; Swedish Group NNSC, *ibid.*, pp. 1-2: *ibid.*, p. 3. Original quotation marks.

of compulsion” it had created by dispatching the Seventh Fleet (specifically Enterprise) into the East Sea, introducing “numerous fighters and bombers into the ROK” and putting American and Korean troops in the South on alert. He regarded Admiral Smith’s previous claim that the Pueblo did not belong to the UNC but to the Pacific Forces as acknowledgement that the case should have been handled directly by the two governments rather than through the MAC machinery. Major General Pak proposed that the governments should appoint representatives to bilateral talks rather than the MAC senior members. Admiral Smith claimed that he represented both the MAC and the US government and was authorized to discuss the issue within the MAC. No progress took place at this meeting either.

One day later, South Korean newspapers reported that North Korea had agreed to return the Pueblo crew upon receipt of an official “letter of apology” which the US had agreed to sign, admitting the intrusion into North Korean territorial waters. At the fourth private meeting held on February 7, Major General Pak asserted that the talks should be formal or official meetings on a government level, but the American government’s position was that they were meetings between the two sides’ Commanders. Major General Pak submitted a list of the names of the killed and wounded to Admiral Smith. At this time, the South Korean government had requested “open” MAC sessions with participation from South Korea; it was concerned that the MAC senior members were appearing to negotiate bilaterally as equal partners. South Korea strongly protested to the US government for having held the fourth private meeting while its government still awaited a US response to its previous demand for participation. The government resented: “Holding a secret dialogue in South Korea with the enemy

North Korea without South Korea's participation is an act of disregard for sovereignty" and demanded in any negotiation "to handle intrusion incidents of communist guerrillas and the Pueblo incident equally."<sup>175</sup>

It delivered a memorandum protesting US appeasement policies towards North Korea. Not only the South Korean government but also the press expressed concern regarding the exclusion of South Korea from the dialogue. There were concerns that this bilateral channel could be misused by North Korea to obtain de facto recognition of its regime or to enhance its prestige worldwide. Consequently, President Johnson, in a letter to President Park Chung Hee, pledged continuing assistance for the security and defence of South Korea. The South Korean government agreed not to oppose the closed talks to release the crew while the US promised to keep the South informed about the talks.

The following several private US-North Korea sessions held throughout February brought no results. The US suggested holding an impartial inquiry of the Pueblo case after the return of the ship and the crew, followed by a public announcement of its results, but North Korea refused. North Korea maintained its demand from the January 24 MAC meeting that the US must tender a "letter of apology" for the return of the crew. The negotiations came to a stalemate at the eighth meeting held on February 20. Informed by Major General Pak, the Czech and Polish NNSC members proposed with his support that the crew should be exchanged for "South Korean patriots" in the South's prisons; if so, the US would not have to apologize for the incident. It was assumed that the US would accept the proposal. The proposals were

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<sup>175</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 129-130; Hong, *op. cit.*, 2003, p. 61; Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, p. 186; Mobley, *op. cit.*, p. 75; Swedish Group NNSC, *Underbilaga H2*, p. 4. Original quotation marks.

presented by the Czech and Polish members at an informal meeting with their Swiss counterpart on February 22. It was requested that the Swedish and the Swiss members should approach the US. To restart negotiations, the members submitted without any comments the proposals on the same day. The US reaction was, as expected, negative; the proposal was regarded as “quite impossible” due in particular to the relations with South Korea. No progress was made during March either.<sup>176</sup>

Meanwhile, three days after the Enterprise had steamed north, North Korean MiGs scrambled from Wõnsan to try to locate the ship and its auxiliary vessels; the deployment of the Enterprise battle group meant that the US could retaliate with little warning. During February, Major General Pak often threatened to terminate the private meetings of the MAC senior members unless the USS Enterprise and its escort vessels were removed from “Korean waters,” but negotiations continued. General Pak informally expressed to the UNC North Korea’s willingness to settle the incident through dialogue if the US would negotiate rather than threaten North Korea by showing force. He also threatened that “only bodies” would be returned if force was used in an attempt to free the crew.

Admiral Smith’s response was that the US would continue to pursue a prompt and peaceful solution to the problem. The dual US approach to preparing militarily while pursuing diplomatic efforts at the UN was alarming to North Korean interests. On February 2, Kim Il Sung sent a laudatory letter to the Navy unit that had seized the Pueblo. He thanked the “men, non-commissioned officers and officers

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<sup>176</sup> Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 130-131, 135; Hong, *ibid.*, 2003, p. 63; Kim, *ibid.*, 2003, p. 186; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), p. 31; Swedish Group NNSC, *Slutrapport H:10*, p. 2. Original quotation marks.

of the 661st Unit of the Korean People's Army" for achieving "brilliant results in the struggle to the military line of self-defence," and he cited their capture of an "armed spy boat" and their assistance to "the armed guerrilla struggle of South Korean revolutionaries." Kim repeated at a celebration of the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army that if the US continued to try to resolve the incident through threats, "it would get nothing but corpses." He added that North Korea did not want war but was never afraid of it.

From late January, North Korea kept America focused on the Pueblo crisis by periodically issuing crew members' "confessions" that, according to Lerner (2002), "...came only after severe beatings and torture." Commander Bucher had "suffered thirty-six hours of severe physical and mental abuse" and capitulated "... only when his captors threatened to shoot his crew in front of him, starting with the youngest member." Lerner also writes: "Virtually every crew member later repudiated their confessions and described the frightening physical and emotional torment they endured before confessing." After Commander Bucher's "confession, admitting the intrusion and espionage," P'yŏngyang Radio Service also broadcast one from the ship's "research officer," Lieutenant Stephen Robert Harris.<sup>177</sup>

He reportedly said: "I admit the crime committed by the armed espionage ship Pueblo and myself in conducting intelligence activities after having entered deep into the coastal waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I apologize for my crime." Many other crew members made similar "confessions" that the Pueblo "intruded

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<sup>177</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 127-8, 131; Lerner, *op. cit.*, p. 88. Original quotation marks but not from Lerner, *ibid.*

deep into North Korean coastal waters and committed criminal acts by conducting espionage activities,” apologizing and begging for leniency. Outside the MAC conference room during the 262nd meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on February 14, with more than a hundred domestic and international newsmen attending, the North Koreans displayed photocopies of “confessions” by five officers of the crew, including Commander Bucher.

The UNC/MAC had called the meeting to charge North Korea with 21 serious violations along the DMZ between January 23 and February 13, including four major attacks in the western sector of the zone. The North criticized the South for having brought tanks and fighter planes into the DMZ during the past week. The UNC/MAC again condemned the assassination attempt on President Park Chung Hee and offered to return the bodies of commandos killed without having to sign a receipt for their return. The North declined, since the commandos would be considered to be South Koreans the moment they crossed the line. While the press was watching, Major General Pak delivered propaganda tirades:

“You are the sworn enemy of the Korean people that has been forcing the national split for as long as more than 20 years. We have never occupied your country the United States even for a single day, to say nothing of 20 years. However, you U.S. imperialist aggressors have been illegally occupying half of our country and committing all conceivable ruthless atrocities for more than 20 years, insisting upon the burglarious allegation that you have to occupy Korea because Koreans commit aggressive acts in Korea.... This is not the place to argue about the struggle of the South Korean people who are waging against you U.S. imperialist aggressors and your stooges...but a place to discuss matters relating to the implementation of the Armistice Agreement.”<sup>178</sup>

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<sup>178</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 131-2; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, p. 144; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 21. Original quotation marks.

The general reiterated that the assassination attempt on President Park Chung Hee had nothing to do with the Armistice Agreement. He attempted to justify the seizure of the *Pueblo* as a “resolute self-defence measure.” He also claimed that the US was taking advantage of the incident to make “full preparations for another war” and create an atmosphere in which hostilities could occur “at any moment.” During the meeting, steps were also taken to outline a solution of the *Pueblo* affair; photographs were displayed of American aircraft that had been forced down in North Korea on March 6, 1958, and May 17, 1963, when they had inadvertently flown into the North’s airspace. The pilots had been returned after the US provided receipts and letters of apology (cf. pp. 57-8, 157-8).

These documents were displayed alongside photocopies of the “confessions” by the *Pueblo* crew, indicating that the UNC should follow past precedents at a time when North Korea could bargain with the lives of 82 innocent American servicemen. At the sixth private session held on February 15 in the NNSC conference room, Major General Pak said: “We will consider returning the crew only when your side apologizes and assures us that it will not commit such criminal acts again.” North Korea wanted a letter of apology similar to that of May 15, 1964 which was signed by the UNC Commander for the return of two US Army helicopter pilots.<sup>179</sup>

At the next private session, Admiral Smith told Major General Pak that the UNC could not accept the validity of the photographs but would welcome resolution of the disagreement by an impartial

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<sup>179</sup> Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 132-3; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), p. 35; *ibid.*, 2004, p. 23. Original quotation marks.

international fact-finding organization, perhaps one named by the International Court, and that such an inquiry could not take place while North Korea still held the crew. At the next meeting held on March 4, Major General Pak dismissed the third-party inquiry and repeated that the demands for the return of the crew would be considered only if the proper apology and assurances were tendered based on the “confessions” of the crew. He played tapes of more “confessions” of the crew and said: “Don’t expect the crew for nothing. Accept our proposal so that we can discuss concrete business-like matters for the return of crew.” Admiral Smith maintained his position not to tender an apology. At the 264th MAC meeting convened on March 7, North Korea again displayed old pictures of the South Korean patrol boat PCE-56 that was sunk in January 1967 and photographs of the American helicopter crew which was forced down in the North in May 1963 with the photos of “apologies” submitted by the UNC Commander and his MAC Senior Member to effect the release of the crew.

On March 10, Radio P’yôngyang domestic service carried a commentary from the party newspaper *Rodong Sinmun* (*Workers’ Daily*) on “How the *Pueblo* case should be resolved” that made the following key points:

“The crewmen of the armed spy ship *Pueblo* are criminals caught in the act of committing a grave crime against our country. Therefore, they should be duly punished by the law of the DPRK. At present the crewmen...are repeatedly imploring the DPRK Government to pardon them leniently, while confessing and apologizing for their crimes. Recently, they [the U.S.] have even been spreading “public opinion” that they would investigate the true facts of the incident after the crewmen are returned, or that some international organization, for instance, the international tribunal, should be delegated to conduct such an investigation....If the U.S. imperialists

should refuse to abandon their present attitude, we will have no alternative but to take some other measures against their crewmen.”<sup>180</sup>

On March 22, both Radio P’yôngyang domestic service and the Korean Central News Agency international service reported that the Pueblo crew sent letters that “unanimously expressed thanks for the leniency of the DPRK government, said their health is good and they are receiving humanitarian treatment from the DPRK government,” and said that their confessions were “from the bottom of their hearts.” The broadcast claimed that the crew asked the US government to “admit the intrusion of the Pueblo into DPRK territorial waters and its espionage acts, ...openly apologize to the DPRK government for this, and guarantee there will be no repetition of such hostile and aggressive acts.” It ended by saying that the North Korean government “may deal leniently” should the US government “tender an apology and give an assurance that it would not repeat similar acts.”

On May 8, the newly appointed UNC/MAC Senior Member, Major General Gilbert H. Woodward, attended his first private meeting (no. 16) with Major General Pak and said: “I am the senior member and represent the U.S. government [on the matter of the *Pueblo*] with full authority.” Major General Pak presented him a draft. The US government would acknowledge the validity of the Pueblo crew’s confessions and the evidence produced by the North’s government that showed the ship was captured by the Korean People’s Army naval vessels in self-defence in its own territorial waters while conducting espionage against North Korea.

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<sup>180</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 133-4; Lee, *ibid.*, 2004, p. 24. Original quotation marks.

It would also apologize for espionage, assure that there would be no more intrusion by US naval vessels and request the North Korean government's leniency for the crew. Major General Woodward noted the demands and repeated that the US would note "confessions" by the crew, respect North Korea's 12-nautical-mile territorial waters and admit that the Pueblo was on an intelligence-gathering mission. He offered to express regret if a third-party investigation would prove that the ship had entered North Korean waters. When a new meeting took place on May 28, the UNC did not agree to the "document of apology and assurance" dictated by North Korea.<sup>181</sup>

On September 17, Generals Woodward and Pak met in a private session. Previously, at the 272nd MAC meeting held on July 8, the North had claimed that the intrusion of Pueblo was evidence of plans for a new war. At the 277th meeting convened on September 5, it asserted that the Pueblo's intrusion was part of the policy to provoke a new war. At the private session, Major General Pak repeated the demand that the US government accept the May 8 draft statement. Major General Woodward asked whether North Korea would simultaneously release the crew if he acknowledged "receipt" of the document prepared by the North. He insisted on "a simultaneous release" of the crew and would be prepared to "acknowledge receipt" on the document with a simultaneous release. An irritated Major General Pak declared: "I already told you... sign the document for the crew." Major General Woodward complained that the May 8 draft did not say what would happen if it were signed. Major General Pak responded that he would

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<sup>181</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 134, 136, 137; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), pp. 36-7; *ibid.*, 2004, p. 31. Original quotation marks. The apology draft appears in Lerner, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

discuss specific arrangements for the return of crew if and when Major General Woodward signed the document. Major General Woodward cautiously repeated that he would acknowledge “receipt” of the document, but he did not agree to sign the document, so no agreement was reached.

At a new private meeting held on September 30, Major General Pak agreed to the “simultaneous release” but reiterated the conditions for releasing the crew and presented for Major General Woodward’s signature a written document identical to the May 8 draft. While welcoming it, Major General Woodward asked how soon the crew could be released if he agreed to “acknowledge receipt of the document.” At a new (23rd) meeting held on October 10, Major General Pak noted Major General Woodward’s agreement to sign the document prepared by North Korea. He proposed that the document be signed at the NNSC conference room where the private meetings had been held, at 11 a.m., on the day the crew was returned, that it would be signed in Major General Pak’s presence with three photographers taking pictures of the event, that the crew must walk across the “Bridge of No Return” two hours after the document had been signed and that the whole operation would be conducted before the press. Major General Woodward replied that he would refer the procedures for the return of crew to his superiors. He planned to “acknowledge the receipt of the crew on the document prepared by North Korea, but not sign the document itself.” Before the meeting ended, Major General Pak exclaimed: “Who are you fooling? No apology and no assurance - and no crew!”<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>182</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 138-9; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, pp. 244, 246;

At the following private (24th) meeting held October 23, the general reiterated North Korea's demands and his strong objection to the US proposal to "acknowledge the receipt of crew" on the draft document. Major General Woodward indicated his distaste for the document prepared by the North and urged Major General Pak to reconsider the US proposal. He questioned why Major General Woodward wanted to write additional words on the document when everything was "already written on it." He held up the document and asked where the additional words would be placed. Major General Woodward said he would write "acknowledge" on the face of the document, diagonally across the text. Major General Pak angrily told him to come back to the meeting when he was ready to sign. At a private meeting called by the UNC held on October 31, Major General Woodward asked his counterpart if North Korea still objected to UNC procedures. Major General Pak asked his counterpart if he had called the meeting "to waste time," and added, "If you don't sign, the crew will pay. No alternatives." After the meeting had concluded after 15 minutes, no private meetings were held throughout November and the first half of December.

On December 17, Major General Woodward met Major General Pak privately in the NNSC conference room to present a new UNC proposal. He proposed a receipt clause to read: "Simultaneous with the signing of this document, the undersigned acknowledges receipt

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Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, p. 148; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), p. 37. Original quotation marks. The "Bridge of No Return" got its name when prisoners-of-war were exchanged after the war since it was impossible to return after having crossed the bridge. The real name is Sach'on Bridge. From Downs, *ibid.*, p. 151; Kim, "Pundan-ti sangjing," 2004(11), p. 45.

of 82 former crew members of the *Pueblo* and one corpse” to be inserted at the end of the document solely dictated by the North Korean government. He also suggested that the following statement would be read into the record before the document was signed to repudiate its contents and clarify that it was signed solely to free the crew:

“The position of the United States Government with regard to the *Pueblo*, as consistently expressed in the negotiations at Panmunjom and in public, has been that the ship was not engaged in illegal activity, that there was no convincing evidence that the ship at any time intruded into the territorial waters claimed by North Korea, and that we could not apologize for actions which we did not believe took place. The document which I am going to sign was prepared by the North Koreans and is at variance with the above position, but my signature will not and cannot alter the facts. I will sign the document to free the crew and only to free the crew.”<sup>183</sup>

After Major General Pak had asked for an hour’s recess to report this new US proposal to P’yŏngyang and receive further guidance, he returned to the meeting and proposed the next meeting two days later. At the meeting on December 19, North Korea agreed to the Woodward proposal but Major General Pak argued that the US statement could in no way alter the facts in the document. Major General Woodward had to affix his signature immediately above his signature block, not across the text of the document as he had proposed. The document signed by Major General Woodward both in English and Korean on instructions from the State Department on December 23, which was verbally repudiated through the above statement before the signing, read (no. 32):

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<sup>183</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 140, 142-3; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), p. 37: *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 43. Original quotation marks.

**TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S  
REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

The Government of the United States of America,

Acknowledging the validity of the confessions of the crew of the USS Pueblo and of the documents of evidence produced by the Representative of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the effect that the ship, which was seized by the self-defence measures of the naval vessels of the Korean People's Army in the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on January 23, 1968, had illegally intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,

Shoulders full responsibility and solemnly apologizes for the grave acts of espionage committed by the U.S. ship against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea after having intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,

And gives firm assurance that no U.S. ships will intrude again in future into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,

Meanwhile, the Government of the United States of America earnestly requests the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to deal leniently with the former crew members of the USS Pueblo confiscated by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea side, taking into consideration the fact that these crew members have confessed honestly to their crimes and petitioned the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for leniency,

Simultaneously, with the signing of this document, the undersigned acknowledges receipt of 82 former crew members of the Pueblo and one corpse.

On Behalf of the Government of the United States of America  
Gilbert H. Woodward  
Major General, United States Army  
23 December 1968.<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>184</sup>– Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 143-4; Lee, *ibid.*, 2004, p. 46. Lee records the statement in Korean (op. cit., 1998(b), pp. 9-10). Forty years later, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) wrote: "In face of the super stiff attitude of the DPRK determined to answer the "retaliation" of the enemy with retaliation and an all-out war with an all-out war, the U.S. administration was forced to sign a document solemnly apologizing for the espionage and hostile acts committed by its spy ship and giving assurances that it would not let any warship intrude into the territorial waters of the DPRK in the future." From KCNA, "U.S. Forgets Pueblo Lesson" (<http://www.kcna.co.jp/index.e-htm>, January 23, 2008).

Following the signing of the document which, according to Lee (2001a), justified the seizure of the Pueblo, the 82-man crew led by Commander Bucher and the remains of one seaman were, as had been agreed, returned on December 23 two hours later via “the Bridge of No Return.” The crew had travelled from P’yŏngyang via Kaesŏng to the bridge. They returned the following day to San Diego. The crew’s uniforms and possessions were later transferred to the Korean War Memorial Museum in P’yŏngyang. In October 1999, the Pueblo was moved around the peninsula from Wŏnsan on the east coast to the Taedong River in P’yŏngyang on the west coast where it is now a museum and tourist attraction.

On December 23, the spokesman of the North Korean Foreign Ministry said: “This means the ignominious defeat of the U.S. imperialist aggressors and constitutes another great victory for the Korean people.” The Korean Central News Agency explained:

“Today in Panmunjom, the historical place where the U.S. imperialist aggressors sustained a miserable defeat in the war against the Korean people fifteen years ago and, bending the knee before the Korean people, signed an instrument of surrender, focusing the attention of the people the world over once again as the U.S. imperialists knelt to the Korean people and apologized for the incident of the armed spy ship Pueblo.”<sup>185</sup>

The newspaper recorded the full text of the document Major General Woodward had signed but the receipt clause he had insisted on inserting at the end was excluded. According to Downs (1999), several years later an NNSC officer who visited the Korean War

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<sup>185</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 144-5, 305: fn. 55; Holmstedt, *Månadsrapport januari 1972: Bilaga 2* (n. p., February 8, 1972), p. 1; Lee, *op. cit.*, 1998(c), p. 10; 2001(a), p. 39; Lerner, *op. cit.*, pp. 2, 219; Mobley, *op. cit.*, pp. 89, 159. Original quotation marks.

Memorial Museum in P'yŏngyang saw an enlarged picture of the signed document with a photo of Woodward signing it. The North Koreans had doctored the document by removing the last paragraph, that is, the receipt clause; since the US had rejected the document there was no need to make a noise about the manipulation. In America, Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, pointed out that after the US had "made every sort of reasonable offer, all of which were harshly rejected, we had come squarely up against a most painful problem: how to obtain the release of the crew without having this Government seem to attest to a statement which simply is not true." He described the Woodward agreement as "a strange procedure.... Apparently the North Koreans believe there is propaganda value even in a worthless document which General Woodward publicly labelled false before he signed it."

However, the agreement was welcomed with relief by both the US Secretary of State and President Johnson at time when the US wanted to resolve the issue because of the installation of President Nixon in 1969. In contrast, as quoted by Lerner (2003), the South Korean daily *Donga Ilbo* called the agreement "dishonorable" and *Chosun Ilbo* lamented the decision to make "a secret deal... with an insignificant communist group in North Korea instead of punishing them." One South Korean official claimed "The US"... "seems to be engrossed more in the release of the Pueblo crewmen than in the security of the free world." The crew attended naval hearings from January 20-March 13, 1969, but no one was sentenced thanks to the Secretary of the Navy's recommendation in May "...they have suffered enough, and further punishment would not be justified." Commander Bucher asserted that the Pueblo had never entered the twelve-mile territorial

water zone claimed by North Korea and was 15 nautical miles from the coast in international waters when seized. However, the navigator said that the Pueblo had been about four miles inside the 12 nautical miles claimed by North Korea, which caused controversies.

At the NNSC meeting held on December 24, the Commission welcomed the release of the crew. According to the Swiss Lieutenant Colonel Jean-David Bettex (1993), the release of the crew was achieved thanks to the dogged and competent work by the Swiss Delegation Chief, Major General Pierre Barbey, who took charge of the return. Similarly, compatriot Major General Bernard A. Sandoz writes (1993) that the NNSC and, in particular, Major General Barbey played a decisive role in bringing North Korea and the US together to discuss and resolve the crisis. The crisis, along with the Czech and Polish members' neutral attitude and cooperation, resulted in unified actions and better understanding within the Commission.<sup>186</sup>

What were the North Korean objectives behind the Pueblo affair? According to Downs (1999), the ostensible objective of the negotiations had been to obtain an official "letter of apology" from the US government, but the actual objective was more complex: to create friction between South Korea and the US, to incite South Koreans to bring down their government and to humiliate the US, to garner respect from the socialist countries and to spread fear among Western

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<sup>186</sup>- Bettex, "Die Geschichte der Neutralen Ueberwachungskommission (NNSC) für den Waffenstillstand in Korea (1953-1983)," pp. 15, 24; Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 3, 145; Lee, *ibid.*, 1998(c), p. 9; *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 27, 39; Lerner, *ibid.*, pp. 221, 225, 227; Sandoz, "Conclusion," pp. 337, 340; Sergel, *op. cit.*, December 1968, p. 17; Swiss officer, letter May 31, 2006. Original quotation marks. Neither Bettex nor Sandoz record any details of the work by General Barbey. The Secretary of the Navy's statement is recorded in Gallery, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-174.

democracies. The US was compelled to enter into negotiations with North Korea not only to respond to the incident but also to reaffirm the validity of the Armistice Agreement, restore security along the DMZ and win the release of the crew.

According to Lee (2001a), by consistently maintaining its position for eleven months North Korea had achieved its objectives, including raising its position to an equal level as the enemy state the US, which denied his regime's validity and displaying its strength both within and outside its territory. By displaying strength, North Korea drove the US into an awkward position. The Pueblo affair also created disharmony between South Korea and the US. Gallery (1970) writes: "The biggest thing the Koreans got out of the Pueblo's capture was a smashing propaganda victory." He notes that the North Koreans at the time broadcast to the world: "Confronted by the brave sailors of the People's Democratic Republic, the cowardly imperialist warmongers surrendered without even a fight." In addition, "What they wanted was to humble the United States and gain face for themselves in the Orient. This they did, beyond their wildest dreams." Finally, "But taking it as they did was the greatest Oriental victory over the West since Pearl Harbor."<sup>187</sup> The political gains achieved should not be underestimated.

Lerner (2002) records that most of the architects of the Pueblo operation linked the attack to a larger Cold War conspiracy. The view was that North Korea attacked on behalf of the Soviet Union, hoped to aid North Vietnam by diverting American resources before the Tet

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<sup>187</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, p. 118; Gallery, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-9; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 39, 41. Second quotation is original from Gallery, *ibid.*, p. 98.

Offensive launched in late January, and that the North was part of a communist plot to expel the US from Asia. He also points out that at a time when *juche* (self-reliance) "...had become the defining principle of North Korean society" the seizure of the Pueblo was a consequence of "...indigenous North Korean circumstances..." In contrast, Mobley (2003) writes that "The CIA, DIA and State Department rapidly concluded that North Korea had acted independently." The seizure was a result of the wish for unification. The CIA concluded that the seizure of the Pueblo:

"was almost certainly taken as a result of a decision at the highest levels of the North Korean government....It seems likely ...that the North Koreans had identified the ship and her mission at least a day in advance. It is possible that the original intent was only to harass and drive off the Pueblo; the final decision to take the ship into Wonsan may have only been taken when it eventually appeared that U.S. forces were not coming to assist the Pueblo."<sup>188</sup>

The above account shows that North Korea succeeded in creating South Korea-US friction and in humiliating the US, but there are no indications that the incident, along with the assassination attempt on President Park Chung Hee and the Ūlchin-Samch'ŏk raid, had incited South Koreans to bring down their government. That the Pueblo affair did not escalate into war may be explained both by Lee's view that the armistice parties wanted to maintain the status quo, not a new war and by the work of the MAC and the NNSC, although the MAC was largely sidestepped by bilateral North Korea-US negotiations (cf. p. 199). The wish to maintain peace was doubtless an

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<sup>188</sup>- Lerner, op. cit., pp. 99, 103, 117-118, 141; Mobley, op. cit., p. 56.

important “positive symmetry” for the NNSC to base its work upon.

To the author’s knowledge, both sides during the crisis conveyed messages to each other through the NNSC. The pro-North Korean line pursued by the Soviet UN Ambassador is the only sign in the account showing that the Pueblo incident garnered respect from the socialist countries. The author has found no indications that the incident caused fear among Western democracies, comprised part of a larger Cold War conspiracy and occurred as a result of the wish for unification. Instead, it was one aspect of the aggressive policy directed towards the US that also had domestic purposes in a power display. The parties were able to handle the conflict but hardly in a creative way considering that the US had to go as far as admitting a crime that it considered it had not committed only to free the crew.

Generals Pak and Woodward held their final meeting on January 28, 1969. Major General Woodward told his counterpart he hoped Kim Il Sung had learned that violence was not the way to achieve his goals and pointed out that more than 290 young North Korean officers had died due to the government policies during the last seven months of 1968. In fact, after the Pueblo incident, the number of armistice violations at sea fell.

In 1967, North Korea had intruded into South Korea’s territorial waters on 31 occasions involving 86 seamen, 12 in 1968 (152 men) and 25 in 1969 (68 men), but not a single case was reported or detected in 1970. Notably, the writing by the South Korean scholar Young Whan Kihl (1984) that in March 1967 Kim Il Sung had purged two prominent members of his own Kapsan faction within the Korean Workers’ Party due to policy disputes concerning the ineffective policies towards South Korea shows that the aggressive policy was

controversial at the top-political level (cf. pp. 133, 147). Later, the line-up of the Central Committee and the Politburo at the Fifth Party Congress published on November 13, 1970 did not include Vice-Premier and Minister of People's Armed Forces Kim Kwang-hyop, who reportedly was responsible for the failure of the Korean People's Army 124th Special Unit in 1968 in both the Blue House raid and the Ulchin-Samch'ok incident (53 other members were also excluded).

At a press conference held prior to his departure, Major General Woodward repeated that he had signed the document only to free the crew and emphasized that there was no evidence that the Pueblo had been involved in any illegal activities. He denied that any compensation had been paid to get the crew released. Major General Pak also quit his office in early 1969. To the author's knowledge, as the highest North Korean official ever he declared several times at his private farewell dinner for the NNSC in Kaesông that the Commission did important work. The Czech alternate emphasized at the dinner that Major General Pak in particular had sought to supervise the implementation of the Armistice Agreement although, as we have seen, there were more infiltrations and related casualties in 1968 than in any other year. The Head of the Swedish Delegation, Major General Karl Sergel, objected to this view in his report for February 1969 to the Army Chief.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>189</sup> Downs, *op. cit.*, p. 145-6; Kihl, *op. cit.*, p. 47; Kim, *op. cit.*, 2003, p. 187; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 60; NNSC *Chief Delegates - List Updated April 14, 1997*; Sergel, *Månadsrapport för januari 1969* (Panmunjom, January 31, 1969), p. 3; *Månadsrapport för februari 1969* (Panmunjom, February 28, 1969), pp. 9, 10.

### 3.8 Conclusions

Throughout the 1960s, both sides strengthened their military forces in violation of Paragraph 13(d) that the UNC had suspended in 1957. Rearmaments were repeatedly raised at MAC meetings, where both sides accused each other of rearming but neither side made any admissions of rearmaments. The KPA/CPV frequently accused the UNC of preparing war, but there are no indications that either side planned for war. The North frequently raised the question of the withdrawal of American troops, but the South regarded their presence as necessary to deter war and claimed that the issue should not be raised in the MAC. Rearmaments also included a militarization of the DMZ in terms, for instance, of constructing fortifications and laying minefields. In 1961, North Korea signed mutual security treaties with the Soviet Union and China. The US substantially increased military support to South Korea. Militarization raised tension in the Korean peninsula.

The number of armistice violations on land, at sea and in the air grew dramatically throughout the 1960s, elevating the level of “negative peace” to a significantly higher level than during the 1950s; the years 1967-69 have even been called “the Second Korean War.” Both sides repeatedly raised armistice violations at MAC meetings, where the “zero-sum game” continued unabated. However, whereas no solution was reached with regard to most incidents raised, some admissions of violations such as airspace intrusions were made, but all by the UNC/MAC. While most incidents, even those that caused casualties, did not create fears for war, a few did, in particular North Korea’s seizure of the USS *Pueblo* in January 1968, but the concurrent

assassination attempt on President Park Chung Hee also caused great tension. However, since both sides wanted to maintain the status quo and did not want a new war, peace was maintained. A few other incidents, most of which took place on land, were also regarded as very serious, but most were not. The most serious incident in the air was North Korea's shooting-down of the EC-121 in April 1969.

Although the MAC, due to the parties' lack of confidence and trust in each other, did not function as a body to raise armistice violations, as the only body for contacts it still helped to secure peace. Without the Commission, the situation could have been far worse. Although the NNSC's mandate had already ceased to exist in 1956-57, the Commission played an important role as a contact body between the two sides and its members were the only people who could visit both sides. In this way, the NNSC helped to reduce tension. Throughout the 1960s, there were less divisions within the NNSC than during the 1950s, but some contentious issues were raised such as the KPA/CPV demand that the Commission should criticize the South's rearmaments, but this was rejected as being outside the mandate.

In 1968, armistice violations reached a peak with North Korea's assassination attempt on President Park Chung Hee and the seizure of the *Pueblo* as the most outstanding examples. The assassination attempt dramatically raised inter-Korean tension, but in the MAC it was soon overshadowed by the *Pueblo* incident. Whether the *Pueblo* was inside or outside the 12-mile territorial border led to conflict between the US and North Korea, who were the main actors, which aroused criticism from South Korea for being excluded from the private talks that were held. North Korea benefitted from American involvement in the Vietnam War, which had become a growing

burden for the US. Consequently, the US sought a diplomatic solution to the issue that ended with the return of the crew following the signing of a receipt that the US repudiated after having signed it. The NNSC played an important role as a contact body during the Pueblo affair and benefitted in its work from “positive symmetry.”



Chapter 4

*North-South Dialogue and Tension  
during the 1970s*



Peace—keeping in the Korean peninsula

## 4.1 Introduction

Tension in the Korean peninsula grew dramatically throughout the 1960s. In January 1968, the seizure of the USS Pueblo even caused fears for war but peace was yet maintained. Such a situation raises the question whether developments during the 1970s resembled or differed from those in the 1960s. In order to analyze this issue, the first section investigates the NNSC's work on the basis of how a few incidents that occurred in the Joint Security Area (JSA) and requests from the parties to interfere in such issues as rearmaments affected the Commission. In the case of incidents, a few MAC meetings are included.

In the early 1970s, North and South Korea initiated a dialogue. How the dialogue started, in what way it was conducted and what results it brought about are investigated with great consideration given to the interaction between the dialogue and the work by the MAC and the NNSC. Armistice violations that affected the dialogue are included.

Attention is then turned to how rearmaments, North Korea's demand for the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea and militarization of the DMZ that, as we have seen, were contentious issues throughout the 1960s, were handled in the MAC. The section also includes military exercises. The following sections analyze armistice violations at sea and in the air on the basis of a few major incidents that were raised at MAC meetings. Then focus is on the 1976 Panmunjom axe murder as one of the best-known armistice violations. The background of the incident, the course of events and what consequences it brought are analyzed from the perspective of both parties. In particular, the notion that only North Korea is to blame for the incident is critically reviewed. Emphasis is put on the role the MAC and the

NNSC played during the crisis but in analyzing the consequences, explanations of the incident and the global context are included to give a fair and comprehensive view.

The final section deals with the North Korean invasion tunnels under the DMZ found in 1974, 1975, 1978 and 1990. The account includes data on the tunnels, how they were discovered, how the issue was handled at MAC meetings and how the NNSC was involved. Finally, data on armistice violations are recorded to evaluate the state of North-South relations and make comparisons with the 1960s.

## 4.2 The Work of the NNSC

An evaluation of the work of the NNSC since 1953 was made at the Commission's 1,000th meeting held on January 20, 1970, by the Swedish delegate who declared:

“The NNSC initially had a difficult time with internal quarrels and was regarded with suspicion from both sides in Korea. Thanks to persevering work and mutual understanding, the four delegations have succeeded in overcoming the difficulties and thereby also survived. We have continuously had an important task to fulfil - and the task has not become less important during the years that have passed. We are privileged to meet representatives of both North and South Korea as well as of their allies. Maybe in the future we will contribute to change the conditions in Korea so that we will get a unified Korea. But to reach this goal, it is really necessary that our four delegations still maintain the good mutual relations we have today.”<sup>190</sup>

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<sup>190</sup>- Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *Historik över de neutrala ländernas övervakningsskommission i Korea*, p. 33. Original quotation marks.

Nonetheless, the Swedish delegation was reduced to seven men in spring 1970. In 1978, the Swiss delegation was reduced from seven to six men. Previously, it had been reduced in 1966 (cf. pp. 26, 81, 88, 115). The only case when an NNSC officer was injured in service occurred on October 9, 1970. A skirmish occurred between North Korean and UN Military Policemen outside the MAC conference room. When the building was being repaired, painters and guards from the South were attacked by guards from the North, reportedly since the former did not wear the required identification signs.

During the fight, in which eight men were severely wounded, a Swiss Lieutenant Colonel attempted to prevent an UNC soldier who was lying on the ground from further attacks by the North Koreans. The Swiss officer was slightly injured in his arm when a North Korean soldier tried to hit the UNC soldier with a shovel. The soldier was regarded as “non-neutral” by the North and was declared “persona nongrata.” He was sent back and replaced. Later, the North’s liaison officer in the JSA conveyed regrets. All NNSC members were told not to interfere in any incidents. This incident was not the first fight among guards in the area; on July 30, 1969, North Korean guards had knocked down four US Military Policemen and with kicks and blows injured them fairly severely in what apparently was retaliation for previous minor intermezzos. This incident was witnessed by the UNC/MAC Senior Member and members of all countries in the NNSC. At the Security Officers meeting convened on July 31, the parties blamed each other for having begun the fight.<sup>191</sup>

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<sup>191</sup>- Bettex, “Die Geschichte der neutralen Ueberwachungskommission (NSC) für den Waffenstillstand in Korea (1953-1983),” p. 24; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *ibid.*, pp. 32, 33-4; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chôngjon wiwônho: che 4 chip*,

The October 9 incident was raised at the 306th MAC meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on October 17. The KPA/CPV claimed that on October 9 seven Americans without identification signs had obstructed the North's guards in their work. Although they told the Americans to stop, they did not; six men surrounded the North's guards and tried to assault them. In an incident on October 12, one American soldier had not worn an identification sign.

When the North's guards protected him, more than 150 armed hooligans brought clubs and stics etc. and collectively made a deliberate criminal attack on the guards. The UNC/MAC protested against the incidents, which were regarded as pre-planned. On October 9, one officer and six guards from the North had approached four guards from the South on the pretext of taking photos. After the first photo had been taken, another one was requested, but when the UNC, refused fighting broke out in which more than 40 guards from the North took part. Since the South's personnel withdrew to the main headquarters, the attack plan failed. The North's guards then threw cobblestones at the windows. On October 12, while five UNC guards were observing on-going work from beside the NNSC conference room, one officer and two guards from the North approached one of the guards and deliberately took his identification sign. When the UNC responded, more than 30 men from the North gathered. To

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1999, p. 280; Knüsli, "Die Schweizer Korea-Mission," p. 131; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *Swiss Mission to Korea in the Change of Times 1953-1997*, p. 67; Sergel, *Må-nadsrapport för juli 1969*, July 31, 1969, pp. 5-6. Original quotation marks. Security officers meetings are "convened specifically to handle alleged infractions by security guards and other matters regarding the security of personnel within the joint security area." From Downs, *Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy*, p. 103.

protect the guard, 16 guards from the South came out, but the North brought in new men, raising their number to above 80. The North's guards isolated the South's guard and began to beat him with clubs and shovels, but when a reinforcement unit from the South arrived, fighting ended.

These incidents had been verified by the South's investigations and had been witnessed directly by several NNSC members. The UNC/MAC regarded the statement by the KPA/CPV Senior Member 'that UNC guards had got "no more than they deserved"' as an admission of responsibility for the incidents (recall that the North had only admitted two violations in 1953). But when the UNC/MAC proposed measures to preserve security, including keeping the number of guards to the agreed 35 men and disarming them, the KPA/CPV Senior Member refused to receive a written copy. The proposal was immediately rejected; if the UNC followed the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, that would be sufficient to maintain security within the JSA. Nor was there any response to the proposal at the 307th MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on October 23.<sup>192</sup>

During the 1970s as well, requests directed to the NNSC to interfere in certain issues caused tension within the Commission. At the meeting held on October 13, 1970, the Swedish and Swiss members attempted to work out a joint letter to the MAC to "reduce tension in the JSA," but the opinion of the Czech and Polish members was that the issue lay outside the NNSC mandate as long as the MAC or either

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<sup>192</sup>- Ahlström, *Månadsrapport okt 1970: Bilaga 2* (n. p., November 9, 1970), pp. 1-2, 3; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 280-281.

side of it not had made a request. When the NNSC met on October 15, the former delegations decided to send a revised letter to both sides' senior members. At the same meeting, a letter from the KPA/CPV Senior Member that put the whole blame for the October 9 and 12 incidents on the UNC was discussed. It was decided to respond in accordance with established practice, that is, to admit receipt to the addressee and send letters to both sides of the MAC.

The NNSC again failed to reach unity on March 2, 1971 when an invitation from the UNC to inspect the large field exercise "Freedom Vault" to be held on March 3-5 in the vicinity of Osan was discussed. Previously, at the 312th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on February 27, the North had claimed that the exercise was a serious violation of the preamble of the Armistice Agreement and Paragraph 13(d). The UNC/MAC confirmed that the exercise would be conducted. The exercise aimed to protect South Korea's freedom and would not violate the agreement.

The Czech and Polish members argued that the exercise and the input of American troops was a "flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement" and that the NNSC's presence would be an approval. However, the Swedish opinion was that it did not change the strategic situation due to its short duration and limited scope. In a letter received on March 2 from the KPA/CPV Senior Member that condemned the exercise as an armistice violation, he hoped that the NNSC would act against it but, as usual, the Commission acknowledged the receipt, took notice of its contents and put it into the files.<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> Ahlström, *ibid.*, November 9, 1970, pp. 4-5; *Månadsrapport februari 1971: Bilaga 2* (n. p., March 10, 1971), p. 2; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *op. cit.*, p. 34; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 287-8; Holmstedt, *Månadsrapport*

At the meeting convened on April 25, 1971, a letter from the UNC/MAC Senior Member urging the NNSC to participate in an investigation of prisoners-of-war was discussed. Since the Czech and Polish members considered the issue to be outside the mandate, the demand was rejected. The Swedish and Swiss members were willing to raise the issue, but this could not happen without the consent of all the members. Afterwards, the UNC did not bring up the issue again.

Later, on July 6, the Swedish NNSC member pointed out that he and some of his officers, when passing through the JSA, had been “disturbed” by visitors on the northern side who had “shouted slogans” against the Americans, although the North Korean guards had tried to stop them. On July 2, 3 and 4, the Swedish and Swiss NNSC delegates had been the object of the demonstrators’ attention. On those occasions, the crowd, in the presence of the Swedish delegation chief, had encouraged the American soldiers to kill their officers, including the Swedish officers; North Korean guards had failed to prevent them. On July 6, the Swedish member’s intention was only to raise the security issue. If necessary, he hoped to receive support to take measures via the MAC. The Swiss member agreed, but the Czech and Polish members argued that the issue was outside the mandate. The Czech member wanted to hold a vote to determine whether the discussion should continue or not.

When the Swedish chairman of the meeting suggested a short break to allow time to consider the request, the Czech member demanded an immediate vote and was supported by the Polish delegate.

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*mars 1971: Bilaga 2* (n. p., April 7, 1971), pp. 2-3. Original quotation marks. Neither Ahlström (*ibid.*, pp. 4-5) nor Försvarets Läromedelscentral (*ibid.*, p. 34) record the contents of the October 15 NNSC letter.

The outcome was two against and two abstentions - Sweden and Switzerland. An incident similar to that on July 6 had occurred in October 1969, when, during a demonstration arranged by the North, participants shouted “Yankee go to hell!” when they saw a Swiss officer. When a North Korean officer said he was a Swiss NNSC member, one participant shouted “Switzerland go home!” The Swiss officer emphasized that all visitors should be informed in advance how to behave in the JSA.<sup>194</sup>

Prior to the NNSC informal meeting held on April 12, 1971, the Commission had received a letter from the KPA/CPV Senior Member that criticized the UNC for having violated Paragraph 13(d) by introducing an anti-aircraft battalion into South Korea. But it had also received a letter from the UNC/MAC Senior Member on North Korean rearmaments in the form of modern weapons such as MIG-21 planes. The UNC/MAC also asserted that by sending letters to the NNSC the KPA/CPV wanted to involve the Commission in the North Korean propaganda; the KPA/CPV must have been well aware that the NNSC had forwarded letters on Paragraph 13(d) to the MAC.

Consequently, the UNC/MAC urged the NNSC in future, on the basis of the information in his letter, to refrain from discussing letters from the KPA/CPV on the South’s violations of Paragraph 13(d). At the NNSC meeting held on April 13, the Commission decided to send one letter to the KPA/CPV Senior Member to confirm receipt and one to the MAC to say that the letter had been discussed as explained in the protocol. The head of the Swiss delegation asserted that data provided

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<sup>194</sup>- Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *ibid.*, pp. 33, 35; Holmstedt, *Månadsrapport juli 1971: Bilaga 2* (n. p., August 11, 1971), p. 7. Original quotation marks.

on the introduction of new weapons differed; while the KPA/CPV gave no official data, the UNC openly showed what measures had been taken. At the meeting held on April 15, the letter received from the UNC/MAC was discussed. Both the Czech and Polish members sharply criticized the charges of North Korean rearmaments. The argument was that the UNC/MAC, which in 1957 had suspended Paragraph 13(d), was not empowered to make unfounded accusations of violations of this paragraph. Following a long debate, the NNSC decided to recognize the receipt of the letter to the UNC/MAC Senior Member but not let MAC know its contents, in line with praxis on letters received from the KPA/CPV Senior Member.

Later, on July 9, in a letter to the NNSC, the KPA/CPV pointed out the introduction of three F-5 fighters into South Korea. At the NNSC meeting held on July 13, the Swedish delegation chief, with support from his Swiss colleague, argued that such letters received from both sides should be handled equally. The Czech and Polish members rejected this argument since the UNC had cancelled Paragraph 13(d). No unity was reached; the letter was handled in line with established practice. At the meeting held on November 23, a letter from the KPA/CPV which charged the UNC with rearming South Korea and requested the NNSC to forward the letter to the MAC was discussed. The Swiss member refused to meet this request since the letter's contents that derived partly from the media were not confirmed. The Swedish member supported this view. Since the following voting ended 2-2, the letter was not forwarded.<sup>195</sup> The disadvantage

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<sup>195</sup>- Holmstedt, *Månadsrapport april 1971: Bilaga 2* (n. p., May 5, 1971), pp. 2-3: *ibid.*, August 11, 1971, p. 8: *Månadsrapport november 1971: Bilaga 3* (n. p., December 7, 1971).

recorded in Chapter 2 of having an equal number of member countries again created difficulties for their work.

In January 1973, the NNSC, for the first time since February 1972, received a letter from the KPA/CPV protesting against the introduction of weapons and military equipment into South Korea. The letter summarized accusations made during recent MAC meetings and encouraged the NNSC to condemn the UNC. It pointed out that new weapons were continuously brought in and said that such a situation makes “the friendly negotiations” that were held more difficult, not least those by the Red Cross. When the request to intervene was discussed, there were the usual two “camps.” The Swedish and Swiss members argued that there were “improper expressions” that should not be inserted in a letter addressed to the NNSC. Furthermore, the NNSC should not make any political statements at all, but the Czech and Polish members supported the North. The NNSC decided to deliver the issue to the MAC, but the Czech and Polish members would send a separate letter. When the reply from the UNC/MAC Senior Member was discussed in March, the Polish delegate attacked the UNC’s criticism of the North’s rearmaments since they had not been proved. However, after the Swedish and Swiss members had expressed their views, receipt of the letter was recognized and in the reply reference was made to the handling of the issue in meeting protocols.

On September 7, 1973, the NNSC received a letter from the KPA/CPV Senior Member accusing the South of having violated the armistice by conducting military exercises and bringing new and modern war munitions into South Korea. The NNSC was encouraged to take measures against the South. At the meeting held on September 11, the Swedish and Swiss members suggested that the letter should

be recorded, put into the files and a reply sent to recognize receipt, but the Czech and Polish members suggested that a letter should also be sent to the UNC to point out the alleged violations. The letter was also discussed at the meetings convened on September 18 and 25. Later, the alternate Czech member declared that the Czech and Polish delegations would send a letter to the UNC/MAC, which they did. On November 30, the NNSC received a letter from the UNC/MAC Senior Member that was regarded as a reply to the KPA/CPV letter. The UNC tried to point out that the KPA/CPV had also brought in new weapons, violating the Armistice Agreement.<sup>196</sup>

At the 355th MAC meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on October 25, 1974, the North accused the US of having violated the Armistice Agreement by bringing combat materials and nuclear weapons into South Korea, making the country a nuclear base. Criticism was also raised against exercises with missile units just 4.5 kilometers from the DMZ. The North also urged the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops and military equipment and claimed that the UNC, while talking about peace, was making preparations for war. The UNC/MAC replied that the South, due to the North's rearmaments, had been forced to cancel Paragraph 13(d) in 1957. Rearmaments had since continued; the issue was not suitable for the MAC. Exercises that both sides carried out were not regarded as a violation of the armistice.

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<sup>196</sup>- Bruzelius, *Månadsrapport januari 1973: Bilaga 1* (n. p., February 6, 1973), pp. 6-7; *Månadsrapport mars 1973: Bilaga 2* (n. p., April 3, 1973), p. 1; Försvarets Läro-medelscentral, op. cit., p. 36; Ljungdahl, *Månadsrapport september 1973: Bilaga 2* (n. p., October 6, 1973), p. 1; *Månadsrapport oktober 1973: Bilaga 2* (n. p., November 8, 1973), p. 1; *Månadsrapport november 1973: Bilaga 2* (n. p., December 7, 1973), p. 1. Original quotation marks. Ljungdahl (ibid., December 7, 1973, p. 1) does not say what measure was taken with regard to the letter received from the UNC/MAC on November 30.

On October 24, the NNSC had received a letter raising the same issues as at the MAC meeting while expressing hopes that the Commission would seriously discuss the issue, take suitable measures and inform the North about the outcome. At the meeting held on October 25, the Czech and Polish members suggested that the NNSC should send a letter to the MAC, saying that nuclear weapons threaten peace, increase regional tension and seriously impede North-South dialogue. Illegally introduced nuclear weapons should be withdrawn. The Swedish and Swiss members argued that Paragraph 13(d) belonged to the MAC. At meetings held in November, the countries maintained their positions. Since voting ended 2-2, no letter was sent to the MAC.<sup>197</sup>

On June 30, 1975, the 364th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV meeting took place. The North protested against the introduction of nuclear weapons into South Korea but the UNC/MAC referred to its cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) in 1957. The American Major William D. Henderson, Deputy Head of a front-line support unit on the southern boundary line of the DMZ, was sitting on a bench outside the NNSC conference room right next to the MAC conference room waiting for the meeting to end. When the North Korean journalist Pae Soo Dong told him to take away the helmet he had taken off, although there was an empty space beside him, a quarrel broke out.

According to the former UNC/MAC advisor James Lee (2004), the journalist was known as a trouble-maker in the Conference area; he touched the major's head, saying "You are shorter than me" and making indecent gestures. Major Henderson then took his helmet,

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<sup>197</sup>- Gerring, *Månadsrapport, oktober 1974: Bilaga 2* (n. p., November 11, 1974), p. 1; *Månadsrapport, November 1974: Bilaga 2* (n. p., December 9, 1974), pp. 1-2; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 320-321.

stood up and pushed Pae away, who hit him and shouted for help. The major was struck from behind by three-four guards, who began to trample on him, his throat and stomach were severely injured and he lost consciousness. The atrocities that almost killed him continued until the North Korean Security Force Commander arrived. Subsequently, security officers interrupted the fight that had erupted between North and South Korean guards in the vicinity of the incident. Later, Major Henderson had to be operated on in Seoul and he was sent home to the US.

The UNC/MAC delivered a sharp protest against the attack at the 365th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on July 12 and urged the North to strengthen discipline among its guards. The KPA/CPV argued that the major himself was responsible for the incident by having struck the journalist in the face. The guards had only acted in self-defence. In addition, it was the head of the North Korean Security Force Commander who had acted to maintain security and order. The South had planned to use the incident to kidnap personnel from the North; the UNC/MAC should apologize. At the NNSC meeting held on July 15, 1975, a letter from the UNC/MAC Senior Member on the Henderson incident was discussed.<sup>198</sup>

At this meeting, the letter that encouraged the Commission to contribute to maintaining security to the greatest possible extent in the Conference area was discussed. The Czech and Polish members refused

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<sup>198</sup>- Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., pp. 36, 50; Knüsli, op. cit., p. 136; Kuk-pang chôngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chôngjon wiwônho: che 2 chip*, 1993, p. 189; Lee, *JSA - P'anmunjôm (1953 ~ 1994)*, 2001(a), pp. 166-7; *Panmunjom, Korea, 2004*, pp. 177-8; Månsson, *Månadsrapport juli 1975: Underbilaga 2* (n. p., August 4, 1975), pp. 1-2; Yi, "Nampuk pundan gwa P'anmunjôm-ti silch'e," July 1994, pp. 57-8.

for the first time to acknowledge receipt of such a protest letter. In particular, the Swedish member emphasized that such a refusal was serious and could make cooperation with the UNC/MAC difficult. Following long discussions, the Polish member demanded a break. He then said: "Considering the good relations within the NNSC, we are ready to acknowledge receipt of the letter in accordance with the following text." Besides sending a joint acknowledgement to the UNC, it was decided to send a joint Swedish-Swiss letter with a slightly different view to the UNC/MAC Senior Member. A letter was thereafter sent.

Later, on August 12, a letter from the North regarding "continuous flagrant violations of the armistice through a rise in the introduction of atomic weapons into South Korea, that the 'US imperialists' were transforming South Korea into an atomic base and that they were preparing a war against North Korea" was discussed. As previously, the Swedish-Swiss opinion was that the NNSC should acknowledge receipt in a letter to the MAC. The Czech-Polish view was to add an appendix stating that the NNSC's opinion was that the South had violated the armistice and should withdraw its atomic weapons. After drawn-out discussions, a letter was worked out in line with established practice, but the Czech and Polish members wrote a slightly different letter. On October 24, the NNSC received a letter from the KPA/CPV regarding, for instance, the introduction of Harpoon and Pershing missiles into South Korea and the plans to purchase modern jet fighters from the US. It was only decided that a letter acknowledging the receipt should be sent to the addressee.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *ibid.*, pp. 36-7; Månsson, *ibid.*, August 4, 1975, p. 3: *Månadsrapport oktober 1975: Underbilaga 2 till bilaga 1* (n. p., November 3, 1975). Original quotation marks.

On November 11, the Swiss member pointed out that the previous meeting had been disturbed by youths on the northern side shouting “Yankee go home” etc. Since both parties had worked to avoid demonstrations being held in the JSA during MAC meetings, such a practice should also apply to NNSC meetings. Previous disturbances were referred to. On March 2, 1976, a new letter from the North accusing the “US imperialist aggressors” of new armistice violations was discussed. Following drawn-out discussions, a joint letter addressed to the KPA/CPV acknowledging receipt of the letter was formulated. The Czech-Polish proposal to send a letter to the MAC about the letter and its contents was rejected by the Swedish and Swiss delegates, but on this occasion, the Czech and Polish members did not send a separate letter. On August 3, a similar letter was received and was handled in the same way. At the NNSC meeting held on August 17, the Swiss member announced that he had sent a letter to the North to point out the disturbances that had again taken place in the JSA after the discussions that had followed the ordinary NNSC meeting held on August 10. Such demonstrations contribute “only to raising tension in the JSA and should be stopped by those responsible.” The Swedish member expressed his support of the letter.

At the NNSC meeting convened on August 31, the acting Swiss delegate read the North’s reply to his letter. “The assertion that demonstrators on their side had raised tension within the JSA” was denied. Instead, they had behaved as they did since the South’s guards had “provoked” the visitors who then “of their own free will had responded to the insolences” it had nothing to do with the North’s personnel. The KPA/CPV Senior Member also regretted “that the Swiss delegate had sent such a letter to him, although the Swiss delegate well knew what

was going on in Panmunjom.” He concluded: “I hope that you will impartially fulfil your mandate in accordance with the Armistice Agreement and as a member of the NNSC.” On September 28, the Swiss delegate declared that the KPA/CPV Senior Member could not possibly know whether the NNSC’s work had been disturbed by the demonstrations or not.<sup>200</sup>

### 4.3 North-South Dialogue and Armistice Violations

According to Downs (1999), North Korea interpreted the shift in US defence policy in 1969 as a chance to hasten the departure of American troops. The Nixon doctrine, announced on Guam on July 25, 1969, emphasized that Asian countries should pay for their own defence. In January 1970, there were 63,000 American troops, but 20,000 were withdrawn in 1970-1971, in spite of passionate opposition from South Korea. In 1971, US soldiers were withdrawn from the DMZ - except along the road to Panmunjom - and replaced by South Korean forces.

North Korea now stopped armed infiltration and attacks across the MDL in order not to undermine policies it thought might lead eventually to a complete US withdrawal. According to Lee (2004), the number of intrusion incidents was 233 in 1968 but fell to 30 in 1970, 20 in 1971 and just two in 1972. Nonetheless, four American soldiers had been killed in an ambush by armed North Korean intruders in the DMZ on October 18, 1969, but after that US personnel casualties fell.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>200</sup>- Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *ibid.*, pp. 37-8, 39. Original quotation marks.

<sup>201</sup>- Downs, *op. cit.*, p. 173; Kim, “Defence of Korea: American Troops Play Key Role,” *The Korea Herald*, November 22, 1974; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 70; Oberdorfer, *The*

The first North-South dialogue was held in 1971-73. At this time, US-China rapprochement had begun, which made the two Koreas hold talks. The American disengagement from Vietnam seems to have influenced President Park Chung Hee to initiate secret contacts with his North Korean counterpart, Kim Il Sung. Moreover, both Koreas shared mistrust of the US and the Soviet Union due to the common conviction that the superpowers had agreed to divide Korea in 1945 without regard for the wishes of the Korean people. The first-ever bilateral North-South discussions through the North and South Korean Red Cross organizations were held in the NNSC conference room on August 20, 1971, when official letters on family reunions were exchanged at a meeting that only lasted four minutes.

Altogether 25 preliminary meetings focusing on divided families were held there in 1971-72: Panmunjom became for the first time a place for direct North-South dialogue (cf. "spot for dialogue," p. 26). These meetings were followed by seven rounds of full-dress talks in Seoul and P'yŏngyang through Panmunjom from August 29, 1972-July 13, 1973, which were the first inter-Korean intercourse since division. One outcome of the preliminary meetings was that on September 22, 1972, a direct telephone line was opened between the North and South Korean Red Cross liaison offices that were set up in P'anmungak and in the Freedom House respectively. However, while both sides' representatives talked about "Red Cross humanitarianism" and "fraternity," "disguised under the name of Red Cross talks contacts took place between the political systems in North and

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*two Koreas: A Contemporary History*, p. 86; Sjölin, *Månadsrapport för augusti 1970: Bilaga 3* (n. p., September 7, 1970), pp. 1-2.

South Korea that were a battle for reconnaissance.” According to Lee (2001b), North Korea refrained from charging South Korean troops along the DMZ with armistice violations when a dialogue was held 1971-73, but charges against the US forces became more frequent, particularly around the MAC Headquarter’s area, including Panmunjom.<sup>202</sup>

While talks took place, both North and South Korea installed barricade lines for the purpose of defence and warning along their northern and southern boundaries, some of them along the front line. In June 1972, five defence lines along the Seoul-Panmunjom road were almost completed. There were similar installations along an eastern road. Beginning from the north, there was a 20-metre-deep anti-tank ditch consisting of concrete arcades followed by a belt that would presumably be mined and a five-ten-metre-high stone wall. The road could be blocked by blasting arcades holding concrete blocks. A large number of boundary checkpoints were established and fortified as military camp-sites within the DMZ.

At the 317th MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC convened on June 12, 1971, however, the South presented a proposal to revert the DMZ to its original state as a buffer zone through the withdrawal of all heavily armed military forces and the mutual destruction of all fortifications. The zone should be cultivated and used for civilian peaceful purposes. The proposal ended by saying:

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<sup>202</sup> Bailey, *The Korean Armistice*, p. 182; Ch’oe, “Panmunjöm-ül t’onghan Nambukhan kyoryu,” 2002, pp. 90-91, 99-100; Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), p. 113: “History of Korea’s MDL and Reduction of Tension along the MDL and Western Sea through Confidence Building Measures between North and South Korea,” 2001(b), pp. 102-103; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., p. 55; Quinones, “South Korea’s Approaches to North Korea,” pp. 27-8. Original quotation marks.

“This proposal is an earnest attempt by the UNC to reduce tension in the Korean peninsula. All that is necessary is that the Commander of your side agrees to the clearing of the DMZ and to allowing its development for civilian use. If this agreement is forthcoming, this Commission will have played a significant role in moving the Korean people toward peace and unification.”<sup>203</sup>

North Korea categorically rejected the proposal by saying “...all that needs to be done is to demilitarise your (UNC) portion of the DMZ.” By the proposal the UNC tried to conceal its “criminal” acts. The North also claimed that heavy weapons and automatic weapons had been brought into the DMZ on a large scale. At the 319th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on July 29, North Korea countered the proposal by raising seven demands to transform the armistice into peace. They were: a) withdraw US forces, b) cease drawing Japan into South Korea, c) withdraw combat equipment, d) cease armed provocations, e) withdraw and demolish heavy equipment and military facilities from the DMZ, f) interrupt provocative acts within the JSA and g) allow free passage across the MDL. The UNC/MAC rejected the proposal, arguing that it was completely unrealistic and could not serve as a basis for serious discussion. The North also demanded the removal of the South’s fortifications in the DMZ.

While preliminary Red Cross meetings were being held, eleven rounds of secret talks between representatives of the Red Cross were held in Panmunjom from November 20, 1971-March 22, 1972. The parties agreed to hold political talks through visits to P’yŏngyang and

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<sup>203</sup>- Bruzelius, *Månadsrapport juni 1972: Bilaga 1* (n. p., July 11, 1972), p. 6; Holmstedt, *Månadsrapport juni 1971: Bilaga 2* (n. p., July 14, 1971), p. 2; Kim, “1960nyŏndae kunsu chŏngjŏn wiwŏnhoe-wa ‘chŏngjŏn ch’eye,” 2003, p. 181; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001 (b), p. 103. Original quotation marks.

Seoul by Yi Hu-rak, Head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), and Kim Yōng-chu, Head of the Korean Workers' Party Agency for Organized Guidance. Preparations for the political talks that took place in March-April 1972 in P'yōngyang and Seoul were the first ever mutually agreed crossings of the MDL. On April 28, the temporary North-South telephone line became official.<sup>204</sup>

Talks held in P'yōngyang on May 2-5 and in Seoul on May 29-June 1 via Panmunjom led to the July 4 Joint Communiqué that was simultaneously announced by the two Koreas. This communiqué expressed the belief that national re-unification should take place without external interference and peacefully, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems and raised hopes for unity in South Korea. At this time, there were hardly any North Korean armistice violations directed against the South Korean Army and anti-South propaganda was interrupted. In contrast, violations against the US Army and anti-American propaganda continued.

North Korea argued that since the two Koreas had agreed to re-unify peacefully without foreign intervention, there was no excuse for the American troops to remain. Instead, they should withdraw immediately. However, since South Korea rejected the demand for the withdrawal of US forces, which in the South was a taboo issue, North Korea broke off the plenary session of the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) that had begun in October 1972 at the sixth meeting to be held on August 28, 1973, although the KCIA's

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<sup>204</sup>- Ch'oe, *op. cit.*, 2002, pp. 93-4; Hapch'am chōngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 291; Holmstedt, *ibid.*, July 14, 1971, p. 2; *op. cit.*, August 11, 1971, p. 5; Kukpang chōngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, p. 168; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(b), p. 103. Original quotation marks.

abduction of opposition leader Kim Dae Jung in Tokyo was the excuse. Afterwards, North Korea's charges against South Korean troops along the DMZ began to rise but, according to Lee (2001b), more than 95 percent of the charges against the UNC and South Korea concerned minor ones such as armband violations and the presence of heavy and automatic weapons in the DMZ. North Korean armed intrusions and attacks through the DMZ remained relatively few with the exception of a few isolated incidents.

Remarkably, as he had done in 1965 and also in 1973, the Head of the Swedish Army, Lieutenant General Carl-Eric Almgren, argued that Sweden had helped to create relative stability in Korea since 1953. In a state of tense relations between the parties which maintained fixed positions, even such a limited channel of communication as the NNSC was significant. Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Poland as well as the war combatants on both sides entirely shared this view. In July 1971, North Korea repeatedly expressed the importance of the NNSC when two Swedish members made a study visit to P'yŏngyang. In October 1972, the Head of the Swedish NNSC delegation, Major General Magnus Bruzelius, wrote in his report for September to the Chief of the Army that on both sides the Commission's presence was presumably regarded as being advantageous. About the MAC, Lee wrote in 1971 that the opinion of a great number of UNC/MAC Senior Members opinions was that by handling armistice violations it had helped to prevent the outbreak of a new war.<sup>205</sup> Their opinion should be

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<sup>205</sup>- Almgren, "Med mitt mått mätt," *Yoboseyo* (June 1973), no. 2, p. 8; Bruzelius, *Månadsrapport september 1972: Bilaga 3* (n. p., October 3, 1972); Ch'oe, *ibid.*, 2002, pp. 94, 95; Downs, *op. cit.*, p. 179; Holmstedt, *ibid.*, August 11, 1971, *Bilaga 4*, pp. 1, 4; Lee, *Han'guk t'ongil munje-e issô-sô kunsâ chŏngjŏn wiwŏnhoe-ga kajintŏn*

regarded as a stronger indication of the MAC's role to secure peace than those recorded in Chapter 2.4 and 3.5, but given its composition and the "zero-sum game" the contribution should not be overvalued.

Along with the installation of defence facilities referred to on p. 255, the breakdown of the dialogue already in 1973 implies that the extent of North-South détente should not be overestimated. According to Bruzelius (February 1973), in January the same year the number of charges against armistice violations by both parties increased. At the 334th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on January 18, 1973, the North condemned the "American imperialists" for having brought in a destroyer that was later transferred to the South Korean Marine Corps and urged the immediate removal from the country of the vessel as well as all other modern war munitions that had been transferred to South Korea. The UNC/MAC explained that Paragraph 13(d) had lost its validity because the KPA/CPV, ever since the armistice was signed, had illegally introduced combat equipment.

As we have seen, the UNC had cancelled Paragraph 13(d) in 1957 due to North Korea's re-armaments that it had protested against. The North presented a request to transform the armistice into a state of solid peace and to promote an independent, peaceful re-unification through: a) the withdrawal of all American troops, b) the cessation of the illegal introduction of war munitions into South Korea and military

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*yŏk'har-e kwanhan yŏn'gu*, 1971, p. 91: op. cit., 2001(a), pp. 113-114, 153: *ibid.*, 2001(b), pp. 103-104: op. cit., 2004, pp. 195-6; *NNSC Chief Delegates - List Updated April 14, 1997*. Downs (*ibid.* p. 179) records the July 4 communiqué in extenso. On UNC/MAC Senior Members, Lee (*ibid.*, 1971, p. 91) writes "taedasu" (= a great number) but on p. 92: fn. 1 only records five major-generals who held the position from April 1966-February 1970. In the author's estimation, the opinion would not have been different with a larger sample.

provocations, c) non-obstruction by the US of the SNCC and the Red Cross talks, d) no obstruction of free North-South exchanges such as family re-unions and correspondence over the MDL and e) an end to creating tension in Panmunjom and the withdrawal of automatic weapons and heavy weapons from the area. For the UNC, these demands were groundless or lay outside the MAC's jurisdiction.

At the 336th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on February 5, the North blamed the US Army for bringing combat equipment into South Korea and charged the UNC with having conducted exercises with missiles along the South Korean west coast. The exercises were regarded as provocative and aimed to increase the risk of war. In this way, the American troops obstructed the on-going North-South dialogue. The UNC/MAC responded that military exercises were no armistice violation and should not be raised in the MAC. The KPA/CPV charge was regarded as propagandistic.<sup>206</sup>

On February 27, 1973, the UNC had informed North Korea, in accordance with long-standing practice, that a South Korean working party would replace MDL markers in the central sector of the DMZ before the second plenary session of the SNCC was held in P'yôngyang March 14-16. The UNC had interrupted such work after the March 15, 1969 incident but restarted it now when tension had markedly decreased in the DMZ thanks to the North-South dialogue. Propaganda broadcasting directed against the South Korean Army had ceased. On March 7, North Korean guards fired without any warning on the

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<sup>206</sup>- Bruzelius, op. cit, February 6, 1973, *Bilaga 2*, pp. 1-2: *Månadsrapport februari 1973: Bilaga 2* (n. p., March 5, 1973); Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 305-306; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 175-6. Original quotation marks.

workers carrying out routine work from a guard post in broad daylight. They hit one South Korean Army captain and wounded one sergeant. One sergeant was killed when he tried to rescue the captain; owing to North Korean fire, the rescue failed. Previously, on March 3-4, two-three North Korean agents had killed a civilian night guard on an island off the South Korean south coast in the reportedly first known case of North Korean infiltration since the July 4 Joint Communiqué. The agents were not found.

The UNC/MAC called the 337th MAC meeting held on March 12 to protest against the March 7 attack. The South explained the incident, showed photos and played a tape interview with the wounded sergeant. It also pointed out that the North had been notified. Notably, the North did not reject that the incident had occurred. North Korean troops had discovered South Korean troops north of the MDL conducting non-identified espionage work. The North rejected the proposal for a joint investigation. The argument was that “a joint investigation is a shameless maneuver to conceal the UNC’s guilt”: North Korea alleged that the working party had infiltrated deep into their portion of the DMZ to spy on their facilities and to conduct hostile acts “on the eve of north-south talks in Pyongyang.” It accused the US of “illegally occupying South Korea and blocking Korea’s independent and peaceful re-unification.” Owing to this incident, repairs of MDL markers ended and Paragraph 4 in the Armistice Agreement on MDL markers was suspended. The North also asserted that the US, by bringing in large quantities of war materials into South Korea, was preparing for war and raising tension in the peninsula.

Finally, it should be noted that Major General Gunnar Ljungdahl, Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation, records (August 1973) that on

the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the armistice, South Korea had charged North Korea with altogether 17,437 violations of the agreement. However, North Korea had accused South Korea of 124,000, of which the “US Imperialists” were responsible for 15,730 (cf. pp. 175-6).<sup>207</sup> The great discrepancy had widened significantly and “negative peace” continued.

#### 4.4 Rearmament, American Troops and Military Exercises raised in the MAC

As during the 1960s, rearmament and American troops in South Korea but increasingly also military exercises were repeatedly raised at MAC meetings throughout the 1970s. At the 298th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on January 26, 1970, the North blamed the UNC for rearming South Korea and conducting “The Focus Retina” exercise. Rearmaments were raised at another eleven meetings from 1970-1971.

When the 300th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV took place on June 4, the North accused the US of planning for a second war by introducing armored vehicles, tanks and heavy weapons into the DMZ (only the North made accusations). It claimed that since the Neutral Nations’ Inspection Teams were expelled in June 1956 the South had

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<sup>207</sup> Bruzelius, op. cit., April 3, 1973, *Bilaga 1*, pp. 1, 6-7; *Bilaga 3*; Ch’oe, *T’alnaengjôn ihu Pulghan-ûi Yuen kunsaryôngbu muryôkhwa-e taehan tongin yôn’gu* (Han’guk Wegugô Taehakkyo, Chôngch’aek Kwahak Taehakwôn, June 2004), p. 24; Columbia University, *Text of the Korean War Armistice Agreement*, Paragraph 4; Downs, op. cit., p. 184; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 176-7; Lee, op. cit., 2001 (a), p. 84.; Ljungdahl, *Månadsrapport juli 1973: Bilaga 1* (n. p., August 6, 1973, nr 808), p. 2; *NNSC Chief Delegates - List Updated April 14, 1997*. Original quotation marks.

strengthened its war preparations by bringing in large quantities of deadly weapons. At the 303rd meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV convened on June 29, the North urged the withdrawal of American troops and again accused the US of planning a new war. When the 305th meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on September 8, the North criticized the US for bringing in new combat equipment such as fighter planes and by making continuous military provocations maneuvering for war, including conducting joint South Korea-US military exercises in March and from April 28 to May 1. Owing to the presence of the American troops, re-unification had not been accomplished; if the troops had been withdrawn, Korea would already have re-unified (cf. pp. 105-106, 130-131).

At the 325th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on December 11, 1971, the North blamed the South for holding military exercises such as “The South Korea-US Eagle Landing Operation” and “The Win War 71” conducted from November 7 to December 4. Along with the declaration of a state of emergency, the former created a war atmosphere but the South responded that the exercise was not an issue to discuss in the MAC. In 1971, troop withdrawals were requested once and one more accusation of war preparations was made.<sup>208</sup>

Rearmaments were raised at three meetings held in 1972 and war accusations were raised at two of them. At the 332nd meeting requested by the KPA/CPV convened on September 7, the North accused the US of preparing for war by signing “The Korea-US Defence Agreement.” It urged the withdrawal of the American troops who as

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<sup>208</sup> Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 274-5, 280, 289, 298; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171.

invaders were using the UN flag. The Korean problem must be solved by the Koreans themselves. The UNC/MAC argued that these demands were inappropriate to raise in the MAC.

At the 338th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on April 10, 1973, the North criticized the American troops for conducting “The Guided Missiles Exercise” and large-scale military exercises. It proposed a “peace treaty” that would include guarantees for a withdrawal of foreign troops, the reduction of military forces in the two Koreas below 100,000 men, a ban on imports of military equipment and not holding military events in North and South Korea. The UNC/MAC argued that these demands should not be raised in the MAC. At the 340th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on June 28, the North claimed that there were no foreign troops in North Korea and that the American troops should be withdrawn from South Korea. The UNC/MAC urged the North not to raise inappropriate issues in the MAC. Troop withdrawals were raised twice more in 1973 and rear-maments six times.

At the 342nd meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on August 23, the North blamed the US for conducting the large-scale airspace maneuver exercise “Maengsüp [“Fierce attack”] no. 2” in July. In this way, the Korean people’s wish for peace was demolished. The UNC/MAC responded that the North also carried out military exercises and again urged it only to discuss issues that should be raised in the MAC. At the 343rd MAC meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on September 6, the North accused the US of illegally occupying South Korea, of hindering North-South dialogue, of modernizing the South’s defence forces by bringing in brand-new fighter planes and equipment in violation of Paragraph 13(d) and, finally, of conducting “offensive”

military exercises. The South denied the North's charges and accused it of using the MAC meetings for propaganda purposes. Moreover, discussing military exercises which the North also carried out, knowing that they are not an armistice violation was a waste of time. The UNC/MAC again raised the introduction of modern weapons into North Korea that were said to be used in military exercises and reminded the North that photos of those had appeared in journals. It reminded the North of the UN Security Council resolution of July 7, 1950, and explained the justification of the presence of UN forces in South Korea.<sup>209</sup>

At the 345th MAC meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on November 5, the North criticized in particular the South's military exercises as an armistice violation and claimed once more that the American troops were the main obstacle to re-unification. The South responded that military exercises were not an armistice violation and should not be raised in the MAC. The exercises were defensive and counter-offensive. It also claimed that 75 percent of the North's statements during the latest 12 MAC meetings were pure propaganda (cf. p. 96). When the 351st meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV was held on June 7, 1974, the South claimed that 75 percent of the North's statements at meetings during the past two years were unrelated to the MAC.

In 1974, rearmament issues were raised four times, twice concurring with accusations of war preparations. In 1975, the corresponding figures were six and three respectively, and in 1976, six and four.

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<sup>209</sup> Bruzelius, *Månadsrapport december 1972: Bilaga 2* (n. p., December 31, 1972), p. 2; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 305, 309-310, 311; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 173, 174-5, 177-180; Ljungdahl, *op. cit.*, October 6, 1973, *Bilaga 2*, p. 2; *op. cit.*, November 8, 1973, *Bilaga 2*, p. 1. Kukpang chôngbo ponbu (*ibid.*, p. 177) does not say to whom the proposal for a "peace treaty" [original quotation] was directed. Original quotation marks.

In 1976, one accusation of war preparations was made without reference to rearmament. In 1977, the rearmament issue was raised only once. The KPA/CPV twice criticized the South's military exercises as war preparations. In 1978, rearmaments were raised three times, twice concurring with criticism of military exercises and accusations of war preparations. At the 386th meeting called by the UNC/MAC convened on May 11, 1978, the North criticized the implementation of joint South Korea-US military exercises, including "Team Spirit 78," to provoke war. At the 392nd meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on March 22, 1979, the North criticized the joint South Korea-US exercise "Team Spirit (TS) 79" as a war exercise. The UNC/MAC again responded that the Armistice Agreement does not refer to military exercises and pointed out that North Korea also conducted exercises. Moreover, Team Spirit was a defensive exercise conducted far away from the DMZ.<sup>210</sup>

Armistice violations within the DMZ were also raised in the MAC, but not at all as frequently as rearmament, American troops and military exercises. At the 320th meeting held on August 25, 1971, the North charged the UNC with having brought weapons into the DMZ and built fortifications in the zone. The UNC/MAC encouraged the North to immediately remove its fortifications, but there was no discussion. No results were reached. At the 327th meeting requested

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<sup>210</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 316, 323, 332-3, 335, 340, 341, 346, 348, 351, 353, 354-5, 357; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197-8, 199, 200-201, 202; Ljungdahl, *op. cit.*, December 7, 1973, *Bilaga 2*, pp. 1-2; [Napsnet] FOIA REPORT: *U.S. Forces Korea/8th U.S. Army 1976 Annual Historical Review: 1976, Appendix 2* ([http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons/ahr\\_seventysix.pdf](http://www.nautilus.org/foia/foiachrons/ahr_seventysix.pdf), July 27, 2005), pp. 3, 5, 6.

by the KPA/CPV held on January 26, 1972, the UNC/MAC accused the North of having violated the armistice by erecting fences in the DMZ, at several places just 100 metres from the MDL. Concrete poles with barbed wire had been detected within an approximately 16-kilometre-wide area. Photos were presented as evidence but the KPA/CPV Senior Member made no comment on this very serious violation. The issue was also raised at the 328th and 329th meetings proposed by the KPA/CPV held on March 2 and March 23 respectively. The UNC/MAC particularly emphasized the fences under construction only about 100 metres north of the MDL. They were built in sections and were estimated to cover at least 100 kilometres. The fences were confirmed by photos from the South, but the North Koreans did not want to discuss the issue. Instead, [non-exemplified] counter-accusations were made against the UNC.

At the 331st meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on June 22, 1972, the UNC/MAC also accused North Korea of continuous building of fences and bulwarks in the DMZ and showed photos as evidence, but the North did not respond. The North criticized South Korea for modernizing the military. With regard to the controversies on militarization of the DMZ, Premier Kim Il Sung, in an interview with *The Washington Post* on June 26, 1972, estimated that tension in the zone could be reduced by the mutual reduction and removal of personnel and installations. North Korea thereby indirectly admitted that the northern part of the zone had become fortified.<sup>211</sup> To the author's

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<sup>211</sup>- Bruzelius, *Månadsrapport april 1972: Bilaga 3* (n. p., May 8, 1972): op. cit., *Bilaga 1*, July 11, 1972, pp. 1, 6; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, p. 304; Holmstedt, *Månadsrapport augusti 1971: Bilaga 2* (n. p., September 14, 1971): op. cit., *Bilaga 3*, February 8, 1972; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 172, 173, 174. *The*

knowledge, this was the first and only such admission ever made.

At the 377th MAC secretary meeting held on June 18, 1970, the parties criticized each other for bringing heavy weapons into the DMZ. At the 384th meeting convened on November 13, the South asserted that its investigations of the North's protests against the introduction of trench mortars into the Joint Security Area (JSA) and heavy firearms into the DMZ had shown that they were groundless. When the 405th meeting took place on August 25, 1972, the South rejected the North's claim that it had brought machine guns into the MAC Headquarter's area and into the JSA, raising tension prior to the scheduled North-South talks in Seoul and P'yŏngyang. At the 406th meeting convened on September 28, the South again rejected the North's claim that it had brought machine guns into the MAC Headquarter's area and into the JSA.

At the 408th meeting held on December 13, the North claimed that machine guns had been placed on vehicles in the UNC's part of the MAC Headquarter's area and taken into the JSA when the North's Red Cross representatives returned home, but the South claimed that no such thing had occurred. At the 411th meeting convened on March 30, 1973, the South again rejected the North's continuous, stereotype protests that machine guns had been brought into the JSA. When the 413th meeting took place on May 15, the North asserted that the introduction of machine guns into the JSA was a major obstacle to North-South talks, but the South responded that this claim was unproductive and unnecessary. At the 416th meeting held on August 30, the South again denied the North's protests that machine guns had

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*Washington Post* interview is quoted in Bruzelius, *ibid.*, July 11, 1972, p. 1.

been brought into the JSA and rejected the charge that it obstructed North-South dialogue; it actively supported it.

Although the South at the 419th secretary meeting held on November 16 claimed that raising armistice violations was not the basic task of these meetings, the North at the 423rd meeting convened on April 26, 1974 protested against the illegal introduction of heavy fire-arms and automatic weapons into the MAC Headquarter's area and into the JSA as well as deliberate arson in the DMZ, but the South argued that these claims were groundless. At the 428th meeting held on November 11, the North protested that the South had brought heavy firearms into the MAC Headquarter's area and the JSA, raising tension, but the South rejected the claims and asserted that the North had elevated tension. When the 433rd meeting took place on May 16, 1975, the South rejected the North's protests against bringing in automatic firearms and building fortifications in the DMZ. At the 443rd meeting held on June 15, 1976, the South rejected the North's protest against the introduction of heavy firearms into the DMZ.<sup>212</sup> In brief, a repetitive zero-sum game with regard to rearmament, American troops, military exercises and armistice violations within the DMZ also took place during the 1970s.

#### 4.5 Armistice Violations at Sea

Naval incidents continued during the 1970s as well. As an indication of its intentions in the West Sea, on June 5, 1970, high-speed

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<sup>212</sup> Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 347, 349, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361-2, 363, 365, 368.

North Korean gunboats sank the South Korean navy psychological-warfare broadcasting ship I-2 around four miles off the nearest northern land mass west of Yōnp'yōng Island and towed it into a harbour. The ship's task was to warn South Korean fishing boats whether they were approaching the North's territorial waters or not. At the 302nd MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on June 9, the North asserted that the ship was an "armed spy ship" which, in spite of warnings, had intruded into its waters and had opened fire on a few North Korean patrol boats two-and-a-half miles from land. After exchanges of fire, the "spy boat" was "completely destroyed and sank." The argument was that the incident had been prepared; South Korean attack planes and naval artillery reportedly supported the "spy ship's" operation.

The UNC/MAC, which claimed that the ship was used for peaceful purposes and conducting a normal operation, protested the incident and the North's version of it. It argued that it had shot in self-defence and urged the immediate return of the 20-man crew, but the KPA/CPV refused to provide any information at all. When the North raised the incident at the 307th MAC meeting held on October 23, photos and materials from the boat were displayed but no data as to whether the crew were alive or not were provided, in spite of the South's persistent requests. In 2007, the crew were still in detention. The North again claimed that it was an armed spy vessel. The South had violated the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 15, requiring naval forces to respect waters under the control of the opposing side, Paragraph 16 urging air forces to respect the airspace over the DMZ and over the area controlled by the other side and, finally, Paragraph 17, stating that the signatories of the armistice and their successors in

command are responsible for enforcing it.

At the 311th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on January 12, 1971, the North accused the UNC of having dispatched two “armed spy ships” into the North’s territorial waters in the West Sea on January 6. One ship was sunk by “self-defensive measures.” In contrast, the UNC/MAC claimed that two unarmed fishing boats had been attacked by five patrol vessels in international waters and requested information on what had happened with the crew of the sunk boat (the other was damaged). Later, the reply was that the 32-man crew had been “sent to the bottom of the sea.” The UNC/MAC protested that the North’s patrol vessels had on December 26 attacked fishing boats. One boat which the previous day had engine trouble drifted during repairs out of the South’s territorial waters into the North’s in the East Sea. When the fishing boat was heading southwards, an armed North Korean patrol vessel fired at it, but South Korea’s coastal batteries responded. The vessel disappeared and the fishing boat was safely rescued. The North claimed that on December 26 a few naval vessels, including spy ships, had intruded into its territorial waters. Patrol vessels had therefore acted in self-defence but were fired at from land with more than 50 shells from large cannons.<sup>213</sup>

In another act showing that territorial waters were contested, between November 1973 and January 1974 North Korea intruded on nine occasions with its high-speed patrol gunboats into waters

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<sup>213</sup> Ahlström, *op. cit.*, November 9, 1970, p. 3; Columbia University, *op. cit.*, Paragraph 15, 16, 17; Hapchi’am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, pp. 276-7, 282, 286-7; Kim et al., *White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea*, 2007, p. 263; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 160-161, 164, 427; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(b), p. 89; Sjölin, *Månadsrapport juni 1970: Bilaga 2* (n. p., July 6), p. 1: *Månadsrapport januari 1971: Bilaga 2* (n. p., February 3), p. 1. Original quotation marks.

contiguous to the five islands under UNC control, all within three nautical miles of them in violation of Paragraph 15. The purpose of these naval maneuvers was to support the illegal claim that the islands were located in North Korea's coastal waters without specifying what constitutes its territorial sea. On November 28, 1973, two North Korean naval patrol gunboats first violated waters contiguous to Soch'ong Island by approaching to a point within 1,200 metres of the island, that is within the three-mile territorial sea claimed by the UNC. They then made a [non-described] provocative maneuver in the path of a South Korean naval vessel before departing the area to the north. The UNC/MAC Senior Member told his North Korean counterpart by telephone that he had committed a serious violation that must not be repeated. The next day the KPA/CPV Senior Member replied by telephone:

“It is the naval vessels of your side that intruded into our coastal water and committed espionage and hostile acts in gross violation of the Armistice Agreement. As for our naval vessels, they performed their routine patrol duty in our coastal waters. Our side resolutely protests and denounces the criminal maneuvers of your side to defame and slander the other side and to mislead public opinion by reversing black and white.”<sup>214</sup>

At the 346th MAC meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on December 1, North Korea charged the UNC and South Korea with specific intrusions by destroyers that spied on its coastal waters, deliberately obstructing the operations of naval vessels, and cited geographic coordinates. The intention was to claim territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles, which would partly include the five islands under

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<sup>214</sup>- Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(b), pp. 89-90. Original quotation marks.

UNC control. North Korea asserted on the basis of Paragraph 13(b) that the islands were in their coastal waters that the Armistice Agreement did not define. The UNC/MAC categorically denied the charges and instead charged two North Korean patrol vessels with violating waters contiguous to the islands. The KPA/CPV Senior Member responded that the vessels were not at the location which the UNC/MAC had referred to and that it had not violated Paragraph 13(b).

He continued: "As is clearly written in the Paragraph 13:(b), these Five Island Groups are in our coastal waters. The sea area involving waters contiguous to the Five Islands Groups in the Western Sea belong to our coastal waters." He also stated that the islands are located in North Korean coastal waters and that the UNC therefore only controls the land area of the islands and then demanded: "If your side wants to sail into the waters off these Five Island Groups in our coastal waters of the West Sea, you should submit a request to our side and get our approval in advance." Afterwards, a stronger threat of possible counteraction was made. The UNC/MAC Senior Member responded that by distorting the pertinent paragraphs of the Armistice Agreement North Korea was making a serious mistake. According to Lee (2001b), the North's demand was utterly ridiculous, aggressive, war-like and in complete contradiction of the agreement.

The UNC/MAC reminded the North Koreans that the UNC and South Korea had, for over 20 years since the armistice was signed, freely sailed to and from the five islands and that they have their own contiguous waters that must be respected by the North. The nautical mile limits were not referred to at all. After the meeting, intrusions by North Korean naval patrol boats continued to raise tension in the Korean peninsula. The South Korean Defence Minister warned that

the armed forces would not tolerate North Korean provocations but would maintain readiness to adopt stern measures. The *Rodong Sinmun* [*Workers' Daily*] charged President Park Chung Hee with stepping up war preparations.<sup>215</sup>

At the 347th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on December 24, 1973, the North criticized the South for intruding into its coastal waters on three occasions. The North also claimed its responsibility for the five islands and refuted the South's claim on them. The South protested that the North had obstructed civilian traffic and military ships between Inch'ôn and Yônp'yông Island and refuted the North's claim over the five islands, which had about 15,000 inhabitants dependent on regular shipping services. The UNC/MAC warned North Korea that a) the UNC will continue to ensure that the five islands remain under its military control, b) any intrusion into waters contiguous to the islands is a clear violation of Paragraph 15, c) any attempt to interfere with or interrupt the passage of UNC/South Korean vessels, including ferries and or naval escort ships, will be an attempt to modify the terms of Paragraph 13(b) and 15, d) the UNC will take whatever measures necessary to stop the North's naval intrusions into waters contiguous to the islands and e) the UNC will not request North Korea's permission to sail to them.

According to Lee (2001b), since the UNC and South Korea stood firm on the basis of the Armistice Agreement this time, the North Korean bluff could be called. The UNC did not refer to the Northern Limit Line even once. North Korea never enforced its earlier demand

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<sup>215</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 312-313; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, p. 181; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(b), pp. 90-92; op. cit., 2004, p. 89.

that the UNC and South Korea should obtain prior approval to sail to the five islands. Later, at the 354th MAC meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on September 12, 1974, the North emphasized that the Armistice Agreement does not say that the waters contiguous to the five islands are controlled by the UNC. At the 355th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on October 25 the South clarified that the islands have always been South Korean territory.<sup>216</sup> As previously, the two sides' positions on the five islands were incompatible, raising tension.

On February 15, 1974, the first serious incident at sea since the 1972 July 4 Joint Communiqué occurred between North Korean patrol vessels and two South Korean fishing boats in international waters approximately 30 nautical miles to the west of Paengnyŏng Island, one of the islands that the North had claimed in recent years. The Suwon-ho 32 was sunk; eleven men from the crew were reportedly killed or drowned but one was rescued by her sister boat the Suwon-ho 33 that was soon afterwards captured and brought to a North Korean port. South Korean vessels within the area came too late to rescue the boats and were hindered by rough seas and poor visibility. South Korea sharply protested the incident, rejected the North Korean claim that the boats were “espionage vessels” and urged the immediate return of the fishermen via Panmunjom.<sup>217</sup>

South Korea claimed that the boats belonged to a fishing-fleet which had been fishing since February 7 off the South's west coast. The boats, each with a 14-man crew, reported their positions twice a

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<sup>216</sup>- Hapch'am chŏngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 313, 321; Kukpang chŏngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 181-2, 185; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(b), pp. 92-3.

<sup>217</sup>- Åhslund, *Särskild rapport: Bilaga 2* (n. p., February 18, 1974). Original quotation marks.

day. A North Korean cannon vessel fired from a distance of around one English mile. The Suwon-ho 32 sank and the North Korean vessel rescued the only survivor. The Suwon-ho 33 was forced to follow the vessel towards North Korea. An attempt was made to transfer the survivor to the Suwon-ho 33 but it failed due to rough seas. The cannon vessel then stated that the Suwon-ho 33 could return southwards and that the survivor would be returned via Panmunjom. The boat sailed southwards but was captured again and sent its last message on its way to a North Korean port.

In contrast, North Korea claimed that the fishing boats were “espionage vessels.” The claim was based on a “confession” made by the captain of the captured boat. The boats were owned by the Korean CIA and were equipped with advanced electronic equipment. The captain had received instructions to intrude into North Korean territorial waters to pursue intelligence work on “attitudes,” “reactions” and the armaments and equipment of the North’s vessels. If the boats were captured, he would argue that they were in international waters and ask for permission to continue fishing. If the boats were forced to go to North Korea, it was believed that the crew would return within a few months.

During that period, spying on economic conditions, roads, the general public’s attitudes and locations of military units in North Korea, in particular, were to take place. When, on February 15, the boats commenced their “espionage operations” in the North’s territorial waters, one of the North Korean warships that were their targets appeared. The captain reportedly understood that the boats were fishing and urged them to enter international waters but they refused. When Suwon-ho 32 took photographs, she tried to escape but was

clumsy and collided with the North Korean cannon vessel and sank. All the crew but one died. The Suwon-ho 33 was immediately captured and “espionage equipment” was destroyed. The boat was immediately brought to a port in the North.<sup>218</sup>

This incident caused widespread public demonstrations in South Korea, above all in Pusan, Inch’ön, from where the boats had departed, and Seoul. The North Korean’s inhuman behaviour was strongly condemned. In Seoul, it was considered the general opinion that the North Korean version contained several contradictions. How the Suwon-ho 32 was sunk and why the reportedly innocent crew of the Suwon-ho 33 was not returned had not been convincingly explained. When the issue was raised at the South-North Coordinating Committee talks in Panmunjom on February 27, South Korea urged North Korea to confess its responsibility for the incident and apologize, immediately return the fishermen and the Suwon-ho 33, pay compensation for the damage caused and to the survivors, punish those responsible for the intermezzo and, finally, guarantee that such an incident would not re-occur.

North Korea refused to meet these demands. Instead, it urged confessions and apologies from South Korea. Following arguments on procedural issues, the 348th MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC was held on February 28. The South protested the attack against the two fishing boats, criticized the killing of innocent fishermen and the kidnappings as inhuman acts and, finally, urged a return of the survivor and the Suwon-ho 33. The North did not answer the UNC/MAC

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<sup>218</sup>- Åhslund, *Särskild rapport: Bilaga 1* (n. p., February 25, 1974), pp. 1-3. Original quotation marks.

delegate's questions about the crew: how many were alive in North Korea and when they would return. Instead, it protested that an armed vessel camouflaged as a fishing boat had intruded into its territorial waters in a hostile act. When a tape containing confessions from the crew of Suwon-ho 33 was made public, the North claimed that the two boats were spy ships. Later, at the Red Cross talks held on March 11 in the NNSC conference room, South Korea demanded data on the physical conditions of the fishermen, guarantees to treat them humanely, urgent repatriation, the return of the victims and restoration of the captured fishing boat. However, even in 2007, the whereabouts of the crew remained unknown and their names were on the list of abductees (cf. p. 270).<sup>219</sup>

A new incident took place in the East Sea on June 28, 1974, when three North Korean cannon vessels sank the South Korean patrol vessel no. 863 with a 28-man crew that belonged to the Maritime Police. Of the crew, 26 persons died and two were arrested. South Korea claimed that the vessel had been out on a routine mission to ensure that fishing boats did not enter into North Korea's territorial waters to prevent a recurrence of the February 15 incident. The ship's position when it was discovered was unclear. The KPA/CPV called the 352nd MAC meeting held on July 1, but the parties failed to resolve the incident. The North accused South Korea of infiltration. It regarded the ship as a spy vessel and declared that it had opened fire on three North Korean ships. In a deviation from established patterns,

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<sup>219</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, p. 314; Kim et al., op. cit., 2007, p. 263; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, p. 182; Åhslund, ibid., February 25, 1974, p. 3: *Månadsrapport, februari 1974: Bilaga 1* (n. p., March 4, 1974), pp. 2, 3: *Bilaga 2*, p. 1: *Månadsrapport, mars 1974: Bilaga 1* (n. p., April 8, 1974), pp. 1-2.

North Korea admitted that it had sunk the ship in retaliation and then rescued some survivors.

The UNC/MAC blamed the North for the incident and claimed that the ship was a 30-year-old lightly-armed former minesweeper used to prevent South Korean fishing boats from entering North Korea's territorial waters. Patrolling was necessary due to the February 15 incident. No armistice violation had taken place. Later, it became clear that the ship had been sunk in North Korea's territorial waters. South Korea claimed that a North Korean sea officer had drowned and offered to return the corpse, but since the North denied that anyone was missing, it refused the offer. On July 2, a South Korean patrol boat sank a North Korean "espionage vessel" in international waters south of the peninsula. The vessel had opened fire when it was discovered in South Korean territorial waters. One South Korean seaman was killed and three were wounded. The patrol boat then followed the vessel and sank it about 32 kilometres south of the south coast. South Korea claimed that infiltrators would be disembarked on some island off the south coast. North Korea denied any knowledge and regarded the incident as fabricated.

On July 20, a South Korean patrol boat discovered an "espionage vessel" off the South's west coast. When the vessel was requested to identify itself, it opened fire and escaped west-wards. The patrol boat followed the vessel, captured it in international waters and brought it into Inch'ôn port. Five men from the crew were found dead and radar equipment, rubber boats and weapons were discovered. North Korea denied any knowledge and refused to receive the corpses. At the 353rd MAC meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on August 12, the North accused the South of claiming on two occasions that it had sunk

or captured North Korean spy vessels. The North regarded these incidents as fabricated. Claiming that no North Korean seamen were missing, the North refused to receive the corpses. In contrast, the South claimed that the North Korean boats were spy vessels.<sup>220</sup>

At the 359th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on February 21, 1975, the North protested that the South had on February 15 attacked and sunk the drifting patrol boat no. 315 that was on a normal operational mission in the East Sea. The patrol boat had drifted from off Wõnsan southwards due to unfavourable weather. The South asserted that it had found a non-identified vessel intruding into its territorial waters. When the South's escort vessel no. 57 had approached the North's patrol boat to investigate it, the patrol boat fired in spite of warning shots and then escaped northwards. An airplane supporting the escort vessel fired at the patrol boat and sank it, but one of the crew was rescued. The North asserted that the patrol boat had drifted due to unfavourable weather, but the South claimed that it was a deliberate intrusion.

A serious incident occurred on February 26. A South Korean patrol vessel discovered off the west coast two fishing boats which did not answer calls for identification but headed northwards. The patrol vessel followed them and found eight more fishing boats that were all moving northwards. When the patrol vessel collided with one of the fishing boats, the latter sank. Owing to bad weather and darkness,

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<sup>220</sup>- Gerring, *Månadsrapport, juni 1974: Bilaga 1* (n. p., July 8, 1974), p. 3; *Månadsrapport, juli 1974: Bilaga 1* (n. p., August 5, 1974), pp. 3-4; *Bilaga 2*, p. 1; *Månadsrapport, augusti 1974: Bilaga 2* (n. p., September 2, 1974); Kukpang chõngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, p. 184; Lee, "DMZ-nûn õpitta" ([http://www.dongailbo.co.kr/docs/magazine/new\\_donga/9712/nd97120100.html](http://www.dongailbo.co.kr/docs/magazine/new_donga/9712/nd97120100.html)), p. 8. Original quotation marks.

none of the crew could be rescued. North Korea dispatched a few warships and MIG-planes to the area. To meet this threat, American Phantom jet planes and South Korean planes came to the area. A tense situation arose but no firing took place. However, in particular since American planes were dispatched, the incident was considered to be one of the most serious at this time.

At the 360th MAC meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on March 3, the North accused the South of “pirate actions” on the open sea, of shots having been fired by naval destroyers and warships at fishing boats and ramming them and of having tried to kidnap the fishermen. The South rejected the accusations. It claimed that, if the North Korean boats had identified themselves and maneuvered to show their peaceful intentions, the crew would have survived. The collisions had taken place in darkness and in the confusion created when the boats were escaping northwards.<sup>221</sup>

Later, on August 1, 1977, the KPA Supreme Command unilaterally proclaimed a 50-mile military sea zone. It would extend 50 nautical miles from the starting line of North Korea’s territorial waters in the East Sea and concur with the boundary line of its 200-mile economic zone in the West Sea. Within the military zone, no foreign military vessels or aircraft would be permitted and civilian vessels only after receiving permission. Within the economic zone, every kind of fishing and exploitation of other resources required permission. The following day the UNC rejected the proclamation by saying:

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<sup>221</sup>- Gerring, *Månadsrapport, februari 1975: Bilaga 1* (n. p., March 7, 1975), p. 2; *Månadsrapport, mars 1975: Bilaga 2* (n. p., April 9, 1975), p. 1; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 324-5 Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 187-8. Original quotation marks.

“Regarding a report that your side has unilaterally established a military boundary on both coasts of Korea, a UNC spokesman reaffirmed the long-standing UNC position that no unilateral declaration by your side can curtail rights of either side under the Armistice Agreement. UNC will continue to observe the Armistice and expects your side to do the same. There will be no change in our operation in international waters and airspace. The passage of time has shown that this North Korean unilateral declaration has had no significant impact on UNC/ROK operations.”<sup>222</sup>

Naval incidents also occurred in the late 1970s. At the 386th MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on May 11, 1978, the South protested that on April 28 an unidentified vessel disguised as a fishing boat had without warning fired on patrol vessels that approached to investigate it. One enlisted man was killed and four were wounded. The South fired back in self-defence and sank the boat. There were no survivors. The South claimed on the basis of pistols and hand grenades displayed that the vessel was armed, but the North argued that it had nothing to do with the incident.

The vessel was shown at the 387th meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC convened on May 27 when the South claimed that it was built only to infiltrate; it had three high-speed engines and radar. The North refused to inspect it. The South claimed that on May 19 an unidentified ship was detected in the East Sea and then intruded into South Korea’s territorial waters. Three South Korean naval vessels

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<sup>222</sup> Beckman, *Månadsrapport augusti 1977: Bilaga 1* (n. p., September 6, 1977), p. 2; Lee, op. cit., 2001(b), pp. 93-4. According to Lee (ibid., p. 93), the 50-mile military sea zone would extend from the boundary line of the 200-mile economic zone in the West Sea whereas Jan Beckman, Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation, writes (ibid., pp. 0, 2) that it would concur with the border of the economic zone. Because of Beckman’s position, his account is followed in the text. The author has found no later references to the 50-mile military sea zone but it is well-known that maritime borders remain contested.

then requested identification but since there was no response, they shot warning shots. When the boat fired back, the vessels fired and sank it, but eight survivors were rescued by the South Korean Navy. The North rejected the South's version of the incident and claimed that an unarmed civilian fishing boat was drifting due to engine trouble, criticized the shooting, urged an excuse and punishment of those responsible and requested an immediate return of the fishermen.

At the 388th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on June 7, the North again urged the return of the survivors. The sinking of the boat was regarded as an act of piracy. The South declared that since the interrogation of the survivors was completed, they would be returned. It claimed that the sunk boat was a naval vessel belonging to the North Korean defence forces and urged the North to prevent a recurrence of similar incidents. According to Lee (2001b), the investigation and interrogation of the survivors concluded that they were genuine fishermen. The armed vessel was used as a fishing boat to supply the military with its catch. The fishermen were free either to return to North Korea or to stay in South Korea, but they all wanted to return since they had their families in the North.<sup>223</sup>

Following an agreement by the Senior Members of the MAC, the MAC secretaries met on June 13 in the 452nd meeting on the MDL between the MAC conference building and the UNC Joint Duty Office at 11 a.m. to return and receive the eight fishermen who arrived in an UNC bus close to the MAC conference room. The fishermen were all

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<sup>223</sup>- Fornwall, *Månadsrapport maj 1978: Bilaga 1* (n. p., June 5, 1978), p. 1; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 347-9; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, p. 198; Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), pp. 132, 134; ibid., 2001 (b), p. 115; *The Korea Herald*, "3 High Speed Engines: N.K. Spy Boat Built for Infiltration," June 1, 1978.

dressed in expensive suits tailored in Seoul and carried a bag full of gifts provided by the South Korean Red Cross; they got off and headed to the North across the MDL where they were briefly identified by both sides' secretaries on the line. Their names were recorded. in the receipts that were signed by the North's MAC secretary.

As soon as they had all crossed the line, a North Korean Army major known as a political officer assembled them and started to talk to them. They suddenly began to undress down to their undershorts and threw their suits and all gifts over the line to the South. They then proceeded to walk up the steps to the North's staff building P'an-mungak. The UNC delivered a protest message against the "blatant Communist propaganda demonstration" the same day. This "strip show" was not the first; when four fishermen were returned in September-October 1960 through Panmunjom after a North Korean patrol vessel had been sunk in the East Sea on July 30, they all undressed (cf. p. 165).

At the 390th MAC meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on July 3, the North claimed that on June 27 naval destroyers and patrol vessels had sunk a fishing boat that had become disoriented due to fog in South Korean waters and urged the return of the fishermen. The South asserted that an unidentified vessel had illegally intruded into the waters around Paengnyōng Island. While investigating the vessel, which had not heaved to when lawfully challenged by the South, a collision took place, whereafter the boat sank. The South offered for humanitarian reasons to return the five rescued fishermen but one who was deputy skipper wanted to remain in South Korea for fear of severe punishment. The others were returned at the 453rd MAC secretary meeting held the same day and, in spite of being asked not to

by the UNC/MAC, repeated the “strip show.”<sup>224</sup>

At the 394th MAC plenary meeting held on July 31, 1979, the UNC/MAC accused the North of having shot at a South Korean police patrol vessel on July 21 off the southern coast. The patrol vessel had approached a North Korean ship which was first spotted by fishermen and had sent signals for help due to engine trouble. The ship then suddenly fired and two policemen were killed and one severely wounded. The ship escaped but was sunk by high-speed South Korean patrol boats after exchanging fire. Six corpses were retrieved. Photos were shown of 376 kinds of firearms and replenishments etc. Books containing texts referring to the South Korean revolution, re-unification of the fatherland and the Great Leader were presented. The North rejected the accusation; no ship and seamen had been dispatched to the area. The anti-espionage command had previously determined that the ship was on a mission to gather military secrets.

#### 4.6 Armistice Violations in the Air

On December 3, 1970, a North Korean MiG-15 crashlanded on an east coast beach in South Korea about 20 kilometres south of the MDL. South Korea asserted that the plane, while approaching its airspace, was detected by radar and then escorted by fighters to a

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<sup>224</sup> Fornwall, *Månadsrapport juli 1978: Bilaga 1* (n. p., August 8, 1978), pp. 1-2; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 351-2; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 199, 372; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 131-2, 134; *ibid.*, 2001(b), pp. 114-115; Song, “At Panmunjom: UNC Turns Over 8 Crewmen to N.K.,” *The Korea Herald*, June 14, 1978; *The Stars and Stripes*, “UNC returns crew of North Korean boat,” July 5, 1978; Unell, *Månadsrapport, november 1984: Bilaga 1, Underbilaga 1:1: Incidenten i JSA 1984-11-23* (n.p., December 2, 1984), p. 1. Original quotation marks except for “blatant Communist propaganda demonstration.”

landing field. Soon afterwards, the South Korean Ministry of National Defence announced that the pilot, Air Force Major Pak Sun Kuk, had defected to South Korea. The pilot was brought for interrogation in Seoul. The KPA/CPV called the 309th MAC meeting convened on December 5, when it urged the immediate return of the pilot and the aircraft. The KPA/CPV Senior Member asserted that the pilot must have left Wõnsan Air Base for high-altitude flight training, had become disoriented “in thick cloud” and had made an emergency landing. He also claimed that the plane had run short of fuel and the pilot had informed his airbase that he intended to land north of the MDL but had mistakenly landed south of the line. The UNC/MAC then repeated its position that the pilot had defected and pledged that the North Koreans would “be advised accordingly after our side has had an opportunity to study the total evidence.”

The KPA/CPV proposed the 310th MAC meeting held on December 16, at which it again urged the return of the pilot and the aircraft. The UNC/MAC replied: “You will be advised accordingly when the evaluation has been completed.” Not until the 316th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on June 2, 1971 did the UNC officially inform the North Koreans that the pilot had decided to remain in South Korea; he was not returned. Since the matter was a political and not a military issue, the UNC/MAC declared that it would “disassociate itself from the case.” Throughout four subsequent closed-door sessions that had been requested by the North Koreans, the UNC/MAC maintained a position that “the issue would be settled based on the freely expressed desire of the pilot concerning his choice of residence and the pilot should be turned over to a disinterested third part to verify his choice.” At the final private meeting, the

KPA/CPV Senior Member, Major General Han Ju Kyong, angrily warned: “If your side persistently keeps on forcibly detaining our pilot and aircraft that made an emergency landing instead of returning them, it will bring about disadvantageous results to you. You must clearly keep in your mind that our just warning is not empty talk.”<sup>225</sup>

However, no UNC personnel fell into North Korean custody until 1977. Early on July 14, a US Army CH-47 helicopter with four crew members left its base in P’yōngt’aek, south of Seoul. It headed east to provide transportation support for a South Korean Army unit deployed along the eastern sector. The pilot became disoriented and flew over the northern boundary of the DMZ at 9.55 a.m. At this time, a warning shot was fired from land but since the pilot believed he had heard the metallic sound of an engine malfunction he landed to check the engine. After the pilot landed, turned off the engine and let the crew out, he first thought he saw South Korean soldiers, but North Korean soldiers and civilians were approaching. The crew quickly returned to the helicopter which started its ascent but too late. North Korean soldiers fired on the helicopter which crashed into the Nam River around 10.10 a.m. at a distance of 4.7 kilometer north of the MDL. Three crew members died and one was wounded.

At 1.40 p.m., the UNC/MAC called for the 385th MAC meeting to be held at 6 p.m. the same day. Around one hour later, the UNC sent a message to the North Koreans explaining that a CH-47 helicopter

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<sup>225</sup>- Ahlström, *Månadsrapport dec 1970: Bilaga 2* (n. p., January 4, 1971), p. 1: *Bilaga 4*, pp. 1-2; Downs, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-114; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 355-6; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 163, 164, 166, 201; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 124; *The Korea Herald*, “Navy Retrieves 6 Dead Agents; N.K. Armed Spy Boat Sunk,” July 24, 1979. Original quotation marks.

had gone down north of the DMZ. It said there were indications that it was forced down by North Korean fire during an “unintentional intrusion” of North Korea’s airspace and requested that the helicopter and the crew be returned immediately. It also expressed the UNC’s deep concern about the “regrettable incident.” Before the message was transmitted to North Korea, Radio P’yōngyang ominously reported at 1.54 p.m. that a US military helicopter had “intruded deep into North Korea across the DMZ on the eastern sector of the front.” The helicopter had been shot down by the Korean People’s Army “artillery fire.” Three crewmen had died but one was captured alive. The incident was described as an “illegal intrusion” of the Armistice Agreement by an “armed” US military helicopter that was unarmed.<sup>226</sup>

On July 14, the US government immediately released a statement that the incident was “unintentional and regrettable.” President Carter’s spokesman explained: “We are trying to let [North Korea] know that we realize the mistake was made by the crew in going into the DMZ....Our primary interest is in having the incident not escalate into a confrontation and to account for the crew members.” It was the first time an American president tendered such an apology over an airspace incident, especially prior to discussions with the North Koreans (no. 33). The routine practice, as we have seen, would have been to handle the issue through a MAC meeting. Since the matter had received such high-level attention in Washington, within a day North Korea gave the full details of the “unfortunate incident.”

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<sup>226</sup> Beckman, *Månadsrapport juli 1977: Bilaga 2* (n. p., August 1, 1977), p. 1; Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 114, 158; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), pp. 75-6. Original quotation marks.

North Korea also proposed to hold the MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC for July 14 on July 16 since the investigation had not been completed, but the South wanted an earlier meeting. At midnight on July 14, North Korea informed the UNC that three crew members had died but one was wounded and was receiving medical treatment. The next day, the UNC again complained about the delay of the meeting and requested the return of the crew and the name of the survivor, which North Korea provided. On July 16, a North Korean guard asked a UNC guard if the UNC could receive the crew member the following day. The following statement came from Radio P'yŏngyang:

“At about 0955 hours, 14 July, a CH-47 helicopter belonging to the U.S. forces...intruded deep into North Korea airspace, crossing the MDL on the eastern sector. North Korean anti-aircraft gunners fired “warning fire” at the enemy helicopter which was compelled to land at a field in Kosong county [North Korea]. North Korean soldiers repeatedly made a signal to the enemy helicopter to stop there to be investigated, but the helicopter refused to do so and started to take off and fly. North Korean soldiers were compelled to fire again at the helicopter and it was brought down at about 10:08 A.M., 14 July. Two crew members were crushed while attempting to escape, another crew member in the helo died from shock, and another was wounded but survived, who is now being treated in a North Korean Army hospital. Whether it was an “intentional or unintentional” intrusion of the U.S. forces helicopter into the area of our side, if they had complied with the demand of our side and had not attempted to flee, after they landed in the area of our side at the warning firing of the anti-aircraft gunners of the Korean People’s Army, such “unfortunate” incident would not have occurred. The “unfortunate” incident entirely resulted from the errors of the military personnel of the U.S. side. The U.S. side should take appropriate measures to ensure that such incidents would not occur again.”<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>227</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 158-160; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 76-7. Original quotation marks.

At the 385th MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on July 16, the KPA/CPV Senior Member, Major General Han, said: “We are going to settle the incident leniently so that a complicated situation will not be created.” “Taking into consideration your side’s admission and expression of regret,” he concluded, “we declare that we are ready to deliver the survivor and the bodies of your side, proceeding from our humanitarian stand.”

The UNC/MAC Senior Member, Rear Admiral Warren C. Hamm, Jr., responded that the UNC was ready to receive the crew. Major General Han emphasized that no condition had been attached to return the crew - the North simply asked for a receipt. The survivor and the remains of the deceased crew members were returned to the UNC in very fine coffins through the secretaries meeting at about 7.20 p.m. on July 16. After the crew had been returned, Admiral Hamm made the following press statement:

“We welcome the prompt North Korean response to our request for the return of the crew of our helicopter which unintentionally entered North Korean territory but we deplore the loss of life and the use of force against an unarmed and inadvertent intrusion. However, it is encouraging that the matter was handled by both sides in a manner consistent with the armistice agreement.”<sup>228</sup>

Downs (1999) explains North Korea’s handling of the incident by Kim Il Sung’s tenacious aim to remove American troops from the Korean peninsula. As long as there was hope that President Jimmy Carter might order a troop withdrawal, North Koreans at Panmunjom

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<sup>228</sup> Downs, *ibid.*, p. 160; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, 1999, *op. cit.*, p. 346; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), p. 78. Original quotation marks.

maintained quiet discipline, but the South claimed at the 383rd MAC meeting held on May 9, 1977, that one of its soldiers in a group carrying out inspections at the southern boundary line on May 3 had been killed. The North refuted the accusation. At the 449th MAC secretary meeting held on October 26, the South claimed that on October 20 the North had kidnapped two soldiers, including a Lieutenant-Colonel, and requested their return, but the North claimed that they had defected voluntarily. Since no MAC meetings were held between July 16, 1977, and May 11, 1978, there were no opportunities to make propaganda harangues in the MAC for 300 days. However, they resumed in July 1978 after President Carter's announcement that the withdrawal would be held in abeyance.

At this time, it had become known from intelligence work that North Korea had many more tanks and pieces of artillery than previously known and ground forces had reached 680,000 men, up from 485,000. North Korea had a two-to-one advantage in the former case and had for the first time more men than South Korea under arms. North Korea again began to state that the US, as the main obstacle to Korea's "peaceful" re-unification, had an obligation to negotiate directly with P'yŏngyang to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. In a joint communiqué issued in Seoul on July 1, 1979, President Carter "assured" South Korean authorities that "the US will continue to maintain an American military presence in south Korea" and that the "force improvement" of South Korea would be supported in the future. The "nuclear umbrella" would be provided for the "security" of South Korea. North Korea regarded the pledge for a withdrawal of US troops as a "deceptive trick." In the end, the total military strength was reduced by only about 3,000 men, leaving nearly 37,000

in place, but while there in 1976 had been 683 nuclear warheads, there were only around 250 in 1981 (the peak number was 763 in 1972).<sup>229</sup>

Previously, on March 25, 1974, North Korea had for the first time, in a letter approved by The Fifth Supreme People's Assembly (legislative branch of government), Third Session, proposed a peace treaty with the US that included a mutual pledge for non-aggression and removal of armed clashes, suspension of rearmaments, complete withdrawal of American troops and prevention of making Korea into a military base for foreign troops. A peace treaty was intended to lead to the withdrawal of American troops. The change from advocating a North-South Korea peace treaty to a North Korea-US treaty was due to the American troop withdrawal from Vietnam and Vietnam's subsequent communization, which encouraged an application of this experience in Korea. Previously, at a speech at The Third Supreme People's Assembly, First Session, held from October 22-23, 1962, Premier Kim Il Sung had proposed, on the condition of a withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, a North-South peace treaty. Armed forces would be reduced to 100,000 men or less on both sides.

North Korea also advocated a peace treaty with South Korea in a memorandum addressed to the UN General Assembly on October 8, 1969, at the second round of the North-South Co-ordinating Committee held on March 14, 1973, and at the Fifth Supreme People's

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<sup>229</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 114, 160-161; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 196, 197, 371; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), p. 78; Oberdorfer, *op. cit.*, pp. 89, 102-103, 108, 257; *Statement of the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (P'yôngyang, July 10, 1979), pp. 1, 3. Original quotation marks except for "deceptive trick." The statement consistently writes "south."

Assembly, Second Session, convened on April 5, 1973. On these occasions, North Korea judged that the situation in the peninsula was in its favour; by suggesting a peace treaty it would lead inter-Korean relations. South Korea was not in favour of the proposals and suggested on January 18, 1974 a “North-South Mutual Non-aggression Pact” which North Korea rejected.<sup>230</sup>

#### 4.7 The 1976 Panmunjom Axe Murder

As we have seen, the 1968 Blue House raid and the Pueblo incident caused fears for war. On August 18, 1976, tension between the two Koreas reached a peak. UNC guards wanted a 25-metre-high poplar tree close to “The Bridge of No Return” that was the only entrance to Panmunjom from North Korea to be cut down so as to be able to see better between UN Checkpoint 3 just in front of the bridge and Checkpoint 5 on a hill looking down on the bridge; the tree had blocked the view each summer. Owing to its location, Checkpoint 3 was the most important one for the UNC. The tree had been trimmed each year by a work force of Korean Service Corps (KSC) employees. Since the UNC work force of four workers and four guards who had gone to trim the tree were told on August 6 that they would be killed if they tried, the KSC employees cancelled the work and returned to

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<sup>230</sup>- Jhe, *Hanbando p'yōnghwa ch'eje-tū mosaek*, 2000, pp. 109-111; Koo, “Hanbando p'yōnghwa p'orūm-tū chaengchōm-gwa kwaje,” in T'ongil yōn'guwōn, *Hanbando p'yōnghwa p'orūm: kusang-gwa ihaeng* (Seoul: T'ongil yōn'guwōn, 2006), pp. 70-71; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 204. The author has found no signs that North Korea's proposal from June 15, 1954, that the two Korean governments should sign a peace treaty was followed up in any way, indicating that South Korea rejected it.

the JSA Advance Camp, but the incident was not reported to military headquarters in Seoul.<sup>231</sup>

However, the Camp commander decided to send a contingent of two American officers, one South Korean officer and eight enlisted UNC guards to accomplish this routine work mission. On August 18, a UNC work party consisting of five South Korean workers, three UNC security officers and a seven-man security force arrived at the site of the tree. Captain Arthur George Bonifas and First Lieutenant Mark Thomas Barrett were selected to lead the action, but the UNC did not inform North Korea in advance since it did not anticipate that North Korean security guards would protest. Due to the North Korean threat, it was decided to cut only the branches and not the root. Work began at around 10.30 a.m. in a peaceful manner. According to Chang Su-gŭn, Head of Public Relations at the Korean General Confederation of Freedom (2003), trimming the tree was a legal and necessary act, but North Korea's guards argued without any foundation that the North Korean people had planted and raised the tree. Approximately five minutes after work had begun, Lieutenant Park Chul and ten other North Korean guards arrived at the location.

Lieutenant Park asked what was going on but initially raised no objections to the team's pruning of the tree. Lieutenant Park and his guards observed the South's team which came equipped with axes for ten to fifteen minutes. The guards were telling the workers how the

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<sup>231</sup>- Bettex, op. cit., p. 25; Hong, "Wigi sog-tŭi chŏngjŏn hyŏpchŏng," 2003, pp. 64-5: "1976nyŏn P'anmunjŏm tokki sarhae sakŏn-gwa Hanbando wigi," *Chŏngsin munhwa yŏn'gu* 28 (Winter 2005), p. 274; Kirkbride, *DMZ: A Story of the Panmunjom Axe Murder* (Elizabeth, New Jersey: Hollym International Corporation, 1984), pp. 28, 29; Lee, op. cit., 2001(b), p. 108; Oberdorfer, op. cit., p. 76.

tree should be pruned. That the tree was trimmed in spite of the North's warnings a few days earlier not to cut it, upset Lieutenant Park. In the author's opinion, the fact that the UNC did not inform North Korea in advance could only have caused more anger. At about 10.50 a.m. Lieutenant Park told Captain Bonifas to stop work immediately and that the force should not work until an agreement could be reached on the status of the tree by a security officer's meeting. "If your side cuts more branches of the tree, you will face great problems."<sup>232</sup>

Nevertheless, Captain Bonifas told the work force to continue work. Since Lieutenant Park shouted at him and the workers and threatened to kill the team and the UNC guards if they continued their work, tension escalated. After Lieutenant Park dispatched a guard to call on reinforcements from the other side of the "Bridge of No Return" there were altogether more than 30 guards around 11 a.m., outnumbering the UNC. At this time, the workers had temporarily stopped working but they soon began again following the captain's order; he believed that the North Korean threat was typical of frequent previous behaviour that had not caused any serious incidents. Lieutenant Park took off his wrist watch, wrapped it in a handkerchief and put it into his pocket. Shouting "Kill the U.S. Aggressors" while UNC guards approached Captain Bonifas, the lieutenant struck him in the back and

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<sup>232</sup> Chang, "Kinjang yōjōnhan JSA nômō-ro 50nyōn noksūn Kyōngūsōn ch'ōlkir-i iōjigo issōtta," *Chayu kongnon* (2003.09), pp. 106, 108; Downs, op. cit., pp. 151-2; Hong, *ibid.*, 2003, p. 65; Kirkbride, *ibid.*, pp. 29-30; Lee, "Hanggong moham," 1998(d), pp. 3-4; e-mail, May 21, 2008; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., p. 67. Original quotation marks. In contrast to Mueller-Lhotska (*ibid.*, p. 67), Chang (*ibid.*, p. 108) writes in the only text known to the author that the South had informed the North in advance about the act but gives no sources. Downs (*ibid.*, p. 151), Hong (*ibid.*, 2003, p. 65) and Lee (*ibid.*, 1998(d), p. 4) write that the operation began at around 10.30 but Kirkbride (*ibid.*, p. 29) records 10.40.

knocked him to the ground.

Captain Bonifas, who had been watching the workers and therefore had not noticed Lieutenant Park's warning, was subsequently beaten to death by at least five other KPA guards who used clubs and metal pipes from their vehicle as well as axes left behind by South Korean workers who had fled the scene after the attack. They also jumped on him. No one could lead the guards after Captain Bonifas had been attacked. The mobile strike force that was just 600 metres away and was constantly on the alert could not even move since the fighting lasted only three-four minutes. In the fighting, Lieutenant Barrett was also killed. His body was found in the forest 50 metres to the east of Checkpoint 3.<sup>233</sup>

The incident was recorded by a movie camera from UNC Checkpoint 5 by a US corporal dispatched to be prepared in case something were to happen. It was suddenly stopped when, at about 11.07 a.m., a UNC truck driver drove his truck over Captain Bonifas's body to protect him from further attacks. Subsequently, the guards who had previously tried to disengage but were continuously attacked and surrounded by North Korean guards scattered from the area. Ten US and South Korean guards were injured in the fighting with North Korean guards, five of whom five were injured. The guards carried pistols in accordance with the agreed rules but no firearms were used. As Hong Seuk-Ryul (2003) points out, if firearms had been used, the situation could have become worse.

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<sup>233</sup>- Chang, *ibid.*, p. 108; Downs, *ibid.*, p. 152; Hong, *ibid.*, 2003, pp. 65-6; Kirkbride, *ibid.*, pp. 30-31; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), pp. 56-7; Yoon, "Managing the Korean Crisis: A Case Study of the Panmunjom Axe Murder Incident of 1976," *Korea Observer* 31 (Winter 2000), no. 4, p. 642.

As a result of the axe murder, the “United Nations Command Advance Camp Kitty Hawk” located immediately south of the DMZ was renamed “Camp Bonifas” to honour the killed Captain Bonifas. The axe murder was the first case of casualties in the JSA that was set up to maintain the armistice but, according to Hong (2003), fist blows and kicks had been exchanged by guards or other personnel in the area 25 times from July 1953 until July 1976 (some are mentioned in Chapter 4.2). Previously, 49 American soldiers had been killed by North Korea in armed clashes in the vicinity of the DMZ since 1953 (more than 1,000 South Korean soldiers were killed during the same period). Once all the KPA soldiers were safe, North Korea, just 15 minutes after the axe murder had occurred, called for a security officers’ meeting to deal with the incident. Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Ho Dam informed his press:

“that U.S. Imperialist Aggression troops with lethal weapons pounced on and beat North Korean guards who had gone to protest that the tree was in their area; that the guards were compelled to take action in self-defence and that the incident was a planned provocation and that the actions were to aggravate the prevailing situation. War could break out at any moment.”<sup>234</sup>

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<sup>234</sup>– Downs, *ibid.*, p. 152; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *op. cit.*, p. 60; Hong, *ibid.*, pp. 64, 66; *op. cit.*, 2005, p. 277; Kim, “Panmunjöm-üi kilgo kin söljön: 25nyön tongan hyönjang-ül chik’yô pon Yi Chin-ho,” *Chayu kongnon* (1990.7), pp. 167-8; Kirkbride, *ibid.*, p. 31; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), p. 58; 2001(b), p. 108; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *op. cit.*, p. 68; Yoon, *ibid.*, p. 642. Original quotation marks. The view of the U.S. as an instigator remains: “The “Panmunjom incident” was a premeditated provocation of the US imperialists committed on August 18, 1976 to ignite a new war in Korea.” Also, “The “Panmunjom incident” clearly showed that the US imperialists are war provokers and the chief disturbers of world peace. Thirty years have passed since then, but the US imperialists still continue provocations for war against the DPRK.” From Kim, “Panmunjom Incident,” *Naenara: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, no. 602 (August 2006).

The UNC immediately evacuated the two killed officers, a South Korean officer and eight other US and South Korean soldiers to Seoul and demanded a MAC meeting to deal with the incident, but North Korea refused since it had already asked for a security officers' meeting. As the UNC was preparing its press release, many army units were put on alert to await how North Korea would react. The UNC Commander, General Richard Stillwell, returned urgently from his holiday in Japan and called a Command Group meeting in his office. A decision to raise the defence level to level three, that is just before war, was taken that was sanctioned by the National Security Council in Washington and the US President.

Consequently, the aircraft carrier Midway was dispatched from Japan carrying 75 bombers. Two squadrons of 40 fighter planes were moved from Okinawa to air bases in South Korea and 20 F-111 were flown in from the US and B-52s also headed towards South Korea. Many of the preparations required to effect the shift in defence level were readily discernible to North Korea. At the same time, South Korea took measures to raise the defence level. The unanimous view of the South Korean government and the press was that the axe murder was a planned provocation by North Korea. On August 19, President Park Chung Hee met with General Stilwell and urged the US to take retaliatory action against North Korea but without using firearms.<sup>235</sup>

At the 379th MAC meeting called by the South held on August 19, the UNC/MAC Senior Member, Rear Admiral Mark P. Frudden, delivered a strongly worded protest from General Stillwell at the

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<sup>235</sup> Downs, *op. cit.*, p. 152 Hong, *op. cit.*, 2005, p. 284; Kirkbride, *ibid.*, pp. 31-2; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 58, 59-60; Mobley, *Flash Point North Korea*, p. 151; Oberdorfer, *op. cit.*, p. 80; Yun, *op. cit.*, p. 644.

latter's request addressed to the KPA Supreme Commander, Kim Il Sung. On the occasion of the axe murder, the UNC for the first time ever defamed the North as "savage." At the meeting, the South charged the North Koreans with "an unprovoked act of severe hostility," one of the most blatantly brutal acts ever committed since the armistice was signed. Admiral Frudden initially even said: "These actions have been exposed as actions of animals. Not only the UNC but civilized people of the entire world will watch you closely to see that you punish the murderers." An apology and compensation were requested. He also said:

"Never before in the twenty-three years since the cease-fire was formally signed has there been the outright and brutal murder of Joint Security Area security force personnel. This was not the eruption of an unplanned argument. It was a deliberate murder of two UNC personnel who, while engaged in a routine maintenance functions of a type your personnel often perform, were attacked unmercifully by a numerically superior force, wielding axes and clubs. I ask your assistance that an incident such as this will not occur again."<sup>236</sup>

The KPA/CPV Senior Member, Major General Han, replied, after Admiral Frudden had presented a series of photographs clearly showing that the KPA guards had started the attack, that the provocations by the UNC personnel had caused the attack. The North's security guards had acted in self-defence "to protect themselves from a pre-meditated onslaught by an overwhelming force of your side." He claimed that the North's personnel had argued that the tree was planted to protect the road and was supervised by the North. Consequently, before cutting

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<sup>236</sup> Downs, *ibid.*, p. 153; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 341; Hong, *ibid.*, 2005, p. 277; Kirkbride, *ibid.*, p. 78. Original quotation marks.

the branches, an agreement should have been reached. He even pointed to one of the deadly axes that UN troops had carried into the area and showed a blood stain caused by the blood of a KPA soldier as further evidence of UNC provocations and claimed that five North Korean guards were injured, some of whom were “seriously wounded.” The UNC had committed the act to raise tension in a pre-planned action, but the South refuted this claim. The usual demand that the UNC should punish those who organized and commanded the latest “provocation,” expel them from the JSA and give assurances that the UNC would not commit such an act of violence again was repeated.

When North Korea, just 18 minutes before the MAC meeting was to begin, requested to first hold a security officer’s meeting and then a MAC meeting, the UNC/MAC counter-proposed that they be held simultaneously. Otherwise it would not agree to attend the MAC meeting. Neither of the two meetings solved the problem of the incident, but they marked a resolve by the UNC negotiators to ensure that the KPA would refrain from such a criminal act in the future. Meanwhile, North Korea placed the entire nation on a military alert to guard against an invasion by the South and ordered a blackout nationwide. Swedish and Swiss NNSC officers watched the war preparations unfold and hoped that the events could be stopped before they got out of hand. In spite of their rigid practice to be strictly neutral, the Swedish and Swiss officers made it known that they definitively did not approve of the axe murder.<sup>237</sup>

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<sup>237</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 153-4; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, p. 342; Kirkbride, *ibid.*, pp. 76, 78-9; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *op. cit.* p. 67. Original quotation marks. The author has seen no reference to what Czech and Polish NNSC officers did after the axe murder had taken place.

On August 21, work to cut down the tree, named Operation Paul Bunyan after the mythical American lumberjack, began at 7 a.m. by 16 US Army engineers accompanied by a 30-man security platoon and 64 South Korean special forces Taekwondo experts. A convoy of 23 American and South Korean vehicles had brought them into the DMZ. Air support was provided by 27 helicopters. As the ground unit moved into the JSA, B-52s from Guam were ordered to fly along the DMZ. At the same time, the carrier USS Midway and her task group of auxiliary vessels weighed anchor for Korean waters. The carrier launched 40 combat aircraft.

The US Second Infantry Division just outside the JSA was on guard and South Korean Army forces were put on increased readiness alert. For the first time, the UNC made a demonstration of strength within the DMZ and the JSA. No advance notice had been provided, but the US Commander of the operation now gave a message to the joint duty officer to convey to his counterpart from North Korea. It said: "At 0700 hours a United Nations Command work force will enter the Joint Security Area to complete the task begun on Wednesday. Should there be no interference, the work will be completed and the work force will leave." The time was chosen since it was 30 minutes before the KPA guards would man the guard posts.

The work, which started three minutes later, did not face any North Korean reaction due to the US show of massive force and Chinese pressure, although there were about 25-30 security guards at its checkpoints from the east end of the "Bridge of No Return" from 7.30 a.m. and 150 soldiers were seen 50 metres north of the bridge. However, they stayed clear of the JSA while the UNC work force worked. As planned, the operation was, finished at 07.45 but about

three metres of the tree, according to Chang (2003), were left behind in order to remind visitors to Panmunjom of the determination of UN troops to protect South Korea's freedom.<sup>238</sup> When visiting the area in 2006, the author saw a stone monument with a brass plate inscribed in memory of the officers killed, but the tree had been cut down to the ground.

At 7 a.m., UNC vehicles behind the Swiss camp were ready to evacuate the Swedish and Swiss NNSC delegations southwards if they so wished, but the proposal was rejected. Instead, the NNSC representatives immediately went to the JSA to observe and follow developments. Since the UNC informed the Swedish and Swiss NNSC delegations only 15 minutes in advance of the action, they were powerless to affect the situation.

According to Hong (2005), since the UNC, for the first time since 1953, directly responded to a North Korean military provocation, the risk of war was higher than in 1968. The South Korean scholar Taeyoung Yoon (2000) claims that the incident resulted in the most serious crisis since 1953 and could have caused war. Mobley (2003) argues that the end of the Vietnam War probably enabled the US to take tougher steps than during the 1968 Pueblo affair and the 1969 EC-121 incident, which was important since the theatre decision-makers felt that the risk of war was high. Hong (2003) notes that, in contrast to the Pueblo affair, the MAC worked properly

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<sup>238</sup>- Chang, op. cit., p. 108; Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 154-5; Hong, op. cit., 2003, p. 68; Kirkbride, *ibid.*, pp. 115, 116, 135; Knüsli, op. cit., p. 137; Mobley, op. cit., p. 152; Oberdorfer, op. cit., p. 80; Wernstedt, *Några iakttagelser och synpunkter i samband med incidenterna i Panmunjom den 18. och 21. augusti 1976* (n.p., August 30, 1976), p. 1; Yoon, op. cit., p. 651: fn. 28. Original quotation marks.

and made an important contribution to a solution of the incident, but also military power contributed. Mobley asserts that the US response this time was smaller, more rapidly executed and more successful than in 1968 and 1969.<sup>239</sup> It is hard to reject his view but, as we have seen, circumstances were different each time. That war did not break out shows that, as during the Blue House raid and the Pueblo affair, the signatories of the Armistice Agreement wished to maintain the status quo.

While the American commanders now congratulated each other on a job well done the North Korean press reported to its people:

“The U.S. imperialists herded over 300 armed hooligans into the Joint Security Area and had them cut down the tree, demolish our side’s guard posts, and destroy the roadblock of our checkpoint, committing ferocious outrages. The gangsters were protected in their hostilities by B-52 strategic bombers, jet planes, and helicopters.”

On the objective, the press reported:

“The objective of the tree-cutting mission was (1) to renew aggressive war, (2) save themselves from crises inside and outside, (3) for President Ford to bolster up his damaged prestige and scrape more votes in the elections to regain the post of presidency, and (4) save the danger of ruin for the Park Chung Hee puppet clique.”

A warning was made at the end:

“The U.S. Imperialist Aggressors must stop at once their criminal new war plots, look at the stark realities, and act with discretion, and leave South

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<sup>239</sup> Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., p. 61; Hong, *ibid.*, 2003, p. 71; op. cit., 2005, p. 272; Mobley, *ibid.*, pp. 151, 153; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., pp. 67-8; Yoon, *ibid.*, p. 639. Original quotation marks.

Korea without delay, taking all lethal weapons and aggressive forces with them. No force on earth can halt the vigorous advance of our people rallied firmly around the great leader and the glorious party center.”<sup>240</sup>

Ten minutes after the operation was over, the KPA/CPV Senior Member, Major General Han, called his UNC/MAC counterpart. General Han told him that 300 combat soldiers had illegally entered the JSA and protested that under the protection of “military airplanes” and hundreds of combat soldiers stationed on the hill on the opposite side, the tree that the North had taken care of had been carelessly cut down. This was not only an armistice violation but also a provocation against North Korea. The provocation was planned to create a serious military confrontation between the two sides.

He urged the immediate withdrawal of the combat units. The UNC/MAC Senior Member replied that since the operation had ended, all units had been withdrawn at around 9.30 a.m. At 11 a.m., the KPA/CPV Senior Member called his UNC/MAC colleague to request a meeting to discuss the message delivered at the August 19 MAC meeting from the latter to the former. On August 21, Kim Il Sung’s reply was presented at a closed MAC meeting, that is, without representatives from South Korea (except an interpreter) and the media, held at noon that lasted merely 13 minutes. The reply that was regarded as an excuse said:

“It is a good thing that no big thing occurred at Panmunjom for a long period. However, it is regretful that an incident occurred in the JSA, Panmunjom this time.

An effort must be made so that such incidents do not recur in the future. For this purpose both sides should make efforts. We urge your side to

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<sup>240</sup>- Kirkbride, op. cit., pp. 120, 121, 122. Original quotation marks.

prevent the provocation. Our side will never provoke first, but take self-defensive measures only when provocation occurs. This is our constant stand.

I have one thing to add. This morning your side again committed provocation by bringing hundreds of completely armed personnel into the JSA without advance notification. Such an incident on your part might cause such (a) one that occurred on the 18th. I strongly demand your side commit no such provocation.”<sup>241</sup>

As we have seen, the North Koreans have regularly denied UNC/MAC charges against their violations and instead accused the South of perpetrating or fabricating them. In contrast, the axe murder was the only major incident for which North Korea ever expressed regret, close to admission. Hong (2005) records that Major General Han, when conveying the regrets, had said to his UNC/MAC counterpart: “The murder of Bonifas and Barrett was essentially a mistake. I admit that it was an accidental clash.” In fact, according to Downs (1999), the apology could imply “...that North Korea felt a sense of shame over the savagery of the attack, but the decision to apologize was a good tactical move as well.” The North Koreans had reason to fear military retaliation and needed to restore the status quo and took action to do so. That Kim Il Sung for the first time personally answered a protest made by the UNC Commander “...might indicate that the murders were not premeditated - that they resulted from a breakdown in discipline.” Yoon (2000) refers to the opinion that the apology came due to fear of the US show of massive force and Chinese pressure on North Korea.<sup>242</sup>

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<sup>241</sup>- Downs, *op. cit.*, p. 155; Kirkbride, *ibid.*, pp. 123, 126; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), p. 64; Wernstedt, *op. cit.*, p. 1. Original quotation marks.

<sup>242</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 155-6; Hong, *op. cit.*, 2005, p. 286; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(b), p. 105; Yoon, *op. cit.*, p. 651: fn. 28. Original quotation from Hong, *ibid.* The [non-

On August 23, the American government announced that the North's regret was "a positive step." At the NNSC meeting held on August 24, the Swedish delegate urged the parties to maintain peace within the JSA and by all means prevent a recurrence. In every way, the NNSC's important work had to be facilitated and the parties had to cooperate to reduce tension. The Swiss delegate supported his statement whereas the Czech and Polish refrained from saying anything. Since the North's regret did not include an "assurance" for the safety of UNC personnel in the JSA as the UNC Commander had requested, at the 380th MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC convened on August 25 the parties decided to resolve the issue through negotiations. Clearly, in line with the "game theory" there was an opportunity to get out of the zero-sum play so far experienced at meetings and create a win-win situation by negotiating.

At this meeting, the UNC/MAC Senior Member remarked that the UNC considered Kim Il Sung's expression of "regret" and remarks on joint efforts in the JSA to prevent future incidents as a positive but insufficient step. He also urged that those responsible should be punished and a recurrence prevented and demanded assurances for the safety of UNC personnel in the JSA. The KPA/CPV Senior Member replied that its position on the issue had been clearly expressed in the message of August 21 and repeated its key points. In order to prevent a recurrence of a similar incident, the JSA should be divided and security guards from both sides should not have entry to the other's side.<sup>243</sup> At the 381st MAC meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC held

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exemplified] Chinese pressure recorded by Yoon on this occasion and during "Operation Paul Bunyan" are the only examples the author has found of China influencing North Korea's actions.

<sup>243</sup>- The North's proposal was almost identical with that proposed by the UNC at the

on August 28, the US repeated its demands from August 25 but also declared that it would accept a division of the Panmunjom area if the KPA could guarantee that its four checkpoints in the South would be dissolved (there were no UNC checkpoints in the North). The demand to punish those responsible for the axe murder was repeated, but the North Korean view was that this had been included in the excuse.<sup>244</sup>

On August 29, the UNC accepted the proposal from August 25. On September 6, both sides agreed to reorganize the Panmunjom area after six meetings had been held by the MAC Secretariat from August 31; the UNC and KPA forces would be divided. According to the report by Major General Lage Wernstedt, Head of the Swedish NNSC delegation, from September 1976 the Commission played an important role by “supervising” all six meetings held by the MAC Secretariat between August 31 and September 6. Supervision was carried out by members outside the meeting room. All meetings were held in a comparatively free atmosphere and the usual propaganda elements were completely absent. The only exception was the September 1 meeting when tension rose within a limited area and “reinforce-

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306th MAC meeting held on October 17, 1970 (cf. p. 241). Following serious gang fights between guard forces on October 9 and 12, 1970, injuring many, the UNC at the meeting made a proposal to divide the JSA. The number of guards should follow the provisions of the Armistice Agreement: guards should not wear weapons, non-essential guard posts should be removed, contacts or talks between guards should not be permitted, visitors and workers on both sides should be prohibited on meeting days and guards should be separated by the MDL. North Korea refused the proposal replying that it would be sufficient just to take measures to guarantee security and order in the JSA: “What is required for the removal of tension in the JSA... is not a new agreement but strict adherence to the Armistice Agreement.” From Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), p. 70; *op. cit.*, 2004, pp. 111-112.

<sup>244</sup> Downs, *op. cit.*, p. 156; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *op. cit.*, p. 38; Hong, *op. cit.*, 2003, pp. 69-70; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 195-6; Lee, *ibid.*, 2004, p. 107. Original quotation marks. “Assurance” and “regret” are quoted from Lee, *ibid.*, 2004. “Positive step” is quoted from Hong, *ibid.*, 2003, p. 70.

ments” were made by both sides. The presence of NNSC personnel between the two sides actively prevented a further escalation. In the author’s opinion, the contribution to reducing tension indicates that its role should not be underestimated, in contrast to the marginalization when the poplar tree was cut down on August 21. The fact that both parties wanted to reduce tension no doubt formed a “positive symmetry” to base actions on, as was the case during the Pueblo affair.

In accordance with the September 6 “Supplement to the Agreement on the MAC Headquarters Area, Its Security and Its Construction,” military and security personnel, except MAC members, Joint Observer Teams and NNSC delegates, could no longer go into the area of the other side, crossing the MDL. Panmunjom would be bisected along the MDL by the raising of five-centimetre-high and 50-centimetre-wide concrete plates between the seven buildings in the Conference Area; the JSA lost its neutral status. The work, which was supervised by Joint Observer Teams that North Korea had agreed to dispatch for the first time since 1967, was accomplished and put into effect on September 16, after a week of haggling about the size of the markers. Border posts were set up at ten-metere intervals. By September 11, the North Koreans had, as required in the supplement, removed their four guard posts and barrier booms on the UNC side of the JSA. Since the “Bridge of No Return” was now on the UNC side, North Korea built the “72-Hour-Bridge” (UNC nickname) within 72 hours over the Sach’ôn River. The UNC has ever since forbidden passage over the “Bridge of No Return.” In 1977, North Korea completed the construction of a new road into the JSA from the northwest.<sup>245</sup>

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<sup>245</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, p. 157; Kim, “Pundan-ûi sangjing kongdong kyôngbi kuyök,” 2004(11), p. 45; Kirkbride, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-9; Knüsli, *op. cit.*, p. 137; Lee, *op.*

Why did the axe murder take place? According to Lee (2001b), North Korea wanted to test the will of the US during its presidential election whether the security commitment to South Korea would be maintained or not presidential candidate Jimmy Carter advocated the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. North Korea also wanted to make headlines in such a visible place as Panmunjom to create additional pressure both at the Conference of the Non-Allied Nations in Sri Lanka that had opened on August 16 and at the UN General Assembly session in New York.

Another target was to raise public opinion in the US for the withdrawal of troops from South Korea and the dissolution of the UNC, which North Korea has consistently regarded only as a front organization of the US in Korea, whereas the real party to the Armistice Agreement is the US government. However, since the incident became known during the last day of the conference when a resolution on the Korean issue had already been adopted, it had no effect on the conference. The resolution called for a) an immediate halt to “war provocation maneuvers” in South Korea, b) withdrawal of “all the war means” including nuclear weapons from the South, c) withdrawal of all foreign troops from the South, d) replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty and e) unification without foreign interference in accordance with the 1972 July 4 Communiqué in accordance with the North Korean party line on unification.

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cit., 2001(a), pp. 71-2: *ibid.*, 2004, p. 113; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *op. cit.*, p. 68; *NNSC Chief Delegates - List Updated April 14, 1997*; *The Korea Times*, “Text of JSA Agreement,” September 7, 1976; Wernstedt, *Bilaga 2: Verksamheten inom MAC, NNSC, Röda Kors-samtalen och SNCC* (n. p., September 30, 1976), p. 1. Original quotation marks. The “Text of JSA Agreement” is recorded in Korean by Kim (“Chôngjôn hyöpchông,” 2006, pp. 77-8).

Hong (2003) writes that the American CIA and high-level officials regarded the axe murder as a planned and deliberate provocation. By provoking the act, a sense of crisis in the Korean peninsula would be raised at the Conference of the Non-Allied Nations which would create a public opinion for the dissolution of the UNC and the withdrawal of American troops. The view was that an opinion for a troop withdrawal would also be created in the US presidential elections. At a time of detente and a world-wide anti-war opinion after the end of the Vietnam War, demands for a troop withdrawal and a dissolution of the UNC gained considerable support. In 1975, the UN General Assembly for the first time adopted a resolution raised by North Korea's allies that requested a dissolution of the UNC, the withdrawal of foreign (US) troops and replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. However, the axe murder exerted a strong negative influence on North Korea. Hong (2005) writes that it strengthened the opinion in the US that the American troops were needed to preserve peace on the Korean peninsula.

The former American journalist Don Oberdorfer (2001) records that on August 5 North Korea had charged in a lengthy government statement that the US and South Korea were stepping up plans to invade the North. P'yôngyang claimed they "have now finished war preparations and are going over to the adventurous machination to directly ignite the fuse of war." Puzzled, several American intelligence analysts attempted to send a warning to US forces in South Korea but this was not done. Instead, on August 6, the first abortive attempt was made to trim the poplar tree.<sup>246</sup>

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<sup>246</sup>- Hong, op. cit., 2003, pp. 70-71: op. cit., 2005, pp. 283, 284, 289; Lee, op. cit.,

According to Downs (1999), President Kim Il Sung, in an interview with the Japanese newspaper *Mainichi Shimbun* on November 27, 1976, attempted to regain some of the ground lost by the axe murder by offering the following version of the incident:

“The tree had been standing at the same place for over 20 years. The security guards from each side stood guard, facing each other for many years, but the tree had not obstructed observation. The U.S. forces tried to cut down the tree, though our guards did not permit that. When our soldiers stopped them, an American soldier took an axe from a South Korean worker and threw it at our soldiers. One of our men was hit by the axe thrown by the American soldier, and his nose started bleeding. Our soldier threw back the axe and it hit an American soldier and he fell down. “Confused fighting” then broke out between the two sides the South Korean soldiers and workers all ran away. The fighting was between our four guard personnel and American soldiers. Two Americans were killed and several of our guard personnel were wounded, but no one, on our side, was killed.”<sup>247</sup>

In an interview on December 3 with a Japanese writer, President Kim Il Sung said that “it was an unexpected incident” and that “our soldiers were caught in a provocative trap,” that is, in reality admitting that their act was a blunder. However, at this time the axe murder had already undermined North Korea’s position; on September 22, 1976, the Communist bloc withdrew its usual resolution at the UN General Assembly since the prospects of winning a vote were very bleak. The resolution called for a disbandment of the UNC and the withdrawal of foreign (US) forces from South Korea. Most importantly, the Soviet Union and China expressed little support: North Korea did not raise

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2001(b), pp. 109, 111: *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 111, 151; Oberdorfer, *op. cit.*, pp. xiv, 77. Original quotation marks.

<sup>247</sup>- Downs, *op. cit.*, p. 157. Original quotation marks.

its demands afterwards in the UN.<sup>248</sup> In brief, the axe murder was a serious blunder by North Korea. However, the UNC shares part of the blame for the incident by neglecting the North Korean government's charges of war preparations made on August 5 that should be regarded as more serious than the claims repeatedly raised at MAC meetings and in 1973 with regard to tension in the West Sea. Moreover, the UNC did not notify North Korea in advance of the tree felling.

#### 4.8 Tunnels discovered under the DMZ

On November 15, 1974, a nine-man South Korean police patrol belonging to the UNC uncovered 'a large underground approach tunnel being constructed by North Korea inside the southern sector of the Demilitarized Zone' around ten kilometres east of Panmunjom and 65 kilometres north of Seoul. Previously, in 1970-71, five attempts by North Korean forces to build tunnels under the southern fence of the DMZ to observe southern positions had been detected. After a sentry in the southern part of the DMZ had heard a faint tapping beneath his feet in November 1973, the search for tunnels was redoubled.

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<sup>248</sup> Hong, *op. cit.*, 2003, p. 71; *op. cit.*, 2005, pp. 286, 288; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(b), p. 111. Original quotation marks. The demand to disband the UNC remains: the Korean Central News Agency wrote on November 4, 2008, in "Disbandment of "UN Command" Demanded" (<http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm>) that a DPRK delegate at the meeting of the Fourth Committee of the 63rd UN General Assembly on October 27 demanded the dis-solution of the UNC. The UNC "is nothing but the U.S. forces command as it is a product of the Cold War." Also, "...the U.S. has persistently insisted on the continued existence of the above said command. This is aimed to justify and perpetuate the U.S. forces' presence in south Korea and bring multinational forces to the Korean peninsula with ease in any time in case of emergency." Finally, "The "UN Command" should be dissolved with-out delay as required by the resolution of the 30th UN General Assembly, he urged."

Since on November 15, 1974 steam ascended from the ground, the patrol started to dig and found concrete around 45 centimetres below earth which was free from frost only above the tunnel. North Korean guards fired at them for an hour but, although fire was returned, there were no casualties. The tunnel was 1.2 metres high and 90 centimetres wide, stretched 1.2 kilometres south of the MDL and presumably began around two kilometres north of the MDL. The total length was 3.5 kilometres and the maximum depth 180 metres. The walls and the ceiling were made of approximately 30-centimetre-wide concrete slabs. There were areas for sleeping and weapons storage. The tunnel was equipped with 220 volt electric light, 60 watt bulbs and decauville track with a wagon to remove earth and building materials.<sup>249</sup> Some tools and personal effects were also found. One regiment of soldiers could be moved per hour. The UNC suggested dispatching a joint observer team to inspect the tunnel, but since the North refused, it sent its own observer team.

On November 17, the UNC/MAC Senior Member and Secretary showed the tunnel to the heads of the Swedish and Swiss NNSC delegations. When the tunnel was inspected on November 20, one American and one South Korean officer died in an explosion that probably occurred due to mines.<sup>250</sup> Five Americans and one South

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<sup>249</sup> The French railway builder Paul Decauville (1846-1922) constructed in 1876 a narrow-gauge railway consisting of short, pre-assembled rail sections that were easily put together. The system became widely used for construction, industrial railways and military usage in the field. From *Nationalencyklopedin*, vol. 4, "Decauville, Paul" (Höganäs: Bokförlaget Bra Böcker AB, 1990), p. 459.

<sup>250</sup> The total number of landmine victims from 1953 up to July 1999 was 3,000. The population exposed to mines then amounted to nearly 50,000 on the northern islands, including Paengnyöngdo, and near the northern area of the Civilian Control Line five to twenty kilometres from the MDL. The line was drawn up by

Korean were wounded. South Korea regarded the tunnel as evidence that, in spite of having publicly declared its peaceful intentions, North Korea had not abandoned its plans to intervene in the South through military action or, at least, dispatches of agents, but the North denied any complicity. At the 356th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on November 26, the UNC/MAC accused the North of having built the tunnel and showed photos. The North claimed that the tunnel “has nothing to do with us” but was one of the South’s “politically motivated tricks” and denied any responsibility. According to

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the South Korean government after the war to prevent the deployment of troops and weaponry and the establishment of military facilities in the DMZ. It forbade civilians to reside or engage in industrial activities without permission. In July 1999, the Ministry of National Defence reportedly claimed that landmine victims in the military with an annual 2,000 cases were twice as high as among civilians. From Hahm (*The Living History of the DMZ*, pp. 45-6, 187-8). The first mine accident the author is aware of took place in January 1964. One of the American drivers serving the NNSC lost both feet when he stepped on a mine in a so-called mine-free area. From Ugglå, *Swedish Group NNSC, Denna orientering omfattar* (Panmunjom, January 31, 1964), p. 3. On December 7, 1979, American soldiers who had changed shifts lost the way, crossed the MDL and entered into a North Korean mine field. One soldier died and two were wounded. North Korea returned all of them. From Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), p. 210. On May 17, 1982, seven UNC soldiers on patrol around 400 metres south of the MDL were injured by the explosion of mines. The soldiers and the personnel who tried to rescue them were fired on from five guards posts in the North. From Kim, “Hyujôn ihu ssangbang chôngjôn hyôpchông wiban,” in Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoë p’yôllam: che 6 chip*, 2006, p. 199. During the 1990s, 15 civilians and 47 soldiers died in mine accidents. The number of injured men was 38 and 64 respectively. From Cho (“Chiroe p’ihæ!,” pp. 444, 445-6) who quotes figures in the report announced by the Korea Campaign to Ban Landmines on January 15, 2003. In sharp contrast, in 1997 Choi wrote in “Hanbando-esô-ûi chôkpôphan chiroe sayong-ûn pojangtwaë-ya handa” (p. 100) that mine fields were thoroughly supervised by soldiers and that their positions were well recorded. Since marking of mines was clear and control over civilians was well implemented, there were no civilian injuries. Feigenbaum wrote in “Korea United” (op. cit., 2001) that since most mines were concentrated in well-designated ‘fields’ along the DMZ and surrounding areas, they did not affect farming and industry. The nature of the mine problem in North Korea was unknown.

North Korean defector Kim Pu-sông (1985), more than 100 workers had been involved in its construction. Kim was educated in mechanical engineering and worked for two years as a surveyor and designer. During this time, eight people died in accidents and more than 50 were injured. The tunnel was important to attack Seoul.<sup>251</sup> The account entirely contradicts the North's denials.

On March 19, 1975, the UNC announced that a second tunnel had been discovered in the central part of the DMZ, 13 kilometres north of Ch'ôr-wôn and about 80 kilometres northeast of Seoul. It was discovered after information had been provided by various sources. The first signs of underground activity in the area were noted in November 1973 and from December the same year underground minor and major explosions were recorded at the same time as diversionary, above-ground explosions. In December 1974, explosions were localized to the area north of Ch'ôr-wôn. In February 1975, it was suspected that there was a tunnel 50 metres below the surface. By means of around 50 drillings and photographing with special equipment over a period of about two months, it was concluded that the tunnel was two metres wide and two metres high and stretched approximately 500 metres south of the MDL. The total length was 3.5 kilometres. To reach the tunnel, which was situated 60-160 metres

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<sup>251</sup> Bailey, op. cit., p. 184; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., pp. 49-50; Gerring, op. cit., november 1974: *Bilaga 1* (n. p., December 9, 1974), pp. 1, 3-4; *Bilaga 2*, p. 1; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 321-2; Kim, "Pimujang chidae-ûi Namch'im ttanggur-ûl palgyônhamyönsô 1975nyön," *Pukhan* (August 1985), pp. 133-4, 135; Knüsli, op. cit., p. 136; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, p. 186; Mun, "Pukhan Namch'ïmyong ttangkul Sôul simjangbu toch'aksöl chinsang: ittan chebo, simnijôn rumô ch'ujök," *Chayu kongnon* (1994.1), pp. 153, 164; Oberdorfer, op. cit., pp. 56-7. Original quotation marks. To the author's knowledge, a regiment consists of 1,600-3,000 men.

below the surface, a transverse tunnel was built in March. The tunnel allowed the passage of light vehicles, heavy weapons and pieces of ordinance. The South estimated that one division could pass through per hour. Another estimation was 30,000 men per hour. During investigations on March 24, seven enlisted South Korean men died of suffocation from explosive gas stored in the tunnel. That water drained from the south to the north and that dynamite was loaded from the north to the south was presented as evidence by South Korea that North Korea had built the tunnel.

On March 20, defector Lieutenant Yu Tae-yun from the KPA who had fled earlier in March through the Conference Area revealed that the construction of tunnels within the whole DMZ had begun in 1972 on the order of Kim Il Sung. On March 21, Kim Pu-sông, who had been a member of the Korean Workers' Party and fled in September 1974 while he was dispatched on a mission to South Korea, and Lieutenant Yu revealed that the main purpose of the tunnels was to quickly dispatch troops into South Korea behind the DMZ and to dispatch spies. Both defectors were involved in the construction of the tunnels and had provided important information to help discover and reveal the tunnels. They revealed that construction of the second tunnel had begun in October 1972. In 1985, Kim wrote that its construction, ordered by Kim Il Sung, had begun as one part of the policy to re-unify Korea under Communist rule after a long period of preparations and tests.

Since North Korean officers who had been dispatched to Vietnam in the late 1960s reported that the Vietcong had caused enormous injuries to the US thanks to their tunnels, Kim decided to apply this experience in Korea as well, but tunnels had been built during the

Korean War to protect them from American air attacks. Equipment for building tunnels had been imported on a large scale since 1975, of which especially machines from the Swedish company Atlas-Copco worked very fast.<sup>252</sup> To the author's knowledge, rumours say that the tunnels could have been built with Atlas-Copco machinery.

South Korea assessed that the purpose of the tunnel was to launch a surprise, large-scale attack and to dispatch agents as well as minor units to lead guerrilla groups. North Korea considered these accusations to be fabricated by the US and South Korea to raise inter-Korean tension. When the South accused the North, on the basis of, among other evidence, videotapes with records from interrogations with the two defectors, of having built the tunnels and urged their destruction at the 361st MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on March 20, the North stated that the tunnel incident was fabricated by the South to divert attention from its domestic problems. The South regarded the North's rejection of the proposal to dispatch a Joint Observer Team as admission of having built the two illegal tunnels. The UNC/MAC invited the NNSC to visit the tunnel in a letter dated April 3. At the meeting held on April 8, the Czech and Polish members opposed the proposal on the grounds that the issue lay

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<sup>252</sup> Beckman, op. cit., September 6, 1977, *Bilaga 2*, pp. 1-2; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *ibid.*, p. 50; Gerring, op. cit., April 9, 1975, *Bilaga 1*, p. 2; Kim, *ibid.*, 1985, pp. 134, 135; Kim, *DMZ p'yŏnghwa tapsa*, 2006, pp. 201-202; Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), pp. 110-111; Mun, *ibid.*, p. 153; Oberdorfer, *ibid.*, p. 56. In contrast to Försvarets Läromedelscentral (*ibid.*) and Gerring (*ibid.*), who record that the tunnel stretched 500 meters south of the MDL, Kim (*ibid.*, 2006, p. 201) and Mun (*ibid.*) give the figure 1,100 meters but none of the works provide any sources. The higher figure of soldiers is from the South Korean journalist Mun Il-sŏk (*ibid.*, pp. 152, 153) but no source is recorded for any of the estimates. To the author's knowledge, a division consists of 5,000-10,000 men.

outside the Commission's mandate. Eventually, the NNSC acknowledged receipt of the letter and referred to the discussion on April 8.

At the 362nd MAC meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on May 27, the UNC/MAC Senior Member showed photos as evidence and urged the North to stop building tunnels within the DMZ and to destroy those under construction. The South asserted that "the illegal tunnels are the biggest threat to peace in the Korean peninsula since the Communist invasion in 1950." The KPA/CPV Senior Member accused the South of having built the tunnels and jeopardizing the Armistice Agreement by "violating peace in and around the buffer zone."<sup>253</sup> The South's opinion implies that the threat of war was now even higher than during the 1968 Blue House raid and the Pueblo incident and the 1976 axe murder but since the author has found this opinion only once, it seems to be somewhat unreasonable.

At the 391st MAC meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC held on October 27, 1978, the South announced that a third tunnel had been found under the DMZ. It was discovered on June 23 thanks to drillings. North Koreans stopped work on June 25. Photos of and evidence from the tunnel that was found on October 17 after almost four years' searching were shown. Defector Kim Pu-sông had provided materials that were helpful in discovering the tunnel. The opinion was that the sole reason for having built the tunnel was to intrude with military forces into South Korea. The UNC/MAC strongly protested and urged

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<sup>253</sup>- Gerring, *ibid.*, April 9, 1975, *Bilaga 1*, pp. 2-3; *Bilaga 2*, p. 1; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 327; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, p. 188; Månsson, *Månadsrapport, april 1975: Bilaga 2* (n. p., May 7, 1975), pp. 1-2; *Månadsrapport, maj 1975: Bilaga 6* (n. p., June 4, 1975), p. 1; Swedish officer, letter June 20, 2006. Original quotation marks.

North Korea to destroy all tunnels, but the North argued that the South had fabricated the incident, which it had nothing to do with since there was no need at all to dig a tunnel. The location was 4.3 kilometres from Panmunjom and three kilometres from “Freedom Bridge” in the westernmost sector of the DMZ, 44 kilometres north of Seoul.<sup>254</sup> It was approximately two metres wide and two metres high. The tunnel was on average 75 metres below the surface and its length was 1,640 metres, 400 metres of which lay in the southern part of the DMZ. Theoretically, 2,000 men could pass through per hour, but another estimate was 30,000 men. Field artillery could also be moved.

On November 21, the NNSC discussed a letter from the UNC/MAC Senior Member on the tunnel. The suggestion was that the NNSC should conduct an impartial investigation if the KPA/CPV Senior Member approved. The Swedish and Swiss members, who had seen the tunnel on November 9, were willing to participate, but the Czech and Polish members refused since events within the DMZ were outside the competence of the NNSC. They also argued that the MAC had already handled the issue. North Korea had again refused to participate in a joint investigation repeatedly suggested by the UNC.<sup>255</sup>

Thanks to a tip-off by the North Korean Air Force Officer Lee

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<sup>254</sup>- The “Freedom Bridge” got its name when prisoners-of-war were exchanged after the Korean War: on January 20-21, 1954 when 7,604 North Korean and 14,235 Chinese prisoners-of-war supervised by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission rejected the Communists’ last persuasions and chose the free world, they crossed over this bridge (cf. “Bridge of No Return,” p. 223: fn. 182). From Lee, “Segye-esô kajang mujanghwoen ‘pimujang chidae’,” 1998(a), pp. 1-2.

<sup>255</sup>- Bailey, op. cit., p. 184; Fornwall, *Sammanfattande rapport* (n. p., October 30, 1978), pp. 9, 10; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, op. cit., pp. 39, 53-4; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 352-3; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, p. 199; Lee, op. cit., 2001 (a), p. 111; Mun, op. cit., p. 153. Mun (ibid.) records 30,000 men but gives no source.

Wung-pyung, who had defected to South Korea in a MiG-19 in February 1983, a fourth tunnel was discovered by the South Korean army 26 kilometres northeast of Yanggu near the east coast on March 3, 1990. Reportedly, drilling had begun in May 1989 after noises had been heard. The tunnel was 2,052 metres long, 1,502 of which were in the south, 1,7 metres high and wide and located 145 metres below the surface. An estimated 30,000 men could pass through per hour and field artillery could be moved. As in 1975, the fact that drainage water flowed from the south to the north and that dynamite was loaded from the north to the south was claimed as evidence by South Korea that North Korea had built the tunnel. However, North Korea again asserted that South Korea had built the tunnel to invade the North.

The UNC/MAC strongly protested the tunnel at the 455th MAC meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on March 14, and showed videos, photos and other evidence. The North claimed that the tunnel was a false propaganda trick for the South to be used for political purposes. Both sides rejected each other's proposals for a joint investigation. In 1994, South Korean military authorities estimated that there were probably more than 20 tunnels. Mueller-Lhotska (1997) records that there were 17 presumed tunnels.<sup>256</sup>

In 1978, two former heads of the Swedish NNSC delegation made evaluations of the Commission. Major General Magnus Bruzelius, Head in 1972-73, expressed the opinion that the NNSC during the

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<sup>256</sup>- Hahm, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-8; Kim, *op. cit.*, 2006, p. 238; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, p. 232; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2004, pp. 67-8; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *op. cit.*, p. 54; Mun, *ibid.*, pp. 153, 158; Park, "Armistice Agreement and Peace on Korean Peninsula," 1998, p. 85.

past 25 years had a restraining and equalizing role in many cases. The exact value could not be estimated, but he made the point that “it exists, that is enough.” Similarly, Major General Gunnar Gerring, Head in 1974-1975, wrote that the NNSC “Through its mere existence in the middle of the buffer zone between the combating parties, the Commission should have had a stabilizing influence and contributed to reduce tension, not least when incidents occurred within the DMZ.”

Major General Jan Beckman, Head of the Delegation, wrote in his summary report to the Army Chief for April 1977-April 1978 that the main task of the NNSC was that its members, through their unique opportunities for a certain degree of observation on both sides, might possibly correct distorted pictures in their propaganda. Daily contacts with representatives of both sides were also considered to be of great significance by enabling observation of changes in mindsets and the current situation on both sides. The NNSC was valuable as an established organ of contacts with knowledge of people and a certain degree of confidence on both sides, who wished the Commission to remain. His successor, Major General Sture Fornwall, wrote in his summary report to the Army Chief for April-October 1978 that the main significance of the NNSC was to convey impressions from both sides of the MDL to the parties since members of the Commission were the only people who maintained contact with the North as well as the South. Both sides accepted its role as an established organ of contact. The NNSC played a balancing role in the Korean peninsula and the parties wished the Commission to remain.

Finally, it is worth noting that Park (1998) records statistics from the MAC stating that North Korea had committed altogether 49,414 armistice violations from 1971-1980, of which 49,371 on

land, 26 at sea and 17 in the air (cf. pp. 175-6, 262). On the other hand, the South Korean scholar Ch'oe Sŏng-ch'ŏl (1999) points out that during the 1970s North and South Korea for the first time recognized the other government as a dialogue partner: North-South relations changed from "confrontation without dialogue" to "confrontation with dialogue." The number of MAC meetings fell from 184 held in 1960-1969 to 100 in 1970-1979.<sup>257</sup>

## 4.9 Conclusions

During the 1970s as well, the MAC and the NNSC helped to secure peace, although their roles should still not be overestimated. The MAC played an important role in reducing the severe tension created by the 1976 axe murder. In a deviation from the established "zero-sum game" that otherwise continued, this tense situation created an opportunity to start negotiations to achieve a "win-win" situation that was eventually manifested by the division of the Joint Security Area (JSA) and the separation of security forces that had originally been proposed by the South in 1970. The NNSC still helped to reduce tension but due to its composition in a few cases failed to achieve unity on contentious issues raised by the two parties. The Commission still received credit for its contributions to secure peace. Following the axe murder, both parties' wish to maintain the status

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<sup>257</sup>- Beckman, *Sammanfattande rapport* (n. p., April 24, 1978), pp. 1, 18, 24; Bruzelius, "Korea - krig och stillestånd," 1978, p. 602; Ch'oe, *op. cit.*, 2002, pp. 83, 99; Fornwall, *op. cit.*, October 30, 1978, p. 18; Gerring, "Sverige och den koreanska frågan under vapenstilleståndet," 1978, p. 147; Kukpang chŏngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 72, 158, 202; NNSC *Chief Delegate - List Updated April 14, 1997*; Park, *ibid.*, 1998, p. 78. Original quotation marks from Ch'oe, *ibid.*, 2002, p. 99.

quo formed a “positive symmetry” that enabled the NNSC to contribute to the accomplishment of new security arrangements for the JSA.

Although there was a marked rise in recorded armistice violations, violations were less severe than during the 1960s, casualties far lower and fewer MAC meetings were held. However, the 1976 axe murder, as was the case with the 1968 Blue House raid and the Pueblo affair, raised fears of war. However, the level of “negative peace” was rather lower, but in comparison to the 1950s it was higher. That North-South dialogue took place for the first time should be regarded as a step in the right direction to preserve peace, but the 1972 July 4 Communiqué was the only concrete result. However, the two Koreas’ divergent views prevented an implementation of the communiqué, not least due to the presence of American troops in South Korea, but the abduction of Kim Dae Jung in 1973 was the excuse for breaking off the dialogue.

Rearmaments, North Korea’s demand for the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea and militarization of the DMZ remained contentious issues in the MAC. Military exercises became an increasingly contested issue. The parties’ positions on these issues remained fixed, preventing any constructive dialogue. The North still accused the South of war preparations and both sides’ proposals to demilitarize the DMZ failed. North-South dialogue led to a reduction in armistice violations by North Korea but they did not end. Most violations took place on land. The dispute on the maritime border continued to raise tension. President Jimmy Carter’s policy to withdraw American troops that was supported by North Korea facilitated a smooth solution to a helicopter incident in 1977. Inspired by the American retreat from Vietnam, North Korea changed its position on

whom to sign a peace treaty with from South Korea to the US in 1974.

In 1976, the Panmunjom axe murder of two American officers took place due to a dispute regarding a tree in the JSA, but underlying reasons were North Korea's policy to test the willingness of the US to defend South Korea and to gain world-wide support for a troop withdrawal. Although North Korean officers committed the murders, the UNC shares responsibility for the incident by ignoring previous warnings not to cut down the tree and by not notifying the North in advance. In a deviation from established patterns, North Korea expressed regret for the axe murder whereas the UNC/MAC admitted the 1977 helicopter incident. The axe murder turned out to be a great blunder by North Korea, which in 1976 failed to gain support for raising a resolution in the UN.

North Korea strongly rejected the UNC/MAC's protests against invasion tunnels constructed under the DMZ and discovered in 1974, 1975, 1978 and 1990. North Korean defectors helped to locate them and provided data contradicting the denials. The tunnel issue caused severe tension and also involved the NNSC.

Chapter 5

*Continued Tension  
but Renewed Dialogue  
during the 1980s*



Peace—keeping in the Korean peninsula

## 5.1 Introduction

As we saw in Chapter 4, armistice violations continued throughout the 1970s, but a difference was that North-South dialogue took place for the first time. The 1976 Panmunjom axe murder was a serious violation that could even have led to war. Since the Joint Security Area (JSA) was divided after the incident, the impact of this division is analyzed in this chapter.

The first section investigates rearmaments by recording data on the militarization of the DMZ, both during the 1980s and afterwards, to give a representative view of this issue that had recurred ever since the 1950s, including the zone's impact on inter-Korean relations. Since rearmaments, the status of American troops and military exercises such as the recurring "Team Spirit" remained contentious issues within the MAC; how the Commission handled these interrelated issues is then analyzed. Whether the Seoul 1988 Olympic Games affected developments is analyzed here and afterwards. Whether the two sides' positions differed from those previously expressed or not is also investigated.

The following section deals with major armistice violations, including the incident when a Soviet citizen defected across the MDL in 1984, that were raised in the MAC. In contrast to previous chapters, no distinction is made between violations that took place on land, at sea and in the air since the number of incidents covered in this chapter is smaller. Statistics on armistice violations are recorded and compared to find out whether developments differed from or resembled previous periods.

As in 1971-73, a period of thaw in inter-Korean relations deve-

loped in 1984-85 when a dialogue was held and cross-border contacts took place. The background to the dialogue, how it was pursued, what concrete results it brought and why it was interrupted is analyzed with great consideration given to the role of the NNSC in the process. Whether the NNSC on its own could promote peace or not is also analyzed.

## **5.2 Rearmaments, Military Exercises and American Troops raised in the MAC**

As we have seen, the DMZ is all but demilitarized. The North Korean Captain Sin Chong-ch'ol, who had worked 12 years in the DMZ and defected through the zone to South Korea on May 7, 1983, the 93rd defector since 1953, stated that there were 18 heavily armed, strongly fortified guard posts in his division area. Each guard post had 36 personnel assigned. There were altogether 648 well-armed men in each division sector, comprising more than half of the total number of 1,024 men authorized in the entire North Korean part of the DMZ. The number of personnel allowed on each side of the DMZ had been raised to 1,024 when "The Rules for Civil Shipping in the Han River Estuary and Related Matters" allowing 24 civil police to maintain order and enforcing the provisions of these rules in that area were approved at the 22nd MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on October 3, 1953. The rules would be enforced from October 10.

Captain Sin also described in detail extensive illegal fortifications and tunnels, barriers, electric fences, mines, illegal arms, including automatic weapons, machine guns, grenade launchers, anti-aircraft artillery, recoilless rifles and hand-held surface-to-air missiles in the

northern half of the DMZ. Three months before Captain Sin's defection, Air Force Officer Lee Wung-pyung had defected to South Korea in a MiG-19. He revealed that North Korea had set up a "Five to Seven Day Invasion Plan": South Korea would be occupied within a week after an invasion. An underground tunnel northeast of Yanggu was part of the plan (cf. p. 320).<sup>258</sup>

The South Korean scholar Seong-Ho Jhe records (1997) that North Korea had installed and maintained 66 military camp sites (28 with trench mortars, 25 with anti-aircraft guns, 4 with field artillery and 9 with anti-tank weapons), four tunnels, 29.4 kilometres of mine zones, 283 guard and observation posts, 100 broadcasting facilities, iron-railing fences and barracks etc. Jhe writes (2000) that South Korea, in response, had installed 96 guard and observation posts and ten broadcasting facilities at principal locations. Compatriot scholar Chae-han Kim (2006) records similar figures: there were reportedly more than 280 North Korean guard and observation posts and over 90 South Korean posts. Each post had 30 soldiers equipped with trench mortar, anti-tank weapons, hand-grenades, automatic rifles and other weapons prohibited in the Armistice Agreement. However, since the concentration of military power in the DMZ was far lower than in the

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<sup>258</sup>- Hahm, *The Living History of the DMZ*, pp. 147-8; Jhe, "Chôngjôn hyöpchông-gwa Nampuk kyoryu hyömnyök: chôngjôn hyöpchông-úi yökhal-gwa silch'on kwaje mosaek," *Hanbando kunbi t'ongje* 38 (2005.12), pp. 167-8: fn. 16; Kim (ed.), *The Korean DMZ - Reverting beyond Division*, 2001, pp. 304, 307; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoë p'yôllam: che 2 chip*, 1993, pp. 29, 212; Lee, "Segye-esô kajang mujanghwa-toen 'pimujang chidae," 1998(a), p. 15: "History of Korea's MDL and Reduction of Tension along the DMZ and Western Sea through Confidence Building Measures between North and South Korea," pp. 101-102; *The Korea Times*, "Thru DMZ in Central Region: NK Army Capt. Defects," May 8, 1983. The October 3, 1953, rules are recorded in Korean by Kim in "Chôngjôn hyöpchông," 2006, pp. 51-2.

areas from the rear of the northern and southern limit lines of the zone up to the area under the jurisdiction of reserve divisions, the zone also helped to reduce tension.

According to the former UNC/MAC advisor James Lee (1998a), the DMZ had most fortifications and the highest concentration of combat strength; he labeled it “the world’s most militarized ‘demi-litized zone.’” Jhe (2000) calls it a “Heavily Militarized Zone.” A Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) documentary from 2001 labeled the DMZ “the most militarized area in the world.” In 2004, Lee labeled the zone “...the most fortified DMZ in the world...”<sup>259</sup>

In addition, during the 1980s the North repeatedly criticized rearmaments and, above all, joint South Korea-US military exercises. At the 398th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on January 22, 1980, the North criticized the joint exercise “Maegaeks 80” that approached the DMZ as a war exercise. By bringing more American troops and brand-new weapons into South Korea, the South pursued a two-Korea policy. The exercise should be stopped and all military forces as well as operational equipment should without delay be withdrawn. There was no threat of invasion from the North but there was from the South which threatened peace and obstructed reunification. The UNC/MAC asserted that the exercise was held to defend South Korea. Neither the exercise nor the troop withdrawal issue had

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<sup>259</sup>- Jhe, “Pimujang chidaena-e-ŭi p’yŏnghwa kujo pangan,” 1997, p. 138: *Hanbando p’yŏnghwa ch’ŕje-ŭi mosaek*, 2000, p. 87; KBS *Sŭp’esyŏl: Pimujang chidae-ŭi ibangin-dŭl - chungnippguk kamdok wiwŏnhoe* ([http://tongil.kbs.co.kr/dataroom/data\\_report\\_list\\_view.php?code=300&tabl](http://tongil.kbs.co.kr/dataroom/data_report_list_view.php?code=300&tabl), June 24, 2001); Kim, *DMZ p’yŏnghwa tapsa*, 2006, pp. 7, 23; Lee, *ibid.*, 1998(a), p. 1: *Panmunjom, Korea*, 2004, p. 215. The data recorded by Jhe (*ibid.*, 1997, p. 138) are the only the author has found on minefields in North Korea.

anything to do with the Armistice Agreement. The latter issue, in accordance with Paragraph 60, should be raised at a high-level political conference.

At the 399th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV convened on March 13, the North criticized the joint South Korea-US exercise TS [Team Spirit]-80 that had started on March 1, involving altogether 160,000 soldiers and claimed that it was a preparation for war. The South mentioned that during the past 20 years the North had criticized military exercises at more than 60 meetings and emphasized that TS-80 was a defensive and an open exercise held far away from the DMZ that did not violate the Armistice Agreement. Again, it argued that military exercises were not an issue to raise in the MAC and noted that the North also carried out exercises. When the 400th meeting requested by the UNC/MAC took place on April 3, the North claimed that the TS-80 exercise created a war atmosphere and criticized the signing of the South Korea-US Defence Agreement in 1953 which had strengthened the South's combat power. Military exercises were criticized by the North once more in 1980.

At the 405th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on February 13, 1981, the North criticized the "TS-81 South Korea-US Joint Exercise" which had started on February 1, involving more than 61,500 American and 170,000 South Korean troops and urged a halt. This annual exercise was regarded as a preparation for war. The South asserted that the exercise was unrelated to the armistice and aimed to guarantee its ability to protect the Republic of Korea. At the 408th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on November 9, the North urged the withdrawal of US troops and replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. Rearmaments were raised at three more meetings

in 1981 and accusations of war preparations were made by the North at two of these.<sup>260</sup>

At the 409th meeting called by the UNC/MAC convened on December 28, the South pointed out that it had observed secret military exercises in the North and proposed that major exercises should be announced in advance to the other side. At this time, it became known that there was a large-scale army corps exercise conducted in the interior eastern parts of North Korea, but why it was conducted was unclear. The South declared it would conduct TS-82 from February 13 to April 26, 1982.

At the 410th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on January 23, 1982, the South announced that five MAC representatives from the North and four NNSC members would be invited to inspect TS-82. When the KPA delegation to the MAC, along with the Czech and Polish NNSC members, were invited by the Swedish and Swiss delegations on January 29, the Senior Member, Major General Han, declared that if a formal invitation came, he would reject it since inspection could be regarded as formal approval of the exercise, but he did not oppose the exercise in itself. However, North Korea was unwilling to accept the introduction of new weapons and foreign troops in connection with the exercise; that would be a potential threat.

At the 411th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on March 9, the North urged an immediate halt to TS-82, which involved more than 160,000 men. The exercise was an outrageous armistice violation

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<sup>260</sup> Haph'am chôngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoë p'yôllam; che 4 chip*, 1999, pp. 359, 360, 366; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 203, 204, 206, 207, 208..

and a severe challenge for the whole Korean people's hope for reunification. The UN forces should be withdrawn immediately. The UNC/MAC explained that its exercises, unlike the North's, were open and aimed to preserve peace and declared that joint South Korean-US exercises would continue. At the 414th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on June 26, the North claimed that the US was planning a second Korean war, in particular through "Team Spirit." The South also claimed that the North had begun to rearm even before the ink at the Armistice Agreement had dried. Rearmaments were raised at five meetings in 1981-82. At two of them, accusations of war preparations were made. An American troop withdrawal was requested once.<sup>261</sup>

At the 416th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on February 3, 1983, the North denounced the large-scale, joint South Korea-US exercise "TS-83" which had started on February 1, involving more than 188,000 man and urged an immediate halt to the war exercise, which was one part of a two-Korea policy and seriously threatened peace. The South asserted that the exercise was conducted only to maintain the armistice and hinder an invasion. Moreover, military exercises had nothing to do with the Armistice Agreement. It requested that five representatives from North Korea in the MAC and four NNSC members should observe the exercise, but the KPA/CPV Senior Member rejected the proposal, alleging that its purpose was to conceal "the northward invasion tactics" of the UNC and the Republic

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<sup>261</sup> Blom, *Månadsrapport december 1981: Bilaga 3* (n.p., January 8, 1982), p. 1; *Månadsrapport januari 1982: Verksamhetsöversikt* (n.p., February 3, 1982), p. 4; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, pp. 373, 377; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 208-209, 210.

of Korea. At the 417th meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on February 18, the North criticized the invitation as a request for the recognition of war preparations. The North pointed out that the risk of war was rising and that large quantities of lethal weapons and operational equipment had been brought into South Korea.

After rearmaments had been raised at the three following meetings and war preparations at one of them, at the 423rd meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on December 23, the North complained that the US had deployed “an additional 248 nuclear bombs in South Korea” and demanded US removal from South Korea of all the “illegally introduced” weapons, including altogether “1,000 nuclear weapons.” The North blamed the US Army Chief-of-Staff, who had said “If war breaks out in Korea, the US will use nuclear weapons” and criticized joint South Korea-US air force exercises as preparations for a nuclear attack. It also urged the withdrawal of American troops and asserted the signing of a peace treaty.

As we have seen, North Korea had proposed a peace treaty with the US on March 25, 1974. On January 10, 1984, the Central People’s Committee and the Supreme People’s Assembly Standing Council, in a joint letter to the South Korean and American governments, proposed opening three-party talks to sign a US-North Korea peace treaty, declare the withdrawal of US troops and conclude a North-South Korea non-aggression pact. Again, a peace treaty was intended to lead to a troop withdrawal. South Korea’s National Unification Board responded the following day by proposing bilateral government talks between the two Koreas. However, in March the North Korean Prime Minister reiterated the demand for three-party talks and rejected the South Korean proposal.<sup>262</sup>

At the 424th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV convened on February 22, 1984, the North criticized the joint South Korea-US exercise TS-84, involving more than 200,000 men as a preparation for war and urged an immediate halt to this outrageous violation of Paragraph 13(c) and (d). The South clarified that the exercise was no threat at all to the North. On the contrary, it aimed to prevent war. When the 425th meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on June 13, Team Spirit was condemned as a nuclear war exercise, but the South pointed out that the North carried out exercises in secret and urged it to take measures to reduce tension and halt rearming.

When the 428th meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on March 21, the North protested that the US, in spite of its warning at the 427th meeting it had called, had brought large quantities of nuclear weapons and brand-new combat equipment into South Korea to conduct TS-85 in violation of Paragraph 12 and 13(d) and urged a halt as well as the withdrawal of manpower and equipment. The South argued that the exercise's purpose was to prepare to meet the North's threat and answered the claim that the exercise obstructed talks by mentioning that it had taken place while dialogue made progress in 1976, 1977, 1979 and 1983. The South pointed out the North's deceitfulness; it had rearmed with 20 submarines, 100,000 men in special air units and combat equipment. The North countered by enumerating the large military forces in the South. Rearmaments had

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<sup>262</sup>- Downs, *Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy*, p. 164; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 378-9, 380, 382, 383; Jhe, *op. cit.*, 2000, p. 112; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 211, 212, 213, 214; Lee, "UNC invites N. Koreans to observe Team Spirit," *The Korea Herald*, February 4, 1983; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2004, pp. 204-205. Original quotation marks.

also been raised at two previous meetings.

After the North had raised military exercises at a subsequent meeting, at the 432nd meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on January 3, 1986, the North argued that to advance North-South talks and to create an atmosphere of reconciliation in the Korean peninsula, military exercises must end and repeated its proposals from the previous meeting it had called. The South pointed out that without the carrying out of exercises, war deterrence is unrealistic. At the 434th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on March 7, the North raised the “Team Spirit” exercise, which at the time involved more than 200,000 men. The North, which had urged a halt to the exercise at the previous meeting it had proposed held on January 28, claimed that the exercise was a preparation for war and violated Paragraph 13(c) and (d). The exercise was regarded as a preparation for a nuclear attack. The South referred to its previous standpoint that military exercises are unrelated to the Armistice Agreement and pointed out that North Korea’s military expenditure reached 25 percent of GNP, reinforcing the already huge military forces (cf. p. 123). The Team Spirit exercise was criticized once more in 1986.<sup>263</sup>

At the 437th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on April 3, 1987, the North criticized the South for conducting the joint exercise “TS-87” involving 200,000 men in preparation for a nuclear attack. The North again claimed that the exercise violated Paragraph 13(c) and (d). The UNC/MAC stated that since military exercises are unrelated to the Armistice Agreement they are inappropriate for the

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<sup>263</sup>- Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 386, 387, 391, 392, 395, 398, 399; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 215, 216, 217, 218-19, 220, 221, 222.

MAC to discuss and accused the North of using the Commission to make political propaganda. Rearmaments were raised once more in 1987.

At the 441st meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on February 23, 1988, the North criticized the large-scale exercise “TS-88” as a preparation for war, protested the illegal introduction of military personnel and strategic materials from abroad and blamed the South for bringing in large quantities of nuclear weapons in preparation for nuclear war. The South pointed out the North’s stereotype criticism against the Team Spirit exercise as a way of using the MAC for unnecessary political propaganda. The South reminded that it had invited the North to send observers since 1982 and emphasized that Team Spirit was a defensive exercise. When the 442nd meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on April 1, the North criticized TS-88 and urged an unconditional halt. With the exercise as an excuse, large quantities of military equipment and several aircraft carriers were brought into the Korean peninsula in violation of Paragraph 13(d). The South responded that the introduction of combat equipment took place due to the North’s rearmaments and emphasized that it was a defensive exercise.

At the 444th meeting requested by the KPA/CPV convened on July 15, the North criticized the South for rearming under the pretext of “guaranteeing security during the Olympics.” The number of American troops had risen by 4,100 men since 1987 to reach 48,000. The North criticized the joint South Korea-US “Ŭlchi-Focus Lens Exercise” as a preparation for war. The South asserted that the North used the meeting for propaganda purposes and did not respond to what it regarded to be false accusations. Previously, at the 490th MAC

secretary meeting held on March 23, the South had rejected the North's protests against the introduction of heavy firearms into the DMZ.<sup>264</sup>

The North again urged a halt to the Team Spirit exercise when the 445th MAC plenary meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC took place on January 17, 1989. The South responded that the issue could not be resolved in the MAC. "In an effort to set the agenda on tension reduction" the meeting was the first ever closed to the media and diplomatic observers, but no concrete measures were decided on such issues as security in the DMZ and the withdrawal of weapons from the JSA. At the 446th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on February 13, the North also criticized the implementation of the exercise.

At the 447th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV convened on March 18, the North, while showing videos and photos, protested against TS-89 which obstructed North-South dialogue, urged an immediate halt and requested the withdrawal of nuclear weapons. The South mentioned that military exercises are not at all referred to in the Armistice Agreement. When the 448th meeting called by the KPA/CPV took place on May 9, North Korea claimed that the US, in preparation for a nuclear war in the Korean peninsula, had stored more than 1,000 nuclear bombs, including 56 neutron bombs. The UNC neglected Paragraph 13(d) and brought large quantities of nuclear weapons and combat equipment into South Korea. That the Commander of the American troops had the right to use tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea raised the risk of a nuclear war. The

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<sup>264</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 403, 411, 414-15; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 223, 224-5, 226, 380.

UNC/MAC claimed that denuclearization as a political issue was irrelevant to the MAC.

At the 451st meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on September 12, the North criticized that the US had brought brand-new F-16 fighter planes and military equipment into South Korea and through military exercises such as Team Spirit and 89 Ūlchi Focus conducted training for a nuclear war between August 21 and September 1. The South's rearmament policy was an outrageous violation of the Armistice Agreement's preamble and Paragraph 13(d). If nuclear weapons were withdrawn, the risk of war would be removed and tension reduced. The South pointed out the North's recent rearmaments and claimed that nuclear weapons were not an issue to raise in the MAC. Rearmaments and military equipment were also raised at the final meetings held in the 1980s.<sup>265</sup> Clearly, the previous "zero-sum game" continued unabated with the same or similar arguments repeated by both parties.

### 5.3 Armistice Violations

At a time of widespread dissent caused by President Park Chung Hee's suppression of his opposition and when the North was eager to convey the impression that a Marxist revolution in South Korea was under way, there were between July 1979 and August 1983 seven infiltrations of North Korean vessels carrying commandos and four of

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<sup>265</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 416, 418, 423-24, 425; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 227, 228, 229-230; *The Korea Times*, "MAC Meeting Held in Secrecy," January 18, 1989; Werner, *Månadsrapport januari 1989*, p. 3. Original quotation marks.

ground forces which had crossed the DMZ and the Han River estuary. In exchanges of fire, 37 North Korean intruders and ten South Koreans were killed and one North Korean and eight South Koreans were wounded. Major Wayne A. Kirkbride (1984) records that the UNC had charged North Korea with approximately 35,000 armistice violations but, as we have seen, only three were admitted (cf. pp. 175-6, 262, 321-2). The UNC and South Korea were charged with 150,000 violations, of which less than 100 were admitted.<sup>266</sup>

During the 1980s, agent incidents and incidents in the DMZ were also raised at MAC meetings. At the 400th meeting held on April 3, 1980, the UNC/MAC claimed that its guards had discovered on March 23 three armed North Korean intruders on the east bank of the Han River 12 kilometres south of the estuary. The agents were killed by South Korean guards, who found more than 179 kinds of weapons and equipment. On March 25, South Korean military forces discovered east of P'ohang an unidentified vessel. Two South Korean patrol vessels were dispatched to investigate it, but when they approached the vessel, it fired without warning. One man was killed and one wounded. Subsequently, five men from the vessel boarded a South Korean fishing boat and killed the captain and two of the crew and wounded two before escaping. Later, a South Korean navy patrol vessel sank the vessel, but no survivors or corpses were discovered. However, three survivors and two wounded from the severely damaged fishing boat were discovered.

The North claimed that the incidents were entirely fabricated.

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<sup>266</sup>- Downs, op. cit., p. 196; Kirkbride, *DMZ: A Story of the Panmunjom Axe Murder*, cover, p. 151.

According to the news, on March 25 the South Korean navy and air force had carried out a collective operation to attack an “armed vessel”, but instead a South Korean fishing boat had been attacked. It asserted that on March 27 shooting had occurred between South Korean soldiers who had fired on a guard post in the DMZ to link the incident with the North. The UNC/MAC claimed that a civilian patrol had found three North Korean armed intruders who had shot and killed one man and wounded another. When the UNC responded, one man was killed and two escaped. To protect them, the guard post to the south fired shots.

At the 401st meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on May 20, the North protested that on May 12 there had been unexpected firing of cannons, machine guns and automatic weapons at its guard posts in the JSA. The UNC/MAC claimed that the North had deliberately distorted the facts. Civilian police had carried out a routine mission in the vicinity of the MAC Headquarters Area, 1.3 kilometres southeast of the JSA when they encountered unidentified men who soon moved northwards. After the police had fired illuminating shots, the men opened fire with automatic weapons, but the police followed them and drove them out. The North was entirely responsible for the incident.<sup>267</sup>

At the 402nd meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on June 27, the South asserted that on June 20 a heavily armed spy boat had intruded into its territorial waters seven miles from the port of Taech’ôn. A Republic of Korea coastal defence unit ordered the boat to stop and fired warning shots but it escaped. On June 21, a naval patrol

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<sup>267</sup>- Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 360-362. Original quotation marks.

vessel followed the boat that was escaping among fishing boats and fired, but it fired back and two men were wounded. Naval vessels and aircrafts were mobilized on both sides, but no fighting took place. The patrol vessel attacked the boat with heavy machine guns. When the boat surrendered, nine agents were found dead after having committed suicide with hand grenades, but the captain was captured alive. Two corpses and equipment were retrieved. The North blamed the South for fabricating the incident to divert attention from the recent suppression of pro-democracy demonstrations in Kwangju to control the crisis of military rule.<sup>268</sup> It denied that the boat, as believed, was of North Korean origin.

When the 403rd meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC took place on November 18, the South accused the North of having dispatched on November 3 armed agents to Hoenggan islet close to Wan island on the south coast and killing an innocent civilian. The agents were discovered by fishermen who contacted the police. Following shooting between the police and the agents, five South Koreans were wounded and one fisherman was killed. The next day one of the intruders committed suicide with a hand-grenade when he was asked to surrender. Another intruder was fired at when diving into the water but his whereabouts were unknown. A small landing craft was discovered. The third intruder was killed on November 6 when he refused to surrender. In the investigation, 424 kinds of intrusion equipment were found; evidence was shown as proof that the North had committed a provocative act. The North should take the

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<sup>268</sup> On the 1980 Kwangju uprising see Oberdorfer, *The two Koreas: A Contemporary History*, pp. 124-133.

entire responsibility for killing an innocent fisherman and wounding personnel. The North argued that the fabricated incident was used by the South Korean government to suppress the population by a shock effect.

At the 404th meeting called by the UNC/MAC convened on December 16, the South criticized the attempted intrusion of three armed North Korean agents along the south coast of Namhae Island in the South Sea on December 1. Two were shot to death by coastguards but the third escaped. The landing craft was sunk but the transport ship escaped. The South condemned the refusal to accept the dead body. On December 2, a clash took place in the South Sea between an unidentified vessel and a Republic of Korea naval vessel after the latter had fired warning shots. After firing back, the former caught fire and sank. Two intruders were killed. Two South Korean soldiers were killed and one was wounded. One intruder survived but was killed on December 6. The North claimed that South Korea fabricated incidents with armed agents to suppress democracy activists and students and once again urged the replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a North Korea-US peace treaty.<sup>269</sup>

A serious airspace incident occurred in 1981. On August 26 at 4.34 p.m. North Korea fired an SA-2 surface-to-air missile at an unarmed SR-71 “Blackbird” reconnaissance aircraft from a missile site. The aircraft was then in international airspace south of the five islands

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<sup>269</sup>- Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 362-6; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 204, 205; Stenqvist, *Månadsrapport juni 1980: Bilaga 2* (n .p., July 1, 1980), p. 1. According to Fischer, *CRS Report for Congress: North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-2007* (p. 7), three North Korean infiltrators were shot to death at Hoenggando Island contradicting Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 363-4.

under UNC and South Korean control in the West Sea. The UNC/MAC called the 407th MAC meeting held on September 1. The UNC/MAC Senior Member, Rear Admiral James C. Storms III, said he was directed by the UNC Commander to charge North Korea “with a premeditated and unprovoked act of aggression against the UNC.” He also claimed that the act could seriously threaten peace. The UNC/MAC argued that North Korea in June had deliberately deployed an SA-2 missile launching site near Chokta-ri in the Ongjin peninsula with the purpose of attacking unarmed UNC reconnaissance flights, having full knowledge of both the flight path and the frequency of flights.

If the aircraft had been shot down on a routine mission in international airspace, the Korean peninsula would have been brought to the brink of a major confrontation. He further warned that the UNC would take necessary measures to ensure the safety of its aircraft and crew and would react against any future such attacks if North Korea attacked any aircraft again in the same area. He urged North Korea to conduct an investigation of the attack, punish those responsible and ensure that such hostile acts would not recur in the future. The KPA/CPV Senior Member, Major General Han, responded that the SR-71 “intruded into North Korean airspace to carry out espionage activities.”

Espionage work was a serious infringement of sovereignty and a vicious military provocation. He denied that the North had launched missiles at the aircraft but claimed that the UNC “fabricated the absurd incident” to slander and defame North Korea at the conference table. He added: “In fact, it is your customary practice that you commit provocation against others first and charge others with provocation before the world public.” When closing, he complained again that the

US had revoked its plan to withdraw its troops from South Korea “to realize [its] wild design to invade the northern half of the Republic [North Korea].” He demanded that the UNC stop updating US forces’ military equipment, cease all military exercises and aerial reconnaissance by SR-71s and withdraw American forces as well as nuclear weapons from South Korea. The UNC continued reconnaissance flights with SR-71s along the DMZ, but there were no new attempts to launch missiles.<sup>270</sup>

At the 412th MAC meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV convened on May 4, 1982, the North claimed that on April 21 South Korean soldiers in the DMZ had fired at its civilian police on patrol with automatic rifles and M-16 machine guns. The South refuted the claim and argued that the North’s civilian police had fired automatic weapons at camp sites of its civilian police. Since the South responded, exchanges of fire took place for ten minutes. The South later fired at a group of 15 armed intruders who then escaped. When the 413th meeting called by the UNC/MAC took place on May 28, the South protested against the North’s armed intrusion on May 15. That day the South’s guards had seen two soldiers equipped with rucksacks and rifles from the North landing on the east coast. When it turned out that they were armed intruders, the South’s guards fired at them. One died and one escaped. The North was entirely responsible for the incident, but the North refuted the South’s version. Instead, the men had disappeared during a military exercise. The South was wholly responsible for the incident.

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<sup>270</sup>- Downs, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-2; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, p. 369; Lee, *JSA - P’anmunjôm*, 2001(a), p. 54: *op. cit.*, 2004, pp. 119-120. Original quotation marks.

The UNC/MAC claimed that the men were discovered at a place that could only be reached from the sea and were armed like previous intruders. They also wore fake South Korean uniforms and were shot to death, not drowned as the North asserted. There were 639 personal effects, including a rifle and a pistol, the latter made only in North Korea. Prior to the meeting, the MAC channel had provided North Korea with information about its own forces. On May 16, the KPA/CPV Senior Member telephoned his UNC/MAC counterpart to ask for the return of any “bodies” that might be found along the east coast, although the request amounted to an admission of the North’s armistice violation. Previously, when the UNC had offered the return of killed North Korean soldiers in 1967-68, the KPA/CPV Senior Member either completely ignored the offer or responded that they were young South Koreans who had fought against South Korea and the US. He claimed that some North Korean military personnel were unaccounted for after a training exercise on the evening of May 14, and at the request of the UNC, the KPA/CPV Senior Member gave the name, age and service number of the three soldiers.

By the time of the meeting, the South Korean media had already reported that a team of three armed North Korean infiltrators had been intercepted on May 15 on an east coast beach, that one was killed in the ensuing gunfire and that the other two fled. There were speculations that the men had become disoriented during training and crossed the line. Clothing, equipment and weapons were typical items carried by armed infiltrators. The UNC returned the remains of the dead soldier at the 465th MAC secretary meeting held on May 18. For the first time, North Korea had accepted the body of one of its infiltrators that had been confirmed by the North. The MAC played a

useful role by giving North Korea an opportunity to explain that the trainees were not the vanguard of an invasion force.<sup>271</sup>

At the 419th MAC plenary meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on June 27, 1983, the South claimed that on June 19, South Korean soldiers on patrol in the vicinity of Munsan had discovered three armed intruders who, after a gun battle, were all killed, but the North asserted that the incident was fabricated. At the 421st meeting requested by the UNC/MAC convened on August 23, the South claimed that on August 5 outside Wŏlsŏng on the east coast an armed spy boat had fired at the Republic of Korea navy vessels which fired back and sank the boat, but the KPA/CPV Senior Member denied the act. On August 13, an unidentified vessel had approached the South Korean coast in the vicinity of Ullŭng Island. On August 5, international signals were sent to stop the vessel, but during interrogation it fired and began to escape. When a navy helicopter chased the vessel, it was fired on by machine guns, but the helicopter responded by sinking the vessel. Three men were found dead but the corpses could not be retrieved and there were no survivors.

The North regarded the incident as fabricated and claimed that the fish-detector vessel “P’ungsan” was on its way from the East to the West Sea. After departing from Japan, a South Korean naval destroyer had bombarded it and an airplane fired at it with missiles. The vessel had sunk further away from Ullŭng Island than the South had asserted. Five men died. The UNC/MAC Senior Member showed

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<sup>271</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, p. 115; Hapch’am chŏngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 374-6; Kukpang chŏngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 209, 374; Lee, *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 125-6; *The Korea Times*, “413th MAC Meet: UNC Charges N. Korea With Dispatching Agents,” May 29, 1982.

photographical and physical evidence such as firearms and invited his KPA/CPV counterpart to view the evidence, but in vain. The former referred to a notebook from one of the sunk boats and described it as “by far the most damaging evidence” against the North’s denials. The notebook contained references to Kim Il Sung “revolutionizing” the Republic of Korea through anti-South operations. Later, at the 472nd MAC secretary meeting held on September 27, the South claimed that its investigation of the North’s protests against the introduction of automatic weapons into the DMZ had concluded that they were groundless.

On October 9, a North Korean assassination attempt on South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan took place at the Burmese Martyrs’ Mausoleum. The Rangoon Bombing killed four South Korean cabinet ministers and 13 other high-ranking dignitaries. Subsequently, the 422nd MAC plenary meeting was held on October 31 (cf. p. 197-9). Since conclusive evidence proving North Korea’s guilt was not yet available and there was no precedent for MAC involvement in an incident outside the peninsula, the KPA/CPV proposed the meeting. They claimed to call the meeting “to straighten out the situation created in Korea by the South Korean military fascist element that contrived the Rangoon explosion in an attempt to extricate itself from the crisis - to divert elsewhere people’s resentment and resistance.” The North Koreans complained that South Korean forces were put on alert and the South Koreans openly talked about retaliation. In contrast, after North Korea had raised the incident three times, the South claimed that all available evidence indicated that the North was involved in it. The UNC/MAC Senior Member pointed out that the methods of operation and the equipment used by the “assassins”

appeared to be remarkably similar to the procedures and equipment previously used by North Korean agents.<sup>272</sup>

According to the American scholar C. Kenneth Quinones (2001), South Koreans, including President Chun Doo Hwan, were ready to risk war to get revenge. The US restrained the president from taking action by reminding him that it controlled the ammunition, bombs and fuel needed for such an action and said that the US-ROK defence treaty which only obligated support in the case of an external attack would not apply.

At the 423rd meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on December 23, the UNC/MAC Senior Member, Rear Admiral F. Warren Kelley, read into the record the entire Burmese official report on the incident and presented additional data indicating North Korea's responsibility. Burma concluded mainly on the basis of the captured North Koreans' confessions, captured equipment and other evidence that the explosion was the work of North Korean saboteurs. The UNC/MAC charged that the assassination attempt had generated rising military tension in the Korean peninsula and urged North Korea to cease its acts of terror and violence against South Korea. The KPA/CPV Senior Member, Major General Li Tae Ho, responded that "the real criminal of the Rangoon explosion is none other than Chun Doo Hwan himself." His purpose was to remain in power.

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<sup>272</sup> Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 162-4; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 382, 383-4; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 212, 214, 376; Lee, "N.K. involved in Rangoon blast: UNC; Methods gear similar to those used by N. Koreans," *The Korea Herald*, November 1, 1983; *The Korea Herald*, "UNC accuses N.K. of recent sea-borne infiltration attempts," August 25, 1983; *The Korea Times*, "MAC Meet: UNC Hits Dispatching Of NK Espionage Boats," August 24, 1983. Original quotation marks.

The North regarded the intrusion on December 3 by two armed North Korean spies into the Pusan area, who were subsequently arrested, as a fabrication, although they had confessed their guilt. The spies were captured by army soldiers and the boat that had brought them ashore was sunk while escaping in a joint operation of army, navy and air force units. Equipment seized included pistols, hand-grenades and ammunition. One pistol made in Belgium was the same type as carried by the North Koreans involved in the bombing in Burma.

To improve its image world-wide after the Rangoon incident, North Korea continued the North-South dialogue, but the talks that were held in the NNSC conference room on April 9, April 30 and May 25 to form a joint Korean team for the 1984 and 1988 Olympic Games and the 1986 Asian Games failed owing to mutual distrust and political problems such as the Rangoon incident which North Korea denied any responsibility for. Three-party talks were also proposed (cf. p. 333).<sup>273</sup>

On November 23, 1984, the defection at around 11.35 a.m. of Foreign Service Officer Vasily Yakovlevic Matuzok at the Soviet Embassy in P'yôngyang via the MDL when he was leading a 16-member Soviet sightseeing group visiting Panmunjom caused the first armed incident in the JSA since the 1976 axe murder. When the group walked out of the MAC conference building, Matuzok, who for two

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<sup>273</sup>. Ch'oe, "P'anmunjôm-ül t'onghan Nambukhan kyoryu," 2002, pp. 101-103; Downs, *ibid.*, p. 164; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, p. 386; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, p. 214; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 204; *Newsreview*, "2 Armed N.K. Infiltrators Captured Near Pusan," December 10, 1983; Quinones, "South Korea's Approaches to North Korea," p. 31. Original quotation marks.

years had awaited an opportunity to seek asylum in the US, ran past the North Korean guards between this building and the UNC Joint Duty Officer's building, crossed the MDL and shouted to the UNC security guards "Help me, cover me!". The guards ran ahead of him southwards. In serious violation of the September 6, 1976, agreement that divided the area into two separate security zones, three North Korean guards crossed the MDL, drew their pistols and fired two warning shots to stop the defector, who hid himself south of the Sunken Garden 150 metres from the MDL, but without any success.<sup>274</sup> Another 17 North Korean guards armed with illegal automatic rifles soon crossed the MDL.

Since the UNC now used its Quick Reaction Force and mobilized more than ten guards from each guard post in self-defence, the first and last exchange of fire between the opposing security forces took place for 20-30 minutes. Three North Korean guards and one South Korean guard were killed. One US guard was slightly wounded and one North Korean seriously wounded. Matuzok could safely leave the area unhurt and was later granted political asylum in the US. According to Lee (2001b), the incident was believed to be accidental and not premeditated.<sup>275</sup> The defector's long wish to seek asylum in

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<sup>274</sup>- At a Security Officers meeting held on June 9, 1982, the US Army Captain and UNC security officer David M. Owens charged that North Korean guards in the JSA "have displayed unprofessional and undisciplined behavior" in the past several weeks. The most serious violation took place on June 3. A KPA guard standing at the west end of the Sach'on Bridge pulled his pistol out of his holster and pointed it at a UNC guard who was performing routine duties at the UNC checkpoint at the east end of the bridge. The conduct "was a major violation of the Armistice Agreement." The KPA/CPV security officer refused to accept photographic evidence. From *The Korea Times*, "UNC Charges: NK Guards Commit Misconduct in JSA," June 10, 1982. Original quotation marks.

<sup>275</sup>- Bailey, *The Korean Armistice*, p. 185; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, p.

the US make this assessment plausible.

At this time, a few NNSC delegates were in its conference room. Since North Korea requested the Czech and Polish NNSC officers to immediately return to their respective camps, no representatives of these countries showed up any more that day. At 11.50 a.m., the North Korean Joint Duty Officer at Panmunjom called his UNC counterpart through the MAC hot-line to request a cease-fire and permission to accompany six officers across the MDL to evacuate the wounded guard. The UNC headquarters in Seoul approved the request and ordered a cease-fire: shooting ended at around 11.59 a.m. Thanks to efforts by Swedish and Swiss NNSC members and by officers from the UNC and KPA, the cease-fire was enforced. As after the axe murder in 1976, the mutual wish to reduce tension formed a “positive symmetry” for the NNSC to act upon.

Around noon, eight unarmed KPA soldiers, including its Joint Duty Officer, crossed the MDL and brought the killed and wounded guards back. The soldiers were escorted by both North Korean and UNC Joint Duty Officers and a few Swiss NNSC officers. At 12.10 p.m., Swedish and Swiss officers went to the North’s staff building P’anmungak to find out whether any soldiers were missing. Gunfire

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437; Lee, “Hanggong moham,” 1998(d), pp. 12-13: op. cit., 2001(b), pp. 112, 113: op. cit., 2004, p. 181; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *Swiss Mission to Korea in the Change of Times 1953-1997*, p. 70; Unell, *Månadsrapport november 1984, Verksamhetsöversikt: Bilaga 1, Underbil. 1:1: Incidenten i JSA 1984-11-23* (December 2, 1984), p. 1. When a Czech NNSC member asked for asylum in the South on October 30, 1981 and succeeded, it did not raise great attention. The illegal border crossing of a Chinese MAC member and his wife on July 29, 1989 was relatively uncomplicated but led to reproaches from the North based on alleged misuse of the negotiation premises in Panmunjom. After the NNSC had confirmed their will to seek asylum in the US, they were granted political asylum there (like the Czech). From Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), pp. 174-5; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, pp. 69, 70.

was heard behind the building, but this was rejected by the officer present from the North. At the 426th MAC meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC held on November 26, the two sides put the blame on each other. The South argued that its guards had shown self-constraint in minimizing injuries to the North's soldiers, who were criticized for having violated the September 6, 1976, agreement not to cross the MDL. Moreover, they had brought automatic weapons into the JSA. The North argued that the South had taken away Matuzok by force and that it had attempted to rescue him. The South had brought more than 90 guards into the area, opened fire with M16 rifles and machine guns and killed the North's guards. Both parties urged an excuse, that those responsible for the shootings should be punished and that measures should be taken to prevent a recurrence. Owing to this incident, the North cancelled the economic talks scheduled to be held on December 5.<sup>276</sup> The "zero-sum game" continued unabated.

According to Mueller-Lhotska (1997), the NNSC reprimanded both parties and presented on January 22 and February 9, 1985 proposals to improve security arrangements in the JSA that were adopted. On April 15, a telephone line that connected all NNSC countries was for the first time brought into use. The main purpose was to clear urgent problems and reduce possible tension in the JSA. In the summer, some 20 mobile TV cameras were installed along both sides of the MDL in Panmunjom and put into operation for control purposes. Megaphones were in readiness. In this way, as during the 1976 axe murder, the NNSC helped to make a serious incident an

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<sup>276</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, pp. 388, 389; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, p. 216; Lee, *ibid.*, 1998(d), p. 13; *ibid.*, 2001(b), pp. 112-113; *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 181-2; Unell, *ibid.*, p. 1; *ibid.*, *Verksamhetsöversikt*, p. 2.

opportunity to introduce security-augmenting measures.

The role of the NNSC changed from that of a passive military onlooker to a diplomatic link between the two Koreas. On June 30, 1985, the KPA/CPV and the UNC took part in celebrations of the 32nd anniversary of the armistice. On December 31, New Year was jointly celebrated by both sides. In spite of previous annual invitations, this was the first time the NNSC had succeeded in bringing together both sides of the MAC. In 1988 and 1989, both MAC Chairmen also attended the New Year reception. There was a view that it was very important for the NNSC, besides its formal tasks, to maintain good and personal contacts with representatives of both sides by, for instance, attending dinners and receptions, but it was more difficult to socialize with the North's personnel than with the South's. Both sides appreciated the NNSC's role as a neutral body, always ready to convey their requests and ideas. According to Mueller-Lhotska (1997): "This way of preventing war was undoubtedly the most significant contribution that could be provided by our NNSC representatives in Korea in this period of time" (cf. p. 88).<sup>277</sup> This contribution differs from the prescriptions of the Armistice Agreement but match well with the reduced NNSC mandate.

As previously, positive evaluations of the NNSC remained. In 1984, the Swedish Colonel Wolmar Boman asserted that both the North and the South regarded the NNSC as an important part of

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<sup>277</sup>- Bucheli, "Die Neutrale Ueberwachungskommission und das politische Umfeld in Korea (Eine Chronik der Ereignisse 1983 bis 1993)," in Kyung Hee University: Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, *The Swiss Delegation to the NNSC 1953-1993 Panmunjom (Korea)*, pp. 37-8; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., pp. 69-70, 73; Swedish officer, letter June 8, 2006.

peace-keeping, thanks to its neutral position. The NNSC was an important link between the two sides by being composed of representatives nominated by both parties. Since members visited both Koreas or within each other's camps, they could meet both sides' representatives. However, to the author's knowledge, until the 1980s Czech and Polish officers did not travel outside the southern part of the DMZ, whereas Swedish and Swiss officers regularly made study tours in both Koreas and participated in such events as dinners and receptions, but no military facilities could be visited in North Korea. The Swedish delegation regularly received visitors. In 1985, Försvarets Läromedelscentral (Textbook Center of The [Swedish] National Defence Force) pointed out that the Swedish delegation enjoyed confidence and respect within the NNSC and from both parties. It wrote:

“Even if the delegation has limited possibilities to act, the involved parties agree that the NNSC's presence is necessary. The NNSC is a contact link between the North and the South. The NNSC is also the world's witness to what goes on in and in the vicinity of the DMZ.”<sup>278</sup>

As we have seen, tension between the two Koreas remained during the 1980s, but during 1984-85 there were a few signs of a thaw for the first time since 1971-73. Notably, in September 1984, North Korea offered assistance to South Korea at a time when flood-like rains in the environs of Seoul led to the death of 190 people and 200,000 homeless persons. On September 8, North Korea announced under

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<sup>278</sup>- Boman, “Trettio års vapenstillestånd i Korea,” *Yoboseyo* (March 1984), no. 1, pp. 7, 9; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, *Historik över de neutrala ländernas övervakningsskommission i Korea*, pp. 40, 70.

the name of the North Korean Red Cross in a message to the South Korean Red Cross that it had decided to send 50,000 sŏk rice (about 7,200 tons), 500,000 metres of cloth, 100,000 tons of cement and medicine to the flood victims and requested active cooperation in the delivery. Since the South's Red Cross on September 14 accepted the proposal as a measure to improve relations, working-level talks on practical issues took place in the NNSC conference room on September 18-19. The parties agreed to deliver cement to Inch'ŏn and Pukp'yŏng, whereas rice, cloth and medicines would be delivered through Panmunjom. Given the "game theory," the disaster was an opportunity to re-open contacts and deviate from the "zero-sum game."

Deliveries were made through Inch'ŏn, Pukp'yŏng and Panmunjom from September 29 to October 4. At Panmunjom, deliveries proceeded smoothly without any controversies on September 29-30. For the first time since the Korean War, North Korean vans and ships entered South Korea. The total value of delivery was estimated at around US\$ 12 million. At the end of deliveries, South Korea donated gifts to a value of \$500 to all North Koreans involved in the work. The Head of the Swedish NNSC delegation, his alternate and the deputy secretary observed deliveries on both days. The delegation had frequent contacts with the South's military and the KPA/CPV that both sides appreciated.

On September 29, the direct telephone line re-opened after having been closed for eight years and one month. Thanks to the delivery of relief goods, the South Korean Red Cross suggested on October 4 in a letter to its northern counterpart that talks should be re-opened, which the North accepted. On November 20, preparatory talks for the eighth round of Red Cross talks on family re-unions were

held in the NNSC conference room. Between September 29 and December 18, 7,200 tons of rice, 759 cartons of medication and 500,000 metres of cloth were delivered via Panmunjom to the “Freedom Village” of Taesông-dong (“Attaining Success Town”) just two kilometres southeast of Panmunjom. On September 30, North Korean cargo-steamers brought 100,000 tons of cement to Inch’ôn and Pukp’yông. Between November 23 and December 18, 1,400 transports of relief goods by vans passed via Panmunjom southwards.<sup>279</sup>

When the eighth round of Red Cross talks was held in Seoul May 27-30, 1985, the South suggested holding family re-unions on August 15. The North suggested that the re-unions should include the heads of the Red Cross from both sides and 100 persons from artistic troupes. Working-level talks were held on July 15, July 19 and August 22. At the third round, the two sides agreed to hold the first family re-unions since the 1945 division in Seoul and P’yôngyang on September 20-23. Visitors from each side included 50 members of divided families, 50 people from artistic troupes, 30 news reporters and 20 support personnel in a precious precedent of civilian exchanges through Panmunjom.

After the South Korean Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Economic Planning Board on October 12, 1984 had suggested North-South economic cooperation and trade, on November 15 the first round of talks ever on trade and cooperation were held in the

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<sup>279</sup>- Bucheli, op. cit., p. 34; Ch’oe, op. cit., 2002, pp. 103-105; Kirkbride, *Panmunjom: Facts About the Korean DMZ*, 2006, p. 42; Lee, op. cit., 2004, p. 205; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., p. 59; Unell, *Månadsrapport september 1984: Verksamhetsöversikt* (n. p., October 5, 1984), pp. 2-3, 5; *Bilaga 1*, pp. 1, 4-5. Original quotation marks.

NNSC conference room, as were the following talks convened on May 17, 1985. However, neither these talks nor the third-fifth rounds held on June 20, September 18 and November 20 the same year brought any substantial results. Following a proposal by North Korea on April 9, 1985 to hold talks on a joint declaration on non-aggression, on July 23 the first preliminary contacts on holding parliamentary talks took place in the NNSC conference room but neither this round nor the following held on September 25 brought any significant results. The ninth round of Red Cross talks held August 27-28 and the tenth convened December 3-4 also failed.

When North Korea on January 20, 1986 unilaterally announced that, under the pretext of the Team Spirit exercise, it would suspend all dialogue, Red Cross, parliamentary and economic talks came to an end.<sup>280</sup> As in 1971-73, this period of détente did not last long. Dialogue hardly brought any significant change to inter-Korean relations, but the symbolic importance of the first family re-unions should not be underestimated. That the parties again used the NNSC conference room confirms the above evaluations of the Commission.

At the 430th MAC meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on October 26, 1985, the South asserted that on October 20 an unidentified vessel had intruded into South Korean territorial waters in the Pusan area. It was considered to be an armed intrusion boat and was ordered to heave-to by a southern navy patrol vessel, but since it did not stop warning shots were fired. When the escaping boat that was identical to the one that had intruded on December 3, 1983, fired back with a hand-held rocket, albeit without success, the patrol vessel

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<sup>280</sup>- Ch'oe, *ibid.*, 2002, pp. 105-110; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

sank it in a counterattack, but the North rejected the South's version and accused the South of deliberately fabricating incidents every time dialogue was proceeding in order to create tension. The UNC/MAC Senior Member told his KPA/CPV counterpart: "Most significant of all is that this violation comes at a time when there is hope for progress in the on-going south-north dialogue."

At the 435th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on May 6, 1986, the North raised the incident on April 24 when a South Korean naval destroyer sank a returning fishing boat in the East Sea. Two fishermen were killed and four wounded. The South claimed that a patrol vessel was dispatched to inspect the suspected boat. When the vessel had approached to confirm the identity, the boat did not respond, although a few warning shots were fired. Fire was exchanged and the boat sank. It emphasized that the incident took place solely because the North had not responded. Otherwise, the incident would not have occurred. At the 440th meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on October 14, 1987, the North protested that on October 7 an armed spy boat had illegally intruded deep into its territorial waters and committed severe spying and provocations. A patrol vessel was dispatched to identify the boat, but when it approached the boat began to flee and tried to strike back. Since the boat could not escape, it shot at random and sank the patrol vessel. The South in turn protested that on October 7 an armed North Korean vessel had sunk an innocent fishing boat in international waters in the West Sea to the west of Paengnyông Island, causing the death of eleven fishermen, but one man survived.<sup>281</sup>

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<sup>281</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, p. 394, 400-401, 408-409; Kukpang

In 1987, North Korea forwarded to the UN Security Council a report on “Armistice Agreement violations by the UNC from July 1986 to June 1987 and North Korean initiatives to reduce tension in the Korean peninsula.” North Korea claimed that the UNC had committed “ceaseless military provocations and hostilities” and “criminal acts” in violation of the Armistice Agreement on some 44,000 occasions during the report period. Of the alleged violations, more than 43,000 were referred to the MAC secretaries; they were either routine administrative issues or minor infractions such as not wearing the correct identification armbands. In fact, 24,789 charges were that workers had not worn proper identification armbands in the DMZ, but investigations revealed that most of these allegations were false. According to Downs (1999), the number was designed to create the false impression that Seoul was an unsafe place to host the Olympic Games in 1988.

In addition, the planting of a time bomb on Korean Air Lines Flight 858 that flew on November 29, 1987 from Abu Dhabi to Seoul was intended to undermine the 1988 Olympics. When the bomb exploded in the Indian Ocean close to Burma, all 115 passengers were killed. Two North Korean agents who had posed as Japanese tourists were unexpectedly detained while trying to escape from Abu Dhabi to Vienna in Bahrain where their forged travel documents were investigated. The elderly man, Kim Sŭng-il, committed suicide, but a police woman removed the poison from the mouth of female terrorist Kim Hyun Hui (28). She was brought to South Korea and later

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chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 218, 221-2; *The Korea Herald*, “UNC hits N.K. spy boat infiltration: P’yang criticized for stifling S-N peace dialogues,” October 27, 1985. Original quotation marks.

explained how the attack had been ordered and directed by Kim Il Sung's son and successor Kim Jong Il in frustration over North Korea's unsuccessful attempt to block the holding of the Olympic Games.

The South protested against the bombing at the 441st MAC meeting held on February 23, 1988 and urged the North to admit its responsibility, punish those responsible and subsequently submit a report to the MAC, making an apology to the families of the victims. The UNC/MAC Senior Member claimed that by the bombing North Korea aimed to create tension so that the world's peace-loving people would not come to the Seoul Olympics in the fall. The South played a video-taped press interview with Kim Hyun Hui in which she said that she and her accomplice had planted a time bomb in an overhead rack in the cabin. The North denied any involvement and argued that it was not an issue to raise in the MAC. Instead, blood-thirsty felons had fabricated the incident to slander the North. It was planned murder by the South Korean marionettes manipulated by your side to attain wicked political aims.<sup>282</sup>

Crossings over the MDL approved by both Korean governments for such purposes as North-South talks, family exchanges and the like were sanctioned by the MAC. However, it was different when South Korean university student Im Su-gyông, who had participated as a representative of the National Students' Association in the 13th International Youth Festival held in P'yôngyang from July 1-8, 1989, crossed the MDL on August 15 on the occasion of the anniversary of

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<sup>282</sup>- Downs, *op. cit.*, p. 207; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, p. 411; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 225, 446-7; Lee, "441st MAC Meeting: UNC Demands NK Apologize For Bombing of KAL Jetliner," *The Korea Times*, February 24, 1988; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *op. cit.*, p. 60. Original quotation marks.

Korea's liberation from Japan in 1945. When Im arrived in P'yŏngyang on June 30, she had declared: "To come to a place that would take only four hours to get to by car, I have travelled by plane for 24 hours. It has taken ten days to get here. When I return, I am even ready to die to return via P'anmunjŏm."

She had travelled via East Berlin and Beijing without the South Korean government's permission. The government opposed the crossing that she had intended to make on July 27 on the anniversary of the signing of the 1953 Armistice Agreement. The reason was the opinion that it would create a precedent for South Koreans who, without the government's permission, returned home via Panmunjom. The KPA/CPV Senior Member requested three times by telegram that the UNC should permit her to cross the MDL but it refused due to the South Korean government's opposition. North Korea in a letter requested the NNSC to cooperate but in vain.<sup>283</sup>

On July 28, the KPA/CPV requested the 450th MAC meeting to be convened. On July 27, Im and Father Mun Kyu-hyŏn, who had been dispatched to protect her, had begun a hunger strike at Panmunjom to cross the MDL, but they ended it on August 1. On the same day, anti-American demonstrations by "visitors" organized by the North took place on the stairs of P'anmungak and in the yard in front of the northern side of the MAC conference building. The UNC reminded the North of its message after the 1976 axe murder that both sides should promote order and stability and reduce tension in Panmunjom and strongly requested an end to the demonstrations, but

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<sup>283</sup> Ch'oe, op. cit., 2002, pp. 122-3; Kukpang chŏngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 438-9; Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), pp. 173-4; op. cit., 2004, p. 184. Original quotation marks.

North Korea replied that since the visitors were voluntarily protesting against the US, it could not stop them.

When the 450th meeting took place on August 8, the KPA/CPV Senior Member requested the UNC/MAC to allow Im and her attendants to cross the MDL. The reason for her wish to return via Panmunjom was to demonstrate that Korea is one and Koreans are entitled to enjoy mutual visits and travel within their own nation. The UNC/MAC Senior Member emphasized that passage by a civilian over the MDL without consent was an armistice violation by referring to Paragraph 7 stating “No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission” and Paragraph 8 saying “No person, military or civilian, in the demilitarized zone shall be permitted to enter into the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the commander into whose territory entry is sought.” The UNC had worked for a peaceful solution of the Korean issue since 1953 but political issues were outside its mandate. Instead, the issue should be resolved in cooperation with the South Korean government.

After the meeting, the KPA requested the UNC to permit her crossing six times but in vain. On August 15, however, Im and Father Mun crossed the MDL and were escorted by South Korean guards through the DMZ and then handed over to the authorities. They were both brought to court and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment but were released a few years later. Im had insisted on returning via Panmunjom instead of Beijing, as North Korea had suggested, and even threatened to commit suicide in Panmunjom unless she could return that way; the North could not stop her crossing. On August 22,

the UNC/MAC Senior Member called the North and said that the crossing was an armistice violation and made clear that crossings should not become a usual practice.<sup>284</sup> In retrospect, if the crossings had not taken place, the situation would probably have become worse.

The South Korean scholar Park Hon-ok (1998) writes that, based on statistics from the MAC, North Korea had committed altogether 329,669 armistice violations from 1981-1990, 329, 659 of them on land, seven at sea and three in the air (cf. pp. 175-6, 262, 321-2, 339). This number accounted for 78 percent of all violations, a figure that is not supported by the account. Compatriot journalist Pak Yŏng-gyu explains (1995) the highest number of violations by the sense of crisis North Korea felt due to the 1988 Seoul Olympics and South Korea's rapid economic growth and improved position in the international community.<sup>285</sup> Although North Korea, as during the 1960s, attempted to compensate its inferiority by instigating incidents, it is noteworthy that no incidents were recorded in 1988.

## 5.4 Conclusions

During the 1980s, inter-Korean relations remained tense and there was still “negative peace.” Statistics show that the number of armistice violations was incomparably higher than before, but the

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<sup>284</sup> Ch'oe, op. cit., 2002, p. 123; Columbia University, *Text of Korean War Armistice Agreement*, Paragraph 7, 8; Kukpang chŏngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 229, 439, 440; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 174-7; *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 184-6. “Visitors” is quoted from Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), p. 174.

<sup>285</sup> Pak, “Pukhan-ŭi hyujŏn hyŏpchŏng wiban sarye-mit t'onggye,” July 1995, pp. 114, 117; Park, “Armistice Agreement and Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” 1998, pp. 78, 84-5.

account shows that the number of incidents was lower than in the 1960s and 1970s, implying that most incidents were fabricated. North Korea's inferiority feelings due to the 1988 Seoul Olympics explain the high number of violations. In contrast to both the 1960s and 1970s, no incidents caused fears of war, although the 1983 Rangoon bombing aroused a desire for retaliation. Casualties were lower than in the 1960s and the number of MAC meetings (55) was by far the lowest ever. One difference was that the two most serious incidents in terms of casualties - the 1983 Rangoon Bombing and the 1987 bombing of a South Korean passenger plane - took place outside the Korean peninsula. However, the relative absence of "serious" incidents and fewer MAC meetings imply that the level of "negative peace" was the lowest since the 1950s. The 1989 crossing of the MDL by student Im Su-gyông and Father Mun Kyu-hyôn was the first non-authorized border crossing, causing severe tension.

MAC meetings were still characterized by a "zero-sum game" with accusations and counter-accusations when both contentious issues and armistice violations were raised. Unlike previous decades, no admissions of violations were made. Rearmaments, including militarization of the DMZ, American troops in South Korea and military exercises such as "Team Spirit" remained contentious issues in the MAC. The parties largely repeated the same arguments as before. Proposals by the UNC/MAC to invite representatives from the KPA/CPV and the NNSC to inspect military exercises did not materialize owing to North Korea's opposition.

In contrast, the "game theory" created opportunities for negotiations in 1984 when South Korea suffered from heavy floods. Since the South Korean Red Cross accepted the offer from its North Korean

counterpart to provide humanitarian aid to promote improved relations, contacts that involved the Red Cross, economic cooperation and parliamentary exchanges developed; an opportunity for mutual benefits was created during a second period of thaw in inter-Korean relations 1984-85. However, the only concrete result was the accomplishment of the first family re-unions in September 1985 in an important breakthrough in civilian contacts. But, as during 1971-73, the period of détente did not last long since in January 1986 North Korea broke all contacts owing to the “Team Spirit” exercise; no stable basis to build relations on had developed.

The NNSC still worked better than the MAC. As after the axe murder in 1976, the mutual desire to reduce tension after the defection in 1984 by a Soviet citizen over the MDL formed a “positive symmetry” for the NNSC to act upon. The division of the JSA could not prevent the first and last exchange of fire between guards over the MDL with casualties on both sides since the incident took place unexpectedly. The Commission helped to enforce a cease-fire and, as in 1976, introduced measures to enhance security in the JSA. The NNSC still enjoyed confidence from both parties and made a positive contribution to North-South contacts by providing its conference room for repeated meetings in 1984-85. As a body for informal contacts, the Commission contributed to peace in a way that is not prescribed in the Armistice Agreement; that must be considered important as an effort to secure peace.



Chapter 6

*North Korea Incapacitates  
the MAC and the NNSC  
in the 1990s*



Peace-keeping in the Korean peninsula

## 6.1 Introduction

Tension continued during the 1980s, but no incidents caused fears of a new war. The most outstanding development was that a second period of thaw in inter-Korean relations occurred in 1984-85, but it did not last long. With this background, this chapter investigates characteristics of developments during the 1990s and compares them with previous decades.

The first section investigates the state of inter-Korean affairs in the early 1990s, first on the basis of MAC meetings held in 1990 and statistics on armistice violations committed by both sides since 1953. More attention is then given to explanations of how peace has been maintained that refer to the whole post-war period. In the case of the NNSC, the review includes parts of its work. The second section contains an account of developments in inter-Korean relations with the emphasis on the dialogue in 1990-1992 and the concurrent emergence of the North Korean nuclear issue and how these issues affected the Commissions' work as well as inter-Korean relations. However, since these issues are not the focus of this chapter, they are investigated rather briefly.

In 1991, a South Korean Major General was for the first time appointed UNC/MAC Senior Member. The background to this appointment, how North Korea's subsequent policies to undermine both the MAC and the NNSC were pursued and what measures were taken by the UNC/MAC and the NNSC to counteract them are investigated in detail in the third section. The analysis includes the issue of signing a peace treaty to end the Korean War and illuminates the two parties' positions on this contentious issue.

The fourth section analyzes in detail North Korea's demolition of the MAC and how this policy affected relations between the UNC/MAC and the KPA/CPV. The policies adopted to demolish the MAC, what new bodies were set up to replace it and how armistice violations as well as other pending issues were handled in the absence of the MAC are in focus here. The analysis includes the four-party talks that were held from 1997-99 and the "sunshine policy" introduced by President Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003). The fifth section deals in detail with North Korea's expulsion from the NNSC of the Czech Republic, which was scheduled to succeed Czechoslovakia following its dissolution in 1993 and Poland in 1995. Why North Korea took these decisions, what actions were taken by the UNC and the NNSC to prevent them and what impact the policies had on the Commission's work are the topics here. The final section investigates a few main incidents such as the intrusion of a North Korean submarine along the South Korean east coast in 1996.

## **6.2 The State of North-South Affairs**

At the 453rd MAC meeting proposed by the KPA/CPV held on January 17, 1990, the North urged a halt to large-scale military exercises. The UNC/MAC responded that Team Spirit was not an issue to raise in the MAC but to the South Korean government, and invited inspectors to the exercise. Moreover, the North should not worry about defensive exercise. When the 455th meeting took place on March 14, the North criticized Team Spirit and asserted that it was an obstacle to inter-Korean dialogue and re-unification. The South claimed that the exercise was justified and again urged the North to

protest to the South Korean government. At the 456th meeting called by the KPA/CPV convened on July 23, the North urged a halt to rearmaments and large-scale military exercises. At the 457th meeting suggested by the KPA/CPV held on August 20, the North criticized the illegal introduction of combat materials into South Korea and urged a halt to frequent military exercises that could cause war. The South asserted that military exercises were unrelated to the maintenance of the armistice and should instead be raised in North-South talks.

At the 458th meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on October 12, the North showed a video and protested that on September 28 an airplane had intruded over the MDL eight kilometres into its territory at Kaesŏng. When the North fired a warning shot, the plane escaped. The South claimed that it was an unarmed, light civilian aeroplane used to prevent insect pests which, after finishing work in Sŏsan region while flying over the Kimp'ŏ area, had been disoriented owing to bad visibility and entered the North. When the pilot realized his mistake, the plane returned homewards, but the North fired at it from the ground in an act which the South protested.<sup>286</sup>

As we have seen, the parties' charges against armistice violations have differed considerably. The South Korean scholar Kim Bo-Young (2003) records that between 1953 and 1991 the UNC had accused the North of 430,612 armistice violations, whereas the North had charged the UNC with 835,838 (cf. pp. 175-6, 262, 321-2, 339, 363). University student Ch'oe Sŏng-u (2004) records 408,445 accusations against North Korea for the same years. Journalist Pak Yŏng-gyu (1995)

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<sup>286</sup>- Hapch'am chŏngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chŏngjŏn wiwŏnhoe p'yŏllam: che 4 chip*, 1999, pp. 426, 432, 433, 464; Kukpang chŏngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chŏngjŏn wiwŏnhoe p'yŏllam: che 2 chip*, 1993, pp. 231, 232, 233, 234.

records the figure 417,353 for the years 1953-1993. Kim writes that, although the figures could have been fabricated for propaganda purposes, a considerable number of violations had taken place. That, as previously noted, the MAC worked without a chairman, that is, a referee making official objective judgments or conclusions as to who really violated the armistice, is one explanation of the different figures.<sup>287</sup>

Scholars have suggested a few reasons how peace was maintained. As mentioned in connection with the 1968 Pueblo incident, the signatory powers of the Armistice Agreement wanted to maintain the status quo, not start a new war. The South Korean scholar Seong-Ho Jhe (2000) argues that since 1953 the military balance between the two Koreas has prevented a recurrence of full-scale military collisions, creating an uncertain but “de facto peace” under the armistice regime. The deterrent power of the joint South Korean-US defence and the ensuing North-South military balance rather than the Armistice Agreement had held back military clashes, an argument that is supported by the present study. In concurrence with this study, the American scholar Kenneth Quinones (2001) also notes that deterrence was one cornerstone of South Korea-US policies; the purpose was to perpetuate a military stalemate, not to pursue durable peace and reconciliation. Since effective deterrence relies on a balance

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<sup>287</sup>- Ch'oe, *T'allaengjôn ihu Pukhan-ûi yuenkunsaryôngbu muryôkhwa-e taehan tongin yôn'gu*, 2004, p. 23: table 2; Jhe, “Chôngjôn hyôpchông ch'eje-e kwanhan yôn'gu,” 2004, p. 99; Kim, “1960 nyôndae kunsâ chôngjôn wiwônhoe-wa 'chôngjôn ch'eje,’” 2003, p. 178; Lee, “History of Korea's MDL and Reduction of Tension along the DMZ and Western Sea through Confidence Building Measures between North and South Korea,” 2001(b), p. 105; Pak, “Pukhan-ûi hyujôn hyôpchông wiban sarye-mit t'onggye,” July 1995, p. 117. Kim's data are based mainly on MAC protocols. The lower figures recorded by Ch'oe are based on statistics of violations made by the two sides (Ch'oe, *ibid.*, p. 23: fn. 43; Kim, *ibid.*, p. 178: fn. 30).

of terror by the amassing of armies and weapons, both Koreas have amassed huge armies backed by modern air forces and navies. The views of Jhe and Quinones concur with that of the former South Korean General Lee Sanghee (2007), who points out that the South Korea-US alliance “was a vital element of national survival.”

In line with these opinions, the former Swiss NNSC officer Urs A. Mueller-Lhotska (1997) writes about the Cold War period 1960-1989 that the main reason that frequent bloody incidents on the frontier did not escalate into war was the “Balance of Fear” created by the two parties’ armament race: the risk was complete extermination (cf. p. 2). In the author’s view, “Balance of Fear” explains the statement by experienced KPA General Li Chan-bok: “Those who talk about or predict a new second Korean War do not know what they are talking about.”<sup>288</sup>

The general’s view largely concurs with that of Yi Chin-ho, who in an interview in 1990 with the South Korean journalist Kim Chip, after having worked as special advisor to the UNC/MAC since 1966, expressed the view that since the military power of the two sides had to a certain extent reached equilibrium, the armistice had been maintained. It was thanks to this balance of power that the armistice was maintained, not thanks to the Armistice Agreement. However, he admitted that the MAC had helped to secure peace by serving, as we have seen, as a contact body during crises.

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<sup>288</sup>- Jhe, *Hanbando p’yonghwa ch’eje-tŭi mosaek*, 2000, pp. 195-6, 421; Lee, *Toward a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula*, May 2, 2007, p. 13; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *Swiss Mission to Korteŭa in the Change of Times 1953-1997*, p. 63; Nilsson, *Rapport efter tjänstgöring som svensk delegat i Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) i Korea 1992/93* (n.p., April 26, 1994), p. 13; Quinones, “South Korea’s Approaches to North Korea,” pp. 24, 25. Original quotation marks except from Lee.

A study by the South Korean Defence Intelligence Headquarters (1997) argues that since 1953 the MAC, by operating and maintaining the armistice, had made an important contribution to reducing tension and maintaining peace. As the only forum for discussing military issues, every time incidents had occurred a dialogue had prevented them from escalating and helped to resolve them. A study by the Joint Intelligence Headquarters (2001) expresses the same view. The present study confirms that the MAC has helped to secure peace but, as we have seen, almost all meetings have, rather than solving issues, ended with the two sides failing to reach any consensus.

Kim Chip (1996) differs from all other observers by arguing that the main reason why the armistice has been maintained was that at least the southern side of the DMZ has served as a buffer zone and that the South Korean and US armies have only held back North Korean intrusions and not retaliated. The only exception was in August 1976 when, as we have seen, the poplar tree was cut down following the axe murder.<sup>289</sup> Retaliation in other cases as well would almost certainly have aggravated tension but, as we have seen, violent incidents have been repeated in a vicious circle. In brief, military power mattered more than the Armistice Agreement to maintain “negative peace.”

Regarding the NNSC, Mueller-Lhotska points out that during the Cold War, the Commission was the only body in Korea whose members had access to military headquarters in Kaesŏng and Seoul

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<sup>289</sup>- Hapch'am chŏngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chŏngjŏn wiwŏnhoe p'yŏllam: che 5 chip*, 2001, p. 81; Kim, “Panmunjŏm-ŭi kilgo kin sŏljŏn: 25nyŏn tongan hyŏnjang-ŭl chik'yŏ pon Yi Chin-ho,” 1990, pp. 163, 172-3: “Chŏngjŏn hyŏpchŏng 43nyŏn: Pimujang chidae-ŭi ōje-wa onŭl,” *Pukhan* (July 1996), pp. 29-30; Kukpang chŏngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chŏngjŏn wiwŏnhoe p'yŏllam: che 3 chip*, 1997, p. 20.

and were authorized to have official and non-official communication with both Koreas across the MDL in an important diplomatic function, while limiting its presence to Panmunjom. In 1993, all NNSC countries dispatched observers to the “Team Spirit” exercise in South Korea. Yi Chin-ho (1990) expresses the opinion that, by holding meetings and being present in Panmunjom, the NNSC had helped greatly to reduce tension in the area.

In line with evaluations recorded in previous chapters, Major General Sven Julin, Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation in 1998-99 (2000), argues that from 1956 to 1991 the Commission had helped to secure peace by serving as a bridge-builder. Similarly, in 1997, the Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation in 1997-98, Major General Lennart Rönnerberg, wrote that between 1956 and 1994 the NNSC had played an active role as a liaison organ between North and South Korea. He labels the NNSC as “watchdogs” of the international community at the MDL. The study by the South Korean Defence Intelligence Headquarters (1997) argued that, by maintaining smooth contacts between representatives of both sides in the MAC and serving as a mediator along with the MAC, the NNSC had helped to maintain the Armistice Agreement, an opinion that the 2001 study by the Joint Intelligence Headquarters repeated.<sup>290</sup>

In 1993, Young Seek Choue, Chancellor of Kyung Hee University,

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<sup>290</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 2001, p. 96; Julin, “NNSC och dess förändrade roll under 1990-talet,” March 22, 2000; Kim, *ibid.*, 1990, p. 177; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1997, p. 136; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *op. cit.*, pp. 63, 65; *NNSC Chief Delegates - List Updated April 14, 1997*; Rönnerberg, “Rapport från orkanens öga,” *Yoboseyo* (November 1997), no. 4, p. 3; Tham, *Rapport efter tjänstgöring som medlem av de Neutrala staternas övervakningskommission, NNSC i Korea, 1993/94* (Panmunjom, October 31, 1994), p. 3. Original quotation marks.

wrote on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Armistice Agreement:

“At the same time, I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to the NNSC for its contribution to the security of the Korean Peninsula. As a peace apostle, the NNSC has also rendered dedicated services to the realization of world peace, for which we cannot easily find proper words to thank.”

The NNSC is referred to as “...maintaining an island of contact in an ocean of no contact” (cf. p. 70). He concluded:

“Seizing the occasion, I would like to reiterate my deepest thanks to Major General [Bernard A.] Sandoz and the staff of the NNSC for their dedicated efforts to keep us at peace. The NNSC’s noble services will be recorded in the annals of Korea as one of the noblest actions taken for Korea’s peaceful existence.”<sup>291</sup>

According to Major General Bernard A. Sandoz, Head of the Swiss NNSC Delegation in 1993, the perception of its image was important for promoting understanding of the Commission’s tasks. Thanks to the visits made to the Swedish-Swiss camp that, to the author’s knowledge, were initiated by the Commission, and the objective information thereby provided, the image was good. In 1991, NNSC officers were always present when important visits took place in Panmunjom, such as when the North and South Korean prime ministers and women representatives crossed the border and high-level foreign dignitaries attended. In October 1991, North Korean

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<sup>291</sup> Choue, “Introduction,” in Kyung Hee University: Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, *The Swiss Delegation to the NNSC 1953-1993 Panmunjom (Korea)*, pp. 5, 6, 7, 8; Sandoz, “La Délégation Suisse dans la NNSC et son environnement géopolitique,” 1993(a), p. 207.

women were invited to Seoul to participate in the conference “Peace in Asia and the Role of Women.” On November 9, six women from the two Koreas met in the NNSC conference room and decided to hold the first conference with women from both states from November 25 to November 30. The North Korean representatives travelled via Panmunjom. Following contacts from North Korea, women met again in the NNSC conference room on August 4, 1992; the third conference in the series would be held in P’yôngyang on September 1-6.

In 1992, the number of visitors to the Swiss camp was only some 200 high-level foreign dignitaries and diplomats, journalists, businessmen and military officers, compared to 107,000 to the JSA as guests of the UNC. Nonetheless, the visits were qualitatively important, not only for the NNSC but also for the UNC, the KPA/CPV and for comprehension of the situation in the Korean peninsula.<sup>292</sup> In the author’s opinion, the NNSC in this way promoted peace outside of the Armistice Agreement but beneficial to maintaining it.

A few other visits also took place via Panmunjom in the early 1990s, most of which involved the NNSC. On October 8, 1990, working-level talks on the visit of 14 South Korean musicians and three journalists to the “National Unification Music Festival” to be held in P’yôngyang from October 18 were convened in the NNSC conference room. The visit took place from October 14 to October 24. Significantly, for the first time since the 1945 division, both govern-

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<sup>292</sup>- Bucheli, “Die Neutrale Ueberwachungskommission und das politische Umfeld in Korea (Eine Chronik der Ereignisse 1983 bis 1993),” pp. 55, 70; Ch’oe, “P’anmunjôm-ül t’onghan Nambukhan kyoryu,” 2002, pp. 125-6; Sandoz, “Conclusion,” 1993(b), pp. 337, 341-2. The author’s visit to the Swedish camp on September 15, 2006, confirms that Sandoz’s opinion that “objective information” was provided was still relevant.

ments had permitted civilians to visit North Korea via Panmunjom. On December 8, 33 North Korean musicians and journalists travelled via Panmunjom to take part in “The 1990 New Year Traditional Music Festival.” On August 12, 1991, student representatives from the two Koreas met for the first time in Panmunjom, but the scheduled second meeting on the following day did not materialize since the South Korean government’s opinion was that rather than arranging a pure visit, North Korea wanted to use the students for their political purposes.

On September 9, 1991, the Kôn’guk University Department of Korean Literature proposed to the Kim Il Sung University Department of Korean Literature that a meeting be held with student representatives in Panmunjom. The purpose was to visit historical spots and to establish a sisterhood relationship. Consequently, on September 18 and 24, 1991, four students from Kôn’guk University Department of Korean Language and Literature and four students from Kim Il Sung University Department of Linguistics met in the NNSC conference room. On October 1, 1990, all NNSC delegations for the first time participated in the celebration of the anniversary of the Republic of Korea armed forces founded in 1948. In June 1998, the Hyundai company’s founder, Chung Ju-yung, crossed the MDL via the NNSC conference room to deliver 500 cows to North Korea as a gift and returned the same way. He crossed via the NNSC conference room again on the delivery of 501 cows in October.<sup>293</sup>

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<sup>293</sup>. Ch’oe, “P’anmunjöm-ül t’onghan Nambukhan kyoryu,” 2002, pp. 124-5; Holmberg, *Månadsrapport oktober* (n. p., October 31, 1990), p. 4; Julin, *Rapport för juni 1998* (n. p., June 29, 1998), pp. 4, 6; *Rapport för oktober 1998* (n. p., October 31, 1998), pp. 4-5. Ch’oe (ibid., p. 125) does not say whether the September 1991 student meetings gave any result.

### 6.3 Reactivation of Dialogue and the North Korean Nuclear Issue

In the early 1990s, North-South dialogue was reactivated and a third period of thaw in relations began. Previously, in the July 7, 1988 Declaration, President Roh Tae Woo (1988-1993) had stressed co-existence and co-prosperity through mutual North-South exchanges, family re-unions, opening of trade, permission of allies to trade in non-military materials with North Korea, North-South cooperation on the international stage and, finally, cooperation with the US and Japan to improve relations with North Korea and improvement of South Korea's relations with Communist countries as part of "Nordpolitik." These reconciliatory efforts, along with North Korean growing uncertainty about its future - the Communist bloc's collapse, the Soviet Union's bankruptcy, the Chinese flirtation with capitalism accompanied by South Korea's diplomatic and commercial gains world-wide - contributed to the opening of dialogue, as did the North's economic crisis.

On December 28, 1988, South Korean Prime Minister Kang Yŏng-hun suggested to his North Korean counterpart Yŏn Hyŏng-muk that prime-minister talks be held to create mutual confidence and reduce tension. Prime Minister Yŏn Hyŏng-muk counter-proposed on January 16, 1989, that prime-minister talks be held on military and political issues and preliminary talks on February 8. Since South Korea agreed, eight rounds of preliminary talks were held from February 8, 1989 to July 26, 1990 in "Re-unification House" in the northern part of Panmunjom and in "Peace House" (built in 1980) in the southern part. Two rounds of representative-level talks also took

place there. Six rounds of prime-minister talks were subsequently held between September 1990 and February 1992.<sup>294</sup>

At the fifth round of talks, the prime ministers signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation (hereafter “Basic Agreement”) on December 13, 1991. They signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (hereafter “Joint Declaration”) on December 31, 1991. According to Donald Gregg, American ambassador to South Korea at the time, the key to the signing of the documents had been the cancellation of the 1992 Team Spirit exercise. Both documents were ratified at the sixth round of talks in February 1992. Notably, North Korean Prime Minister Yôn Hyông-muk called the Basic Agreement “the most valuable achievement ever made between the South and North Korean authorities.” Under this agreement, both parties reaffirmed the unification principles expressed in the 1972 July 4 Joint Communiqué (cf. p. 257). Both sides pledged “...to exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification.”

Parts of the contents in the sections on reconciliation and non-aggression are basically identical with the Armistice Agreement. Article 5 refers to it: “Both parties shall endeavor together to transform the present armistice regime into a firm state of peace between the South and the North and shall abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement (of July 27, 1953) until such time as such a state of peace has taken hold.” Article 11 also refers to it: “The North-South demarcation line and areas for non-aggression shall be identical with

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<sup>294</sup>- Ch’oe, *ibid.*, 2002, pp. 112-114; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *op. cit.*, p. 102; Quinones, *op. cit.*, pp. 21, 35-6.

the military demarcation line specified in the Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953 and the areas that have been under the jurisdiction of each party respectively there under until the present.” Article 9 says: “Both parties shall not use armed force against each other and shall not make armed aggression against each other.” In the Joint Declaration, the parties declare: “The South and the North will not test, manufacture, produce, introduce, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.” On September 27, 1991, US President George Bush had announced the withdrawal of all atomic weapons from South Korea as part of the initiative to remove ground-based nuclear weapons world-wide to bring forth reciprocal steps from the Soviet Union. In 1989, there were in South Korea about 100 nuclear warheads, but all had been removed in December 1991; on December 18, President Roh Tae Woo announced that there were no nuclear weapons in South Korea.<sup>295</sup>

At the same time as the 1991 agreements were ratified, an agreement was signed to establish joint sub-committees to implement the agreed measures. In 1992, more than 70 sessions opened in Panmunjom in “Re-unification House,” “Peace House” or in the NNSC conference room. In mid-May, a telephone line was established between the North and South Korean liaison offices that were set up in

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<sup>295</sup>- Ch’oe, *ibid.*, 2002, p. 114; *Inter-Korean Agreement*, (Stockholm, December 13, 1991); Gregg, “Ties with the Eastern Bloc: The presidency of Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993),” in Korean Culture and Information Service Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, *Korea: Impossible to Possible* (Seoul, 2008), pp. 175, 180, 183; Jonsson, *Towards Korean Reconciliation: Socio-Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), pp. 57, 241; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(b), pp. 123-4; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, pp. 103-105, 163; Oberdorfer, *The two Koreas: A Contemporary History*, pp. 258, 259, 260. Original quotation from Jonsson, *ibid.*, p. 57.

Panmunjom. When the line began operating, it was the fourth direct telephone line in Panmunjom across the MDL besides those of the Korean Red Cross, the MAC and the NNSC. However, once more the period of closer relations did not last very long, in particular due to North Korea's suspected nuclear ambitions, in spite of the Joint Declaration. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korea could no longer rely on Soviet military might to deter US military strength; the ability to rush to the North's defence as provided for in their mutual 1961 defence treaty had diminished. To restore the balance of terror in the peninsula, North Korea speeded up the development of an indigenous nuclear capability. In spring 1992, North Korea allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect the once top-secret Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear Research Facility.

At this time, "Team Spirit" had been discontinued in return for the North's willingness to permit these inspections. North Korea had also received assurances that there were no nuclear weapons in South Korea, which was a major concern. However, in September 1992 the process of reconciliation was undercut by mounting distrust, fostered by evidence that North Korea was attempting to conceal the extent of its previous production of nuclear weapon-grade plutonium. When North Korea repeatedly denied the IAEA access to its nuclear waste site that US intelligence had revealed, the 1993-94 nuclear crisis was born. The threat on March 12, 1993 to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) owing to the rejection of the request by the IAEA for a special inspection of two military sites near Yŏngbyŏn where plutonium for one or two nuclear bombs may have been produced also contributed to tension. Another reason was that the 1993 "Team Spirit" nuclear war exercise had violated the spirit of the NPT and the

1991 Joint Declaration.

When in May 1993 the UN Security Council passed a US-sponsored resolution that called for North Korea to reconsider its position, the North said that, if sanctions were to be imposed, they would be regarded as a “declaration of war.” South Korean officials were publicly against any possible sanctions against North Korea or a pre-emptive strike against the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear reactor for fear of renewed conflict. After North Korea and the US had agreed on June 11 not to use military force, including nuclear weapons, against each other and to ensure denuclearization, peace and security in the Korean peninsula, the North remained in the NPT.<sup>296</sup>

In October 1993, North Korea had accepted South Korea’s proposal from September to exchange special nuclear envoys; eight preparatory rounds of talks were held from October 1993 to March 1994 in “Peace House” and “Reunification House.” These talks failed since North Korea raised such demands as cancelling exercises for nuclear war and the introduction of new weapons such as Patriot anti-missiles, the first of which arrived in mid-April and were deployed the same month. While criticizing the South, North Korea was estimated to spend about 25 percent of its GDP on maintaining its 1.1 million troops (cf. pp. 123, 135). At the eighth round held on March 19, the North’s chief delegate warned that Seoul would become

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<sup>296</sup> Ch’oe, *ibid.*, 2002, p. 119; Jonsson, *ibid.*, p. 57; Lee, *Panmunjom, Korea*, 2004, pp. 216-217; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 105; Oberdorfer, *ibid.*, pp. 264, 279, 280; Quinones, *op. cit.*, pp. 20, 25, 37, 38, 39. “Declaration of war” is quoted from Lee, *ibid.*, p. 216. In the 1970s, South Korea had a nuclear program, partly since President Park Chung Hee “... wished to have the [nuclear] card to deal with other governments.” The programme caused tension with the US and was eventually abandoned in 1978 due to American pressure. From Oberdorfer, *ibid.*, pp. 68-74.

“a sea of fire” if war broke out. The North’s delegation unilaterally walked out and talks ended.

By June 1994, due to rising tension over the unresolved nuclear inspections and defueling of the North Korean reactor in Yŏngbyŏn, the crisis had escalated to one of virtual war that would certainly have involved the US. On June 10, the IAEA passed a resolution that suspended its technical assistance to North Korea, which responded by announcing its withdrawal from the agency. Quinones writes (2001) that intense mistrust between the people of North and South Korea had continued virtually unabated. Between fall 1992 and 1994, mistrust both disrupted North-South dialogue and almost led to war in the Korean peninsula. The South Korean scholar Hong Seuk-Ryul (2003) regards the nuclear crisis as the third occasion that created fears of a new war after the 1968 Pueblo incident and the 1976 axe murder but notes that the issue was not directly related to the Armistice Agreement which does not contain any article on nuclear weapons or indigenous manufacturing of weapons. The issue was entirely unrelated to the UNC and the MAC.<sup>297</sup> During the nuclear crisis, the high level of “negative peace” remained, but the causes were different than in 1968 and 1976 and it materialized differently.

The only occasion the author has found when the nuclear issue was raised in the MAC was at the secretary meeting requested by the KPA/CPV held on March 25, 1994. The North claimed that the US, without any recent evidence, argued that the IAEA inspections were unsatisfactory, raising tension. The US was threatening the North by

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<sup>297</sup> Ch’oe, *ibid.*, 2002, pp. 119-120; Hong, “Wigi sog-tŭi chŏngjŏn hyŏpchŏng,” 2003, p. 57; Lee, *ibid.*, 2004, p. 218; Oberdorfer, *ibid.*, pp. 306, 312-313, 314, 321; Quinones, *ibid.*, pp. 20, 39-40.

reopening Team Spirit, deploying Patriot missiles in South Korea, suspending the third round of North Korea-US nuclear talks, presenting the nuclear issue to the UN Security Council and imposing sanctions; the US was unwilling to resolve the nuclear issue and improve relations with North Korea. Instead, with the nuclear issue as an excuse the intention was to isolate and break down the North. If the US sincerely wanted peace, it should first cease such war games as “Team Spirit” and deployments of Patriot missiles.

The UNC/MAC responded that the Patriot missiles were for defensive purposes; the North had raised tension and threatened war. The North should immediately respond to IAEA inspections. Although South Korea had conditionally suspended Team Spirit, North Korea rejected North-South dialogue and raised tension. The North responded that the intention to reopen Team Spirit was the most serious issue. The nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes; the North was a NPT member and accepted nuclear inspections. The North had no intention of attacking the South but claimed that imposing sanctions would cause war.<sup>298</sup> The “zero-sum game” was just repeated.

Eventually, the US resumed dialogue with North Korea and accomplished a negotiated resolution of the nuclear crisis. Given the game theory, the opinion should have been that, as in the Pueblo affair, a negotiated solution benefitting both parties must be pursued. In June 1994, former US President Jimmy Carter visited P’yŏngyang via Panmunjom and met President Kim Il Sung, who promised that North Korea would suspend its nuclear programme. The parties agreed to hold high-level talks that led to the signing of the Agreed

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<sup>298</sup>- Kukpang chŏngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1997, pp. 60, 61-3.

Framework of October 21, 1994. The US would provide North Korea with two light-water reactors, replacing graphite-moderated reactors, and deliver crude oil until the first reactor was completed. Both parties would strive to normalize political and economic relations. North Korea would implement the 1991 North-South Joint Declaration and re-engage in North-South dialogue.

Through Carter, a suggestion had been made to President Kim Young Sam (1993-98) to hold a summit meeting. Secret vice-premier-level talks were held in Panmunjom on June 28 that led to an agreement to hold a summit in P'yŏngyang from July 25 to 27. Working-level talks were held in Panmunjom on July 1 and 2, but the talks that were scheduled to be held on July 7 and 8 were cancelled due to the death of Kim Il Sung on July 8. No further talks were held afterwards. On the contrary, inter-Korean relations deteriorated, in particular since South Korean authorities did not allow any condolences to be sent for Kim Il Sung and defined him as a war criminal. In contrast, US President Bill Clinton sent a letter of condolence to keep the Geneva negotiations on the nuclear issue on track. The policy of the new leader Kim Jong Il to reject contacts was a policy to exclude South Korea. Instead, North Korea used the “nuclear card” to improve relations with the US.

The only North-South talks held concerned rice aid in 1995 and food aid in 1997. To incapacitate the armistice regime, both talks were held in Beijing instead of Panmunjom. In addition, after Kim Dae Jung had become South Korean president in February 1998, talks on supplies of fertilizers from South to North Korea were held in April 1998 and June 1999 in Beijing; the role of Panmunjom as a place for contacts had decreased. The only meetings held in Panmunjom after

February 1998 were working contacts on the June 2000 inter-Korean summit and military affairs.<sup>299</sup>

## 6.4 The 1991 Appointment of a South Korean General as UNC/MAC Senior Member

In sharp contrast to progress in inter-Korean dialogue from 1990-1991, relations between the armistice's parties deteriorated from 1991 onwards due also to an event entirely unrelated to the nuclear issue. On March 25, 1991, the UNC/MAC for the first time appointed a South Korean Major General, Deputy Chief-of-Staff of the joint South Korea-US forces, Hwang Won Tak, as Senior Member.<sup>300</sup> According to Mueller-Lhotska (1997), the purpose was to promote the inclusion of the South Korean military in the inter-Korean dialogue and in the cause of the nation's defence. North Korea did not accept the credentials passed by the UNC Joint Duty Officer at the meeting

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<sup>299</sup>- Ch'oe, op. cit., 2002, pp. 121, 126-7, 129; Ch'oe, op. cit., 2004, p. 67; Jonsson, op. cit., p. 217; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1997, p. 245; Oberdorfer, op. cit., pp. 278, 342, 343, 357; Quinones, op. cit., p. 40; Lee, op. cit., 2004, pp. 218-219.

<sup>300</sup>- Already in 1964, a special study made by the UNC had proposed appointing a South Korean as UNC/MAC Senior Member. In 1971, the departing UNC/MAC Senior Member had suggested that a South Korean should become Senior Member. If Koreans could talk to each other, the negotiations would get a political status leading to considerable progress. That South Korea did not sign the Armistice Agreement should not hinder the appointment of a South Korean as Senior Member. The UNC should still be represented in the UNC/MAC since its presence was important for South Korea. That North Korea only used the MAC meetings for propaganda purposes was another reason for the change. According to an UNC spokesman, the proposal only came from the Senior Member and did not reflect official opinion. The proposal evoked a mixed response in South Korea whereas representatives of American authorities in the press entirely rejected it and claimed that it reflected the Senior Member's personal views. From Holmstedt, *Månadsrapport juli 1971: Bilaga 1*, pp. 1-2, 6.

held on March 25. The reason was that South Korea had neither signed the Armistice Agreement nor was a member of the UNC: President Syngman Rhee had formally withdrawn his army from the UNC on June 18, 1953. Consequently, Major General Hwang could not represent all armed forces in South Korea. Since the appointment from North Korea's point of view was illegal, the MAC could not continue its work, which meant that North Korea could not receive the credentials from the new American UNC/MAC member either. Finally, there were directives from above not to receive the credentials.

According to James Lee (2001b), the appointment had not been officially discussed with the North Korean side prior to its effectuation, but their response to an unofficial informal query on the subject raised by a South Korean military officer was negative. It was a major miscalculation not to take the response as serious on the grounds that North Korea needed Panmunjom more than the UNC and South Korea as the only window available for disseminating its propaganda. In a joint letter addressed to both sides of the MAC on January 8, 1991, the NNSC tried to point out the problems associated with the appointment announced in November. Subsequently, the South charged the NNSC with having violated neutrality and summoned the Swedish and Swiss Ambassadors to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In contrast, North Korea expressed its positive attitude through Deputy Foreign Minister Song Ho Kyong during a reception when a NNSC trip was made to P'yŏngyang in February 1991, which was the Commission's last official to the North.<sup>301</sup>

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<sup>301</sup> Bucheli, op. cit., p. 66; Holmberg, *Månadsrapport januari: Bilaga 3* (n. p., January 31, 1991); Kim, "Kunsa chŏngjŏn wiwŏnhoe (UNCMAC)," in Hapch'am chŏngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chŏngjŏn wiwŏnhoe p'yŏllam: che 7 chip* (2004-2006), 2006(a), p. 86;

According to Lee (2001b), if the appointment had been accepted, South Korea would have been accepted as a de facto signatory power of the Armistice Agreement. North Korea would thereby lose a vital opportunity for direct negotiations with the US to turn the agreement into a peace treaty and to demand the withdrawal of American forces from South Korea. It would also become harder to coerce South Korea into accepting its unification formula through the establishment of the Confederal Republic of Koryō that had been suggested already on June 23, 1973, and to gradually absorb the South under its own terms. While North Korea had previously recognized the participation of two South Korean officers in the MAC in order to bind the South's military to the Armistice Agreement as one party of it, following the appointment, the North declared through Radio P'yōngyang on March 27: "...it is impossible to exchange telephone messages and letters signed by the senior member and to hold meetings with the MAC in the future."

The message was conveyed to representatives of the NNSC member countries, who were invited individually to Kaesōng on March 27-28. The Commission's work after this would not be affected at all, but the hope was that the NNSC would actively interfere to cancel the appointment. However, the NNSC decided at the April 2 meeting not to respond; the issue was not one for the Commission to handle. After the appointment of Major General Hwang, North Korea did not recognize the new generals to the NNSC. The KPA/CPV Senior Member declared that in the future North Korea only wanted to maintain contacts with the US representative in the MAC to discuss

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Lee, op. cit., 2001(b), pp. 120, 122; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., p. 119.

issues to be raised in the Commission. On April 6, the party paper *Rodong Sinmun* [Workers' Daily] accused the US of the appointment, which was motivated by the wish "...to avoid its legal duty to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty [between the U.S. and North Korea] and to remain in South Korea permanently."<sup>302</sup>

On April 10, the KPA urged the UNC to arrange an informal meeting between the two Korean Senior Members to restore the functions of the MAC, but the UNC dismissed the proposal, arguing that other tactics were behind it. Moreover, the UNC/MAC Senior Member could not meet his KPA/CPV counterpart as an individual informally. On the same day, North Korea announced that the annual visit by the NNSC to Kim Il Sung's birthday (April 15) and the Korean People's Army's Foundation Day (April 25) was postponed indefinitely. Additionally, since the NNSC in essence did not at all contribute to solving the issues of the Armistice Agreement, the Commission was not needed any more, which was in sharp contrast to previous views.

At the 459th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on February 13, 1991, the North protested against Team Spirit '91, which it regarded as an offensive exercise in preparation for war and demanded an immediate halt. The exercise violated the preamble of the Armistice Agreement and Paragraph 13(c) and (d). The UNC/MAC Senior Member responded that he well knew the North's position and

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<sup>302</sup>- Bucheli, *ibid.*, p. 66; Chông, "Nambuk wiwônho-e-ûi yangsan-gwa hyujôn ch'eje-ûi hôjôm - 7.27 hyujôn 39nyôn, chôngjôn kwalli kinûng-ûi mabi sang'ae," *Chayu kongnon* (1992.7), pp. 92, 93; Holmberg, *Månadsrapport april* (n. p., April 30, 1991), p. 4; Jhe, *op. cit.*, 2000, p. 111; Kim, *ibid.*, 2006(a), p. 86; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001 (b), pp. 121-2; *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 230; Sandoz, *op. cit.*, 1993(a), p. 217. Original quotation from Bucheli, *ibid.*, p. 66.

had invited North Korea to observe it, but the North maintained its standpoint. Furthermore, military exercises were an inter-governmental issue. Since the KPA/CPV Senior Member, owing to the March 27 statement, refused to attend the 460th meeting called by the UNC/MAC on May 29, 1992, the 459th meeting was the last plenary session. Notably, 340 of the 459 MAC meetings had been called by the KPA/CPV.<sup>303</sup> This figure reconfirms the discrepancy in charges of armistice violations.

Although the appointment of Major General Hwang worsened relations between the two parties, contacts continued. As a consequence of the political upheavals in Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia and Poland did not support North Korea's protests; these countries were no longer regarded as neutral by the North. Although the appointment created controversies, it did not violate the Armistice Agreement, as North Korea claimed it did on March 27. In a special report presented by the UNC Commander to the chairman of the UN Security Council on March 21, he stated that the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 20, neither specifies the Senior Member's nationality nor states that the other side's consent or approval is required for the appointment. Neither would the appointment transfer responsibility for implementing the agreement to the South Korean government: the UNC Commander appointed the Senior Member and implemented the

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<sup>303</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1999, p. 434; Kim, op. cit., 2003, p. 171; Kim, ibid., 2006(a), p. 87; Kim, "Chungnipguk kamdok wiwônho (NNSC)," in Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 2006(b), p. 105; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, pp. 234-5; Lee, *JSA - P'anmunjôm (1953~1994)*, 2001(a), pp. 226-7; ibid., 2001(b), p. 120. Comparing Lee's figure of meetings called with those of Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, ibid., 1993, pp. 21-235, gives the numbers 343 versus 116, but the discrepancy is indisputable.

agreement. Consequently, Lee (2001b) points out that the appointment was not a Koreanization of Panmunjom, although on October 1, 1991, South Korea took over responsibility for security in the area from the US, making it clearer that it was a party to the armistice.

On May 9, 1991, the KPA/CPV informed representatives that reports on rotation of personnel and replacements of combat materials in accordance with Paragraph 13(c) and (d) would not be delivered any more, but the UNC continued to report on personnel. The reason was said to be that reports by the UNC on personnel were incorrect and did not, for instance, reflect the rotation of personnel associated with “Team Spirit” exercises. From this time onwards, no minutes and reports were received from the NNSC. Since the North did not wish to receive reports from the South, there was no need any longer to hold Joint Duty Officers meetings. The KPA/CPV cancelled the daily Joint Duty Officers meeting that handled the reports, but in 1992 frequent meetings were held to raise issues in the JSA. Almost all formal meetings between the two sides of the MAC were cancelled, but Senior Members continued to meet.

Informal meetings took place but less frequently than before and they were less available since no official minutes were kept. Informal meetings between the MAC secretaries with the rank of colonel were held rather often, but a few formal meetings also took place. James Munhang Lee, special advisor to the UNC Commander and the MAC on armistice affairs, maintained informal contact with North Korean MAC members and their staff with guidance from the UNC Chief of Staff and the Commander.<sup>304</sup> The direct telephone line was maintained.

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<sup>304</sup>- American-Korean Lee had as special advisor to the UNC/MAC since 1963 made

According to Lee (2001a), since 1953, 1,199 reports had been submitted by the KPA/CPV to the MAC and the NNSC, but according to them no new weapons such as fighter planes, tanks and warships had been introduced. Only weapons used during the war were reported.<sup>305</sup>

On May 22, the UNC protested the cancellation of reports on the rotation of personnel at a Joint Duty Officer Meeting. The cancellation was pointed out as an act unilaterally demolishing the Armistice Agreement and obstructing the work of the MAC. The appointment of Major General Hwang was no problem at all from the point of the Armistice Agreement, but the refusal to receive his credentials was an armistice violation. The UNC would strictly observe the agreement to maintain peace and hoped that North Korea would cease its obstructions and participate to fulfill the agreement. On the same day, the North notified that it would refuse to receive the monthly reports from the NNSC to the MAC. On May 23, the North declared that all its formal

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great contributions to reducing tension by formulating policies towards North Korea and serving as a mediator on the basis of experiencing incidents. From Kukpang chôngbo ponbu (op. cit., 1997), p. 77. In 1997, he received for that service to his adopted country as the first American citizen born in Korea the president's award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service. From *Downs, Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy*, p. xiii. The award appears in Lee (op. cit., 2004, p. xi) but is dated November 22, 1996.

<sup>305</sup>- Bucheli, op. cit., pp. 66-7, 83; Chông, op. cit., p. 94; Columbia University, *Text of the Korean War Armistice Agreement*, Paragraph 20; Holmberg, *Månadsrapport maj* (n. p., May 31, 1991), p. 3; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, p. 409; Lee, "Chôngjônwi-esô ch'ôlsuhan Pukhan-ûi noll-wa soksem: môlgo hômhan kil, P'anmunjôm-ûi Han'gukhwa" ([http://www2.donga.com/docs/magazine/new\\_donga/9803/nd98030170.html](http://www2.donga.com/docs/magazine/new_donga/9803/nd98030170.html)), 1998 (e), p. 2: op. cit., 2001(a), pp. 204, 216: op. cit., 2001(b), pp. 122, 123; op. cit., 2004, p. 150; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., p. 119; Nilsson, op. cit., p. 4; Sandoz, op. cit., 1993(a), p. 217; Stalder, "Die Koreanische Wiedervereinigung," in Kyung Hee University: Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, *The Swiss Delegation to the NNSC 1953-1993 Panmunjom (Korea)*, p. 162.

contacts with the NNSC would cease. Only informal meetings with KPA/CPV officers were held afterwards. Invitations to dinners, film showings and travels in North Korea ceased.

On the other hand, the North continued to recognize the NNSC as a necessary body to provide security in the JSA; when a South Korean soldier fled to North Korea on March 3, 1991, the NNSC was informed first of all on the same day. Later, the soldier was returned. On May 28, the UNC and the KPA/CPV sent a letter to the NNSC regarding the cancellation of exchanges of reports on the rotation of personnel. On May 31, the KPA/CPV, through a Joint Duty Officers' meeting, notified the UNC that there was no need to hold the weekly Language Branch Meetings that translated MAC and NNSC documents since the North did not receive the South's reports. From August 28, NNSC members were prohibited from visiting P'yŏngyang.

On November 29, the North suggested at a secretary meeting to form a three-party committee consisting of the two Koreas and the US Army that would replace the suspended MAC until a peace treaty was signed. On January 8, 1992, the KPA/CPV and the UNC met at New Year's festivities in the NNSC conference room in the first meeting since the appointment of Major General Hwang. On February 13, the KPA proposed that the newly established joint North-South military committee should, as a proxy, implement the work of the MAC. In February, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that since the Basic Agreement had been signed as a new agreement for peace in the Korean peninsula, the UNC was not needed any more. Consequently, it urged Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, New Zealand, the Phillipines, Thailand and the United Kingdom to withdraw their liaison officers from the UNC. All NNSC countries

were informally invited to P'yōngyang on April 15 on the occasion of the 80th birthday of President Kim Il Sung and they also went there. When the MAC secretaries met on November 30, the UNC/MAC secretary conveyed to the North's counter-part an oral message to the KPA Supreme Commander that the UNC would oppose any measures taken by the KPA/CPV to suspend the NNSC's work. Yet, in spite of the policy to undermine the NNSC, a North Korean general took part in the celebration of the 41st anniversary of the NNSC on July 29, 1994.<sup>306</sup>

Previously, North Korea had limited the logistic support of the Czech and Polish delegations to basic needs. From June 1991, gas supplies to the lodging quarters in Kaesōng were interrupted. On June 6, North Korea did not assist the delegations with a vehicle to return to their camp after festivities on the Swedish national day; they had to walk 1,5 kilometres back. On June 16, the North announced that financial support for family visits from Czechoslovakia and Poland to Panmunjom would be interrupted. Immediately after the simultaneous entry by the two Koreas into the UN on September 17, 1991, transport was no longer provided between Kaesōng and Panmunjom. On October 15, the supply of water, electricity and daily necessities was interrupted. In contrast, the South arranged visits for shopping, offered the delegates medical care and invited them to official and cultural events.

On June 3, the North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Song Ho

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<sup>306</sup>- Bucheli, *ibid.*, pp. 66, 68, 69, 82, 84; Hapch'am chōngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chōngjōn wiwōnhoe p'yōllam: che 5 chip*, 2001, pp. 84-6; Holmberg, *ibid.*, May 31, 1991, p. 5; Jhe, *op. cit.*, 2000, p. 48; Kim, *op. cit.*, 2006(b), p. 110; Kukpang chōngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, p. 397; Sandoz, "Panmunjom 1990-1994," in *50 Jahre Schweizer Militärdelegation in der NNSC Panmunjom Korea 1953-2003*, p. 30.

Kyong informed the Czech and Polish ambassadors that the NNSC's presence was no longer desirable after the cancellation of the KPA/CPV reports on the rotation of personnel and equipment; a prolongation would only cause unnecessary costs for both sides. At the NNSC meeting held on June 4, the Polish member stated that Minister Song had informed the Polish Ambassador the day before: "North Korea does not feel a need for the NNSC any longer. Even if you were possibly to withdraw soon to your country, we would not oppose that." On June 8, the KPA/CPV Senior Member informed the Polish Ambassador visiting Panmunjom that the NNSC was not needed. In contrast, the South Korean Foreign Ministry declared on June 13 that the Armistice Agreement must remain in force. Owing to the June 3 statement, on August 8 the NNSC made a joint declaration to the members of the UNC, South Korea, North Korea and China at the meeting in Berne.

It urged them to respect the importance of the Armistice Agreement, to observe its provisions and to enable the NNSC to implement its tasks. A withdrawal would not be considered unless the signatories of the Armistice Agreement so wished or a peace treaty replacing it or an equivalent document was signed. The declaration was well received, although on September 19 North Korea blamed the NNSC's difficult situation entirely on the UNC due to the forceful withdrawal of the inspection teams from South Korea on June 9, 1956, the unilateral cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) on June 21, 1957 and the appointment of Major General Hwang as UNC/MAC Senior Member on March 25, 1991. However, appreciation was expressed of the Commission's contributions "... over the years in defusing the tension, ensuring peace and preventing the recurrence of war in the

Korean peninsula.”<sup>307</sup>

In contrast, the South Korean government and the US actively supported the NNSC, arguing that so long as a peace treaty did not exist, the Commission should remain in Panmunjom. This opinion was stressed in particular by the Deputy Minister of Unification, Lim Tong Won. Moreover, the UNC Commander, General Robert W. RisCassi, had said on June 23, 1992: “...your presence and contribution to maintaining stability on the Peninsula are more vital than ever.” In 1992, North Korea continued its policy of avoiding contact with the NNSC, but some meetings took place between the KPA and Commission members creating at least some confidence. In spring 1993, North Korea boycotted all NNSC members with the exception of the delegations’ secretaries, although by signing the 1991 Basic Agreement it had acknowledged the Armistice Agreement and thereby also the further existence of the NNSC.

In 1992, Rolf Stalder, official at the Swiss Embassy in Seoul, wrote that the NNSC was important as a channel of North-South communications even during the last years of direct inter-Korean contacts but, above all, by maintaining contacts even during periods of tension. On the other hand, he emphasized that, in spite of recent contacts, North-South distrust remained very high. From that point of view, the NNSC was an important element of stabilization whose

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<sup>307</sup>- Bucheli, *ibid.* pp. 68-9, 85; Holmberg, *Månadsrapport juni* (June 30, 1991), p. 4; Jhe, *ibid.*, 2000, p. 96: fn. 57; Kim, *ibid.*, 2006(b), pp. 105-106; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, p. 410: *op. cit.*, 1997, p. 139; *Letter dated 28 September 1992 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council* (n. p., S/24598, 29 September, 1992), pp. 4-6; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 127; Sandoz, *op. cit.*, 1993(b), p. 339. Original quotation from Kim, *ibid.*, 2006(b), p. 105.

psychological significance should not be undervalued. In Major General Sandoz' view, the mere presence of the NNSC was a guarantee for objectivity which all parties could benefit from. The Swiss delegation had in a spirit of "good office" ["Bons Offices"] since 1953 helped to secure peace.

In 1993, Dr. Walter Knüsli, official at the Swiss Ministry of Defence, wrote that continuing NNSC presence had significantly helped to prevent war. By helping to set up contacts between the parties, the NNSC had contributed to securing peace. All authoritative experts on Korea were convinced that the presence of and work by the NNSC had contributed to and continued to contribute to maintaining peace and stability. All parties of the Armistice Agreement wanted the Commission to remain in force, an opinion that stands in sharp contrast to the KPA policies to undermine it. Finally, Captain Thomas Bucheli, Secretary of the Swiss Delegation in 1993, wrote that through its successful work the NNSC had helped to prevent the outbreak of a new war.<sup>308</sup>

Although the parties had agreed in the Basic Agreement not to use armed force and not make armed aggression against each other, the first serious incident after the appointment of Major General Hwang took place on May 21-22, 1992. In two exchanges of fire, South Korean soldiers shot to death three North Korean soldiers disguised in poor imitations of South Korean uniforms who had participated in a patrol on a reconnaissance tour approximately one kilometre south of the MDL in the central front of the DMZ in the first crossing of the line

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<sup>308</sup> Bucheli, *ibid.*, pp. 29, 83, 84-5, 95; Knüsli, "Die Schweizer Korea-Mission," pp. 99, 126, 131, 132; Sandoz, *op. cit.*, 1993(a), pp. 218, 219: *op. cit.*, 1993(b), 338-9, 343; Stalder, *op. cit.*, pp. 155, 161-2, 163. Original quotation marks.

since November 1984 (cf. pp. 349-350). Two South Korean soldiers were wounded. On the basis of their weapons (M-16 rifles), equipment that included hand-grenades and cameras discovered by the UNC investigation team, the soldiers were regarded as infiltrators who had sought to spy on military facilities. The team concluded that the infiltration violated the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 6, 7 and 8, prohibiting hostile acts within the DMZ and unauthorized crossings of the MDL and Paragraph 12, requiring both commanders to cease all hostilities, and “that the infiltration attempt was prepared and intentional.”

When the 460th MAC meeting was held on May 29 to raise the incident, the North refused to participate, although the UNC/MAC had requested participation seven times; nevertheless, a meeting that protested it was held. The North also refused to raise the issue in the North-South Military Commission. In this way, the illusion that the Armistice Agreement was unnecessary was promoted. After waiting for five minutes, the UNC/MAC strongly protested that the North’s non-participation was an armistice violation. The South also protested at the MAC secretary meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on June 2, but although the UNC referred to its investigation of the incident, the North denied it. The North claimed that the unilateral holding of the MAC meeting on May 29 was illegal. On September 28, North Korea’s UN Ambassador claimed in a letter to the Security Council that the incident “...has nothing to do with us. It has already been widely known in the world as a drama concocted by the South Korean authorities to put a brake on the wheel of the favourably developing North-South dialogue.”

Through a UNC/KPA arrangement, the remains of 15 American

soldiers from the war were returned on May 12, 1992. Another 15 were returned on May 18 and 17 on July 12 through the same channel. After the UNC and North Korea on August 24, 1993 had signed an agreement on returning the remains of dead soldiers, 33 corpses were returned on November 30, 31 on December 7, 33 on December 14 and 34 on December 21. Lee (2001a, 2004) explains their return with the wish to sign a peace treaty with the US and achieve the withdrawal of American forces. Since North Korea has consistently regarded the UNC only as a front organisation of the US in South Korea, the real party to the armistice is not the UNC Commander but the American government. Consequently, the two governments should sign a peace treaty enabling the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea and an ensuing peaceful settlement of the Korean question.<sup>309</sup>

According to Jhe (2000), since North Korea regarded the Basic Agreement and its annex on non-aggression as a declaration of North-South non-aggression, it only emphasized afterwards the signing of a peace treaty with the US. Compatriot scholar Bon Hak Koo (2006) argues that by containing a provision on non-aggression, the Basic Agreement made it unnecessary to sign a separate North-South peace treaty. The logical grounds for North Korea to sign a peace treaty with the US were that the two states had fought the Korean War, that

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<sup>309</sup>. Bucheli, *ibid.*, p. 82; Chông, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-2; Columbia University, *op. cit.*, Paragraph 6, 7, 8, 12; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 235, 411, 423, 445-6: *op. cit.*, 1997, pp. 43-4, 190; Lee, *op. cit.*, 1998(e), pp. 10-11: *op. cit.*, 2001(a), pp. 193-4: *op. cit.*, 2004, pp. 150-2; *Letter dated 15 June 1992 from the Charge d'Affaires A. I. of the United States Mission to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council* (n. p., S/24467, 15 June, 1992), pp. 1, 2, 5, 6: *op. cit.*, S/24598, 29 September, 1992, pp. 1, 2. The August 24, 1993, agreement is recorded in Lee, *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 266-7 and in Korean in Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, p. 422.

the US in reality signed the Armistice Agreement and that the American forces in South Korea had operational control over the Korean Army in wartime and exerted actual military power. However, South Korea acquired control in peacetime on December 1, 1994 as a result of America's policy to change the role of the US forces from a leading to a supportive role. The purpose was to sign a non-aggression treaty with the US, dissolve the UNC and force the American troops to withdraw. The South Korean scholar Pak Myōng-nim (2004) argues that it is a mistake to regard the US as a partner of a peace treaty on the basis of the Armistice Agreement. If a peace treaty were signed in this way, it would be one between the UN member North Korea and the UN.

A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry explained on May 6, 1994 why the North would not accept South Korea as a party to a peace treaty:

“The Republic’s government proposed negotiations for a new system for guaranteeing peace to the United States out of ‘legal’ and ‘realistic’ considerations because it is a signatory to the Armistice Agreement and in reality holds military control in South Korea. The South Korean authorities had desperately opposed an agreement for a cease-fire. They have neither authority nor qualification to take part in negotiations for a peace regime.”<sup>310</sup>

In contrast, the American and South Korean position was that a

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<sup>310</sup> Jhe, op. cit., 2000, pp. 112-113; Koo, “Hanbando p’yōnghwa p’orōm-tū chaengjōm-gwa kwaje,” p. 73; Lee, “Seoul seeks flexibility on OPCON transfer” (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>, April 9, 2008); Pak, “Nambuk p’yōnghwa hyōpchōng-gwa Hanbando p’yōnghwa,” 2004, p. 224; Yun, “Diplomatic Strategy for Building a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula,” *Korea Focus*, vol. 15, no. 3 (2007), p. 99. Original quotation marks. The common term “peace regime” is not defined by Yun (and in other texts used) but is interpreted as an interim stage prior to a peace treaty.

peace treaty should be signed by the two Koreas. The South Korean position was that North and South Korea, as the main states involved in the peace issue in the Korean peninsula, should, on the basis of mutual confidence-building, first create a state of peaceful coexistence and thereafter sign a peace treaty followed by a non-aggression treaty. However, through the 1991 Basic Agreement the issue of a non-aggression treaty had been resolved before a peace treaty had been signed. Subsequently, while peace was not established, non-aggression had become a dead letter. In 1999, the South Korean view was that a peace treaty would include a declaration of an end to the armistice, mutual non-aggression and non-use of military force, the peaceful solution of disputes, mutual respect for each other's systems and non-intervention in domestic affairs and, finally, the observation and implementation of already signed agreements. The US and China, which were equally important in the creation of a peace mechanism, would guarantee the treaty. In 2007, it was believed that China supported the South Korean position that the two Koreas should sign a peace treaty. China supported the establishment of a peace regime in the Korean peninsula.

According to Jhe (2000), since North Korea and the US had not fought a war they could not sign a peace treaty whose core part would be the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. The South Korean view was that the troops issue would not be included in a North-South peace treaty but be resolved between South Korea and the US. Additionally, the troops were needed not only to deter a North Korean invasion but also to guarantee peace and stability in the region. Without declaring war, North Korea had started the Korean War on June 25, 1950 to invade South Korea, not to wage war on the US. The

US participated in the war to help South Korea at the request of the UN Security Council resolution of June 27 to UN member states to assist the Republic of Korea. It was only one of 16 members of the UNC that was established to maximize combat strength on the basis of the Council's resolution from July 7, 1950, but contributed more than half of the ground forces, 85 percent of the naval forces and nearly 95 percent of the air force units. A US-North Korea peace treaty would also, by excluding South Korea as an entity, violate the Basic Agreement, Article 1, stating that "The North and the South shall respect each other's political and social system" and Article 5, in which, as we have seen, the two Koreas pledge to maintain the Armistice Agreement until it is replaced by a firm state of peace.

In October 1996, the UN Security Council, including the war combatants China and the US, unanimously adopted a resolution stating that the Armistice Agreement should remain in force until replaced by a special peace mechanism.<sup>311</sup> The UN obviously attached great importance to peace in the Korean peninsula.

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<sup>311</sup>-Burdelski and Jendraszczak, "Die tatigkeit der Neutralen Uberwachungskommission in der Koreakrise," p. 9, in Birchmeier, *Quellensammlung: Inter-Korean Agreement*, Article 1; Jhe, *ibid.*, 2000, pp. 133-7, 143-4, 162-3, 181-2, 285, 286, 296, 324; Koo, *ibid.*, pp. 73-4, 75; Lee, *op. cit.*, May 2, 2007, p. 10; Ren, "Korea's New Administration and Challenges for China's Relations with the Korean Peninsula," *Asian Perspective*, vol. 32 (no. 2), 2008, p. 182; Sjoberg, *From Korea and Suez to Iraq: Half a Century of United Nations Conflict Management*, p. 120. The Security Council resolutions adopted on June 27 and July 7, 1950 are recorded in English and Korean in Jhe (*ibid.*, 2000, pp. 456-9).

## 6.5 North Korea Withdraws from the MAC in 1994

As North Korea had undermined the MAC ever since the appointment of Major General Hwang on March 25, 1991, the KPA withdrew its Senior Member on August 24, 1992, who under the present circumstances was regarded as unnecessary. On March 8, 1994, the KPA notified that two of its four other MAC members had been withdrawn.

On April 28, 1994, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a proposal to the US to hold negotiations for establishing a peace treaty replacing the Armistice Agreement. Referring to armistice violations by the US through recent and past rearmaments and the withdrawal of the inspection teams in June 1956, and criticizing the appointment of Major General Hwang, it stated:

“Such unreasonable behaviour on the part of the United States has now turned the Korean armistice agreement into blank sheets of paper incapable of helping to ensure peace on the Korean peninsula and reduced the Military Armistice Commission to a de facto nominal and inoperative body in which its legitimate component parties have ceased to exist.”<sup>312</sup>

In sharp contrast to opinions recorded in this study, on April 28 the Ministry also said: “It is only thanks to the patient and peace-loving policy and will of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that the armistice has so far stayed in place and peace has been maintained in the Korean peninsula.” After the KPA, on the same day at a secretary

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<sup>312</sup>- Ch’oe, op. cit., 2004, pp. 34-5; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 2001, pp. 86-7; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, *DPRK Government Proposes to USA to Hold Negotiation for Establishment of New Peace Arrangement*, April 28, 1994, pp. 2, 3. Capital letters are absent in the original.

meeting requested by the North, had officially notified the UNC that it would withdraw its personnel from the MAC, it pulled out of the MAC the day after. On the other hand, on April 28 the KPA also declared that during the transition from the armistice regime to a new peace regime, hostile acts would not be committed and the armistice would be respected. The hot-line between military officers would be maintained to keep peace and prevent incidents in the DMZ. Although the UNC would not be recognized, Joint Duty Officers meetings would continue. In fact, Jhe (1995) argues that North Korea's acts and attitudes "...are illogical and inconsistent." The UNC rejected the measures and declared: "We will continue to staff and operate the MAC and maintain the NNSC."

As one part of the policy to undermine the MAC, after April 1994 the North unilaterally stopped supplying data on armistice violations and refused to receive data. The two sides had informed each other of violations or exchanged such data once a month since 1953. Consequently, the UNC also stopped providing statistics after April 1994. On May 3, 1994, the South Korean Ministry of Unification declared that North Korea's policy to incapacitate the MAC and to replace the Armistice Agreement with a North Korea-US peace treaty was a violation of Paragraph 62, stating that the agreement shall remain in effect until both sides agree on amendments and additions or an agreement for a peaceful settlement is reached at a political level, as well as the Basic Agreement, Article 5, on maintenance of the Armistice Agreement until it is replaced by a firm state of peace. The issue of replacing the armistice regime should be resolved independently by the two Koreas. The policy of obstructing peace should cease immediately and the MAC's work should be normalized as soon as possible.

On May 6, at the MAC secretary meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC, the South declared its opposition to North Korea's unilateral policy to demolish the MAC and the NNSC. The Commissions could only be changed on the basis of Paragraph 61, stating that amendments and additions must be agreed by both sides' Commanders, and Paragraph 62 on mutual consent. However, the UNC/MAC welcomed that the armistice's provisions for a cease-fire would be observed. It declared that both Commissions would be maintained. The KPA referred to the armistice violations by the UNC through the withdrawal of the inspection teams in June 1956, the cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) in June 1957, the appointment of Major General Hwang in March 1991 and recent rearmaments, raising tension. It also declared that its policies aimed to replace the armistice with a new peace regime.<sup>313</sup>

On May 24, 1994, the KPA officially informed the UNC in a letter that it had withdrawn from the MAC on April 28. In violation of the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 61, and the Basic Agreement, Article 5, it also unilaterally set up "the Korean People Army's Panmunjom Mission" as a body to replace the MAC, but in reality the organs co-existed. The mission had no legal basis and was not recognized by the UNC. A roster of names that were identical with the North Korean MAC members was submitted to the UNC. Members of

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<sup>313</sup>- Ch'oe, *ibid.*, 2004, pp. 23: fn. 43, 35; Columbia University, *op. cit.*, Paragraph 61, 62; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 2001, p. 87; Jhe, "Replacing the Military Armistice Agreement on the Korean Peninsula?" *Korea and World Affairs* (Spring 1995), p. 75; *op. cit.*, 2000, p. 93; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1997, pp. 68, 70-71, 191; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, *ibid.*, p. 3; Park, "Armistice Agreement and Peace on Korean Peninsula," 1998, p. 77; Tham, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4. Original quotations from Tham.

the new organization demonstratively stopped wearing red MAC armbands. Instead, in summer 1996 a special emblem was created for North Korea's military personnel in Panmunjom.

The aim of the new mission was direct talks with high American UNC officers that would eventually lead to a bilateral North Korea-US peace treaty. Through negotiations with the US, it would also take measures to ease tension and ensure peace, to raise pending military issues, including the DMZ and the JSA, and to discuss humanitarian matters beginning with the return of dead American soldiers. Informal contacts were re-established between the KPA Panmunjom Mission and the UNC at the secretary and colonel level but more often between the liaison officers in Panmunjom.

In order to show that it would no longer pursue dialogue through the MAC, on May 30 North Korea removed almost all its equipment, including two stationary and four mobile microphones, one telephone, 12 receivers and two document boxes from the MAC conference room. Speakers and electric wires were removed from the northern part of the NNSC's conference room. North Korea had informed the UNC through a Joint Duty Officers meeting the day before, but since the North administered the northern part, the South could do nothing about it. It is worth noting that when Major General Hwang, who kept his post until September 22, 1995, held his farewell speech on the occasion of the celebration of the 42nd anniversary of the NNSC on July 27, he summed up his term in office by saying "It was a dialogue *without* dialogue."<sup>314</sup>

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<sup>314</sup>- Choi, "Nambukhan kunsajôk habûi-wa Han'guk chôngjôn hyôpchông-ûi hyoryôk," p. 490; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 2001, pp. 87-8; Jhe, *ibid.*, 2000, pp. 93, 146; Lee, *op. cit.*, 1998(e), p. 3; *op. cit.*, 2001(b), pp. 120-121; *op. cit.*, 2004, p.

The UNC/MAC had asked to hold a MAC secretary meeting on June 6, 1994, but since the North refused to participate due to its non-recognition of the Commission, the South held the meeting alone to protest the KPA/CPV withdrawal from the MAC. It claimed that the Armistice Agreement could only be changed on the basis of mutual consent and that the UNC Commander had never agreed to the withdrawal. At the secretary meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC convened on June 22, the North argued that the Armistice Agreement was temporary, that most of its provisions were no longer valid and that maintaining the present system would only cause continuous tension. Since the only military in the UNC in reality were American, the North intended to sign a peace treaty with the US. In a striking reversal of the previous standpoint, there would be no withdrawal of American troops since the North needed a dialogue partner. The Armistice Agreement would be maintained until a new legal framework was created. A peace treaty would be discussed between governments, whereas the new mission would only deal with the Armistice Agreement and issues to be raised in the MAC.

The UNC/MAC repeated its criticism of the withdrawal from the MAC at the May 6 meeting and referred to the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 61, that mutual consent is required to revise it. Moreover, the opinion was that the agreement would continue to contribute to maintaining peace. At the MAC secretary meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on September 8, the North proposed talks between the KPA and the US Army to replace the non-functioning MAC with a

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233; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *op. cit.*, pp. 120, 121; Tham, *ibid.*, p. 4; Yi, "Nambuk pundan-gwa P'anmunjôm-ûi silch'e," July 1994, pp. 50-51. Original quotation marks.

new peace regime. The UNC/MAC responded that the MAC was paralyzed owing to the North's policies and that it could not accept the proposals. All contacts with the North must take place within the framework of the Armistice Agreement.<sup>315</sup>

At the secretary meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on November 15, the South said it was ready to participate in talks to revise the Armistice Agreement that would involve the UNC/MAC and the KPA/CPV. The UNC/MAC claimed that North Korea was neglecting the Armistice Agreement and had unilaterally withdrawn from the MAC. To urge direct talks with the US while violating the Armistice Agreement was an indication that the North would not follow the agreement in the future. The UNC/MAC was unwilling to accept the KPA demand for General Officers' talks without the participation of its Senior Member and the CPV representative. The North argued that the South's violations of the Armistice Agreement had begun with the withdrawal of the inspection teams in 1956 and that the appointment of Major General Hwang in 1991 was absurd. Since China had decided to withdraw from the MAC, it had nothing to do with the issue.

On August 30, 1994, during a visit of the North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Song Ho Kyong to Beijing, China announced that its MAC Delegation would be withdrawn from the Headquarter in Kaesŏng to Beijing, as the Minister had requested. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially announced the decision on September 1. In a letter dated November 30, the UNC Commander, General Gary E. Luck, urged his Chinese counterpart to fulfill the obligations in the

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<sup>315</sup>- Kim, *op. cit.*, 2006(a), p. 90; Kukpang chŏngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1997, pp. 72-3, 77-8.

Armistice Agreement by writing: “In my view, sir, our job here is not finished.” Yet, in December, following strong North Korean pressure, China recalled its MAC representative. Representatives of the CPV were officially discharged in P’yŏngyang on December 15. Consequently, another significant armistice mechanism was dismantled and a contact point in Panmunjom was lost.<sup>316</sup>

The secretary meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on December 21 to discuss the return of a US helicopter and the pilot resulted in the first direct talks between North Korean and US generals at P’anmungsk on the same day. Previously, on December 17, during routine training near the DMZ, Warrant Officers David Hilemon and Bobby Hall inadvertently flew in snow-covered terrain an unarmed US Army helicopter into North Korean airspace. Assuming that it was a spy mission and without trying to communicate with the helicopter or the US Army, North Korean anti-aircraft guns shot the helicopter down 15 kilometres from the frontier over its territory. Hilemon was killed but Hall escaped from the wreckage and was captured by North Korean soldiers, who tied him to a tree, kicked him, threw stones at him and forced him to pose for a photograph with his hands in the air. He was moved to P’yŏngyang, where North Korean interrogators lectured him about the 1968 Pueblo incident. Hall had to write many drafts of a confession before signing the final version on December 27, backdating it to Christmas Day on the North Koreans’ demand. He

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<sup>316</sup> Jhe, *op. cit.*, 1995, p. 73; Kim, *ibid.*, 2006(a), p. 91; Kukpang chŏngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1997, pp. 84-5; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *op. cit.*, p. 120; Widén, “Korearefleksioner,” *Yoboseyo* (September 1996), no. 3, p. 3. Original quotation marks. The UNC Commander’s letter is recorded in Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, pp. 150-151.

asked forgiveness for his “grave infringement upon the sovereignty of the DPRK.”

Because North Korea did not recognize the MAC, American proposals to hold MAC meetings were rejected. Instead, since an agreement was reached at the two hours of general talks between the UNC represented by an American general, the Staff Chief for Planning and Management and the secretary and the Head of the KPA Panmunjom Mission to return the dead corpse on December 21, it was returned the following day at a secretary meeting requested by the UNC/MAC.<sup>317</sup>

On December 24, the UNC Commander, General Gary Luck, signed an “official letter of regret” directed to the KPA Supreme Commander, saying that the pilot had made a navigation error and promised a non-recurrence, but it did not clear the way for Hall’s release. He was not released until the North Korean military had an opportunity to press for bilateral US-North Korea military talks. The US did not accept this demand but dispatched as a special envoy of the President Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas C. Hubbard, to P’yŏngyang via Panmunjom from December 28-30 to participate in a dialogue away from the MAC for the first time. He agreed to a statement of “sincere regret for this incident.” The South Korean press criticized this solution since South Korea was excluded, as it had been during the Pueblo incident (cf. pp. 213-214).

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<sup>317</sup>- Ch’oe, op. cit., 2004; pp. 35-6; Downs, op. cit., pp. 261-2; Kukpang chŏngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1997, pp. 87-8; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., p. 124; Oberdorfer, op. cit., p. 359; Quinones, op. cit., p. 40; Widén, *Helikopterincidenten - återlämnandet av den omkomne föraren* (Panmunjom, December 23, 1994), p. 1. Original quotation marks.

Following secretary meetings proposed by the UNC/MAC held on December 23 and 24, Hall was released at a secretary meeting called by the KPA convened on December 30. At the December 23 meeting, the UNC/MAC claimed that due to bad weather the helicopter had intruded into the North's airspace and urged the speedy return of Hall. The North responded that he was under investigation. At the December 24 meeting, the "letter of regret" from the UNC Commander was conveyed to the North while hopes for a speedy return were expressed (no. 34). At the December 30 meeting, Hall was returned, accompanied by Hubbard and his staff.<sup>318</sup> Unusually, an incident had been quickly resolved.

As a result of the negotiations, the US agreed to maintain an appropriate form of military contact. At the MAC secretary meeting requested by the KPA convened on March 2, 1995, North Korea claimed that the US had recently augmented military forces and equipment in the Panmunjom area and placed 168 missiles in South Korea, raising tension. To resolve such a situation, it proposed for the first time to hold General-level talks within the near future. Two-star generals would participate. The agenda would be peace and security in the Korean peninsula and other matters of common interest. On March 28, at the secretary meeting proposed by the KPA the North again suggested holding General-level talks. The KPA criticized the US for introducing attack helicopters, tanks and vehicles as well as various kinds of ammunition and combat equipment into South Korea in advance of the large-scale "Team Spirit" exercise which, as usual,

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<sup>318</sup> Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 262-3; Harrison, *Military Armistice in Korea. A Case Study for Strategic Leaders*, p. 20; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1997, pp. 88-90, 94, 245, 246; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(a), p. 231. Original quotation marks.

was regarded as a preparation for war. The UNC/MAC responded that the strengthening of the American forces took place to meet the threat of war from the North. The KPA claimed that the US wanted confrontation rather than dialogue, but the UNC/MAC said that it would carefully consider the proposal and, if possible, soon reply.

From June to September 1995, eleven secretary and staff officer meetings were held, resulting in a primary procedural proposal. Since the KPA did not accept the South Korean Ministry of Defence's position that a MAC representative should treat issues related to the Armistice Agreement, the talks came to a standstill. After consultations between the UNC and the ministry, seven secretary and staff meetings were held between March 3 and May 29, 1998, resulting in a proposal for General Officers' talks.<sup>319</sup>

Previously, on May 24, 1995, the KPA Panmunjom Mission proposed to the UNC that the talks should only include North Korea and the US. On May 25, the UNC responded that the talks should only concern pending military issues and rejected bilateral US-North Korea talks but insisted that generals from South Korea and the United Kingdom should be included among the six-seven participants. After North Korea had proposed holding General Officers' talks at staff officers' meetings convened on July 25 and August 7, 1996, on August 20 the same year UNC declared that it was willing to hold such talks if they took place within the framework of the Armistice Agreement. At the August 12, 1997, jointly agreed MAC secretary meeting, the KPA accused the South, at a time when its military actively supported

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<sup>319</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 2001, pp. 111, 112; Keum, "P'anmunjôm changsônggûp hoedam-ûi silche (1998.6 ~ 1999.9)," *Kunsa* (2003.8), no. 49, p. 3; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1997, pp. 96-7.

four-party talks to promote peace in the Korean peninsula of conducting “The Ŭlchi Focus exercise” to prepare for war, and urged an immediate halt. The UNC/MAC responded that the exercise took place annually and was defensive. Since military confrontation was serious, to conduct military exercises to maintain peace was a justified act.

At the secretary meeting requested by the KPA held on August 14, North Korea declared that most paragraphs of the Armistice Agreement had become invalid. Since the UNC, by its illegal replacement of the Senior Member, had demolished the MAC, there was no legal institution to prevent the outbreak of war. Consequently, General Officers’ talks should be held. The UNC/MAC claimed that, since a decision had to be made by a superior office, it could not respond now. Of 17 secretary meetings held during 1997, eight dealt with the talks. During 1998, seven of 12 secretary meetings held up to June 8 dealt with them.

At the meeting requested by the KPA held on March 12, 1998, the KPA made it clear that the MAC could not be restored. The UNC/MAC responded that the talks would not restore the MAC. At the 12th meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on June 8, the parties agreed to hold the first General Officers’ talks on June 23. On that day, the KPA and the UNC held closed talks in Panmunjom to maintain contact in the absence of dialogue through the MAC, seven years after the MAC had ceased to function and three years after the first proposal for such talks. Four representatives from each side participated in the UNC-KPA General Officers’ talks that were established in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 25(i), enabling contacts between the two sides through other channels than the MAC, which remained, as long as the commanders pledged to maintain the

Armistice Agreement in accordance with Paragraph 17. While only North Korea represented the North, from the UNC the US, South Korea, the United Kingdom and Thailand participated. In the MAC, only the Senior Member had the right to speak, but now all members enjoyed that right. As before, the calling party had the right to open.<sup>320</sup>

As expected, North Korea raised the signing of a bilateral North Korea-US peace treaty and the withdrawal of American troops in South Korea. As we have seen, the ultimate target of a peace treaty was the withdrawal of American troops who were still the main obstacle for unification on North Korean terms. The demand was unacceptable to South Korea: a withdrawal would destroy the military balance and cause instability. The UNC first raised the intrusion of an armed North Korean submarine at Sokch'o on the east coast on June 22, which was regarded as "a severe military provocation" and "a major violation of the Armistice Agreement," but the KPA claimed it was unaware of the incident. At this time, President Kim Dae Jung had declared the "sunshine policy" in the spirit of the Basic Agreement to promote peaceful coexistence, reconciliation and cooperation between North and South Korea, as the first stage towards reunification. The promotion of immediate re-unification was not regarded as realistic in a situation where the two states, for more than 50 years, had been in a state of confrontation. He also made it clear that no acts of armed provocation were to be tolerated.

The submarine was first caught in a fishing boat's net, but the

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<sup>320</sup>- Ch'oe, *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 38; Columbia University, *op. cit.*, Paragraph 17, 25(i); Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, pp. 442, 443, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468-9, 473, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480-482: *ibid.*, 2001, p. 90; Keum, *ibid.*, pp. 1-2, 3, 4; Kim, *op. cit.*, 2006(a), p. 95; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 234.

crew removed the net and continued navigating along the coast before being stopped by naval vessels. These vessels had in vain tried to talk to the submarine and the crew refused to come out. On June 25, the sub-marine was moved to a naval base on the east coast, but since the exit hatches were locked, it was necessary to cut them from outside to enter the submarine. It was confirmed that the crew had committed suicide. Equipment such as pistols and automatic rifles and documents confirming intrusion and intelligence-gathering were discovered. The UNC requested an admission of facts, punishment of those responsible and a guarantee that such an incident would not reoccur, but the KPA claimed that the incident was due to engine trouble during exercise. South Korea had seized the submarine by force and killed the crew. On July 3, nine corpses of the crew were returned through Panmunjom, as decided.

North Korea emphasized that the Armistice Agreement should be annulled and a new system prepared. The UNC protested by claiming that the signing of a peace treaty was a political issue that should not be raised in the talks but through the four-party talks or North-South dialogue. The target was to ease tension and maintain peace through agreed procedures and the existing commissions should be normalized. The US and South Korean members argued that the Armistice Agreement had helped to prevent military clashes and ease tension. The incident was also raised at the secretary meeting called by the UNC/MAC held on June 26. The KPA again referred to engine trouble and requested the return of the crew and the submarine. The UNC/MAC mentioned that the incident was under investigation and urged the non-recurrence of such an incident.<sup>321</sup>

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<sup>321</sup>- Ch'oe, *ibid.*, 2004; pp. 38, 39; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 442,

At the second round of talks requested by the KPA convened on June 30, the submarine incident was also raised. On June 26, the South Korean Defence Ministry had declared: "North Korea intruded into our territorial waters and committed a violation of the Armistice Agreement and the North-South Basic Agreement through an infiltration operation." In a counter-offensive, North Korea claimed the same day: "As a repeated strategy of anti-North Korea disturbances, the submarine incident is a fabrication of facts as a maneuver, infiltration operation and provocative act etc. against South Korea." In addition, "Since the submarine was not rescued at the proper time, the crew were sacrificed. South Korea must take the responsibility, provide a convincing explanation and immediately return the corpses and the submarine."

On June 30, North Korea again insisted that an accident had occurred during exercise and urged the return of the submarine and the crew. The UNC first noted the contradictions in the North Korean charges and then explained its investigation of the incident, according to which there was no evidence of engine trouble or signals of being in distress. It was confirmed that the crew had committed suicide. Equipment for intrusion, intelligence-gathering and special operational activities and an operational journal were found. The UNC pointed out the violation of the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 12, urging Commanders to cease all hostilities in Korea and Paragraph 15, requiring naval forces to respect each other's territorial waters as well as of the admission after the 1996 submarine incident to prevent a

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483, 484: *ibid.*, 2001, pp. 273-4; Jhe, *op. cit.*, 2000, p. 181; Jonsson, *op. cit.*, pp. 59, 60; Keum, *ibid.*, pp. 6, 7-8, 32; Kim, "Hyujŏn ihu ssangbang chŏngjŏn hyŏpchŏng wiban," 2006(c), p. 219.

recurrence and urged North Korea to admit facts, to punish those responsible and to prevent a recurrence. Since North Korea eventually admitted that the crew had committed suicide, the UNC decided to return the corpses. President Kim Dae Jung argued that North Korea had thereby indirectly admitted the intrusion.<sup>322</sup>

On July 12, a dead armed North Korean agent in a diving suit was found at Mukho on the South Korean east coast, around 90 kilometres from the MDL. A mini-submarine was found one kilometre away. On the same day, the South Korean Defence Ministry stated: “The intrusion of an armed North Korean agent is a clear act of provocation and a violation of the Armistice Agreement.” In addition, “Again, we urge North Korea to immediately halt all provocative acts against the Armistice Agreement. We sternly warn it that we will absolutely not watch idly such a provocative act.” The incident was raised at the July 13 secretary meeting requested by the UNC/MAC which confirmed the intrusion, raising tension and obstructing the General Officer’s talks. The KPA denied the intrusion and said that the incident would be raised in the following General Officers’ talks.

The UNC protested the incident at the third round of talks it had called held on July 16 and referred to its investigation, which had shown that the agent was equipped with, for instance, a pistol and a map of the area. The equipment was identical with that found on the submarine after the June 22 incident. The UNC offered to return the corpse, but the KPA refused, arguing that the South had created the incident. The UNC urged an admission of facts, the prevention of a

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<sup>322</sup>- Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 12, 15; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 443, 444; Keum, *ibid.*, pp. 8-10. Original quotation marks.

recurrence, punishment of those responsible and an apology. However, North Korea put the blame on the extreme-right conservatives in South Korea and asserted: “Do not expect any mercy at all from us.” It also urged the US to apologize for the acts of the South Korean soldiers and to return the submarine immediately. After the UNC had asserted that threats were improper, the same demands were repeated.<sup>323</sup>

As we have seen, after MAC plenary sessions had ceased, armistice issues were raised through secretary meetings. At the August 13, 1998 secretary meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC, the KPA referred to the “Ŭlchi Focus Lens Exercise” which it regarded as an aggressive and provocative act. The South mentioned a letter delivered via the Joint Duty Officers on August 11 claiming that there should be no misunderstandings about this annual regular exercise, but the KPA still regarded it as an aggressive and provocative war exercise with the North as its target. When the KPA suggested jointly creating “The New House” to discuss joint issues, the UNC/MAC argued that it would be easier to return to the MAC than to create a new body. The KPA responded that the MAC had been broken up, but the South argued that it could be restored if there was mutual consent. At the meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on January 6, 1999, the South delivered a protest against the intrusion of a North Korean high-speed landing boat on December 17-18, 1998 into its territorial waters along the south coast. The boat was sunk in international waters. Of the four-man crew, one dead infiltrator was found. The North’s participants reported to higher authorities and then explained that the

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<sup>323</sup>- Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 445, 484-5: *op. cit.*, 2001, p. 274: Keum, *ibid.*, pp. 10-12. Original quotation marks.

incident was fabricated and returned the protest letter.

At the fourth round of General Officers' talks proposed by the UNC held on February 11, 1999, reduction of tension in the Korean peninsula and prevention of war were discussed. The UNC rejected the KPA proposal to form a three-party body consisting of generals from the two Koreas and the US to replace the MAC which was made at informal talks held on October 9, 1998, called by the KPA. The KPA claimed that this new body would suit the changed circumstances to ease tension and prevent military clashes and diagnose whether the South sincerely wanted to ease tension and prevent war. It asserted that the General Officers' talks were a forum for discussion and not one to implement the Armistice Agreement. The UNC argued that no other channels could replace these talks.

Topics raised at the fifth round called by the UNC convened on March 9 included regularization of meetings and the restoration of communication channels. The UNC again rejected the KPA proposal since, in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, it consisted of several countries that ever since the armistice had been signed had faithfully implemented their duties and would continue to do so until a peace treaty was signed. The UNC claimed that to build confidence and relations, regular meetings to discuss issues of mutual interest were necessary and mentioned the reconnection of telephones. All contacts that would benefit the General Officers' talks would be welcomed.<sup>324</sup> With the exception of June 30, the “zero-sum game”

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<sup>324</sup>- Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 447, 448-9, 450, 451, 486-7; *ibid.*, 2001, pp. 116, 149; *Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoë p'yôllam: che 6 chip* (2000-2003) (Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu: kunjôngwidan, n. p., 2003), p. 71; Julin, *Rapport för december 1998* (n. p., December 30, 1998), p. 5.

characterized not only the MAC secretary meetings but also the General Officers' talks; negative peace continued.

As we saw in Chapters 3.5 and 4.5, maritime borders have been a point of dispute since 1953. Since June 7, 1999, 15 North Korean fishing boats and six patrol vessels had intruded into South Korean territorial waters in the West Sea under the justification of blue-crab fishing. South Korea responded by mobilizing naval vessels in the area, raising tension. At the sixth round of talks requested by the UNC convened on June 15, it explained that the meeting aimed to ease tension in the West Sea south of the Northern Limit Line (NLL).

The KPA then asked whether the UNC was aware of the Yŏnp'yŏng Island battle in which South Korean high-speed vessels had fired on the North's naval vessels. The UNC demanded a break to confirm the news, according to which a collision had occurred when the South's vessels were driving out the North's vessels that had begun firing. When talks were resumed after 15 minutes, a verbal battle followed as to which side had begun firing. North Korea also asserted that the status of the five disputed islands under UNC control should be the focus of the talks. The UNC explained that since the battle was not planned, it could not know what had happened. It refused to make any concessions on the five islands and asserted that the North had started the planned attack in which one North Korean vessel was sunk and five severely damaged. More than 30 North Korean soldiers were killed, but South Korea suffered only a few slightly wounded seamen. The South Korean Defence Ministry explained that the South had acted in self-defence and urged an end to intrusions of the NLL and the use of military force. The South Korean scholar Samuel S. Kim writes that the battle was for North Korea "...the most serious naval clash and

Pyongyang's most humiliating defeat since the 1953 armistice.”

At the seventh round of talks proposed by the UNC held on June 22, the KPA put the blame for the incident on the South Korean military and argued that the water area belonged to the North. South Korea should admit its responsibility, punish those responsible, prevent a recurrence and provide compensation for the damage. The UNC claimed that North Korea was responsible; it should admit its responsibility and provide compensation.<sup>325</sup>

The UNC asserted that the status of the NLL was not an issue for discussion and claimed that North Korea should admit its responsibility, punish those responsible and prevent a recurrence. North Korea then again put the blame on South Korea and urged an unconditional abolition of the NLL, which it repeated at the eighth round of talks called by the UNC held on July 2. In contrast, the UNC argued that the NLL was established to supplement the Armistice Agreement and that the issue should be discussed with the South Korean government. At the ninth round of talks requested by the KPA held on July 21, North Korea suggested a new Maritime Border Line. The UNC reminded North Korea of its claim from the previous talks that the issue should be negotiated on the basis of the 1991 Basic Agreement. North Korea regarded this claim as an insincere attitude towards the talks. Also, the Basic Agreement did not at all refer to the maritime border. After the meeting, the South Korean Defence Ministry

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<sup>325</sup>. Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1999, pp. 453, 456; Jhe, *op. cit.*, 2000, pp. 99-100; Jonsson, *op. cit.*, p. 68; Keum, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-22, 24, 25; Kim, "North Korea in 1999: Bringing The Grand Chollima March Back In," *Asian Survey* 40:1 (2000), pp. 151, 160-161; Kim, "NLL punjaeng-gwa Nambukhan haeyang silloe kuch'uk pangan," *Kukpang yôn'gu* 49 (June 2006), no. 1, pp. 183-4.

claimed: “North Korea’s claim to establish a new Maritime Border Line has no value at all and cannot be negotiated.”

Both parties repeated their claims at the tenth and eleventh round of talks held on August 17 and September 1, both requested by the KPA. At the tenth meeting, the KPA criticized the UNC for conducting the “Ŭlchi Focus Lens 99” exercise from August 16 to 28, which it regarded as a preparation for war, and urged an immediate halt. The UNC responded that military exercises are not mentioned in the Armistice Agreement and are entirely unrelated. The regular exercises were made to protect the Republic of Korea. At the eleventh round, the UNC declared that the “Ŭlchi Focus Lens 99” exercise, which had been announced in advance, had ended without any violence committed. The UNC also hoped that to avoid misunderstandings the KPA would announce major exercises in advance and regarded the North’s rhetorics with regard to the exercises as groundless. On September 2, North Korea unilaterally declared a military demarcation line in the West Sea, invalidating the NLL. It was followed on March 23, 2000, by “The Order for Navigation to the Five Islands in the West Sea” that opened only two passages two nautical miles wide to the islands.<sup>326</sup> Notably, fewer accusations of war preparations were made than before.

Besides General Officers’ talks, to transform the armistice regime, which was widely considered to be inadequate to guarantee secure peace in the Korean peninsula, into a peace regime, President Kim Young Sam and President Bill Clinton at the summit meeting held

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<sup>326</sup> Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 2001, pp. 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 126, 141; Keum, *ibid.*, pp. 24-5, 26, 28-32; Yi, “Pug-ŭi yoksim, Nam-ŭi chosim ...NLL-ŭn puranhada,” May 2006, p. 176. Original quotation marks.

on Cheju Island on April 16, 1996, suggested to North Korea that four-party talks should be held. After the first round of talks were held on December 9-10, 1997, in Geneva with North Korea, China, South Korea and the US participating, another five rounds took place there from March 16 to 21 and October 21 to 24, 1998, and from January 18 to 23, April 24 to 27 and August 5 to 9, 1999. At the first two rounds, South Korea and the US asserted that subcommittees to work on a peace regime, tension reduction and confidence-building should first be established. Since North Korea argued that the talks should focus on the withdrawal of American troops and the signing of a North Korea-US peace treaty, there was hardly any progress.

Although agreement was reached at the third round to form two subcommittees that would work on a peace regime and tension reduction respectively, no results were reached at the fourth round owing to the different views of the two Koreas. North Korea still wanted to discuss the withdrawal of American troops and the signing of a North Korea-US peace treaty. In contrast, South Korea wanted to open a direct telephone line between military authorities, to notify each other of major military exercises and allow limited inspection of them and, finally, to exchange visits by military officials. At the fifth round, North and South Korea repeated their different positions. The sixth round ended without setting a new date to meet.<sup>327</sup> Like the 1954 Geneva conference, the talks failed owing to incompatible positions.

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<sup>327</sup>- Jhe, op. cit., 2000, pp. 106-107, 281-3.

## 6.6 North Korea Expels the Czech Republic in 1993 and Poland in 1995

North Korea's efforts to undermine the armistice did not end with its efforts to incapacitate the MAC. When communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia and Poland had become genuinely neutral and increasingly at odds with North Korean views. Since the NNSC no longer served the North's objectives, North Korea then openly sought to dismantle the Commission. The appointment of Major General Hwang in March 1991 was the pretext. On August 25, 1992, North Korea announced at a visit to the Czech/Polish camp that one member each would be allowed to visit P'yŏngyang once a month for one night and two days and only for such special occasions as formal requests from the embassies, principal visits from the motherlands and illness. Swedish and Swiss members on journeys to China would not be allowed to visit North Korea and travel by train from P'yŏngyang to Beijing.

When Czechoslovakia was divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia on January 1, 1993, the former, following an agreement concluded on December 29, was willing to take over Czechoslovakia's mandate. On December 30, this message was conveyed to the MAC and the NNSC. However, whereas the UNC/MAC, the NNSC and China supported the succession, arguing that the Czech Republic should be regarded as the legal successor of Czechoslovakia, North Korea, which although it had been informed in advance argued that it had not, refused. The opinion was that there was no successor state but two new nations. On December 31, the KPA/CPV Senior Member, General Li Chan-bok, proposed to the Swedish and Swiss NNSC

members that the Czech delegation should be replaced by Finland or Cuba, that the Czech Republic should not be recognized as the successor and that, if inevitable, it should be recognized as the successor.<sup>328</sup>

Although from North Korea's point of view both Czechoslovakia and Poland, following the end of Communist rule in 1989, had moved into the wrong ideological camp, it accepted the opinion that the NNSC should consist of four members. According to the North, nominating a new member would be the task of the KPA/CPV, but it was already clear in January 1993 that no new representative would be appointed. On January 12, the NNSC received an official oral message from the KPA stating that a decision had been taken to withdraw the Czech delegate "...as soon as practically possible."

This irreversible decision was conveyed to the Czech government the same day. In addition, the delegation would lose its diplomatic immunity. At a MAC secretary meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on the same day, the North declared that since Czechoslovakia had been dissolved, the Czech NNSC delegation had no legal qualifications to remain in the DMZ, but this position would have no influence on the Polish delegation which, if it so wanted, would be allowed to remain. The UNC expressed its hope that the Czech delegation would remain and, if not, that a successor state would be appointed; the NNSC had to fulfil its duties. In a letter on January 18

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<sup>328</sup> Bucheli, op. cit., pp. 92-3; Downs, op. cit., p. 109; Kim, op. cit., 2006(b), pp. 106-107; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, p. 400; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., p. 128; Sandoz, op. cit., 1993(a), pp. 218-219. An official at the DPRK Embassy in Sweden reconfirmed the changed opinion about the NNSC at this time.

the NNSC expressed its unanimous opinion that the Commission shall consist of four senior officers from four neutral nations. The exclusion could not be effective until a successor state had been nominated. Until the succession issue had been resolved, the NNSC would "... continue to fulfil its duties and missions..."

North Korea did not take notice of the joint opinion of the UNC/MAC and the NNSC but imposed restrictions on the Czech delegation. On January 19, North Korea declared that Czech members were no longer welcome at the NNSC plenary meetings; this meeting was their last. Vehicles would no longer be supplied. During the second half of January, supplies of food, electricity, water and clothing were interrupted. Later, the delegation was not welcome at the Commission's official activities. They could neither travel to P'yŏngyang nor meet their Polish colleagues. Only the secretary could have daily contact with the other NNSC delegations in the JSA and receive post from Joint Duty Officers. On January 21, the Czech Ambassador in North Korea conveyed the government's opinion that the expulsion of the delegation was improper and that it would remain. On January 26, North Korea told the Czech delegation to leave within 30 days.<sup>329</sup>

At the MAC secretary meeting requested by the UNC/MAC convened on February 3, the South repeated its hope that the Czech delegation would remain. The delegation must fulfil its tasks until a

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<sup>329</sup>- Bucheli, *ibid.*, pp. 92, 93; Jhe, *op. cit.*, 2000, p. 96: fn. 57; Kim, *ibid.*, 2006(b), pp. 107-108; Kukpang chŏngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1997, pp. 51-2; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 128; *The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission's Unanimous Declaration* (Panmunjom, January 18th 1993). The whole letter is recorded in Appendix XVII(a), p. 696.

successor state was appointed. North Korea declared that since January 1 the Czech Republic was no longer a NNSC member but the Commission would not be hindered in its work. The opinion was that the selection of a successor state was entirely in the North's jurisdiction. After North Korea had urged the Czech delegation on February 12 to report its date of departure by March 1, the Czech government declared on February 25 that it hoped to succeed Czechoslovakia's membership, that the North should immediately guarantee the delegation's duties and should report its position by March 1. On February 25, the UNC/MAC secretary informed the North in a letter that the UNC supported the Czech Republic as the successor state, that if North Korea wanted to select a third country as the successor, it should do so quickly and inform the UNC and that the North had to take measures to enable the delegation to work until a new member was appointed, but on the basis of mutual consent.

On March 2, the KPA/CPV secretary responded in a letter that since Czechoslovakia had already disappeared, the withdrawal of the Czech delegation was inevitable. The decision to let the Czech Republic succeed Czechoslovakia had been taken without consulting North Korea, which claimed that, according to the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 37 on the composition of the NNSC, it had the sole right to nominate a successor state. Notifying North Korea along with the UNC was an infringement of its self-determination and interference in internal policies. North Korea was seeking a successor state but not the Czech Republic, which had infringed on its self-determination.

Since the NNSC and UNC/MAC declarations as well as diplomatic initiatives failed, the Czech Republic declared on March 5

that it would withdraw on April 10. This declaration referred to the decision to let the Czech Republic succeed Czechoslovakia, to the support from the MAC and the NNSC for this decision, to North Korea's policy to use the successor issue to undermine the Commission's work and raise tension and to the expulsion of 13 North Korean diplomats from the Czech Republic in protest against the treatment of Czech officers with effect from April 10. On March 6, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed regret regarding the expulsion of the Czech delegation in violation of the Armistice Agreement and the spirit of the 1991 Basic Agreement. The NNSC would be weakened and there were fears that tension would rise. The Ministry sincerely hoped that a successor state would be chosen before the Czech delegation withdrew in order to normalize the Commission's work quickly.<sup>330</sup>

Following the expulsion of the North Korean diplomats, North Korea cancelled its previous assurance that the Czech delegation would have free access to the farewell ceremonies in the South, but it could enter the JSA and the Swedish/Swiss camp. On March 29, at the farewell luncheon in the Swiss camp, the Czech representative thanked South Korea for its support to the NNSC and regretted the North Korean pressures that had interrupted the Commission's work and forced the delegation to leave the Korean peninsula. In Kaesŏng, the KPA/CPV said farewell to the Czech delegation but there was no official farewell in P'yŏngyang.

On April 3, the Czech NNSC delegation left Panmunjom for

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<sup>330</sup>- Bucheli, *ibid.*, p. 93; Columbia University, *op. cit.*, Paragraph 37; Kim, *ibid.*, 2006(b), pp. 108-109; Kukpang chŏngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 399-401; *ibid.*, 1997, pp. 52-3; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 128.

P'yŏngyang and its flag was lowered. The Czech delegation left North Korea on April 10. Notably, Sandoz (1993a) points out that the pressures on the NNSC resembled those of the UNC in the 1950s. On April 13, Sweden, Switzerland and Poland jointly declared that the Czech Republic had succeeded Czechoslovakia as a NNSC member, but while the UNC accepted the declaration, North Korea did not. Since Paragraph 37 states that the NNSC shall consist of four neutral senior officers representing four neutral nations, the unanimous opinion was that the departing delegate should have been replaced at the time of departure after a proposal from the North followed by agreement between the two sides. The NNSC demanded an immediate nomination of a successor state that the South could accept in order to enable the Commission to conduct its work in accordance with the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. Until that time, the NNSC would conduct its work with three delegates.

On April 22, the UNC/MAC secretary urged the KPA in a letter to nominate a successor state as soon as possible. Nonetheless, in January 1994, North Korea's MAC representatives tried through an informal meeting with the American side to achieve agreement on the withdrawal of the NNSC from Panmunjom. The US refused: the UNC position was that the NNSC is an integral part of the Armistice Agreement. On April 28, North Korea declared that the "NNSC cannot exist since the MAC has disappeared" and urged Poland to withdraw (cf. p. 394). The Polish delegation was to leave the North on May 15 but, although the withdrawal was postponed, the KPA took no action. In contrast, on June 7, two Polish officers were invited by the North Koreans to participate in a tourist tour to P'yŏngyang and Mt. Kŭmgang from June 7 to 13 and two others from June 13 to 19 This

friendly gesture was later interpreted as a final appreciation of contributions to secure peace rather than as a change in North Korea's basic attitude to the NNSC.<sup>331</sup>

On April 29, around 40 North Korean soldiers wearing steel helmets and equipped with rifles, which are prohibited in the Joint Security Area (JSA), appeared in the area in the first such armistice violation since the 1976 axe murder. Since the UNC immediately protested against the action, the North's soldiers withdrew about three hours later. On April 30, at a MAC secretary meeting called by the UNC/MAC, the South protested against the serious violation that took place for a period of five hours. The North argued that the UNC had threatened them and that the guards' leader had decided to take defensive measures. The UNC/MAC questioned this statement. Eventually, the North declared that it would make efforts not to repeat such an incident. The direct telephone line would be maintained and the armistice observed. On April 30, the North Korean air force made an exceptional exercise with fighter planes heading southwards. More than 20 planes intercepted an imaginary enemy plane at a point only 27 kilometers north of the MDL. On May 6, the UNC declared its opposition to North Korea's unilateral policy to incapacitate the NNSC, but the North argued that it was not a matter for the South to interfere in.

On June 6, the MAC held a secretary meeting requested by the

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<sup>331</sup>- Bucheli, *ibid.*, pp. 93-4; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 2001, p. 87; Kim, *ibid.*, 2006(b), p. 109; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2001(b), p. 119; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 129; *The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission's unanimous declaration* (Panmunjom, April 13, 1993); Sandoz, *op. cit.*, 1993(a), p. 219; Tham, *op. cit.*, p. 3. Original quotation marks. The whole letter is recorded in Appendix XVII(b), p. 697.

UNC/MAC to protest North Korea's policy to expel Poland from the NNSC, but the KPA refused to participate. On November 15, the North Korean Foreign Ministry declared in an official letter to Poland that "the legal effect of the nomination of Poland as a Member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission under Paragraph 37 of the Korean Armistice Agreement has terminated." The justification was that the armistice's operative mechanisms had been systematically paralyzed by "one" contracting party (the South was not explicitly mentioned) and that China had left the MAC. During a state visit to Seoul, President Lech Walesa declared that the letter would be ignored and the NNSC obligations would continue to be implemented; the Polish government argued that the Commission could only be amended at the consent of both parties of the Armistice Agreement.

On January 23, 1995, the KPA Panmunjom Mission's representative Li Chan-bok visited the Polish camp and urged it to withdraw by February 28. All support to the delegation would thereafter be interrupted. This message was also conveyed to the Polish embassy in P'yŏngyang and in an official letter to the Polish government. The letter stated that the NNSC had lost its functions owing to the US already in the 1950s. Since one part of the MAC had disappeared, the legal effect to invite Poland as a NNSC member had ended. In a state where the MAC had disappeared, the conditions of the NNSC could not be guaranteed and budget support had disappeared. Consequently, the hope was that the Polish government would act on behalf of the delegation.<sup>332</sup>

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<sup>332</sup> Hapch'am chŏngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 2001, p. 87; Kim, "Pukhan-ŭi kunsu chŏngjŏn wiwŏnhoe-esŏ-ŭi ch'ŏlsu-wa kukchepŏp," *Pukhan hakbo* 18 (1994), p. 130; Kim, "Hyujŏn hyŏpchŏng wiban-e taehayŏ-nŭn haep̄yŏt chŏngch'i-wa-nŭn mugwan-

On February 9, the Deputy Head of the KPA Panmunjom Mission advised the Polish NNSC delegation at a visit there that they could not move south of the camp, thus preventing them from participating in any further meetings, and that they had to leave by February 28. If they did not leave, their stay would be regarded as “illegal” and security could not be guaranteed any longer. The plan to withdraw should be presented by February 18. From the next day, all visits to the Polish camp were prohibited. Since the whole Polish delegation protested by not shaving and by wearing civilian clothes from February 10 onwards, no farewell ceremony was, as planned, held in P’yŏngyang. At a new visit to the Polish camp on February 18, the Deputy Head of the KPA Panmunjom Mission announced that all support in terms of cars, telecommunications, electricity, drinking water and the like would end from February 27 and that all North Korean guards and employees would be withdrawn from February 28.

The expulsion of the Polish delegation led to protests. On February 3, the Swedish, Swiss and Polish delegations tried in a letter to the KPA Panmunjom Mission to protest the policy to expel Poland, but the Head refused to receive it. On February 8, North Korea refused to receive a letter from the UNC/MAC secretary, protesting the policy. On February 9, the Swedish, Swiss and Polish delegations delivered a new letter to the KPA Panmunjom Mission, pointing out that the end of support to the Polish delegation and the termination of officers’ immunity from February 10 was a unilateral act violating the

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hage chūkkakchōgin taeūng chōngch’i-rūl ch’wihae-ya handa,” *Pukhan* (July 2003), p. 68; Kim, *ibid.*, 2006(b), p. 110; Kukpang chōngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1997, pp. 69-70, 71; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 129; Yi, *op. cit.*, July 1994, pp. 52-3.

Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 13(j), ensuring free conduct of the NNSC's work. Until the agreement was altered or replaced by mutual agreement, North Korea should observe it.

At the MAC secretary meeting proposed by the UNC/MAC convened on February 13, the South declared that it could not accept the withdrawal of the Polish delegation exhorted by the North. The KPA argued that there was no point in discussing the issue. As a self-defensive measure, the withdrawal process had already begun and could not be reversed. On February 16, the UNC Commander, General Gary E. Luck, sent a letter to the Supreme Commanders of the seven nations - Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, the Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom - with liaison officers in the UNC to request a joint protest against the expulsion through official diplomatic channels.<sup>333</sup>

On February 21, the UNC Commander addressed a letter to the CPV Commander requesting China as a signatory of the Armistice Agreement to protest against North Korea's policy to expel Poland. The North Korean embassy in Warsaw refused to receive Poland's reply to the North's note regarding the withdrawal of the Polish delegation. On February 23, General Luck sent a letter to the NNSC in which he emphasized the significance of the Commission; it had played an important role in maintaining the Armistice Agreement since 1953. The maintenance of the NNSC was necessary for peace in the Korean peninsula and the Commission's work to maintain the armistice was internationally acknowledged (cf. p. 396).

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<sup>333</sup> Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 13(j); Kim, *ibid.*, 2006(b), pp. 110-112; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1997, p. 95; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, pp. 129, 153; Widén, op. cit., September 1996, pp. 3-4. Original quotation marks.

On February 24, the South Korean Foreign Ministry declared that North Korea's expulsion of Poland from the NNSC threatened stability and peace in the Korean peninsula and violated the spirit in the Basic Agreement to observe the Armistice Agreement until a peace regime had been established. In spite of North Korea's policy to obstruct the armistice, South Korea would, on the basis of the spirit in the Basic Agreement, continue to firmly observe the armistice. By withdrawing its unilateral policy to evict the Polish delegation, North Korea should immediately follow the Armistice Agreement. On the same day, General Luck sent a letter to the Supreme Commanders of the seven nations - Belgium, Ethiopia, Greece, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, South Africa and Turkey - that had withdrawn their liaison officers in the UNC to request a joint protest against the expulsion of Poland. On February 25, General Luck also delivered a protest to the KPA Commander-in-Chief, Kim Jong Il, but North Korea's position did not change. Subsequently, the Chinese government rejected the Polish request to operate from Beijing.<sup>334</sup>

Following the eviction of six Polish officers on February 28, the NNSC presence was reduced to Sweden and Switzerland. The direct telephone contact with the northern NNSC Camp set up in 1985 was lost, but contacts were maintained with UN personnel and representatives of the Red Cross, who have maintained permanent contacts, and the South Korean Committee for Reunification. On March 4, the Polish officers had to leave P'yôngyang and return home. Officially,

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<sup>334</sup> Kim, *ibid.*, 2006(b), pp. 112-113; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 130; Widén, *Månadsrapport februari* (n. p., February 28, 1995), p. 13. The February 8 and 25 letters are recorded in Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1997, on pp. 151, 153 (Korean) and pp. 152, 154 (English).

they did not give up their NNSC mandate but continued to work from home. An important contact with the North was lost but, as with the MAC, there was no provision in the Armistice Agreement to restore the Commission.

On February 28, North Korea's Foreign Ministry declared that the US had from the beginning systematically demolished the Armistice Agreement. Since the agreement only existed in name after the withdrawal of the Czech and Polish NNSC delegations, the armistice should be replaced by a peace regime. According to Lee (2001b), the function of the NNSC afterwards consisted only in evaluating reports submitted to the Commission without any inspection. In spite of being a defunct agency, the NNSC constituted a stabilizing influence on the activities of the opposing sides in the JSA. Jean-Paul Dietrich, Swiss NNSC Member 1986-87 (1994), regarded the Commission as a guarantee for the status quo unless the two Koreas would wish to replace the Armistice Agreement.

After the Polish delegation had withdrawn, all NNSC meetings had to be adjourned since at least one party from the other side had to participate. From April 1995 until January 1999, the Polish member and secretary travelled altogether 13 times via South Korea to Panmunjom approximately every three to six months for five to ten day visits to sign whenever possible the NNSC Summary Records, evaluation reports and declarations as well as to approve the agendas. The purpose was to "show the flag," emphasizing that the Armistice Agreement was still valid, not to sign documents which in the meantime had lost their significance.

On April 24, 1995, the NNSC adopted a joint resolution stating that the Armistice Agreement can be revised only by the consent of

both sides; North Korea's unilateral act did not at all change the legal status of the NNSC. Until a successor state was appointed, Poland would continue to work from Warsaw. The NNSC could make no decisions in the absence of the Poles. Finally, the Polish delegation would participate in meetings at least once every third month or whenever there was a need to meet.<sup>335</sup>

The expulsion of the Czech and Polish delegations was not the end of the KPA policy to undermine the Armistice Agreement. On May 3, 1995, the KPA Panmunjom Mission announced at the MAC secretary meeting proposed by the KPA that both NNSC and UNC personnel, in violation of the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 11 that guarantees the MAC and the NNSC "...complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the demilitarized zone..." were prohibited from crossing the MDL without the KPA's special permission from 12 p.m. the same day. The KPA closed its NNSC premises in the JSA on May 4. However, already from spring 1993 Swedish and Swiss officers had been prohibited from visiting North Korea owing to the appointment of Major General Hwang and the dispatch of observers from the NNSC member states to "Team Spirit" in 1993.

The KPA claimed that even though the NNSC, after the eviction of Czechoslovakia and Poland, could no longer hold meetings, the US regularly opened meetings to use the Commission as a cover for its war preparations. The UNC/MAC protested against the unilateral measures

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<sup>335</sup>- Dietrich, "Der Beitrag de Schweiz zur Friedensförderung in Korea: Vier Jahrzehnte in der Überwachungskommission," February 10, 1994; Jhe, op. cit., 2004, p. 99; Kim, *ibid.*, 2006(b), pp. 113-116; Lee, op. cit., 2001 (b), p. 119; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 130; Swedish officer, oral interview, March 13, 2009; Widén, op. cit., September 1996, p. 4. Original quotation marks.

taken by the KPA and raised the intrusions over the MDL by armed soldiers on April 19 and April 23 in spite of warnings by megaphone, but North Korea rejected the accusations as false. The NNSC protested against the prohibition to cross the MDL, but the KPA refused to receive any messages. The NNSC archive in the part of the headquarters administered by the North had to be transferred to the Historical Branch of the UNC in Seoul for storage in a computer. All meetings were transferred to the conference building maintained by the South.

At a meeting held in Berne on October 5, 1995, Polish, Swiss and Swedish NNSC representatives pointed out in a joint declaration that North Korea's unilateral measures had no effect on NNSC's legal status. In spite of the absence of working relations with the North, at least some contacts had been maintained since 1995. To the author's knowledge, in April 2001 Major General Adrien Evequoz, Head of the Swiss delegation, was the first NNSC officer to cross the MDL since 1995. The purpose was to meet the Swiss Foreign Minister who was not allowed to cross the line to visit the Swedish and Swiss camp. Since the North rejected the UNC proposal to let the Swiss representative and the KPA meet to prepare the meeting, it was accomplished thanks to telephone calls between the Joint Duty Officers, but he visited as a Swiss citizen, not as a NNSC member. However, on May 18, 2003, the Swiss Foreign Minister was allowed by the KPA to cross the MDL to visit the Swiss camp and inspect the area on her way to South Korea in an unusual crossing.<sup>336</sup>

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<sup>336</sup> Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 11; Frisk, "NNSC:s arbete på gränsen mellan Nordoch Sydkorea," November 22, 2006; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 2003, pp. 200, 293-4; op. cit., "Purok," 2006, p. 71; Kim, *ibid.*, 2006(b), p.

According to the Swedish officer Bo Henricson (1996), North Korea regarded the NNSC as “non-existent” after May 3, 1995. On the other hand, South Korea regarded the NNSC as increasingly important and, in his words, as “living and obvious evidence that the armistice was still maintained. Thanks to our presence at the demarcation line and the hotspot Panmunjom, we are also regarded as the international community’s witnesses.” He refers to the NNSC camp as “a peaceful island in an ocean of weapons.”

Similarly, the Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation from October 1994 to December 1995, Major General K-G Widén (1996), writes: “According to the North Koreans, the NNSC does not exist.” In 1995, Widén wrote that the UNC Commander wanted the NNSC to remain until a peace treaty that had to include South Korea was signed. In 1996, he noted that, in spite of the restrictions imposed on the Commission’s work, it continued to implement its mandate. In January 1996, when the Polish delegation visited Panmunjom, a joint resolution was adopted stating that the NNSC would remain as a body of the Armistice Agreement. The NNSC urged the UNC and the KPA/CPV to maintain dialogue and would actively support it.

At the April meeting, the NNSC declared that the Commission as a principal body of the Armistice Agreement would remain until a joint decision was made to change its position. Poland promised to fulfil its duties as a member country. In contrast, since North Korea regarded the Armistice Agreement as worthless, neither the NNSC nor the MAC was needed any longer. On the other hand, the UNC/MAC

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114; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1997, pp. 97-9; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 131; Tham, op. cit., p. 3; Widén, “Svenskar i Panmunjom,” *Yoboseyo* (September 1995), no. 3, p. 7; *ibid.*, September 1996, p. 4.

highly appreciated the Commission's work. Both the South Korean government and the military leadership appreciated the presence which practically showed that the Armistice Agreement was still being enforced. At the same time, all parties wanted to replace the Armistice Agreement with another agreement, preferably a peace treaty but, as we have seen, North Korea did not want to include South Korea.<sup>337</sup>

According to Major General Julin (2000), the NNSC's presence sent important signals to the world community that the Armistice Agreement was implemented. In contrast, a withdrawal would indicate non-recognition of the enforcement of the agreement. In addition, the presence helped to promote respect for international public law. Both Sweden and Switzerland were highly respected NNSC members. Since the NNSC had to fulfil its duties, South Korea wanted the Commission to remain in the Korean peninsula, which Julin calls "the last remnant of the Cold War."

In 2003, Major General Adrien Evéquoz expressed an opinion similar to that of Julin: "We show our colours. Our presence makes it clear that the armistice still holds. That is why North Korea ignores us. If we left – which would be appreciated by North Korea – the agreement would be even further undermined." The Swedish, Swiss and Polish governments' opinion was that the NNSC would continue to implement the mandate and thereby maintain the provisions of the Armistice Agreement pertaining to the NNSC. According to Mueller-

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<sup>337</sup>- Henricson, "En fredlig ö i ett hav av vapen," *Yoboseyo* (March 1996), no. 1, pp. 4, 5; Kim, *ibid.*, 2006(b), pp. 114-115; *NNSC Chief Delegates - List Updated April 14, 1997*; Widén, *ibid.*, September 1995, pp. 6-7; *ibid.*, September 1996, pp. 3, 4. "K-G" stands for Karl-Göte. From *NNSC Chief Delegates - List Updated April 14, 1997*. According to Mr. Widén, everyone calls him "K-G."

Lhotska (1997), for both Sweden and Switzerland the Korea Mission was a matter of foreign policy prestige. In 1997, the two countries had five officers each stationed in Panmunjom, which was also the case in 2006 (cf. pp. 26, 81, 88, 115, 240).<sup>338</sup>

## 6.7 North Korean Intrusion in the DMZ and at Kangnûng in 1996

On April 4, 1996, at a meeting the KPA Panmunjom Mission stated in a letter to the UNC that it would no longer continue its responsibilities according to the Armistice Agreement for the maintenance and administration of the MDL and the DMZ since the southern side - the “South Korean Puppets” - had violated the armistice’s provisions; these measures were taken in self-defence. However, North Korea did not reject the MDL itself. North Korea argued that it had acted to prevent war in the Korean peninsula by presenting rational proposals and making patient efforts.

In contrast, “The South has transformed the southern side of the DMZ into an armed zone with a military campsite for an invasion of the North.” Under such circumstances, dialogue could not be expected to resolve the issue. The KPA guard force in the JSA would remove their red armbands, which had been mutually agreed upon and worn since an agreement had been reached at the 19th MAC meeting called by the KPA/CPV held on September 16, 1953. Vehicles moving in the DMZ would no longer fly special flags. On April 4, the UNC/MAC

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<sup>338</sup> Frisk, op. cit.; Julin, op. cit., March 22, 2000; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, op. cit., p. 133; Rönnberg, op. cit., p. 3; Sägerser, “<<Wir Machen Klar, Dass Der Waffenstillestand Gilt>>,” *Coopzeitung*, July 23, 2003.

Senior Member, Major General Lee Suk Bok, protested in a letter against these serious violations of the Armistice Agreement and urged North Korea to maintain the armistice. Major General Lee rejected the armistice violations raised by the KPA.<sup>339</sup>

On April 5, military trucks without flags brought some 120 KPA soldiers equipped with automatic guns into the northern part of the JSA, whereas only 35 lightly-armed security personnel were allowed under amendments to the Armistice Agreement. Military personnel in the JSA ceased to wear armbands. The troops carried recoilless rifles and mortars and built field fortifications in violation of the agreement. The UN security battalion in Camp Bonifas immediately occupied the southern part of the JSA with corresponding forces. At the same time, NNSC officers and Korean employees were evacuated from the NNSC Camp.

Sweden and Switzerland maintained their support for the armistice; the North Korean measures were described by the head of the Swedish delegation at the NNSC plenary meeting held on April 9 “...as a serious violation of the Armistice Agreement...” The Swiss delegation chief made a similar statement. Although the UNC/MAC proposed holding a secretary meeting on April 6 to discuss the incident, the KPA refused to take part.

The evacuation went smoothly without any incidents. After two hours, the KPA’s action was terminated. Daily routines were resumed.

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<sup>339</sup> Jhe, op. cit., 2000, p. 71; op. cit., 2004, p. 102; Kim, op. cit., July 1996, p. 28; Kim, op. cit., 2006(a), pp. 93-4; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, p. 28; Lee, *Letter to Major General Mats Marling*, classified April 25, 1996; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 122. Original quotation marks. “South Korean Puppets” is quoted from Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, p. 122.

However, what Mueller-Lhotska (1997) calls “experimental alarms” that took place in front of innumerable control cameras were repeated on the two following days for a few hours. Such practices had also taken place during a similar incident on April 29, 1994 (cf. p. 430). The intention was to tell the world that North Korea did not intend to observe the Armistice Agreement any longer. A better date could not have been chosen; during Easter, the Americans’ crucial posts were either not occupied at all or inadequately. CNN and other western news agencies disseminated the distorted information that North Korea had brought troops into the entire DMZ and created imminent danger of war. The dominant opinion in intellectual circles was that North Korea wanted a victory for the government party of President Kim Young Sam in the April 11 parliamentary elections since it did not want to resume the reunification issue owing to its serious economic problems.<sup>340</sup> Considering North Korea’s policy to exclude South Korea from talks, this assumption is reasonable.

On April 8, the UNC/MAC began to investigate the incident. More than 200 soldiers equipped with prohibited automatic guns, machine guns and trench mortars had been dispatched from April 5-7. On April 9, the North Korean Ambassador in Sweden, Mr. Kim Hung Rim, was called to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which expressed its concerns regarding the armistice violation, referred to the Swedish participation in the NNSC and stressed that it was extremely important to respect the Armistice Agreement. Unilateral actions were not acceptable and the agreement could only be

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<sup>340</sup>- Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1997, pp. 158, 194; Lee, *ibid.*, April 25, 1996; Marling, *Letter to Major General Lee Suk Bok*, April 25, 1996, p. 1; Mueller-Lhotska and Millett, *ibid.*, pp. 122-3, 158-9; Swedish officer, letter June 3, 2006.

changed through negotiations.

The Ambassador pointed out the US as a long-time systematic violator of the Armistice Agreement. Consequently, the agreement was no longer valid and had become irrelevant. As we have seen, already in 1957 the UNC/MAC had declared that it would not follow the regulations concerning the introduction of military equipment into the area. By systematically acting provocatively, the US and South Korea had undermined the agreement. In contrast, North Korea had in 1974 and 1986 presented [non-exemplified] proposals for renegotiating it. The meeting did not change the Swedish view of North Korea's actions, but a consensus was reached that the NNSC still had a role to fulfil.<sup>341</sup> Considering North Korea's policy to undermine the NNSC, it is remarkable that consensus was reached on this point.

This armed intrusion was not the only serious incident in 1996. On September 18, a North Korean submarine ran aground at Kangnūng on the South Korean east coast. The submarine was discovered by a taxi driver, who reported it to the local police. Remarkably, the incident became known in the same way as the 1968 Blue House raid and the Ulchin-Samch'ok incident (cf. pp. 148, 198).

Within hours, South Korean troops and police had identified the discovery as a submarine. The Defence Ministry mobilized 40,000 troops, helicopter gunships and sniffer dogs to search for the intruders. On the same day, on a mountain approximately five kilometers from the landing site, they found eleven bodies of North Korean infiltrators who had been executed with bullets to the back of their heads,

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<sup>341</sup> Kukpang chōngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1997, pp. 157, 194-5; Marling, *ibid.*, pp. 1-2; Rosander, *Nordkoreas ambassadör uppkallad till polchefen* (April 10, 1996), pp. 1-2. The lower number of KPA soldiers in the JSA above is from Mueller-Lhotska, *ibid.*, p. 122.

evidently with their own consent to avoid being captured. About the same time, local police in a nearby area, acting on a tip from a villager, found infiltrator Lee Kwang Su in a farmer's field. As the only man captured, he revealed that the personnel of the submarine belonged to the Reconnaissance Bureau of the KPA in charge of collecting tactical and strategic intelligence on American and South Korean troops. Their mission was to test South Korea's defence and reconnoitre an airbase and radar facilities near Kangnŭng; the North Korean government, however, referred to submarine engine trouble.

Another 15 men escaped into the South Korean countryside. Over the next two weeks, eleven commandos were killed in shootouts with South Korean soldiers. Two more held out for 48 days before being killed in early November, near the eastern end of the DMZ. Another commando may have found his way back to North Korea, but South Korean authorities concluded that the submarine's crew probably amounted altogether to 25. In other words, it was the incident with the second largest number of casualties during the 1990s, surpassed only by the June 15, 1999 West Sea battle. As the commandos fled across South Korea, they killed five soldiers and four civilians. President Kim Young Sam declared on September 20 that "this is an armed provocation, not a simple repeat of infiltration of agents of the past." Following almost daily condemnations of North Korea, he eventually declared that any further provocation would bring a "real possibility of war." On September 23, North Korea made an official announcement that the submarine had become disoriented while undergoing training and run aground, and requested for the first time since 1982 the return of the killed infiltrators.<sup>342</sup>

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<sup>342</sup>- Downs, op. cit., p. 264; Kim, op. cit., 2006(c), p. 219; Kukpang chŏngbo ponbu,

On September 19, the UNC/MAC Senior Member protested the incident, but North Korea refused to receive the message. After having learnt some details about the botched infiltration mission from South Korean news accounts, the KPA requested a MAC secretary meeting to be held on September 26; in spite of its policy to dismantle it, North Korea returned to the MAC when needed. At the seven secretary meetings held between September 26 and December 17, all but the last of them called by the KPA, North Korean officers demanded the return of the submarine and the crew and threatened to retaliate “a hundredfold or a thousandfold” for the deaths of the commandos, but the UNC/MAC consistently insisted that the incident should be handled by the South Korean government.

On September 26, the North claimed that the crew was not properly equipped with weapons for self-protection, but when they were encircled by personnel from the South they just coped with the situation. Since the submarine had stranded due to engine trouble, the incident was not an armistice violation. Consequently, the submarine and the crew should be returned as soon as possible. The UNC/MAC responded that, after its investigation, its special investigation team had concluded that it was a deliberate armed intrusion and a serious armistice violation and protested severely. At the NNSC meeting held on September 24, the Swedish and Swiss members made similar statements to those on April 9. The intrusion was regarded as a “planned infiltration attempt that failed” and as “one of the gravest incidents between North and South Korea in recent years.” Such an

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ibid., 1997, p. 160; Lee, op. cit., 2004, p. 126; Oberdorfer, op. cit., pp. 387-9. Original quotation marks.

incident “only serves to further undermine the strength of the Korean armistice and its foundation, the Armistice Agreement.”

At the secretary meeting held on October 2, the KPA strongly protested the killings of the crew and threatened “serious consequences” of the death of the North Korean “soldiers.” The North urged the US to declare its official position on the demand for repatriation of the submarine, which it again claimed had stranded due to engine trouble, and the crew. The UNC/MAC referred to its investigation and refuted the North’s claims. According to the investigation, the killed North Korean personnel had worn South Korean Army uniforms and civilian clothes and some were equipped with M-16 guns. They also had films showing the principal military areas of South Korea and maps of the South. Since the sea currents when the incident occurred were flowing northwards, the claim that the submarine had become disoriented was false. In the submarine, heavy weapons, hand grenades and ammunition were discovered. Since four soldiers had been killed, there was no doubt that the incident was planned. The UNC/MAC urged the KPA soldiers to surrender and to stop making threats that would make it more difficult to resolve the incident.<sup>343</sup>

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<sup>343</sup>- Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 263-4; Kim, *ibid.*, 2006(c), p. 219; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1997, pp. 125-7, 131, 160; Lee, *ibid.*, 2004, p. 126; Swedish officer, June 3, 2006. Original quotation marks. The independent investigation of the submarine incident was not a new pattern. Since April 1967, the KPA/CPV had rejected more than 170 requests made by the UNC to conduct joint investigations of armistice violations in the DMZ. Consequently, it had to investigate them independently, and in 1992 had more than 80 times dispatched investigation teams. In 1993, teams were dispatched on 47 occasions. From Kukpang chôngbo ponbu (*ibid.*, 1997, pp. 173-4, 178). Jhe (*op. cit.* 2000, pp. 79-80: fn. 32) regards the unilateral investigations not as a partial implementation of the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 11, guaranteeing freedom for joint observer teams within the DMZ, but a serious armistice violation.

At the meeting convened on November 14, the North urged repatriation of the corpses, but since the South claimed that there was no evidence to prove that they were soldiers, the issue could not be resolved through the MAC but at government level. The North argued that to handle the issue as a political one was to abandon implementation of the Armistice Agreement. The UNC/MAC claimed that the North, by unilaterally withdrawing from the MAC in April 1994, had severely violated the agreement. At the meeting held on November 19, the North urged repatriation of the bodies through a military body, while the South again asserted a solution at government level since there was no rule to repatriate killed agents through the MAC and no such practice. The South Korean representative claimed that if the North really wanted repatriation, it should provide a convincing excuse and a promise to the government to prevent a recurrence.

At the meeting convened on November 26, the North urged that repatriation should take place through a military body at Panmunjom and that the issue should not be abused for political purposes. The South maintained its position that the issue should be resolved at government level. At the meeting held on December 3, the North claimed that, with regard to the repatriation issue, the Armistice Agreement should not be used for political purposes, while the South urged a solution at government level. At the final meeting held on December 17, the North still claimed that the repatriation issue should not be abused politically and that the corpses should be unconditionally returned. Besides the MAC, the US State Department Country Director for Korea and North Korea's Director General of American affairs met on nine separate days in December to resolve the issue.<sup>344</sup>

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<sup>344</sup>- Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 21; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1997, pp. 127-132;

As we have seen, North Korea had only admitted two incidents in 1953 and the 1976 axe murder and made a few indirect admissions, but on December 29 it apologized again, so the South Korean government decided to return the bodies through the MAC. According to Downs (1999), North Korea had reason to fear a cut in food aid. The American Lieutenant Colonel Harrison (2002) argues that the separate US-North Korean talks contributed to the following apology:

“The spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK is authorized to express deep regret for the submarine incident in the coastal waters of Kangnung, South Korea, in September 1996, that caused the tragic loss of human life. The DPRK will make efforts to ensure that such an incident will not recur and will work with others for durable peace and stability in the Korean peninsula.”<sup>345</sup>

On December 30, when the remains of the 24 dead crew were transferred through the MAC secretary meeting at Panmunjom, North Korean officials were shocked to find that they received only cremated ashes: American officers believed the bodies were too riddled with bullets to be presentable. A condolence ceremony was subsequently held on the northern side of the JSA. In a statement it was claimed that the submarine had drifted during an exercise and that South Korean soldiers had mercilessly killed innocent personnel; the Defence Intelligence Headquarters writes (1997) that the apology was not sincere (cf. p. 311).<sup>346</sup> Downs' explanation of the apology supports

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Oberdorfer, op. cit., p. 392.

<sup>345</sup> Downs, op. cit., pp. 156, 264; Harrison, *ibid.*, p. 21; Kim, op. cit., 2006(c), p. 219; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1997, p. 134.

<sup>346</sup> Kim, *ibid.*, 2006(c), p. 219; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1997, pp. 134, 161; Oberdorfer, op. cit., p. 393. Original quotation marks. The investigation of the incident made in South Korea concluded that the initial operations began too

this view, but without it North-South relations would probably have deteriorated further. The tension created was rather short-lived in comparison with the North Korean nuclear issue. Considering the nuclear issue, the submarine incident and the 1999 West Sea battle, the level of “negative peace” was higher than in the 1980s, about the same as in the 1950s and 1970s but lower than in the high-tension era of the 1960s.

On October 17, 1997, two South Korean farmers who had departed from the UNC guards’ protection were abducted at gunpoint by 12 North Korean soldiers near the village of Taesông-dong east of but not far from Panmunjom. The village is called the “Freedom Village”, in which residents reside on their ancestral homes under very rigid conditions. They must be out of their fields and in their village by dark each day and must be at home and accounted for with their windows and doors secured by 11 p.m. each night. The farmers were gathering acorns when they were surrounded by soldiers and taken into captivity. A UNC patrol later found the soldiers and urged them to release the farmers but they refused. Instead, on October 17, North Korea attended a MAC secretary meeting. The South claimed that the soldiers had kidnapped the farmers, suggested forming a joint observer team (JOT) and expressed hopes for their immediate return. The North asserted that the farmers had crossed the MDL, were on the

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slowly and were inefficient. Naval vessels and the army radar system on land were unable to discover the submarine. Reporting took too long, and leadership, but above all military discipline, was deficient. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to punish 20 officers and soldiers due to negligence in terms of failing to discover the submarine, the slow reaction to the report from the taxi driver and responsibility for accidental shootings during the hunt for the infiltrators. According to unconfirmed data, ten North Korean officers were executed in consequence of the incident. From Rönnerberg, *Rapport för december 1996* (n. p., January 7, 1997), pp. 4-5.

northern side when they were apprehended and would be released “in due course.”

At the October 19 meeting, Colonel Yu Sang Yol asserted that the farmers had crossed the MDL but the KPA planned to return them, if only the South would first admit the crossing. Colonel Thomas Riley asserted that the innocent farmers had been abducted by force and remained detained; he could not recognize the North’s investigation. The farmers should be released immediately and unconditionally. At a third meeting proposed, like the previous one, by the UNC/MAC and convened on October 20, it was decided to make a joint investigation on the next day. Colonel Riley for the UNC and Colonel Yu for the KPA formed a joint observer team which was the first convened since 1976. After the investigation, the two detainees agreed: “It seems we accidentally crossed the Military Demarcation Line in an area that is not clearly marked.” The UNC spokesman, Kim Young Kyu, said: “We accepted the farmers’ statement to secure their safe and timely release.” The farmers were handed over to the UNC on October 21.<sup>347</sup>

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<sup>347</sup>- Downs, *op. cit.*, pp. 265-6; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1999, pp. 471-3; *op. cit.*, 2001, pp. 264-5; Kirkbride, *Panmunjom: Facts About the Korean DMZ*, 2006, pp. 22, 42. Original quotation marks. On the North’s side of the JSA, just some 200 metres away, is Kijông-dong, well known in South Korea as the “Pro-paganda Village” due, above all, to the extensive loud speaker system that broadcasts to the citizens of Taesông-dong. Also, it is merely a village in a caretaker status: there are no citizens but only 15 to 20 workers present every day to raise and lower the flag and to maintain the facilities. In 2002, more than 40 three-to-five storey buildings were located densely in the village, which in North Korea is reportedly called “The P’anmunjôm Peace Collective Farm” (organized in 1982). The flagpole at the entrance is with its 160 metres the world’s highest, while the one in Taesông-dong is 100 metres high. From Kang, “Pukhan-ûi chôpkyông chiyök hyônhwang,” in Chông et al., *DMZ III - chôpkyông chiyôg-ûi hwahae hyômmyôk* (Seoul: Tosô ch’ulp’an Sohwa, 2002), p. 65; Kim, *DMZ*

Remarkably, the incident differs from almost all others by being resolved by mutual consent.

## 6.8 Conclusions

The years 1990-1992 were a third period of thaw in inter-Korean relations, marked by the signing of the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration on a nuclear-free Korea in December 1991. The NNSC was involved in contacts by providing its conference room. The Basic Agreement was a milestone in relations, but they soon worsened due to the North Korean nuclear programme. Like the Pueblo incident in 1968 and the axe murder in 1976, this issue caused fears of war in 1993-94, but they were unrelated to the Armistice Agreement and hardly involved the MAC.

Instead, the main parties were North Korea and the US, which

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*p'yŏnghwa tapsa: Nambuk p'yŏnghwa-wa Namnam hwahae-rŭl wihae*, 2006, p. 182; Kirkbride, op. cit., 2006, pp. 42, 49; Yi, *Pimujang chidae-rŭl ch'aja-sŏ*, op. cit., 2003, p. 18. The North Koreans started farming right beside the MDL to provoke South Korea. The village was built to show their "supposed superiority." South Korea subsequently allowed people to dwell in the area. From Hahm, *The Living History of the DMZ*, p. 46. Original quotation marks. In 2001, a North Korean defector stated that the especially selected farmers lived in a military way and were completely isolated from the outside. On the other hand, since all electronic products were supplied at government-authorized prices etc., the inhabitants enjoyed privileges that even P'yŏngyang citizens did not have. Since the village was excluded from the national plan, farming was also relatively easy and distribution at the fall harvest abundant. Consequently, there was hardly any better place to live in in North Korea. National security and people's security personnel administered every work group. Civilians stood guard during day and night. To leave the village, citizens need special permission from the National Security Agency. With the exception of such special occasions as parents' deaths or relatives' weddings, travelling outside the area was forbidden. Residents of Taesŏng-dong do not pay taxes and are exempt from military service. Original quotation marks. From Kang, *ibid.*, p. 65; Kim, *ibid.*, 2006, pp. 27, 182.

signed the 1994 Agreed Framework that aimed to resolve the issue. North Korea increasingly emphasized the signing of a peace treaty with the US, a position that was unacceptable to both the US and South Korea. A North Korea-US peace treaty would also violate the Basic Agreement. Four-party talks held in 1997-99 on ending the Korean War failed. Statistics of armistice violations from the early 1990s still differed widely between the KPA/CPV and the UNC/MAC. Since the nuclear issue differs from the military tension referred to in previous chapters and since the two sides, owing to the dissolution of the MAC in 1994, ceased to provide statistics on armistice violations, it is somewhat difficult to make comparisons of the degree of “negative peace.” However, it may be concluded that the level was higher than in the 1980s, comparable to the 1950s and 1970s but lower than in the 1960s.

The 1990s were a turbulent period for both the MAC and the NNSC. Following the appointment of a South Korean Major General as UNC/MAC Senior Member for the first time in 1991, the KPA/CPV boycotted the MAC plenary sessions. In April 1994, the KPA withdrew from the MAC. Instead, the KPA Panmunjom Mission was set up, but the UNC did not recognize it. The demolition of the MAC made contacts between the two sides more irregular but did not end them.

Following the December 1994 incident of an American helicopter crossing the MDL, talks between North Korean and American generals were held for the first time. These talks eventually developed into General Officers’ talks that were held from June 1998 onwards, involving mainly North Korea, the US and South Korea. The General Officers’ talks superseded the MAC but were also characterized

by a “zero-sum game” in dealing with armistice violations in 1998-99. However, North Korea admitted the 1996 submarine incident in its fourth admission altogether.

The appointment of a South Korean Major General as UNC/MAC Senior Member was used as an opportunity for North Korea to demolish the NNSC. Following the end of the Cold War, Czechoslovakia and Poland were no longer regarded as neutral and North Korea increasingly hindered their work from 1991 onwards. Prior to the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993, it was decided that the Czech Republic should take over the mandate in the NNSC, but while the NNSC and the UNC/MAC welcomed the decision, North Korea objected, arguing that there was no successor but two new states. Protests did not help: in April 1993, the Czech delegation left North Korea.

Protests could not stop the eviction of Poland in February 1995 either, but the Polish delegation continued its work from Warsaw and occasionally visited Panmunjom. In December 1994, North Korea forced the Chinese delegation to leave. From May 3, 1995, NNSC and MAC officers were prohibited from crossing the MDL, but in spite of these restrictions the Commissions continued their work that contributed to maintaining the Armistice Agreement.



Chapter 7

*Expanding Relations but  
Continuing Tension since 2000*



Peace—keeping in the Korean peninsula

## 7.1 Introduction

The 1990s was a turbulent period for the armistice regime, beginning with the 1991 appointment of a South Korean general as UNC/MAC Senior Member. The subsequent withdrawal by the KPA from the MAC and the expulsion of China in 1994, along with the expulsion of the Czech Republic from the NNSC in 1993 and Poland in 1995, undermined the Armistice Agreement. A main issue in this chapter is to investigate how the Commissions worked after the turn of the century under these new circumstances.

The first section investigates the state of inter-Korean affairs in the early 1990s, first on the basis of statistics on armistice violations committed by both sides since 1953. The numbers of admissions made are recorded. More attention is then given to opinions on the contributions by the MAC and the NNSC to preserve peace. As we saw in Chapter 6, the launch of the sunshine policy in 1998 led to an activation of inter-Korean exchanges that was followed in June 2000 by the first inter-Korean summit. This summit and subsequent developments including talks on military affairs are investigated, particularly in light of the two Koreas' position on the Armistice Agreement. The section ends by analyzing in detail which paragraphs had been observed and which had not up to 2000. Both paragraphs applying to the MAC and the NNSC and those that do not are included to illuminate the agreement's long-term significance. The findings are compared with accounts in previous chapters.

The second section investigates the work of the MAC and the NNSC. As previously, armistice violations such as the June 2002 West Sea battle and a few others are included and comparisons are made

with previous periods. The account includes UNC-KPA General Officers' talks. The section ends in 2008 and includes North Korea's opinion on the NNSC. The impact of the expansion of inter-Korean relations on the Commissions' work is also investigated.

The third section analyzes the development of inter-Korean relations with the focus on military talks, the nuclear issue and prospects for peace, with a few references to the NNSC. Since peace in the Korean peninsula is a multi-dimensional issue and new forms of contacts that emerged after the June 2000 summit affected peace, more attention is devoted here to inter-Korean relations. The account of the creation of a peace regime and the signing of a peace treaty is followed up. Military expenditure and threats to peace are included in the analysis, which also deals with recent developments such as the North Korean nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. Finally, the impact of the new policy towards North Korea pursued by President Lee Myung-bak (2008-) is investigated along with recent main developments.

## **7.2 The State of North-South Relations**

As noted in Chapter 6, in April 1994 both parties ceased to notify each other of armistice violations. Afterwards, only the UNC published statistics of violations by the KPA and from 2000 merely of major violations, of which there were three the same year, ten in 2001 and nine up to May 2002. There were altogether 83 violations in 2000, compared to 213 in 1999. According to the South Korean scholar Seong-Ho Jhe (2002), the reasons why the UNC only announced major violations after 2000 could have been that it did not want to

irritate North Korea. Instead, the UNC wished to show the results of the South Korean government's sunshine policy in terms of reduced tension. Reductions in tension facilitated the work of the NNSC.

Nonetheless, the accumulated number of armistice violations remained extraordinary high. The South Korean scholar Park Hon-ok (1998) records that based on statistics from the MAC North Korea had, from July 1953 to late June 1998, committed altogether 424,356 violations, 424,142 of them on land, 104 at sea and 110 in the air (cf. pp. 175-6, 262, 321-2, 339, 363, 370). This figure corresponds to 26 violations a day. From 1991 to June 1998, there were 37,101 violations (37,098 on land and three at sea). This enormous decrease from the 1980s indicates that figures at that time were highly inflated. The most recent figures the author has found are from the South Korean scholar Ha Chae-p'yông (2003), who records that North Korea had committed altogether 430,917 armistice violations, 430,699 of them on land, 110 in the air and 108 at sea. Jhe (2004) argues that a considerable part of the statistics was fabricated and did not reflect realities. A study by the South Korean Joint Intelligence Headquarters (1999) records that among the violations protested by the North in the MAC, 95 percent were false. Such a situation implies that protests were made for the sake of protest rather than to resolve incidents.

According to Downs (1999), the UNC has admitted 117 violations, including 90 inadvertent aerial overflights, four inadvertent naval intrusions and 23 ground violations such as accidental crossing of the MDL and accidental firing of weapons in the DMZ but, as we have seen, the KPA had only made four admissions in 1996 (cf. p. 175). However, Jhe (2004) records that the opinion of the UNC/MAC is that it had committed only 16 violations, but the KPA had accused it of

835,838 cases, 832,260 of them on land, 1,179 at sea and 2,399 in the air. Regarding casualties, Downs records that up to 1999, 496 South Koreans and 221 Americans had been killed or wounded since 1953. Many of those 717 people had died along the MDL. In South Korea, 302 civilians had been killed or wounded by North Korean agents who had crossed the MDL with orders to kill.<sup>348</sup> In addition to the difficulty of verifying violations committed, to get a fair view of armistice violations it is worth emphasizing that no party has ever admitted any violations of Paragraph 13(d) prohibiting rearmaments. In this particular respect, it is virtually impossible to determine which party has violated the agreement to the largest degree.

As we have seen, some scholars note the contributions of the MAC to secure peace. According to Downs (1999), “The MAC has performed a vital role as a channel for communication, one of the functions specified in the armistice agreement.” By calling meetings, tension could be reduced. In addition, “MAC meetings and the MAC hotline have provided the opposing sides with an opportunity to explain their positions and their concerns. This has inevitably precluded some misunderstandings and miscalculations.” The implemen-

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<sup>348</sup> Downs, *Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy*, pp. 1, 302: fn. 31; Ha, “Chôngjôn hyôpchông ch'êje-wa yuensa-ûi yôkhal,” pp. 1, 49; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoe p'yôllam: che 4 chip*, 1999, p. 513; *Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoe p'yôllam: che 6 chip (2000-2003)*, 2003, p. 191; Jhe, “Hanggujök p'yônghwa ch'êje pojang wihan 'sae hyôpchông'-e ch'ochôm match'uô-ya,” *Pukhan* (July 2002), p. 60; “Chôngjôn hyôpchông ch'êje-e kwanhan yôn'gu,” 2004, pp. 99-100; Park, “Armistice Agreement and Peace on Korean Peninsula,” 1998, p. 78; Swedish officer, e-mail, March 1, 2009. It is hard to know what Downs means by “inadvertent”, but some recorded admissions have been attributed to navigational errors. Statistics recorded in Appendix VI-VII on armistice violations claimed give a lower number of confessions by the UNC and a higher number by the KPA, but the wide difference remains.

tation of the terms of the armistice by the MAC has, despite shortcomings, proved of value. Even North Korea has used the MAC channel when its interests compel direct communication. The MAC also provides an intangible benefit that should not be undervalued; it is a constant reminder of allied resolve.

Similarly, former UNC/MAC advisor James Lee (2001b) argues that the MAC has performed an important function by being an essential channel of communication between the military commanders, who are ultimately responsible for the maintenance of the armistice until a peaceful solution of the Korean question is reached. The MAC meetings and the Panmunjom hot-line under MAC jurisdiction has been utilized by both Commanders to inform the other side of their respective opinions on more serious incidents and issues to preclude a possible misunderstanding or miscalculation and to de-escalate tension during crises such as the 1968 Blue House raid, the USS Pueblo incident and the Ŭlchin-Samch'ŏk raid.<sup>349</sup>

In 2004, Lee wrote that more than 76 percent of the officers who had served with the MAC expressed their positive views on the contributions by the Commission to prevent the outbreak of war but adds his belief that the Armistice Agreement or the MAC alone did not prevent one side from launching an attack on the other. The figure provides far stronger support for the importance of the MAC for preserving peace than his references in 1971 to a few UNC/MAC senior members (cf. p. 259: fn. 205). The balance of power maintained by the armistice parties and negotiations from a position of strength in

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<sup>349</sup> Downs, *ibid.*, pp. 114-116; Lee, "History of Korea's MDL and Reduction of Tension along the DMZ and Western Sea through Confidence Building Measures between North and South Korea," 2001(b), pp. 105-106.

settling serious incidents have helped to maintain the armistice.

According to the American Lieutenant Colonel William T. Harrison (2002), "...the MAC has sustained a critical role of defusing tense situations that could have led to war again. The MAC played the central role in negotiating the release of the 82-man Pueblo crew." In the case of the 1976 axe murder incident and the 1983 assassination attempt on President Chun Doo Hwan, the MAC also helped to defuse the threat of war. The most serious period was from 1966-1970 when the US was focused on Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War. Finally, "Because of the repeated failures to reach any kind of political settlement, the MAC continues to play an important but limited role. The NNSC role remains insignificant." The South Korean scholar Kim Bo-Young (2003) records that the armistice system, in spite of the constant risk of a new war, has maintained an "uncertain peace." The basic explanation of such a situation is "naked power standing face to face," but institutions to handle crises beginning with the MAC had also contributed.

The South Korean university student Ch'oe Sŏng-u argues (2004) that the MAC has made an important contribution to reduce tension and secure peace while North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement on several hundred thousand occasions. As the only channel to raise military issues, the MAC has, by pursuing dialogue every time incidents have occurred, prevented them from escalating and resolved them. The South Korean Lieutenant Colonel Kim Hae-wŏn similarly argues (2006a) that the MAC has played an important role in reducing tension and maintaining peace in the Korean peninsula. As the only channel for raising military issues, the MAC has, by pursuing dialogue every time incidents have occurred,

prevented them from escalating and resolved them and thereby contributed greatly to reducing tension and maintaining peace.<sup>350</sup> However, the opinions of Ch'oe and Kim that the MAC has resolved incidents does not match well with this study, albeit with a few but important exceptions.

There are also somewhat more cautious evaluations of the Commission. According to Ha (2003), the MAC has not worked well owing to North Korea's obstructions, a view that concurs with that of many observers quoted in this study. But Ha also notes that peace has been preserved thanks to the role of the UNC on the basis of the armistice regime and the American troops' presence. The Armistice Agreement is the legal and systemic basis for maintaining peace in the Korean peninsula which, as we have seen, was confirmed when the Basic Agreement was signed in 1991. By implementing the Armistice Agreement and exercising control over the MAC, the UNC has played a decisive role in preventing war. Both the MAC and the NNSC have prevented war. In 2006, the UNC was still responsible for the administration of the DMZ and in 2008, it was the longest peace enforcement coalition in the history of the UN.

Quinones (2001) notes that the MAC was for many years the only institutionalized, politically accepted and functioning channel of communication between the two Koreas. But its role as the sole channel of communication has greatly diminished since the two

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<sup>350</sup>- Ch'oe, *T'allaengjŏn ihu Pukhan-tŭi yuenkunsaryŏngbu muryŏkhwa-e taehan tongin yŏn'gu*, 2004, p. 18; Harrison, *Military Armistice in Korea: A Case Study for Strategic Leaders*, pp. 18-19, 23; Kim, "1960nyŏndae kunsŏ chŏngjŏn wiwŏnhoe-wa 'chŏngjŏn ch'eje,'" 2003, p. 166; Kim, "Kunsŏ chŏngjŏn wiwŏnhoe (UNCMAC)," 2006(a), pp. 81, 83; Lee, *Panmunjom, Korea*, 2004, pp. xviii-xix. Original quotation from Kim, *ibid.*, 2003.

Korean governments began in 1972 to expand the number of officially sanctioned channels of communication such as direct dialogue and contacts through liaison offices at Panmunjom. The purpose of the dialogue was to perpetuate the armistice and not to resolve the conflict's underlying causes, nor to promote reconciliation or pursue a durable peace (cf. p. 383). On the contrary, as we have seen, dialogue through the MAC was not negotiation but a stage for two armies to berate and belittle one another. Nevertheless, he concludes: "Although the Military Armistice Commission is more or less dysfunctional and certainly no longer the sole channel of communication between the two Koreas, the Armistice backed by deterrence's balance of terror continues to prevent war" (cf. "balance of fear," p. 372).

Finally, Jhe (2004) records, to the author's knowledge, the most negative recent evaluation of the MAC that was made by the Ministry of Unification in 1994, arguing that there had been hardly any cases in which incidents were resolved through dialogue and negotiations. On the contrary, North Korea had utilized the Commission as a propaganda instrument to rationalize its own opinions and attack the South.<sup>351</sup> Although this opinion is supported by this study, the MAC has undoubtedly contributed to securing "negative peace" but since, as previously noted, its work has been hampered by being composed of war combatants and the absence of a referee to judge on armistice violations: the degree of contribution should not be overvalued.

As the highest South Korean official ever, President Kim Dae

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<sup>351</sup>- Frisk, "NNSC:s arbete pågränsen mellan Nordoch Sydkorea," November 22, 2006; Ha, op. cit., pp. 49-51; Jhe, op. cit., 2004, pp. 99, 100; Lee, "Seoul seeks flexibility on OPCON transfer," *The Korea Herald*, April 9, 2008; Quinones, "South Korea's Approaches to North Korea," pp. 20, 26-7, 45.

Jung (1998-2003) made clear the country's high esteem for Sweden's contribution of the NNSC to maintain peace when he said in his address to the Swedish Parliament on December 12, 2000:

“After the war, as a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. it has continued to contribute to maintaining the peace in the Korean peninsula. As the only EU member country to keep resident diplomatic missions in both Seoul and P'yŏngyang, it enjoys the trust of both South and North Korea.”<sup>352</sup>

In 2003, the Swedish officer Klas Gröndahl argued that the NNSC presence may have a dampening effect on the situation in the Joint Security Area (JSA) and referred to the South's opinion that the Commission fulfills a duty, if only a formal one. Officially, high-ranking US officers and representatives of South Korea always attested such a view. In contrast, the North had neglected the NNSC since 1995 when, as we have seen, crossings of the MDL were prohibited but it still observed the Commission's work. Through its daily presence in the JSA, the NNSC emphasized its determination to fulfil the mandate.

In fact, a Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) documentary from 2001 shows that NNSC members came to the conference building every day to meet and to show its presence. Minutes of meetings were put into the post boxes of the KPA/CPV, but their representatives did not empty them, a practice that had begun as early as May 1991. In 2001, the NNSC only investigated reports on the rotation of personnel

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<sup>352</sup> Kim, *Peace on the Korean Peninsula and Sweden: An Address to the Parliament of the Kingdom of Sweden* (Stockholm, December 12, 2000), p. 9. President Kim Dae Jung visited Sweden after having received the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo.

from the UNC. The investigation of reports from December 2000 to May 2001 concluded that the UNC had not violated the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 13(c), as did the report for May-November 2001.

The former head of the Swiss delegation, Bernard A. Sandoz, points out (2003) that he and his colleagues agreed that the NNSC played an important role and by its mere presence was a symbol for the international will to ensure that the Armistice Agreement was respected. Another opinion was that the NNSC, which created stability mainly through its presence, helped to maintain peace and thereby to maintain the Armistice Agreement. The South Korean Army Major Kim Kwang-su writes (2006b) that the NNSC, together with the MAC, has helped to maintain the Armistice Agreement through the maintenance of smooth contacts with personnel from both sides of the MAC and by its role as mediator for dialogue.<sup>353</sup> The importance of informal contacts for maintaining peace should not be undervalued.

The most recent evaluation of the MAC and the NNSC the author has seen was made by the South Korean Ministry of Unification in December 2007:

“For the past half a century, the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission have played very important roles in maintaining peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. You have

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<sup>353</sup>- Gröndahl, “Svenska delegationen 50 år i Korea - rapport från besök oktober 2003,” *Yoboseyo* (November 2003), no. 4, p. 13; Hapch’am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 2003, pp. 198-9; *KBS Sûp’esyôl: Pimujang chidae-ûi ibangin-dûl - chungnipguk kamdok wiwônho*, June 24, 2001; Kim, “Chungnipguk kamdok wiwônho,” 2006 (b), pp. 101, 103; Nilsson, *Rapport efter tjänstgöring som svensk delegat i Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) i Korea 1992/93*, p. 3; Sandoz, “Panmunjom 1990-1994,” p. 31; Swedish officer, e-mail, March 1, 2009.

stayed with us in times both good and bad. During the times, you have seen North and South Korea confront each other during the Cold War era and ice-thawing developments in recent years. I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to you for your dedication.”<sup>354</sup>

Following the introduction of the sunshine policy in 1998, inter-Korean relations showed signs of improvement. After the first inter-Korean summit had been announced on April 8, 2000, five preparatory meetings were held in Panmunjom from April 22-May 18. These talks were the first government-level, inter-Korean talks held in Panmunjom since 1994 (cf. p. 385-6). At the June 13-15 P’yŏngyang summit, President Kim Dae Jung and National Defence Committee Chairman Kim Jong Il agreed in the June 15 Declaration to resolve the unification issue independently, to recognize similarities in the unification formulas, to reunify divided families and return long-term prisoners, to promote balanced economic development through cooperation and to activate cooperation as well as exchanges in such fields as culture and sports and, finally, to open talks between North and South Korean authorities. This declaration, which was based on the 1972 July 4 Communiqué and the 1991 Basic Agreement, had, owing to North Korea’s opposition, nothing to say about military and security matters, not even in general terms about working together for tension-reduction and confidence-building. Such a situation caused some disappointment in South Korea. Since the core of inter-Korean confrontation is military rivalry, a general perception at this time was that, without resolving military issues, it would be impossible to

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<sup>354</sup> Tonggilbu, “Kunjŏngwi, chunggamwi songnyŏn haengsa manch’ansa” ([http://www.allim.go.kr/jsp/dataroom/dataroom\\_speech\\_view.jsp?id=91013267](http://www.allim.go.kr/jsp/dataroom/dataroom_speech_view.jsp?id=91013267), December 17, 2007).

achieve improvements in contacts in other fields, sustaining exchanges and cooperation.

Subsequently, the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25 was heavily downgraded in both states; there was no troop parade in Seoul. President Kim Dae Jung declared in his speech: “We must let 70 million Koreans live without fears of war.” He also said that he had explained to the North that the American troops would remain until peace is entirely secured and that the troops would also be needed after re-unification to maintain the regional balance of power. Again, he emphasized that the first steps towards peace and re-unification are peaceful coexistence and cooperation. At this time, North Korean media emphasized independence, peaceful re-unification and grand national unity, that is, the principles of the June 15 Declaration. At the same time, the North repeated that there could be no re-unification as long as the American troops remained in South Korea. In addition to the recorded opinions regarding the American troops, it is worth adding that in 2007, 77 percent of South Koreans supported the stationing of American forces.

Contacts held afterwards included four rounds of ministerial talks, defence minister talks, working-level military talks convened five times and two rounds of family re-unions. Contacts now took place in P’yŏngyang, Seoul and Cheju Island, among other places, but military talks were held in Panmunjom. However, North Korea did not want to meet there. Since relations had improved after the summit, the need to meet at a “neutral area” such as Panmunjom had decreased, but it was still important for North-South contacts. In 2004, 14 rounds of ministerial talks and ten family re-unions had been held.<sup>355</sup>

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<sup>355</sup>- Blix, *Rapport för juni 2000: Bilaga 1* (n. p., June 28), pp. 3, 4; Ch’oe, “Pan-

Although, as we have seen, North Korea's policy to incapacitate the MAC meant that the functions of the Armistice Agreement were suspended, following the adoption of the June 15 Declaration, the two Koreas confirmed that the agreement remained valid on a few occasions. Firstly, at the first defence ministers meeting ever held at South Korea's request on September 25-26, 2000 on Cheju Island, they stated in the joint declaration that the settlement of the jurisdiction issue with regard to the opening of the MDL and the DMZ in the vicinity of the railways and roads that would connect North and South Korea would be based on the agreement. It was also reconfirmed that until it was replaced with a peace treaty, the armistice's provisions must be observed. The defence ministers agreed to cooperate to resolve military issues and to work to minimize tension and reduce the risk of war. South Korea had requested the establishment of a military hot-line, exchanges of information regarding troop movements and the like, mutual inspections of maneuvers and regular defence minister meetings, but North Korea disapproved these proposals. Notably, the North Korean delegation passed through the NNSC conference room in Panmunjom on their way to Cheju Island.

Secondly, in "The Agreement between the United Nations Command and the Korean People's Army on Opening Some Areas of the DMZ" adopted at the 12th round of General Officers' talks called by the KPA held on November 17, 2000, it was decided that the Armistice

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munjŏm-ŭl t'onghan Nambukhan kyoryu," 2002, pp. 128, 129, 131; Jonsson, *Towards Korean Reconciliation: Socio-Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation*, pp. 72, 255, 262; Lee, *Toward a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula*, May 2, 2007, p. 14: fn. 8. Original quotation marks.

Agreement should be the basis for opening passages through the MDL and the DMZ of the Seoul-Sinŭiju railway and the Munsan-Kaesŏng road. Technical and military problems related to the partial opening of the DMZ and that part of the zone under the jurisdiction of the two Koreas would be resolved in accordance with the Armistice Agreement on the basis of negotiations. Prior to November 17, five of eleven MAC secretary meetings held throughout the year had dealt with the partial opening of the DMZ. At the eleventh meeting called by the KPA held on November 16, the parties had agreed to ratify this supplement to the Armistice Agreement at the General Officers' talks. Thirdly, "The Agreement between the United Nations Command and the Korean People's Army on Opening Some Areas of the DMZ" reached at the 14th round of General Officers' talks proposed by the UNC held on September 12, 2002 on opening the eastern railway was also based on the Armistice Agreement.

Fourthly, North Korea has never declared that it would cancel or annul the Armistice Agreement, thereby recognizing its existence and validity. Finally, South Korea has, after prior approval of the UNC and the KPA, permitted passage across the MDL in line with the agreement's provisions. In brief, while the Armistice Agreement did not work well, it continued to exist legally as a valid international document.<sup>356</sup>

After the November 17, 2000 agreement had been reached

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<sup>356</sup> Hammarström, *Rapport för september 2000: Bilaga 1* (n. p., September 29, 2000), pp. 3-4; Hapch'am chŏngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chŏngjŏn wiwŏnhoe p'yŏllam: che 5 chip*, 2001, pp. 149, 159, 161, 162, 163; op. cit., 2003, pp. 30, 42; Jhe, "Chŏngjŏn hyŏpchŏng-gwa Nambuk kyoryu hyŏmnyŏk," 2005, pp. 162-5; Jonsson, *ibid.*, p. 75; Kim (ed.), *The Korean DMZ: Reverting beyond Division*, 2001, p. 359.

through telephone notification and liaison officers' contacts, it was decided to hold working-level military talks in "Re-unification House" north of the MDL and "Peace House" south of it. Working-level talks between the KPA and the South Korean Ministry of National Defence on the areas of North-South jurisdiction and military guarantees for the construction of railways and motorways to connect the two Koreas were held on November 28, December 5 and December 21, 2000, and January 31 and February 8, 2001, the first three of which were called by the North and the other two by the South. An agreement to build railways and roads was reached at the final meeting.

Later, on September 14 and 17, 2002, the sixth and seventh rounds proposed by the South Korean Ministry of National Defence were held. On September 14, an agreement on the military aspects of opening railways and roads that included the removal of mines and the connection of communication lines was adopted. On September 17, North and South Korean military authorities signed "The Agreement on Materials for Equipment for Reconnection of Inter-Korean Railways and Highways." In accordance with the agreement, the removal of mines was jointly completed by military personnel for the East Sea railway on December 3 and for the Seoul-Sinŭiju railway on December 6 the same year. On June 14, 2003, the railways were ceremonially joined in the DMZ, but since gaps remained on both lines on the Northern side, it was only a symbolic gesture.<sup>357</sup>

In 2000, Jhe published to the author's knowledge the most comprehensive evaluation ever of how the Armistice Agreement has been

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<sup>357</sup> Ch'oe, *op. cit.*, 2002, p. 130; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 2003, pp. 30, 31, 32, 42, 52; Jonsson, *ibid.*, p. 87; Lim, *Kaesong Industrial Complex: History, Pending Issues, and Outlook* (Seoul: Haenam Publishing Company, 2007), pp. 227-8.

enforced. Ten paragraphs remained in force. Firstly, Paragraph 2 on the position of the MDL remained effective, in spite of North Korea's numerous illegal border crossings and hostile acts within the DMZ. In 2004, the South Korean scholar Choi Cheol-Young wrote that Paragraph 2 was the most well-observed part of the agreement. Secondly, both scholars argue that Paragraph 6 on the prohibition of hostile acts within the DMZ was respected, but Jhe mentions occasional non-intentional and incidental shooting incidents, most of which were minor. However, the present study largely contradicts this view.

Thirdly, both Jhe and Choi write that Paragraph 13(b) regarding the withdrawal of military forces from coastal waters under the control of the other side and the jurisdiction of the UNC Commander over five islands in the West Sea was observed. The only exception is that North Korea, from December 1973 three months onwards, claimed that waters around Paengnyông Island were the North's (cf. pp. 274-5). Fourthly, Jhe writes that Paragraph 17, stating that responsibility for implementing the Armistice Agreement lies on the signatories, that is, the Commanders of both sides, and their successors remained in force, but cooperation to implement the agreement could not be expected. Fifthly, Paragraph 25(a) on the position of the MAC Headquarters in the vicinity of Panmunjom remained valid.

Sixthly, both sides' consent to Paragraph 35, giving the MAC the right to recommend to the Commanders of the opposing sides amendments and additions to the agreement remained in force. Seventhly, Paragraph 49 giving the NNSC the right to recommend to the MAC amendments and additions to the agreement was still effective. Eighthly, Paragraph 61, stating that amendments and additions to the agreement could be made with the consent of Commanders of both

sides remained valid but, as we have seen, this paragraph has been violated a few times: by the UNC/MAC through the suspension of the inspection teams in May 1956 and of Paragraph 13(d) in June 1957 and by the KPA/CPV through the expulsion of the Czech Republic from the NNSC in April 1993 and by the KPA through the expulsion of China from the MAC in December 1994 and of Poland from the NNSC in February 1995. Ninthly, Paragraph 62 on the term of validity was in force; as long as the agreement was not added to or amended and a political solution to replace it was not reached, it remained valid. Tenthly, Paragraph 22 on the equal validity of the agreement's texts in English, Korean and Chinese and Paragraph 63 on the date of effectuation were still valid.<sup>358</sup> In the author's opinion, to preserve peace it was especially important that Paragraph 2 and 13(b) remained in force but, as we have repeatedly seen, sea borders have always been contested.

Jhe also notes that seven paragraphs were partly observed or only by the UNC/MAC (partly). Firstly, Paragraph 4 on the marking of the MDL and the border-lines between the DMZ and the two sides' respective areas by the MAC was only observed by the South. Maintenance and supervision had not been properly enforced since 1973 and, in particular, after the MAC was paralyzed in April 1994 by the KPA withdrawal. Supervision of the borderlines was violated by both sides.

Secondly, Paragraph 5 on opening the Han River Estuary for civilian shipping was not observed. North Korea asserted that there

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<sup>358</sup>- Choi, "Nambukhan kunsajök habûi-wa Han'guk chôngjôn hyôpchông," p. 492; Columbia University, *Text of the Korean War Armistice Agreement*, Paragraph 2, 6, 13(b), 17, 22, 25(a), 35, 49, 61, 62, 63; Jhe, *Hanbando p'yônghwa ch'eje-ûi mosaek*, 2000, pp. 71-3, 81-5.

was no demand for navigation in the area and maintained a hostile position as part of its policy to incapacitate the Armistice Agreement; there was no need to observe the paragraph. The UNC was also unwilling to observe it owing to its opinion that civilian shipping in the area could cause intrusions from North Korea, but the paragraph was not entirely suspended or non-implemented. In November 1990 and 1991, the UNC/MAC, thanks to informal meetings between its Special Advisor James Lee and senior North Korean officers, including MAC members, for the first time received permission for commercial dredgers to enter the river and remove sand to build a new express way from Seoul to the “Freedom Bridge” across the Imjin River. From November 5 to 8, 1991, seven dredgers passed the estuary. In August 1999, dredgers were towed in the area without North Korea interfering.

Thirdly, Paragraph 7 prohibiting crossings of the MDL without permission from the MAC was not strictly applied. As one part of the policy to incapacitate the MAC, North Korea did not report crossings by illegal South Korean visitors to North Korea across the MDL and the crossing by the Honorary Chairman of the Hyundai Group, Chung Ju-yung, and his company with 500 cows on June 16, 1998 to the MAC. He was the first businessman to cross the MDL and passed through the NNSC conference room before crossing the MDL, while 50 trucks transported the cows that were handed over as a gift beside Re-unification House. He crossed the MDL again on October 27 with 501 cows and on December 15 with 50 passenger cars for exports on deferred payments. Prior to the crossings, the Kim Dae Jung administration in March 1998 announced its official policy of allowing South Korean businesses to negotiate directly, without government consent being required and without government control, with North Korea

concerning trade, investment or aid as part of the sunshine policy of positive engagement. In contrast, the UNC/MAC reported crossings by South Korean visitors to the KPA/CPV.<sup>359</sup>

Fourthly, Paragraph 8 requiring permission by the Commander of the side into whose territory entry is requested was not respected by the KPA but by the UNC; this paragraph was partly implemented (recall that the MDL was closed for the MAC and the NNSC on May 3, 1995). Fifthly, Paragraph 12 on the complete cessation of all hostilities was only partly enforced; North Korean intrusions into the waters around the five islands controlled by the UNC in the West Sea, kidnappings of fishing boats and intrusions of submarines along the east coast and other infringements continued.

Sixthly, with regard to Paragraph 13(i) on constructing, operating and maintaining airfields in the vicinity of the headquarters of the MAC, the South built a pad for helicopter landings in the JSA that remained in use, but the North had not yet built one. Seventhly, Paragraph 13(j) on “the privileges, treatment, and immunities equivalent to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under international usage” ensured to the NNSC was disrespected by North Korea through the expulsion of the Czech Republic in April 1993 and of Poland in February 1995, but the UNC continued to guarantee the Swedish and Swiss members those rights.

Jhe also records that some paragraphs had been implemented or for other reasons had expired. Firstly, Paragraph 51-58 on the

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<sup>359</sup>- Ch'oe, op. cit., 2002, pp. 127-8; Columbia University, *ibid.*, Paragraph 4, 5, 7; Jhe, *ibid.*, 2000, pp. 73-5, 81; Jonsson, op. cit., pp. 60, 61; Kukbang chôngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoe p'yôllam: che 3 chip*, op. cit., 1997, p. 42; Lee, op. cit., 2004, pp. xvii-xviii, 98-9.

repatriation of prisoners-of-war was to a large extent implemented directly after the end of the war, yet prisoners remained: US war remains were transferred by North Korea only in 1954 and 1990. Secondly, Paragraph 59 dealing with the issue of returning people who had lost their native places was also largely resolved at the same time and is therefore regarded as a closed issue, but North Korea still kept South Korean citizens kidnapped during the war. Thirdly, Paragraph 60 on the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea and the holding of a political conference within three months after the Armistice Agreement is signed to solve the Korea question was fulfilled through the holding of the Geneva conference in 1954 but since it broke down, its validity came to an end (cf. pp. 54-5).<sup>360</sup>

Finally, Jhe points out some paragraphs that were not observed or violated. First, as previously noted, the DMZ is no longer two kilometres wide north and south of the MDL owing to both parties' violation of Paragraph 1. Secondly, owing to the violation of Paragraph 1, the definition of the DMZ by a northern and southern boundary was no longer observed in violation of Paragraph 3, but parts of the boundaries were observed. Thirdly, in the second half of the 1950s, North Korea began without due notice to import weapons from China and the Soviet Union in violation of Paragraph 13(d). As we have seen, the UNC responded by suspending Paragraph 13(d) on June 21, 1957. Fourthly, Paragraph 10 on the limit of 1,000 people to be on either side of the DMZ and the severe restrictions on carrying weapons were not followed. Among other paragraphs, Paragraph 13(c) limiting

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<sup>360</sup>- Columbia University, *ibid.*, Paragraph 8, 12, 13(i), (j), 51-60; Jhe, *ibid.*, 2000, pp. 75-8, 81-2, 85.

the number of troops for rotation to 35,000 a month, Paragraph 42 (b-g) on the tasks and functions of the NNSC and Paragraph 43 on stationing inspection teams at ten ports of entry were not observed. In brief, Jhe's research confirms, as this study has shown, that the Armistice Agreement has been violated or poorly implemented and concurs with the negative opinions recorded.

On the other hand, the retired South Korean General Lee Sanghee argues (2007) that although North Korea has undermined the Armistice Agreement, as a legal document it has not been nullified and it has continued to be implemented. The MAC has not lost all of its functionality. The agreement and enforcement of it have shown instability and limitations but, along with the ROK-US Mutual Defence Treaty and Alliance, it helped to prevent the outbreak of war and to preserve peace, a fact that should not be underestimated.<sup>361</sup> This study gives credibility to this view.

### **7.3 The Work of the MAC and the NNSC**

After the foundation of the KPA Panmunjom Mission on May 24, 1994, MAC secretary meetings were not held regularly. Instead, meetings were held between personnel of the UNC/MAC Secretariat and the KPA Senior Liaison Officer. Six meetings were held in 2001, 14 in 2002 and 13 in 2003. In 2001, staff officers meetings were convened four times and a Joint Duty Officers meeting once. In contrast, altogether 21 meetings took place in 2000, many of which

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<sup>361</sup>- Columbia University, *ibid.*, Paragraph 1, 3, 10, 13(c), (d), 42(b-g), 43; Jhe, *ibid.*, 2000, pp. 78-80, 81-2, 84; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 149; Lee, *op. cit.*, May 2, 2007, p. 3.

were held because of the building of roads between Munsan and Kaesŏng.

In 2001, three of the staff officers meetings were held owing to the KPA soldier who had fallen into a river by mistake on August 3 during the rain season and floated to the South, where he was captured along the southern boundary fence of the DMZ. The Swedish and Swiss NNSC members made an important contribution to the investigation by interviewing the soldier. Before his release, he had to confirm that he wished to be repatriated; the members confirmed the results of the UNC/MAC Special Investigation Team. On August 7, the UNC/MAC returned the soldier through Panmunjom. Previously, in September 1999, the Swedish and Swiss delegation chiefs, following a request by the UNC/MAC, had interviewed a KPA soldier who had disappeared while gathering mussels. They confirmed his wish to stay in South Korea and that he had no intention to return to the North.

In 2001, the other staff officers meetings concerned the remains of Chinese soldiers from the Korean War. An unofficial meeting took place in early 2001 to exchange New Year's greetings. Following an agreement reached at the secretary meeting held on August 29, 2002, staff officers meetings were held once a week. However, on March 26, 2003, North Korea unilaterally refused to hold meetings owing to annual US-South Korean military exercises that were still regarded as a violation of the Armistice Agreement; regular meetings and contacts between the UNC/MAC and the KPA were interrupted thereafter.

Instead, secretary and staff officers meetings were held to discuss pending issues. Among the 21 meetings and contacts that took place from 2004-2006, 13 of which were held in 2004, seven in 2005 and one in 2006, 15 concerned joint exhumations of American and

North Korean soldiers (the others concerned the return of North Korean and Chinese soldiers and the like.) but one secretary meeting on this issue had already taken place on April 11, 2001. Contacts between secretaries also dealt with handing over dead civilians from both Koreas in 2001 and 2003, from North Korea in 2002 and rescued North Koreans in 2002 and 2003. On December 11, 2002, ten North Korean seamen who had run aground on December 6 and were rescued by South Korea were the first civilians ever to be returned by sea through the cooperation of military authorities.<sup>362</sup> Notably, the fact that the agenda no longer dealt only with armistice issues but also with connecting the two Koreas and joint exhumations implies that the parties tried to create some kind of working relationship.

In January 2001, the Swedish and Swiss NNSC delegations held five meetings. Both in April and in June, the NNSC held four meetings. In June, the Commission received several guests, including the Head of the Swiss Army Staff. In July, five meetings were held. In August, four meetings were held. Some members of the delegation visited the on-going building of roads and railways on the southern side of the DMZ, but no activities were noted on the northern side. There were seven visits to the Swedish delegation, which also held a ceremony to celebrate meeting number 2700. Visitors in 2000-2001 included the Swedish prime minister and foreign minister as well as important guests from different countries.

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<sup>362</sup>- Blixt, *Rapport för september 1999: Bilaga*, p. 2; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 2001, pp. 154-5; op. cit., 2003, pp. 33, 35, 63, 112, 123, 176, 177, 188, 192, 201, 203, 256, 257; Harrison, op. cit., p. 18; Kim, "Yuensa kunjôngwi, Pukhangun P'anmunjôm taep'yobugan hoedam," in Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *Kumsa chôngjôn wiwônhoë p'yôllam: che 7 chip (2004-2006)*, 2006(c), p. 139.

In September, four meetings were held. The Head of the Swedish delegation took part as an observer in an air-control flight along the western part of the DMZ. In October, five meetings were held. Visits were made by representatives of the Swiss, Polish and French embassies. Cadets from South Korea, Australia and France visited the mission as well as a French Brigadier General. In November, the Swedish delegation received many guests, including some from the European Union and the Swedish Embassy. In December, five meetings were held. There were still many visits to the Swedish delegation, including the Ambassadors of Belgium, Italy and Finland. During the year, the Commission maintained regular contacts with the UNC/MAC, but there were none with the KPA.<sup>363</sup>

During January 2002, there were many visits to the Swedish/Swiss camp, including one by the director of negotiations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the US to inform about talks on repatriating the remains of American soldiers from the Korean War. In the Commission's view, these visits were highly appreciated and valuable in spite of the work they required. Ten visits to the camp took place in February. Visits to the camp also took place in March-April, including one by Sweden's Deputy Commander-in-Chief, as well

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<sup>363</sup> Lindquist, "Korea, januari 2001" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, February 15, 2001): "Korea, april 2001" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, April 28, 2001): "Korea, juni 2001" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, June 30, 2001): "Korea, juli 2001" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, July 30, 2001): "Korea, augusti 2001" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, August 30, 2001): "Korea, september 2001" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, September 30, 2001): "Korea, oktober 2001" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, October 30, 2001): "Korea, november 2001" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, November 30, 2001): "Korea, december 2001" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, December 30, 2001); Swedish officer, e-mail January 31, 2009. Since the number of meetings held was four or five almost every month, the number is not recorded for each month until June 2009, when this chapter ends.

as in June, including one by Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski.

In February, President George W. Bush's inclusion of North Korea, along with Iraq and Iran, in "the axis of evil," in his annual State of the Union Message on January 29 led to protests from the North and astonishment in South Korea, which the President visited February 19-21. North Korea regarded its inclusion as "a clear declaration of war" and repeatedly demanded to be removed from it. During the night before the visit to the DMZ on February 20, a North Korean soldier was found in the vicinity of Torasan station south of the zone. The soldier claimed that he had left his post, crossed the MDL and walked towards the southern limit line carrying three machine-guns. In order to attract attention from the South Korean guards, he had fired one of the guns. Reportedly, the soldier did not want to return to North Korea and claimed that he did not know that President Bush would visit Torasan the following day.

On March 5, the NNSC, at the request of the UNC, interviewed the soldier, who re-confirmed that he did not intend to return. He had served in the unit responsible for loudspeakers diffusing propaganda to the South. His escape was well-planned; he had made observations over a period of a few weeks when doing service work and had checked the weather forecast. He also took equipment to cut holes in the fence and to locate mines, a field telephone and a device to find out whether the fence was electric. Later, in July, the Commission held five meetings, but whereas regular contacts were maintained with the UNC/MAC, there were none with the KPA.<sup>364</sup>

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<sup>364</sup> Fors, "Korea, mars 2002" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, March 30, 2002); "Korea, april 2002" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, April 30, 2002); Jonsson, *op. cit.*, pp. 82, 85, 257; Koserius, *Rapport för mars 2002: Bilaga 1* (n. p., March 31, 2002), pp. 2, 4-5; Lind-

In 2002 and 2003, joint exhumations of soldiers were repeatedly raised by the armistice parties following the signing of an agreement between the US State Department and the South Korean government. After the remains of five American soldiers from the war had been handed over in Panmunjom in May 1990, joint exhumations began in 1996. Between 2001 and 2003, 79 corpses were handed over. Since 1991-99, 310 corpses had been delivered; the total number was 394, 186 of which were found jointly and 208 by the KPA. In 2001, the UNC/MAC secretary and NNSC officers took part in the repatriation of the remains of American soldiers four times, in 2002 three times and in 2003 once, on the last occasions as observers. During the years 1999-2002, repatriation took place at the Japanese airbase Yokota outside of Tokyo, which upset South Korea.

Armistice violations were raised by both sides a few times. On November 27, 2001, KPA soldiers fired machine-guns for a short while from a guard post. At least one shot hit the UNC's guard post. No one was hurt, but the window on the South Korean side was hit. An UNC investigation team concluded the following day that three shots had been fired at its guard post. Two had struck within two metres of the post and the third had hit the concrete wall, but there were no casualties. Since the UNC believed that the shooting was deliberate, it fired six warning shots during a period of more than an hour. The KPA did not respond until 90 minutes had passed, when soldiers withdrew from an advanced trench. The UNC investigation team regarded the

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quist, "Korea, januari 2002" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, January 30, 2002): "Korea, februari 2002" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, February 28, 2002): "Korea, juni 2002" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, June 30, 2002): "Korea, juli 2002" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, July 30, 2002). Original quotation marks.

incident as a major armistice violation.

At the secretary meeting held on February 26, 2003 requested by the UNC/MAC, the South protested that KPA soldiers had crossed the MDL in the JSA on February 20 when they were removing trees, but the North rejected the accusation. At the meeting convened on March 5 proposed by the UNC/MAC, the South protested that the soldiers had been equipped with axes in a provocative act and showed photos, but the KPA responded that they had only carried out a normal removal of trees.<sup>365</sup>

When the meeting suggested by the UNC/MAC opened on March 12, the South protested that a North Korean fighter had infringed the South's airspace three nautical miles from Yŏnp'yŏng Island on February 20 in an intentional violation of the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 13(b) requiring the withdrawal of all military forces from the coastal islands and waters of the other side and Paragraph 16 concerning respect for the airspace controlled by the opposing side. The UNC/MAC urged that those responsible should be punished in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 13(e) and a recurrence prevented. The KPA responded that it had not violated South Korean airspace and repeated that it had never recognized the illegal NLL.

In 2003, armistice violations were also raised in contacts between the KPA and the South Korean Ministry of National Defence. On May 24, the KPA urged the removal of camp sites where firing took place along the MDL. On May 26, the KPA notified that accidental

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<sup>365</sup>- Hapch'am chŏngbo ponbu, op, cit., 2003, p. 38, 39, 40, 53, 54, 55, 113, 114, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129-130, 132, 135, 136, 204; Lindquist, op. cit., November 30, 2001; Swedish officer, e-mail, September 17, 2009.

firing by machine guns had taken place in the Ch'ŏrwŏn area due to its own lack of attention. The ministry recognized the non-hostile intention and asserted that the UNC should be informed of the incident. On May 27, the UNC/MAC responded that no such camp sites had been built but on the following day the North requested the South to withdraw them. On July 16, North Korean soldiers fired four shots with machine guns at a South Korean patrol at an observation post in the central front of the DMZ about 20 kilometres from the NNSC camp. The South Korean soldiers responded by firing 17 shots at the North Korean observation post. No casualties were reported in the South, whereas no data were available from the North. As this was a clear violation of the Armistice Agreement, the UNC/MAC called a secretary meeting to be convened on July 24, but the KPA did not respond. The South expressed concern that it was not only an armistice violation but also a serious incident that could raise military tension; it was the most serious incident in two years. The South also urged an explanation from the North and responsible measures to prevent a recurrence.

On August 27, the KPA asserted that accidental firing had taken place on the eastern front due to lack of attention. The Ministry of National Defence urged that since the attack on South Korean checkpoints in the vicinity of jointly administered areas could unnecessarily raise tension, measures should be taken to prevent a recurrence. The KPA requested measures to prevent unnecessary tension and a recurrence and emphasized that the incident should be reported to the UNC. North Korea's claim on November 16, 2004 that South Korean soldiers had crossed the MDL on the west front and entered the vicinity of guard post number 0235 was rejected on

November 19 by an investigation group of UNC soldiers from the US, the United Kingdom and New Zealand.<sup>366</sup> Clearly, these violations were strikingly similar to the previous ones and the “zero-sum game” just continued.

A second battle in the West Sea took place on June 29, 2002, close to Yŏnp'yŏng Island. North Korean patrol vessels, which had crossed the NLL three times since June 27, clashed with South Korean naval vessels. One high-speed boat was sunk and five soldiers were killed. One North Korean vessel was severely damaged and at least ten seamen died. The South regarded the battle as a planned attack by North Korea and protested on July 10 when the UNC/MAC Secretary, the KPA Panmunjom Mission's Senior Liaison Officer and their escorts met at the request of the UNC/MAC Secretary. The incident was regarded as a serious violation of the Armistice Agreement, but the North's officers did not give any response. In late July, for the first time, North Korea directly expressed its regret to South Korean authorities and indicated a willingness to prevent a recurrence. Because of this incident, President Kim Dae Jung dismissed the defence minister.

Officers from Poland, Sweden and Switzerland participated at the request of the UNC/MAC in the salvage operation from August 4 to 23; it wanted a broader international presence to deter North Korea from disturbing the work that was undertaken in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 28, authorizing the MAC to request the NNSC “...to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone...” The purpose of the observation was

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<sup>366</sup> Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 13(b), (e), 16; Hapch'am chŏngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 2003, pp. 51, 54, 64, 115, 266, 267; Kim, op. cit., 2006(c), pp. 155-6; Persson, “Oroligheter i Korea” (<http://www.mil.se/int>, July 18, 2003).

“...to ensure an independent and impartial observation of the salvage operation and Special Investigation Team (SIT) process and procedures.”

The issue was raised at the 13th round of General Officers' talks requested by the UNC held on August 6. The UNC notified the KPA about its investigation of the incident with international participation. An admission of the incident, a promise to prevent a recurrence and punishment of those responsible was urged. To reduce tension and prevent clashes in the West Sea, the UNC proposed that a direct telephone should be established and operated between the nearby fleets, that naval vessels should use the same frequencies and that legislation on signals and the like in maritime activities should be enacted. The KPA proposed to open discussions to establish a policy to prevent recurrences of armed clashes in the West Sea and did not want unnecessary tension during the salvage operation.<sup>367</sup> This sea battle shows that negative peace continued in spite of the sunshine policy, but the number of casualties was lower, indicating that the extent was lesser than previously.

During April 2003, the NNSC held five meetings. During May, five meetings were held, two of them with Polish participants. A few visits took place at the camp, including those by the Swiss Foreign Minister and the American Defence Attaché. In September, too, five meetings were held and visits took place. While regular contacts were maintained with the UNC/MAC, there were none with the KPA.

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<sup>367</sup>- Columbia University, *ibid.*, Paragraph 28; Elmér, *Rapport för juli 2002* (n. p., July 31, 2002), pp. 4, 5; *Fartygsbärgning mm; NNSC's roll. Interimsrapport* (n.p., August 21, 2002), pp. 1-2; Frisk, *op. cit.*, November 22, 2006; Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 2003, pp. 65-7, 70, 73, 100-101; Jonsson, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-3; Kim, “Hyujôn-ihu ssangbang chôngjôn hyöpchông wiban,” 2006(d), p. 222; Kim, “NLL punjaeng-gwa Nambukhan haeyang silloe kuch'uk pangan,” June 2006, pp. 183-4.

In fall 2005, the NNSC, following a dialogue with the UNC Commander, was given new tasks aimed at confidence-building (CBMs) such as observing that military exercises were conducted according to the rules.<sup>368</sup> Another task was to accompany the UNC/MAC during helicopter flights over the DMZ to observe the control of checkpoints and guard posts. Other tasks were to participate in evacuation flights to and from the JSA and to be prepared to participate in “special investigations.” By encouraging the NNSC to take part in such work, the purpose was to arouse North Korea’s interest in CBMs. It remained important to show its presence; NNSC officers still went to the conference room every day. Another task for the Commission was to receive media representatives. In June 2005, the Head of the Swedish NNSC delegation assisted by his Swiss colleague carried out an interview with a North Korean defector at the request of the UNC/MAC to find out whether the soldier intended to defect to South Korea or wanted to be repatriated. Another purpose was to find out how he had been treated by South Koreans. It was concluded that he wanted to stay in South Korea and had been well treated.

In March 2006, for the first time, the NNSC carried out one of its new tasks by verifying that “The Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration/Foal Eagle Exercise” involving more than 100,000 man was purely defensive. In March, the Swedish delegation made a field trip to the northwest islands, including the main island of

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<sup>368</sup>- An often cited definition of CBMs is that confidence-building involves the “communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threats.” The UN uses a broader definition: “Actions taken to reduce or eliminate the causes of mistrust, fear, tension and hostility amongst modern states.” From Lachowski et al., *Tools for Building Confidence on the Korean peninsula* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Center for Security Studies: Elanders, 2007), p. 7.

Paengnyŏng only about 12 kilometres from the North Korean coast. These islands are defended by the Sixth Marine Corps Brigade. In May, the delegation made a tour to the First Marine Corps division in P'ohang and to Ullŭng Island. During these three-day field trips to places important for South Korea's defence, the attitude towards the Swedish contribution to the NNSC was very positive. In March 2008, the Commission participated for two days as observers in an inspection of the contested northwest islands in order to maintain the armistice and show its presence.<sup>369</sup>

Owing to these enlarged operational tasks, in summer 2006 Sweden decided to expand its delegation to the NNSC from four to five men. Previously, in spring 2001 the delegation was ordered by the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces to reduce its numbers from five to four men since the Foreign Ministry had to curtail expenses. The Commission then decided to abolish the secretary. Instead, this task was assigned to the Alternate Member.

In November 2006, one member each from the Swedish and Swiss delegations accompanied the UNC/MAC, the Republic of Korea Advisory Group and the Republic of Korea Army at inspections of a few guard posts and observation posts in the DMZ, which at that time was considered to be the most supervised and the most heavily mined

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<sup>369</sup> Enlund, "NNSC följer övningsverksamhet" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, April 19, 2006); Fogelmark, "Sverige utökar i Korea" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, January 18, 2007); Frisk, op. cit., November 22, 2006: "Intervju med Nordkoreansk avhoppare" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, August 25, 2005); "Den svenska delegationen till NNSC deltog i fältövningar" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, May 30, 2006); Kagg, "Korea, april 2003" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, May 22, 2003); "Korea, maj 2003" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, June 16, 2003); "Korea, september 2003" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, October 1, 2003); Sjödén, "NNSC deltar med observatörer vid inspektion på North West Islands" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, March 26, 2008). Original quotation marks.

land area in the world. The military presence along both sides was very high and there were 27,000 American soldiers in South Korea. In December, one member from each NNSC delegation accompanied an helicopter exercise by the UNC to and from the heliport in the JSA. The purpose was to verify that no violations of the Armistice Agreement occurred. On December 27, two North Korean soldiers who had spent seven days in a small fishing boat which had unintentionally entered South Korean territorial waters and had been rescued by the South's navy were repatriated by the UNC/MAC via the JSA. The soldiers were interviewed by, among others, personnel from the NNSC. Both wanted to return.

On January 18, 2007, a delegation from the KPA walked across the MDL into the South and one from the UNC/MAC walked in the opposite direction to repair telecommunications. When communications did not work, both sides used megaphones to call delegates to meetings. The Swedish and Swiss NNSC delegates monitored the event, which lasted four hours: fax, telephones and field telephones worked well afterwards. On January 23, the NNSC held its 3000th meeting with participants from Sweden, Switzerland and Poland but also a few from the UNC/MAC at a time when the Cold War was still continuing in the peninsula. Although as usual there were no North Korean observers, soldiers from the North followed the meeting through binoculars. On January 25, a new NNSC meeting led by Poland was held. Reports on troops and materials from the UNC during the past six months were reviewed; no violations of the armistice had occurred. No reports had been received from North Korea.<sup>370</sup>

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<sup>370</sup>- Ahlgren, "Inspektioner längs DMZ i Korea" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, December 5, 2006): "Helikopterflygning i DMZ" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, December 19, 2006):

In February, Swedish and Swiss NNSC members visited the eastern corridor along the East Sea, which is one of two roads through the DMZ. The other goes from Torasan to Kaesŏng in the west. In late March, the UNC invited the NNSC to observe parts of the exercise “Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration/Foal Eagle” with forces from the Combined Forces Command established in 1978, consisting of American and South Korean troops and the South Korean Defence. The purpose was to verify that it was a defensive and not an offensive exercise. The NNSC should also verify that the exercise which aimed to support the existing South Korean forces with troops and materials as such did not violate the Armistice Agreement.

Finally, the NNSC supervised the ceremony at Panmunjom in May in which the remains of a few soldiers from the UNC killed during the Korean War were repatriated to the UNC following a visit by an American delegation to P’yŏngyang. At this ceremony, the delegation crossed the MDL. Armed soldiers from both the US and North Korea monitored the events. The event was considered to be an important political step in the right direction and symbolically important. The NNSC supervised the repatriation and took part in a commemorative ceremony the following day at the Yongsan Army Base in Seoul.

On August 8, 2008, North Korea blamed the US for armistice violations but its criticism included the Swedish and Swiss NNSC delegations. Three days later, North Korea urged that the criticism

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“Fungerande kommunikation i Panmunjom” (<http://www.mil.se/int>, January 24, 2007); Fogelmark, *ibid.*, January 18, 2007; Jacobsson, “Repatriering tillbaka till Nordkorea” (<http://www.mil.se/int>, January 22, 2007); Swedish officer, e-mail, September 17, 2009; Theolin, “NNSC håller sitt 3000:e möte i Panmunjom,” March 20, 2007.

should be broadcast as an official document in the UN Security Council. The message requested the replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty and expressed the opinion that Sweden and Switzerland had allowed themselves to be manipulated and used in American war preparations; the NNSC was part of the enemy. The message was delivered while the Commission was observing the US-South Korean “Ūlchi Freedom Guardian” exercise to verify that it was defensive and aimed to maintain the armistice. The Swedish Colonel Bengt Carlsson claimed that the tasks were entirely in line with the Armistice Agreement. In sharp contrast, the letter to the UN Security Council dated August 11 asserts:

“Nevertheless, the United States is playing tricks to give the impression that the defunct NNSC still exists. This sinister move is aimed at justifying the presence of the “United Nations Command” as a signatory to the Armistice Agreement and giving legitimacy to an automatic and prompt deployment of multinational armed forces in case of an emergency on the Korean peninsula. It also seeks to shift the blame for the collapse of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by preparing the Swiss and Swedish personnel to act as “eyewitnesses” in favour of the United States. However, it takes more than cunning tricks of this nature to avoid responsibility. The blame for the intentional scrapping of the NNSC and the creation of the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula lies entirely with the United States.”<sup>371</sup>

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<sup>371</sup>- Ahlgren, “NNSC på östkusten i Korea” (<http://www.mil.se/int>, April 3, 2007); “NNSC verifierar övning i Korea” (<http://www.mil.se/int>, May 4, 2007); Försvarsmakten, “Nordkoreansk kritik mot Sverige” (<http://www.mil.se/int>, August 19, 2008); Heimler, “Överlämning av stupade krigshjältar” (<http://www.mil.se/int>, May 15, 2007); Lee, *op. cit.*, April 9, 2008; *Letter dated 11 August 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council* (n. p., S2008/547, August 11, 2008). “United Nations Command” and “eyewitnesses” are original quotations from the August 11 letter to the UN Security Council, p. 3. From the UN homepage (<http://www.un.org>) it is clear that no resolution was adopted.

## 7.4 Expansion of Inter-Korean Exchanges, Military Talks and Prospects for Peace

In the early 2000s, Panmunjom had become somewhat less important for North-South contacts due to the opening of one corridor in the west in 2001 and one in the east in 2002 for contacts and cooperation that included the Kaesŏng Industrial Complex and Mt. Kŭmgang tours just north of the DMZ. The latter project began thanks to an agreement reached between the Hyundai Group Honorary Chairman, Chung Ju-yung, and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in October 1998; Hyundai would pay \$ 942m to North Korea for the project over a six-year period. On November 18, 1998, 826 South Korean tourists were the first since national division in 1945 to travel by passenger ferry from Tonghae to Changjŏn in North Korea. This tourist project, operated by the Hyundai Company, marked the beginning of regular tourist exchanges between the two Koreas but whereas in July 2003, 46,611 South Koreans had visited the North since 1989, only 2,797 North Koreans had travelled to South Korea (this figure excludes Mt. Kŭmgang tours). Among the 30,248 South Koreans who had visited North Korea between 1989 and April 2002, 27,843 went there from 1998 onwards. This expansion of visits, even though the number is extremely low, implies that both Koreas wished to create some form of peaceful coexistence, but the South wanted it more than the North.

In the case of Mt. Kŭmgang tours, these have continued with the exception of the interruption of tours for a few days after the June 15, 1999 West Sea battle. This battle resulted from the detention of a South Korean housewife who had allegedly attempted to entice a

guide to defect to South Korea, but she was released within a week after having been forced to write a “confession” in contrast to previous periods of thaw, contacts did not end when an incident occurred. It should be noted that Mt. Kūmgang tourism was a matter of “pre-arranged tours” rather than “tourism” the visitors were not allowed to take pictures outside of the designated areas, to have any contacts with North Koreans and to criticize North Korea in any fashion whatsoever. After the military of the two Koreas had reached “The Agreement on Military Guarantees Regarding Passing Temporary Roads” on January 27, 2003, an opening ceremony of the land route tour was held on February 14. As of June 7, 2005, one million South Korean tourists had visited Mt. Kūmgang - in 2003, the total population of South Korea was 48 million. In June 2008, the figure had almost doubled to 1.9 million visitors. Construction of the Kaesōng Industrial Complex (KIC) began in June 2003 and production in December 2004. The Secretary of North Korea’s Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland, Ahn Kyung-ho, had said in an interview with the South Korean press on April 7, 2004:

“...We gave away a huge region for the KIC. This symbolizes our peace-loving attitude. Kaesong is the most sensitive area in terms of our military because it is located near the Demilitarized Zone. The People’s Army was deployed in the region but was relocated elsewhere to declare it an industrial zone. This demonstrates how sincerely we desire peace”...<sup>372</sup>

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<sup>372</sup>- Frisk, op. cit., November 22, 2006; Jhe, op. cit., 2000, pp. 389-390; Jin, “Gloomy anniversary for Geumgang tours,” *The Korea Herald* (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/>, November 18, 2008); Jonsson, op. cit., pp. 61-2, 68, 106, 107; Kim, *DMZ: p’yōnghwa tapsa*, 2006(e), pp. 179, 230, 247; Lim, op. cit., pp. 30-31, 37; Swedish officer, e-mail, September 17, 2009. Original quotation marks. “Kūmgang” is

Whether this is true or not, two years later the KPA moved one military division from Kaesŏng to a different location. According to the South Korean scholar Lim Eul-chul (2007), the Kaesŏng project, along with Mt. Kŭmgang tourism and railroad and road connection projects in the west and east, is the driving force in easing military tension. The Mt. Kŭmgang project paved the way for reducing military tension and the other two ventures were possible thanks to it. These projects indicate that the opinion expressed on the occasion of the June 2000 summit that military confrontation would prevent the improvements of relations in other fields did not materialize in these cases.

The first North-South Korea General Officers' talks since 1953 and the first official military talks since September 2000 were held at South Korea's request on May 26, 2004 at Mt. Kŭmgang to discuss measures to reduce the risk of incidents during the crab-fishing season in May-June. North Korea then proposed to cease propaganda broadcasts along the border. Following an agreement reached at the second round of General Officers' talks held at Mt. Sŏrak on June 3-4 to suspend propaganda activities and remove propaganda equipment along the MDL, half of the equipment was removed in June 2004. Previously, on March 21, 2003, the KPA had urged the Ministry of National Defence to suspend propaganda broadcasts directed at North Korea, but the ministry notified the North the same day that there had been no such broadcasts. In 2005, two rounds of representation-level talks were held to implement the June 2004 agreement. The first was held on July 20 in "Peace House" in Panmunjom, one year after July

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spelled "Geumgang" due to the Ministry of Education system of spelling.

19, the date suggested by the South.

On August 12 at “Re-unification House” in Panmunjom, the two Koreas confirmed that they had both removed propaganda equipment directed against the other side. They also re-confirmed that they would thereafter cease propaganda activities and, as agreed, not establish propaganda equipment. In 2006, some of the hundreds of megaphones directed at North Korea were temporarily stored at the parking site of the restored Kim Il Sung villa at Lake Hwajinp’o along the East Sea as a gift from the Ministry of National Defence to Kangwŏn province. The villa got its name since there are photos taken of Kim Il Sung’s family there.<sup>373</sup>

The removal of propaganda equipment should have helped to create confidence, but peace was not secured. A joint study from 2007 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Center for Security Studies (CSS) in Zürich argues:

“The forward deployment of forces on both sides of the DMZ is currently the greatest threat to peace on the Korean peninsula. On the North Korea side, it has been estimated that around 70 per cent of the armed forces are deployed south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. Along with this massive man-power, much of North Korea’s heavy offensive armaments are also deployed in these areas. In particular, North Korea is estimated to have stationed large amounts of long-range artillery along the northern side of the DMZ, some of which are capable of reaching Seoul.”

Previously, on March 7, 2000, the former UNC Commander,

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<sup>373</sup>- Frisk, *Rapport för maj 2004: Bilaga 1* (n. p., May 31, 2004), p. 2: *ibid.*, November 22, 2006; Hapch’am chŏngbo ponbu, *op. cit.*, 2003, p. 50; Jonsson, *ibid.*, p. 92; Kim, *op. cit.*, 2006(d), pp. 242-3; Kim, *op. cit.*, June 2006, pp. 186, 187; Lim, *op. cit.*, pp. 53, 67; Son, “Kunsa hoedam,” in *T’ongil yŏn’guwŏn, T’ongil hwangyŏng-mit Nambukhan kwangye chŏnmang: 2005~2006* (Seoul: T’ongil yŏn’guwŏn, 2005), pp. 95, 96-7; Swedish officer, e-mail, March 1, 2009.

General Thomas A. Schwartz, stated in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee:

“The [North Korean] ground forces, numbering one million active duty soldiers, provide the bulk of the North’s offensive war-fighting capability and are the world’s third largest army... Seventy percent of their active force, to include 700,000 troops, 8,000 artillery systems, and 2,000 tanks, are garrisoned within 100 miles of the Demilitarized Zone. Much of this force is protected by underground facilities, including over 4,000 underground facilities in the forward area alone....”<sup>374</sup>

In South Korea the forward deployment is similar, with much of the US forces close to the DMZ; according to Jhe (2000), two-thirds of battle strength was concentrated along the zone. Jhe emphasizes that the DMZ must be demilitarized to transform the present armistice into a peace regime. Otherwise, the possibility that minor clashes in the zone caused by misunderstandings or bad judgement could trigger a new war cannot be excluded. A renewal of war would be a disaster; a study from 2005 by the Korea Institute for National Unification estimates that if war broke out, even local warfare on a low scale could cause a collapse of the South Korean economy. The possibility that a full-scale war would cause destruction similar to that in the 1950s in almost every region in South Korea immediately after the Korean War was high.

While renewal of warfare cannot be excluded, the SIPRI-CSS study argues that the NNSC states “...could potentially play an

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<sup>374</sup>- Kim, *ibid.*, June 2006, p. 187; Lachowski et al., *op. cit.*, p. 56; Lee, *op. cit.*, 2004, p. 71. Original quotation marks. To the author’s knowledge, North Korea’s army is not the third but the fifth largest after the US, Russia, India and China (ranking among those countries is unknown to the author).

important supporting role in a CBM process. Their comparative advantages lie in their long-term relations to the Korean peninsula and the use of a facilitative non-threatening approach.” The main contributions could most likely be made in CBM capacity building at the early stages of a peace process through organizing training programmes (lectures, workshops etc.), inviting guest researchers and arranging exchanges between academics, officials and experts from the two Koreas.<sup>375</sup> These opinions are reasonable, but the contributions hinge on an highly uncertain “if”: whether there is a shared will to enter into a peace process that in the long run might change the status quo in the Korean peninsula.

At the annual consultations between representatives of Poland, Sweden and Switzerland held in Stockholm on November 7, 2006, they stressed that the Armistice Agreement remains the only legal instrument to avoid hostilities in the Korean peninsula as long as it is not replaced by a comprehensive peace treaty. They also “..underlined the necessity that its implementing mechanisms continue to function and to provide channels of communication for the settlement of divergences through negotiations.” The member nations “... reiterated their commitment to continue their active participation in the NNSC at the service of the Armistice...” and reaffirmed that they were ready “...to contribute to the efforts towards peace on the Korean Peninsula ...”<sup>376</sup>

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<sup>375</sup>- Jhe, op. cit., 2000, p. 370: fn. 50, 383, 424; Kim et al., *P'yŏnghwa piyong-tŭi ūimi-wa sirik* (Seoul: Tongil yŏn'guwŏn, 2005), p. 1; Lachowski et al., *ibid.*, pp. 34-6. The study by Kim et al. does not refer to the consequences of warfare for North Korea, but there can be no doubt that they would be disastrous (cf. “balance of fear,” p. 372).

<sup>376</sup>- The Federal Authorities of the Swiss Confederation, “Consultations in Stockholm

The two Koreas' different positions on how to end the Korean War remained, but the only example known to the author that North Korea's position was not entirely consistent is that the South Korean scholar Boon Hak Koo writes (2006) that on May 12, 2004, the Deputy North Korean Ambassador to the UN asserted in an interview with *USA Today* that "all countries with troops in the Korean peninsula should sign an eternal peace treaty." At that time, the Deputy Ambassador had declared that would "mean a peace treaty signed by North Korea, South Korea and the United States." There was a possibility that North Korea, through three-party talks including South Korea, wished to create an atmosphere in which a peace treaty with the US would be signed.

In 2007, the South Korean scholar Yun Duk-min pointed out the pre-conditions for peace: "Future endeavors should focus on building a peace regime that effectively guarantees peace instead of simply concluding a formal treaty. A peace treaty dangled as the prize for denuclearization in the North cannot guarantee permanent peace. Our goal should be a practical peace in the peninsula, not a nominal peace." A peace treaty can be reached if the South accepts a peace regime suggested by the North, but such a treaty would not practically guarantee peace in the region. However, a peace regime that the South "... believes would guarantee a permanent, stable peace would not be acceptable to the North. What is needed then is a practical system that guarantees real peace." In addition, "Inter-Korean relations are the essence of the Korean question, so a peace treaty to end the Korean

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of the Member States of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in Korea" (<http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/recent/media/mcom.html>, November 7, 2006).

War should be concluded between the two Koreas.” The special status of the US and China “...needs to be recognized to a certain extent. When South and North Korea conclude a peace treaty, the United States and China may be invited to sign “a peace-guaranteeing protocol” and they may be requested to participate in a peace-management organization for a limited time.” Finally:

“A stable peace on the peninsula will be achieved not through a peace agreement but through the dissolution of military confrontation between the two halves. It is meaningless to produce a peace pact without first resolving the problem of military standoff. The formation of a permanent peace regime, not the making of a treaty, is our task and the objective is a practical peace, not a nominal treaty. The essence of a peace treaty should be the normalization of relations between the two Koreas in all aspects. A stable peace can be built and interference of foreign powers can be held in check when the South and the North are in normal relations. A peace treaty should be pursued in parallel with endeavors to improve overall relations between the two Koreas.”<sup>377</sup>

While this opinion cannot be rejected, the words of Nicolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) should be noted: “And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.” This explains very well the failure to transform the armistice into a peace treaty. His words also imply that the task will not be any easier in the future.

The most recent indication seen by the author that North Korea’s strong anti-US policy and its wish for a separate peace treaty

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<sup>377</sup>- Koo, “Hanbando p’yônghwa p’orûm-ûi chaengchôm-gwa kwaje,” pp. 72-4; Yun, “Diplomatic Strategy for Building a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula,” pp. 92, 100-101, 102-103. Original quotation marks from Koo, *ibid.*, p. 72. “Peace guaranteeing protocol” is an original quotation from Yun, *ibid.*, p. 102.

with the US continue was published by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on January 23, 2008, on the 40th anniversary of the seizure of the USS Pueblo. It urges the US to "...stop the anachronistic hostile policy toward the DPRK at once and sincerely opt for replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace accord." After referring to hostile US policies and talk of the "nuclear issue," the statement goes on:

"The history and reality clearly prove that the U.S. is a harasser of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and it is chiefly to blame for posing a threat of war there. In order to ease the constant tension and achieve lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, it is necessary to stop the arms buildup and military exercises for aggression conducted by the U.S. and its followers and get the U.S. forces withdrawn from south Korea."<sup>378</sup>

To make the situation worse, the nuclear issue re-appeared on October 17, 2002. North Korea admitted to the US envoy, James Kelley, that it had been engaged in developing a programme of highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons in violation of the 1991 Joint North-South Declaration but not of the 1994 Agreed Framework. In December, the US cut off its supplies of heavy oil to North Korea, which responded by reactivating its Yŏngbyŏn nuclear reactor, removing the monitoring devices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and telling its inspectors to leave. On January 10, 2003, North Korea declared its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in response to the US refusal to hold bilateral talks and to the IAEA resolution demanding that the North should comply with its

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<sup>378</sup> KCNA, "U.S. Termed wrecker of Peace on Korean Peninsula" (<http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm>, January 23, 2008); Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. 1952), p. 9. "south" in the original.

obligations under the NPT. In April, North Korea formally withdrew from the NPT. At this time, the new South Korean President, Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008), had made “a peaceful solution of the North’s nuclear issue through dialogue” the major target of its “policy for peace and prosperity” that aimed to establish a peace mechanism in the Korean peninsula and to promote mutual prosperity in line with the sunshine policy.

In line with the “game theory,” negotiations began to resolve the issue. Thanks to China’s shuttle diplomacy, six-party talks with North Korea, South Korea, the US, China, Japan and Russia were held in Beijing from August 27 to 29, 2003 and in 2004 from February 25 to 28 and June 23 to 26 but without reaching any solution. In February 2004, North Korea’s position was that it would only give up its nuclear program if the US abandoned its hostile policy. Because of this policy, North Korea repeatedly announced its determination to maintain and strengthen its nuclear deterrent force. It now declared that a freeze of nuclear activities would be the first step towards denuclearization but demanded compensation to do so. On the other hand, the US demanded a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the nuclear programme. Otherwise, no compensation could be provided.

In 2005, the fourth round of the six-party talks was held in Beijing in two sessions from July 26 to August 7 and September 13 to 19. The September 19 Joint Statement stipulated that North Korea was to abandon its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear program, re-enter the NPT talks and permit IAEA inspections of facilities. In reciprocation, the US undertook not to conduct offensive operations against North Korea or stockpile nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula. North Korea received promises of assistance regarding

energy supplies and technical aid. Both the US and Japan further agreed to normalize relations with North Korea. Moreover, “The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.”<sup>379</sup>

At the first session of the fifth round of six-party talks convened in Beijing from November 9 to 11, the parties reaffirmed that they would fully implement the September agreement in accordance with the principle “commitment-for-commitment, action-for-action” in order to accomplish soon a verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and lasting peace and stability in the region. However, North Korea delayed implementation of the September 19 agreement, first due to the demand for a light-water reactor and then for the request to remove financial sanctions that the US imposed in September on North Korea’s account in the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA) due to its alleged money laundering and counterfeiting of US currency. In particular, the last issue was a major shock for the North Korean leadership; if the sanctions were not removed, no new six-party talks would be held. The US claimed that the sanctions were unrelated to the six-party talks but had to do with implementing American law. For North Korea, the sanctions were not only harmful for the government but also hindered business transactions, infringed on sovereignty and contributed to the failure to implement the September 19 agreement.

Feeling insulted and ignored, on July 4, 2006, North Korea launched seven short-, medium- and long-distance missiles. Subse-

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<sup>379</sup>– Jonsson, op. cit., pp. 85, 86, 87, 91-2, 259; Lee, op. cit., May 2, 2007, p. 3. Original quotation marks.

quently, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution warning North Korea not to manufacture and deploy weapons of mass destruction. On October 3, North Korea declared that it would conduct a safe nuclear test, that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, to threaten anyone with them or to transfer them, and that it would work for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and global nuclear reduction. On October 9, North Korea carried out an underground nuclear test. This took place because of the legacy of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula and the ensuing insecurity, the tilting balance of power in favour of South Korea in strategic, political, economic and military terms, the North's nuclear calculation with regard to the US, hardening US North Korea policy since the 2001 policy review and, finally, domestic civil-military relations reflecting the position of hardliners. Regime survival was the primary goal for Kim Jong Il and the US was the main threat to that end.<sup>380</sup>

Nuclear weapons, referred to as “weapons of prestige”, were a way to deter an attack, invasion or regime change: in fact, they were North Korea's only trump card. In 2006, military expenditure amounted to 25-33 percent of its GDP. North Korea had much larger armed forces than South Korea, which only spent three percent of its GDP which, however, was 33 times larger than the North Korea's on defence in 2003 and it had much more modernized forces (cf. pp. 123,

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<sup>380</sup>- Cheon, “Puk haengmunje-wa 6cha hoedam,” in T'ongil yōn'guwōn, *T'ongil hwangyōng-mit Nambukhan kwangye chōnmang: 2006~2007* (Seoul: T'ongil yōn'guwōn, 2006), pp. 17-18; Jonsson, *ibid.*, p. 92; Lee, *The February 13 Agreement: A New Dawn for North Korea's Denuclearization?* (Stockholm-Nacka: Institute for Security and Development Policy, *Asia Paper*, December 2007), pp. 13, 34-5; Liu, *The North Korean Nuclear Test and Its Implications* (Washington, D. C. and Uppsala: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, *Silk Road Paper*, 2006), pp. 1-2, 13. Original quotation marks.

335). While the sunshine policy was pursued, rearmament continued.

After the nuclear test, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1718 that included strong legal measures against North Korea. Capital inflow would be cut off, a travel ban on people related to the nuclear weapons program would be imposed and selling conventional weapons such as fighter planes and tanks would be prohibited. In addition, selling luxury items (German Mercedes Benz cars, Swiss Rollex watches, French cognac) which are an important means for Kim Jong Il to rule would be prohibited as punishment for the nuclear program that threatened global peace. However, the nuclear test hardly affected the Swedish/Swiss NNSC camp since, like all the other events, it took place outside the area. The security battalion always maintained high alert that could not be further elevated. At the second session of the fifth round of six-party talks held in Beijing, December 18-22, the US urged North Korea to take rapid steps for denuclearization. For North Korea, the removal of financial sanctions on accounts in BDA remained a prime consideration; the issue was thoroughly linked to denuclearization.<sup>381</sup>

The third session of the fifth round of the six-party talks was held in Beijing from February 8 to 13, 2007. In the February 13 agreement, the parties agreed to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, to normalize relations between on the one hand North Korea and on the other the US and Japan, to cooperate on economic and energy issues and, finally, to work for peace and security in Northeast Asia. North Korea would first close down the nuclear facilities at Yŏngbyŏn until

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<sup>381</sup> Cheon, *ibid.*, pp. 18-20, 21; Jonsson, *ibid.*, p. 62; Liu, *ibid.*, pp. 15, 18-19, 25; Lee, *ibid.*, December 2007, p. 39; Norlin, "Lugnt hos svenskar i Korea" (<http://www.mil.se/int>, October 11, 2006); Swedish officer, oral interview, March 13, 2009.

April 13 and then report on its entire nuclear program and incapacitate all existing reactors. In return, North Korea would receive 950,000 tons of heavy oil. After the BDA issue was resolved in June by the transfer of around \$25m via a Russian bank to North Korea, the North on July 6 officially declared that it had suspended the nuclear facilities at Yŏngbyŏn.

Although the sunshine policy led to better North-South relations, military relations did not improve. Nonetheless, military talks were held more often in 2007 than in any other year, including one defence ministers' meeting, three North-South General Officers' talks and seven working-level talks on military affairs. At the fifth round of North-South General Officers' talks held at Re-unification House on May 8-11, an agreement was reached on military security for the experiment in railway traffic that took place on May 17 for the first time in over 50 years. In the October 4 declaration for developing relations, peace and prosperity adopted at the second inter-Korean summit held in P'yŏngyang from October 2-4, it was agreed in Paragraph 3 "to end the state of military antagonism and cooperate for easing tension and guaranteeing peace."

In the agreement reached at the second defence minister talks held seven years after the previous from November 27 to 29 in P'yŏngyang, the two Koreas pledged to ease tension and guarantee peace, to resolve disputes through talks, to prevent clashes and guarantee peace in the West Sea, to end the armistice and create a peace regime and, finally, to formulate a plan for military guarantees for exchanges and cooperation. On December 5, an agreement was reached at the 35th round of working-level talks held at Re-unification House on military guarantees for railway freight traffic from Munsan

to Kaesŏng to take place on December 11. Finally, it should be noted that, in early 2007, the South Korean and US defence ministers agreed that South Korea would assume wartime operational control of its forces on April 17, 2012 (recall that peacetime control was assumed on December 1, 1994).<sup>382</sup>

Following his inauguration in February 2008, President Lee Myung-bak replaced his predecessors' policy of engagement with a "give-and-take" approach that led to the end of a ten-year period with expanding contacts and the lowest degree of negative peace ever. On March 19, the Minister of Unification said at a meeting with companies operating in Kaesŏng Industrial Complex: "It will be difficult to expand the Gaeseong complex if the North's nuclear problem is not resolved." In protest, on March 27 North Korea, forced eleven South Korean officials to leave the inter-Korean economic cooperation office in Kaesŏng. The Ministry of Unification condemned the North: "We express deep regret over the North's measure...This unilateral action is entirely the responsibility of the North, and it contradicts the agreement between the two Koreas."

On October 2, the first official inter-Korean talks during the year took place. Working-level military talks requested by North Korea on September 25 were held at Freedom House in Panmunjom. For 90 minutes the parties mostly exchanged views on, for instance, the killing on July 11 by a North Korean soldier of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kŭmgang that made the South cancel the tours indefinitely and

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<sup>382</sup>- Cheon, "Puk haengmunje," in *T'ongil yŏn'guwŏn, T'ongil hwangyŏng-mit Nam-bukhan kwangye chŏnmang: 2007~2008* (Seoul: T'ongil yŏn'guwŏn, 2008), pp. 23-4; Huh, "Kunsa punya hoedam," in *ibid.*, pp. 106-107, 108-109; Lee, *op. cit.*, April 9, 2008; Swedish officer, e-mail, March 1, 2009. Original quotation marks.

the diffusion by South Korean civic groups of critical leaflets that insulted leader Kim Jong Il. The former case was the first lethal incident since the June 29, 2002 West Sea battle; South Korea claimed that the restoration of ties hinged on the Mt. Kūmgang issue but North Korea claimed it had done all it could. North Korea had refused a joint investigation, as South Korea had suggested. In November, North Korea's view was that the restoration of Mt. Kūmgang tours and cooperation hinged on South Korea's implementation of the June 15, 2000 declaration and the October 4, 2007 declaration; it claimed that President Lee Myung-bak had negated the summit declarations.

On October 27, a second working-level meeting suggested by North Korea was held for less than 20 minutes near the border. North Korea again urged South Korea to prevent activists from sending leaflets across the border by balloon that, for instance, requested the return of 487 South Korean abductees, 436 of whom were fishermen (cf. p. 167). South Korea claimed it had made efforts to stop the diffusion of propaganda leaflets and urged North Korea to immediately stop its verbal attacks on President Lee Myung-bak, who was often called "traitor." North Korea asked South Korea to expedite efforts to repair its military hotlines that had been out of operation for months; the 2007 agreement to help modernize communications had not been implemented due to tension. There were nine inter-Korean military communication lines, but the Red Cross was also a constant source of contact important for maintaining peace. Due to the worsened relations, the two Koreas failed to hold an event to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Mt. Kūmgang tours on November 18. On November 24, North Korea notified South Korea that it would suspend tours for South Koreans to Kaesŏng and cross-border rail

services from December 1 in protest against South Korea's hard-line policy. The number of South Koreans allowed to stay in the Kaesŏng Industrial Complex would be halved.<sup>383</sup>

On January 17, 2009, North Korea's military threatened a "posture of all-out confrontation" against South Korea. In particular, intrusions by South Korean vessels into North Korean waters would not be tolerated. The military would preserve the sea border the North claimed in the Yellow Sea. In response, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a border alert and increased reconnaissance flights. On January 30, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea referred in a statement "...to the south Korean conservative authorities' reckless moves to escalate the confrontation with the DPRK." Furthermore,

"The inter-Korean relations have reached such pass that there is neither way to improve them nor hope to bring them on track. The confrontation between the north and the south in the political and military fields has been put to such extremes that the inter-Korean relations have reached the brink of war."<sup>384</sup>

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<sup>383</sup> Jin, op. cit., November 18, 2008: "N.K. to suspend Gaeseong tour Dec. 1," *The Korea Herald* (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/>, November 24, 2008); Jung, "N. Korea Asks Seoul to Help Modernize Military Hot-lines," *The Korea Times* (<http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/>, October 27, 2008); Kim, "Military talks with N. Korea end in failure," *The Korea Herald* (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/>, October 2, 2008); "N.K. criticizes anti-North leaflets," *The Korea Herald* (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/>, October 28, 2008); Lee, "N.K. boots out Seoul's Gaeseong officials," *The Korea Herald* (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/>, March 27, 2008); Swedish officer, oral interview, March 13, 2009. Original quotation marks except for "traitor." "Kaesŏng" is spelled "Gaeseong" due to the Ministry of Education system of spelling.

<sup>384</sup> KCNA, "DPRK to Scrap All Points Agreed with S. Korea over Political and Military Issues," (<http://www.kcna.co.jp/index.e-hm>, January 30, 2009); *The Korea Herald*, "N.K. message," (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/>, January 19, 2009). The first quotation is original.

The KCNA further wrote that “The group of traitors has already reduced all the agreements reached between the north and the south in the past to dead documents” and that there was therefore “...no need for the DPRK to remain bound to those north-south agreements.” All the agreed points with regard to ending political and military confrontation, the 1992 Basic Agreement and the points on the West Sea military boundary line in its appendix would be nullified. Since the “Lee Myung-bak group” was wholly responsible for the present tension, it said: “Never to be condoned are the crimes the Lee group has committed against the nation and reunification by bedevilling overnight the inter-Korean relations that had developed favorably amidst the support and encouragement of all the Koreans and ruthlessly scrapping the inter-Korean agreements.”

The South Korean government deeply regretted the statement and urged North Korea to return to dialogue as soon as possible. The Basic Agreement could not be unilaterally abolished. South Korea also pledged “firm counteraction” against violations of the sea border. The Ministry of Defence enhanced alert on the West Sea, where the navy reportedly had deployed a 4,500 ton destroyer and ordered forces to be prepared for any provocations. It was believed that the statement aimed to ensure that North Korea became a diplomatic priority for the new American President Barrack Obama, to put pressure on President Lee Myung-bak and to raise domestic political support. President Lee Myung-bak declared hours after the statement: “North Korea must realize which country out of the many nations in the world sincerely works to help it. If the North thinks hard enough, it will realize it is South Korea that will help it with compassion, and North Korea must

realize this.”<sup>385</sup>

On March 2, the UNC and the KPA held half an hour of General Officers’ talks in Panmunjom at North Korea’s request to discuss ways to ease border tension. On February 28, the KPA had sent a message to the South asserting that American troops had conducted “provocative activities” by approaching too close to the MDL and taking photographs of the North, but the South Korean Ministry of National Defence defended the troops by arguing that they had not stepped into North Korean territory and were engaged in work based on the Armistice Agreement. At the first UNC-KPA General Officers’ talks held since September 2002, North Korea demanded that the US and South Korea cancel the annual “Key Resolve and Foal Eagle Exercise” aimed to assess abilities to rapidly reinforce frontline forces and deter rear infiltration, but the meeting did not reach any tangible results.

On March 5, at a time when North Korea was stepping up its warnings against the exercise to be held on March 9-20, the UNC and the KPA held a 45-minute meeting in Panmunjom, but the agenda was not revealed. On March 9, North Korea cut off the only remaining phone and fax channel and closed the border. The border was closed three times during the exercise. On March 21, North Korea restored an interrupted military communication channel and reopened the border for South Koreans visiting the Kaesŏng Industrial Complex. North Korea regarded the exercise as an “...undisguised threat of

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<sup>385</sup> KCNA, *ibid.*, January 30, 2009; *The Korea Herald*, “Lee says inter-Korean relations will soon be repaired” (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/>, January 31, 2009): “N.K. scraps accord with South” (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/>, January 31, 2009). “Firm counteraction” and the president’s statement are original quotations.

aggression” that “...escalated the confrontation and tension on the Korean Peninsula and increased the danger of nuclear war.” The pursuit of the exercise in spite of repeated warnings was seen as a sign “...that there is no change in their hostile policy towards it and their ambition for invading it.”<sup>386</sup>

On April 5, North Korea launched a long-range rocket that was widely condemned as a de facto missile test. The launch took place in violation of the UN Security Council resolution 1718 adopted in 2006 after the North Korean missile and nuclear tests. One reason for the test could have been to consolidate Kim Jong Il’s power, following rumours of his bad health and the possible nomination of his third son as his successor. The South Korean President Lee Myung-bak declared the same day: “North Korea’s reckless act that threatens regional and global security cannot be justified under any circumstances.” The National Assembly adopted a resolution that denounced the act as a “serious provocation.”

On April 13, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a chairman’s statement that condemned the rocket launch and demanded that North Korea refrain from any further ballistic missile tests and return to the deadlocked six-party talks. In contrast, on April 7 the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) had quoted an editorial on “the successful satellite launch” from the *Rodong Sinmun* (*Workers’ Daily*):

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<sup>386</sup>- Jung, “UNC-NK Military Talks End Without Results” (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/>, March 2, 2009); KCNA, “Papers on Gravity of Joint Military Exercises Targeted against DPRK” ([http://www.kcna.co.jp/index\\_e-htm](http://www.kcna.co.jp/index_e-htm), March 21, 2009); Kim, “Generals meet at Panmunjom” (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/>, March 2, 2009); *The Korea Herald*, “N. Korea, U.N. Command end border talks amid tension over drill” (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>, March 6, 2009): “N.K. closes air routes for launch of rocket” (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>, March 23, 2009).

“The successful launch of the satellite Kwangmyongsong-2 marks a historic event which fully demonstrated the national power of the DPRK and meant a gunfire heralding the victory in the struggle to build a great prosperous and powerful nation, a significant event instilling great national pride and self-esteem in the Korean people and an event which made a great contribution to the peace and security of the world.”<sup>387</sup>

On May 25, North Korea conducted a second nuclear test and launched three short-range missiles, but tension along the border did not rise and the work of the Swedish and Swiss NNSC delegations was not affected at all. South Korea condemned the test as an “intolerable provocation,” violating inter-Korean and multinational agreements and a UN resolution banning nuclear and missile tests. President Lee Myung-bak called the test “truly disappointing.” The presidential spokesman said: “The North’s second nuclear test is a serious threat to peace not only on the Korean peninsula but also in Northeast Asia and the rest of the world, and a grave challenge to the international non-proliferation regime” and referred to the 1991 North-South agreement on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and the agreement of the six-party talks. The government forbade South Koreans to go to North Korea with the exception of the Kaesŏng Industrial Complex. The UN Security Council condemned the nuclear test as “a clear violation” of the 2006 resolution banning tests.

On June 12, the Security Council unanimously approved

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<sup>387</sup>- Hwang, “Lee affirms willingness to join PSI” (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/>, April 6, 2009); KCNA, “Rodong Sinmun on Successful Satellite Launch” ([http://www.kcna.co.jp/index\\_e-hm](http://www.kcna.co.jp/index_e-hm), April 7, 2009); *The Korea Herald*, “UNSC condemns N.K. rocket launch” (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>, April 14, 2009); “Reactions from U.N. chief Ban, South Korea and U.S.” (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>, April 14, 2009). “Provocative activities,” the president’s statement and “serious provocation” are original quotations.

resolution 1874 calling for an overall arms embargo against North Korea, except for light weapons or small arms. It also calls for member states to inspect North Korean vessels suspected of carrying weapon materials. The resolution imposed financial sanctions to prevent the flow of funds that could benefit North Korea's missile and nuclear program. It banned North Korea from conducting further ballistic missile and nuclear tests. On June 13, North Korea denounced the resolution and vowed to go ahead with uranium enrichment and weaponize all the new plutonium it made. Any outside attempt to impose a blockade would be considered an act of war.

The reasons for the test were to secure recognition of the North's status as a nuclear power, to increase leverage in negotiations with the US and to consolidate Kim Jong Il's grip on power. The KCNA wrote on May 25: "The test will contribute to defending the sovereignty of the country and the nation and socialism and ensuring peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and the region around it with the might of Songun." On May 27, North Korea declared that it would no longer be bound by the Armistice Agreement, in response to South Korea's decision the day before to join the Proliferation Security Initiative launched by the US to combat the trafficking of weapons and of weapons of mass destruction and related materials. Member states are encouraged to interdict and seize ships and planes suspected of carrying such weapons. The decision was regarded as "a declaration of war."

North Korea considers the campaign a violation of the Armistice Agreement that prohibits attempts at naval blockage; according to Paragraph 15, "This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the water contiguous to

the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.” On May 28, the UNC rejected North Korea’s claim that it was no longer bound by the agreement and said in a release: “The armistice remains in force and is binding on all signatories including North Korea.” Furthermore, “The U.N. Command will adhere to the terms of the armistice and the mechanisms that support it.”<sup>388</sup> The deterioration of inter-Korean relations during 2009 is obvious.

## 7.5 Conclusions

Whereas statistics on armistice violations since 1953 still differed widely, data from 1999 show that the UNC had made incomparably more admissions than the KPA. As a communication body, the MAC has contributed to securing peace, although views differed on to what extent. The UNC had played a crucial role in maintaining peace. The NNSC had also contributed to securing peace. In 2000, only a few paragraphs of the Armistice Agreement were still observed while other were only partly followed or had lost

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<sup>388</sup> Carlsson, “Vad är det som händer egentligen” (<http://www.nwt.se/kristinehamn/article534566.ece>, May 27, 2009); Columbia University, op. cit., Paragraph 15; Hwang, “N. Korea conducts second nuke test” (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>, May 26, 2009); KCNA, “KCNA Report on One More Successful Underground Nuclear Test” (<http://www.kcna.co.jp/index.e-htm>, May 25, 2009); Kim, “N.K. says not bound to armistice” (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>, May 26, 2009); *The Korea Herald*, “UNSC condemns N. Korea’s nuke test” (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>, May 26, 2009); “U.N. command rejects nullification of truce” (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>, May 28, 2009); N. “Korea to push ahead with uranium enrichment” (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>, June 13, 2009); “UNSC approves sanctions on N.K. for nuke test” (<http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>, June 13, 2009). Quotations except that from the KCNA and the two following are original. “Songun” means “military first.”

enforcement, some of which pertain to the MAC and the NNSC. Although the Armistice Agreement and the enforcement of it have shown instability and limitations, along with the ROK-US Mutual Defence Treaty and alliance, it has helped to prevent the outbreak of war. The agreement remains the only legal instrument for avoiding hostilities in the Korean peninsula until it is replaced by a peace treaty. The parties' position on signing a peace treaty still differed. The opinion in South Korea was that, if it is to function, a peace regime must be created before a peace treaty is signed.

The first inter-Korean summit held in June 2000 led to an activation of contacts that included defence minister talks, but military talks were less active than contacts in other areas. Although military tension remained, half of the propaganda equipment along the border was removed in 2004. At the second summit held in October 2007, the two Koreas pledged to reduce military tension and work for peace. After the first summit, both Koreas confirmed that the Armistice Agreement remains valid on a few occasions. The summit opened the way for new transport corridors through the DMZ and therefore led to UNC-KPA contacts, but talks were irregular. Besides raising armistice violations, talks also dealt with joint exhumations of soldiers and the remains of soldiers from the Korean War.

In spite of improved inter-Korean relations, armistice violations occurred and “negative peace” remained; the process to create peaceful coexistence had only begun. A serious violation was the June 2002 West Sea battle, which caused casualties on both sides. Otherwise, mainly shooting incidents in the DMZ took place. At UNC-KPA talks, the “zero-sum game” continued. The NNSC was given new tasks such as accompanying UNC/MAC during flights over

the DMZ and observing US-South Korea military exercises, but whereas there were contacts with the UNC/MAC, there were none with the KPA. The NNSC also took part in the salvage work after the 2002 sea battle, interviewed North Korean defectors and participated in the repatriation of corpses and the remains of soldiers.

Inter-Korean relations improved not only in terms of ministerial talks and family re-unions after the June 2000 summit but also through the joint Kaesŏng Industrial Complex, while Mt. Kŭmgang tourism began in 1998. On the other hand, the North Korean nuclear issue remained a major threat to peace. After the issue had reappeared in 2002, six-party talks opened in Beijing in 2003 but failed to resolve the issue. Instead, on October 9, 2006, North Korea carried out a nuclear test because of the threat from the US.

After President Lee Myung-bak assumed office in 2008, North-South relations deteriorated owing to his “give-and-take” approach that differed from his predecessors’ policy of engagement. Following the killing in July of a tourist at Mt. Kŭmgang, tours were cancelled, but working-level military talks were held twice. In January 2009, all North-South agreements were declared non-valid. In March 2009, the first UNC-KPA talks held since 2002 dealt with the March 9-20 US-South Korea military exercise that caused tension. North Korea’s missile test on April 5 and nuclear test on May 25 were condemned by South Korea and the UN Security Council. On May 27, North Korea nullified the Armistice Agreement, but the UNC rejected the claim on May 28.



Chapter 8

# *General Conclusions*



Peace-keeping in the Korean peninsula

## 8.1 Contributions of the MAC and the NNSC to Securing Peace

The present study gives support to the opinion that both the MAC and the NNSC have contributed to securing peace. “Peace” in this context refers to maintaining the armistice, that is, “negative peace,” not transforming it into a state of “non-violent and peaceful conflict transformation” corresponding to “positive peace.” Scholars’ opinions largely concur on the importance of the NNSC but are more divided with regard to the MAC. The question is to what degree the Commissions have contributed to securing peace since the study has identified other factors that also explain how peace has been maintained. These factors are: both parties’ desire for peace, maintenance of “Balance of fear” through rearmaments, the Armistice Agreement and the sunshine policy. The author would like to rank these five factors in the following order:

- Both parties’ desire for peace
- Maintenance of “Balance of fear” through rearmaments
- The MAC and the NNSC
- The Armistice Agreement
- The sunshine policy

In spite of the risk of war during the 1968 Pueblo affair, the 1976 axe murder and the 1993-94 nuclear crisis, the high level of tension created in particular by the 1968 Blue House raid, the third North Korean tunnel built under the DMZ found in 1978 and the 1983 Rangoon Bombing and, finally, numerous accusations by the KPA/CPV

against war preparations by the UNC, there are from the 1960 onwards no indications whatsoever that the parties on any occasion have wanted to renew warfare. In 1968, 1976 and 1993-94, there were high levels of tension, but when they approached a critical point, both parties made the utmost efforts to reduce them and hold negotiations, in accordance with the “game theory,” to maintain peace. The fact that tension created by the new South Korean policy towards North Korea under President Lee Myung-bak since 2008, the US-South Korea military exercise in March 2009, the North Korean rocket test on April 5 and the nuclear test on May 25 have not escalated into any military confrontation implies that the desire to maintain peace is as strong as ever.

The bitter experience of the Korean War that perpetuated division and caused millions of casualties is one reason for the desire for peace: the long-term impact cannot be underestimated. The desire for peace is only natural, but due to the high level of mutual distrust and the knowledge that maintaining the armistice is easier than transforming it even into a state of peaceful coexistence, the process that some day perhaps could transform the armistice regime into a peace treaty has not yet begun; the Cold War remains. Due to mutual distrust, the whole post-war period has been characterized by a “zero-sum game,” perpetuating the two parties’ positions and making it extremely difficult to implement any policy changes. Such a situation hardly changed with the holding of four-party talks from 1997-99, the launch of the sunshine policy in 1998 and military talks convened after the first inter-Korean summit in June 2000. Equally important reasons for the desire to maintain peace are that both parties are well aware that the war they are prepared for would cause

enormous damage. Also, it is virtually impossible to win a war and certainly not possible to know the outcome in advance.

Expressed in different term, “Balance of fear” has prevented the renewal of warfare. “Balance of fear” has been maintained through amassing huge and well-equipped military forces and by stationing American troops in South Korea. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s words “Peace can only succeed in a place where there is will to observe peace and effective power to enforce peace” are appropriate in the Korean context. The military build-up, along with the high concentration of forces in the border areas on both sides, has created fears of each other and an unwillingness to take any steps that would change the status quo, such as withdrawing American troops, as President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) had suggested.

Although military tension has been high ever since 1953, military talks held after the inter-Korean summit in June 2000, including one defence minister meeting in 2000 and one in 2007 and five rounds of General Officers’ talks since 2004, are important indications that both Koreas want peace. The dismantlement of propaganda equipment along the border in 2004 was an important concrete step to reduce tension. On the other hand, although the Armistice Agreement prohibits rearmaments, owing to the high level of mutual distrust it would have been virtually impossible to maintain peace through other means; rearmament is at the same time both a cause and an effect of the zero-sum game. In the author’s opinion, rearmament has been and will continue to be a “necessary evil” to maintain peace.

The MAC and the NNSC have in different but supplementary ways contributed to securing peace. As a communication body for

raising incidents, the MAC has played a crucial role in maintaining peace. This opinion is true even though most meetings have been characterized by a zero-sum game, not only when incidents have been on the agenda but also when contentious issues such as American troops in South Korea, rearmaments and military exercises were repeatedly raised from the 1960s onwards. Due to the impact of the war legacy and the Cold War, work has been characterized by a lack of the trust and credibility that are necessary to pursue fruitful negotiations.

However, during such serious incidents as the 1968 Pueblo affair and the 1976 axe murder, the MAC played a crucial role in resolving the incidents, although a solution in the former case forced the UNC/MAC to go as far as to make a false confession that was repudiated immediately after it was signed to save the crew. Both through the MAC and through the presence of American troops in South Korea, the UNC has made an important contribution to securing peace, which it would have been difficult for South Korea to achieve without this presence. Although only two examples are recorded of imports of military equipment from the Soviet Union to North Korea, the North has also been dependent on external support for its defence.

The division of the Joint Security Area in 1976 deviates from the zero-sum pattern, but it could not prevent the first and last exchange of fire between guards across the MDL in 1984, causing casualties on both sides after a Soviet citizen had defected unexpectedly. Unlike the Pueblo incident and the axe murder, the 1993-94 nuclear crisis was handled outside the Armistice Agreement, as has been the case with the nuclear issue after it re-appeared in 2002. In other words,

peace-keeping took place in different ways, but bilateral US-North Korea talks and the six-party talks that opened in 2003 were also dependent on the parties' wish to maintain peace.

Although the MAC has worked rather poorly due to its being composed of the war combatants North Korea, China, South Korea and the US, perpetuating distrust and creating opportunities to abuse the Commission for propaganda purposes, as well as the absence of a referee to judge on armistice violations, the armistice could not have been maintained without it. Due to the absence of such a referee, statistics on armistice violations since 1953 differ widely, but the extraordinarily high number of violations raised by the KPA/CPV is not reliable. The far lower statistics provided by the UNC also raise serious doubts over their accuracy. However, it is indisputable that numerous serious incidents have taken place, many of which have caused casualties. That the MAC continued its work through such channels as secretary meetings and informal contacts after the plenary sessions had ended in 1991 following the appointment of a South Korean general as UNC/MAC Senior Member for the first time, the KPA withdrawal in 1994 and the expulsion of China the same year has contributed to maintaining the armistice. Otherwise, tension would have risen further. Notably, although North Korea boycotted plenary sessions, it used other levels of MAC channels when considered appropriate.

In accordance with the Armistice Agreement, Paragraph 25(i), enabling Commanders to pursue other means of contacts than those envisaged in the agreement, General Officers' talks were held from June 1998 to September 2002, but those were also characterized by a zero-sum game. After inter-Korean relations had begun to expand in

1998, the most outstanding outcomes were the agreements reached between the UNC and the KPA in November 2000 to open some areas of the DMZ and in September 2002 to open the eastern railway. Significantly, the work by the MAC came to include the exhumation and return of soldiers' remains from the war that also involved the NNSC, albeit on a limited scale. Following bilateral US-North Korea talks, the MAC handled such issues by including them on the agenda, thereby indicating a capability to promote peace outside the mandate.

The main initial difficulty for the NNSC was the contradiction that the mandate was sub-ordinated to the MAC member states that it was required to supervise. The NNSC was also weakened by simultaneously implementing inspections of introduction of military equipment that both parties obstructed, the internal split in an East and West bloc due to the Cold War, the even number of members and the absence of a referee for decision-making. The withdrawal of the inspection teams ordered by the UNC in 1956 and the unilateral suspension of Paragraph 13(d), prohibiting rearmaments in 1957 by the UNC, transformed it into "a Commission without supervision." From then onwards, the NNSC no longer supervised the MAC members, who could rearm freely. Later, from 1991 onwards, North Korea's policy to undermine the Commission further weakened it.

Nonetheless, as a third party the NNSC has played a role in maintaining peace that no other body could have undertaken. During the 1968 Pueblo incident, the 1976 axe murder and the 1984 shooting incident in the Joint Security Area, the NNSC, on the basis of "positive symmetry", played an important role in reducing tension and bringing the crises to an end. On the two latter occasions, the NNSC also contributed to the introduction of safety-enhancing measures.

Otherwise, its mere presence has helped to reduce tension in the area and maintain stability. Another important point is that the Commission has remained neutral when the KPA/CPV and the UNC/MAC have approached it on contentious issues such as rearmaments.

Equally significant, the NNSC has long maintained informal contacts with both sides and was during the global Cold War era the only body with access to military headquarters in both Kaesŏng and Seoul. The words “Contacts away from the bargaining table in a relaxed atmosphere may contribute to the creation of good working relations” quoted in the Introduction apply well to the Commission’s work. The maintenance of informal contacts until the KPA closed the MDL for the Commission on May 3, 1995 was the most important contribution the NNSC could make to maintaining peace after the events in 1956-57.

Following these events, the mandate was reduced to a mere formality through the verification of monthly reports from the UNC and the KPA/CPV, in the former case only on rotations of personnel. Both in 1956-57 and from 1991 onwards, it was of the utmost importance that the NNSC continued its work, as it did during the years of “mission impossible” from 1953-56 when a dissolution, as advocated by South Korea and the US, was on the agenda. If dissolved, the armistice regime would have been further undermined. Owing to the reduced mandate, the US and South Korea changed their position on the NNSC and have since strongly advocated its work.

Equally important, the NNSC continued its work in spite of North Korea’s policy to undermine the Commission from 1991. Following the end of the Cold War, Czechoslovakia and Poland were no longer regarded as neutral and North Korea increasingly hindered

their work. North Korea's unilateral expulsion of the Czech Republic in 1993 and Poland in 1995 violated the Armistice Agreement and weakened the Commission, but Poland, Sweden and Switzerland have since repeatedly expressed their willingness to maintain the armistice. Continuous support from the UNC/MAC and the fact that the KPA, while neglecting the NNSC, has tacitly accepted the Swedish-Swiss presence show that both parties are rather satisfied with maintaining the status quo. The frequent use of the conference room for North-South contacts shows that the NNSC has enjoyed both parties' confidence. Both sides expressed appreciation of its contributions to securing peace during the years 1956-1991 when it was a "bridge-builder" between the two camps. Following the 1956-57 events, the NNSC began to change its role from a military body to a military and diplomatic contact area between the two sides that deviates from the role stated in the Armistice Agreement.

Since no other body could have fulfilled this task, the change of mandate that took place without amending the Armistice Agreement was significant for maintaining peace. The widening of the mandate in 2005 by taking part in UNC/MAC helicopter inspections and observing South Korea-US military exercises confirms that the South regards the NNSC as an indispensable part of peace-keeping. The fact that the NNSC also took part in the salvage work after the 2002 sea battle, interviewed North Korean defectors and participated in repatriations/returns of civilians and soldiers is other evidence of this view. Thus, both the MAC and the NNSC have undertaken tasks to promote peace outside of the mandate; these deserve credit.

The Armistice Agreement's main significance is that it is the only legal instrument for preventing hostilities in the Korean peninsula and

will remain so until it is replaced by a peace treaty. Significantly, Paragraph 2 on the position of the MDL has been respected. Although Paragraph 6, prohibiting hostile acts within, from or against the DMZ, has been grossly violated, the zone has helped to maintain peace. Besides its weaknesses in terms of the absence of a referee to judge on armistice violations and a sea border and the limitation to military matters, it does not deal at all with the roots of conflict but only prescribes how to handle the post-war situation. In addition, ever since the war ended, the agreement has been implemented in a Cold War context of mutual distrust, disabling any concrete attempts to fulfil the target of Paragraph 60 to settle through negotiations “...the peaceful settlement of the Korean question...” Both the 1954 Geneva conference and the 1997-99 four-party talks failed due to the parties’ incompatible positions.

The much contested Paragraph 13(d) is unrealistic; how is it possible to make a distinction between replacements and reinforcements without taking technological development into consideration? Furthermore, prohibiting the introduction of military equipment, except for ten ports of entry that could easily be blocked for inspections, while not mentioning domestic manufacturing of weapons and dual-use products, means that observation of this paragraph was doomed to failure. Although North Korea reportedly began to rearm first, it is virtually impossible to judge objectively. The October 1, 1953 South Korea-US Mutual Defence Treaty opened the way for the large-scale introduction of military personnel and equipment in violation of the Armistice Agreement. It is virtually impossible to judge which party has violated Paragraph 13(d) to the largest extent, but no party has ever admitted any violation of it. For the NNSC, the fact that Paragraph

28, authorizing the MAC to request the Commission to observe and inspect armistice violations outside the DMZ, lost its validity already in 1956 has undermined the mandate. In this respect, the mandate had been unsuccessfully implemented only a few times before.

Since the agreement does not prohibit the installation of military facilities within the DMZ, the zone has become heavily militarized on both sides of the MDL; the northern and southern boundary lines hardly exist any longer. Although the UNC/MAC has made far more admissions of armistice violations than the KPA/CPV, the vast majority of those are inadvertent aerial overflights over the MDL that in several recorded cases were a result of navigational errors. The major admissions made by the KPA/CPV are the 1976 axe murder and the 1996 submarine incident, which were just two of many more serious incidents instigated. A few indirect admissions have also been made.

The launch of the sunshine policy by President Kim Dae Jung in 1998 opened the way for an expansion of contacts that continued until 2008, when President Lee Myung-bak replaced the engagement policy with a “give-and-take approach” that has roused North Korea’s wrath. After 1998, inter-Korean summits were held in June 2000 and October 2007 which, in the former case, led to the holding of not only military talks but also ministerial talks and family re-unions. In addition, Mt. Kûmgang tours were initiated in November 1998 and the Kaesông Industrial Complex began operations in December 2004. None of these developments would have been possible previously and contacts continued while incidents took place such as the June 1999 and June 2002 West Sea battles. In contrast, previous thaws in relations in 1971-72, 1984-85 and 1990-1992 were broken by steps backwards in relations. However, considering the sea battles and slow

progress in the military field in particular, the degree of improved relations should not be exaggerated. By expanding contacts, both Koreas showed that they wished to reach some form of peaceful coexistence that, as a result of long-term tension, was one of the policy's targets. The changes in relations that took place have now been undermined. At present, it is very difficult to expect any changes in relations.

## **8.2 Peace in the Korean Peninsula**

“Peace” in the Korean peninsula should be divided into four concepts: negative peace, peaceful coexistence, a peace regime and positive peace, whereas the ultimate target is a peace treaty to officially end the Korean War. Owing to the perpetuation of division and mutual distrust caused by the Korean War, only “negative peace” has been maintained, but the degree has varied. Galtung’s definition of negative peace as “...the absence/reduction of violence of all kinds” is appropriate to the Korean context, although “reduction” is the more relevant term. During the first post-war years, inspections of the introduction of military equipment was the main issue, but armed incidents such as spy cases and border crossings also took place. The level of negative peace reached a peak throughout the 1960s on the basis of the number of casualties, the frequency of incidents and the number of MAC meetings convened. That the years 1967-69 have been called “the second Korean War” speaks for itself. Rearmaments were the major reason for the violations.

That the KPA/CPV consistently called most plenary meetings 1953-1991 shows that it has regarded the UNC as lying behind most

armistice violations. Although the 1968 Blue House raid and the Pueblo incident in particular caused tension, other serious incidents occurred as well, but North Korea failed to gain support for its revolutionary policies in South Korea and for the withdrawal of American troops. On the contrary, North Korea's acts strengthened South Korea's and the US will to defend South Korea, indicating a profound lack of knowledge of its neighbour. The argument that if the American troops withdrew, re-unification would be accomplished was and remains unrealistic. That American pressure prevented South Korea from retaliating after the Blue House raid must in retrospect be regarded as very fortunate since retaliation would inevitably have raised tension.

During the 1970s, serious incidents such as the 1976 axe murder and North Korean tunnels under the DMZ discovered by the UNC in 1974, 1975 and 1978 also took place, but the degree of negative peace was rather lower and North-South dialogue was held for the first time in 1971-73. The 1972 July 4 Communiqué on re-unification by peaceful means, without foreign intervention and in national unity, could have been an impetus for improved relations but became impossible to implement since South Korea could not accept the North Korean demand for an American troop withdrawal. Although the Panmunjom axe murder took place due to a dispute regarding a tree in the Joint Security Area, the underlying reasons were the KPA policy to test the willingness of the US to defend South Korea and to gain world-wide support for a troop withdrawal, but the incident backfired. While there is no excuse for the murders, the UNC shares responsibility for the incident by ignoring the North's previous warnings against cutting down the tree and not notifying it in advance.

The axe murder is the only incident when the UNC has retaliated to a KPA violation, but the level of tension was so high that North Korea did not respond. Nonetheless, Galtung's words "violence of any kind breeds violence of any kind" apply to the Korean context; violent incidents have been repeated in a vicious circle. Regarding his opinion that the test of peace lies in the ability to handle conflict, the parties have failed to transform the conflict by handling it creatively, but the words "peace of any kind breeds peace of any kind" are also applicable. The number of violent incidents has decreased throughout the decades. However, apart from the 1960s, the number of casualties has differed less, but incidents with double-digit figures have occurred in almost every decade.

Although statistics from the MAC show that North Korea accused the UNC of 78 percent of all armistice violations committed since 1953 during the 1980s, the lower level of negative peace remained. The extraordinarily high number of violations implies that most incidents were fabricated because of North Korea's inferiority feelings due to the 1988 Seoul Olympics. The number of casualties from the 1983 Rangoon Bombing and the 1987 explosion of a South Korean civilian passenger plane in the Indian Ocean was high, exceeding deaths from incidents during the 1970s. On the other hand, there were few other serious incidents and the number of MAC meetings was almost halved. Significantly, following the assassination attempt on President Chun Doo Hwan in 1983, the Americans again prevented retaliation.

In contrast to 1971-73, the thaw in relations in 1984-85 was a result of North Korea's offer to provide humanitarian aid following severe floods in South Korea which the South accepted in order to

improve relations in line with the game theory. In a deviation from the zero-sum game, the multi-level talks resulted in the first family re-unions in Seoul and P'yŏngyang in September 1985. However, dialogue ended in January 1986 due to the joint South Korea-US exercise "Team Spirit" that the KPA has consistently regarded as a preparation for war.

The North Korean nuclear issue was the main reason for continued tension in the early 1990s, in particular during 1993-94. This issue put an end to a third period of thaw in relations that originated from President Roh Tae Woo's July 7, 1988 declaration regarding the expansion of inter-Korean contacts. Prime minister talks culminated in the signing of the December 1991 Basic Agreement in which both Koreas pledged to work for solid peace and to respect the Armistice Agreement, but it was not implemented. In December 1991, the Joint Declaration on a nuclear-free Korea was also signed. If the declaration had been observed, the nuclear issue would not have occurred, but considering North Korea's weakened position world-wide, nuclear weapons became a means for survival.

Since North Korea regarded the Basic Agreement as a North-South non-aggression pact, it later pursued only a North Korea-US peace treaty which, however, would violate the Basic Agreement. Moreover, such a position was unacceptable to both the US and South Korea, who wanted a North-South Korea peace treaty. The South Korean opinion was that a peace regime must be created before a peace treaty was signed. North Korea's position contrasts sharply with the pursuit of a North-South peace treaty to lead inter-Korean relations up to 1974. Inspired by the American retreat from Vietnam, North Korea then changed its position on whom to sign a peace treaty with from

South Korea to the US. In the 1990s, the explanation was that South Korea had not signed the Armistice Agreement, a decision that made North Korea doubt its wish to end the war.

Considering tension caused by the nuclear issue and armistice violations such as the KPA declaration not to abide by the Armistice Agreement in April 1996 and the North Korean submarine incident in September the same year, the latter causing around 30 casualties, the level of negative peace remained as high as previously. However, since the nuclear issue is not included in the Armistice Agreement and the agreement's enforcement mechanisms became severely weakened, it is somewhat difficult to compare the period with previous ones; the 1990s were the most turbulent period for both the MAC and the NNSC.

Since the introduction of the sunshine policy in 1998 led to an unprecedented expansion of contacts and a fourth period of thaw that lasted until 2008, the level of negative peace was lower than ever. However the degree should not be exaggerated in view of the West Sea battles in June 1999 and June 2002 that led to more than 40 casualties, the reappearance of the nuclear issue in 2002 and North Korea's nuclear test conducted largely because of the perceived American threat in October 2006. The sea battles are the most outstanding examples of tension raised by the absence of a sea border. The 1994 North Korea-US Agreed Framework that aimed to resolve the issue had failed since the North Koreans continued to develop nuclear weapons. None of these events led to a halt in contacts and the launch of the Mt. Kûmgang tours and the opening of Kaesông Industrial Complex. Such a situation shows that both Koreas worked to achieve some form of peaceful coexistence in accordance with the sunshine policy.


The inter-Korean summit held in June 2000 led to an expansion of contacts that included the first defence minister talks, but military talks were less active than in other areas. After the summit, both Koreas confirmed that the Armistice Agreement remains valid on a few occasions. The summit opened the way for new transport corridors through the DMZ and therefore led to UNC-KPA contacts, but talks were irregular. Meanwhile, the huge discrepancy in visitors from North to South Korea in comparison with travellers in the opposite direction indicates that North Korea was more cautious about accomplishing peaceful coexistence. At the second summit held in October 2007, the two Koreas pledged to reduce military tension and work for peace.

Considering long-term confrontation and that peaceful coexistence implies coexistence rather than interaction, which is a pre-condition for positive peace, it is only natural that Presidents Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo-hyun emphasized peaceful coexistence. Peaceful coexistence should proceed a “peace regime,” an issue that had already been raised before the sunshine policy was launched. As a higher stage of peace, a peace regime should correspond to a stage of “positive peace.” In other words, it would correspond to a state of affairs creating working relations prior to the signing of a peace treaty that would officially end the Korean War. However, considering the difficulties of creating even some state of peaceful coexistence and the worsening of relations since 2008, it would require extraordinary changes to develop inter-Korean relations into such a state. That North Korea in January 2009 declared all North-South agreements non-valid shows that it is very difficult to expect a re-opening of contacts at the present. The long-term impact of the UNC-KPA talks

held in March 2009 is hard to assess but the March 9-20 US-South Korea military exercise created a high level of tension, as did the North Korean rocket test conducted on April 5 and the nuclear test carried out on May 25.


Although the nuclear issue is the main obstacle to improving relations, military tension, deep-rooted mutual distrust and the constant risk of backlashes while the Cold War continues in the Korean peninsula make it difficult to expect the creation of positive peace in Galtung's sense that "peace is nonviolent and creative conflict transformation." Even if a state of positive peace were to develop, a most difficult question that would remain unsolved is who the signatories would be. The North Korean position to exclude South Korea from a peace treaty is entirely unrealistic since it would simply not work. Furthermore, the US would never accept signing a bilateral peace treaty with North Korea. The US and China would need to guarantee a North-South Korea peace treaty that should be endorsed by the UN Security Council. Until a peace treaty is signed, the MAC and the NNSC have to remain to maintain the Armistice Agreement, but the prospects of reaching such a state of affairs and officially ending the Korean War are at present virtually non-existent. Only time will tell whether such a situation can develop.

# *Appendix*




Peace-keeping in the Korean peninsula

a) Map of the Korean Peninsula




1. Changjôn
2. Cheju Island
3. Chumunjin
4. Ch'ôngjin
5. Ch'ôrwôn
6. DMZ
7. East Sea
8. Hûngnam
9. Hwanghae Province
10. Imjin River
11. Inch'ôn
12. Kaesông
13. Kanghwa Island
14. Kangnûng
15. Kangwôn Province
16. Kôje Island
17. Kunsan
18. Lake Hwajinp'o
19. Manp'o
20. Mayangdo
21. Mt. Kûmgang
22. Mt. Sôrak
23. Mukho
24. Munsan
25. Namhae Island
26. Namp'o
27. Ongjin peninsula
28. Osan
29. Panmunjom
30. P'aju
31. Paengnyông Island
32. P'ohang
33. Pukp'yông
34. Pusan
35. P'yôngyang
36. Samch'ôk
37. Seoul
38. Sinanju
39. Sinûiju
40. Soch'ông Island
41. Sokch'o
42. South Sea
43. Sôngjin
44. Sôsan
45. Taech'ôn
46. Taech'ông Island
47. Taegu
48. Tonghae
49. T'aeon
50. U Island
51. Ulchin
52. Ullûng Island
53. Wan Island
54. West Sea
55. Wôlsông
56. Wônsan
57. Yanggu
58. Yônpyông Island

b) Map of the Joint Security Area before 1976




\* Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:JSAmap.jpg>.

c) Map of the Joint Security Area after 1976




\* Source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Map\\_JSA.jpg](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Map_JSA.jpg)

d) Buildings in the Joint Security Area, 2008



\* Source: <http://www.lifekorea.com/Images/dmz/pmj095.jpg>.

e) Map of the Location of North Korean Tunnels under the DMZ



\* Source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Korean\\_dmz\\_map.png](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Korean_dmz_map.png).

July 27, 1953

Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, concerning a military armistice in Korea.

### **Preamble**

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toil of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following articles and paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea:

### **Article I. Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone**

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.
2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached map.
3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and southern boundary as indicated on the attached map.
4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary

between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the military demarcation line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map. Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side.
6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone.
7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.
8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.
9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.
10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice

Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.

## **Article II. Concrete Arrangements for Cease-Fire and Armistice**

### ***A. General***

12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. (See Paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement.)
13. In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall:
  - (a) Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of military forces there from, together with lanes known to be free of all such hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice

Commission by the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as directed by under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under Military Armistice Commission, such units of a police nature as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under Paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone.

- (b) Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay the other side shall have the right to take any action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term 'coastal islands', as used above, refers to those islands, which, though occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37° 58' N, 124° 40' E), TAECHONG-DO (37° 50' N, 124°42' E), SOCHONG-DO (37° 46' N, 124° 46' E), YONPYONG-DO (37°38' N, 125° 40' E), and U-DO (37° 36'N, 125° 58' E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in- Chief, United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. (See Map 3).

- (c) Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed below. 'Rotation' is defined as the replacement of units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; provided, however, that no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation policy. No military personnel of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel of that side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement to exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that side who have departed from Korea since that date. Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.
- (d) Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. In order to justify the requirements for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to be

introduced into Korea for replacement purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being replaced. Items to be replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

- (e) Ensure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are adequately punished.
- (f) In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the territory of Korea under their military control, for the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.
- (g) Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides (see Map 4), and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to

prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main lines of communication are closed or impassable.

- (h) Provide such logistic support, including communications and transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams.
  - (i) Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their respective parts of the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine.
  - (j) Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the proper exercise of their functions, including privileges, treatment, and immunities equivalent to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under international usage.
14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.
  15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the water contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.
  16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.
  17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories hereto and their successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to insure complete compliance with all of the provisions hereof by all elements of their commands. They shall actively cooperate with one

another and with the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring observance of both letter and the spirit of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement.

18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission and of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides.

## ***B. Military Armistice Commission***

### **1. Composition**

19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.
20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of general of flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be Major Generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.
21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants as required.
22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.
23. (a) The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.  
(b) Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of

whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.

## 2. Functions and Authority

24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.
25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:
  - (a) Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PANMUNJOM (37° 57'29" N, 126° 40'00"E). The Military Armistice Commission may relocate its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission.
  - (b) Operate as a joint organization without a chairman.
  - (c) Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.
  - (d) Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.
  - (e) Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams.
  - (f) Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.
  - (g) Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.
  - (h) Give general supervision and direction to the activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.
  - (i) Act as intermediary in transmitting communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ.

- (j) Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.
- 26. The Mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.
- 27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.
- 28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.
- 29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.
- 30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

### **3. General**

- 31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members of both sides; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side.
- 32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting.

33. The Joint Observer teams shall make periodic reports to the Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission.
34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.
35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

### ***C. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission***

#### **1. Compositions**

36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.
37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN and SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term "neutral nations" as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side.

38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required. These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.
39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it.
40. (a) The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only.
  - (b) Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointed nations. In order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, subteams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and equip-

ment of its own as it may desire; provided, however, that such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed.

## 2. Functions and Authority

41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in Sub-paragraphs 13(c) and 13(d) and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.
42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall:
  - (a) Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.
  - (b) Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.
  - (c) Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13(c) and 13(d) of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in Paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any secret designs or characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition.
  - (d) Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.
  - (e) Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the

military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission.

- (f) Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-paragraphs, conduct without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either side on the Commission.
  - (g) Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels used in the performance of this mission.
43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry:

Territory under the military control of the United Nations Command

Inchon.....(37° 28' N, 126° 38' E)  
 Taegu.....(35° 52' N, 128° 36' E)  
 Pusan.....(35° 06' N, 129° 02' E)  
 Kangnung.....(37° 45" N, 128° 54' E)  
 Kunsan.....(35° 59" N, 126° 43' E)

Territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers

Sinuiju.....(40° 06' N, 124° 24' E)  
 Chongjin.....(41° 46' N, 129° 49' E)  
 Hungnam.....(39° 50' N, 127° 37' E)  
 Manpo.....(41° 09' N, 126° 18' E)

Sinanju.....(39° 36' N, 125° 36' E)

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map (Map 5).

### 3. General

44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member.
45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese.
46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports concerning the results of their supervision, observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more individual members thereof shall be considered as information only.
47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which received. They shall not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance before the Military Armistice

Commission, at the request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.

48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.
49. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.
50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military Armistice Commission.

### **Article III. Arrangements Relating to Prisoners of War**

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.
  - (a) Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, or personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or military serial number.
  - (b) Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and

hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the Annex hereto, "Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission."

- (c) So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to the other side shall, for the purposes of the Armistice Agreement, be called "repatriation" in English, "songhwan" in Korean and "ch'ienfan" in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such prisoner of war.
52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming into effect of this Armistice Agreement.
53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible, there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care and attendance en route.
54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time.
55. PANMUNJOM is designated as the place where prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war in the Demilitarized Zone may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.
56. (a) A Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervision of the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the

repatriation of prisoners of war. It shall be the duty of this Committee to coordinate the timing of the arrival of prisoners of war at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camps of both sides; to make, when necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with regard to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of war; to coordinate the work of the joint Red Cross teams, established in Paragraph 57 hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of war; to supervise the implementation of the arrangements for the actual repatriation of prisoners of war stipulated in Paragraphs 53 and 54 hereof; to select, when necessary, additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; and to carry out such other related functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

- (b) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.
  - (c) The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Committee upon completion of the program of repatriation of prisoners of war.
57. (a) Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, joint Red Cross teams composed of representatives of the national Red Cross Societies of countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command on the one hand, and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof, who insist upon repatriation, by the performance of such humanitarian services as are necessary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this task, the joint Red Cross teams shall provide assistance in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war,

and shall visit the prisoner-of-war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of war and to bring in and distribute gift articles for the comfort and welfare of the prisoners of war. The joint Red Cross teams may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

- (b) The joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below:
- (1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten (10) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to assist in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. The chairmanship of this team shall alternate daily between representatives from the Red Cross Societies of the two sides. The work and services of this team shall be coordinated by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.
  - (2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner-of-war camps under the administration of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team.
  - (3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the United Nations Command. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of a nation contributing to forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team.
  - (4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from this team, with an equal number of representatives from each side, may be formed as circumstances require.

- (5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters, and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side to the team operating in the territory under his military control.
  - (6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both sides on any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be increased or decreased, subject to confirmation by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.
  - (c) The Commander of each side shall co-operate fully with the joint Red Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to insure the security of the personnel of the Joint Red Cross team in the area under his military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic, administrative, and communications facilities as may be required by the team operating in the territory under his military control.
  - (d) The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of the program of repatriation of all of the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51 (a) hereof, who insist upon repatriation.
58. (a) The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of the other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following information concerning prisoners of war:
- (1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped since the effective date of the data last exchanged.
  - (2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality, rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place of burial, of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody.
  - (b) If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of the supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall furnish to the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of Sub-paragraph 58 (a) hereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-day intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.
  - (c) Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the custody of the detaining side after the completion of the program of delivery and reception of

prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for disposition.

59. (a) All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement become effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the Military Demarcation Line; and all civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and who on 24 June 1950, resided south of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to re-turn home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers to return to the area south of the Military Demarcation Line. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians who desire to return home.
- (b) All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers shall if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, be permitted and assisted to do so; all civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, be permitted and assisted to do so. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory

under his military control of contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander of the other side.

- (c) Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59(a) hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59(b) hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as possible after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective.
- (d) (1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians is hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade, two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing point(s) through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the crossing point(s); and to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians.
- (2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.
- (3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfillment of its mission.

#### Article IV. Recommendations to the Governments Concerned on Both Sides

60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

#### Article V. Miscellaneous

61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.
62. The articles and paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.
63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 2200 hours on 27 July 1953.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July 1953, in English, Korean and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

|  |  |   |
|--|--|---|
| (Signature)  | (Signature)  | (Signature)   |
| KIM IL SUNG  | PENG TEH-HUAI  | MARK W. CLARK   |
| Marshal, Democratic<br>People's Republic<br>of Korea<br>Supreme Commander,<br>Korean People's Army | Commander General,<br>Chinese People's<br>Volunteers | United States Army<br>Commander-in-Chief,<br>United Nations Commander |

Present:

NAM IL

General, Korea People's Army  
Senior Delegate,  
Delegation of the Korean People's Army  
and the Chinese People's Volunteers

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.

Lieutenant General, United States  
Senior Delegate,  
United Nations Command Delegation

\* **Source:** Columbia University, op. cit.; Kim (ed.), op. cit., 2001, pp. 241-267.

\* **Note:** Kim Il Sung signed on July 27 in P'yŏngyang at 10 A.M. Nine signed copies were transported to the UNC base camp at Munsan-ni where they for confirmation were signed by Mark Clark at 1.00 P.M. Another nine were transported to Kaesŏng where they were signed by Peng Teh-Huai on July 28 at 9.30 A.M.. However, Downs (1999) records that both Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai signed the nine copies in Kaesŏng but does not say when and does not give the source. From Downs, op. cit., p. 93; Ha, op. cit., pp. 37-8.

To the Stationmaster of Sinuiju  
I rather hunt as Greeks of old  
for golden fleece as I was told  
but I must hunt for something new  
the Stationmaster of Sinuiju

I'd search for gold of distant shores  
like the good old old conquistadors  
but search I must on the Yalu  
the Stationmaster of Sinuiju

I'd like to think of coming peace  
of budding flowers, humming bees  
but all my thoughts are going to  
the Stationmaster of Sinuiju

I hope to see my folks again,  
I hope for sunshine after rain  
I hope to see, will it come through,  
the Stationmaster of Sinuiju

I wish that people would agree  
to live, at last, in harmony  
I wish to see, but that won't do  
the Stationmaster of Sinuiju

As all men, one day I'll die  
and go to heaven if I may  
I hope to God he won't come too  
the Stationmaster of Sinuiju

\*Source: Robert Chappellet, interpreter in Sinuiju, North Korea, 1953.

1950-1953      The Korean War rages June 25, 1950-July 27, 1953.

### **1950**

- June 27      The UN Security Council adopts a resolution requesting member states to assist the Republic of Korea, of which 16 respond.
- July 7      The UN Security Council adopts a resolution to integrate the UN combat units into one organization.
- July 15      South Korea transfers operational command to the US.
- July 24      The United Nations Command (UNC) is founded on the basis of the July 7 UN Security Council resolution.

### **1953**

- July 27      The Armistice Agreement is signed.
- July 29      At the second MAC meeting, the North protests that the South had violated the Armistice Agreement.
- July 30      The third MAC meeting permits military police in the DMZ instead of civilian police. The North protests that the South had violated the Armistice Agreement.
- July 31      The fourth MAC meeting reaches agreement that civilian police will be armed with rifles and pistols. The North protests that the South had violated the Armistice Agreement.
- August onwards      North Korea hinders NNSC inspections in the ports of entry.
- August 1      The NNSC holds its first meeting.
- August 4      At the seventh MAC meeting, the South submits a reply to the North's protests against armistice violations up to July 31.
- August 5      At the eighth MAC meeting, the South admits a violation after the North's protests against crossings of the MDL (no. 1).

- August 8            At the ninth MAC meeting, the North admits a violation after the South's protests against crossings over the MDL (no. 1).  
                          The South admits a violation after the North's protests against crossings of the MDL (no. 2).  
                          The North protests that the South had violated the Armistice Agreement.
- August 12           The NNSC dispatches inspection teams who begin their work a week later.
- August 13           At the eleventh MAC meeting, the South refutes the North's claims of violations made at the second and eighth meetings.
- August 19           At the 12th MAC meeting, the South admits the North's claim of the introduction of guns made at the eleventh meeting (no. 3).
- August 20           At the 13th MAC meeting, the North requests the dispatch of a mobile neutral nations inspection team to inspect prisoner-of-war camps.
- August 21           At the 14th MAC meeting, agreement is reached to dispatch a mobile inspection team.
- August 24           The first conflict within the NNSC occurs concerning investigations of prisoners' camps in South Korea. No joint report is submitted in October but two separate reports.
- August 25           At the 29th MAC secretary meeting, the South admits the North's protest against crossings of the MDL (no. 4).  
                          The North denies the South's accusation of crossings of the MDL.
- August 27           At the 31st MAC secretary meeting, the North denies the South's protest against border crossings.
- August 28           At the 15th MAC meeting, the South admits an airspace violation raised by the North at the ninth meeting (no. 5).
- September           The NNSC disagrees on the arrival of a box containing 106 grenade throwers stored in Pusan harbour.
- September 9        A Polish NNSC member seeks asylum in the US.

- September 10 At the 43rd MAC secretary meeting, the South denies the North's accusation of airspace intrusions but admits crossings of the MDL (no. 6).
- September 16 At the 19th MAC meeting, agreement is reached that guard forces in the Joint Security Area should wear red armbands.
- September 23 At the 53rd MAC secretary meeting, the South admits the North's protest against guards crossing the MDL (no. 7).
- September 24 At the 54th MAC secretary meeting, the South denies the North's protest against airspace intrusions.
- September 28 At the 57th MAC secretary meeting, the South admits the North's protest against an airspace intrusion (no. 8).
- October 1 South Korea and the United States signs a Mutual Defence Treaty which is enforced from November 17, 1954.
- October 8 At the 65th MAC secretary meeting, the South denies the North's protest against an airspace intrusion.  
The KPA/CPV reports on minor troop rotations.
- October 12 The UNC/MAC requests the NNSC to dispatch a mobile inspection team to Ŭiju airport. No report is elaborated to the MAC in late October.
- October 19 At the 25th MAC plenary meeting, the Joint Security Area is set up.  
At the 74th MAC secretary meeting, the South denies the North's claim of an airspace intrusion.
- October 24 At the 79th MAC secretary meeting, the South rejects the North's claim of an airspace intrusion.
- October 27 At the 81st MAC secretary meeting, the South denies the North's claim that a guard had crossed the MDL.
- October 30 At the 84th MAC secretary meeting, the South refutes the North's protest against airspace intrusions.
- November 3 At the 86th MAC secretary meeting, the South denies the North's protest against airspace intrusions.

- November 16 At the 89th MAC secretary meeting, the South rejects the North's protest against airspace intrusions.
- November 18 At the 28th MAC meeting, the North protests that the South obstructed its work at the prison camps but the South refutes this view.
- November 23 At the 92nd MAC secretary meeting, the South denies the North's protest against airspace intrusions.
- November 30 At the 93rd MAC secretary meeting, the South rejects the North's protest against airspace intrusions.
- December 1 At the 31st MAC plenary meeting, the number of mobile teams is reduced from ten to six.
- December 12 The South admits the North's protest against a soldier crossing the MDL on December 12 (no. 9).
- December 16 At the 96th MAC secretary meeting, the South denies the North's protest against airspace intrusions.
- December 18 At the 33rd MAC plenary meeting, the South refutes the North's protest against the detention of defected soldiers by force.
- December 20 A South Korean representative takes part in the MAC. An Army General takes part from March 3, 1954.
- December 23 At the 97th MAC secretary meeting, the North admits the South's protests against an MDL crossing (no. 2).  
The South denies the North's protest against airspace intrusions.
- December 30 At the 98th MAC secretary meeting, the South denies the North's protest against airspace intrusions. The South admits the North's protest against an MDL crossing (no. 10).

#### 1954

- January 5 At the 99th MAC secretary meeting, the South rejects the North's protest against airspace intrusions.

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| January 10  | At the 35th MAC plenary meeting, the North protests against the South's airspace intrusions.  |
| January 15  | At the 87th NNSC meeting, Sweden suggests different systems of inspection in North and South Korea.   |
| January 23  | At the 37th MAC meeting, the South claims that 116 of 130 cases of airspace violations raised by the North were false.  |
| February    | The NNSC begins to meet twice a week.   |
| February 11 | The NNSC reports on the introduction of fighter planes into North Korea.  |
| February 12 | The KPA/CPV informs the NNSC that it would no longer let it make investigations on its territory.   |
| February 23 | At the 107th NNSC meeting, the Swiss member criticizes that the Czechs and Poles conducted work outside their mandate.  |
| March 18    | At the 39th MAC meeting, the South rejects the North's protests against violating Paragraph 13(d). Both sides accuse each other of obstructing the inspection teams' work.          |
| March 29    | Swedish and Swiss NNSC representatives express their dissatisfaction to the UN.   |
| Spring      | Evaluations of reports, engagement of mobile inspection teams and differences between inspection routines in North and South Korea lead to permanent controversies within the NNSC. |
| April       | The Swedish Major General Paul Mohn advocates the abolition of the NNSC.  |
| April 5     | Swedish and Swiss NNSC representatives announce that inspections had been completely ruined.  |
| April 7     | At the 40th MAC meeting, North Korea raises the first spy case.   |
| April 14    | Restrictive inspection procedures similar to those in North Korea are introduced in South Korea.  |
| April 14-15 | Sweden and Switzerland ask the US and China whether the NNSC could not be dissolved.  |

- April 15            The UNC Commander in a letter to the NNSC states that North Korea, Czech and Polish NNSC members make the worst armistice violations.
- April 16            At the 108th MAC secretary meeting, the South denies the North's protest against airspace intrusions.
- The UNC Commander requests in a message to the US Ministry of Defence an end to the NNSC's work in South Korea.
- April 20            At the 41st MAC plenary meeting, the South rejects the North's criticism of violating Paragraph 13(d). Both sides accuse each other of obstructing the inspection teams' work.
- April 26-July 5    The Geneva Conference on Korea (and Indochina) is held.
- May 4              At the 110th MAC secretary meeting, the South admits the North's protest against border crossings by military police (no. 11).
- May 22             At the 43rd MAC meeting, the South admits the North's protest against MDL crossings (no. 12).
- June                The NNSC begins to meet once a week.
- June 11            The UNC Commander recommends to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the NNSC should be abolished.
- June 12            Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou En-lai declares that the NNSC constitutes an 'an island of contacts in a sea without contacts.'
- June 15            The Geneva Conference ends in failure. A sixteen-nation declaration is adopted. North Korea suggest that the two Koreas should be the parties of a peace treaty.
- June 18            At the 113th MAC secretary meeting, the North criticizes the South for denying the intrusion into its airspace.
- The US General Bedell Smith, declares "... his unambiguous conviction that the NNSC could be dissolved without any harm to the armistice cause."
- July                 The South Korean Prime Minister tells the UN that his government "no longer regarded the armistice as binding."

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| July 14          | At the 44th MAC plenary meeting, the North rejects the South's protests against shootings in the Han River estuary. The South denies intrusions over the MDL.  |
| August           | The South Korean government organizes large-scale violent anti-NNSC demonstrations. The NNSC's relative freedom of movement in South Korea ends.   |
| August 3         | At the 45th MAC meeting, the North protests against the South's anti-NNSC demonstrations. The South responds that it had actively supported the NNSC and its inspection teams.   |
| August-July 1955 | Due to the difficulties for the NNSC to conduct its work, the period is dominated by the issue of its dissolution.   |
| September 2      | South Korea's Prime Minister writes to the UNC Commander on the need to maintain power balance.  |
| September 15     | At 116th MAC secretary meeting, the South admits protests from the North against violations of its airspace (no. 13).  |
| September 22     | The NNSC submits its first joint monthly report to the MAC.  |
| September 29     | At the 117th MAC secretary meeting, the South denies the North's charge of kidnappings and detentions.   |
| October 6        | At the 48th MAC plenary meeting and the 118 <sup>th</sup> MAC secretary meeting, US Lieutenant Colonel Herbert A. Peters is returned.<br><br>The South denies the North's protest against an armed attack across the MDL.    |
| November         | The US 8th Army drastically restricts the inspection teams' freedom of movement in South Korea.  |
| November 1       | At the 119th MAC secretary meeting, the South admits one of the 16 cases of airspace violations the North had charged (no. 14).  |
| November 22      | At the 50th MAC plenary meeting, North Korea proposes civilian North-South exchanges across the DMZ.<br><br>The South Korean government invites Czechs and Poles to leave the South within a week but the demand is not met. |

- December 1 North Korea suggests a minister meeting on post and communication cooperation to be held on December 17.
- December 8 At the 51st MAC meeting, the South responds that civilian exchanges lay outside the Commission's mandate. The South Korean government opposes exchanges.
- December 14 At the 52nd MAC meeting, the North proposes civilian North-South exchanges over the DMZ, but the South responds that such contacts lay outside the Commission's mandate.
- December 21 At the 122th MAC secretary meeting, the North denies the South's protest against threats to joint observer teams.

### *1955*

- January 3 At the 123rd MAC secretary meeting, the parties accuse each other of airspace violations.
- January 21 At the 124th MAC secretary meeting, the parties blame each other for airspace violations.
- January 31 The UNC Commander proposes a dissolution of the NNSC.
- February 5 A US aircraft is attacked by MIG fighters over the West Sea. The incident ends safely.
- February 9 At the 53rd MAC plenary meeting, the South rejects the North's claim of airspace intrusions.
- February 10 At the 54th MAC meeting, the South admits one airspace intrusion (no. 15).
- February 14 At the 127th MAC secretary meeting, the parties accuse each other of airspace violations.
- March 8 At the 128th MAC secretary meeting, the North denies the South's charge of airspace violations. The South admits one airspace violation but denies 123 accusations (no. 16).
- March 19 South Korea's Foreign Minister "...called on the United Nations to declare explicitly that the armistice had lost all validity..." The opinion was "...that, while the UNC had faithfully

observed its terms, North Korea had flagrantly violated them, 'particularly by the illegal introduction of combat aircraft'" South Korea protests that the NNSC had been rendered incapable of working in North Korea and demands that the Commission be abolished and that the Inspection Teams leave the country.

- April 13            The Swedish NNSC member proposes a withdrawal of all fixed teams in the ports-of-entry teams to Panmunjom. Both sides accept the proposal on August 29.
- April 25            At the 130th MAC secretary meeting, the South admits one of 12 airspace violations (no. 17).
- May 28             North Korea kidnaps ten South Korean fishermen.
- Summer-fall        It becomes increasingly difficult for the NNSC to conduct its work in South Korea.
- June 14            At the 59th MAC plenary meeting, the South protests the North's killings of armed personnel.
- June 16            A US aircraft is attacked over international water. The plane returns safely.
- June 20            At the 133rd MAC secretary meeting, the North denies the South's claim against airspace violations.
- July                The South Korean Chiefs of Staff demand the NNSC be disbanded and South Korea be permitted to develop military strength equivalent to that of the North.
- July 5              At the 60th MAC plenary meeting, the South criticizes the North for rearming. The North asserts that the South had rearmed and that it had observed Paragraph 13(d).
- July 14            At the 61st MAC meeting, the South protests that the North had hindered inspections and built up its combat forces. The North protests that the South defamed the Czech and Polish members and planned to demolish the NNSC.
- August 5            The acting South Korean Foreign Minister requests the NNSC to leave the country on August 13.

- August 6 At the 63rd MAC meeting, the South denies the North's accusation of seizures of fishing boats and fishermen.
- August 21 At the 65th MAC meeting, the South protests against the North's shooting down of an aircraft on August 17. The crew and the aircraft are returned on August 23.
- August-December The South Korean government organizes large-scale anti-NNSC demonstrations.
- September 5 Ports of entry are reduced from ten to six.
- October 18 At the 143rd MAC secretary meeting, the two sides refute each other's protests against airspace violations.
- December 20 At the 145th MAC secretary meeting, the South admits a violation of the North's airspace (no. 18). The North refutes the South's accusations of airspace violations.

### **1956**

- February 11 At the 150th MAC secretary meeting, the two sides accuse each other of airspace violations.
- February 14 At the 68th MAC plenary meeting, the South claims that the Czechs and Poles undermine the Commissions' work.
- March 10 The Swedish NNSC member proposes a temporary withdrawal of fixed teams to Panmunjom.
- April 14 At the 152nd MAC secretary meeting, the South denies the North's charges against airspace violations and shootings.
- May 31 At the 70th MAC plenary meeting, the UNC/MAC declares that all armistice's provisions on the NNSC are suspended.
- June 4 At the 71st MAC meeting, the North demands a withdrawal of the UNC/MAC statement.
- June 5 The NNSC declares in a letter to the MAC that it had agreed to temporarily withdraw its inspection teams to Panmunjom.
- June 7 At the 72nd MAC meeting, the North asserts that the withdrawal would be temporary. The South claims that the

- North had obstructed the work of the NNSC.
- June 8            The MAC declares in a letter to the NNSC that its activities would be suspended from June 9.
- June 9            At an extraordinary meeting, the NNSC agrees to withdraw all inspection teams to Panmunjom. The teams are withdrawn from the South on June 9 and from the North on June 12. The NNSC becomes a “Commission without Supervision.”
- June 16           A US Navy aircraft is attacked over international waters. The plane returns safely.
- June 18           The South Korean National Assembly passes a motion appealing to the UNC to dissolve the NNSC and to expel it.
- July 6             At the 153rd MAC secretary meeting, the South admits the North’s accusation of a violation of its airspace (no. 19).
- October 5          At the 155th MAC secretary meeting, both sides accuse each other of the responsibility for a shooting incident.
- November 7        A South Korean airplane that had crossed the MDL is shot down by North Korea.
- November 10      At the 73rd MAC plenary meeting, the North and the South fail to reach agreement on the November 7 incident. The pilot and the aircraft are returned on November 20.
- 1957**
- May 6             At the 159th MAC secretary meeting, the North rejects the South’s claims of border crossings.
- June 21            At the 75th MAC plenary meeting, the UNC/MAC unilaterally cancels Paragraph 13(d). Reports on combat materials cease.
- June 26            At the 76th MAC meeting, the North requests a withdrawal of the cancellation. The South responds that the MAC is not a proper forum to discuss political issues.
- June 28            At the 161st MAC secretary meeting, both parties accuse each other that personnel who had entered the DMZ had not worn

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|             | armbands.   |
| July 1      | The UNC Headquarter is moved from Tokyo to Seoul.   |
| July 28     | At the 77th MAC plenary meeting, the South claims that until the North observes Paragraph 13(d), it could depart from it. The North urges the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea.   |
| August 31   | At the 164th MAC secretary meeting, the South denies the North's claim that spies had intruded into the North.  |
| October 11  | At the 78th MAC plenary meeting, the North suggests North-South trade across the DMZ, but the South responds that the issue lay outside the Commission's mandate.   |
| November    | North Korea captures 56 South Korean fishing boats for the first time since 1953.   |
| November 4  | At the 165th MAC secretary meeting, the South asserts that the North's protests against kidnappings of fishermen were false.  |
| November 27 | At the 166th MAC secretary meeting, the North protests against border crossings, but the South denies them.   |
| <b>1958</b> | The US Naval Command in South Korea unilaterally establishes the Operational Control Line to prevent fishing boats from sailing into fishing grounds north or east of the five islands under UNC control. North Korea stops returning wreckage.<br><br>North Korea captures nine South Korean fishing boats and 54 fishermen. |
| January 29  | The South Korean press reports that the UNC had stationed nuclear weapons in the country. The North condemns this policy on February 3.   |
| February 1  | At the 80th MAC plenary meeting, the North criticizes the South for armistice violations. The South responds that it observes the armistice.  |
| February 16 | A South Korean civilian airplane is hijacked to North Korea.  |

- February 24      At the 81st MAC meeting, the South requests a return of the plane and passengers, but the North argues that it was not a problem to be solved between the two states' authorities.
- The South rejects a troop withdrawal; it was not an issue for the MAC.
- March 6            An American fighter plane is shot down in North Korea.
- In Panmunjom 26 passengers from the hijacked plane are returned.
- March 10          At the 82nd MAC meeting, the North complains that fighter planes had crossed the MDL. The South admits the intrusion by mistake (no. 20).
- The pilot was returned but without the plane on March 17.
- May 29            At the 179th MAC secretary meeting, the South refutes the North's charges of espionage.
- June 25            At the 182nd MAC secretary meeting, the South denies the North's charges of armed attacks in the West Sea.
- July 2              At the 84th MAC plenary meeting, the North criticizes the US for rearming South Korea by introducing large quantities of nuclear weapons and combat materials.
- July 14             At the 85th MAC plenary meeting, the North requests the withdrawal of nuclear weapons, but the South refuses.
- October 17        A North Korean guard defects in the vicinity of Panmunjom. North Korea remains silent at the 185th MAC secretary meeting on October 20.
- October 27        At the 88th MAC meeting, the North urges the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. The South argues that troop withdrawal should be discussed at a high-level political conference.
- October 28        The last Chinese People's Volunteers are withdrawn.
- November 25      At the 89th MAC meeting, the North urges the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea.

- December 11 At the 90th MAC meeting, the North requests the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea.
- December 19 At the 91st MAC meeting, the South argues that as long as the North does not observe Paragraph 13(d), it would not follow it. The North urges the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea.
- December 29 At the 92nd MAC meeting, the North demands the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea.

### **1959**

- January 3 At the 93rd MAC meeting, the North argues that the American troops obstruct re-unification.
- January 24 At the 95th MAC meeting, the North requires the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea.
- Spring President Syngman Rhee recognizes the work of Sweden and Switzerland in the NNSC to Radio Lausanne.
- April 16 At the 99th MAC meeting, the North urges the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea.
- April 21 At the 192nd MAC secretary meeting, the North protests against border intrusions, but the South rejects them.
- Summer North Korea begins to fortify its checkpoints in the DMZ.
- June 10 At the 103rd MAC plenary meeting, the North urges the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. The South repeats its claim from the 88th meeting claim and argues that the MAC does not have the authority to discuss the issue.
- June 20 At the 194th MAC secretary meeting, the North asserts that spies from the South had intruded into its territory, but the South denies the charge.
- July 21 At the 195th MAC meeting, the South denies the North's claim that personnel had intruded into the North for the purpose of espionage.

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| July 25      | At the 105th MAC plenary meeting, the North urges the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea.  |
| August 20    | At the 106th MAC meeting, the North demands the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea.  |
| September 10 | At the 107th MAC meeting, the North urges the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. The South argues that the troops help to protect freedom and achieve peaceful re-unification.  |
| November 3   | At the 112th MAC meeting, the North demands the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea.  |
| December 23  | At the 199th MAC secretary meeting, the North protests against espionage, but the South denies the claim.  |
| 1960s        | <p>In connection with the Southern Boundary Line South Korea builds ironrailing fences north of the line.</p> <p>The DMZ becomes the world's most heavily militarized zone.</p> <p>North Korea claims its rights to fish in territory extending 12 nautical miles from its shores but South Korea claims three.</p> <p>There are 227 abductees to North Korea compared with 35 in the 1950s.</p> |

## *1960*

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| January 15  | At the 200th MAC secretary meeting, the South rejects the North's claim that a fighter plane had violated its airspace.   |
| February 5  | At the 201st MAC secretary meeting, the South rejects the North's protest against crossings of the MDL by military airplanes.   |
| February 11 | At the 114th MAC plenary meeting, the North criticizes the South for rearming, but the South refers to its cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) in 1957. The South had rearmed only to maintain relative military balance. |

- March 3 At the 115th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the South for rearming, but the South refers to its cancellation of Paragraph 13(d). The South had rearmed only for defensive purposes.
- March 15 At the 116th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the South for rearming and urges the withdrawal of war preparations. The South refers to its cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) which had been made only for defensive purposes.
- March 22 At the 202nd MAC secretary meeting, the South denies the North's claim that a patrol craft escort on January 19 had intruded into the North's territorial waters and escaped.
- April 19 At the 117th MAC plenary meeting, the North blames the South for violating Paragraph 13(d) but the South responds that the cancellation was made to defend South Korea and preserve peace.
- Both sides accuse each other of dispatching spies.
- May 4 At the 118th MAC meeting, the North asserts that the South had brought in brand-new weapons and atomic weapons, but the South rejects the accusations.
- May 19 At the 119th MAC meeting, the South accuses the North of repairing and constructing bunkers and military camp sites in the DMZ and protests its refusal to dispatch a joint observation team (JOT). The North claims that since the Armistice Agreement does not prohibit the construction of buildings in the DMZ for civilian police, the request to dispatch a JOT was foolish.
- May 26 At the 207th MAC secretary meeting, the South admits its violation of the North's airspace on May 2 (no. 21).
- June 24 At the 210th MAC secretary meeting, the South admits the North's claim that on June 18 one shell had fallen on the North's territory (no. 22).
- June 25 At the 120th MAC plenary meeting, the North claims that the US troops obstructs reunification. The South claims that to discuss the claim is a waste of time.

- July 6 At the 211th MAC secretary meeting, the South protests that two armed soldiers from the North had crossed the MDL, one of whom one was killed, but the North asserts that the protest was fabricated.
- July 8 At the 121st MAC plenary meeting, the North claims that to achieve peace in the Korean peninsula the US troops who obstruct re-unification should immediately be withdrawn.
- July 19 At the 122nd MAC meeting, the North requests the withdrawal of US troops, but the South responds that it was not an issue for the MAC.
- July 27 At the 123rd MAC meeting, the North urges a US troop withdrawal.  
  
The North accuses a UNC naval vessel of having intruded on July 22 and fired cannons at a North Korean police vessel on patrol and then disappeared. The South denies the claim.
- August 3 At the 124th MAC meeting, the North criticizes South Korea for having attacked and seized a North Korean patrol vessel on July 30. The South explains that the North's police vessel had fired first and that the ship had been sunk in self-defence.
- August 11 At the 214th MAC secretary meeting, the South claims that the North's protests against intrusions of fishing boats were groundless.  
  
The South rejects the North's protest against intrusions of its airspace.
- September 6 At the 216th MAC secretary meeting, the South admits the North's protest that fighter planes had intruded into its airspace (no. 23).
- September 16 At the 217th MAC secretary meeting, the South admits the North's protest made on September 6 that two F-86 fighters on September 2 had intruded into the North's airspace (no. 24).
- October 6 At the 128th MAC plenary meeting, the North urges the return of the vessel and the dead bodies from the July 30 incident. The South had not raised the vessel, but the fishermen were

- returned via Panmunjom in September-October. When returned, they all undressed.
- October 11 At the 218th MAC secretary meeting, the South refutes the North's protest made on September 16 that a military aircraft had intruded into its airspace on September 13.
- October 25 At the 129th MAC plenary meeting, the North claims that the American troops obstruct re-unification, but the South argues that such an issue should not be discussed in the MAC.
- November 5 At the 220th MAC secretary meeting, the South denies accusations made by the North of shooting incidents in the DMZ.
- The South denies the North's claim made on October 11 that fighter planes had intruded into its airspace.
- November 14 At the 130th MAC plenary meeting, the North criticizes the South for having brought in brand-new weapons, but the South refers to its cancellation of Paragraph 13(d).
- November 29 At the 131st MAC meeting, the North asserts that it had worked to solve the Korean problem peacefully, but the American troops obstructed reunification by rearming South Korea and by making it an outpost for nuclear warfare planned for a second war. Rearmaments should cease and brand-new weapons and combat equipment be withdrawn immediately.
- 1961-66** North Korea captures one-two South Korean boats a year.
- 1961-70** North Korea commits altogether 7,544 armistice violations, of which 7,476 on land, 57 at sea and eleven in the air.
- 1961**
- January 4 At the 132nd MAC meeting, the North accuses the South of having hijacked two fishing boats. The South explains that the boats were armed and argues that it had rescued the boats since there was a risk of them sinking. The parties repeat their

- positions at the 133rd MAC meeting held on January 13.
- January 24 At the 134th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the South for rearming, but the South refutes the claims and blames the North for rearming. The North argues that rearmaments intend to provoke a new war. The South declares that two fishermen had asked to remain in South Korea but the North argued that the South had prevented them from returning by threats.
- March 2 At the 136th MAC meeting, the North argues that the American troops create a war atmosphere by rearming South Korea.
- March 8 At the 137th MAC meeting, the North claims that foreign troops must be withdrawn to peacefully resolve the Korean issue but the South argues that the withdrawal of foreign troops was not an issue to raise in the MAC but at a government level.
- March 21 At the 138th MAC meeting, the North asserts that an American troop withdrawal would lead to peaceful re-unification, but the South argues that a troop withdrawal should not be raised in the MAC.
- April 7 At the 232nd MAC secretary meeting, the South admits the protest made by the North on March 10 against an airspace violation by a military airplane (no. 25).
- April 11 At the 139th MAC plenary meeting, the South claims that the North had captured six torpedo boats and 43 fishermen. The North asserts that an UNC vessel had intruded to capture fishing boats.
- Charges of kidnappings cause an offense and defence from the two sides.
- April 22 At the 140th MAC meeting, the South protests against the North's capture of torpedo boats. The North responds that the incident was not kidnapping but free crossings.
- May 16 Brigadier-General Park Chung Hee seizes power in South Korea.

- June 24 At the 142nd MAC meeting, the North accuses the South of preparing for war and requests a troop withdrawal. The South responds that troops are stationed in South Korea to prevent a new invasion.
- July 6 North Korea signs a 'Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance' with the Soviet Union.
- July 11 North Korea signs a 'Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance' with China.
- July 26 At the 235th MAC secretary meeting, the North claims that spies from the South had intruded into its part of the DMZ, but the South argues that the incidents were fabricated by the North.
- September 16 At the 145th MAC plenary meeting, the North accuses the South of rearming to provoke a new war.
- October 16 NNSC-KPA/CPV relations deteriorate due to quarrels with North Korean drivers in the Swiss camp. The UNC prohibits North Korean drivers from driving to the Swedish-Swiss camp.
- November 25 At the 146th MAC meeting, the North accuses the South of rearming but the South responds that the purpose was to maintain military balance.
- December 25 At the 147th MAC meeting, the two sides accuse each other of rearming. The North accuses the South of war preparations.
- 1962** North Korea introduces the four military lines.
- January 26 At the 149th MAC meeting, the South claims that the UN troops should remain as long as there is an invasion threat.
- April 3 At the 150th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the introduction into South Korea of military equipment and urges the withdrawal of combat materials. The South refers to its position on Paragraph 13(d).
- April 28 At the 151st MAC meeting, the North criticizes the South for rearming.

- The South cites the North Korean General Chief of Staff's statement as evidence of rearmament.
- May 25 At the 152nd MAC meeting, the North criticizes the introduction of combat and operational materials into South Korea and urges their withdrawal. The South refers to its position regarding Paragraph 13(d) expressed at the 75th MAC meeting and asserts that the North had also strengthened its combat force.
- July 10 At the 153rd MAC meeting, the North raises kidnappings by the South of fishermen. The South declares that the incident was under investigation.
- July 20 At the 154th MAC meeting, the South announces that the fishermen and their equipment would be returned.
- August 29 At the 155th MAC meeting, the North claims that the South on August 7 had hijacked fishing boats but the South rejects the claim.
- September 5 Fight breaks out between North and South Korean soldiers. Three North Koreans are killed and two wounded.
- September 15 At the 250th MAC secretary meeting, the South rejects the North's protest made at the 249th meeting convened on August 14 against a shooting incident in the DMZ.
- September 27 At the 156th MAC plenary meeting, the South claims that six armed soldiers had crossed the MDL and caused fighting. The North claims that the South's guards had intruded over the MDL and kidnapped and killed its guards.
- October 5 At the 157th MAC meeting, the North requests the return of its officers but the UNC said that they would be kept detained and that they had requested to live in South Korea.
- October 17 At the 158th MAC meeting, the North asserts that the US Army was making an outpost for nuclear war in South Korea and planning for a second war. The North repeats its request for the return of its officers but the South refuses.

October 22-23 Premier Kim Il Sung proposes on the condition of the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea a North-South peace treaty. Armed forces would be reduced to 100,000 men or less on both sides.

North Korea advocates a peace treaty with South Korea as well in a memorandum addressed to the UN General Assembly on October 8, 1969, at the second round of the North-South Coordinating Committee held on March 14, 1973, and at the Fifth Supreme People's Assembly, Second Session, convened on April 5, 1973.

November 20 North Korean attacks a UNC observation post in the DMZ. One American soldier was killed and another wounded.

November 29 At the 160th MAC meeting, the South's protests against the act by North Korea, which argues that the incident took place among the South's enlisted men.

December 11 At the 252nd MAC secretary meeting, the South denies the North's protest made on October 27 against a shooting incident in the DMZ.

**1963-1965** North Korea constructs fortifications and introduces military forces into their part of the DMZ in violation of the Armistice Agreement that only allows single-shot rifles or pistols. In 1965, most checkpoints had become fortifications.

### **1963**

January 10 At the 253rd MAC meeting, the South rejects the North's claim that more than the jointly agreed 35 guards had been brought into the JSA.

March 8 At the 164th MAC plenary meeting, the parties quarrel about whether the UNC military plane P-2V on February 25 had intruded into the North's airspace or not.

May 3 At the 167th MAC meeting, the North claims that an armed South Korean group had intruded in the West Sea and killed

- two fishermen and kidnapped one. The South responds that the North's claim was false.
- May 17 Two American captains flying an inspection tour become disoriented and are forced down in North Korea.
- At the 168th MAC meeting, North Korea claims that it was an intrusion but the South demands the return of the pilots. A verbal battle occurs due to the exchange of fire in the West Sea.
- June 14 At the 171st MAC meeting, North Korea accuses the UNC of having made violations of its airspace 694 times since 1953.
- June 29 At the 173rd MAC meeting, the North blames the South for having brought in naval destroyers. The South responds that its position regarding Paragraph 13(d) remained unchanged.
- November 16 At the 179th MAC meeting, the South accuses the North of having killed a South Korean captain and wounded a UN soldier on patrol, but the North denies any knowledge of the incident.
- December 26 At the 181st MAC meeting, the North accuses the South of having crossed the border with a patrol on December 17 and fired. The North killed one soldier in self-defence and captured another but the South denies any knowledge.
- 1964** The North makes 17,909 accusations against the UNC of armistice violations. The South makes 1,295 accusations against the North. The number is the highest ever.
- January 16 At the 182nd MAC meeting, the North reports that on January 14 two UNC fighter planes had intruded, one of which was shot down in self-defence. The North accuses the South of having on January 14 and 15 on five occasions crossed its territory with airplanes. The South denies the crossings with the exception of the shot-down plane (no. 26).
- May 16 At the 269th MAC secretary meeting, two American captains are released after the UNC/MAC had signed a prepared receipt (no. 27).

- August 19            At 186th MAC plenary meeting, the North protests that a military airplane had intruded into its airspace on August 14. On August 15, the UNC admitted that the intrusion was due to a mistake (no. 28).
- October 28            At the 192nd MAC plenary meeting, the North criticizes the South for violating Paragraph 13(d). The South refers to its cancellation of the paragraph in 1957.
- November            The “Peace Pagoda” is built in the northern part of the JSA.
- November 13            At the 193rd MAC meeting, the South denies the North’s accusation of seven violations of its territorial waters since October 21 made on October 28.
- The South admits the North’s protest that a military airplane H-21 had intruded into the North’s airspace by mistake (no. 29).
- December 14            At the 195th MAC meeting, the South declares that all the North’s protests against violations of its territorial waters were false.
- December 19            At the 196th MAC meeting, the North accuses the US Army of preparing for a new war.
- The South rejects the North’s claim made on December 14 that a military airplane had crossed the MDL and then escaped.
- December 30            At the 197th MAC meeting, the North blames the South for violating the armistice during 1964 in the air 17 times, at sea 164 times and on land 18,064 times (11,761 more cases than in 1963). The South responds that the incidents were fabricated by North Korea.
- 1965**                    North Korea introduces the three-revolution theory.
- South Korea stations military troops in the DMZ in self-defence.
- The South records 88 provocations from the North against the MDL.

- January 15      At the 198th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the introduction of brand-new weapons into South Korea. The South argues that to maintain relative military balance, equipment has to be introduced.
- January 22      At the 199th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the dispatch of troops to Vietnam but the South responds that it was not an issue to raise in the MAC. The North criticizes the introduction of weapons into South Korea.
- January 28      At the 200th MAC meeting, the North claims that the South is rearming to prepare for a new war.
- March            Premier Kim Il Sung emphasizes in a speech that more intelligence activities are necessary to accomplish the policy targets. Subsequently, spy training centres were set up.
- April 9           At the 205th MAC meeting, the North blames the South for raising tension to start a new war and for demolishing the armistice regime.
- The South criticizes the North for neglecting Paragraph 13(d).
- The accusation by the South that the North prohibits the NNSC's work causes concern within the Czech and Polish delegations, but through mediation by Sweden, the dispute is removed from the agenda.
- May 3            At the 206th MAC meeting, the North claims that a military airplane on April 28 had intruded into its airspace for reconnaissance.
- The South protests that two MIG-17 fighters had approached it over open sea and without warning shot at it.
- May 21           At the 208th MAC meeting, the North claims that a military airplane on May 18 had intruded into its airspace. As a spy plane, it was shot down in self-defence and the pilot killed. The South asserts that the plane was on a routine tour but diverged from its route and admits the armistice violation.
- May 22           At the 209th MAC meeting, the South signs a confession of the May 18 violation (no. 30).

- September 30 The “Freedom House” is completed in the southern part of the JSA in response to the “Peace Pagoda” to beautify the area.
- October 8 At the 215th MAC meeting, the North protests the South’s rearmament in preparation for war. The South claimed that the North had violated Paragraph 13(d) from the start.  
The North criticizes the construction of the “Freedom House” as an act to use the JSA as a place for propaganda.
- October 19 The Polish and Czech NNSC members in a letter to the UNC/MAC express their joint opinion that the northern side should not be discredited because it violates the Armistice Agreement.
- October 25 The UNC/MAC Senior Member replies that he had not been able to find anything that discredits the North.
- October 26 At the 216th MAC meeting, the North protests against the “Freedom House.” The South responds that the house was built to beautify the area and as a resting place for tourists it was not an issue to protest against.
- November 4 At the 217th MAC meeting, the South criticizes the North for having kidnapped more than 100 fishermen on October 29.
- November 30 Since 1953 and the 218th MAC secretary meeting held this day, the North had accused the UNC of 35,127 armistice violations, of which 88 were admitted. Among the 4,714 violations raised by the UNC to the North, two were admitted.
- 1966** The UNC records 80 provocations from the North against the MDL.
- January 5 At the 220th MAC plenary meeting, it is announced that all but two of the 104 captured fishermen had been released.
- January 12 At the 307th MAC secretary meeting, the South asserts that the North’s protests against the introduction of machine guns into the DMZ and shooting and arson incidents in the zone are groundless.

- February 3 At the 222nd MAC plenary meeting, the North protests that the US had brought weapons into South Korea to prepare for war. The South refers to its cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) and criticizes the North's rearmaments.
- March 3 At the 223rd MAC meeting, the parties blame each other for violating Paragraph 13(d).  
The North accuses the South of preparing for a new war.
- March 8 For the first time the NNSC submits a letter to the KPA/CPV expressing different opinions on the introduction of weapons.
- March 11 At the 312th MAC secretary meeting, the South claims that the North's accusations of deliberate shooting towards the northern part of the DMZ and the introduction of machine guns into the zone are groundless.
- March 24 At the 224th MAC plenary meeting, the North blames the South for bringing in new weapons to prepare for war.
- April 23 At the 225th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the South for violating Paragraph 13(d). The South refers to its cancellation of the paragraph, blames the North for rearming and claims that it rearmed to maintain relative military balance.
- April 24 The journey by Lennart Petri, Swedish Ambassador to Japan, via Kaesŏng and P'yŏngyang back to Beijing causes controversies since he had made no report to the South Korean government when he departed.
- April 29 At the 315th MAC secretary meeting, both parties accuse each other of arson incidents and the introduction of heavy firearms into the DMZ.
- May 26 At the 226th MAC plenary meeting, both sides blame each other for rearming. The South asserts that it rearms for defence. The North claims that on May 17 there had been more than 300 rounds fired into its part of the DMZ. On May 18, four armed personnel from the South had crossed the MDL, intruded into the North's territory and fired automatic rifles.

- July 22 At the 227th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the South for bringing in new weapons to prepare for war.
- The South denies both incidents raised on May 26 and claims that they were deliberately fabricated.
- The South claims that in a planned incident on May 27 armed personnel from the North had intruded into its part of the DMZ. Two South Korean soldiers were wounded and one North Korean soldier was killed. The North asserts that the incident was fabricated.
- August 5 At the 228th MAC meeting, the North claims that on July 29 two ships from the South had intruded into its waters and fired at fishing boats.
- The South asserts that nine naval vessels disguised as fishing boats had attacked a South Korean patrol vessel, but the attack was repulsed.
- August 12 At the 318th MAC secretary meeting, the South refutes that the North's protests against the introduction of machine guns into the DMZ are unfounded.
- October 11 At the 229th MAC plenary meeting, the North asserts that a fishing boat had been hijacked by force, but the South responds that the fishermen had freely chosen to come to the South.
- October 21 Armed North Korean agents ambush a South Korean Army vehicle food transport and return. Six South Korean soldiers were killed, three were severely wounded and one was kidnapped. The UNC/MAC regards the incident as the most serious armistice violation so far.
- October 25 At the 231st MAC plenary meeting, the North claims that the UNC had mobilized four tanks in the DMZ and fired hundreds of live shells into its part of the DMZ.
- The North denies the October 21 incident.
- November 17 At the 233rd MAC meeting, both sides accuse each other of violating Paragraph 13(d).

- November 23 At the 324th MAC secretary meeting, the South admits that on November 21 an aircraft had by mistake momentarily intruded into the DMZ.
- December 16 At the 236th MAC plenary meeting, the North criticizes the South for bringing in military equipment. The South claims that they were for defensive purposes.
- 1967**
- North Korea's military expenditures are raised from 12.5 percent in 1966 to 30.4 percent.
- Mine zones are established to prevent North Korean infiltration.
- The South records 784 provocations from the North against the MDL.
- North Korea seizes 67 South Korean fishing boats and kidnaps 352 fishermen.
- North Korea intrudes into South Korea's territorial waters on 31 occasions, involving 86 seamen.
- 1967-69**
- The "Second Korean War" rages.
- January 19 A South Korean patrol boat with a 40-man crew is sunk by the North's shore batteries when escorting fishing boats.
- January 21 At the 239th MAC meeting, the South charges the North Koreans with having sunken the vessel. The North claims that the boat had illegally intruded into its territorial water and that it had acted in self-defence.
- January 31 At the 240th MAC meeting, the North protests the introduction of naval vessels into South Korea as a preparation for war.
- February 10 At the 241st MAC meeting, the South protests that on February 3 armed personnel had crossed the MDL. One of the intruders was killed. The North claims that on February 2 their civilian police had been attacked and denies the protest. A US-made

- gun shown as evidence of the South Korean infiltration had been stolen at the October 21 attack.
- March Kim Il Sung purges two prominent members of his own Kapsan faction due to policy disputes concerning policies towards South Korea.
- March 22 At the 242nd MAC meeting, the North criticizes the US for rearming South Korea. The South claims that the North had neglected Paragraph 13(d) and continuously rearmed.
- North Korean journalist Lee Su-gun defects during the meeting.
- March 23 At the 333rd MAC secretary meeting, the North claims that Lee Su-gun had been kidnapped, but the South emphasizes that he fled voluntarily.
- April 6-7 At the Joint Observer Team meeting, the parties fail to reach agreement on the April 5 incident when three North Korean guards were killed on the UNC side of the DMZ, but the South allows the North to retrieve the bodies.
- April 8 At the 243rd MAC plenary meeting, the parties charge each other with the April 5 incident.
- April 18 At the 245th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the South for having buried mines in the DMZ, but the South refutes the accusation on April 22.
- April 22 At the 246th MAC meeting, the North asserts that on April 20 there were shootings into its part of the DMZ but the South claimed that there were no traces of any shootings.
- May 26 At the 247th MAC meeting, the South protests that on May 22 armed personnel from the North had crossed the MDL and thrown hand grenades into two front-line units of the US Second Army Division, killing two soldiers and wounding 19. The North denies all knowledge.
- The North rejects the South's protests against attacks on April 28 and on April 29.

- June 1 At the 248th MAC meeting, the North claims that on May 27 naval vessels from the South had fired shells along the North's coast.
- The South claims that it was in self-defence.
- June 13 At the 249th MAC meeting, a carbine shown to prove that South Korea had dispatched soldiers into North Korea turned out to have been stolen on October 21, 1966.
- July 27 At the 252nd MAC meeting, the North accuses the South of planning for a second war. The South responded that the North's accusations were false.
- August 16 At the 253rd MAC meeting, the North unleashes anti-American propaganda.
- August 28 Armed North Korean infiltrators attack the US 76th Army Engineer Battalion at the UNC/MAC advance camp. Three soldiers are killed. The attack is regarded as the most serious armistice violation so far.
- September 3 A special unit of the South Korean Army crossed the MDL, causing severe damage to North Korean military installations. One South Korean soldier died in the attack.
- September 8 At the 254th MAC meeting, the South protests the August 28 incident and demands an investigation by a joint observer team, but the North Koreans refuse.
- November 12 South Korean soldiers from a special corps blew up a KPA divisional headquarters but without any casualties being sustained.
- December 12 At the 256th MAC meeting, the South claimed that there had been 181 cases of armed intrusions across the MDL into the South since January 1967, but the North does not admit any cases.
- 1968** The South records 985 provocations from the North against the MDL.

- North Korea seizes 100 South Korean fishing boats and kidnaps 805 fishermen.
- North Korea intrudes into South Korea's territorial waters on 12 occasions, involving 152 seamen.
- January 18 North Korean commando soldiers cross the MDL on a mission to assassinate President Park Chung Hee.
- January 20 At the 260th MAC meeting, the North claimed that due to the "American imperialists" there was no re-unification. The South responds that the UN troops guarantee peace.
- North Korea warns the UNC not to commit provocative acts.
- January 21 North Korean assassination attempt on President Park Chung Hee fails.
- January 23 The American intelligence ship "USS Pueblo" is seized by North Korea off Wonsan.
- January 24 At the 261st MAC meeting, the UNC expresses concern regarding the assassination attempt on President Park Chung Hee and charges North Korea with having illegally seized the Pueblo. The North denies the assassination charges and accuses the US of an aggressive act by infiltrating an armed spy ship.
- In the US, four meetings on how to handle the crisis are held.
- January 26 The NNSC holds a meeting on the Pueblo. The NNSC serves as a liaison organ during the crisis.
- President Park Chung Hee orders the First Army into full combat status.
- January 27 The NNSC declares that North Korea is willing to negotiate over the Pueblo if the Americans stop shaking their fists.
- January 29 Swedish and Swiss NNSC members tell the UNC/MAC Senior Member that the time was ripe for negotiations. The South declares it is willing to negotiate.
- January 31 North Korea announces that the Pueblo issue could be resolved

- through the MAC.
- February 1      The US State Department accepts North Korea's proposal to handle the Pueblo affair through US-North Korean talks held under MAC auspices.
- February 2      The first private US-North Korea General Officers' talks are held on the Pueblo; 29 such meetings are held.
- Premier Kim Il Sung sends a laudatory letter to the Navy unit that had seized the Pueblo.
- February 4      At the second round of US-North Korea talks, no progress is made.
- February 7      At the fourth round of US-North Korea talks, North Korea submits a list of the names of the killed and wounded seamen.
- February 12-15      Special envoy Cyrus Vance meets with the South leaders. The mission secures President Park Chung Hee's agreement not to retaliate for the Blue House raid or impede the Panmunjom talks.
- February 14      At the 262nd MAC meeting, North Korea displays photocopies of "confessions" by five officers of the Pueblo crew.
- The South charges North Korea with armistice violations along the DMZ. The North criticizes the South for having brought tanks and fighter planes into the DMZ.
- February 20      US-North Korea talks reach stalemate at the eighth round.
- February 22      The US rejects the proposal that the crew should be exchanged for "South Korean patriots" imprisoned.
- March              No progress is made in US-North Korea talks.
- March 4          At US-North Korea talks, the North dismisses third-party inquiry.
- March 7          At the 264th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the US for conducting joint military exercises with Japan and South Korea, thereby planning for a new war.
- The South blames the North's rearmaments.

- March 22 North Korea reports that the Pueblo crew state that they are being treated well.
- April 14 North Korean infiltrators attack a truck in the UNC headquarters area and kill four security guards. The South protests the incident on April 15.
- April 18 The 266th MAC meeting on the April 14 attack ends in failure.
- May 2 At the 269th MAC meeting, the South warns that it would take protective measures against North Korean intrusions.
- May 8 At the 16th round of US-North Korea talks, the North presents a draft apology on the Pueblo issue to the US.
- May 17 At the 270th MAC meeting, the North claims that the UNC had initiated gunfire on 46 occasions in May in the DMZ and that three South Koreans spies were arrested on May 6.
- July 8 At the 272nd MAC meeting, the South criticizes the North for rearming. The North blames the South for having brought in military equipment. The South refers to its cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) and claims that replaced weapons were only for defensive purposes.
- The North claims that the intrusion of the Pueblo was evidence of plans for a new war.
- July 25 At the 274th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the South for planning a new war by rearming.
- September 5 At the 277th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the South for rearming.
- The South claims that the North had begun to rearm immediately after the Armistice Agreement was signed.
- The North asserts that the Pueblo's intrusion was part of the policy to provoke a new war.
- The South claims that a North Korean intelligence vessel on August 20 had become disabled during an espionage mission near Cheju Island.

|                      |   |
|----------------------|---|
|                      | The North rejects charges of espionage.   |
| September 17         | At the US-North Korea talks, North Korea again demands that the US accept the May 8 draft statement.  |
| September 30         | At the US-North Korea talks, the North reiterates the conditions for releasing the crew and presents for signature a written document identical to the May 8 draft.               |
| October 10           | At the 23rd round of US-North Korea talks, the North notes the South's agreement to sign the document prepared by North Korea.  |
| October 23           | At the 24th round of US-North Korea talks, the North repeats its demands, but the US express its distaste for the document prepared by the North.                                 |
| October 31           | US-North Korea talks end in failure.  |
| October-<br>November | North Korean commandos land at Ulchin-Samch'ok on October 30 and November 2; 107 of 120 commandos are killed.   |
| December 10          | At the 282nd MAC meeting, the South protests against the "most serious violations of the armistice agreement," but the North denies the accusations.                              |
| December 12          | At the 256th MAC meeting, the UNC claims that there had been 181 armed intrusions across the MDL into the South since January 1967, but the North did not admit any cases.        |
| December 17          | US-North Korea talks are held in which a new UNC proposal is presented.   |
| December 19          | North Korea agrees to the US proposal, but the US statement could not alter the facts in the document. which was verbally repudiated before being signed on December 23 (no. 31). |
| December 23          | The 82-man crew of the Pueblo are released and one corpse is returned via "the Bridge of No Return."  |
| December 24          | At the NNSC meeting, the Commission welcomes the release of the Pueblo crew.  |

- December 30 At the 283rd MAC meeting, both sides give the other the responsibility for tension during 1968.
- 1969**
- North Korea intrudes into South Korea's territorial waters on 25 occasions, involving 68 seamen.
- January 20-  
March 13 The Pueblo crew attends naval hearings but no one was sentenced thanks to the Secretary of the Navy's recommendation in May "...they have suffered enough, and further punishment would not be justified."
- January 28 At the 284th MAC meeting, the North blames the US for introducing weapons into South Korea to train for war. The South criticizes the North for rearmaments.
- March 11 At the 285th MAC meeting, the South asserts that the UN troops protect South Korea and explains that as long as the threat from the North continues the troops would remain.
- March 15 North Korea attacks a UNC patrol replacing poles south of the MDL.  
  
One man is killed and three wounded.
- March 15-16 A North Korean infiltration attempt at sea takes place at Chumunjin along the east coast. The head of the police is killed. The crew drowns when the intruders' rubber boat is sunk.
- March 17 At the 286th MAC meeting, the South protests against the March 15 incident, but the North claims there had been military provocations under the pretext of repairing the MDL markers.  
  
The North accuses the South of having begun firing at Chumunjin. The South protests the incident.
- March 26 At the 287th MAC meeting, the UNC protests the Chumunjin operation, but the North denies that it has anything to do with the incident.

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| April 5     | At the 288th MAC meeting, the North does not provide any guarantees to meet the requests to improve security after the March 15 incident.   |
| April 10    | At the 289th MAC meeting, the North protests that on April 7 an armed group had attacked a guard post in the DMZ. The South protests that the North on April 7 had fired at an UNC guard post, but no solution is reached.                        |
| April 15    | The US reconnaissance airplane EC-121 is shot down by North Korea on a routine flight over open sea.  |
| April 18    | At the 290th MAC meeting, the South charges the North with shooting down the unarmed EC-121, but the North denies.  |
| July 3      | The North Korean spy Lee Su-gun is executed.  |
| July 25     | The Nixon doctrine is announced.  |
| July 30     | North Korean guards knock down four US Military Policemen.  |
| August 14   | At the 291st MAC meeting, the South claims that as long as there is a threat from the North it is necessary to rearm. The North criticizes the South for rearming.<br><br>The North criticizes the South for walking out of the April 18 meeting. |
| August 17   | An unarmed American helicopter on a routine training mission is shot down in North Korean airspace.   |
| August 21   | At the 292nd MAC meeting, the South claims that the August 17 incident was unintentional, but the North accused it of distorting facts.<br><br>No solution is reached.  |
| August 29   | At the 293rd MAC meeting, the North informs that the crew were wounded and that all were receiving medical treatment.   |
| September 4 | At the 294th MAC meeting, North Korea reiterates that it would consider returning the crew on receipt of a document.  |
| October 18  | North Korean intruders ambush a UNC police truck in the DMZ, killing all four American soldiers onboard.  |

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| October 23     | At the 296th MAC meeting, the South charges the North Koreans with the October 18 attack, but the charge is ignored.   |
| December 3     | The South signs an apology and the crew members are released (no. 32).   |
| <b>1970</b>    | North Korea demolishes the Peace Pagoda and builds P'anmungak on the same hill where the pagoda was located.   |
| <b>1970-71</b> | Five attempts by North Korean forces to build tunnels under the southern fence of the DMZ are detected.  |
| January        | There are 63,000 American troops in South Korea but 20,000 were withdrawn in 1970-71.  |
| January 26     | At the 298th MAC meeting, the North blames the South for rearming South Korea and conducting "The Focus Retina" exercise.  |
| Spring         | The Swedish NNSC delegation is reduced to seven men.   |
| June 4         | At the 300th MAC meeting, the North accuses the US of planning for a second Korean War.  |
| June 5         | North Korean gunboats sink the South Korean warship I-2.   |
| June 9         | At the 302nd MAC meeting, the North asserts that the ship was an "armed spy ship" that had opened fire against patrol boats and sunk after exchanges of fire. The South argues that the ship was conducting a routine operation and had shot in self-defence and urges the return of the crew, but the North refuses to provide any information. |
| June 18        | At the 377th MAC secretary meeting, the parties criticize each other for bringing heavy weapons into the DMZ.  |
| June 29        | At the 303rd MAC plenary meeting, the North urges the withdrawal of American troops and accuses the US of planning for a second Korean war.  |
| August 11      | At the 304th MAC meeting, the North blames the South for bringing combat equipment into South Korea and rearming.  |

- September 8 At the 305th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the US for bringing in new combat equipment and by making continuous military provocations maneuvering for war.
- October 9 A Swiss NNSC officer is injured in service after a skirmish between North Korean and UN Military Policemen.
- October 12 Fighting takes place between North Korean and UNC guards.
- October 17 At the 306th MAC meeting, the South protests against the October 9 and 12 incidents. The North declares ‘that UNC guards had got no more than they deserved.’
- October 23 At the 307th MAC meeting, the South requests data on whether the crew from the ship sunken on June 5 were alive or not, but the North refuses. In 2007, the crew still remained in detention.
- November 13 At the 384th MAC secretary meeting, the South refutes the North’s protests against the introduction of trench mortars into the JSA and heavy firearms into the DMZ.
- December 3 A North Korean MiG-15 crashlands on the South Korean east coast.  
The pilot defects.
- December 5 At the 309th MAC plenary meeting, the North urges the return of the pilot and the aircraft but the South repeats its position that the pilot had defected.
- December 16 At the 310th MAC meeting, the North again urges the return of the pilot and the aircraft. At the 316th MAC meeting held on June 2, 1971, the South officially informs the North Koreans that the pilot had decided to remain in South Korea; he was not returned.
- 1971** US soldiers are withdrawn from the DMZ, except along the road to Panmunjom, and replaced by South Korean forces.

- 1971-1980** North Korea commits altogether 49,414 armistice violations, of which 49,371 on land, 26 at sea and 17 in the air.
- 1971-73** The first North-South dialogue is held.
- January 12 At the 311th MAC meeting, the North blames the South for illegally introducing fighter planes and heavy weapons into South Korea.
- The North accuses the South of having dispatched two “armed spy ships” into the North’s territorial waters. One ship was sunk through “self- defensive measures.” The South claims that two unarmed fishing boats had been attacked by patrol vessels in international waters and requested information on the crew of the sunk boat (the other was damaged). Later, the reply was that the 32-man crew had been “sent to the bottom of the sea.”
- The South protests that patrol vessels had attacked fishing boats.
- The North claims that naval vessels had intruded into its territorial waters. Patrol vessels had acted in self-defence but were fired at from land with more than 50 rounds from heavy cannons.
- February 27 At the 312th MAC meeting, the North claims that the “Freedom Vault” exercise violates the armistice. The South confirms that the exercise would be conducted. The exercise aims to protect South Korea and would not violate the agreement.
- The North criticizes the illegal introduction of combat material into South Korea to prepare for war.
- April 1 At the 314th MAC meeting, the North blames the South for introducing combat equipment.
- May 6 At the 315th MAC meeting, both sides criticize each other for re-arming.
- June 12 At the 317th MAC meeting, the South proposes to revert the DMZ into a buffer zone, but the North rejects the proposal.

- July 9                    At the 318th MAC meeting, the North asserts that the South had illegally brought in new fighter planes.
- July 29                    At the 319th MAC meeting, North Korea makes a counter-proposal from the 317th meeting that the South rejects.
- The North blames the UNC for bringing in various kinds of combat equipment into South Korea.
- August 20                The first-ever bilateral North-South discussions through the North and
- South Korean Red Cross organizations are held in the NNSC conference room. Altogether 25 preliminary meetings focusing on divided families are held there in 1971-72.
- August 25                At the 320th MAC meeting, the North urges the withdrawal of American troops and combat equipment from South Korea.
- The North charges the South with having brought weapons into the DMZ and built fortifications in the zone. The South encourages the North to remove its fortifications, but no results were reached.
- September                The “Freedom House” is turned into an office for North-South dialogue.
- November 20-            Eleven rounds of secret talks between representatives of the  
March 22, 1972        Red Cross are held in Panmunjom.
- December 11             At the 325th MAC meeting, the North blames the South for holding the exercise “The South Korea-US Eagle Landing Operation,” but the South responds that it was not an issue to discuss in the MAC.
- The North protests against the US for rearming South Korea and the South blames the North for having demolished Paragraph 13(d) by rearming illegally.

## 1972

- January 26 At the 327th MAC meeting, the South accuses the North of having violated the armistice by erecting fences in the DMZ, but the North makes no comment. The accusations are repeated at the 328th and 329th MAC meetings held on March 2 and March 23 respectively, but the North Koreans do not want to discuss the issue.
- March 23 At the 329th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the South for bringing in brand-new fighter planes, establishing new airfields and holding military exercises.
- April 28 The temporary North-South telephone line becomes official.
- June 22 At the 331st MAC meeting, the South accuses North Korea of building fences and bulwarks in the DMZ, but the North did not respond. The North criticizes South Korea for modernization of its military.
- June 26 Premier Kim Il Sung estimates in an interview that tension in the DMZ could be reduced by the mutual reduction and removal of personnel and installations.
- July 4 The July 4 Joint Communiqué is announced in both Koreas.
- August 25 At the 405th MAC secretary meeting, the South rejects the North's claim that it had brought machine guns into the MAC Headquarter's area and into the JSA, raising tension prior to the scheduled North-South talks. The South also rejects the claim at the 406th secretary meeting held on September 28.
- August 29-  
July 13, 1973 Seven rounds of full-dress talks in Seoul and P'yŏngyang via Panmunjom are the first inter-Korean intercourse.
- September 7 At the 332nd MAC plenary meeting, the North accuses the US of preparing for war by signing "The Korea-US Defence Agreement" and urges the withdrawal of the American troops. The South argues that the demands are inappropriate to raise in the MAC.

- September 22 A direct telephone line is opened between the North and South Korean Red Cross liaison offices.
- October The South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) begins talks.
- December 4 At the 333rd MAC meeting, the North protests against the US for violating Paragraph 13(d). The South responds that there was no other alternative than to restore military balance at the 75th meeting in 1957. The North argues “The US must leave Korea, otherwise peaceful unification is impossible.” The South responds that the MAC should not discuss Korean politics.
- December 13 At the 408th MAC secretary meeting, the North claims that machine guns were placed on vehicles in the UNC’s part of the MAC Headquarter’s area and in the JSA when the North’s Red Cross representatives returned home, but the South claims that no such thing had occurred.

### **1973**

- January 18 At the 334th MAC plenary meeting, the North urges the removal of all war munitions transferred to South Korea. The South explains that Paragraph 13(d) had lost validity since the KPA/CPV had illegally introduced combat equipment.
- February 5 At the 336th MAC meeting, the North blames the US Army for bringing combat equipment into South Korea and charges the South with having conducted firing exercises. The South responds that military exercises are not armistice violations and should not be raised in the MAC.
- March 3-4 North Korean agents kill a civilian South Korean night guard, but the agents were not found.
- March 7 North Korean guards fire on workers, although the South on February 27 had informed that they would replace MDL markers. Two men are killed.

- March 12            At the 337th MAC meeting, the South protests the March 7 attack. The North does not deny that the incident had occurred but alleged that the work party had spied on their facilities.
- The North asserts that the US brings war materials into South Korea to prepare for war and raises tension in the peninsula.
- March 30            At the 411th MAC secretary meeting, the South rejects the North's protests that machine guns had been brought into the JSA.
- April 10            At the 338th MAC plenary meeting, the North criticizes the American troops for conducting "The Guided Missiles Exercise" and military exercises. It proposes a peace treaty, but the South argues that these demands should not be raised in the MAC.
- April 23            At the 339th MAC meeting, the North urges the withdrawal of the American troops and criticizes the US for obstructing peaceful reunification by introducing military equipment and conducting "The Joint South Korea-US Military Exercise" while expressing support for North-South talks.
- May 15             At the 413th MAC secretary meeting, the North asserts that the introduction of machine guns into the JSA is a major obstacle to North-South talks, but the South responds that this claim was unproductive and unnecessary.
- June 28            At the 340th MAC plenary meeting, the North criticizes the American troops for bringing in brand-new combat equipment and conducting large-scale military exercises in preparation for a second war. There are no foreign troops in North Korea and the American troops should be withdrawn from South Korea. The South requests the North not to raise inappropriate issues in the MAC and clarifies its cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) in 1957 due to the North's rearmaments.
- July 25             At the 341st MAC meeting, the North urges the withdrawal of the American troops but the South argues that the issue was inappropriate to raise in the MAC. It criticizes the cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) but the South asserts that the North from the beginning had secretly violated it.

- July 27                    On the 20th anniversary of the Armistice Agreement, South Korea had charged North Korea with 17,437 violations of the agreement. North Korea accused South Korea of 124,000, of which the “US Imperialists” were responsible for 15,730.
- August 23                At the 342nd MAC meeting, the North blames the US for illegally introducing brand-new airplanes into South Korea and conducting the air-space maneuver exercise “Maengsŭp no. 2.” The South responds that the North also carried out military exercises.
- August 28                North Korea breaks off the SNCC talks with the abduction of opposition leader Kim Dae Jung in Tokyo as the excuse.
- August 30                At the 416th MAC secretary meeting, the South denies the North’s protests that machine guns had been brought into the JSA and rejects the charge that it obstructed North-South dialogue; it actively supported it.
- September 6            At the 343rd MAC plenary meeting, the North accuses the US of occupying South Korea, hindering North-South dialogue, modernizing the South’s defence forces and conducting “offensive” military exercises. The South denies the charges.
- October 12              At the 344th MAC meeting, the North accuses the US of illegally occupying South Korea, modernizing the South’s defence forces, conducting large-scale military exercises and preparing for war. The South claims that the North criticizes the South for measures it had itself taken and reminds them of the cancellation of Paragraph 13(d).
- November 5              At the 345th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the South’s military exercises as an armistice violation. The South responds that military exercises are not armistice violations and should not be raised in the MAC.
- November 28            Two North Korean gunboats violate waters contiguous to Soch’ŏng Island. The UNC/MAC Senior Member tells his North Korean counterpart that he had made a serious violation that must not be repeated.

- November-January 1974 North Korea intrude on nine occasions into waters contiguous to the five islands under UNC control in violation of Paragraph 15 to support its claim for the islands.
- December 1 At the 346th MAC meeting, North Korea charges the UNC and South Korea with intrusions by naval destroyers, but the South denies the charges and instead charges two North Korean patrol vessels with violating waters contiguous to the five islands. The KPA/CPV rejects the claim.
- December 24 At the 347th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the South for intruding into its coastal waters, claims its responsibility for the five islands and refutes the South's claim on them. The South protests that the North had obstructed civilian traffic and military ships between Inch'ŏn and Yŏnp'yŏng Island and refutes the North's claim on the islands.

#### **1974**

- January 18 South Korea suggests a "North-South Mutual Non-aggression Pact" that North Korea rejects.
- February 15 North Korean patrol vessels sink the South Korean fishing boat Suwon-ho 32 in the West Sea. South Korea protests the incident, rejects the claim that the boats were "espionage vessels" and urges the return of the fishermen via Panmunjom.
- February 27 At the SNCC talks in Panmunjom, South Korea urges North Korea to confess its responsibility for the February 15 incident, but North Korea refuses and urges confessions and apologies from South Korea.
- February 28 At the 348th MAC meeting, the South protests the February 15 attack on two fishing boats and urges the return of the survivor and the Suwon-ho 33, but the North does not respond.
- March 11 At Red Cross talks held in the NNSC conference room, South Korea Demands repatriation of the fishermen, but in 2007 the whereabouts of the crew still remained unknown.

- March 25 North Korea for the first time proposes a peace treaty with the US that include non-aggression, suspension of rearmaments, withdrawal of American troops and preventing making Korea into a military base for foreign troops.
- April 26 At the 423rd MAC secretary meeting, the North protests against the illegal introduction of heavy firearms and automatic weapons into the MAC Headquarter's area and into the JSA and deliberate arson in the DMZ, but the South argues that the claims were groundless.
- June 7 At the 351st MAC plenary meeting, the North claims that the US, by conducting war exercises in South Korea, obstructed peaceful re-unification and violated Paragraph 13(d) in preparation for a new war. The South refers to its decision at the 75th meeting.
- June 28 North Korean cannon vessels sink a South Korean patrol vessel with a 28-man crew in the East Sea, killing 26 persons. Two were arrested.
- July 1 The 352nd MAC meeting fails to solve the June 28 incident.
- July 2 A South Korean patrol boat sinks a North Korean "espionage vessel" south of the peninsula, but North Korea denies any knowledge and regards the incident as fabricated.
- July 20 A South Korean patrol boat discover an "espionage vessel" on the South's west coast that is captured. Five men are found dead and radar equipment, rubber boats and weapons are discovered, but North Korea denies any knowledge and refuses to receive the corpses.
- August 12 At the 353rd MAC meeting, the North criticizes the US for increasing military aid to South Korea and planning for war.  
  
The North accuses the South of claiming that it had sunk or captured North Korean spy vessels. The North regards these incidents as fabricated.
- September 12 At the 354th MAC meeting, the North blames the US for bringing in combat equipment into South Korea.

The North emphasizes that the Armistice Agreement does not say that the waters contiguous to the five islands are controlled by the UNC.

- October 25      At the 355th MAC meeting, the North accuses the US of violating the armistice by bringing combat materials and nuclear weapons into South Korea, criticizes exercises with missile units, urges the withdrawal of all foreign troops and military equipment and claims that the UNC, while talking about peace, prepares for war. The South replies that due to the North's rearmaments it had cancelled Paragraph 13(d). Exercises that both sides conduct are not an armistice violation.
- The South clarifies that the West Sea islands have always been South Korean territory.
- November 11      At the 428th MAC secretary meeting, the North protests that the South had brought heavy firearms into the MAC Head-quarter's area and the JSA, raising tension. The South rejects the claims and asserts that the North had elevated tension.
- November 15      A South Korean police patrol discovers a tunnel built by North Korea in the DMZ. On November 17, the UNC/MAC shows the tunnel to the heads of the Swedish and Swiss NNSC delegations. When the tunnel is inspected on November 20, one American and one South Korean officer die in an explosion probably caused by mines.
- November 26      At the 356th MAC meeting, the South accuses the North of having built the tunnel, but the North denies any responsibility.
- December 20      At the 357th MAC plenary meeting, the North claims that US troops are illegally stationed in South Korea, wearing UN helmets while rearming the South and threatening peace by the introduction of nuclear weapons into South Korea. The South responds that the North is wasting time by raising issues inappropriate for the MAC.

## 1975

- February 5      At the 358th MAC meeting, the North claims that the US had introduced nuclear weapons and combat material into South Korea and trained for war by conducting military exercises. The South argues that the exercises are necessary and not armistice violations. It points out that the North also carries out exercises.
- February 21     At the 359th MAC meeting, the North protests that on February 15 the South had attacked and sunk a drifting patrol boat on a routine operational tour, but the South asserts that it had found an unidentified vessel intruding into its territorial waters.
- February 26     A South Korean patrol vessel discover two fishing boats which do not answer calls for identification. The patrol vessel followed them and found eight more fishing boats that were moving northwards. When the patrol boat collided with one of the fishing boats, the latter sank.
- March 3          At the 360th MAC meeting, the North accuses the South of “pirate actions“ on the open sea, but the South rejects the claim.
- March 19        The UNC announces that a second tunnel had been discovered in the DMZ. During investigations on March 24, seven enlisted South Korean men die of suffocation from explosive gas stored in the tunnel.
- March 20        At the 361st MAC meeting, the North blames the US for bringing combat equipment and military forces into South Korea and conducting joint exercises for war.
- The South accuses the North of having built the tunnels and urges their destruction, but the North states that the tunnel incident was fabricated by the South to divert attention from its domestic problems.
- Defector Lieutenant Yu Tae-yun reveals that the construction of tunnels within the whole DMZ had begun in 1972 on the order of Kim Il Sung.

- March 21 Defectors Kim Pu-sông and Lieutenant Yu reveal that the main purpose of the tunnels was to quickly dispatch troops into South Korea behind the DMZ and to dispatch spies.
- May 16 At the 433rd MAC secretary meeting, the South rejects the North's protests against bringing in automatic firearms and building fortifications in the DMZ.
- May 27 At the 362nd MAC plenary meeting, the South urges the North to stop building tunnels within the DMZ and to destroy those under construction. The North accuses the South of having built the tunnels.
- June 30 At the 364th MAC meeting, the North protests against the introduction of nuclear weapons into South Korea, but the UNC refers to its cancellation of Paragraph 13(d).  
  
North Korean guards maltreat Major William D. Henderson while the meeting is taking place.
- July 12 At the 365th MAC meeting, the South protests the June 30 attack and urges the North to strengthen discipline among the guards. The KPA argues that the major himself was responsible for the incident. The guards had only acted in self-defence.
- July 30 At the 366th MAC meeting, the North accuses the South of violating Paragraph 13(d) to prepare for a second war and requests the withdrawal of combat equipment. The South refers to the 75th meeting and protests against the North's reinforcements of combat equipment.
- September 3 At the 367th MAC meeting, the North protests the introduction of nuclear weapons into South Korea.
- October 24 At the 368th MAC meeting, the North accuses the US Army of illegally bringing combat equipment into South Korea.
- November 11 The Swiss NNSC member points out that the previous meeting was disturbed by youths shouting "Yankee go home" etc. Demonstrations should be avoided during NNSC meetings.
- December 10 At the 369th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the introduction of combat equipment into South Korea and requests the

withdrawal of nuclear weapons. The South declares that until the North observes Paragraph 13(d), its position will not change.

**1976**

- January 22      At the 370th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the introduction of guided missiles into South Korea to conduct military exercises and accuses the US of preparing an invasion. The South urges the North to observe Paragraph 13(d) and responds that the MAC was not a forum for discussing military exercises that do not violate the armistice.
- April 3          At the 373rd MAC meeting, the North accuses the US of having introduced brand-new weapons into South Korea and conducted military exercises to prepare for a new war. The South responds that exercises were routine measures.
- May 13          At the 374th MAC meeting, the North protests that the US was preparing for war by rearming and by bringing in naval destroyers to conduct large-scale maneuver exercises. The South urges the North to stop raising inappropriate issues in the MAC.
- June 15          At the 443rd MAC secretary meeting, the South rejects the North's protest against the introduction of heavy firearms into the DMZ.
- June 18          At the 376th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the US for preparing for war by introducing nuclear weapons and combat materials into South Korea. The South rejects the statement as inappropriate to the MAC and requests the withdrawal of combat materials brought into North Korea.
- June 28          At the 377th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the US for bringing weapons and ammunition into South Korea and conducting a joint naval exercise in preparation for a new war. The South reiterates its peaceful intent and right to conduct exercises.

- August 5 At the 378th MAC meeting, the North accuses the South of neglecting Paragraph 13(d) and bringing combat equipment into South Korea that should be withdrawn. The South remarks that if the North Koreans observed Paragraph 13(d), it would consider reciprocating.
- The North Korean government claims that the US and South Korea were stepping up plans to invade the North.
- August 6 A UNC work force of four workers and four guards who had gone to prune a poplar tree in the JSA are told that they would be killed if they tried to carry out the task. The work is cancelled.
- August 18 The axe murder, killing two American soldiers, takes place in the JSA when a UNC party prunes a poplar tree.
- August 19 At the 379th MAC meeting, the South protests the axe murder, but the North claims that the South had begun provocations.
- August 21 The poplar tree is cut down in “Operation Paul Bunyan.” KPA Supreme Commander Kim Il Sung apologizes for the incident (no. 3).
- August 23 The American government announced that the North’s regret was “a positive step.”
- August 24 At the NNSC meeting, the Swedish delegate urges the parties to maintain peace within the JSA and by all means prevent a recurrence.
- August 25 At the 380th MAC meeting, the North proposes that the JSA should be divided and security guards from both sides should not have entrance to the other’s side.
- August 28 At the 381st MAC meeting, the US declares that it would accept a division of the Panmunjom area if the KPA closed its four check-points in the South.
- August 29 The UNC accepts the KPA proposal from August 25.
- September 6 Both sides agree to reorganize the Panmunjom area; the UNC and KPA forces would be divided.

- September 16 Division of the JSA is effectuated.
- October 9 At the 382nd MAC meeting, the North claims that the US Army is making war preparations in South Korea. The South urges the North not to waste time by raising issues inappropriate to the MAC.

### **1977**

- May 9 At the 383rd MAC meeting, the North criticizes joint South Korean-US military exercises as war preparations.
- The South claims that one of its soldiers in a group carrying out inspections along the MDL was killed on May 3, but the North refutes the accusation.
- July 1 At the 384th MAC meeting, the North claims that the South neglects Paragraph 13(d) and that the US is conducting military exercises in South Korea in preparation for war. The South responds that military exercises are not an issue for the MAC to deal with.
- July 14 North Korea shoots down a US helicopter that had crossed the MDL by mistake. President Jimmy Carter tenders an apology (no. 33).
- July 16 At the 385th MAC meeting, the parties reach an agreement on returning the crew, who are returned to the UNC through the secretaries meeting held the same day.
- August 1 The KPA Supreme Command unilaterally proclaims a 50-mile military sea zone in the East and West Sea that the UNC rejects on August 2.
- October 26 At the 449th MAC secretary meeting, the South claims that the North had kidnapped two soldiers on October 20 and requests their return, but the North claims that they had defected voluntarily.

- 1978** The Swiss NNSC delegation is reduced from seven to six men.
- May 11 At the 386th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the US for bringing brand-new weapons and military forces into South Korea in preparation for war.
- The South protests that on April 28 an unidentified vessel had without warning fired on approaching patrol vessels. The South fired back in self-defence and sank the boat. The South claims that the vessel was armed, but the North argues that it had nothing to do with the incident.
- May 19 South Korean vessels sink an unidentified boat in the East Sea. Eight survivors are rescued.
- May 27 At the 387th MAC meeting, the boat sunk on April 28 is shown when the South asserts that it was built only to infiltrate.
- The South claims that on May 19 an unidentified boat had intruded into its territorial waters. Since there was no response to a request for identification, they fired warning shots. When the boat fired back, the vessels fired and sank it, but eight survivors were rescued by the South Korean Navy; the North rejects the South's version of the incident.
- June 7 At the 388th MAC meeting, the North again urges the return of the survivors. The South declares that they would be returned.
- June 13 When eight fishermen are returned at the 452nd MAC secretary meeting, they perform a "strip show."
- June 27 At the 389th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the introduction of brand-new fighter planes and bombers into South Korea in preparation for a new war and the conduct of airspace exercises. The South responds that military exercises do not violate the Armistice Agreement.
- July 3 At the 390th MAC meeting, the North claims that on June 27 naval ships had sunk a fishing boat that had been disoriented in South Korean waters and urges the return of the fishermen. The South asserts that an unidentified vessel had intruded

around Paengnyōng Island.

During investigation, a collision took place, whereafter the boat sank. Four of five rescued fishermen were returned at the 453rd MAC secretary meeting held the same day. The returnees repeated the “strip show.”

October 27 At the 391st MAC meeting, the North accuses the South of bringing in fighter planes and combat equipment and urges the withdrawal of brand-new weapons and equipment.

The South announces that a third tunnel had been found under the DMZ on October 17. The UNC protests and urges North Korea to destroy all tunnels, but the North argues that the South had fabricated the incident, which it had nothing to do with since there was no need at all to dig one.

## **1979**

March 22 At the 392nd MAC meeting, the North criticizes the joint exercise “Team Spirit (TS) 79” as a war exercise. The South responds that the Armistice Agreement does not refer to military exercises and points out that North Korea also conducted exercises.

June 22 At the 393rd MAC meeting, the North criticizes the South for bringing combat equipment into South Korea to conduct war exercises. The South claims that because the North had brought in brand-new weapons since the armistice was signed, it had to continue to suspend Paragraph 13(d).

July 1 In a joint communiqué issued in Seoul, President Carter promises continuing military support to South Korea.

July 31 At the 394th MAC meeting, the North claims that the US had introduced fighter planes, bombers, Balkan cannons and naval destroyers to prepare for war.

The UNC blames the North for having fired at a South Korean police patrol vessel on July 21. The boat escaped but was sunk by South Korean patrol boats after an exchange of fire. The

- North rejects the accusation.
- August 31 At the 395th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the introduction of combat materials into South Korea and the preparations for war and urges the withdrawal of the American troops. The South responds that the troops are stationed on the basis of the UN Security Council resolution of July 7, 1950.
- October 2 At the 396th MAC meeting, the North blames the South for introducing combat equipment into South Korea to conduct military exercises.
- October 22 At the 397th MAC meeting, the North blames the South for introducing military forces and weapons into South Korea to prepare for war.

### **1980**

- January 22 At the 398th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the joint exercise “Maegaeks 80” as a war exercise. The exercise should be stopped and all military forces and operational equipment should be withdrawn. The UNC asserts that the exercise was held to defend South Korea. Both the exercise and the troop withdrawal issue were unrelated to the Armistice Agreement.
- March 13 At the 399th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the joint exercise TS-80 and claims that it is a preparation for war. The South argues that military exercises were not an issue to raise in the MAC and notes that the North also conducts exercises.
- April 3 At the 400th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the signing of the South Korea-US Defence Agreement in 1953 and claims that the TS-80 exercise creates a war atmosphere.
- The UNC claims that on March 23 its guards had discovered North Korean intruders, who were killed by South Korean guards.
- On March 25, South Korean military forces discovered an unidentified vessel which fired at South Korean patrol vessels dispatched to investigate it. One man was killed and one

wounded. Five men from the vessel boarded a South Korean fishing boat and killed the captain and two men from the crew and injured two before escaping. A South Korean navy patrol vessel sank the vessel. The North claims that the incidents were entirely fabricated.

May 20 At the 401st MAC meeting, the North blames the South for holding military exercises.

The North protests that on May 12 there had been shootings by cannons, machine guns and automatic weapons at its guard posts in the JSA, but the South claims that the North had deliberately distorted facts.

June 27 At the 402nd MAC meeting, the South asserts that on June 20 a spy boat had intruded into its territorial waters. On June 21, the boat is overturned. Nine men were found dead. One survivor was captured alive.

The North criticizes the South for fabricating the incident to divert attention from the suppression of demonstrations for democratization in Kwangju.

November 11 At the 403rd MAC meeting, the South criticizes the North for having dispatched armed agents on November 3 and killed an innocent civilian. One is killed. Intrusion equipment was found.

The North argues that the fabricated incident was used by the South Korean government to suppress its population by a shock effect.

December 16 At the 404th MAC meeting, the South criticizes the attempted intrusion of armed North Korean agents on December 1. Two were shot to death but the third escaped. The landing craft sank, but the transport ship escaped. On December 2, a clash took place between an unidentified vessel and a Republic of Korea naval vessel. After firing back, the former caught fire and sank. Two intruders and two South Korean soldiers were killed. One intruder survived but was killed on December 6. The North claims that South Korea fabricated incidents with armed agents to suppress democracy activists and students and

urges replacing the Armistice Agreement with a North Korea-US peace treaty.

**1981-1990**

North Korea commits 329,669 armistice violations, of which 329,659 on land, seven at sea and three in the air.

**1981**

February 13 At the 405th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the “TS-81 South Korea- US Joint Exercise” and urges a halt. The exercise is regarded as a war preparation. The South asserts that the exercise is unrelated to the armistice and is aimed to guarantee its ability to protect the Republic of Korea.

July 17 At the 406th MAC meeting, the South reconfirms that the cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) would continue. The North criticizes the US for bringing F-15 and F-16 planes, tanks etc. into South Korea.

August 26 A North Korean missile shoots down an unarmed SR-71 “Blackbird” reconnaissance aircraft.

September 1 At the 407th MAC meeting, the South charges North Korea “with a pre-meditated and unprovoked act of aggression against the UNC” that could seriously threaten peace.

The KPA/CPV responds that the SR-71 “intruded into North Korean airspace to carry out espionage activities” and that the South “fabricated the absurd incident” to slander and defame North Korea at the conference table.

The North claims that the South, under the pretext of “military balance” and “defence,” was busy rearming and planning for a new war.

November 9 At the 408th MAC meeting, the North urges the withdrawal of the US troops and replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty.

December 28 At the 409th MAC meeting, the South points out that it had observed secret military exercises in the North and proposes

that major exercises should be announced in advance. The North criticized that the American troops had brought in brand-new planes and tanks and prepared war exercises.

**1982**

January 23 At the 410th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the US for its rearmament plan and the introduction of F-16 fighter planes and other new weapons into South Korea to prepare for war and urges the withdrawal of the plan. The South asserts that a restoration of Paragraph 13(d) hinges on the North's attitude and that military exercises should not be raised in the MAC.

January 29 At a meeting with the NNSC, the North declares that if an invitation to inspect a military exercise came, he would reject; it could signal approval.

March 9 At the 411th MAC meeting, the North urges a halt to TS-82 and criticizes the introduction of brand-new weapons into South Korea. The UN forces should be withdrawn. The South explains that its exercises, unlike the North's, were open and aimed to preserve peace.

May 4 At the 412th MAC meeting, the North criticizes rearmament in South Korea.

The North claims that on April 21 South Korean soldiers in the DMZ had fired at its civilian police, but the South refutes the claim and argues that the North's civilian police had fired at its civilian police. Exchanges of fire took place for ten minutes. The South fired at a group of armed intruders, who then escaped.

May 16 The KPA/CPV Senior Member telephones his UNC/MAC counterpart to ask for the return of any "bodies" that might be found along the east coast. He claims that some North Korean military personnel were unaccounted for after a training exercise on the evening of May 14.

On May 15, a team of three armed North Korean infiltrators was intercepted. On May 18, the UNC returns the remains of

- the dead soldier at the 465th MAC secretary meeting.
- May 28 At the 413th MAC meeting, the North criticizes rearmament in South Korea.
- The South protests against the North's armed intrusion on May 15, when two soldiers landed on the east coast. The South's guards killed one, but one escaped. The North refutes this version and claims that the men had disappeared during a military exercise.
- June 26 At the 414th MAC meeting, the North claims that the US was planning a second Korean war. The South claims that the North had begun to rearm even before the ink at the Armistice Agreement had dried.
- December 21 At the 415th MAC meeting, the North criticizes joint military exercises and preparations for TS-83 by bringing in brand-new equipment, and claims that war preparations continue. The North urges the withdrawal of the American troops. The South claims that military exercises are unrelated to the Armistice Agreement.

### **1983**

- February Air Force Officer Lee Wung-pyung defects to South Korea, piloting a MiG-19. He reveals that North Korea had set up a "Five to Seven Day Invasion Plan": South Korea would be occupied within a week after the invasion.
- February 3 At the 416th MAC meeting, the North denounces the joint exercise TS-83 and urges an immediate stop. The South asserts that the exercise is conducted only to maintain the armistice and hinder an invasion.
- Military exercises had nothing to do with the Armistice Agreement.
- February 18 At the 417th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the invitation at the 416th meeting of five representatives from the North in the MAC and four NNSC members to observe the exercise; it was a request for recognition of war preparations.

- May 7 Captain Sin Chong-ch'ol defects to South Korea. He provides detailed data on militarization of the northern part of the DMZ.
- May 21 At the 418th MAC meeting, the North argues that TS-83 raises tension and criticizes the introduction of neutron bombs etc. into South Korea in preparation for an “atomic war.”
- June 27 At the 419th MAC meeting, the North blames the South for bringing in fighter bombers and nuclear weapons etc. into South Korea. The South refers to its cancellation of Paragraph 13(d).  
  
The South claims that on June 19 South Korean soldiers on patrol had discovered three armed intruders, who were all killed in a gun battle, but the North asserts that the incident was fabricated.
- July 29 At the 420th MAC meeting, the North criticizes rearmaments in South Korea and accuses the US of raising tension by conducting military exercises. The South explains its cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) and urges the North to reduce tension.
- August 23 At the 421st MAC meeting, the South claims that on August 13 an unidentified vessel had approached the South Korean coast in the vicinity of Ullung Island. When interrogating the vessel, it fired and tried to escape. A navy helicopter then sank the vessel. Three men were killed. The North regards the incident as fabricated and claims that the fish-detector vessel was on its way from the East to the West Sea.  
  
After departing from Japan, a South Korean naval destroyer had bombarded it and an airplane fired at it with missiles. The vessel had sunk farther away from Ullung Island than the South had asserted.
- September 27 At the 472nd MAC secretary meeting, the South rejects the North's protests against the introduction of automatic weapons into the DMZ
- October 9 A North Korean assassination attempt on South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan in Burma fails but kills 17 high-ranking South Koreans.

- October 31 At the 422nd MAC plenary meeting, the KPA/CPV accuses the South Korean military of being behind the Rangoon bombing.
- December 3 Two armed North Korea spies intrude into the Pusan area but they are captured and their boat is sunk.
- December 23 At the 423rd MAC meeting, the North complains that the US had deployed more nuclear bombs and demand the removal from South Korea of all the “illegally introduced” weapons. It urges the withdrawal of American troops and demands the signing of a peace treaty.
- The South claims that the October 9 assassination attempt had generated rising military tension in the Korean peninsula and urges North Korea to cease its acts of terror and violence against South Korea. The North responds that “the real criminal of the Rangoon explosion is none other than Chun Doo Hwan himself.” The purpose was to remain in power. The North regards the intrusion on December 3 as a fabrication.
- 1984** The UNC had charged North Korea with approximately 35,000 violations of the Armistice Agreement. The UNC and South Korea had been charged with 150,000 violations.
- January 10 North Korea proposes three-party talks to sign a US-North Korea peace treaty, withdraw US troops and conclude a North-South Korea non-aggression declaration. South Korea proposes the following day bilateral government talks between the two Koreas.
- February 22 At the 424th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the joint exercise TS-84 as a war preparation and urges an immediate halt. The South clarifies that the exercise is no threat to the North but aims to prevent war.
- March North Korea’s Prime Minister reiterates the demand for three-party talks and rejects the South Korean proposal from January 10.
- June 13 At the 425th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the introduction of combat equipment into South Korea and the reinforcement of military forces. Team Spirit is condemned as

a nuclear war exercise, but the South points out that the North carried out exercises in secret and urges it to take measures to reduce tension and halt rearming.

- September      The Seoul area suffers from flood-like rains. North Korea offers assistance to South Korea.
- September 8      North Korea announces that it has decided to send rice, clothing and cement and requests active cooperation in the delivery. South Korea's Red Cross accepts the proposal on September 14 to improve relations.
- September 29      The direct North-South telephone line re-opens after having been interrupted for eight years and one month.
- November 15      The first round of talks on North-South trade and cooperation is held in the NNSC conference room.
- November 20      The first round of preparatory talks for Red Cross talks is held in the NNSC conference room.
- November 23      The defection of a Soviet citizen leads to gunfire with casualties on both sides.
- November 26      At the 426th MAC meeting, the North argues that the US, by bringing in combat equipment when it delivered relief aid to flood victims and when North-South talks were making progress, obstructed the reconciliatory inter-Korean atmosphere.
- The two sides blame each other for the November 23 incident.

**1985**

- January 25      At the 427th MAC meeting, the North complains that planning for the joint TS-85 exercise while inter-Korean economic and Red Cross talks were being held raised tension. The South responds that the North had neglected the invitation to send observers and that to claim that the exercise aggravated relations was stupid.
- March 21      At the 428th MAC meeting, the North protests that the US, in spite of its warning at the 427th meeting, had brought nuclear

weapons and brand-new combat equipment into South Korea to conduct TS-85 in violation of Paragraph 12 and 13(d) and urges a halt and withdrawal of manpower and equipment. The South argues that the exercise's purpose was to prepare to meet the North's threat. The exercise took place while dialogue made progress in 1976, 1977, 1979 and 1983.

- April 15            The telephone line that connects all NNSC countries is for the first time brought into use.
- May 27-30        At the eighth round of Red Cross talks held in Seoul, the South suggests holding family re-unions on August 15.
- Summer           Mobile TV cameras are installed along both sides of the MDL in Panmunjom for control purposes.
- June 30           The KPA/CPV and the UNC take part in celebrations of the 32nd anniversary of the armistice.
- July 23            The first preliminary contacts on holding inter-Korean parliamentary talks take place in the NNSC conference room
- August 22        The two Koreas agree to hold the first family re-unions in Seoul and P'yŏngyang on September 20-23; they are held as scheduled.
- October 26        At the 430th MAC meeting, the South asserts that on October 20 an unidentified vessel had intruded into the Pusan area. It was an armed intrusion boat and was sunk in a counterattack, but the North rejects the South's version.
- December 6        At the 431st MAC meeting, the North asserts that at a time when North-South economic and Red Cross talks and family re-unions were taking place, military exercises continued. The South argues that the MAC is an inappropriate forum to raise them in and that the Armistice Agreement does not mention military exercises.
- December 31      New Year is jointly celebrated by both the North and the South for the first time.

## **1986**

- January 3            At the 432nd MAC meeting, the North argues that to advance North-South talks military exercises must end. The South points out that without conducting exercises war deterrence is unrealistic.
- January 20           North Korea unilaterally announces that, under the pretext of the Team Spirit exercise, it would suspend all dialogue. Red Cross, parliamentary and economic talks come to an end.
- January 28           At the 433rd MAC meeting, the North criticizes the plan to conduct TS 86 which obstructs North-South dialogue and violates Paragraph 12 and 13(d) and urges an halt. The South argues that the North protests against the defensive exercise are a pretext to break off dialogue.
- March 7              At the 434th MAC meeting, the North claims that the Team Spirit exercise was a preparation for war and violated Paragraph 13(c) and (d).
- The South argues that military exercises are unrelated to the Armistice Agreement.
- May 6                 At the 435th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the TS-86 exercise.
- The North raises the incident on April 24 when a South Korean naval destroyer sank a fishing boat. Two fishermen were killed and four wounded. The South claims that a patrol vessel was dispatched to inspect the boat. When the vessel approached to confirm its identity, the boat did not respond. Fire was exchanged and the boat sank.
- 1987**                North Korea forwards to the UN Security Council a report on “Armistice Agreement violations by the UNC from July 1986 to June 1987 and North Korean initiatives to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula.” The UNC had committed 44,000 violations of the Armistice Agreement during the report period.

- April 3 At the 437th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the South for conducting the joint exercise TS-87 in preparation for a nuclear attack and in violation of Paragraph 13(c) and (d). The South states that since military exercises are unrelated to the Armistice Agreement, they are inappropriate to the MAC.
- September 22 At the 439th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the introduction of combat equipment into South Korea, but the South rejects the claim.
- October 14 At the 440th MAC meeting, the parties accuse each other of sinking boats.
- November 29 A time bomb on Korean Air Lines Flight 858 explodes over the Indian Ocean close to Burma. All 115 passengers are killed.

### **1988**

- February 23 At the 441st MAC meeting, the North criticizes TS-88 as a war preparation, protests the illegal introduction of military personnel and strategic materials from abroad and blames the South for bringing in nuclear weapons in preparation for nuclear war. The South points out that the criticism of the Team Spirit exercise is designed to use the MAC as a forum for unnecessary political propaganda.
- The South protests against the November 29 bombing. The North denies any involvement and argues that it was not an issue to raise in the MAC.
- March 23 At the 490th MAC secretary meeting, the South rejects the North's protests against the introduction of heavy firearms into the DMZ.
- April 1 At the 442nd MAC plenary meeting, the North criticizes TS-88 and urges an unconditional halt. During the exercise, military equipment and aircraft carriers were brought into the Korean peninsula in violation of Paragraph 13(d). The South responds that the introduction of combat equipment was due to the North's rearmaments and emphasizes that Team Spirit is a defensive exercise.

- July 7 President Roh Tae Woo stresses North-South co-existence and co-prosperity in the July 7 declaration.
- July 15 At the 444th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the South for rearming under the pretext of “guaranteeing security during the Olympics” and calls the joint “Ŭlchi Focus Lens Exercise” a preparation for war. The South asserts that the North uses the meeting for propaganda purposes and does not respond to false accusations.
- December 28 South Korea proposes to hold prime minister talks. Following a North Korean counterproposal on January 16, 1989, eight rounds of preliminary talks are held from February 8, 1989 to July 26, 1990 in Panmunjom. Six rounds of prime minister talks are held from September 1990 to February 1992.

**1989**

- January 17 At the 445th MAC meeting, the North urges a halt to the Team Spirit exercise, but the South responds that the issue cannot be solved in the MAC. This is the first meeting closed to the media and diplomatic observers.
- January 24 Both parties’ MAC secretaries, colonels from the CPV and the Republic of Korea and the NNSC alternates have lunch in the Swedish camp.  
  
For the first time since 1961, North Korean and Chinese officers cross the border.
- February 13 At the 446th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the implementation of exercise Team Spirit.
- March 18 At the 447th MAC meeting, the North protests against TS-89, urges an immediate halt and requests the withdrawal of nuclear weapons. The South mentions that military exercises are not referred to at all in the Armistice Agreement.
- May 9 At the 448th MAC meeting, North Korea claims that the US, in preparation for a nuclear war in the Korean peninsula, had stockpiled more than 1,000 nuclear bombs. The South claims

- that it is irrelevant to raise denuclearization as a political issue in the MAC.
- August 8 At the 450th MAC meeting, the KPA/CPV requests the UNC to allow student Im Su-gyông and her attendants to cross the MDL.
- August 15 Im Su-gyông and Father Mun Kyu-hyôn cross the MDL.
- August 21-  
September 1 The joint South Korea-US exercise “89 Ūlchi Focus” is conducted.
- August 22 The UNC/MAC Senior Member calls the North and says that the August 15 crossing was an armistice violation that should not become a usual practice.
- September 12 At the 451st MAC meeting, the North criticizes the US for bringing brand-new F-16 fighter planes and military equipment into South Korea and through military exercises training for a nuclear war. The South points out the North’s recent rearmaments, claims that nuclear weapons are not an issue to raise in the MAC and refers to its cancellation of Paragraph 13(d) in 1957.
- November 30 At the 452nd MAC meeting, the North criticizes the introduction of military equipment into South Korea and the implementation of military and nuclear exercises and urges denuclearization and three-party talks between the two Koreas and the US to discuss the issue. The South responds that military exercises and nuclear weapons are not issues to raise in the MAC but political issues. The South conducts open exercises, but the North does them in secret.
- 1990**
- January 17 At the 453rd MAC meeting, the North urges a halt to large-scale military exercises. The South responds that Team Spirit is not an issue to raise in the MAC but with the South Korean government and invites inspectors to the exercise.

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| March 3        | A fourth North Korean tunnel under the DMZ is discovered.  |
| March 14       | At the 455th MAC meeting, the UNC/MAC protests the tunnel, but the North claims that the tunnel was a false propaganda trick for the South to use for political purposes.<br><br>The North criticizes Team Spirit and asserts that it is an obstacle to inter-Korean dialogue and re-unification. The South claims that the exercise is justified and urges the North to protest to the South Korean government. |
| May            | The remains of five American soldiers from the war are handed over in Panmunjom.   |
| July 23        | At the 456th MAC meeting, the North urges a halt to rearmaments and large-scale military exercises.  |
| August 20      | At the 457th MAC meeting, the North criticizes the illegal introduction of combat materials into South Korea and urges a halt to military exercises. The South asserts that military exercises are unrelated to maintaining the armistice and should not be raised in North-South talks.   |
| October 1      | For the first time, all NNSC delegations participate in the celebration of the anniversary of the Republic of Korea armed forces founded in 1948.  |
| October 12     | At the 458th MAC meeting, the parties quarrel on the crossing of the MDL by an airplane from the South on September 28.  |
| October 14-24  | South Korean musicians and journalists visit North Korea to attend The National Unification Music Festival. For the first time, both governments permit civilians to visit North Korea via Panmunjom.  |
| <b>1991</b>    | Since 1953, the UNC had accused the North of 430,612 violations of the Armistice Agreement whereas the KPA/CPV had accused the UNC of 835,838.   |
| <b>1991-92</b> | The NNSC conference room serves as a venue for meetings between North and South Korea.   |

- 1991-99** 310 corpses of American soldiers from the war are delivered.
- January 8 The NNSC points out the problems associated with appointing a South Korean as UNC/MAC Senior Member in a joint letter addressed to both sides of the MAC.
- February The NNSC makes its last official trip to North Korea.
- February 13 At the 459th MAC meeting, the North protests that Team Spirit '91 is an offensive exercise in preparation for war. The South responds that it well knows the North's position and had invited North Korea to observe it, but the North maintained its standpoint. The meeting is the last plenary session.
- March 25 South Korean Major General Hwang Won Tak is appointed UNC/MAC Senior Member. North Korea subsequently boycotts most MAC meetings and limits contacts with the NNSC.
- March 27 Radio P'yŏngyang declares: "...it is impossible to exchange telephone messages and letters signed by the senior member and to hold meetings with the MAC in the future."
- April 2 The NNSC decides not to respond to the North Korean request to interfere and cancel the appointment of Major General Hwang.
- April 6 *Rodong Sinmun* blames the US for the appointment of Major General Hwang, which is motivated by the wish to avoid replacing the Armistice Agreement with a North Korea-US peace treaty and to remain in South Korea permanently.
- May 9 The KPA/CPV advises that reports on rotations of personnel and replacements of combat materials would be discontinued. The UNC/MAC continues to report on personnel.
- May 22 The UNC/MAC protests the cancellation of reports on rotations of personnel.
- May 23 The North declares that all its formal contacts with the NNSC would cease.

- May 28 The UNC/MAC and the KPA/CPV send a letter to the NNSC regarding the cancellation of exchanges of reports on the rotation of personnel.
- May 31 The KPA/CPV notifies the UNC that there is no need to hold Language Branch Meetings since the North does not receive the South's reports.
- June Gas supplies to the Czech and Polish NNSC delegations' lodging quarters in Kaesŏng are interrupted.
- June 3 North Korea informs the Czech and Polish ambassadors that the NNSC's presence is no longer desirable after the cancellation of the KPA/CPV reports on rotations of personnel and equipment.
- June 6 North Korea does not assist the Czech and Polish delegations with a vehicle after celebrating the Swedish national day.
- June 8 The KPA/CPV informs the Polish Ambassador visiting Panmunjom that the NNSC is not needed.
- June 13 The South Korean Foreign Ministry declares that the Armistice Agreement must remain in force.
- June 16 The North announces that financial support for family visits from Czechoslovakia and Poland would be interrupted.
- August 8 The NNSC urges in a joint declaration to the members of the UNC, South Korea, North Korea and China that they respect the Armistice Agreement, observe its provisions and enable the Commission to implement its tasks.
- August 12 Student representatives from the two Koreas meet for the first time in Panmunjom.
- August 28 NNSC members are prohibited from visiting P'yŏngyang.
- September 17 Immediately after the simultaneous entry by the two Koreas into the UN, transport for the Czech and Polish delegations was no longer provided between Kaesŏng and Panmunjom.
- September 27 President George Bush announces the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from South Korea. All had been removed in

- December 1991.
- October 1 South Korea takes over responsibility for security in the Panmunjom area from the US.
- October 15 The supply of water, electricity and daily necessities to the Czech and Polish NNSC delegations is interrupted.
- November 5-8 Seven South Korean dredgers pass the Han River estuary.
- December 13 The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation (Basic Agreement) is signed.
- December 18 President Roh Tae Woo announces that there are no nuclear weapons in South Korea.
- December 31 The Joint Declaration for the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Joint Declaration) is signed.

## **1992**

- January 8 The KPA/CPV and the UNC/MAC meet at New Year's festivities in the NNSC conference room in the first meeting since the appointment of Major General Hwang.
- February The Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration are ratified.
- Spring North Korea allows the IAEA to inspect the Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear Research Facility.
- May A telephone line is established between the North and South Korean liaison offices in Panmunjom.
- May 12 The KPA returns remains of 15 corpses of American soldiers from the war to the UNC. Another 15 were returned on May 18 and 17 on July 12.
- May 22 South Korean soldiers kill three North Korean soldiers who participated in a patrol in the DMZ. The South protests the incident at the 460th MAC meeting that is held without the North's participation on May 29.
- June 3 The South protests the May 21-22 incident at a secretary meeting, but the North denies it.

- June 23            The UNC Commander declares on the NNSC: "...your presence and contribution to maintaining stability in the Peninsula are more vital than ever."
- August 24        The KPA withdraws its MAC Senior Member.
- August 25        North Korea announces that one Czech and one Polish NNSC member would be allowed to visit P'yŏngyang irregularly and on special occasions. Swedish and Swiss members on journeys to China would not be allowed to visit North Korea and travel by train from P'yŏngyang to Beijing.
- December 29     Agreement is reached between the Czech Republic and Slovakia to let the former take over Czechoslovakia's NNSC mandate.
- December 30     The KPA, MAC and the NNSC are notified of the December 29 agreement.
- December 31     The KPA/CPV proposes to the Swedish and Swiss NNSC members that the Czech delegation should be replaced, that the Czech Republic should not be recognized as successor and that, if inevitable, it would be recognized as successor.

### **1993**

- January 1        When Czechoslovakia is divided, the Czech Republic is willing to take over the mandate. The NNSC and the UNC/MAC support the succession, but North Korea opposes it.
- January 12       The NNSC receives a message from the KPA that the Czech delegate would be withdrawn "...as soon as practically possible." The decision was conveyed to the Czech government the same day. At the MAC secretary meeting, opinions on the status of the Czech delegation differ.
- January 18       The NNSC expresses in a letter its unanimous opinion that the Commission shall consist of four senior officers from four neutral nations. The exclusion could not be effective until a successor state had been nominated. Until the succession issue had been resolved, the NNSC would "...continue to fulfil its duties and missions..."

- January 19 North Korea declares that Czech members are no longer welcome at the NNSC plenary meetings. During the second half of January, supplies of food, electricity, water and clothing are interrupted.
- January 21 The Czech Ambassador in North Korea conveys the government's opinion that the expulsion of the delegation was improper and that it would remain.
- January 26 North Korea tells the Czech delegation to leave within 30 days.
- February 3 At the MAC secretary meeting, the South wants the Czech NNSC delegation to remain. North Korea declares that the selection of a successor state was entirely within the North's jurisdiction.
- February 12 North Korea urges the Czech delegation to report its date of departure by March 1.
- February 25 The Czech government declares that it hopes to succeed Czechoslovakia's membership, that the North should guarantee the delegation's duties and should report its position by March 1.
- The UNC/MAC secretary informs the North that the UNC supports the Czech Republic as successor state, that if North Korea wants to select a third country as successor it should do so quickly and inform the UNC and that the North must take measures to enable the delegation to work until a new member is appointed but on the basis of mutual consent.
- March 2 The KPA/CPV claims that since Czechoslovakia has already disappeared, the withdrawal of the Czech delegation is inevitable.
- March 5 The Czech Republic declares that it would withdraw from the NNSC on April 10.
- March 6 The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses regrets regarding the expulsion of the Czech delegation.
- March 12 North Korea threatens to leave NPT but decides to remain on June 11.

- March 29 At the farewell luncheon in the Swiss camp, the Czech representative thanks South Korean for its support to the NNSC.
- April 3 The Czech NNSC delegation leaves Panmunjom for P'yŏngyang.
- April 10 The Czech delegation leaves North Korea.
- April 13 Sweden, Switzerland and Poland declare that the Czech Republic had succeeded Czechoslovakia as an NNSC member, but while the UNC accepts the declaration, North Korea does not. The departing delegate should have been replaced at the time of departure.
- April 22 The UNC/MAC urges the KPA to nominate a successor state.
- Spring North Korea maintains contacts only with the secretaries of the NNSC delegations. Swedish and Swiss NNSC members are no longer welcome to visit North Korea north of the DMZ.
- August 24 The UNC and North Korea sign an agreement on returning the remains of dead soldiers. On November 30, 33 corpses were returned, followed by 31 on December 7, 33 on December 14 and 34 on December 21.
- October 1993-  
March 1994 Eight preparatory rounds of North-South talks to exchange special nuclear envoys are held. At the eighth round held on March 19, the North's chief delegate warns that Seoul would become "a sea of fire" if war breaks out. The North's delegation walks out and talks end.

### **1994**

- January North Korea's MAC representatives try to achieve agreement on the withdrawal of the NNSC from Panmunjom, but the US refuses.
- March 8 The KPA notifies that two of its four other MAC members had been withdrawn.
- March 25 At the MAC secretary meeting, the parties quarrel over the nuclear issue and deployment of Patriot missiles in South Korea.

- April Both parties cease to supply data on armistice violations that had been provided since 1953.
- April 28 The North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes a proposal to the US to hold negotiations for establishing a peace treaty replacing the Armistice Agreement. North Korea declares that the “NNSC cannot exist since the MAC has disappeared” and urges Poland to withdraw.
- April 29 North Korea pulls out of the MAC.
- Around 40 armed North Korean soldiers appear in the Joint Security Area. After the UNC protests against the action, the soldiers withdraw about three hours later.
- April 30 At the MAC secretary meeting, the South protests against the serious violation that took place for five hours. The North argues that the UNC had threatened them and that the guards’ leader had decided to take defensive measures. The UNC questions this statement.
- The North Korean air force conducts an exceptional exercise with fighter planes heading southwards.
- May 3 The South Korean Ministry of Unification declares that North Korea’s policy to incapacitate the MAC in order to replace the Armistice Agreement with a North Korea-US peace treaty violates the Agreement, Paragraph 62, and the Basic Agreement, Article 5.
- May 6 The UNC/MAC declares its opposition to North Korea’s policy to incapacitate the NNSC, but the North argues that it was not a matter for the South to interfere in.
- May 24 North Korea sets up the KPA Panmunjom Mission to replace the MAC but in reality the organs co-existed. The UNC did not recognize the mission.
- May 30 North Korea removes almost all its equipment from the MAC conference room. Speakers and electric cables are removed from the northern part of the NNSC conference room.

- June Former President Jimmy Carter visits P'yŏngyang and meets President Kim Il Sung, who promises that North Korea would suspend its nuclear programme.
- June 6 The UNC/MAC protests the KPA/CPV withdrawal from the MAC. The Armistice Agreement could only be changed on the basis of mutual consent.
- The South protests North Korea's policy to expel Poland from the NNSC, but the KPA refuses to participate.
- June 10 The IAEA passes a resolution that suspends its technical assistance to North Korea, which responds by announcing its withdrawal from the agency.
- June 22 At the MAC secretary meeting, the North expresses its intention to sign a peace treaty with the US. The South repeats its criticism of the withdrawal from the MAC.
- July 8 Kim Il Sung dies. Since South Korea sends no condolences, virtually no North-South talks are held until 1998.
- August 30 China announces that its MAC Delegation would be withdrawn. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially announces the decision on September 1.
- September 8 At the MAC secretary meeting, the North proposes talks between the KPA and the US Army to replace the non-functioning MAC with a new peace regime. The South responds that the MAC was paralyzed due to the North's policies and that it could not accept the proposal.
- October 21 North Korea and the US sign the Agreed Framework.
- November 15 At the MAC secretary meeting, the South is ready to participate in talks to revise the Armistice Agreement that would involve both parties. The North blames the South for armistice violations and the appointment of a South Korean general as UNC/MAC Senior Member.
- The North Korean Foreign Ministry declares in an official letter to Poland that its mandate in the NNSC had ended.

- December 1 South Korea acquires operational control over the Army in peace-time from the US.
- December 15 Representatives of the CPV are officially discharged in P'yongyang.
- December 17 A US helicopter is shot down by North Korea in the North.
- December 21 The first direct talks between North Korean and US generals take place.
- Agreement is reached on returning the dead corpse, which is returned on December 22.
- December 24 The UNC Commander signs an "official letter of regret" directed to the KPA Supreme Commander on the December 17 incident (no. 34). A US envoy visits P'yongyang from December 28-30 in dialogue away from the MAC for the first time.
- December 30 Pilot Bobby Hall is returned by the KPA.

### **1995**

- January 23 The KPA Panmunjom Mission's representative visits the Polish camp and urges Poland to withdraw by February 28.
- February 3 The Swedish, Swiss and Polish delegations in a letter to the KPA Panmunjom Mission try to protest the policy to expel Poland, but the Head refuses to receive it.
- February 8 North Korea refuses to receive a letter from the UNC/MAC secretary protesting the policy to expel Poland.
- February 9 The Deputy Head of the KPA Panmunjom Mission advises the Polish NNSC delegation at a visit there that they could not move south of the camp and had to leave by February 28. The whole Polish delegation protests by not shaving and wearing civilian clothes from February 10 onwards. The Swedish, Swiss and Polish NNSC delegations send a letter protesting the eviction of Poland.

- February 13 At the MAC secretary meeting, the South declares that it could not accept the withdrawal of the Polish delegation. The KPA argues that there was no point in discussing the issue.
- February 16 The UNC Commander sends a letter to the Supreme Commanders of seven countries with liaison officers in the UNC to request a joint protest against the expulsion through official diplomatic channels.
- February 18 The Deputy Head of the KPA Panmunjom Mission announces at a visit to the Polish camp that all support in terms of cars, telecommunications, electricity and drinking water etc. would end from February 27 and that all North Korean guards and employees would be withdrawn from February 28.
- February 21 The UNC Commander requests China as a signatory of the Armistice Agreement to protest against the policy to expel Poland.
- The North Korean embassy in Warsaw refuses to receive Poland's reply to the North's note regarding the withdrawal of the Polish delegation.
- February 23 The UNC Commander emphasizes in a letter to the NNSC the significance of the Commission.
- February 24 The South Korean Foreign Ministry declares that the expulsion of Poland from the NNSC threatens stability and peace in the Korean peninsula.
- The UNC Commander sends a letter to the Supreme Commanders of the seven nations that had withdrawn their liaison officers in the UNC to request a joint protest against the expulsion of Poland.
- February 25 The UNC Commander delivers a protest to the KPA Commander-in-Chief, Kim Jong Il, but North Korea's position did not change. Subsequently, the Chinese government rejects the Polish request to operate from Beijing.
- February 28 North Korea expels Poland from the NNSC, but Poland continues to participate via South Korea.

- March 2 At the MAC secretary meeting, the KPA claims that the US, by rearming, had raised tension. To resolve such a situation, it proposes holding General Officers' talks.
- March 4 Polish officers leave P'yŏngyang and return home.
- March 28 At the MAC secretary meeting, the KPA again suggests holding General Officers' talks. The KPA criticizes the US for introducing military equipment into South Korea in advance of the Team Spirit exercise.
- The South responds that rearmament took place to meet the threat of war from the North.
- April 24 The NNSC adopts a joint resolution stating that the Armistice Agreement can be revised only by the consent of both sides: North Korea's unilateral act did not change the legal status of the NNSC at all.
- May 3 The KPA Panmunjom Mission announces that both NNSC and UNC personnel are prohibited from crossing the MDL without special permission from 12 p.m. the same day.
- May 4 The KPA closes its NNSC premises in the JSA.
- May 24 The KPA Panmunjom Mission proposes to the UNC that the General Officers' talks should only include North Korea and the US.
- May 25 The UNC insists that generals from South Korea and the United Kingdom should be included among the participants.
- October 5 At the meeting held in Berne, Poland, Switzerland and Sweden in a joint declaration state that North Korea's unilateral measures have no effect on NNSC's legal status.
- 1996** Joint UNC-KPA exhumations of American soldiers begin.
- April 4 The KPA Panmunjom Mission announces that it would no longer keep its responsibilities according to the Armistice Agreement for the maintenance and administration of the MDL and the DMZ since the southern side had violated the

- armistice's provisions. Heavily armed North Korean troops enter the DMZ from April 5 to 7. The UNC/MAC protests against the measures.
- April 9            The North Korean Ambassador to Sweden is called to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs owing to the recent actions.
- April 16           Presidents Kim Young Sam and Bill Clinton suggest to North Korea that four-party talks should be held.
- August 20        The UNC declares that it is willing to hold General Officers' talks if they take place within the framework of the Armistice Agreement.
- October            The UN Security Council adopts a resolution stating that the Armistice Agreement should remain in force until it is replaced by a special peace mechanism.
- September 18    A North Korean submarine runs aground at Kangnūng.
- September 19    The UNC/MAC Senior Member protests the submarine incident, but North Korea refuses to receive the message.
- September 20    President Kim Young Sam declares on the submarine incident: "This is an armed provocation, not a simple repeat of infiltration of agents of the past."
- September 23    North Korea makes an official announcement that the submarine had become disoriented while undergoing training and ran aground.
- September 26    At the MAC secretary meeting, North Korean officers demand the return of the submarine and the crew, but the UNC/MAC insists that the incident should be handled by the South Korean government. Since the submarine had stranded due to engine trouble, the incident was not an armistice violation. The UNC/MAC responds that it was a deliberate armed intrusion and a serious armistice violation and protests strongly.
- October 2         At the MAC secretary meeting, the KPA protests the killings of the crew and claims that the submarine had stranded due to engine trouble, but the South refutes the North's claims.

- November 14 At the MAC secretary meeting, the North urges repatriation of the corpses, but the South claims that the issue should be solved at a government level.
- November 19 At the MAC secretary meeting, the North urges repatriation of the bodies through a military body, but the South asserts a solution at a government level.
- November 26 At the MAC secretary meeting, the North urges repatriation through a military body at Panmunjom but the South wants to resolve the issue at a government level.
- December 3 At the MAC secretary meeting, the North claims that the Armistice Agreement should not be used for political purposes while the South urges a solution at a government level.
- December 17 At the MAC secretary meeting, the North urges that the corpses should be unconditionally repatriated.
- December 29 North Korea apologizes for the submarine intrusion (no. 4). Remains of the 24 dead are transferred at Panmunjom on December 30.
- 1997** The two-kilometre zone north and south of the MDL, as defined in the Armistice Agreement, hardly exists any longer.
- August 12 At the MAC secretary meeting, the KPA blames the South for conducting The Ŭlchi Focus exercise to prepare for war and urges an immediate halt. The South responds that the exercise takes place annually and is defensive. Since military confrontation was serious, to conduct military exercises to maintain peace was a justified act.
- August 14 At the secretary meeting, North Korea urges holding General Officers' talks, but the South does not respond.
- October 17 Two South Korean farmers are abducted by North Korean soldiers near Taesōng-dong village. An UNC patrol urges the soldiers to release the farmers but they refuse. MAC secretary meetings are held on October 17, 19 and 20. After a joint investigation, the two detainees are released on October 21.

December 9-10 The first round of Four-Party Talks is held in Geneva. South Korea and the US asserts that subcommittees to work on a peace regime, tension reduction and confidence-building should be established. Since North Korea argues that the talks should focus on the withdrawal of American troops and the signing of a North Korea-US peace treaty, there was hardly any progress.

## **1998**

February Kim Dae Jung becomes South Korean president and launches the “sunshine policy” to promote peaceful coexistence.

March Business with and travel to North Korea are facilitated.

March 12 At the MAC secretary meeting, the North argues that the MAC could not be restored. The South responds that the talks would not restore the MAC.

March 16-21 The second round of Four-Party Talks is held in Geneva.

June 8 At the secretary meeting, the parties agree to hold the first General Officers’ talks on June 23.

June 16 Chung Ju-yung, Honorary Chairman of the Hyundai Group, and 500 cows cross the MDL. He crosses the MDL through the NNSC conference room again on October 27. This time 501 cows crossed the MDL.

June 22 An armed North Korean submarine intrudes at Sokch’o, but the KPA claims it is unaware of the incident.

June 23 At the first General Officers’ talks, the UNC requests an admission of facts on the submarine intrusion, punishment of those responsible and a guarantee that such an incident would not reoccur, but the KPA refers to engine trouble during an exercise. North Korea emphasizes that the Armistice Agreement should be annulled, but the UNC protests by claiming that the signing of a peace treaty was a political issue that should not be raised at the talks.

- June 26 At the MAC secretary meeting, the KPA refers to engine trouble and requests the return of the crew and the submarine. The South mentions that the incident is under investigation and urges a non-recurrence.
- North and South Korea put the blame on each other for the submarine incident.
- June 30 At the second round of General Officers' talks, the KPA insists that an accident had occurred during an exercise and urges the return of the submarine and the crew. The UNC claims there was no evidence of engine trouble or signals of being shipwrecked.
- July 3 Nine corpses of the crew from the June 22 incident are returned through Panmunjom.
- July 12 A dead armed North Korean soldier is found at Mukho. A mini-submarine was found one kilometre away.
- July 13 At the MAC secretary meeting, the KPA denies the intrusion.
- July 16 At the third round of General Officers' talks, the UNC protests the July 12 incident. The agent was equipped with a pistol and a map of the area.
- The UNC offers to return the corpse, but the KPA refuses, arguing that the South had created the incident. The UNC urges an admission of facts, prevention of a recurrence, punishment of those responsible and an apology, but North Korea blames the extreme-right conservatives in South Korea.
- August 13 At the MAC secretary meeting, the KPA regards the Ŭlchi Focus Lens Exercise as an aggressive and provocative act. The KPA suggests jointly creating "The New House" to discuss joint issues, but the UNC argues that it would be easier to return to the MAC than to create a new body.
- October Agreement is reached on opening Mt. Kŭmgang tours.
- October 21-24 The third round of Four-Party Talks is held in Geneva. Agreement is reached to form two subcommittees that would work on a peace regime and tension reduction.

- November 18      826 South Korean tourists are the first since 1945 to travel to North Korea.
- 1999**              The South Korean Ministry of National Defence announces that 1,125,000 mines are buried south of the MDL.
- The UNC had admitted 117 armistice violations, but in 2004 the opinion was that it had committed only 16 violations, whereas the KPA had accused it of 835,838.
- January 6            At the MAC secretary meeting, the South protests against the intrusion of a North Korean boat on December 17-18 along the south coast. The North explains that the incident was fabricated and returns the protest letter.
- January 18-23      The fourth round of Four-Party Talks is held in Geneva. North Korea wants to discuss the withdrawal of American troops and the signing of a North Korea-US peace treaty. South Korea wants to open a direct telephone line between military authorities, to notify each other of major military exercises and allow limited inspection of them and to exchange visits of military officials. No results are reached.
- February 11        At the fourth round of General Officers' talks, the UNC rejects the KPA proposal to form a three-party body to replace the MAC.
- March 9             At the fifth round of General Officers' talks, the UNC again rejects the KPA proposal.
- April 24-27        The fifth round of Four-Party Talks is held in Geneva. North and South Korea repeat their different positions.
- June                 Mt. Kūmgang tours are temporarily interrupted after a South Korean housewife had allegedly attempted to entice a guide to escape.
- June 15             At the sixth round of General Officers' talks, the parties blame each other for having started on the same day the sea battle in the West Sea in which more than 30 North Korean soldiers were killed.

- June 22 At the seventh round of General Officers' talks, the KPA puts the blame for the June 15 sea battle on the South Korean military and argues that the water area belonged to the North. The UNC claims that North Korea was responsible.
- July 2 At the eighth round of General Officers' talks, North Korea urges the unconditional abolition of the NLL. The UNC argues that the NLL was established to supplement the Armistice Agreement and that the issue should be discussed with the South Korean government.
- July 21 At the ninth round of General Officers' talks, North Korea suggests a new Maritime Border Line.
- August South Korean dredgers are towed in the Han River estuary.
- August 5-9 The sixth round of four-party talks is held in Geneva. No new date to meet is decided.
- August 17 At the tenth round of General Officers' talks, the KPA criticizes the UNC for conducting the Ŭlchi Focus Lens 99 exercise, which it regards as a war preparation. The UNC responds that military exercises are not mentioned in the Armistice Agreement. The regular exercises are conducted to protect the Republic of Korea.
- September 1 At the eleventh round of General Officers' talks, the UNC declares that Ŭlchi Focus Lens 99 had ended without any violence committed.
- The UNC regards the North's rhetorics regarding the exercises as groundless.
- September Swedish and Swiss NNSC delegation chiefs interview a KPA soldier who had disappeared. They confirm his wish to stay in South Korea.
- September 2 North Korea unilaterally declares a military demarcation line in the West Sea, invalidating the NLL.
- October The USS Pueblo is moved from Wŏnsan to the west coast.

- 2000** The UNC/MAC begins publishing statistics only on major armistice violations by the KPA. Altogether 21 UNC-KPA meetings take place, many of which were held due to the building of roads between Munsan and Kaesŏng.
- March 23 North Korea issues “The Order for Navigation to the Five Islands in the West Sea” that opened only two passages two nautical miles wide to the islands.
- June 13-15 The first inter-Korean summit is held in P’yŏngyang. A five-point Joint Declaration is announced on June 15.
- September 25-26 At the first defence ministers meeting ever held on Cheju Island, they declare that settlement of the jurisdiction issue to open the MDL and the DMZ for railway and road connections would be based on the Armistice Agreement. Until the agreement was replaced with a peace treaty, its provisions must be observed. South Korea proposes the establishment of a military hot-line, exchange of information on troop movements and mutual inspection of maneuvers, but North Korea rejects the proposal.
- November 17 At the 12th round of General Officers’ talks, it is decided that the Armistice Agreement will be the basis for opening passages through the MDL and the DMZ of the Seoul-Sinŭiju railway and the Munsan-Kaesŏng road.
- November 28 Working-level talks are held between the KPA and the South Korean Ministry of National Defence on the areas of North-South jurisdiction and military guarantees for the construction of railways and motorways to connect the two Koreas.
- December 5 The second round of working-level military talks is held.
- December 12 President Kim Dae Jung expresses his appreciation of the Swedish contribution to the NNSC to maintain peace in an address to the Swedish Parliament.
- December 21 The third round of working-level military talks is held.

- 2001** Six UNC/MAC Secretariat-KPA Senior Liaison Officer meetings are held in 2001. Staff officers meetings are held four times and a Joint Duty Officers meeting once.
- 2001-2003** 79 corpses of American soldiers from the war are handed over. The UNC/MAC secretary and NNSC officers take part in repatriation four times, in 2002 three times and in 2003 once, at the latter as observers.
- January 31 The fourth round of working level military talks is held.
- February 8 At the fifth round of working level military talks, agreement to build railways and roads is reached.
- Spring The Swedish NNSC delegation is reduced from five to four men.
- April The Head of the Swiss delegation become the first NNSC officer to cross the MDL since 1995, but he visits as a Swiss citizen.
- August 7 The UNC/MAC returns a KPA soldier who had floated into the South through Panmunjom. Swedish and Swiss NNSC members interviewed the soldier.
- November 27 KPA soldiers fire machine-guns from a guard post for a short while.
- One shot hit the UNC's guard post. An UNC investigation team conclude that three shots had been fired. After the UNC had fired six warning shots, the KPA withdrew from an advanced trench. The investigation team regards the incident as a major armistice violation.
- 2002** Fourteen UNC/MAC Secretariat-KPA Senior Liaison Officer meetings are held.
- January 29 President George Bush declares North Korea to be part of "the axis of evil." North Korea regards the inclusion as "a clear declaration of war" and repeatedly urges that it be removed from it.

- February 19-21 President George W. Bush visits South Korea, including the DMZ, on February 20. The night before the visit to the DMZ, a North Korean soldier found south of the zone claims that he had walked towards the southern limit line carrying three machine-guns and had fired one of them. On March 5, the NNSC interviews the soldier, who re-confirms that he does not intend to return.
- June 29 In the second West Sea battle, North Korea sinks one South Korean vessel and five men are killed. One high-speed boat is sunk and five soldiers killed. One North Korean vessel is damaged and ten seamen die.
- July 10 The UNC/MAC protests against the sea battle to the KPA Panmunjom Mission. The incident is regarded as a serious armistice violation, but the North does not make any response. In late July, North Korea for the first time directly expresses its regret to South Korean authorities.
- August 4-23 The NNSC takes part in salvaging the sunk boat.
- August 6 At the 13th round of General Officers' talks, the UNC notifies the KPA about its investigation of the sea battle. Admission of the incident, a promise to prevent a recurrence and punishment of those responsible is urged.
- September 12 At the 14th round of General Officers' talks, agreement is reached on opening the eastern railway based on the Armistice Agreement.
- September 14 At the sixth round of working level military talks, an agreement on the military aspects of opening railways and roads is adopted.
- September 17 North and South Korea sign "The Agreement on Materials for Equipment for Re-connection of Inter-Korean Railways and Highways."
- October 17 North Korea admits that it had been engaged in developing a programme of highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons in violation of the 1991 Joint North-South Declaration but not of the Agreed Framework.

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| December    | The US cuts off oil supplies to North Korea, which reactivates its Yŏngbyŏn nuclear reactor, removes monitoring IAEA devices and tell its inspectors to leave.   |
| December 3  | The removal of mines is completed for the East Sea railway.  |
| December 6  | The removal of mines is completed for the Seoul-Sinŭiju railway.   |
| December 11 | Ten North Korean seamen are the first civilians ever to be returned by sea through the cooperation of military authorities.  |
| <b>2003</b> | North Korea had committed 430,917 armistice violations.<br><br>Thirteen UNC/MAC Secretariat-KPA Senior Liaison Officer meetings are held.  |
| January 10  | North Korea declares its withdrawal from the NPT in response to the US refusal to hold bilateral talks and to the IAEA resolution that demanded that the North should comply with its obligations under the NPT. |
| January 27  | The two Koreas reach “The Agreement on Military Guarantees Regarding Passing Temporary Roads.”   |
| February 14 | An opening ceremony of the land route tour to Mt. Kŭmgang is held.   |
| February 26 | At the MAC secretary meeting, the UNC/MAC protests that KPA soldiers on February 20 had crossed the MDL in the JSA when they removed trees but the North rejected the accusation.                                |
| March 5     | At the secretary meeting, the UNC/MAC protests that the soldiers had been equipped with axes, but the KPA responds that they had only carried out a normal removal of trees.                                     |
| March 12    | At the secretary meeting, the UNC/MAC protests that a North Korean fighter on February 20 had infringed the South’s airspace, but the KPA responds that it had not violated South Korean airspace.               |
| March 21    | The KPA urges the South Korean Ministry of National Defence to suspend propaganda broadcasts directed at North Korea,  |

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|              | but the Ministry notifies that there had been no such broadcasts.  |
| March 26     | North Korea rejects holding staff officer meetings owing to annual US- South Korean military exercises. Regular UNC/MAC-KPA meetings and contacts were interrupted.  |
| April        | North Korea formally withdraws from the NPT.   |
| May 18       | The Swiss Foreign Minister crosses the MDL to visit the Swiss camp and inspect the area on her way to South Korea.   |
| May 24       | The KPA urges the removal of firing camp sites along the MDL, but the UNC/MAC responds on May 27 that no firing camp sites had been built.   |
| May 26       | The KPA notifies the South Korean Ministry of National Defence that accidental firing by machine-guns had taken place due to its lack of attention. The Ministry recognizes the non-hostile intention.   |
| June         | Construction of the Kaesŏng Industrial Complex begins.   |
| June 14      | Railways are ceremonially joined in the DMZ.   |
| July         | Since 1989, 46,611 South Koreans had visited the North and 2,797 North Koreans had travelled to the South.   |
| July 16      | North Korean soldiers fire four shots with machine-guns at a South Korean patrol at an observation post in the DMZ. The South Korean soldiers fire 17 shots at the observation post. The UNC/MAC regards it as the most serious incident in two years.                             |
| August 27    | The KPA asserts that accidental firing had taken place on the eastern front due to lack of attention. The South Korean Ministry of National Defence urges that since the attack on South Korean checkpoints could raise tension, measures should be taken to prevent a recurrence. |
| August 27-29 | Six-party talks are held in Beijing.   |
| <b>2004</b>  | Thirteen UNC/MAC-KPA secretary and staff officer meetings and contacts take place.   |

- February 25-28 The second round of six-party talks is held in Beijing.
- May 12 The Deputy North Korean Ambassador to the UN asserts in an interview that “all countries with troops in the Korean peninsula should sign an eternal peace treaty.” It would “mean a peace treaty signed by North Korea, South Korea and the United States.”
- May 26 At the first North-South Korea General Officers’ talks, tension reduction during the crab-fishing season is discussed.
- June 3-4 At the second round of North-South Korea General Officers’ talks, agreement is reached to suspend propaganda activities and remove equipment along the MDL. Half the propaganda equipment is removed in the same month.
- June 23-26 The third round of six-party talks is held in Beijing.
- November 16 North Korea claims that South Korean soldiers had crossed the MDL on the west front, but a UNC investigation group rejects the claim.
- December The Kaesŏng Industrial Complex begins production.
- 2005** Seven UNC/MAC-KPA contacts take place.  
The NNSC is assigned confidence-building measures.
- June The Heads of the Swedish and Swiss NNSC delegation interview a North Korean defector who wants to stay in South Korea and who had been well treated.
- June 7 One million South Koreans had visited Mt. Kūmgang.
- July 20 Representation-level talks are held in Panmunjom to implement the June 2004 agreement.
- July 26-August 7 The first session of the fourth round of six-party talks is held in Beijing.
- August 12 At the representation-level talks held in Panmunjom to implement the June 2004 agreement, both Koreas confirm that propaganda equipment directed against the other side had

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|                 | been removed.  |
| September       | The US imposes financial sanctions on North Korea's account in Banco Delta Asia (BDA).   |
| September 13-19 | The second session of the fourth round of six-party talks is held in Beijing.<br><br>An agreement on North Korea's denuclearization is reached on September 19. A statement on adopting a peace regime in the Korean peninsula is adopted. |
| November 9-11   | The first session of the fifth round of six-party talks is held in Beijing.  |
| <b>2006</b>     | One UNC/MAC-KPA contact takes place.<br><br>Military expenditure amounts to 25-33 percent of GDP in North Korea but only three percent in South Korea.   |
| March           | The NNSC verifies that "The Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration/Foal Eagle Exercise" is purely defensive.<br><br>The Commission makes a field trip to the northwest islands.   |
| May             | The NNSC makes a tour to the First Marine Corps division in P'ohang and to Ullungdo Island.  |
| Summer          | Sweden decides to expand its NNSC delegation to five men.  |
| July 4          | North Korea launches seven missiles. The UN Security Council adopts a resolution warning North Korea not to manufacture and spread weapons of mass destruction.  |
| October 9       | North Korea carries out a nuclear test. Subsequently, the UN Security Council unanimously adopts resolution 1718 against North Korea.  |
| November        | One Swedish and one Swiss NNSC member accompany the UNC/MAC, the Republic of Korea Advisory Group and the Republic of Korea Army on inspections in the DMZ.  |

- November 7 At the NNSC consultation held in Stockholm, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland stress that the Armistice Agreement is the only legal instrument to avoid hostilities in the Korean peninsula until it is replaced by a peace treaty and that the work through the Commission will continue.
- December One Swedish and one Swiss NNSC member accompany a helicopter exercise by the UNC.
- December 18-22 The second session of the fifth round of six-party talks is held in Beijing.
- December 27 Two North Korean soldiers are repatriated by the UNC/MAC via the JSA. The soldiers were interviewed by personnel from the NNSC.
- 2007**
- Altogether 3,696 South Korean fishermen had been abducted since 1953 but 3,267 had been returned while 428 remained.. The total number of abductees was 3,795, 480 of which had not been returned.
- The South Korean and US defence ministers agree that South Korea will assume wartime operational control of its forces on April 17, 2012.
- January 18 A KPA delegation walks across the MDL into the South and one from the UNC/MAC into the North to repair telecommunications. Swedish and Swiss NNSC delegates monitor the event.
- January 23 The NNSC holds its 3000th meeting.
- February 8-13 The third session of the fifth round of the six-party talks is held in Beijing. An agreement on denuclearization is reached on February 13.
- March The Commission verifies the exercise “Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration/Foal Eagle.”
- May The NNSC supervises the repatriation of the remains of a few UNC soldiers from the Korean War.

- May 8-11 At the fifth round of North-South Korea General Officers' talks, an agreement is reached on military security for the experimental railway traffic that takes place on May 17.
- June The BDA issue is solved.
- July 6 North Korea officially declares that it has suspended the nuclear facilities at Yŏngbyŏn.
- October 2-4 The second inter-Korean summit is held in P'yŏngyang. In the October 4 declaration for the development of relations, peace and prosperity, it is agreed "to end the state of military antagonism and cooperate for easing tension and guaranteeing peace."
- November 27-29 At the second defence minister talks held from November 27-29 in P'yŏngyang, the parties pledge to ease tension and guarantee peace, to solve disputes through talks, to prevent clashes in the West Sea and guarantee peace, to end the armistice and create a peace regime and to form a plan for military guarantees for exchanges and cooperation.
- December 5 An agreement is reached at the 35th round of working-level talks held on military guarantees for railway freight traffic in Munsan-Kaesŏng to take place on December 11.

## 2008

- March The NNSC participates for two days as observers in the inspection of the contested northwest islands.
- March 27 North Korea expels eleven South Korean officials from the inter-Korean economic cooperation office in Kaesŏng in protest against the South Korean Minister of Unification's statement on March 19 on the North's nuclear problem.
- June The number of South Korean tourists to Mt. Kŭmgang reaches 1.9 million.
- July 11 A South Korean tourist is shot to death at Mt. Kŭmgang. Tours are suspended.

- August 8 North Korea blames the US for armistice violations and criticizes the Swedish and Swiss NNSC delegations. On August 11, North Korea urges the UN Security Council to spread the critical radio message as an official document. The message requests replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty and regards the NNSC as part of the enemy. The message is delivered while the Commission observed the US-South Korean Ŭlchi Freedom Guardian exercise.
- October 2 Working-level inter-Korean military talks are held in Panmunjom.
- October 27 Working-level inter-Korean military talks are held near the border.
- November 24 North Korea notifies South Korea that it will suspend tours for South Koreans to Kaesŏng and cross-border rail services from December 1 in protest against South Korea's hard-line policy. The number of South Koreans allowed to stay in the Kaesŏng Industrial Complex would be halved.

## 2009

- January 17 North Korea's military threaten a "posture of all-out confrontation" against South Korea.
- January 30 North Korea claims that all the agreed points with regard to ending political and military confrontation, the 1992 Basic Agreement and the points on the West Sea military boundary line in its appendix would be nullified. South Korea regrets the statement and urges North Korea to return to dialogue. The Ministry of Defence raises the level of alert on the West Sea.
- March 2 The UNC and the KPA hold General Officers' talks to discuss ways to ease border tension. No tangible results are reached..
- March 6 The UNC and the KPA hold General Officers' talks but the agenda is not revealed.
- March 9 North Korea cuts off the only remaining phone and fax channel and closes the border owing to the opening of a US-South

- Korea military exercise. The border is closed three times during the exercise.
- March 21 North Korea restores the military communication channel and reopens the border for South Koreans to the Kaesŏng Industrial Complex.
- April 5 North Korea launches a long-range rocket. South Korea condemns the test.
- The UN Security Council condemns the test on April 13.
- May 25 North Korea conducts its second nuclear test. South Korea and the UN Security Council condemn the test.
- May 27 North Korea declares that it is no longer bound by the Armistice Agreement due to South Korea's decision on May 26 to join the Proliferation Security Initiative. The UNC rejects the nullification on May 28.
- June 12 The UN Security Council approves resolution 1874 against North Korea's nuclear test. On June 13, North Korea denounces the resolution.

**Violations claimed by Both Parties of the Armistice  
Agreement, 1953-1994**

| Year | Violations by North Korea |     |       |       | Violations by the UNC |     |        |       |
|------|---------------------------|-----|-------|-------|-----------------------|-----|--------|-------|
|      | Air                       | Sea | Land  | Total | Air                   | Sea | Land   | Total |
| 1953 | 28                        | 0   | 11    | 39    | 135                   | 0   | 17     | 152   |
| 1954 | 20                        | 1   | 1     | 22    | 261                   | 0   | 14     | 275   |
| 1955 | 12                        | 0   | 3     | 15    | 100                   | 396 | 31     | 527   |
| 1956 | 2                         | 0   | 2     | 4     | 19                    | 0   | 3      | 22    |
| 1957 | 9                         | 1   | 50    | 60    | 55                    | 2   | 76     | 133   |
| 1958 | 7                         | 3   | 86    | 96    | 44                    | 0   | 28     | 72    |
| 1959 | 1                         | 0   | 208   | 209   | 13                    | 8   | 19     | 40    |
| 1960 | 0                         | 6   | 177   | 183   | 19                    | 6   | 200    | 225   |
| 1961 | 5                         | 8   | 723   | 736   | 13                    | 137 | 2342   | 2492  |
| 1962 | 0                         | 3   | 608   | 611   | 15                    | 44  | 1542   | 1601  |
| 1963 | 0                         | 6   | 979   | 985   | 14                    | 107 | 6217   | 6338  |
| 1964 | 0                         | 1   | 1 294 | 1295  | 14                    | 98  | 17 797 | 17909 |
| 1965 | 2                         | 2   | 493   | 497   | 6                     | 88  | 6 650  | 6744  |
| 1966 | 0                         | 3   | 708   | 711   | 1                     | 87  | 8 201  | 8289  |
| 1967 | 1                         | 8   | 485   | 494   | 17                    | 82  | 7 578  | 7677  |
| 1968 | 1                         | 2   | 777   | 780   | 18                    | 68  | 9 022  | 9108  |
| 1969 | 1                         | 16  | 505   | 522   | 10                    | 1   | 8 515  | 8526  |
| 1970 | 1                         | 8   | 904   | 913   | 16                    | 1   | 9864   | 9881  |
| 1971 | 0                         | 4   | 2 479 | 2483  | 20                    | 2   | 11 981 | 12003 |
| 1972 | 0                         | 0   | 5160  | 5160  | 8                     | 1   | 8 644  | 8653  |
| 1973 | 0                         | 8   | 5 407 | 5415  | 11                    | 45  | 6 219  | 6275  |
| 1974 | 0                         | 2   | 4 983 | 4985  | 78                    | 10  | 21 997 | 22085 |
| 1975 | 15                        | 4   | 5 232 | 5251  | 46                    | 18  | 25 426 | 25490 |
| 1976 | 1                         | 0   | 7220  | 7221  | 84                    | 17  | 28 507 | 28608 |

| Year | Violations by North Korea |     |         |        | Violations by the UNC |      |         |        |
|------|---------------------------|-----|---------|--------|-----------------------|------|---------|--------|
|      | Air                       | Sea | Land    | Total  | Air                   | Sea  | Land    | Total  |
| 1977 | 1                         | 0   | 2945    | 2946   | 73                    | 0    | 23234   | 23307  |
| 1978 | 0                         | 3   | 2 256   | 2259   | 58                    | 2    | 23 173  | 23233  |
| 1979 | 0                         | 1   | 5 382   | 5383   | 79                    | 0    | 25297   | 25376  |
| 1980 | 0                         | 4   | 8 307   | 8311   | 42                    | 1    | 13 736  | 13779  |
| 1981 | 2                         | 0   | 3692    | 3694   | 85                    | 0    | 23788   | 23873  |
| 1982 | 0                         | 0   | 11826   | 11826  | 161                   | 1    | 26 002  | 26164  |
| 1983 | 1                         | 2   | 4 070   | 4073   | 209                   | 2    | 67 168  | 67379  |
| 1984 | 0                         | 0   | 2130    | 2130   | 177                   | 3    | 26 819  | 26999  |
| 1985 | 0                         | 1   | 11 461  | 11462  | 142                   | 4    | 26 000  | 26164  |
| 1986 | 0                         | 0   | 37404   | 37404  | 171                   | 2    | 37 041  | 37214  |
| 1987 | 0                         | 0   | 105234  | 105234 | 132                   | 5    | 101 791 | 101928 |
| 1988 | 0                         | 1   | 96 831  | 96832  | 38                    | 7    | 115 691 | 115736 |
| 1989 | 0                         | 3   | 38 154  | 38157  | 3                     | 11   | 45 306  | 45320  |
| 1990 | 0                         | 0   | 24610   | 24610  | 1                     | 8    | 33 486  | 33495  |
| 1991 | 0                         | 1   | 15 676  | 15677  | 2                     | 0    | 26771   | 26773  |
| 1992 | 0                         | 0   | 8726    | 8726   | 5                     | 0    | 17426   | 17431  |
| 1993 | 0                         | 2   | 7 333   | 7335   | 4                     | 5    | 16 966  | 16975  |
| 1994 | 0                         | 0   | 525     | 525    | 0                     | 0    | 1310    | 1310   |
| Sum  | 110                       | 104 | 425 057 | 425271 | 2409                  | 1269 | 831895  | 835573 |

\* **Source:** Kim, “Hyujŏn ihu ssangbang chŏngjŏn hyŏpchŏng wiban,” in Hapch’am chŏngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chŏngjŏn wiwŏnhoe p’yŏllam: che 7 chip (2004-2006)*, 2006, pp. 187-8. Violations are based on “Monthly Statistics of Violations of the Armistice Agreement” prepared by North Korea and the UNC for the other side. Data for 1994 end in April. Statistics were not delivered from May 1994.

\* **Notes:** Numbers have been checked by the author. Violations on land refer to shootings in the DMZ, crossings and intrusions over the MDL, the introduction of heavy firearms into the DMZ, building of camp sites, establishment of hinders, laying mine fields, not wearing identification, violations in the Han River estuary and the Joint Security Area etc. Violations at sea and in the air refer to intrusions, shootings and kidnappings etc. From Hapch’am chŏngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chŏngjŏn wiwŏnhoe p’yŏllam: che 5 chip*, 2001, p. 180.

## a) 1953–1959

|                           | 1953 | 1954 | 1955 | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 |
|---------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Air                       | 135  | 261  | 100  | 19   | 55   | 44   | 13   |
| Sea                       | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 2    | 0    | 8    |
| Land                      | 17   | 14   | 4    | 3    | 76   | 28   | 19   |
| Armed attacks             | 0    | 1    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    |
| Shootings, DMZ            | 6    | 1    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 2    | 13   |
| Intrusion (spies)         | 10   | 7    | 3    | 1    | 3    | 2    | 5    |
| Heavy & automatic weapons | 1    | 2    | 0    | 0    | 11   | 1    | 1    |
| Military camps            | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    |
| No armbands               | 0    | 1    | 0    | 0    | 61   | 23   | 0    |
| Others                    | 0    | 2    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    |
| Total                     | 152  | 275  | 104  | 22   | 133  | 72   | 40   |

\* **Source:** Lee, *JSA – P'anmunjŏn (1953-1994)*, 2001(a), p. 367.

\* **Notes:** The number of confessed incidents in the air were 13 in 1953, 13 in 1954, four in 1955, two in 1956 and seven in 1958, that is, altogether 39. The number of confessed incidents on land were ten in 1953 and two in 1954. The total numbers were 23 in 1953, 15 in 1954, four in 1955, two in 1956 and seven in 1958, that is 51. Lee does not record his source for this and the following tables. The statistics on confessions here refer to all confessions made and are therefore higher than in the text. The author has checked the sums in this and the following tables and altered them when they do not match.

## b) 1960–1969

|                           | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | 1964  | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 |
|---------------------------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Air                       | 19   | 13   | 15   | 14   | 14    | 6    | 1    | 17   | 18   | 10   |
| Sea                       | 6    | 137  | 44   | 107  | 98    | 88   | 87   | 82   | 68   | 1    |
| Land                      | 200  | 2342 | 1542 | 6210 | 15794 | 6650 | 8201 | 7558 | 9001 | 8453 |
| Armed attacks             | 0    | 0    | 0    | 4    | 2     | 0    | 0    | 0    | 37   | 3    |
| Shootings, DMZ            | 11   | 52   | 219  | 48   | 19    | 25   | 69   | 325  | 474  | 104  |
| Intrusion (spies)         | 2    | 3    | 2    | 13   | 9     | 11   | 31   | 0    | 15   | 9    |
| Heavy & automatic weapons | 66   | 51   | 34   | 716  | 2256  | 319  | 639  | 1034 | 2763 | 2571 |
| Military camps            | 0    | 7    | 0    | 0    | 0     | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    |
| No armbands               | 119  | 2207 | 1265 | 5392 | 15472 | 6295 | 7435 | 6172 | 5678 | 5754 |
| Others                    | 2    | 22   | 22   | 37   | 36    | 0    | 27   | 27   | 34   | 12   |
| Total                     | 225  | 2492 | 1601 | 6331 | 15906 | 6744 | 8289 | 7657 | 9087 | 8464 |

\* **Source:** Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 367-8.

\* **Notes:** The number of confessed incidents in the air were nine in 1960, six in 1961, two in 1962, six in 1963, five in 1964, three in 1965, one in 1966, one in 1967, two in 1968 and one in 1969 (36). The number of confessed incidents at sea were one in 1962 and two in 1965 (three). The number of confessed incidents on land were two in 1961, one in 1962 and one in 1966 (four). The total numbers were nine in 1960, eight in 1961, four in 1962, six in 1963, five in 1964 and 1965, two in 1966, one in 1967, two in 1968 and one in 1969 (43).

### c) 1970–1979

|                           | 1970 | 1971  | 1972  | 1973 | 1974  | 1975  | 1976  | 1977  | 1978  | 1979  |
|---------------------------|------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Air                       | 16   | 21    | 8     | 11   | 38    | 27    | 55    | 37    | 59    | 29    |
| SR-71                     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0    | 40    | 71    | 27    | 36    | 0     | 50    |
| Sea                       | 1    | 2     | 1     | 45   | 40    | 20    | 19    | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| Land                      | 9826 | 13163 | 10723 | 6219 | 21997 | 26081 | 30004 | 22631 | 23998 | 25410 |
| Armed attacks             | -    | -     | -     | -    | -     | 4     | 2     | 1     | 1     | 1     |
| Armed attacks             | 0    | 4     | 1     | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| Shootings, DMZ            | 185  | 177   | 86    | 285  | 42    | 36    | 95    | 324   | 400   | 656   |
| Intrusion (spies)         | 3    | 23    | 6     | 10   | 4     | 0     | 2     | 3     | 7     | 1     |
| Heavy & automatic weapons | 2603 | 4393  | 6566  | 2399 | 4498  | 7619  | 8798  | 4924  | 5971  | 6596  |
| Military camps            | 0    | 84    | 56    | 347  | 218   | 578   | 782   | 129   | 837   | 240   |
| No armbands               | 7032 | 8460  | 3955  | 3133 | 17140 | 17755 | 20249 | 17097 | 16642 | 17680 |
| Others                    | 3    | 22    | 53    | 45   | 95    | 89    | 76    | 153   | 140   | 236   |
| Total                     | 9843 | 13186 | 10732 | 6275 | 22115 | 26199 | 30105 | 22704 | 24057 | 25489 |

\* **Source:** Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), p. 368.

\* **Notes:** The number of confessed incidents in the air was one in 1970.

### d) 1980–1989

|                           | 1980  | 1981  | 1982  | 1983  | 1984  | 1985  | 1986  | 1987   | 1988   | 1989  |
|---------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|-------|
| Air                       | 15    | 6     | 5     | 21    | 5     | 4     | 1     | 4      | 7      | 3     |
| SR-71                     | 31    | 79    | 156   | 189   | 172   | 137   | 170   | 128    | 38     | 0     |
| Sea                       | 1     | 0     | 1     | 2     | 3     | 4     | 2     | 5      | 4      | 11    |
| Land                      | 27171 | 23857 | 26176 | 25846 | 26519 | 25948 | 37041 | 101309 | 115687 | 45286 |
| Armed attacks             | 1     | 5     | 3     | 0     | 1     | 1     | 0     | 3      | 0      | 0     |
| Armed attacks             | 0     | 0     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0      | 0      | 0     |
| Shootings, DMZ            | 343   | 104   | 233   | 201   | 94    | 79    | 89    | 76     | 68     | 30    |
| Intrusion (spies)         | 17    | 2     | 1     | 3     | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0      | 0      | 0     |
| Heavy & automatic weapons | 7994  | 8388  | 10769 | 9978  | 9493  | 8360  | 12730 | 39690  | 57507  | 28310 |
| Military camps            | 338   | 65    | 1163  | 1023  | 163   | 569   | 740   | 1791   | 1216   | 902   |
| No armbands               | 18262 | 15105 | 13666 | 14480 | 16649 | 16319 | 22927 | 59543  | 56329  | 15544 |
| Others                    | 216   | 188   | 340   | 161   | 119   | 620   | 555   | 206    | 567    | 500   |
| Total                     | 27218 | 23942 | 26338 | 26058 | 26699 | 26093 | 37214 | 101346 | 115736 | 45300 |

\* **Source:** Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 368-9.

\* **Notes:** Lee writes on p. 369 that for propaganda purposes the North claimed that the South had committed 115,000 serious violations of the Armistice Agreement in one year but did not say that their own guards in the DMZ did not wear armbands on some 5,000 occasions. Both sides carried heavy weapons in the zone.

e) 1990–1993

|                           | 1990  | 1991  | 1992  | 1993  |
|---------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Air                       | 0     | 2     | 5     | 4     |
| SR-71                     | 1     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| Sea                       | 8     | 0     | 0     | 5     |
| Land                      | 33486 | 26771 | 17426 | 16966 |
| Armed attacks             | 0     | 1     | 3     | 3     |
| Armed attacks             | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| Shootings, DMZ            | 19    | 17    | 9     | 9     |
| Intrusion (spies)         | 0     | 0     | 0     | 0     |
| Heavy & automatic weapons | 16211 | 15229 | 10220 | 10329 |
| Military camps            | 3201  | 1157  | 643   | 1192  |
| No armbands               | 13740 | 10317 | 6487  | 5407  |
| Others                    | 315   | 50    | 64    | 26    |
| Total                     | 33495 | 26773 | 17431 | 16975 |

\* Source: Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), p. 369.

## a) 1953–1959

|                           | 1953 | 1954 | 1955 | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 |
|---------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Air                       | 28   | 20   | 12   | 2    | 9    | 7    | 1    |
| Sea                       | 0    | 1    | 0    | 0    | 1    | 3    | 0    |
| Land                      | 11   | 1    | 3    | 2    | 50   | 86   | 208  |
| Armed attacks             | 0    | 0    | 1    | 2    | 0    | 0    | 1    |
| Shootings, DMZ            | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 1    | 0    |
| Intrusion (spies)         | 5    | 1    | 1    | 0    | 2    | 1    | 1    |
| Heavy & automatic weapons | 1    | 0    | 1    | 0    | 0    | 2    | 9    |
| Military camps            | 1    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 1    | 1    |
| No armbands*              | 1    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 48   | 80   | 194  |
| Others                    | 3    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 1    | 2    |
| Total                     | 39   | 22   | 15   | 4    | 60   | 96   | 209  |

\* **Source:** Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), p. 369.

\* **Notes:** Guards in the DMZ had forgotten to wear armbands. The number of confessed incidents on the ground were two in 1953 and two intrusions of spies in 1957. Admissions thus differ from the text.

## b) 1960–1969

|                           | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 |
|---------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Air                       | 0    | 5    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 2    | 0    | 1    | 1    | 1    |
| Sea                       | 6    | 8    | 3    | 6    | 1    | 2    | 3    | 8    | 2    | 16   |
| Land                      | 175  | 723  | 608  | 979  | 1294 | 491  | 708  | 482  | 777  | 505  |
| Armed attacks             | 2    | 1    | 4    | 7    | 1    | 1    | 15   | 69   | 175  | 21   |
| Shootings, DMZ            | 5    | 21   | 5    | 21   | 15   | 4    | 7    | 12   | 165  | 59   |
| Intrusion (spies)         | 4    | 11   | 1    | 3    | 3    | 1    | 11   | 110  | 232  | 60   |
| Heavy & automatic weapons | 79   | 168  | 154  | 99   | 89   | 26   | 40   | 73   | 127  | 105  |
| Military camps            | 2    | 25   | 5    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 2    | 15   | 230  |
| No armbands*              | 76   | 461  | 438  | 834  | 1180 | 459  | 635  | 212  | 50   | 30   |
| Others                    | 7    | 36   | 1    | 15   | 6    | 0    | 0    | 4    | 13   | 0    |
| Total                     | 181  | 736  | 611  | 985  | 1295 | 495  | 711  | 491  | 780  | 522  |

\* **Source:** Lee, *ibid.*, 2001a, pp. 369-370.

\* **Notes:** Guards in the DMZ had forgotten to wear armbands. The number of confessed incidents on the ground were two in 1960, one in 1963, one in 1964, one in 1965 and three in 1967, all intrusions by spies. Admissions differ from the text but why is unclear.

c) 1970–1979

|                           | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 |
|---------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Air                       | 1    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 15   | 1    | 1    | 0    | 0    |
| Sea                       | 8    | 4    | 0    | 8    | 2    | 4    | 0    | 0    | 3    | 1    |
| Land                      | 1082 | 2628 | 5866 | 6069 | 5870 | 7914 | 8865 | 3039 | 2235 | 5361 |
| Armed attacks             | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 1    | 1    | 0    | 0    | 1    | 0    |
| Armed attacks             | 4    | 10   | 0    | 1    | 1    | 0    | 1    | 1    | 0    | 0    |
| Shootings, DMZ            | 40   | 98   | 118  | 63   | 3    | 4    | 4    | 2    | 0    | 1    |
| Intrusion (spies)         | 26   | 19   | 0    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 6    |
| Heavy & automatic weapons | 494  | 927  | 933  | 954  | 611  | 865  | 1140 | 503  | 102  | 201  |
| Military camps            | 487  | 1159 | 1675 | 848  | 686  | 618  | 627  | 403  | 234  | 1566 |
| No armbands*              | 29   | 404  | 3158 | 4159 | 4461 | 6355 | 7065 | 2122 | 1891 | 3573 |
| Others                    | 2    | 11   | 2    | 43   | 106  | 70   | 27   | 7    | 6    | 14   |
| Total                     | 1091 | 2632 | 5886 | 6077 | 5872 | 7933 | 8866 | 3040 | 2238 | 5362 |

\* **Source:** Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), p. 370.

\* **Notes:** Guards in the DMZ had forgotten to wear armbands.

d) 1980–1989

|                           | 1980 | 1981 | 1982  | 1983 | 1984 | 1985  | 1986  | 1987   | 1988  | 1989  |
|---------------------------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|
| Air                       | 0    | 1    | 0     | 1    | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0      | 0     | 0     |
| Sea                       | 4    | 0    | 1     | 3    | 0    | 1     | 0     | 0      | 1     | 3     |
| Land                      | 8318 | 3693 | 10826 | 4070 | 2131 | 11567 | 37403 | 105231 | 96831 | 38209 |
| Armed attacks             | 0    | 1    | 0     | 0    | 1    | 0     | 0     | 0      | 0     | 1     |
| Shootings, DMZ            | 9    | 9    | 54    | 7    | 2    | 8     | 82    | 47     | 6     | 1     |
| Intrusion (spies)         | 4    | 2    | 4     | 1    | 0    | 0     | 0     | 0      | 0     | 0     |
| Heavy & automatic weapons | 1311 | 1248 | 5450  | 2492 | 1415 | 2851  | 5960  | 10582  | 23944 | 14970 |
| Military camps            | 1136 | 1671 | 1949  | 461  | 455  | 1935  | 280   | 1523   | 1199  | 2323  |
| No armbands*              | 5843 | 760  | 3328  | 1109 | 258  | 6561  | 30758 | 92293  | 69136 | 17521 |
| Others                    | 15   | 2    | 40    | 0    | 0    | 212   | 323   | 786    | 2546  | 3393  |
| Total                     | 8322 | 3694 | 11826 | 4074 | 2131 | 11568 | 37403 | 105231 | 96832 | 38212 |

\* **Source:** Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 371.

\* **Notes:** Guards in the DMZ had forgotten to wear armbands.

e) 1990–1991

|                           | 1990  | 1991  |
|---------------------------|-------|-------|
| Air                       | 0     | 0     |
| Sea                       | 0     | 0     |
| Land                      | 25201 | 11917 |
| Armed attacks             | 0     | 0     |
| Shootings, DMZ            | 3     | 3     |
| Intrusion (spies)         | 0     | 0     |
| Heavy & automatic weapons | 9515  | 1102  |
| Military camps            | 1027  | 1047  |
| No armbands*              | 13883 | 9354  |
| Others                    | 773   | 411   |
| Total                     | 25201 | 11917 |

\* **Source:** Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), p. 371.

\* **Notes:** Guards in the DMZ had forgotten to wear armbands. According to Jhe (*op. cit.*, 2000, p. 105), the number of violations claimed in 1992 was 8,726, in 1993 7,336, in 1994 2,880, in 1995 1,235, in 1996 811, in 1997 556, in 1998 476 and, until June 1999, 117. Almost all claims were made against land violations and none against air violations. The number of sea violations was very low: two in 1993, one in 1996, two in 1998 and one in 1999.

(Unit: number of times)

## a) 1953–1959

|                                   | 1953 | 1954 | 1955 | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 |
|-----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Rearmaments                       | -    | -    | -    | 2    | 1    | 1    | 1    |
|                                   | 1    | 3    | -    | 2    | 5    | 4    | 7    |
|                                   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Violations in the DMZ             | 2    | 2    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    |
|                                   | 3    | 9    | 6    | 1    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| a) MDL crossings                  | 2    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                   | -    | 5    | 4    | 1    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| b) Shootings                      | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                   | 1    | 3    | 2    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| c) Building military facilities   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                   | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| d) Introduction of heavy firearms | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    |
|                                   | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| e) Violating rules in the JSA     | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                   | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Intrusion of spies                | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 4    |
|                                   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Airspace intrusions               | -    | -    | 1    | -    | 1    | 3    | 2    |
|                                   | 4    | 3    | 2    | 1    | 1    | -    | 1    |
|                                   | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    |
| Reconnaissance flights            | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                   | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Shooting down airplanes           | -    | -    | 2    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |

|  | 1953 | 1954 | 1955 | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Violations at sea  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    |
|  | -    | -    | 1    | 1    | -    | -    | 2    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Sinking fishing boats                                    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Hijacking fishing boats and returning fishermen          | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 3    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Obstruction of returning prisoners-of-war                | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | 7    | 5    | -    | 2    | 1    | 1    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| MAC provisional procedures                               | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Repairs to the MAC Headquarters Area                     | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Advance notification of MAC meetings <sup>1</sup> agenda | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| NNSC activities  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | 8    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Obstructions of the NNSC's work                          | -    | 1    | 1    | 1    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | 4    | 3    | 1    | 2    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| JOTs and entry of personnel into the DMZ                 | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | 3    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| DMZ civil police's arms                                  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Airfields in the DMZ                                     | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | 2    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |

|   | 1953 | 1954 | 1955 | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Disposal of corpses in the DMZ                                  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | 4    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Work in the DMZ   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | 3    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Opening of the DMZ for North-South exchanges                    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    |
|   | -    | 2    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 2    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| MDL border markers  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | 3    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Identification of personnel, vehicles and aeroplanes            | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | 3    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Navigation of civilian boats in the Han River                   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | 2    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Arrival and departure of personnel and replacement of equipment | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | 3    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Withdrawal of foreign troops                                    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | 2    | 1    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Criticism of political issues                                   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | 2    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |

\* **Source:** Kukbang chôngbo ponbu, *Kunsa chôngjôn wiwônhoec p'yôllam: che 2 chip*, 1993, pp. 453-7.

\* **Notes:** a) The original has been reorganized by the author. b) The upper row refers to UNC/MAC, the middle to KPA/CPV and the lower to commonly raised issues.

b) 1960–1969

|   | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Rearmaments                             | -    | -    | 2    | 2    | 1    | 3    | 4    | 2    | -    | 1    |
|   | 8    | 8    | 6    | 2    | 3    | 6    | 6    | 3    | -    | 5    |
| Reduction of military forces            | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Defending suspension of Paragraph 13(d) | -    | 4    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Large-scale military exercise           | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    |
| Violations in the DMZ                   | 1    | 1    | 7    | 9    | 2    | 6    | 11   | 12   | 12   | 9    |
|   | 1    | -    | 5    | 15   | 8    | 18   | 9    | 20   | 37   | 17   |
| a) MDL crossings                        | -    | 1    | 2    | -    | -    | 1    | 5    | -    | 2    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | 2    | 2    | 2    | -    | -    | -    |
| b) Shootings                            | -    | -    | 5    | 6    | 1    | 1    | 5    | 12   | 5    | 6    |
|   | -    | -    | 4    | 9    | 5    | 7    | 4    | 15   | 21   | 11   |
| c) Militarization of the DMZ            | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    |
| d) Building military facilities         | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| e) Introduction of heavy firearms       | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 2    | 1    | -    | 1    | -    |
|   | 1    | -    | -    | 2    | 1    | 6    | 3    | 5    | 13   | 4    |
| f) Espionage acts                       | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | 3    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| g) Intrusions                           | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 2    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 2    |
| h) Kidnappings of personnel             | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| i) Deliberate arson                     | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| j) Guards' identification marks         | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| k) Violation of rules in the JSA        | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | 2    | -    | -    | 3    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 3    | -    | -    | 2    | -    |
| Opening of the DMZ/MDL                  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    |
| Intrusion of spies                      | -    | 1    | -    | -    | 3    | 3    | -    | -    | 7    | -    |
|   | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    |

|                                      | 1960 | 1961 | 1962 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 |
|--------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Airspace intrusions                  | -    | -    | -    | 5    | -    | 3    | -    | -    | 1    | -    |
|                                      | -    | 2    | 3    | 2    | 6    | 5    | 2    | 2    | 4    | 2    |
| Shooting down airplanes              | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 5    |
|                                      | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Returning airplanes and crew         | -    | -    | -    | 8    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                      | 2    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Returning pilot                      | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                      | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Violations at sea                    | 2    | 6    | 2    | 3    | 1    | -    | 3    | 1    | -    | 2    |
|                                      | 2    | 6    | 8    | 14   | 10   | 10   | 4    | 6    | 10   | -    |
| Intrusion of spy vessels             | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 3    | -    |
|                                      | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Violations in the Han River estuary  | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                      | -    | -    | 2    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Kidnapping fishermen                 | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                      | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 2    | -    |
| Returning fishermen                  | -    | -    | 1    | 2    | 2    | 3    | 1    | 4    | -    | -    |
|                                      | 2    | 5    | 2    | -    | 1    | 5    | -    | 1    | -    | -    |
| Delays of MAC meetings               | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                      | -    | -    | -    | 1    | 4    | 7    | 2    | 3    | 1    | 1    |
| Political propaganda in the MAC      | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 2    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                      | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 2    | -    | -    |
| Obstructions of the NNSC's work      | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                      | -    | 1    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| JOT investigations                   | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                      | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Withdrawal of foreign troops         | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|                                      | 2    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Criticism of the other side's system | 1    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | 4    | -    | -    | -    | 1    |
|                                      | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 3    | 7    | 1    | 6    | 2    |

\* **Source:** Kukbang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 457-464.

\* **Notes:** a) The original has been reorganized by the author. b) The upper row refers to UNC/MAC and the lower to KPA/CPV. c) For 1963, "airspace intrusions" include reconnaissance flights but the distribution is not recorded. d) For 1964, "DMZ shooting incidents" include the Han River estuary but the distribution is not recorded. e) For 1965, "intrusion of spies" includes spy vessels but the distribution is not recorded. f) For 1960, opening of the DMZ/MDL refers to the DMZ and for 1966 the MDL.

c) 1970–1979

|  | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Rearmaments                                | 1    | 2    | -    | -    | 1    | 1    | 1    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | 4    | 6    | 1    | 9    | 5    | 5    | 6    | -    | 3    | 6    |
| Reduction of military forces               | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Introducing nuclear weapons                | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | 2    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Large-scale military exercise              | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | 1    | 1    | -    | 5    | 2    | 2    | -    | 2    | -    | 2    |
| Violations in the DMZ                      | 12   | 14   | 4    | 7    | 2    | 4    | 11   | 2    | 1    | 4    |
|  | 13   | 28   | 14   | 13   | 16   | 12   | 13   | 4    | 7    | 13   |
| a) Shootings                               | 4    | 4    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 1    | 1    | -    | -    |
|  | 2    | 8    | 6    | 7    | 8    | 5    | 7    | 2    | 2    | 6    |
| b) Building fortifications                 | -    | 1    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | 2    | 1    | -    | -    | 2    | 1    | -    | 1    | -    |
| c) Erecting barriers                       | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | 3    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 3    |
| d) Introduction of heavy firearms          | 1    | 1    | 2    | 2    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | 7    | 9    | 6    | 5    | 8    | 5    | 7    | 2    | 3    | 4    |
| e) Building tunnels                        | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | 1    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| f) Intrusions                              | 3    | 2    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | 1    |
|  | 3    | 5    | 1    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    |
| g) Kidnapping of civilians                 | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| h) Non-enforcement of markers for rules    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| i) Violation of rules in the JSA           | 1    | 5    | -    | 3    | -    | 1    | 6    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | 1    | 4    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| j) Proposal to discuss security in the JSA | 3    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| k) Proposal to remove military facilities  | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| l) Proposal to investigate violations      | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |

|   | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Intrusion of spies                        | 3    | 3    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | 2    | 2    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Airspace intrusions                       | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 4    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | 3    | 4    | 1    | 1    | 2    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    |
| Reconnaissance flights                    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | 2    | 2    | 2    | 6    | 1    | 7    | -    | -    | 4    |
| Attacking civilian airplane               | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Shooting down airplane                    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Violations at sea                         | 1    | 1    | -    | 1    | 1    | 1    | -    | -    | 3    | 2    |
|   | 2    | 1    | 1    | 3    | 3    | 2    | 2    | -    | 2    | -    |
| Intrusion of spy vessels                  | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Violations in the Han River Estuary       | 2    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | 2    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Sinking military ships                    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Sinking fishing boats                     | -    | -    | -    | -    | 2    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Delays of MAC meetings                    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | 2    | 4    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Advance notification of agenda in the MAC | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Proposal to investigate violations        | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| JOT investigations                        | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Withdrawal of foreign troops              | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | -    | -    | -    | 5    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Criticism of the other side's system      | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|   | 4    | -    | 2    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |

\* **Source:** Kukbang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 464-471.

\* **Notes:** a) The original has been reorganized by the author. b) The upper row refers to UNC/MAC and the lower to KPA/CPV. c) For 1972, "criticism of the other side's system" includes military treaties but the distribution is not recorded. d) For 1973, "withdrawal of foreign troops" includes reduction of military forces but the distribution is not recorded. e) For 1975, "sinking fishing boats" also refers to attack by the KPA.

d) 1980–1990

|  | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Rearmaments  | -    | -    | 1    | 1    | -    | 1    | 1    | -    | -    | 1    | -    |
|  | 2    | 5    | 5    | 5    | 2    | 1    | -    | 1    | 3    | 5    | 1    |
| Production and storage of nuclear weapons            | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 2    | -    |
| Large-scale military exercise                        | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | 5    | 1    | 3    | 4    | 1    | 2    | 4    | 1    | 3    | 5    | 4    |
| Defending Team Spirit, reconnaissance flights        | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Notification of exercises and invitations to inspect | -    | -    | 1    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Violations in the DMZ                                | 2    | 3    | 2    | 6    | 1    | -    | 3    | -    | -    | 1    | 2    |
|  | 6    | 10   | 4    | 6    | 2    | -    | 1    | 2    | 1    | 3    | 2    |
| a) MDL crossings                                     | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| b) Shootings   | -    | -    | 1    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | 2    | 5    | 3    | 4    | -    | -    | 1    | 1    | 1    | -    | -    |
| c) Building fortifications                           | -    | -    | -    | 2    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 4    |
| d) Building tunnels                                  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| e) Erecting barriers                                 | 1    | 3    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| f) Introduction of heavy firearms                    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | 5    | 5    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | 2    |
| g) Hostile acts                                      | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| h) Intrusions  | -    | -    | -    | 2    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| i) Violation of rules in the JSA                     | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | 1    | -    | 1    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| j) Demonstrations in the JSA                         | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | 1    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| k) Proposals for security in the JSA                 | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 3    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
|  | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | 1    | -    |

|  | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| l) Demilitarization of the DMZ                 | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Passage of civilians through Panmunjom         | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Removal of concrete barriers                   | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    |
| Intrusion of spies                             | 3    | 1    | 1    | 2    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Airspace intrusions                            | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Reconnaissance flights                         | -    | 1    | -    | 1    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    |
| Shooting anti-aircraft missiles                | 4    | 2    | 4    | 4    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | 1    | -    | -    |
| Blowing-up civilian airplanes                  | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Violations at sea                              | 2    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Sinking fishing boats                          | 1    | -    | -    | 2    | -    | 1    | 1    | 1    | -    | 1    | 1    |
| Shootings in the Imjin River estuary           | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Protest against violation, urge for punishment | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Returning corpses                              | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | 1    |
| Essential discussions at MAC meetings          | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    |
| Political propaganda in the MAC                | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | 3    | 2    | -    |
| Advance notification of agenda in the MAC      | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    |
| Proposal for NNSC to investigate the DMZ       | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |

|   | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| JOT investigations                      | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | 2    | 2    |
| Withdrawal of foreign troops            | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    |
| Raising tension in the Korean peninsula | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 1    | -    | -    | -    |
| Proposals for tension reduction         | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 2    | 5    | 3    |

\* **Source:** Kukbang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1993, pp. 471-7.

\* **Notes:** a) The original has been reorganized by the author. b) The upper row refers to UNC/MAC and the lower to KPA/CPV. c) For 1982, "introduction of heavy firearms" refers to heavy equipment. d) For 1990, "introduction of heavy firearms" include tanks but the distribution is not recorded.

|      | United States |         | South Korea |         | North Korea |         |
|------|---------------|---------|-------------|---------|-------------|---------|
|      | Killed        | Wounded | Killed      | Wounded | Killed      | Wounded |
| 1953 | 0             | 0       | 0           | 0       | 0           | 0       |
| 1954 | 0             | 0       | 0           | 0       | 0           | 0       |
| 1955 | 1             | 0       | 7           | 0       | 0           | 0       |
| 1956 | 0             | 0       | 0           | 0       | 0           | 0       |
| 1957 | 0             | 0       | 0           | 0       | 0           | 0       |
| 1958 | 0             | 0       | 1           | 1       | 0           | 0       |
| 1959 | 0             | 0       | 0           | 0       | 0           | 0       |
| 1960 | 0             | 0       | 1           | 1       | 1           | 0       |
| 1961 | 1             | 0       | 1           | 4       | 0           | 0       |
| 1962 | 2             | 1       | 3           | 1       | 3           | 2       |
| 1963 | 3             | 7       | 1           | 0       | 4           | 0       |
| 1964 | 0             | 1       | 1           | 0       | 3           | 1       |
| 1965 | 0             | 0       | 21          | 6       | 4           | 51      |
| 1966 | 6             | 1       | 29          | 28      | 43          | 19      |
| 1967 | 16            | 51      | 115         | 243     | 228         | 57      |
| 1968 | 18            | 54      | 145         | 240     | 321         | 13      |
| 1969 | 35            | 5       | 10          | 39      | 55          | 6       |
| 1970 | 0             | 0       | 9           | 22      | 46          | 3       |
| 1971 | 0             | 0       | 18          | 28      | 22          | 2       |
| 1972 | 0             | 0       | 0           | 0       | 0           | 0       |
| 1973 | 0             | 0       | 2           | 1       | 2           | 1       |
| 1974 | 1             | 4       | 1           | 2       | 5           | 0       |
| 1975 | 0             | 1       | 0           | 0       | 0           | 0       |
| 1976 | 2             | 4       | 4           | 10      | 3           | 5       |
| 1977 | 3             | 1       | 1           | 1       | 0           | 0       |
| 1978 | 0             | 0       | 1           | 4       | 23          | 0       |
| 1979 | 1             | 2       | 2           | 1       | 7           | 0       |
| 1980 | 0             | 0       | 5           | 1       | 19          | 1       |
| 1981 | 0             | 0       | 0           | 2       | 1           | 0       |
| 1982 | 0             | 0       | 0           | 0       | 1           | 0       |
| 1983 | 0             | 0       | 0           | 0       | 16          | 2       |
| 1984 | 0             | 1       | 0           | 0       | 3           | 0       |
| 1985 | 0             | 0       | 0           | 0       | 0           | 0       |

|      | United States |         | South Korea |         | North Korea |         |
|------|---------------|---------|-------------|---------|-------------|---------|
|      | Killed        | Wounded | Killed      | Wounded | Killed      | Wounded |
| 1986 | 0             | 0       | 0           | 0       | 0           | 0       |
| 1987 | 0             | 0       | 0           | 0       | 0           | 0       |
| 1988 | 0             | 0       | 0           | 0       | 0           | 0       |
| 1989 | 0             | 0       | 0           | 0       | 0           | 0       |
| 1990 | 0             | 0       | 0           | 0       | 0           | 0       |
| 1991 | 0             | 0       | 0           | 2       | 3           | 0       |
| Sum  | 89            | 133     | 378         | 637     | 813         | 163     |

\* **Source:** Lee, *JSA – P'anmunjôm (1953-1994)*, 2001(a), p. 373; *P'anmunjôm, Korea*, 2004, pp. 257-8.

\* **Notes:** Sums are calculated by the author. Figures for South Korea include civilians for 1965-1971, 1974 and 1980. The figures of killed civilians these years were 19, 4, 22, 35, 19, seven, four, 38 and one respectively. The figures for wounded were 13, five, 53, 16, 17, 17, four, 16, and one. Eleven civilians were killed in 1987 but no non-civilians. The figures exclude the South Korean victims from the October 9, 1983 bombing in Rangoon and the November 29, 1987 bombing of a civilian aeroplane in the Indian Ocean.

## Appendix X

Number of Proposed MAC Plenary Meetings,  
1953-1991

| Year | UNC/MAC | KPA/CPV | Total | Accumulated |
|------|---------|---------|-------|-------------|
| 1953 | 15      | 19      | 34    | 34          |
| 1954 | 4       | 14      | 18    | 52          |
| 1955 | 6       | 9       | 15    | 67          |
| 1956 | 2       | 5       | 7     | 74          |
| 1957 | 2       | 3       | 5     | 79          |
| 1958 | 4       | 9       | 13    | 92          |
| 1959 | 8       | 13      | 21    | 113         |
| 1960 | 3       | 15      | 18    | 131         |
| 1961 | 3       | 13      | 16    | 147         |
| 1962 | 4       | 11      | 15    | 162         |
| 1963 | 8       | 11      | 19    | 181         |
| 1964 | 1       | 15      | 16    | 197         |
| 1965 | 3       | 19      | 22    | 219         |
| 1966 | 3       | 15      | 18    | 237         |
| 1967 | 6       | 16      | 22    | 259         |
| 1968 | 8       | 16      | 24    | 283         |
| 1969 | 8       | 6       | 14    | 297         |
| 1970 | 1       | 12      | 13    | 310         |
| 1971 | 2       | 13      | 15    | 325         |
| 1972 | 0       | 8       | 8     | 333         |
| 1973 | 1       | 13      | 14    | 347         |
| 1974 | 1       | 9       | 10    | 357         |
| 1975 | 0       | 12      | 12    | 369         |
| 1976 | 3       | 10      | 13    | 382         |
| 1977 | 2       | 1       | 3     | 385         |
| 1978 | 3       | 3       | 6     | 391         |
| 1979 | 1       | 5       | 6     | 397         |
| 1980 | 4       | 3       | 7     | 404         |
| 1981 | 3       | 2       | 5     | 409         |
| 1982 | 1       | 5       | 6     | 415         |

| Year | UNC/MAC | KPA/CPV | Total | Accumulated |
|------|---------|---------|-------|-------------|
| 1983 | 2       | 6       | 8     | 423         |
| 1984 | 1       | 2       | 3     | 426         |
| 1985 | 1       | 4       | 5     | 431         |
| 1986 | 0       | 5       | 5     | 436         |
| 1987 | 1       | 3       | 4     | 440         |
| 1988 | 0       | 4       | 4     | 444         |
| 1989 | 1       | 7       | 8     | 452         |
| 1990 | 0       | 6       | 6     | 458         |
| 1991 | 0       | 1       | 1     | 459         |

\* **Source:** Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 360-61.

\* **Notes:** Numbers have been checked against Kukpang chôngbu ponbu, *op. cit.*, 1993, pp. 21-235. In the few cases where numbers of proposals differ, the latter is used. According to Kukpang chôngbo ponbu [Defence Intelligence Headquarters] *Kunsa chôngiôn wiwônhoë p'yöllam* (n. p., 1986), pp. 195-6, the North called 336 of 480 secretary meetings convened from 1953-1986.

| No | Name             | Rank    | Mandate Period | Number of Meetings |
|----|------------------|---------|----------------|--------------------|
| 1  | Yi Sang-cho      | General | 530727-550716  | 1-62               |
| 2  | Chông Kùk-nok    | General | 550717-571022  | 63-79              |
| 3  | Kang Sang Ho     | General | 571023-590320  | 80-98              |
| 4  | Chu Ch'ang-chun  | General | 590321-610320  | 99-138             |
| 5  | Chang Chung Hwan | General | 610321-640920  | 139-189            |
| 6  | Pak Chung Kuk    | General | 640921-690218  | 190-284            |
| 7  | Ri Choon-Sun     | General | 690219-700729  | 285-303            |
| 8  | Han Yông-ok      | General | 700730-721105  | 304-332            |
| 9  | Kim Pung-sôp     | General | 721106-751222  | 333-369            |
| 10 | Han Ju Kyong     | General | 751223-830822  | 370-420            |
| 11 | Li Tae Ho        | General | 830823-880823  | 421-444            |
| 12 | Ch'oe Ūi-ung     | General | 880824-940428* | 444-459            |

\* **Source:** Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), p. 376.

\* **Notes:** The last MAC plenary meeting was held February 13, 1991. North Korea withdrew from MAC on April 28, 1994.

| No | Name                      | Rank    | Mandate Period | Number of Meetings |
|----|---------------------------|---------|----------------|--------------------|
| 1  | Blackshea M. Bryan        | General | 53.0620-531020 | 26                 |
| 2  | Julius K. Lacey           | General | 531021-540430  | 13                 |
| 3  | Albert E. Jarrell         | General | 540501-540611  | 4                  |
| 4  | Thomas B. Brittain        | General | 540612-541103  | 6                  |
| 5  | Leslie D. Carter          | General | 541104-550503  | 8                  |
| 6  | Harlan C. Park Chung Heer | General | 550504-551103  | 9                  |
| 7  | Walter E. Moore           | General | 551104-560501  | 3                  |
| 8  | Robert G. Gard            | General | 560502-561031  | 3                  |
| 9  | Matthew K. Deichelman     | General | 561101-570430  | 2                  |
| 10 | Homer L. Litzenberg       | General | 570501-571031  | 5                  |
| 11 | Olaf H. Kyster            | General | 571101-580430  | 4                  |
| 12 | Albert T. Wilson          | General | 580501-581031  | 5                  |
| 13 | Ira H. Nunn               | General | 581101-590430  | 13                 |
| 14 | William S. Biddle         | General | 590501-591031  | 10                 |
| 15 | Sam Maddux, Jr.           | General | 591101-600430  | 6                  |
| 16 | Marion L. Dawson          | General | 600501-601031  | 12                 |
| 17 | Richard Collins           | General | 601101-610430  | 11                 |
| 18 | Robert H. Warren          | General | 610501-611031  | 5                  |
| 19 | Robert T. S. Keith        | General | 611101-620430  | 6                  |
| 20 | James R. Winn             | General | 620501-621031  | 7                  |
| 21 | Joseph E. Gill            | General | 621101-630430  | 8                  |
| 22 | George H. Cloud           | General | 630501-631031  | 12                 |
| 23 | Robert F. Seedlok         | General | 631101-640430  | 4                  |
| 24 | Cecil E. Combs            | General | 640501-641031  | 10                 |
| 25 | Paul P. Blackburn, Jr.    | General | 641101-650217  | 10                 |
| 26 | William P. Yarborough     | General | 650218-651005  | 12                 |
| 27 | Laurence E. Schlenser     | General | 651006-651014  | 1                  |
| 28 | Harry J. Sands, Jr.       | General | 651015-660414  | 9                  |
| 30 | Richard G. Ciccolella     | General | 661101-670430  | 15                 |
| 29 | Joseph O. Butcher         | General | 660415-661030  | 7                  |
| 31 | Marvin C. Demier          | General | 670501-671026  | 10                 |
| 32 | John V. Smith             | General | 671027-6804.9  | 12                 |
| 33 | Gilbert H. Woodward       | General | 680430-690130  | 16                 |
| 34 | James B. Knapp            | General | 690131-690727  | 6                  |
| 35 | Arthur H. Adams           | General | 690728-700206  | 8                  |
| 36 | James H. Skeldon          | General | 700207-700802  | 5                  |

| No | Name                  | Rank    | Mandate Period | Number of Meetings |
|----|-----------------------|---------|----------------|--------------------|
| 37 | F. M. Rogers          | General | 700803-710723  | 15                 |
| 38 | F. D. Foley           | General | 710724-720213  | 9                  |
| 39 | Raymond P. Murphy     | General | 720214-720803  | 4                  |
| 40 | Rollen H. Anthis      | General | 720804-730205  | 5                  |
| 41 | Fred E. Haynes, Jr.   | General | 730206-730812  | 5                  |
| 42 | Thomas U. Green       | General | 730813-740131  | 6                  |
| 43 | W. E. Mcloed          | General | 740201-741117  | 8                  |
| 44 | Henry S. Morgan       | General | 741118-750420  | 6                  |
| 45 | William I. Webb, Jr.  | General | 750421-750701  | 3                  |
| 46 | James C. Smith        | General | 750702-760627  | 12                 |
| 47 | Mark P. Frudden       | General | 76.0628-761031 | 5                  |
| 48 | John K. Singlaub      | General | 761101-770522  | 1                  |
| 49 | Warren C. Hamm, Jr.   | General | 770523-790702  | 8                  |
| 50 | Stephan J. Hostettler | General | 790703-810712  | 12                 |
| 51 | James G. Storms       | General | 810713-830714  | 14                 |
| 52 | K. Warren Kelly       | General | 830715-840419  | 5                  |
| 53 | Charles H. Horne      | General | 840420-861014  | 12                 |
| 54 | William T. Pendley    | General | 861015-890216  | 10                 |
| 55 | Larry G. Vogt         | General | 890217-910211  | 12                 |
| 56 | James F. Record       | General | 910212-910324  | 1                  |
| 57 | Hwang Won-Tak         | General | 910325-950830  | -                  |
| 58 | Lee Suk Bok           | General | 950901-960730  | -                  |
| 59 | Ch'a Ki-mun           | General | 960731-981112  | -                  |
| 60 | Ha Chae-p'yŏng        | General | 981113-000511  | -                  |
| 61 | An Kwang-ch'an        | General | 000512-010506  | -                  |
| 62 | Song Yŏng-gŭn         | General | 010507-030420  | -                  |
| 63 | Yi Sŏng-gyu           | General | 030421-031020  | -                  |
| 64 | Pak Hong-gwan         | General | 031020-041104  | -                  |
| 65 | Cho Yŏng-nae          | General | 041104-        | -                  |

\* **Source:** Hapch'am chŏngbo ponbu, op. cit., 2006: "Purok IV: Yŏkdae kunjŏngwi/chunggamwi-mit ch'amjŏnguk yŏllakdan taep'yo myŏngdan," in Hapch'am chŏngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 2006, pp. 64-5; Lee, *ibid.*, 2001(a), pp. 380-382.

| No | Name              | Rank    | Mandate Period |
|----|-------------------|---------|----------------|
| 1  | Frantisek Bures   | General | 5308-540623    |
| 2  | Josef Hecko       | General | 540630-550615  |
| 3  | Vaclav Taus       | General | 550602-560605  |
| 4  | Chyle             | General | 560607-630625  |
| 5  | Vaclav Taus       | General | 630702-641027  |
| 6  | Karel Borsky      | Colonel | 641103-670131  |
| 7  | Vilem Toman       | General | 670207-700811  |
| 8  | Zdenek Pav        | General | 700818-720502  |
| 9  | Miroslav Smoldas  | General | 720509-760623  |
| 10 | Vladimir Vella    | Colonel | 760623-770414  |
| 11 | Frantisek Suchnek | General | 770415-7912    |
| 12 | Jan Gazik         | General | 8107-8308      |
| 13 | Jaroslav Ulehla   | General | 8312-870811    |
| 14 | Jan Martinsky     | General | 871221-9011    |
| 15 | Josef Cervasek    | General | 901119-911127  |
| 16 | Emil Nemeč        | Colonel | 911128-920826  |
| 17 | Jan Klocok        | General | 920827-930403  |

\* **Source:** Drahonovsky, e-mail, March 27, 2009; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, p. 490; op. cit., 1997, p. 290.

| No | Name                    | Rank            | Mandate Period |
|----|-------------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| 1  | Mieczyslaw Wagrowski    | General         | 530801-540415  |
| 2  | Leszek Krzemien         | General         | 540421-550622  |
| 3  | Albert Morski           | Deputy Minister | 550629-560820  |
| 4  | Henryk Brzostowski      | Deputy Minister | 560913-570812  |
| 5  | Zygmunt Czajkowski      | Deputy Minister | 570819-580225  |
| 6  | Leon Samet              | General         | 580304-600503  |
| 7  | Tadeusz Kunicki         | General         | 600510-620123  |
| 8  | Franciszek Mróz         | General         | 620130-631112  |
| 9  | Stefan Orlinski         | General         | 631119-650202  |
| 10 | Włodzimierz Kopijkowski | General         | 650209-660111  |
| 11 | Józef Waluk             | General         | 660119-670404  |
| 12 | Tadeusz Jedynak         | General         | 670411-680130  |
| 13 | Wacław Czyzewski        | General         | 680206-690128  |
| 14 | Marian Ryba             | General         | 690204-700602  |
| 15 | Mikołaj Matwiejowicz    | General         | 700609-710921  |
| 16 | Bronisław Kuriata       | General         | 710928-721030  |
| 17 | Józef Dziadura          | General         | 721031-73.1120 |
| 18 | Brunon Marchewka        | General         | 731121-741128  |
| 19 | Wiktor Kozak            | General         | 741129-751202  |
| 20 | Zbigniew Czerwinski     | General         | 751203-770310  |
| 21 | Apoloniusz Golik        | General         | 770311-781231  |
| 22 | Janusz Sieczkowski      | General         | 790101-800324  |
| 23 | Edward Lancucki         | General         | 800325-810320  |
| 24 | Tadeusz Sroczynski      | General         | 810320-820422  |
| 25 | Zbigniew Jurewicz       | General         | 820423-830922  |
| 26 | Henryk Rzepkowski       | General         | 830923-850218  |
| 27 | Marian Koper            | General         | 850219-860316  |
| 28 | Krzysztof Hille         | General         | 860317-870425  |
| 29 | Stanisław Wytyczak      | General         | 870426-880515  |
| 30 | Leopold Rąznowiecki     | General         | 880516-890714  |
| 31 | Stanisław Stec          | General         | 890715-900701  |

| No | Name              | Rank    | Mandate Period |
|----|-------------------|---------|----------------|
| 32 | Zdzislaw Zarski   | General | 900702-920326  |
| 33 | Miriam Wroblewski | Colonel | 920327-920929  |
| 34 | Andrzej Owczarek  | General | 920930-950228  |
| 35 | Stanislaw Koziej  | General | 1996-1997      |
| 36 | Andrzej Ekiert    | General | 1997-1999      |
| 37 | Wincenty Cybulski | General | 1999-2002      |
| 38 | Andrzej Ekiert    | General | 2002-          |

\* **Source:** "Anhang," in Birchmeier, *Quellensammlung*; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, *ibid.*, 1997, pp. 291-2.

\* **Notes:** All generals except no. 16, who is recorded as Major General, are recorded as "Brigade-general," that is "Brigadier General."

1953-2007

| No | Name                     | Rank         | Served in Korea |
|----|--------------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| 1  | Nils Ingvarsson          | Colonel      | 530609-540608   |
| 2  | Carl-Oscar Agell         | General      | 540501-551130   |
| 3  | Nore Eriksson            | Colonel      | 550901-560107   |
| 4  | Gustaf Molander          | Colonel      | 560116-560720   |
| 5  | Gunnar Areskog           | Colonel      | 560518-561121   |
| 6  | Bo Benckert              | Colonel      | 561009-570418   |
| 7  | Tore Wigforss            | Colonel      | 570220-571231   |
| 8  | Sven Tilly               | Colonel      | 571104-580706   |
| 9  | Carl Reuterswärd         | Colonel      | 580512-581130   |
| 10 | Allan Edebäck            | Colonel      | 581010-590415   |
| 11 | Karl Ångström            | General      | 590305-600315   |
| 12 | Bengt Lind af Hageby     | Commodore    | 591101-601231   |
| 13 | Gustaf Adolf Westring    | General      | 601001-611031   |
| 14 | Åke Wikland              | General      | 610904-620404   |
| 15 | Göran Schildt            | General      | 620215-621005   |
| 16 | Carl Klingenstierna      | General      | 620801-630331   |
| 17 | Miles Flach              | General      | 630211-630931   |
| 18 | Sven Ugglå               | General      | 630826-640331   |
| 19 | Arne Hallström           | General      | 640310-640930   |
| 20 | Ingemar Bratt            | General      | 640910-650331   |
| 21 | Birger Hasselrot         | General      | 650310-650930   |
| 22 | Carol Bennedich          | General      | 650908-660331   |
| 23 | Bertil Hård af Segerstad | General      | 660310-660930   |
| 24 | Ingvar Berg              | General      | 660908-670331   |
| 25 | Arthur Raab              | General      | 670310-670930   |
| 26 | Gunnar Smedmark          | General      | 670911-680331   |
| 27 | Nils-Erik Ödman          | Rear-Admiral | 680307-680930   |
| 28 | Karl Sergel              | General      | 680911-690922   |
| 29 | Tage Grönwall            | General      | 690925-700331   |
| 30 | Tryggve Sjölin           | General      | 700309-710331   |

| No | Name               | Rank    | Served in Korea |
|----|--------------------|---------|-----------------|
| 31 | Nils Holmstedt     | General | 710310-720331   |
| 32 | Magnus Bruzelius   | General | 720301-730331   |
| 33 | Gunnar Ljungdahl   | General | 730430-740430   |
| 34 | Gunnar Gerring     | General | 740410-750430   |
| 35 | Allan Månsson      | General | 750412-760430   |
| 36 | Lage Wernstedt     | General | 760401-770430   |
| 37 | Jan Beckman        | General | 770401-771031   |
| 38 | Sture Fornwall     | General | 780401-781108   |
| 39 | Sten Torfgård      | General | 781001-791031   |
| 40 | Nils Stenqvist     | General | 791001-800930   |
| 41 | Göte Blom          | General | 801001-820331   |
| 42 | Otto Rathsman      | General | 820401-830331   |
| 43 | Gustaf Peyron      | General | 830401-841001   |
| 44 | Gunnar Uhell       | General | 840901-850930   |
| 45 | Ulf Norström       | General | 850901-860930   |
| 46 | Lennart Frick      | General | 860901-870928   |
| 47 | Jan Bring          | General | 870902-881130   |
| 48 | Finn Werner        | General | 881108-900531   |
| 49 | Cay Holmberg       | General | 900503-911130   |
| 50 | Leif Nilsson       | General | 920110-930805   |
| 51 | Vollrath Tham      | General | 931101-941030   |
| 52 | Karl-Göte Widén    | General | 941011-951231   |
| 53 | Mats Marling       | General | 951202-961231   |
| 54 | Lennart Rönnerberg | General | 970101-980230   |
| 55 | Sven Julin         | General | 98.0225-990625  |
| 56 | Kurt Blixt         | General | 990626-000619   |
| 57 | Peter Hammarström  | General | 000620-010627   |
| 58 | Kjell Koserius     | General | 010627-020611   |
| 59 | Björn Elmer        | General | 020612-040116   |
| 60 | Lars Frisk         | General | 040117-061001   |
| 61 | Sture Theolin      | General | 061001-         |

\* **Source:** Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, "Purok," *ibid.*, 2006, pp. 71-3; *NNSC Chief Delegates - List Updated April 14, 1997.*

\* **Notes:** Sven Grafström is not recorded in the original while he was actually the first Head of the Delegation (cf. p. 31).

| No | Name                   | Rank       | Mandate Period |
|----|------------------------|------------|----------------|
| 1  | Friedrich Rihner       | General    | 530801-531205  |
| 2  | Paul Wacker            | General    | 531208-540429  |
| 3  | Ernst Gross            | General    | 540501-541027  |
| 4  | Alfred Escher          | Minister   | 541102-550323  |
| 5  | Carl Stucki            | Minister   | 550330-550826  |
| 6  | Egbert von Graffenreid | Minister   | 550902-560209  |
| 7  | Fritz Real             | Minister   | 560216-560920  |
| 8  | Jean de Stoutz         | Councillor | 560927-570314  |
| 9  | Pierre H. Aubaret      | General    | 570321-571003  |
| 10 | Andre Dominicé         | Councillor | 571010-580304  |
| 11 | Edmond Deslex          | Councillor | 580310-580906  |
| 12 | Richars Aman           | Councillor | 580913-590120  |
| 13 | Frieder Andres         | Councillor | 590127-590714  |
| 14 | Georges Bonnant        | Councillor | 590721-600119  |
| 15 | Pierre Dumont          | Councillor | 600126-600802  |
| 16 | Rudolf Hartmann        | Councillor | 600809-610124  |
| 17 | Jacques Albert Mallet  | Councillor | 610131-610627  |
| 18 | Lucien Guillaume       | Councillor | 610794-620227  |
| 19 | Etienne Serra          | Councillor | 62036-620911   |
| 20 | Marcel Luy             | Councillor | 620918-630409  |
| 21 | Marcel Scherler        | Councillor | 630416-630924  |
| 22 | Raoul Thiébaud         | General    | 631001-640519  |
| 23 | August Geiser          | General    | 640526-641229  |
| 24 | Marcel Luy             | Councillor | 650125-650908  |
| 25 | Lucine Musy            | Councillor | 650914-660306  |
| 26 | Claude van Muyden      | Councillor | 660315-670131  |
| 27 | Eurico Holmberger      | Councillor | 670207-671117  |
| 28 | Pierre Barbey          | General    | 671121-680618  |
| 29 | Marcel Vogelbacher     | General    | 680625-690701  |
| 30 | Claude van Muyden      | General    | 690708-790301  |
| 31 | Pierre Barbey          | General    | 790302-800912  |

| No | Name               | Rank    | Mandate Period |
|----|--------------------|---------|----------------|
| 32 | Otto Bornhauser    | General | 800913-820607  |
| 33 | Peter Niederberger | General | 820608-840720  |
| 34 | Pierre Jordan      | General | 840721-870806  |
| 35 | Pierre Monod       | General | 870808-900829  |
| 36 | Bernard A. Sandoz  | General | 900831-941005  |
| 37 | Peter Sutter       | General | 941006-991102  |
| 38 | Adrien Evequoz     | General | 000501-041201  |
| 39 | Gerhard Brügger    | General | 041202-        |

\* **Source:** Hapch'am chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 2006, pp. 70-71; Kyong Hee University: Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, *The Swiss Delegation to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Panmunjom (Korea) 1953-1993*, pp. 347-8, 356, 359, 371, 372, 376, 377, 378.

\* **Notes:** The spelling of Paul Wakker is “Wacker” on p. 32.

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**Unanimous Declaration**

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On the 12th of January 1993 the NNSC has received an official, oral message - delivered by a representative from KPA - according to which a decision has been taken by DPRK concerning the withdrawal of the Czech delegate from the commission as soon as practically possible. Referring to Armistice Agreement §37, the NNSC is of the unanimous opinion that the commission shall be composed of four (4) neutral senior officers representing four (4) neutral nations. Therefore, respecting the spirit of the Armistice Agreement, if - for some reason - one of the delegates/nations is excluded from the commission the exclusion could not be effective until the date when a new delegate/nation is assigned to replace the former one in agreement between those who have signed the Armistice Agreement.

As long as the replacement of the delegate representing the former Czechoslovakia has not been accepted by both sides and has not been practically implemented NNSC will - according to the Armistice Agreement and the rules of procedure of the commission - continue to fulfil its duties and mission accepting the decision of an agreement between the government of the Czech Republic and the government of the Slovak Republic that the Czech Republic becomes successor state of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in the NNSC in Korea on 1 January 1993.

The commission is of the firm opinion that above mentioned fulfilment of its mission and duties could and should be carried out even if - for some reason - one of the delegates or representative for him is absent during the meetings etc.

Panmunjom, January 18th 1993.

Major General Krzysztof Owczarek  
Polish Member

Major General Bernard Sandoz  
Swiss Member

Major General Jan Klocok  
Czech Member

Major General Leif Nilsson  
Swedish Member

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**Unanimous Declaration**

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According to a decision taken in the end of December 1992 by the former Czechoslovakia concerning the succession after the partition of the state the Czech delegate became the successor of the Czechoslovakian delegate to the NNSC by 1 January 1993.

This was accepted by the south side - UNC - whereas the north side - KPA/CPV - rejected this decision. Because KPA/CPV does not recognize the Czech Republic as a successor state of former Czechoslovakia to the NNSC they have been urging the Czech delegate to leave Korea. The Czech government decided on 5 March 1993 to withdraw its delegate to the NNSC by 10 April 1993.

Referring to the Armistice Agreement para 37 in which is stated that the NNSC shall be composed of four (4) neutral senior officers representing four (4) neutral nations the commission is of the unanimous opinion that the departing delegate should have been replaced at the time of the Czech delegate's departure after proposal from the north side and thereafter in agreement between the two sides. What has happened was in accordance with neither the letter nor the spirit of the Armistice Agreement. Thus the NNSC strongly demands the immediate nomination of a successor also acceptable to the south side so that the NNSC also in the future has the structure and may operate according to what is stated in the Armistice Agreement.

Until a new delegate is assigned the NNSC will continue to fulfil its mission and carry out its duties with three delegates.

Panmunjom, April 13 1993.

Major General Krzysztof Owczarek  
Polish Member

Major General Bernard Sandoz  
Swiss Member

Major General Leif Nilsson  
Swedish Member



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Peace-keeping  
in the Korean Peninsula:  
The Role of Commissions

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