

Facing and Loosening the Grip of Sino-US Rivalry: Similarities in Approaches and Potential for Cooperation between Europe and South Korea

Antoine Bondaz*

The Sino-American rivalry, born of the end of the Cold War, is multidimensional, systemic and global. While their respective strategies may differ slightly, Koreans and Europeans share the assessment that it is having an increasing impact on their interests, but also the need not to let themselves be locked in that rivalry. A debate on the need for strategic autonomy is taking shape, and it cannot be dissociated from the need to rely even more on multilateralism. However, the potential of both Seoul-Brussels cooperation and Europe's contribution to the Korean Peninsula is often under-estimated and under-exploited. In order to loosen the grip and mitigate the impact of the Sino-American rivalry, a rapprochement between Europeans and Koreans is inevitable as it is mutually beneficial. Against the backdrop of increasing Sino-US tensions, this article aims to present some concrete examples of potential cooperation between South Korea, the European Union and its member states.

Keywords: European Union, Europe-Korea relations, Strategic Autonomy, Multilateralism, North Korea

* Antoine Bondaz is the Director of the FRS-KF Korea Program at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), and teaches at Sciences Po. He can be reached at a.bondaz@frstrategie.org and followed on Twitter@AntoineBondaz.

I . INTRODUCTION

A few days before the first summit between President Moon and President Biden in Washington last May, Chinese state media warned South Korea against any explicit rapprochement with the United States and advised the country not to fall into the trap set by its ally.¹ The stakes are well known and have been well documented for a long time for South Korea, which must find a balance in its relations with its historical ally, and its first commercial partner.² The stakes are just as high for the European Union (EU) and its member states (EUMS), although the consequences of the rivalry are less direct for them at the moment. Yet, this balance is increasingly threatened by a Sino-American rivalry that continues to strengthen and that pushes many countries to position themselves more clearly in it, often at the expense of China. If Sino-American tensions are not recent, the rivalry is now intensifying, and, as such, the arrival in power of President Trump in 2017 or the Covid-19 pandemic has indeed amplified pre-existing dynamics. The tensions between the two countries are increasingly structural and will last. In this context, both the Europeans and, above all, the Koreans face the consequences of this rivalry and try to adapt to it.

While their respective strategies may differ slightly, Koreans and Europeans share the assessment that it is having an increasing impact on their interests, but also the need not to let themselves be locked in the US-China rivalry. Above all, it is essential for these countries to adopt a resolutely multilateral approach that allows them to increase interactions, and especially cooperation, with other international actors. The European Union and its member states (EUMS) are already strategic partners for South Korea. Seoul and Brussels have signed a free trade agreement in force since 2015, a framework agreement covering political cooperation in force since 2014, and a crisis

-
- 1 "US prepares a trap for South Korea in White House summit: Global Times editorial," *Global Times*, May 21, 2021.
 - 2 Avery Goldstein, "The Future of US-China Relations and the Korean Peninsula," *Asian Perspective* 26, no. 3 (2002); Jae Ho Chung, *Between Ally and Partner* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).

management participation agreement in force since 2016, which makes South Korea the only partner that has signed all three types of agreements with the EU. Yet, the potential of both Seoul-Brussels cooperation and Europe's contribution to the Korean Peninsula is often under-estimated and under-exploited. The purpose of this article is to analyze the Sino-American rivalry, to compare the adaptation strategy of the Europeans and Koreans, and to explore the potential for cooperation.

II. A SINO-AMERICAN RIVALRY BORN OF THE END OF THE COLD WAR

It is a pleonasm to point out that Sino-American tensions are long-standing. Of course, the Korean Peninsula suffered the full brunt of these tensions over 70 years ago. Not only does the Korean War remain to this day the "first and only Sino-American conflagration,"³ but it is "primordial by its legacy" in China, as it has deeply marked the national memory by being presented as "the first victory of the Communist Party over the American imperialists."⁴ It is not so much these tensions that are important today but the growing rivalry between the two countries since it is not a temporary situation. The end of the Cold War led to a change in China's perception of the threat, from a northern continental threat, the USSR, to a southern maritime threat, the United States, as in the 1950s. The first Gulf War in 1990-1991, the third crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-1996, or the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999 were all considered by Beijing as proof that the United States was a "world hegemon,"⁵ criticized as such by the political authorities.⁶ The collision between an American reconnaissance plane and a Chinese fighter

3 Lyle Goldstein, *Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2015), 1.

4 Da Wei (Director of the Institute of American Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations-CICIR) in discussion with the author, Spring 2013.

5 阎学通, *美国霸权与中国安全* (天津人民出版社, 2000), 16.

6 "1999年5月9日胡锦涛就我驻南使馆遭袭击发表讲话," *人民日报*, May 10, 1999.

plane over the island of Hainan in April 2001, followed by the American military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s, only reinforced Chinese concerns.⁷ The United States, for its part, did not consider China to be a "near peer-competitor," and did not envisage the country becoming one before at least 2025.⁸ The consensus was that of a "unipolar moment,"⁹ although theorists agree that it was of some duration,¹⁰ i.e. destined to be replaced by a possible bipolarity with China.¹¹

The financial and economic crisis that began in 2007 radically changed American and Chinese perceptions. China's catching up with the United States accelerated, and the country became the world's second economic power in 2010, and a dual process of "globalization" and "multipolarization" accelerated.¹² Although still considered the world's leading power, and even if there was "no doubt about the American superpower and influence in the world," the United States was considered as facing a relative rather than absolute decline, according to Yan Xuetong.¹³ However, a wave of declinism once again hit the United States,¹⁴ to the point of becoming a "new conventional wisdom."¹⁵ The bipartisan consensus of preserving American primacy partly explained the priority given to Asia-Pacific by the Obama administration, which intended

7 Yong Deng, "Hegemon on the offensive: Chinese perspectives on US global strategy," *Political Science Quarterly* 116, no. 3 (2001).

8 Michèle A. Flournoy (ed.), "QDR 2001: Strategy Driven Choices for America's Security" (Darby: DIANE Publishing, 2001).

9 Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (1990/1991).

10 Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000).

11 Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993); Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," *International Security* 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006).

12 崔立如, "全球化时代与多极化世界," *现代国际关系*, 2010.

13 阎学通, "权力中心转移与国际体系转变," *当代亚太* 6, 2012.

14 Samuel Huntington, "The U.S.: Decline or Renewal?," *Foreign Affairs* 67 (1988).

15 Clyde Prestowitz, "New Blowing Wind: American Decline Becomes New Conventional Wisdom," *Foreign Policy*, June 15, 2011.

to disengage from Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan. This priority took shape with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's first foreign trip to Japan, Indonesia, Korea and China in February 2009, a first since Secretary of State Dean Rusk's visit in 1961.¹⁶ The chief diplomat made an explicit statement in 2010 that "the United States is back in Asia."¹⁷ It should be noted here that Southeast Asia was receiving special attention, whereas it had been neglected by the previous Bush administrations. Secretary of State Clinton was the first to visit all the ASEAN countries and President Obama was the first to participate in a US-ASEAN Leaders' Summit. More generally, 2010 became a special year for the deterioration of bilateral relations with China. The concept of Chinese assertiveness was presented as the "tagline for international anxiety about Chinese foreign policy behavior."¹⁸ Beijing was seen in Washington as seeking to take advantage of the economic crisis to weaken the United States in Asia and implementing a more confrontational policy.¹⁹

Above all, at the end of 2011, the administration presented a strategy of rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, initially in a remarkable op-ed,²⁰ and then in President Obama's speech in Australia.²¹ China was obviously targeted by this strategy, and this at a time when American political and military authorities were multiplying their criticisms of China's international

16 Traditionnellement, les Secrétaires d'Etat effectuaient leur première visite en Europe. Parmi les 25 Secrétaires d'Etat depuis 1945, 15 d'entre eux ont effectué leur premier déplacement en Europe, 4 en Amérique du Nord, 3 en Asie, 2 au Moyen-Orient, et 1 en URSS.

17 Hillary Clinton, "Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities," Transcript of speech delivered at Imin Center-Jefferson Hall, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 12, 2010.

18 Andrew Small, "Testimony before the U.S. - China Economic and Security Review Commission" (Hearing on China's Foreign Policy: Challenges and Players, Washington, April 13, 2011).

19 Susan Shirk, "Can China's Political System Sustain Its Peaceful Rise?," *IGCC-University of California*, April 2013.

20 Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific century," *Foreign Policy* 189, no. 1 (2011).

21 "Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament" (Australian Parliament, Canberra, November 17, 2011).

behavior and the opacity of its military spending. The Chinese authorities denounced the American strategy,²² all the more so as relations were deteriorating against a backdrop of Chinese territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, cyber-attacks, etc. This "diplomatic New Deal"²³ of the United States reinforced the Chinese perception of an American desire to hinder its development and maintain its hegemony.²⁴ The Sino-American rivalry was therefore omnipresent in Chinese publications.²⁵ In particular, China was considered to be facing a "rise dilemma" and scholars agreed on the structural, and therefore long-term, nature of the Sino-American rivalry.²⁶ At the same time, Chinese scholars, such as Wang Jisi, urged their country to rebalance its national strategy as well.²⁷ The announcement by the Party's General Secretary of the One Belt One Road initiative during two speeches in Kazakhstan and then in Indonesia in 2013, then its concretization in 2015 with the presentation of an action plan and its new name Belt and Road Initiatives, contributed to reinforcing mutual suspicions. Indeed, by deepening interdependence and pursuing common interests with its neighbors, China would become the key partner for their economic development while weakening the economic and political leverage of the US over these countries.²⁸

22 Michael Swaine, "Chinese leadership and elite responses to the US Pacific pivot," *China Leadership Monitor* 38 (2012).

23 阮宗泽, "美国" 亚太再平衡 "战略前景论析," *世界经济与政治* 4, 2014.

24 金灿荣, "戴维来, "冷静看待美国重返亚洲," *环球时报*, November 14, 2012.

25 任卫东, "亚太地缘政治形势与中国战略思考," *中国与世界观察* 1, 2013.

26 Antoine Bondaz, "Explaining China's foreign policy reset," *European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)*, April 2015.

27 王缉思, "西进, 中国地缘战略的再平衡," *环球时报*, October 17, 2012.

28 Antoine Bondaz, "Solving the 'Rise' Dilemma: How the Chinese Silk Road Initiative Could Challenge the United States," *International Relations and Security Network - ETH Zurich*, May 2015.

III. A MULTIDIMENSIONAL, SYSTEMIC AND GLOBAL RIVALRY

The arrival in power of the Trump administration was therefore part of this dynamic and accentuated and institutionalized rivalry, and not only in its trade aspects. In December 2017, the new U.S. security strategy considered that "strategic interstate competition, not terrorism, is now the primary national security concern" and specified that China was a "strategic competitor" on par with Russia.²⁹ In June 2018, a White House report stated that "China's economic aggression threatens not only the U.S. economy, but the global economy as a whole."³⁰ China was furthermore portrayed as an emerging threat to the US political system, which was clearly mentioned in a speech dedicated to China by US Vice President Mike Pence, a first, in October 2018.³¹ The US Director of National Intelligence went so far as to state in December 2020 that China was the "greatest threat to America today, and the greatest threat to democracy and freedom world-wide since World War II."³² According to Chinese academics, the concept popular in Washington of the "China threat theory" was in the process of diversifying, spreading, strengthening and becoming more concrete.³³ The United States was seen as always seeking to change the Chinese political system and weaken the country.³⁴ The United States was indeed multiplying strong political measures: tightening of bilateral cooperation conditions, embargo on the export of certain semi-conductors,

29 The White House, "National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2017.

30 White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, "How China's Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World," Washington, D.C.: The White House, June 2018.

31 Mike Pence, "Remarks on the Administration's Policy Towards China," *Hudson Institute*, October 4, 2018.

32 John Ratcliffe, "China Is National Security Threat no. 1," *Wall Street Journal*, December 3, 2020.

33 Antoine Bondaz, "Faire entendre la voix de la Chine: les recommandations des experts chinois pour atténuer la perception d'une menace chinoise," *Revue internationale et stratégique* 3, no. 115 (2019).

34 王聪悦, "新一轮" 中国威胁论: "酝酿、表征与应对," *世界社会主义研究* 1, 2019; 张晓明, 曹延中, 洛岩, "新一轮" 中国威胁论 "透析," *国防* 12, 2018.

sanctions in connection with the deterioration of the human rights situation and the country's refusal to respect its international commitments in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, etc.³⁵

Above all, the rivalry between the United States and China is no longer just a question of security, or a question of politics. It is a long-term confrontation, assumed by both countries. In China, reference to the notion of "struggle" is now ubiquitous, as evidenced by General Secretary Xi Jinping's speeches to Party members,³⁶ the promotion of the economic concept of "dual circulation" taking into account the deterioration of bilateral relations as a central factor, or the staging on the 70th anniversary of China's entry into the Korean War.³⁷ China is now omnipresent in US political discourse, even to the point of having been one of Donald Trump's campaign elements, not only in 2016, but especially in 2020. To discredit his competitor, he went so far as to say during the last Republican Convention: "Joe Biden's agenda is made in China. My agenda is made in the USA." The Biden administration has explicitly recognized the rivalry with China, with Secretary of State Anthony Blinken presenting the American approach to the country as "competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be and adversarial when it must be."³⁸ In addition, the United States is now seeking to coordinate as best it can on China with its allies and partners, a notable shift from the Trump administration. In this respect, the sequence leading up to the Sino-American diplomatic summit in Alaska in March 2021 is noteworthy: the first presidential summit in the Quad format, the joint visit of the Secretaries of State and Defense to Japan and South Korea, the telephone call between the National Security Advisor and his French, British and German counterparts, etc.

35 Alison J. Stafford Powell and Alexandre Lamy, "US Sanctions against China," *Baker MacKenzie*, 2021.

36 "Xi Focus: Xi emphasizes 'struggles' to achieve national rejuvenation," *Xinhua*, September 3, 2019.

37 "Xi Focus: Xi stresses carrying forward China's volunteers army's spirit in War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea," *Xinhua*, October 20, 2020.

38 Nick Wadhams, "Blinken Says Only China Can Truly Challenge Global System," *Bloomberg*, March 3, 2021.

But what is much more important is that it is now both a multidimensional confrontation and a systemic rivalry. First, it is a multidimensional confrontation that can be divided into four distinct but overlapping areas: geopolitics and security, economics and finance, technology and innovation, and governance and values. Second, it is a rivalry between systems that goes beyond the simple opposition between democratic and authoritarian models.³⁹ The Chinese authorities' willingness to instrumentalize traditional values in order to fuel a surrogate nationalism,⁴⁰ the promotion of "fundamental socialist values" since the 18th Party Congress and their constitutionalization in 2018, or the campaign initiated in 2013 against the influence of "Western values,"⁴¹ all lead to a rivalry that goes beyond an economic or military rivalry. Moreover, China is trying to export not an ideology per se, but a global model to legitimize its own and discredit others, a trend that has accelerated with the pandemic.⁴² Beijing is generalizing its "anti" - ideology⁴³ (anti-Western, anti-status quo, anti-liberal), exporting tools for implementing authoritarian control of societies,⁴⁴ seeking to distort the definition of key concepts such as human rights,⁴⁵ etc.

39 Hal Brands and Zack Cooper, "U.S.-Chinese Rivalry Is a Battle Over Values," *Foreign Affairs*, March 16, 2021.

40 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, "The Many Facets of Chinese Nationalism," *China Perspectives*, no. 59 (2005).

41 Kristin Shi-Kupfer, Mareike Ohlberg, Simon Lang and Bertram Land, "Ideas and ideologies competing for China's political future," *Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS)*, no. 5, October 2017.

42 Antoine Bondaz, "Coronavirus: Le modèle de gouvernance chinois n'est pas un modèle à suivre," *Le Monde*, March 16, 2020.

43 Nadège Rolland, "A 'China Model?' Beijing's Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards," *The National Bureau of Asian Research*, April 27, 2020.

44 Steven Feldstein, "When It Comes to Digital Authoritarianism, China is a Challenge—But Not the Only Challenge," *War on the Rocks*, February 12, 2020.

45 Ted Piccone, "China's Long Game on Human Rights at the United Nations," *Brookings Institution*, September 2018.

IV. EUROPE, IN SEARCH OF STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

Sino-American tensions, and above all this multidimensional and systemic rivalry, have consequences on other countries, and in particular on the allies or partners of the United States. In this respect, Koreans and Europeans share common challenges that can encourage them to come closer together and cooperate more. In spite of notable differences that we will address, they face a double dependence, economic with China and security with the United States, without choosing an equidistance between the two since they implement a policy of balancing. Both Seoul and Brussels are considered by Beijing as weak links in the American coordination efforts, which the country is trying to "neutralize."⁴⁶ Both intend to promote their strategic autonomy, including in the defense industry, without seeking to weaken their alliance with the United States. Their companies are facing increasingly direct competition from their Chinese counterparts, but also China's ambitions in science and technology, and are seeking to increase the resilience of their economy in the face of potential Chinese sanctions. Finally, China's image on both sides of Eurasia is deteriorating, with civil society becoming increasingly critical of Beijing, which is constraining political cooperation with the country.

Europeans, however, are far less confronted with the consequences of Sino-American rivalry than Koreans. The awareness of this rivalry is ongoing, but also, fundamentally, the awareness that this rivalry also directly concerns their relations with China.⁴⁷ In 2019, for the first time, the European Commission published a common strategy on China, which, although minimalist, presents the country as "simultaneously, in different policy areas, a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor

46 Yushan Zhao, "S.Korea 'weak link' of US strategy to encircle China," *Global Times*, March 17, 2021; Grzegorz Stec, "Correct choice' on strategic autonomy: What China wants from the EU," *Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS)*, Apr 28, 2021.

47 Janka Oertel, "US-China confrontation and repercussions for the EU," *European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)*, March 25, 2021.

in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance."⁴⁸ At the same time, debates on the need to promote strategic autonomy are growing, and a consensus is beginning to emerge, although differences of opinion remain.⁴⁹ This concept is one of the concepts that aims to promote a more capable, independent EU at a time of growing geopolitical competition.⁵⁰ And while the Trump administration has led many Europeans to reflect on the future of the transatlantic relationship, and in particular on U.S. commitments in the continent, the debates do not fundamentally challenge the relationship with the United States.⁵¹

In this respect, the search for a balancing strategy between China and the United States, with the former remaining the EU's main trading partner, does not in any way signify equidistance, or even equivalence, between the two countries. For several years, the Chinese strategy, which aims to divide the member states in order to avoid the adoption of measures that go against it, to invest in certain strategic sectors, or to abuse its increasingly unacceptable status as a developing economy, has been taken into account by the Europeans.⁵² In response, measures have multiplied aimed at setting up an investment control mechanism at the European level,⁵³ or at reducing the asymmetry

48 European Commission, "EU-China – A strategic outlook," Brussels: European Commission, March 12, 2019.

49 Barbara Lippert, Nicolai von Ondarza, Volker Perthes (eds.), "European Strategic Autonomy: Actors, Issues, Conflicts of Interests," *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)*, Research Paper, no. 4, March 2019; Paola Tamma, "Europe wants 'strategic autonomy' – it just has to decide what that means," *Politico*, October 15, 2020.

50 Ulrike Franke, Tara Varma, Independence play: Europe's pursuit of strategic autonomy, *European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)*, July 18, 2019.

51 Charles Michel, "Strategic autonomy for Europe - the aim of our generation," Transcript of speech delivered at Bruegel, Brussels, September 28, 2020.

52 Francois Godement and Abigaël Vasselier, "China at the gates: A new power audit of EU-China relations," *European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)*, 2017; Alicia García-Herrero and Guntram B. Wolff, "China Has an Unfair Advantage in the EU Market. What Can Be Done to Level the Playing Field?," *Bruegel Institute*, July 28, 2020.

53 European Commission, "EU foreign investment screening mechanism becomes fully operational," Brussels: European Commission, October 9, 2020.

of interdependence,⁵⁴ in areas considered critical for Europe's health or energy security.⁵⁵ At the same time, China's image has deteriorated considerably, with unfavorable opinions reaching historic highs in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands.⁵⁶ Moreover, official criticism has been growing recently, on a wide range of topics from Hong Kong to Xinjiang, from uncertainty about the security of 5G infrastructure to the defense of intellectual protection, etc.⁵⁷ The EU's adoption of targeted political sanctions against four Chinese officials and one entity for human rights abuses in Xinjiang is a first since 1989,⁵⁸ and also underscores the deterioration of relations between Europeans and Chinese. Chinese reprisals, targeting elected officials, researchers and political and research institutions, have led, for example, to the suspension of the review of the bilateral agreement on investment (CAI).⁵⁹ However, the stakes are primarily economic and human rights, not military. And while NATO, of which many European countries are members, now mentions China as a concern, the country is not yet officially considered a threat.⁶⁰

54 Max J. Zenglein, "Mapping and Recalibrating Europe's Economic Interdependence with China," *Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS)*, November 18, 2020.

55 "EU aims to cut foreign reliance on chips, pharma materials—document," Reuters, April 30, 2021.

56 "How people in 14 countries view the state of the world in 2020," *Pew Research Center*, September 23, 2020.

57 Antoine Bondaz, "Searching for a Bolder China Policy," *Echowall*, Nov. 2020.

58 Lucas Niewenhuis, "EU issues first sanctions on China since 1989 over treatment of Uyghurs," *SupChina*, March 22, 2021.

59 "MEPs vote to freeze controversial EU-China investment deal Access to the comments," *Euronews*, May 21, 2021.

60 François Heisbourg, "NATO 4.0: The Atlantic Alliance and the Rise of China," *Survival* 62, no. 2 (2020); Antoine Bondaz, "L'OTAN vue de Chine," *Diplomatie* 103, March-April 2020.

V. SOUTH KOREA, A DIRECT VICTIM OF THIS RIVALRY

The Koreans have been confronted for much longer, and in a much more intense way, with the consequences of the Sino-American rivalry, and are trying to adapt to it. There is no need to go back to the Korean War, mentioned in the introduction, but only to the last decade. The stakes are obviously high for South Korea, especially since China is not only the country's largest trading partner, but also a key player in the North Korean issue and, potentially, a direct military threat.⁶¹ Even more than the Europeans, the Koreans need to implement a balancing act between China and the United States. This is evidenced by the South Korean foreign minister's meeting with his Chinese counterpart in South China last April, and within a day of each other;⁶² the South Korean National Security Bureau director's parallel meeting with his American and Japanese counterparts in Washington.⁶³

First, the consequences of the Sino-US rivalry for South Korea are long-standing and have a direct impact on the country's security. China considers that the United States seeks to destabilize its periphery and implements a policy of securing its external environment," in particular by supporting North Korea in the event of instability. The year 2010, sometimes presented as the "year of living arrogantly for China and its People's Liberation Army,"⁶⁴ and even as "the worst year for China's image since the events of Tiananmen,"⁶⁵ is quite emblematic in this respect. While the second transition process in the country's history was underway, North Korea multiplied its provocations, by formalizing a uranium enrichment program, but above all

61 Chung Min Lee, "South Korea Is Caught Between China and the United States," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, October 21, 2020.

62 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Wang Yi Holds Talks with ROK's Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong," April 3, 2021.

63 White House, "United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral National Security Advisors' Press Statement," April 2, 2021.

64 Ralph Cossa, Brad Glosserman, "Return to Asia: It's Not (All) About China," *PacNet Newsletter*, January 30, 2012.

65 David Shambaugh, *China Goes Global: The Partial Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 42.

its aggressions against South Korea, with the deadly torpedoing of the corvette Cheonan in March and the bombing of Yeonpyeong Island in November.⁶⁶ China, worried about the risk of internal destabilization in North Korea and the American strategy in the region, showed a benevolent neutrality. It refused to criticize its ally, questioned the conclusions of the investigation report,⁶⁷ and blocked the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution in the spring, which did not help to dissuade North Korea from stopping its provocations. While President Obama denounced the Chinese attitude and stated that there was "a difference between restraint and stubborn blindness,"⁶⁸ and while American-South Korean military exercises were taking place in the Yellow Sea, Beijing focused its attacks on Washington. The analysis in China seemed to be that the United States was looking for pretexts to make "two moves in one":⁶⁹ to put pressure on North Korea and to strengthen its regional alliances and military presence. The country was presented as the great beneficiary of these incidents⁷⁰ and was omnipresent in China's strategic calculations.⁷¹ The vicious circle of Sino-American rivalry, and China's blind protection of North Korea, thus led to an increase in tensions on the peninsula to the detriment of South Korea's security.

Secondly, the Sino-American rivalry has now also forced Seoul to make choices that lead either to implicit criticism from Washington or to explicit sanctions from Beijing. In this respect, the unfortunate episode of THAAD was a revelation of South Korea's inability to simultaneously satisfy its ally and its partner, but also of Seoul's sometimes disproportionate expectations

66 Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun, "Cheonan and Yeonpyeong: The Northeast Asian Response to North Korea's Provocations," *The RUSI Journal* 156, no. 2 (2011).

67 成晓河, "天安舰"凸显韩国难言之隐," *经济观察报*, May 24, 2010; Dingli Shen, "Lessons from Cheonan," *China.org*, July 28, 2010.

68 Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama at G-20 Press Conference," Transcript of speech delivered at Toronto, Canada, June 27, 2010.

69 石源华, 文恩熙, "试论中韩战略合作伙伴关系中的美国因素," *东北亚论坛* 5, 2012.

70 张廷瑰, "2010年的朝鲜半岛: 千钧一发," *世界知识* 1, 2011.

71 钮维敢, 赵秋梧, "国际法视角下的调查"天安"舰事件及其影响," *南京航空航天大学学报*, 2, June 2011.

of Beijing.⁷² Despite the Park administration's early expressions of goodwill, China did not take a hard line against North Korea following its fourth nuclear test in January 2016 and a ballistic test in February 2016.⁷³ The deployment announced in July 2016 and carried out in 2017 of the U.S. THAAD missile defense system caused a sharp deterioration in relations between Beijing and Seoul. China considered that this deployment strengthened the U.S.-South Korean alliance, increased the risk of a trilateralization of U.S. alliances with Seoul and with Tokyo, and weakened China's nuclear deterrence.⁷⁴ Above all, Beijing was seeking to neutralize Seoul, considering that the country could not afford too great a deterioration in its relations with China. South Korea's dependence on China is indeed much greater than that of the EU on China. In less than 30 years, bilateral trade has increased by 5,000%, from \$6 billion in 1992 to nearly \$300 billion in 2019,⁷⁵ and China accounted for 25% of South Korea's trade according to the Korea Customs Service. Chinese sanctions in 2017 were then unprecedented with an estimated impact of nearly \$10 billion per year, or more than 0.5% of South Korean GDP.⁷⁶ And yet, South Korea has stayed the course by assuming its security despite the economic sanctions. A deterioration in Sino-US relations, coupled with North Korean provocations, can therefore theoretically lead South Korea to make decisions that would favor security at the expense of its prosperity.

72 Jaeho Hwang, "China's Policy toward the Korean Peninsula: The Return to a Policy of Two Koreas," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 32, no. 2 (2017).

73 Sukhee Han, "Resetting the South Korea-China Relationship: The THAAD Controversies and Their Aftermath," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 31, no. 4 (December 2019).

74 Antoine Bondaz, "La réaction chinoise au déploiement du THAAD, illustration du dilemme sud-coréen," *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique*, April 2017.

75 Jianguo Huo, "Cooperation with China crucial to South Korean economy," *Global Times*, August 04, 2020.

76 Javier Hernandez, "South Korean Stores Feel China's Wrath as U.S. Missile System Is Deployed," *The New York Times*, March 09, 2017; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, "China's Response to U.S.-South Korean Missile Defense System Deployment and Its Implications," by Ethan Meick and Nargiza Salidjanova, July 26, 2017.

VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH KOREA'S TIGHTROPE DIPLOMACY

In this context, South Korea intends to adapt as best it can to the consequences of this rivalry, not only to ensure its security but also its prosperity. Seoul is implementing a "tightrope diplomacy"⁷⁷ while seeking to reduce its "excessive dependence" on China.⁷⁸ Efforts in this direction are long-standing, particularly in the economic sphere, and have been initiated by both the political authorities and the business community. South Korea, for example, is trying to diversify its economic partners. The country has increased the number of free trade agreements, in force with India (2010), the EU (2011), the United States (2012), Turkey (2013), Australia (2014), Canada and Vietnam (2015). The focus is on ASEAN, the core target of President Moon's "New Southern Policy," which is now Seoul's second largest trading partner and second largest destination for Korean FDI.⁷⁹ Coupled with the strategy of private companies to mitigate their exposure to Chinese sanctions but also to take advantage of emerging markets and cheaper labor, this has led, for example, to a meteoric increase in trade with Vietnam, which is expected to become the country's third largest trading partner behind the United States and ahead of Japan by 2021. However, South Korea's strategy is not only economic, it is also political. The Korean President is the first to have visited all the ASEAN countries, and the organization of the ASEAN-Republic of Korea Commemorative Summit in Busan in 2019 was an opportunity to stage the rapprochement between these countries. This underlines South Korea's ability to implement an even more ambitious foreign policy that, while it continues to prioritize the Big Four, rightly so, is able to look beyond and promote concrete and, above all, sustainable cooperation over time.⁸⁰

77 Jae-jung Suh, "S. Korea's false dilemma," *The Hankyoreh*, April 06, 2021.

78 Min-hee Park, "Things more important than Xi Jinping's visit to S. Korea," *The Hankyoreh*, November 27, 2020.

79 Antoine Bondaz, President Moon promised he would visit all ten ASEAN countries within his term, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS).

80 Seong-hyon Lee, "New Southern Policy," *Korea Times*, April 14, 2020.

Moreover, there has been a rapprochement with the United States, a development greatly facilitated by the arrival in power of the Biden administration, much to China's dismay. Relations between the two allies had deteriorated due to President Trump's unrealistic demands, such as a 600% increase in South Korean funding for the more than 28,000 US troops based in the country,⁸¹ or the adoption of tariffs on Korean steel. Since January 2021, the U.S. government has insisted on strengthening its alliances. Secretary of State Blinken made his first diplomatic tour to Japan and South Korea, accompanied by the Secretary of Defense, a sign of the importance attached to the region. During the visit, a 2+2 meeting was held in Seoul, a first since 2016, none having been held during the four years of the Trump administration. While Washington avoids publicly asking Seoul to adopt a tougher policy toward Beijing, the consensus in the country is that South Korea should abandon its "strategic ambiguity" that would have a "high cost with low benefits for Seoul."⁸² The country seems to be responding favorably to its American ally's quiet appeals by now publicly emphasizing the convergences between the "New South Policy" and the US Indo-Pacific strategy.⁸³ Most importantly, the joint statement following the May 2021 presidential summit explicitly mentions stability and peace in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, which Seoul has studiously avoided mentioning until now.⁸⁴ This is all the more remarkable given that in recent years Seoul has kept criticism of Beijing to a minimum, as the country needs to ensure that China does not stand in the way of its initiatives on the Peninsula. South Korea, unlike Japan, has refused to join several multilateral initiatives criticizing the human rights situation in China. Seoul did not sign the letter on the subject addressed to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2019, although signed by 22 countries,

81 "U.S. breaks off defense cost talks, as South Korea balks at \$5 billion demand," Reuters, November 19, 2019.

82 James Hamre, Joseph Nye Jr., Victor Cha (eds.), "CSIS Commission on the Korean Peninsula Recommendations for the U.S.-Korea Alliance," *CSIS*, March 2021.

83 Wongi Choe, "New Southern Policy, Korea's Newfound Ambition in Search of Strategic Autonomy," *IFRI*, *Asie Visions*, no. 118, January 2021.

84 The White House, "U.S.-ROK Leaders' Joint Statement," May 21, 2021.

nor the joint statement made in the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in 2020, supported by 39 countries.⁸⁵ The country also remained relatively silent on the attacks on democracy in Hong Kong, a silence sometimes exploited by Beijing to claim Seoul's support of its policy.⁸⁶

In addition, many disputes persist in the bilateral relationship with China, allowing conservative media to criticize "China's arrogance" as well as the Moon administration's "submissive attitude."⁸⁷ On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of China's intervention in the Korean War, some of the statements made by Chinese leaders were severely criticized in Seoul. The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to point out that "the fact that the Korean War was provoked by the invasion of North Korea is an undeniable historical fact."⁸⁸ Above all, events that may appear to be anecdotal abroad have an important political significance. For example, the South Korean media have been investigating incidents of cultural appropriation by China: attempts to label the traditional Korean garment hanbok as a type of Chinese hanfu; China's attempt to present pao cai, a pickled vegetable dish from Sichuan, as the international standard for the kimchi industry, which is considered a national dish by Koreans; and the portrayal of historical figures or Korean national heroes, such as the poet Yun Dong-ju, as Chinese of Korean origin,⁸⁹ etc. These incidents fuel resentment towards China and amplify pre-existing dynamics.

Thus, the deterioration of China's image in South Korea continues to grow, with unfavorable opinions rising from 37% in 2015, to 61% in 2017,

85 Putz Catherine, "2020 Edition: Which Countries Are For or Against China's Xinjiang Policies?," *The Diplomat*, October 09, 2020.

86 Lo Kinling, "South Korea rejects China's version of President Moon's Hong Kong remarks," *South China Morning Post*, December 25, 2019.

87 "Lack of reciprocity: China cancels flights without notice, flouting accord; Korea does not protest," *Korea Herald*, November 16, 2020.

88 "S. Korea says N.K. invasion triggering Korean War is 'undeniable historical fact,'" *Yonhap*, October 24, 2020.

89 Gallo William, "South Korean Outrage Over TV Series is Latest Sign of Growing Antagonism Toward China," *VoA*, April 21, 2021.

and to 75% in 2020, more than in the United States.⁹⁰ A characteristic specific to South Korea is that young people (18-29 years old) have a much more negative image of China than their elders (50 years old and over), unlike in France or the United States. This could have concrete impacts on the upcoming presidential election in March 2022, and on the foreign policy of the next administration. Indeed, in South Korea, we are witnessing not only a growing polarization, pushing the candidates to differentiate themselves on subjects considered divisive, such as relations with China and more broadly anti-communist rhetoric,⁹¹ but also an unexpected and massive support of young men for conservatives.⁹² Moreover, 70% of South Koreans are now in favor of a rapprochement with Washington, compared to only 15% in favor of a rapprochement with Beijing. The election of a conservative candidate in 2022 could thus reproduce the scenario of Lee Myung-bak's arrival in power in 2008 and a major diplomatic shift characterized by a rapprochement with Washington and a distancing from Beijing.⁹³ This shift could be all the more important as a conservative president in a period of cohabitation (the progressive party retaining a majority in the Assembly until the 2024 elections), would have to put himself in the forefront of key national domains, including foreign policy.

90 Pew Research Center, "Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries," *Pew Research Center*, Oct. 6, 2020.

91 Dongwoo Kim, "The Politics of South Korea's 'China Threat,'" *The Diplomat*, April 05, 2021.

92 According to exit polls in Seoul in April 2021 for the municipal elections, 72.5 percent of male voters between the ages of 20 and 29 voted for former conservative mayor Oh Se-hoon, despite the fact that this electorate voted overwhelmingly for progressive candidate Moon Jae-in in 2017. Seoho Lee, "Why Did Young South Koreans Ditch the Democratic Party and President Moon?," *The Diplomat*, April 09, 2021.

93 James Kim, and Chungku Kang, "The U.S.-China Competition in South Korean Public Eyes," *The Asan Institute for Policy Studies*, August 25, 2020.

VII. ECONOMIC SHIELD, MULTILATERALISM AND INDO–PACIFIC: TOWARDS AN EUROPE–KOREA COOPERATION TO LOOSEN THE GRIP

These aforementioned elements demonstrate that while South Korea seeks to maintain good relations with China, it is trying to increase its economic resilience and is moving de facto closer to the United States—A very similar dynamic to that of the EU and the EUMS. This trend was further highlighted in the joint communiqué issued after the presidential summit in Washington between President Moon and Biden, a move the Chinese ambassador in South Korea was not shy about openly criticizing.⁹⁴

Thus, not only is the Sino-American rivalry intensifying, but it is leading other countries to adapt in order to limit the consequences for their security and prosperity. In this context, a balancing act between the United States and China can only succeed if it dispels the illusion of neutrality and remains faithful to the values they defend. The distinction in many countries between traditional conservatives emphasizing the critical importance of the alliance with the United States and progressives seeking to guard against over-reliance on U.S. security guarantees seems to be dissipating compared to a decade ago.⁹⁵ If not aligning with the United States is an impulse displayed by both Koreans and Europeans, it is more and more difficult for them to display a proximity with Beijing. There should therefore not be a sterile debate between alignment and neutrality, but a substantive debate about our adaptation to the consequences of the Sino-American rivalry and the ongoing rise of China. Above all, it is essential for countries to adopt a resolutely multilateral approach that allows them to increase interactions, and especially cooperation, with other international actors. In this respect, the EU as well as EUMS are essential partners for South Korea. Seoul and Brussels have signed a free trade agreement in force since 2015, a framework agreement covering political cooperation in force since 2014, and a crisis management participation agreement in force

94 "China is aware Moon-Biden statement targets China despite no mention of Beijing": Chinese amb.," *Yonhap*, May 24, 2021.

95 Sung-Mi Kim, "South Korea's Middle-power Diplomacy: Changes and Challenges," *Chatham House*, 2016.

since 2016. This makes South Korea the only partner that has signed all three types of agreements with the EU.⁹⁶

First, strengthening economic cooperation between the two sides of Eurasia can help mitigate the impacts of Sino-American rivalry, and especially the risk now posed by likely Chinese sanctions as well as US ones to a much lesser extent. Trade between the EU and Korea has increased by nearly 50% in 10 years, from 61 billion euros in 2010 to 89 billion euros in 2020, which represents 2.5% of the EU's foreign trade.⁹⁷ While the EU cannot replace China as South Korea's main partner in the short term, Europeans and Koreans have a clear interest in increasing their trade in order to reduce their dependence on China, and especially to increase their coordination in the event of Chinese trade sanctions. Last February, former Danish diplomat Jonas Parellø-Plesner proposed adopting an economic version of NATO's Article 5: "an attack on the economy of one democracy is an attack on all." According to him, the "democratic" allies should retaliate against China by applying tariffs whenever a country's industry is threatened.⁹⁸ While this proposal appears to be ineffective because it requires considerable coordination and planning, with the risk of fueling a trade war scenario, Lindsay Gorman's proposal appears more relevant: "to soften the blow to one nation by spreading out the cost among all."⁹⁹ A group of countries could together reduce the impact of sanctions, thus dissuading China from implementing retaliatory measures whose effect would be limited. In this respect, feedback from countries targeted by Chinese sanctions is just as useful as reflection on solidarity mechanisms to best protect the economic and, ultimately, political interests of European states.¹⁰⁰

96 Nicola Casarini, "The EU's Growing Security Cooperation With South Korea," *The Diplomat*, March 25, 2021.

97 European Commission's Directorate-General for Trade, "European Union, Trade in goods with South Korea," Brussels: European Commission, 2021.

98 Jonas Parellø-Plesner, "An 'Economic Article 5' to Counter China," *Wall Street Journal*, February 11, 2021.

99 Lindsay Gorman, "Pineapple War Shows Taiwan Won't Be Bullied by Beijing," *Foreign Affairs*, March 16, 2021.

100 Antoine Bondaz, "L'expérience australienne des sanctions commerciales chinoises: une leçon pour l'Europe?," Fondation pour la recherche stratégique

Diversifying supply chains and reducing dependency on critical goods, a priority for the European Union and South Korea, can also enable concrete and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Second, debates in South Korea have often focused on the concept of middle power, even though policy-makers often use the term without sufficiently unravelling its meanings and their ramifications.¹⁰¹ Seoul has thus invested since 2013 in the MIKTA format (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia), bringing together middle powers with an eye to balancing the G7 and BRICS coalitions.¹⁰² However, this format appears to be less and less adapted to the global challenges. On the contrary, a more inclusive and broader format is essential, and this is the case of the Alliance for Multilateralism, initiated by France and Germany and officially launched on September 26, 2019 with an event co-organized alongside Canada, Mexico, Chile, Singapore and Ghana. Since then, concrete initiatives to address global challenges together have been launched in seven areas including the Berlin Principles on one Health, the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, the 11 Principles on Lethal Autonomous Weapons, the Alliance against Impunity and the Gender at the Centre (GCI) initiative. South Korea, which already has its place in this Alliance, should strengthen its coordination with the EU and EUMS and increase its initiatives. South Korea, which is already taking its full place in this Alliance, should strengthen its coordination with the European Union and the member states in order to multiply joint initiatives. Closer cooperation can also stabilize international organizations and mitigate Sino-US rivalry within them, thus promoting Korea and Europe's interests.¹⁰³

(FRS), DEFENSE & Industries, no. 15, April 2021.

101 Sung-Mi Kim, "South Korea's Middle-power Diplomacy: Changes and Challenges," *Chatham House*, 2016.

102 Jeffrey Robertson, "South Korea's quandary: what to do about MIKTA?," *Lowy Institute*, November 29, 2018.

103 Barbara Lippert, Volker Perthes (eds.), "Strategic Rivalry between United States and China: Causes, Trajectories, and Implications for Europe," *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)*, Research Paper no. 4, April 2020.

Third, Seoul assumes points of convergence between its New South Policy and Washington's Indo-Pacific Strategy,¹⁰⁴ but refuses to be seen as ostensibly moving toward the Quad format so as not to offend Beijing.¹⁰⁵ In this sense, it is highly unlikely that Seoul will be interested in the Quad, or even a Quad+, as this format is now politically connoted.¹⁰⁶ The same is true for the EU and EUMS. Given the overlap between European and Korean strategies in the region¹⁰⁷ and the political constraints facing South Korea, there is still untapped potential for increased cooperation between Europe and Korea in a wide range of areas from maritime security to ocean governance, from development assistance to third parties to connectivity, which is particularly appropriate. As researchers in the case of Germany point out, South Korea will "incredibly benefit from a comprehensive and truly committed cooperation with a partner whose reputation in avoiding unipolar imperatives is becoming increasingly clearer to international observers."¹⁰⁸ The same is true for France, which has been multiplying its cooperation in the field of security with South Korea for several years within the framework of a Global Partnership for the 21st Century and during many high level strategic dialogues.¹⁰⁹

Above all, this cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region can enable South Korea to support initiatives that can ultimately be transposed to the Korean

104 Andrew Yeo, "South Korea and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy," *CSIS*, July 20, 2020.

105 Kuyoun Chung, "Why South Korea is balking at the Quad, East Asia Forum," March 31, 2021.

106 Ramon Pacheco Pardo, "What's the Quad and why would South Korea join?," *Washington Post*, May 21, 2021.

107 France was the first country to present a dedicated Indo-Pacific strategy in 2018, followed by Germany and the Netherlands in 2020, and the EU in 2021.

108 Eric Ballbach, and Laura Morazzini, "A Restrained Embrace: South Korea's Response to Germany's Indo-Pacific Strategy," *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)*, Comment no. 13, February 2021.

109 Antoine Bondaz, "Interview of Ambassador Choi Jong-moon: France has been and will be considered as one of the most important countries in realizing Korea's policy toward Europe," *Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS)*, May 2019.

Peninsula. The country is very active in Southeast Asia to support reforestation efforts with the creation of the Korea Indonesia Forest Center in 2011 and the Korea-Mekong Forest Cooperation Center in Cambodia in 2016.¹¹⁰ A broader Indo-Pacific initiative, co-launched with the EU, would materialize the Indo-Pacific concept through specific and concrete initiatives, emphasize initiatives related to environmental issues, create innovative cooperation formats outside of the Quad, and facilitate interactions of different government agencies. Most importantly, such a multilateral initiative could be extended to North Korea, and its acceptability would not depend solely on the state of inter-Korean relations.

VIII. TOWARDS AN EUROPEAN STRATEGY OF CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA

While the Sino-American rivalry has direct consequences for the security of South Korea, it is not alone responsible for the current impasse on the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, it is the divergent interests of the various actors that primarily explain the blockages as well as the numerous political constraints. A frequent argument is that North Korea would benefit from this current rivalry.¹¹¹ However, it does not seem that Chinese support has particularly increased recently as it depends primarily on Beijing's assessment of the risk of instability on the peninsula and not just on tensions with Washington. Also, the total intertwining of Seoul's two main objectives—improving inter-Korean relations and denuclearizing North Korea—is mainly due to multilateral and unilateral sanctions, limiting the possibility of achieving the first objective without concrete progress on the second, and partly explaining the growing frustration in Seoul.¹¹² Similarly, while the country

110 Suk-yeo Jung, "Korea Forest Service to Host Global Forest Meetings in June," *Business Korea*, May 30, 2019.

111 Jacob Fromer, "US-China tensions give North Korea an opportunity to strengthen its position in nuclear talks," *South China Morning Post*, March 21, 2021.

112 Antoine Bondaz, "The lull before the storm: the worst may be yet to come in the Korean Peninsula," *Real Instituto Elcano*, September 2020.

played a central role in the inter-Korean and then Pyongyang-Washington rapprochement process in 2018, Seoul has unfortunately no trump cards up its sleeve in dealing with Pyongyang and has almost reached the limit of what the country can do without violating international sanctions, causing additional tensions in the U.S.-Korea alliance, or bearing too great a political cost. Yet, greater cooperation between Europe and Korea, and greater European involvement in the Korean Peninsula, can make a limited yet positive contribution to stabilizing the region, a common interest.

It remains to be seen whether Pyongyang will agree to open negotiations with Washington, which is in the process of presenting its new strategy towards North Korea.¹¹³ In the meantime, North Korea is wary of engaging with the EU because it does not perceive Brussels as a neutral player or mediator. Rather than engaging constructively with the EU and EUMS, the North has sometimes tried to divide it, openly criticizing some EUMS while sending more conciliatory signals to others.¹¹⁴ Moreover, the role of the EU and its member states is now much more limited than it was two decades ago, and diplomatic and economic leverage has been significantly reduced.¹¹⁵ Unlike China or the United States, they are not key players capable of providing sufficient security guarantees to North Korea. In a recent policy paper published by the European Consortium on Nonproliferation and Disarmament, we still argued that the EU should move from a strategy of critical engagement to the implementation of a more proactive strategy of credible engagements in four areas: political engagement, nonproliferation, implementation of restrictive measures, and engagement with the North Korean people.¹¹⁶ This

113 Sang-Min Kim, and Julia Masterson, "Biden's North Korea Policy Review: Toward a More Effective Strategy," *Arms Control Association*, Issue Briefs 13, no. 2, April 13, 2021; Robert Einhorn, "The rollout of the Biden administration's North Korea policy review leaves unanswered questions," *Brookings*, May 4, 2021.

114 Meetings with senior North Korean officials since 2016.

115 Ramon Pacheco Pardo, "North Korea's denuclearization: Is there a role for Europe?," 38 *North*, March 26, 2019.

116 Antoine Bondaz, "From critical engagement to credible commitments: a renewed EU strategy for the North Korean proliferation crisis," EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Paper no. 67, EU Consortium on non-proliferation and

renewed strategy should be highly coordinated, build on the many initiatives already taken, and be facilitated by the appointment of an EU Special Representative for North Korea who would become an ideal interlocutor for his Korean (Noh Kyu-duk), American (Sung Kim) and Chinese (Liu Xiaoming) counterparts. Indeed, the EU and EUMS regularly and rightly assert that their shared interests with South Korea are at stake: the fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of stability on the Korean Peninsula and prosperity in Asia.

Notably, as the Sino-American rivalry continues to escalate, it is fundamental to consider the added value, although limited, of the EU and EUMS. The Europeans and the Koreans must share the same objective: to avoid making North Korea an issue in the Sino-American rivalry and try, at best, to stabilize the situation. First, while interactions between the U.S. and Chinese officials and researchers are increasingly difficult or non-existent, it is important to maintain channels of communication that are conducive to dialogue, especially if they can address sensitive issues in the Korean Peninsula. In this context, the EU and EUMS should facilitate international negotiations with North Korea, but also discussions between the U.S. and China on North Korea, taking advantage of a unique EUMS diplomatic network and building on the key role played by some of them, from Germany in the late 1990s to Sweden more recently at both the track 1.0 and track 1.5 level. Second, while some countries may seek to politicize events on the peninsula, including ballistic tests, the EU and EUMS must play its role as a responsible actor in strengthening European declaratory policy and diplomacy to better defend the international nonproliferation regime and continuing to raise awareness in international fora. In particular, as is already partly the case, European countries, including the two permanent members of the Security Council, can propose resolutions that could appear more consensual than American or Chinese resolutions. Third, while the implementation of international sanctions may be negatively impacted by the Sino-American

disarmament, February 2020; Antoine Bondaz, "Reinvigorating the EU's Strategy Toward North Korea: From Critical Engagement to Credible Commitments," 38 North, April 16, 2020.

rivalry, Beijing having shown a certain laxity for years, the Europeans should respond more effectively to North Korea's sanctions evasion techniques,¹¹⁷ making full use of its newly created institutions and tools—such as the cyber sanctions framework adopted in May 2019, as well as providing more assistance to promote capacity building with partners worldwide to better implement restrictive measures at the global level on conventional arms and dual-use goods, and improve their export control mechanisms through existing programs.

Last but not least, Europe has been an important actor in providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea and continues to be so through four European resident NGOs in North Korea, the only ones in the country.¹¹⁸ The EU, through ECHO, Sweden, Germany and France are the biggest European contributors. Yet, the EU and EUMS should address even more the North's humanitarian crisis at the European and international levels, as well as the unintended but real consequences of international sanctions, etc. They should also be more active in areas where the US or South Korea have political constraints: accelerate efforts to help North Korea build a more efficient and responsive disaster relief mechanism, a high priority for the country; provide hundreds of thousands of desired vaccines to the country to speed up the reopening of borders and then facilitate international negotiations with North Korean diplomats; continue to foster exchanges with North Korean society in non-sensitive sectors such as culture and education; and focus on augmenting financing for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria operations dedicated to help North Korea deal with infectious diseases, etc.

117 Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, "North Korea's Illicit Cyber Operations: What Can Be Done?," 38 North, February 28, 2020.

118 Première Urgence Internationale, Triangle Génération Humanitaire, Concern Worldwide and Welthungerhilfe. These four NGOs had to withdraw temporarily from the country because of the pandemic. Handicap International and Save the Children eventually withdrew from the country in 2019, independently of the pandemic.

IX. CONCLUSION

We have sought to demonstrate that the Sino-American rivalry, born of the end of the Cold War, is multidimensional, systemic and global. While it continues to intensify and tighten its grip, pushing third countries to position themselves in this rivalry, Koreans and Europeans share the assessment that it is having an increasing impact on their interests. While their respective strategies may differ slightly, they share both the need to promote a form of strategic autonomy, the need to rely even more on multilateralism and to defend their democratic political system. In this context, the strengthening of bilateral cooperation, a pragmatic cooperation that does not aim to replace but to complement existing international partnerships, appears to be indispensable. From the Indo-Pacific to North Korea to defense against economic coercion, the potential for cooperation is considerable and must be further exploited.

■ Article Received: 05/26 ■ Reviewed: 06/10 ■ Revised: 06/16 ■ Accepted: 06/23

Bibliography

Books

- Chung, Jae Ho. *Between Ally and Partner*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
- Flournoy, Michele A. QDR 2001: *Strategy-driven choices for America's Security*. Darby: DIANE Publishing, 2001.
- Goldstein, Lyle J. *Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry*. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2015.
- Kim, Sung-Mi. *South Korea's Middle-power Diplomacy: Changes and Challenges*. London: Chatham House, 2016.
- Shambaugh, David. *China Goes Global: The Partial Power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- 阎, 学通. 美国霸权与中国安全, 天津: 天津人民出版社, 2000.

Academic Articles

- Bondaz, Antoine. "Faire entendre la voix de la Chine: les recommandations des experts chinois pour atténuer la perception d'une menace chinoise." *Revue internationale et stratégique* 3, no. 115 (2019): 97-106.
- Bondaz, Antoine. "L'OTAN vue de Chine." *Diplomatie* 103 (2020): 68-69.
- Brands, Hal, and Zack Cooper. "U.S. - Chinese Rivalry Is a Battle Over Values." *Foreign Affairs* (2021).
- Cabestan, Jean-Pierre. "The many facets of Chinese nationalism." *China Perspectives*, no. 59 (2005).
- Clinton, Hillary. "America's Pacific century." *Foreign Policy* 189, no. 1 (2011).
- Cossa, Ralph, and Brad Glosserman. "Return to Asia: It's not (all) about China." *PacNet Newsletter*, January 30, 2012.
- 崔, 立如. "全球化时代与多极化世界." 现代国际关系 (2010).
- Deng, Yong. "Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on U. S. Global Strategy." *Political Science Quarterly* 116, no. 3 (2001): 343-365.

- Goldstein, Avery. "The Future of US-China Relations and the Korean Peninsula." *Asian Perspective* 26, no. 3 (2002): 111-129.
- Han Suk-hui. "Resetting the South Korea-China Relationship: The THAAD Controversies and Their Aftermath." *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 31, no. 4 (2019): 539-557.
- Heisbourg, François. "NATO 4.0: The Atlantic Alliance and the Rise of China." *Survival* 62, no. 2 (2020): 83-102.
- Huntington, Samuel. "The U.S.: Decline or Renewal?" *Foreign Affairs* 67 (1988).
- Hwang, Jaeho. "China's Policy toward the Korean Peninsula: The Return to a Policy of Two Koreas." *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 32, no. 2 (2017): 36-58.
- Krauthammer, Charles. "The Unipolar Moment." *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (1990/1991).
- Layne, Christopher. "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment." *International Security* 31, no. 2 (2006).
- Layne, Christopher. "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise." *International Security* 17, no. 4 (1993).
- Lippert, Barbara, and Volker Perthes. "Strategic Rivalry between United States and China." *Causes, Trajectories, and Implications for Europe, SWP Research Paper* 4 (2020).
- 钮, 维敢, and 赵, 秋梧. "国际法视角下的调查" 天安 "舰事件及其影响." *南京航空航天大学学报* 2 (2011).
- Prestowitz, Clyde. "New Blowing Wind: American Decline Becomes New Conventional Wisdom." *Foreign Policy* (2011).
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/15/new-wind-blowing-american-decline-becomes-the-new-conventional-wisdom/> (Accessed April 22, 2021).
- 任, 卫东. "亚太地缘政治形势与中国战略思考." *中国与世界观察* 1 (2013).
- Robertson, Jeffrey. "South Korea's quandary: What to do about MIKTA." *The Interpreter* 29 (2018).
- 阮, 宗泽. "美国"亚太再平衡"战略前景论析." *世界经济与政治* 4 (2014).
- 石, 源华 and 文, 恩熙. "试论中韩战略合作伙伴关系中的美国因素." *东北亚论坛* 5 (2012).
- Snyder, Scott, and See-Won Byun. "Cheonan and Yeonpyeong: The Northeast Asian Response to North Korea's Provocations." *The RUSI Journal* 156, no. 2 (2011): 74-81.

Swaine, Michael D. "Chinese leadership and elite responses to the US Pacific pivot." *China Leadership Monitor* 38, no. 5 (2012): 1-26.

Waltz, Kenneth. "Structural Realism after the Cold war." *International Security* 5, no. 1 (2000).

王, 聪悦. "新一轮"中国威胁论: "酝酿、表征与应对." *世界社会主义研究* 1 (2019).

阎, 学通. "权力中心转移与国际体系转变." *当代亚太* 6 (2012).

张, 晓明. 曹, 延中, and 洛, 岩. "新一轮"中国威胁论 "透析." *国防* 12 (2018).

张, 琏瑰. "2010年的朝鲜半岛: 千钧一发." *世界知识* 1 (2011).

Press Articles

Bondaz, Antoine. "Coronavirus: Le modèle de gouvernance chinois n'est pas un modèle à suivre." *Le Monde*, March 16, 2020.

https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2020/03/16/coronavirus-le-modele-de-gouvernance-chinois-n-est-pas-un-modele-a-suivre_6033206_3232.html (Accessed May 3, 2021).

Casarini, Nicola. "The EU's Growing Security Cooperation With South Korea." *The Diplomat*, March 25, 2021.

<https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/the-eus-growing-security-cooperation-with-south-korea/> (Accessed May 26, 2021).

成, 晓河. "天安舰" 凸显韩国难言之隐." *经济观察报*, May 24, 2010.

Euronews. "MEPs vote to freeze controversial EU-China investment deal." May 21, 2021.

<https://www.euronews.com/2021/05/20/european-parliament-votes-to-freeze-controversial-eu-china-investment-deal> (Accessed May 22, 2021).

Fromer, Jacob. "US-China tensions give North Korea an opportunity to strengthen its position in nuclear talks." *South China Morning Post*, March 21, 2021.

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3126225/us-china-tensions-give-north-korea-opportunity-strengthen-its> (Accessed May 6, 2021).

Hernandez, Javier. "South Korean Stores Feel China's Wrath as U.S. Missile System Is Deployed." *The New York Times*, March 09, 2017.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/world/asia/china-lotte-thaad-south-korea.html> (Accessed May 14, 2021).

Huo, Jianguo. "Cooperation with China crucial to South Korean economy." *Global Times*, August 04, 2020.

<https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1196686.shtml> (Accessed May 19, 2021).

Gallo, William. "South Korean Outrage Over TV Series is Latest Sign of Growing Antagonism Toward China." *VOA*, April 21, 2021.

<https://www.voacambodia.com/a/5861366.html> (Accessed May 2, 2021).

Global Times. "US prepares a trap for South Korea in White House summit: Global Times editorial." May 21, 2021.

<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202105/1224133.shtml> (Accessed May 22, 2021).

Gorman, Lindsay. "Pineapple War Shows Taiwan Won't Be Bullied by Beijing." *Foreign Policy*, March 16, 2021.

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/16/taiwan-china-pineapple-war-economic-bullying-democracies-boycott/> (Accessed May 14, 2021).

金, 灿荣. "戴维来, "冷静看待美国重返亚洲." *环球时报*, November 14, 2012.

Jung, Suk-ye. "Korea Forest Service to Host Global Forest Meetings in June." *Business Korea*, May 30, 2019.

<http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=32406> (Accessed May 16, 2021).

Kim, Dongwoo. "The Politics of South Korea's 'China Threat.'" *The Diplomat*, April 05, 2021.

<https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-politics-of-south-koreas-china-threat/> (Accessed May 24, 2021).

Korea Herald. "Lack of reciprocity: China cancels flights without notice, flouting accord; Korea does not protest." November 16, 2020.

<http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20201115000227> (Accessed May 7, 2021).

Lee, Seoho. "Why Did Young South Koreans Ditch the Democratic Party and President Moon?," *The Diplomat*, April 09, 2021.

<https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/why-did-young-south-koreans-ditch-the-democratic-party-and-president-moon/> (Accessed May 3, 2021).

Lee, Seong-hyon. "New Southern Policy." *Korea Times*, April 14, 2020.

<https://m.koreatimes.co.kr/pages/article.asp?newsIdx=287872> (Accessed May 16, 2021).

Lo, Kinling. "South Korea rejects China's version of President Moon's Hong Kong remarks." *South China Morning Post*, December 25, 2019.

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3043476/south-korea-rejects-chinas-version-president-moons-hong-kong> (Accessed May 23, 2021).

Niewenhuis, Lucas. "EU issues first sanctions on China since 1989 over treatment of Uyghurs." *Supchina*, March 22, 2021.

<https://supchina.com/2021/03/22/eu-issues-first-sanctions-on-china-since-1989-over-treatment-of-uyghurs/> (Accessed May 5, 2021).

Pardo, Ramon Pacheco. "What's the Quad and why would South Korea join?" *Washington Post*, May 21, 2021.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/gdpr-consent/?next_url=https%3a%2f%2fwww.washingtonpost.com%2fpolitics%2f2021%2f05%2f21%2fsouth-korea-rebuffed-trump-heres-why-it-might-cooperate-with-biden%2f (Accessed May 22, 2021).

Parello-Plesner, Jonas. "An 'Economic Article 5' to Counter China." *Wall Street Journal*, February 11, 2021.

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/an-economic-article-5-to-counter-china-11613084046> (Accessed May 13, 2021).

Park, Min-hee. "Things more important than Xi Jinping's visit to S. Korea." *The Hankyoreh*, November 27, 2020.

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/971879.html (Accessed May 22, 2021).

Putz, Catherine. "2020 Edition: Which Countries Are For or Against China's Xinjiang Policies?" *The Diplomat*, October 09, 2020.

<https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/2020-edition-which-countries-are-for-or-against-chinas-xinjiang-policies/> (Accessed May 6, 2021).

Ratcliffe, John. "China Is National Security Threat no. 1." *Wall Street Journal*, December 3, 2020.

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-is-national-security-threat-no-1-11607019599> (Accessed May 13, 2021).

人民日报, "1999年5月9日胡锦涛就我驻南使馆遭袭击发表讲话." May 10, 1999.

Reuters. "U.S. breaks off defense cost talks, as South Korea balks at \$5 billion demand." November 19, 2019.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-talks-idUSKBN1XT0EN> (Accessed May 18, 2021).

Suh, Jae-Jung. "S. Korea's false dilemma." *The Hankyoreh*, April 06, 2021.

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/989881.html (Accessed May 2, 2021).

Tamma, Paola. "Europe wants 'strategic autonomy' — it just has to decide what that means." *Politico*, October 15, 2020.

<https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-trade-wants-strategic-autonomy-decide-what-means/> (Accessed May 21, 2021).

王, 缉思. "西进, 中国地缘战略的再平衡." *环球时报*, October 17, 2012.

- Xinhua. "Xi Focus: Xi emphasizes 'struggles' to achieve national rejuvenation." September 3, 2019.
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/03/c_138362482.htm (Accessed May 13, 2021).
- Xinhua. "Xi Focus: Xi stresses carrying forward China's volunteers army's spirit in War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea." October 20, 2020.
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-10/20/c_139452337.htm (Accessed May 27, 2021).
- Yonhap. "China is aware Moon-Biden statement targets China despite no mention of Beijing': Chinese amb." May 24, 2021.
<https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210524005651325> (Accessed May 26, 2021).
- Yonhap. "S. Korea says N.K. invasion triggering Korean War is 'undeniable historical fact.'" October 24, 2020.
<https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201024002400325> (Accessed May 26, 2021).
- Zhao, Yushan. "S.Korea 'weak link' of US strategy to encircle China." *Global Times*, March 17, 2021.
<https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1218725.shtml> (Accessed May 3, 2021).

Reports and Working Papers

- Ballbach, Eric J., and Laura Morazzini. "A restrained embrace: South Korea's response to Germany's Indo-Pacific strategy." SWP (2021): 7.
https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2021C13_SouthKorea_Indo_Pacific.pdf (Accessed May 13, 2021).
- Bondaz, Antoine, François Godement, and Agatha Kratz. *Explaining China's Foreign Policy Reset*. European Council on Foreign Relations, 2015.
https://ecfr.eu/publication/explaining_chinas_foreign_policy_reset3001/ (Accessed May 6, 2021).
- Bondaz, Antoine. "Solving the 'Rise' Dilemma: How the Chinese Silk Road Initiative Could Challenge the United States." International Relations and Security Network - ETH Zurich, 2015.
<https://isnblog.ethz.ch/international-relations/solving-the-rise-dilemma-how-the-chinese-silk-road-initiative-could-challenge-the-united-states> (Accessed May 3, 2021).
- Bondaz, Antoine. "La réaction chinoise au déploiement du THAAD, illustration du dilemme sud-coréen." Note de la FRS 9 (2017): 8.
<https://www.frstrategie.org/publications/notes/reaction-chinoise-deploiement-thaad-illustration-dilemme-sud-coreen-2017> (Accessed May 8, 2021).

Bondaz, Antoine. "Interview of Ambassador Choi Jong-moon: France has been and will be considered as one of the most important countries in realizing Korea's policy toward Europe." Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), FRS-KF Korea Program, May 2019.

<https://frstrategie.org/en/programs/korea-security-and-diplomacy-program/france-has-been-and-will-be-considered-one-most-important-countries-realizing-korea-s-policy-toward-europe-2019> (Accessed May 10, 2021).

Bondaz, Antoine. "President Moon promised he would visit all ten ASEAN countries within his term." Interview of Dr. Lee Jaehyon, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), FRS-KF Korea Program, May 2019.

<https://frstrategie.org/en/programs/korea-security-and-diplomacy-program/president-moon-promised-he-would-visit-all-ten-asean-countries-within-his-term-2019> (Accessed May 6, 2021).

Bondaz, Antoine. "From critical engagement to credible commitments: a renewed EU strategy for the North Korean proliferation crisis." EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Paper 67, EU Consortium on non-proliferation and disarmament, February 2020.

<https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/eu-non-proliferation-and-disarmament-papers/critical-engagement-credible-commitments-renewed-eu-strategy-north-korean-proliferation-crisis> (Accessed May 13, 2021).

Bondaz, Antoine. "Reinvigorating the EU's Strategy Toward North Korea: From Critical Engagement to Credible Commitments." 38 North, April 16, 2020.

<https://www.38north.org/2020/04/abondaz041620/> (Accessed May 6, 2021).

Bondaz, Antoine. "The lull before the storm: the worst may be yet to come in the Korean Peninsula." Real Instituto Elcano, September 2020.

<http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/62c92c4a-e168-4a6c-b4ef-3425cc15071b/ARI111-2020-Bondaz-The-lull-before-the-storm-worst-may-be-yet-to-come-in-Korean-Peninsula.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=62c92c4a-e168-4a6c-b4ef-3425cc15071b> (Accessed May 14, 2021).

Bondaz, Antoine. "Searching for a Bolder China Policy." Echowall, November 2020.

<https://www.echo-wall.eu/knowledge-gaps/searching-bolder-china-policy> (Accessed May 7, 2021).

Bondaz, Antoine. "L'expérience australienne des sanctions commerciales chinoises: une leçon pour l'Europe?" Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), DEFENSE & Industries no. 15, April 2021.

<https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/defense-et-industries/2021/2.pdf> (Accessed May 6, 2021).

Choe, Wongi. "New Southern Policy": Korea's Newfound Ambition in Search of

Strategic Autonomy." Ifri, January 2021.

<https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/asie-visions/new-southern-policy-koreas-newfound-ambition-search> (Accessed May 18, 2021).

Chung, Kuyoun. "Why South Korea is balking at the Quad." East Asia Forum, March 31, 2021.

<https://www.easiaforum.org/2021/03/31/why-south-korea-is-balking-at-the-quad/> (Accessed May 12, 2021).

Einhorn, Robert. "The rollout of the Biden administration's North Korea policy review leaves unanswered questions." Brookings, May 4, 2021.

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/05/04/the-rollout-of-the-biden-administrations-north-korea-policy-review-leaves-unanswered-questions/> (Accessed May 6, 2021).

Feldstein, Steven. "When It Comes to Digital Authoritarianism, China is a Challenge — But Not the Only Challenge." War on the Rocks, 2020.

<https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/when-it-comes-to-digital-authoritarianism-china-is-a-challenge-but-not-the-only-challenge/> (Accessed May 13, 2021).

Franke, Ulrike, and Tara Varma. "Independence play: Europe's pursuit of strategic autonomy." European Council on Foreign Relations 293, 2019.

https://ecfr.eu/special/independence_play_europes_pursuit_of_strategic_autonomy/ (Accessed May 21, 2021).

García-Herrero, Alicia, and Guntram B. Wolff. "China Has an Unfair Advantage in the EU Market. What Can Be Done to Level the Playing Field?" Bruegel-Blogs (2020): NA-NA.

<https://www.bruegel.org/2020/07/china-has-an-unfair-advantage-in-the-eu-market-what-can-be-done-to-level-the-playing-field/> (Accessed May 8, 2021).

Godement, François, and Abigaël Vasselier. "China at the gates: A new power audit of EU-China relations." European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017.

https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/China_Power_Audit.pdf (Accessed May 13, 2021).

Hamre, James, Joseph Nye Jr., and Victor Cha. "CSIS Commission on the Korean Peninsula Recommendations for the U.S.-Korea Alliance." *CSIS*, March 2021.

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/csis-commission-korean-peninsula-recommendations-us-korea-alliance> (Accessed May 21, 2021).

Kim, James, and Chungku Kang. "The U.S.-China Competition in South Korean Public Eyes." The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, August 25, 2020.

<http://en.asaninst.org/contents/the-u-s-china-competition-in-south-korean-public-eyes/> (Accessed May 18, 2021).

- Kim, Sang-Min, and Julia Masterson. "Biden's North Korea Policy Review: Toward a More Effective Strategy." Arms Control Association, Issue Briefs 13, no. 2, April 13, 2021.
<https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2021-04/bidens-north-korea-policy-review-toward-more-effective-strategy> (Accessed May 15, 2021).
- Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Stephanie. "North Korea's Illicit Cyber Operations: What Can Be Done?" 38 North, February 28, 2020.
<https://www.38north.org/2020/02/skleineahlbrandt022820/> (Accessed May 4, 2021).
- Lee, Chung Min. "South Korea Is Caught Between China and the United States." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 21, 2020.
<https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/21/south-korea-is-caught-between-china-and-united-states-pub-83019> (Accessed May 19, 2021).
- Lippert, Barbara, Nicolai von Ondarza, and Volker Perthes. "European strategic autonomy: actors, issues, conflicts of interests." Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), 2019.
<https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019RP04/> (Accessed May 13, 2021).
- Oertel, Janka. "US-China confrontation and repercussions for the EU." European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), March 25, 2021.
<https://ecfr.eu/article/us-china-systemic-rivalry-repercussions-for-the-eu/> (Accessed May 7, 2021).
- Pardo, Ramon Pacheco. "North Korea's Denuclearization: Is There a Role for Europe?" 38 North, March 26, 2019.
<https://www.38north.org/2019/03/rpachecopardo032619/> (Accessed May 14, 2021).
- Pence, Mike. "Vice President Mike Pence's remarks on the administration's policy towards China." Hudson Institute, October 4, 2018.
<https://www.hudson.org/events/1610-vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarks-on-the-administration-s-policy-towards-china102018> (Accessed May 18, 2021).
- Piccone, Ted. "China's long game on human rights at the United Nations." Brookings Institution, September 7, 2018.
<https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-long-game-on-human-rights-at-the-united-nations/> (Accessed May 24, 2021).
- Poushter, Jacob and J.J Moncus. "How people in 14 countries view the state of the world in 2020." Pew Research Center, September 23, 2020.
<https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/09/23/how-people-in-14-countries-view-the-state-of-the-world-in-2020/> (Accessed May 10, 2021).
- Rolland, Nadège. "China's vision for a new world order." National Bureau of Asian Research, 2020.

<https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-vision-for-a-new-world-order/>
(Accessed May 20, 2021).

Shi-Kupfer, Kristin, et al. "Ideas and ideologies competing for China's political future." MERICS Papers on China. Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS).

<https://merics.org/en/report/ideas-and-ideologies-competing-chinas-political-future> (Accessed May 15, 2021).

Shirk, Susan L. "Can China's Political System Sustain Its Peaceful Rise?" SITC-NWC 2013 Policy Briefs, April 2013.

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3mb1269b> (Accessed May 9, 2021).

Silver, Laura, Kat Devlin and Christine Huang. "Unfavorable views of China reach historic highs in many countries." Pew Research Center 6, 2020.

<https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries/> (Accessed May 12, 2021).

Small, Andrew. "Testimony before the U.S. - China Economic and Security Review Commission." Hearing on China's Foreign Policy: Challenges and Players, Washington, April 13, 2011.

<https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/4.13.11Small.pdf> (Accessed May 8, 2021).

Stafford Powell, Alison J., and Alexandre Lamy. "US Sanctions against China." Baker MacKenzie. 2021.

<https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/us-government-issues-executive-order-amending-ban-on-us-persons-purchasing-securities-of-certain-chinese-companies/> (Accessed June 10, 2021).

Stec, Grzegorz. "'Correct choice' on strategic autonomy: What China wants from the EU." Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), April 28, 2021.

<https://merics.org/en/briefing/correct-choice-strategic-autonomy-what-china-wants-eu> (Accessed May 17, 2021).

Wadhams, Nick. "Blinken Says Only China Can Truly Challenge Global System." Bloomberg, March 3, 2021.

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-03/blinken-calls-china-competition-a-key-challenge-for-the-u-s> (Accessed May 9, 2021).

Yeo, Andrew. "South Korea and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy." Center for Strategic and International Studies Newsletter, July 20 (2020).

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-korea-and-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy> (Accessed May 16, 2021).

Zenglein, Max J. "Mapping and Recalibrating Europe's Economic Interdependence with China." Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), November 18, 2020.

<https://merics.org/en/report/mapping-and-recalibrating-europes-economic-interdependence-china> (Accessed May 11, 2021).

Government Documents

US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. "China's Response to US – South Korean Missile Defense System Deployment and Its Implications." Ethan Meick and Nargiza Salidjanova. 2017.

https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Report_China%27s%20Response%20to%20THAAD%20Deployment%20and%20its%20Implications.pdf (Accessed May 21, 2021).

European Commission. "EU-China – A strategic outlook." Brussels: European Commission, March 12, 2019.

<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf> (Accessed May 13, 2021).

European Commission. "EU foreign investment screening mechanism becomes fully operational." Brussels: European Commission, October 9, 2020.

<https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2187> (Accessed May 13, 2021).

Directorate-General for Trade. "European Union, Trade in goods with South Korea?" Brussels: European Commission, 2021.

https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_south-korea_en.pdf (Accessed May 13, 2021).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. "Wang Yi Holds Talks with ROK's Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong." Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. April 3, 2021.

<https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-response-us-south-korean-missile-defense-system-deployment-and-its-implications> (Accessed May 8, 2021).

Executive Office of the President. "National security strategy of the United States of America." Washington DC: The White House, December 2017.

<https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf> (Accessed May 17, 2021).

Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy. "How China's economic aggression threatens the technologies and intellectual property of the United States and the World." Washington DC: The White House, 2018.

<https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/office-trade-manufacturing-policy-report-chinas-economic-aggression-threatens-technologies-intellectual-property-united-states-world/> (Accessed May 17, 2021).

The White House. "United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral National Security Advisors' Press Statement." Washington DC: The White House, April 2, 2021. <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=812268> (Accessed May 17, 2021).

The White House. "U.S.-ROK Leaders' Joint Statement." Washington DC: The White House, May 21, 2021. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-joint-statement/> (Accessed May 17, 2021).

Speeches

Clinton, Hillary. "Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities." Transcript of speech delivered at Imin Center-Jefferson Hall, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 12, 2010. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135090.htm> (Accessed May 15, 2021).

Michel, Charles. "Strategic autonomy for Europe - the aim of our generation." Transcript of speech delivered at Bruegel, Brussels, September 28, 2020. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/09/28/l-autonomie-strategique-europeenne-est-l-objectif-de-notre-generation-discours-du-president-charles-michel-au-groupe-de-reflexion-bruegel/> (Accessed May 15, 2021).

Obama, Barack. "Remarks by President Obama at G-20 Press Conference." Transcript of speech delivered at Toronto, Canada, June 27, 2010. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/16/remarks-president-obama-g20-press-conference-november-16-2014> (Accessed May 2021).