

2019 Annual Reports of Attitude of Koreans toward Peace and Reconciliation

Juhwa Park
Min Kyu Rhee
Hoon Seok Choi
Young-Mi Kwon
Steven Sloman
Eran Halperin

Juhwa Park

Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification

Min Kyu Rhee

Professor, Gyeongsang National University

Hoon Seok Choi

Professor, Sungkyunkwan University

Young-Mi Kwon

Visiting Professor, Sungkyunkwan University

Steven Sloman

Professor, Brown University

Eran Halperin

Professor, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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This English translation is a summarized and edited version of the research paper “*2019 Annual Reports of Attitude of Koreans toward Peace and Reconciliation*” by Juhwa Park, Min Kyu Rhe, Hoon Seok Choi, Young-Mi Kwon, Steven Sloman, and Eran Halperin (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, December 2019). The analysis, comments, and opinions contained in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Korea Institute for National Unification.

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1. Introduction

Steps toward peace on the Korean Peninsula have repeatedly been on- and off-track ever since the peace process was first initiated in 2018. Three inter-Korean summits in 2018 and historic North Korea-U.S. summits are evaluated as having provided the turning point for peace on the Korean Peninsula. However, after a failed agreement at the North Korea-U.S. summit in Hanoi in February 2019, the situation appeared to take a turn, seemingly leaving behind an impasse, triggered by South Korea-North Korea-U.S. trilateral meeting and subsequent North Korea-U.S. summit on June 2019. However, as North Korea-U.S. working-level negotiations ended without any fruitful results in Stockholm in October 2019, concerns and interests have been mounting over a 'new path' proclaimed by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

It is not hard to presume that the public may be feeling hope on one hand and a sense of anxiety on the other hand while watching the changing developments in political circumstances surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Research on reconciliation defines the situation on the Korean Peninsula, marked by both hope and anxiety, as an era of duality.¹⁾ An era of duality and the minds of duality are an inevitable byproduct that is bound to occur in the peace-making process. The context of duality has a variety of characteristics of conflicts as well as the context of emerging peace at the same time. The public sees signs of peace-making through activities related to peace talks while negotiators remind the public that there is always a possibility of being forced onto a confrontational path marred by violence so that people can be informed of the

1) Daniel Bar-Tal, and Eran Halperin, "The Psychology of Intractable Conflicts: Eruption, Escalation, and Peacemaking," in *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, eds. Leonie uddy, David O. Sears and Jack S. Levy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 925-926.

risks of failure in the negotiations. In other words, we are faced with the possibility for peace and the rhetoric of violence at the same time.

What kind of impact do efforts for peace-making on the Korean Peninsula, amidst an environment of hope and anxiety, have on people's hope and anxiety? What if efforts to change the division that people have become accustomed with for the last 7 decades imbue the public with a new type of fear? Can peace on the Korean Peninsula be felt in people's daily life?—people who are not inconvenienced by the division in their everyday life? After all, emotional and psychological peace-building and peace-making among the public are required for a sustainable political, diplomatic, and military peace-building and peace-making. However, relatively lesser attention is given to people's emotional and psychological peace-making compared to political, diplomatic, and military peace-building processes. It is impossible to eliminate at once the hostility that both South and North Korean people have accumulated over the span of 70 years by the end-of-the war declaration, denuclearization, peace agreement, and the establishment of North Korea-U.S. diplomatic ties. Political, diplomatic, and military trust-building is a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition, for guaranteeing an emotional and psychological change.

As the division has prolonged, inter-Korean homogeneity has weakened and heterogeneity and antagonism have strengthened. Negative stereotypes toward and the demonization of North Korea are still an on-going process and South Korea's sense of superiority over North Korea has been deepening. Perception toward North Korea has transpired into an ideological issue and matters of worldview directly related to the identity of the nation and the

individual, making it harder for compromise and persuasion. South-South conflicts over North Korea and unification have further worsened and morphed into the dominant conflict of South Korean society.

However, despite psychological, cultural, and life differences aggravated over the 70 years of division, policy governance over inter-Korean emotional and psychological difference is lacking. Since 2015, there have not been enough policy studies that focus on emotional and psychological differences. For example, searching keywords, such as 'South-North,' 'conflict,' and 'unification,' only showed two studies in the Policy Research Information Service and Management (PRISM) website (<http://www.prism.go.kr>). Only a handful of research has been done on policy related to inter-Korean integration or inter-Korean conflict management, which merely focused on conflict management and integration after the formation of a single, unified nation. Research on the psychological-emotional perception toward North Korea mostly centers around an image about North Korea substantially lacking details. There exists no research on present- and near future-oriented perception as opposed to unification in the far-distant future.

This study aims to make a diagnosis on 'peace on the Korean Peninsula as perceived by the public.' To that end, first, the study attempts to make a diagnosis of the minds of people in the Republic of Korea (ROK) who are living in an era of duality. The purpose of the study is to explore the theory that befits an era of duality, construct a survey based on that theory, and carry out an in-depth analysis thereby overcoming the limits of survey. In more detail, the psychology of anxiety and conflict is diagnosed based on a 'theory of intractable conflict,' and the psychology of peace on a

‘theory of reconciliation.’ A theory-based survey becomes the foundation to scientifically grasp the inner perception by excluding as much as possible an arbitrary interpretation of an era of duality and using social-scientifically proven questionnaires. This research sets the worldview and our society’s belief as factors that affect the psychology of duality. Lastly, the study makes this survey more timely by examining the perception on North Korea policy and unification.

A. Psychology of Intractable Conflict

Researchers on conflicts categorize the various development of conflicts into protracted conflicts, enduring rivalries, and malignant conflicts. However, not every conflict requires the reconciliation process. Conflicts over interests that could be resolved through compromise do not need the reconciliation process. A conflict that requires reconciliation is a deep-rooted one that can only be resolved by eliminating the causes related to the human desires underling the conflict.²⁾ In the same context, Bar-Tal argued “since parties involved in conflicts neither have the thoughts to earn a victory nor have the will for reaching a peaceful resolution,” reconciliation is needed only in intractable conflicts, in other words “conflicts that span over more than one generation.”³⁾ Considering that North and South Korea’s social structure is built upon 70

2) For characteristics of various types of conflicts, see John Wear Burton, *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook* (Lanham, M.D.: University Press of America, 1987).

3) Daniel Bar-Tal, “From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis,” *Political Psychology*, vol. 21, no. 2 (2000), p. 355.

years of division, including the war, it appears apparent that the social context on the Korean Peninsula is in line with the social context of intractable conflicts.

Characteristics of a society suffering from intractable conflicts are as follows.⁴⁾ First, intractable conflicts prolong over a long duration, at least more than one generation. In other words, at least one generation is born into a culture of conflicts, which renders them oblivious to another reality that once existed aside from a culture of conflict. Prolonged conflict means that parties to the conflict experience repeated confrontations, thereby having a sense of opposition and hostility that has accumulated over time. Therefore, the longer intractable conflicts get, the more members of society are forced into getting accustomed to living in endless tension. This means that a culture of conflicts would act as a reinforcement of the status quo and that a move to peacefully resolve conflicts could paradoxically be perceived as being violent.

Second, people living their daily life in intractable conflicts recognize the conflict itself as the complete whole as they view that conflicts are an indispensable element of society's fundamental goal, need, or of a group's existence and survival. Therefore, conflicts have comprehensive characteristics that influence various aspects, such as territory, ethnic identity, a nation's status, economy, religion, or culture.

Third, intractable conflict tends to be violent. People living in intractable conflicts die and get injured by either a full-blown war, skirmishes, or terrorist attacks. Violence in intractable conflicts continues for a long time, albeit differently in frequency and

4) Daniel Bar-Tal and Eran Halperin, "The Psychology of Intractable Conflicts: Eruption, Escalation, and Peacemaking," p. 924.

intensity. Physical violence, in particular a human loss, has an enormous emotional impact on a whole member of society. Treatment and reparation for victims of the violence, efforts to prevent the recurrence of physical violence, and revenge for the loss are all implemented at the societal level.

Fourth, intractable conflicts have a zero-sum feature. Parties to the conflict do not look for a room for compromise while they view the loss of another party as being advantageous to them and their own loss as being advantageous to the other. Intractable conflicts are full-blown conflicts that stick to the original goal while thoroughly excluding a possibility for negotiation. Parties to the conflicts focus only on their own desire and impose their own purpose onto others. To them, negotiation, and in particular, concession, are out of consideration under any circumstances since they tend to perceive that their own desire is a prerequisite for their survival. As a result, a member of society who considers negotiation and concession naturally becomes excluded from society.

Fifth, people living under intractable conflicts do not acknowledge the possibility of a peaceful resolution of conflicts. They predict that since no one could win the conflict, it will prolong the conflict, triggering violent confrontation in the process. As a result, a member of society braces for prolonged conflicts, which then leads to adaptation and changes in society as a whole.

Lastly, intractable conflicts make up the center of not only the individual but also the whole society. Members of society are always bound to be involved in conflicts. When confronted with the moment to have to make a choice for an individual or collective purpose, society's members use a conflict-related thinking as a

basis for their decision and consider it as a major element for their decision. The centrality of intractable conflicts becomes much more apparent when looking at how conflicts are highlighted as a public agenda. The media, leadership, and other social institutions demonstrate the tendency of consistently being obsessed with intractable conflicts at large. As a result, a society riddled by intractable conflicts naturally tends to successfully address conflicts by utilizing enormous resources (i.e., munitions, technology, and the economy) and via psychological investment.

Then, can the social context of South Korean be understood as the context of intractable conflicts? The divided Korean Peninsula epitomizes features of intractable conflicts: ① the division accompanied physical violence in the form of massive killings; ② the war fixated the division and turned it into a 70-year-long division; ③ the division has internalized the culture of a dichotomic view of the world and a sense of otherness toward others (even a sense of hostility); ④ inter-Korean relations were approached as zero-sum relations, thereby having re-produced social conflicts with the divided situation as a basis. This indicates that division not only accompanies physical violence but also transpires deeper into structural and cultural violence. This is even called the concept of ‘division violence.’⁵⁾

Nak-chung Paik’s ‘division system theory’ claims that the 70-year-long division has been rooted in the everyday life of people living on the Korean Peninsula and that it is capable of self-reproduction to a significant degree.⁶⁾ Nak-chung Paik argued

5) For the violence of division on the Korean Peninsula, refer to Byeong-ro Kim, Bo-hyuk Suh, *Violence of the Division: Reflection of Peace Studies on Militarization on the Korean Peninsula* (Paju: Akanet, 2016). (in Korean)

6) Nak-chung Paik, *Swaying Division System* (Seoul: Changbi Publishers, 1998),

that a life under the divided system is a life under the division of everyday life, and that it is a life that blindly accepts the division. In the same context, Woo Young Lee claimed that although we may not recognize it, a ‘divided structure’ is impacting various dimension from an individual’s day-to-day activity and thinking to the society as a whole and to the culture.⁷⁾ Young-pyo Hong used the cold war culture in explaining the social context of South Korea and paid attention to conflicts of social perception toward North Korea and the U.S. He argued that under a culture of conflict in South Korean society, the perception toward the U.S. or North Korea serves as an exclusive value that expresses animosity toward the other party and that such a culture not only hinders the formation of objective perception toward the U.S. and North Korea but also reinforces the value of dichotomous conflicts and distrust in everyday life as opposed to tolerance and understanding.⁸⁾ Intractable conflicts can be said to have provided a comprehensive and systematic framework of analysis for ‘mundane influence of the division on daily life’ raised by ‘division system theory,’ ‘theory of divided structure,’ and ‘theory of cold war culture.’

B. Psychology of Reconciliation

The most crucial condition for turning intractable conflicts into sustainable peace is reconciliation.⁹⁾ Reconciliation has increasingly

pp. 17~18. (in Korean)

7) Woo Young Lee, “Chapter 3 the Necessity for New Unification Discourse,” *Korean Association of Comparative Sociology*, vol. 4 (2002), pp. 76~83. (in Korean)

8) Young-pyo Hong, “Culture of Peace and Sustainable Peace,” *Culture and Politics*, vol. 5, no. 2 (2018), pp. 17~18. (in Korean)

9) Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, “Israel-Egypt Peace: Stable Peace?” in *Stable Peace among*

received growing attention as the traditional approach of conflict resolution has been met with new challenges since the Cold War. The actor in violent conflicts during the Cold War was mostly the state. Conflicts between states took the form of a war over territory, a war over independence, separatist movement, civil war, and interventionist war. Scholars and politicians mostly paid attention to the bipolar system and the variances that affected the structure of such a system. Conflicts after the bipolar system collapsed took a form that cannot be explained by traditionally state-centered conflicts, involving race, identity, religion, economy, population, refugees, food, and environment issues.¹⁰⁾ During the post-cold war period, there has been an increase of conflicts in frequency, intensity, and lethality among sects or groups with different identities within a state, not between states. Such intra-state conflicts and conflicts between non-state actors are hard to completely be resolved solely through diplomatic agreement or strategic consultation.

Amidst new challenges of the post cold war, researchers in conflict resolution, especially those studying reconciliation, heed the fact that an official peace agreement is a mere necessary condition to realize genuinely peaceful relations. They argue that even though past enemies were to establish internal and external

Nations, eds. Arie Kacowicz *et al.* (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p. 237.

- 10) Daniel J Christie, Richard V Wagner and Deborah Du Nann Ed Winter, "Introduction to Peace Psychology," in *Peace, Conflict, Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century*, eds. Daniel J Christie *et al.* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 2001), pp. 11~12. This research referred to the literature provided at this link <<https://u.osu.edu/christie/about/peace-conflict-and-violence-peace-psychology-for-the-21st-century/>>. Therefore, page information might differ from the published book.

institutions to create economic and political mechanism and enhance mutual dependence and intimacy, it would not guarantee sustainable peace relations. Wilmer claimed that “While it is true that structural factors trigger conflicts and contribute to establishing a stable peace regime, a structural factor alone cannot occur or resolve prolonged violent conflicts.”¹¹⁾

In general, official conflict resolution mostly occurs around the leader and the elites. Therefore, even though the conflicts get officially resolved through a peace agreement or armistice agreement, conflicts could escalate or result in a collapse as it did in Angola, or enter into a cold peace as it did in Israel-Egypt, if members of society do not agree or oppose such an agreement. Unification did not happen as 75.8% of the public in North Cyprus opposed it according to a referendum on unification in Cyprus, made possible by an active intervention of the UN. This case well demonstrates the limitation of political agreement and the necessity for reconciliation.¹²⁾

Nadler and Saguy illustrate the difference between the traditional conflict resolution approach and the reconciliation approach as follows. First, the two researchers posit that a conflict begins with an incongruence over how states or individual actors divide the resources, such as goods, territory, and identity. Traditional conflict resolution calculates the way in which resources that are the subject for conflicts are optimally divided. Under this approach, conflict resolution is considered to be intervening in a way that calculates the conflicting interests of rational actors. After

11) Franke Wilmer, “The Social Construction of Conflict and Reconciliation in the Former Yugoslavia,” *Social Justice*, vol. 25, no. 4 (1998), p. 93.

12) Yeon-chul Kim, *Strategy of Negotiation: The Power of Negotiation that Changed the World* (Seoul: Humanist, 2006), pp. 526~530. (in Korean)

all, the traditional conflict resolution approach, including diplomacy, emphasizes drawing up a way of distribution of resources that can be embraced by all the parties to the conflict. On the other hand, reconciliation focuses on ridding parties to the conflict of psychological and emotional barriers. In particular, Nadler and Saguy stress the need to change (1) the psychology that only “I” am the victim of the conflict and (2) the psychology of distrust toward the other party. If the perception that only I (we) am (are) the victim continues, the sole focus will naturally be on my (our) past during which damages were incurred, thereby rendering the efforts to enhance the possibility of co-existence in the future a failure. In addition, the continued distrust toward the other party will doubt the efforts of the other party to achieve peace and increase the possibility of misunderstanding and misperceiving the acts and remarks of the other party, thereby more likely putting the possibility of peace agreement out of reach. Nadler and Saguy viewed the failure of the Oslo peace process as a representative case of traditional conflict resolution’s assumption that political-military agreements will naturally resolve psychological-emotional issues, such as the perception of the victim and the mistrust toward the other party.¹³⁾

What then is reconciliation? Reconciliation is generally defined as recovering hostile relations and learning how to non-violently co-exist with the other party despite fundamental differences. It is also the essence of peace-making and cultural peace-building.¹⁴⁾

13) Arie Nadler and Tamar Saguy, “Reconciliation between Nations: Overcoming Emotional Deterrents to Ending Conflicts between Groups,” in *The Psychology of Diplomacy*, eds. Harvey Langholtz and Chris E. Stout (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2004), pp. 29~46.

14) Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary*

However, the definition of reconciliation significantly varies by scholars. Long and Brecke's definition of reconciliation is that hostile groups, after having experienced violent conflicts, have reached a mutual peace agreement as an essential mechanism of alleviating future violence and maintaining social relations.¹⁵⁾ Rosoux's definition of reconciliation is that hostile groups of the past resolve their history of violence to a mutually acceptable level to formulate constructive relations.¹⁶⁾

Dwyer viewed reconciliation epistemologically. Dwyer saw reconciliation as a process of addressing the confrontation between tension and belief, the conflicting interpretation on the same case, and the confrontation between incompatible values. To Dwyer, reconciliation is a process of resolving confrontation under which new beliefs and attitudes are established, and the pain of the past is acknowledged in the context of an overall narrative that determines the life of the individual or the state. In more detail, Dwyer argued that reconciliation is defined as a strategy needed for revision of the narrative of the individual or the state and that revision of the narrative is done by understanding and intelligibility, not by truth and logic.¹⁷⁾ In the same context, Asmal viewed reconciliation as confronting an uncomfortable truth to make the incompatible world-view compatible. He argued that by confronting an uncomfortable truth, conflicts and differences that inevitably

Conflict Resolution, p. 286.

15) William J. Long and Peter Brecke, *War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution*, p. 1.

16) Valerie Rosoux, "Reconciliation as a Peace-Building Process: Scope and Limits," in *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, eds. Jacob Bercovitch et al. (London: Sage, 2007), p. 543.

17) Susan Dwyer, "Reconciliation for Realists," *Ethics & International Affairs*, vol. 13, no. 1 (1999), pp. 85, 96.

continue could be transformed into a unified worldview to an extent that is at least mutually agreeable.¹⁸⁾

Kriesberg compared reconciliation to coexistence, which is a state where parties to the conflict do not have the intent to destroy each other, and defined the reconciliation as an act, process, and the result of transforming destructive conflict/relations.¹⁹⁾

Staub and Bar-Tal defined reconciliation as “mutual acceptance of members of present or past hostile groups and the social structure and psychological process that contributes to the development and maintenance of such an acceptance.” They added that “genuine acceptance means trust and positive attitude toward each other and sensitivity and consideration for demands and interests of the other party.”²⁰⁾ Kelman defined reconciliation as the process of learning how to co-exist with each other after conflicts, in particular, the process of transforming identity.²¹⁾ Ross defined reconciliation as the state that transforms conflicting relations into a more positive direction both instrumentally and

18) Kader Asmal, Louise Asmal and Ronald Suresh Roberts, *Reconciliation through Truth: A Reckoning of Apartheid's Criminal Governance* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1997), p. 46.

19) Louis Kriesberg, “Coexistence and the Reconciliation of Communal Conflicts,” in *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*, eds. Eugene Weiner (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Company, 1998), pp. 183~184; Louis Kriesberg, “Comparing Reconciliation Actions within and between Countries,” in *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, eds. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 82.

20) Ervin Staub, and Daniel Bar-Tal, “Genocide, Mass Killing and Intractable Conflict: Roots, Evolution, Prevention and Reconciliation,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, eds. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears and Jack S. Levy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 732~733.

21) Herbert C. Kelman, “Reconciliation from a Social-Psychological Perspective,” in *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Reconciliation*, eds. Arie Nadler et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 24~27.

emotionally and enables one to more easily imagine a harmonious future between two groups.²²⁾ Marrow defined reconciliation as trust-building through the recovery of friendship between traditionally hostile groups. Marrow argued for the importance of enhancing sensitivity toward the demands of the other party to build trust. In particular, Marrow stressed that trust-building starts from a question of what we should do as opposed to what they should do.²³⁾

Feldman claimed that reconciliation is a process of building long-term peace through the emotional development of amity, trust, empathy, and acceptance among past hostile nations, which encompasses regional and emotional dimensions as well as practical and material dimensions. Feldman also saw reconciliation as the dynamic process of history, institution, leadership, and international relations comprehensively coming into play. Moreover, Feldman argued that groups that are reconciling should set realistic goals such as constructive diversity that integrates differences, rather than seeking ideal goals, such as complete harmony or co-existence without conflicts.²⁴⁾ Elizabeth A. Cole defined reconciliation as the state in which “a state and its organizations—at least theoretically—do not settle with simply pointing out the

22) Marc Howard Ross, “Ritual and the Politics of Reconciliation,” in *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, eds. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 200~202.

23) Duncan Morrow, “Seeking Peace Amid the Memories of War: Learning from the Peace Process in Northern Ireland,” in *After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation*, eds. Robert L. Rothstein (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 132.

24) Lily Gardner-Feldman, “The Principle and Practice of ‘Reconciliation’ in German Foreign Policy: Relations with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic,” *International Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 2 (1999), pp. 336~337.

unique need that arises during the transitional period of going for more stable and fair order of the society, but seeking beyond that.”²⁵⁾ Ja-hyun Chun also saw the subject for reconciliation as the state. Chun viewed reconciliation as the “international political process of addressing issues stemmed from hostile acts between states and overcoming those issues.”²⁶⁾

The definition of reconciliation stated above can be viewed as the maximalist definition in that the desired goal and the process is ideal and normative. On the other hand, Maoz’s approach deserves attention in the context of the Korean Peninsula dominated by hostile relations given that reconciliation is minimally defined. Maoz posited that reconciliation is a complex mechanism involving perceptual and emotional processes in which individuals, groups, society, and the state accept relations of cooperation, concession, and peace amidst the conflict situation. In more detail, Maoz claimed that reconciliation is achieved through the psychological process that occurs during the transition from conflicting relations to peaceful relations among individuals and groups and by the formation of relations that accompany political and structural processes. Based on this notion, Maoz laid out the minimalist definition of reconciliation as “the psychological will to make peaceful relations based on cooperation with hostile subjects even though one does not clearly demand structural change to the status quo.”²⁷⁾

25) Elizabeth A. Cole, translated by Kim Won-joong, *Reconciling Past History and History Education. How to Teach Painful Past* (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2010), p. 10. (in Korean)

26) Ja-hyun Chun, “Politics of International Reconciliation,” *Korean Journal of International Relations*, vol. 53, no. 2 (2013), p. 14. (in Korean)

27) Ifat Maoz, “Social-Cognitive Mechanisms in Reconciliation,” in *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, eds. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (Oxford: Oxford

Although there has been increasing attention toward reconciliation, criticism of the concept of reconciliation has also existed, namely, that it is not theorized,²⁸⁾ it is an ambiguous and controversial concept,²⁹⁾ and that it is not a sophisticated analytical tool.³⁰⁾ Bloomfield pointed out that it has become a practice for every researcher studying reconciliation to mention in almost every research paper that there is no agreed understanding on reconciliation.³¹⁾ Galtung also criticized the ambiguity of the concept of reconciliation, citing that reconciliation is related to the deep nature of humans as psychological, sociological, theological, and philosophical subjects and that no one really knows how to reach reconciliation.³²⁾ In addition, criticism has also been raised on whether reconciliation is a necessary condition for peace-building and peace-making and whether it is actually helpful for the process of peace-building and peace-making. For example, this criticism suggests that no one can answer the basic question as to whether the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa facilitated reconciliation after apartheid, because no one really knows what reconciliation means.³³⁾

University Press, 2004), pp. 225~226.

28) William J. Long and Peter Brecke, *War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), p. 147.

29) Tuomas Forsberg, "The Philosophy and Practice of Dealing with the Past," in *Burying the Past. Making Peace Doing Justice after Civil Conflicts*, eds. Nigel Biggar (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003), p. 73.

30) Tamar Hermann, "Reconciliation: Reflections on the Theoretical and Practical Utility of the Term," in *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, eds. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 40~41.

31) David Bloomfield, *On Good Terms: Clarifying Reconciliation* (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2006), p. 4.

32) Johan Galtung, "After Violence, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, and Resolution," in *Reconciliation, Justice Coexistence: Theory & Practice*, eds. Mohammed Abu-Nimer (New York: Lexington Books, 2001), p. 4.

The ambiguity of the concept of reconciliation fundamentally stems from the multi-dimensionality of conflicts. The concept of reconciliation starts from conflict resolution.³⁴⁾ Since conflicts unfold in various forms depending on the history of conflicts, social background, the parties to the conflict, the causes of conflicts, and the duration of conflicts, it is hard to draw a universal resolution principle that could be applied to all conflicts. As a result, the process and the goals of reaching a reconciliation differ depending on the background, parties, and causes of the conflict. Furthermore, given that the reconciliation goes beyond an official end to the conflict and requires psychological change of members of groups that experienced conflicts, it seems natural that there is no consensus among scholars on a conceptual definition of reconciliation.

Realist international political scientists and liberal political scientists refuse any concept of reconciliation that exhibits a psychological and emotional nature. Political theorists, such as Mouffe, argue that political conflicts, which cannot be naturally avoided, should aim to transform hostile relations into controversial relations and quarrel into conflicting relations that could be constrained within the political system. Some studies suggest that attempts to reconcile in the initial stage of peace-making after the conflict are meaningless and could backfire. This is related to a controversy over “Contact Hypothesis” on conflict resolution in

33) Arie Nadler, “Intergroup Reconciliation: Definitions, Processes, and Future Directions,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict* (Oxford: The Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 291~292.

34) For the history of conflict resolution research and reconciliation studies, see Oliver Ramsbotham, Hugh Miall and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, pp. 38~67.

which the more contacts there are among parties to the conflict, the more expanded the range for resolution has become. There is another argument that depending on a case, separation, not reconciliation, is a more effective method.³⁵⁾

The task for transforming the psychology of intractable conflict and the psychology of division, in other words, the task for reconciliation, is summarized into a change of collective memory, social conviction, and collective sentiment about the conflict.³⁶⁾ First, a change in social conviction about a collective goal is required. There needs to be a change in belief in the legitimacy of the goal that underlies the occurrence and maintenance of conflicts. Groups involved in the conflict get to establish their own goal, which would in turn provide the epistemological ground for the conflict. It confers a supreme priority to such a goal and provides compatible legitimacy and rationality. Reconciliation only happens when such a conviction changes. That means destroying such a conviction or at least delaying the social fervor that is expressed in such a goal. New social convictions in pursuit of a goal have to be formulated in its place. New convictions should lay out new social goals that have a conflict resolution agreement at its basis and focus on maintaining peace relations with the other party that used to be the enemy. In addition, justification and rationalization for a new goal and new symbol and myth has to be laid out through such a conviction.

At the same time, the image of the opposite group should be changed. In a period of conflict, one party attempts to disparage

35) Oliver Ramsbotham, Hugh Miall and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, pp. 286~287.

36) Daniel Bar-Tal, "From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis," pp. 357~360.

the authority of the opposing party in order to point out the other party's immoral acts, account for the outbreak and continuation of the conflict, and justify their reactions. Facilitating the reconciliation process requires a change in the perception toward the rival group. It is important to justify and personalize the members of the group: justification enables conferring a sense of humanity to members of the opposing group that had been denied for years. That allows viewing the other party to be belonging to an acceptable group, through which maintaining peace relations is perceived to be desirable. Personalization enables a view that recognizes members of the rival group not only to be trustworthy but also to be an individual that carries rational needs and goals. Lastly, viewing the opposing party of the conflict as a victim should be allowed since members of the other party, too, had suffered in the conflict process.

The transition of intractable conflicts necessitates a change of social conviction of one's own group. A group, in the process of an ongoing conflict, tends to have a biased view of one's self, including a sense of superiority and self-pride, and at the same time ignores or constrains the information that highlights a negative view of one self. However, in the reconciliation process, if one group were to be involved in the occurrence of the conflict, or contribute to violence, including amoral behavior, or refuse to a peaceful settlement, that party should be held accountable. Therefore, a more "objective" and critical view of their own group, especially their past actions, can be suggested in a new social conviction.

Furthermore, it is necessary to formulate new social convictions regarding the bilateral relations of the two groups embroiled in the

conflict. Social conviction supports confrontation and aversion in the conflict process. Such a conviction should be changed in a direction that stresses the importance of cooperation and friendly relations in order to facilitate reconciliation. It is especially crucial to emphasize a mutual sense on equal relations, each other's needs, goals, and general well-being. New convictions on such relations are also related to the past. As discussed above, new convictions should define past relations based on a new system that could revise the collective memory and could be formulated in line with a view of the past rival group.

However, an approach on reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula deserves meticulous attention given that there is no clear definition of reconciliation and consensus on the reconciliation process. The biggest challenge is that there should be an agreement on the definition and the process of reconciliation that could be applied to the Korean Peninsula. The first step would be to distinguish between the generality and peculiarity of the conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Some cases, deemed a success in reaching reconciliation, may not all be applicable to reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula. The Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) in the Republic of South Africa, which received the international spotlight, was a result of state-level efforts on intra-state conflict, racial conflict, and conflicts whose perpetrators acknowledged its wrongdoings, leading to the relatively distinct identification of the victim and the perpetrator. Another example of the reconciliation case, frequently mentioned in Korea, is the one of North Island, in which there is no clear distinction between the victim and the perpetrator on intra-state conflicts, religious conflicts, and physical violence. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict belongs to a category of

inter-state conflict as well as a conflict over territory, in which there is no clear distinction between the victim and the perpetrator. Are those cases applicable to the inter-Korean reconciliation? This question has an answer only when one distinguishes between areas that can be applied to conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and areas that cannot. Are inter-Korean conflicts an intra-state conflict, or inter-state conflict? What are the fundamental causes behind the inter-Korean conflict? Is the victim distinguishable from the perpetrator in the inter-Korean conflict? Who does the international community think is the victim and the perpetrator of the conflict on the Korean Peninsula?

On the other hand, there needs to be a systematic analysis on the various definitions of and approaches towards reconciliation. The ambiguity of reconciliation paradoxically indicates that the concept of reconciliation in fact is very multi-faceted. A critical deliberation on discussions of reconciliation—various definitions of reconciliation, conditions for reconciliation, sequences of reconciliation, and subjects for reconciliation—will enable exploring the kind of reconciliation applicable to the Korean Peninsula. After all, the analysis on the South-North conflict, South-South conflict, and North-North conflict, should be simultaneously carried out to achieve reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula. This research sheds a light on the psychology of the South Korean public on the South-North conflict from the theoretical framework of intractable conflicts.

This study presents various tasks ahead to reach reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula based on the theory of intractable conflict and of reconciliation, which will rightly be delved into in the follow-up studies. On the basis of the in-depth analysis of the

preceding studies, the author would like to conclude this chapter by laying out the definition of reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula. The maximalist definition of reconciliation, which sets the goal of reconciliation as being in the ideal and normative state and process involving notions such as trust, friendship, truth, and worldview, is tantamount to shunning the solemn reality facing the Korean Peninsula and therefore is highly likely to act as an obstacle to reconciliation. For the deeply intractable conflict-ridden Korean Peninsula, the more realistic and appropriate approach would be to have the minimalist approach as the basis, such as ‘the will to make peaceful relations based on cooperation with North Korea.’

2. Survey Result: Focused on Psychology of Intractable Conflict and the Psychology of Reconciliation

Survey questionnaires designed for this research consist of five broad areas: worldview, a view of society, culture of the division, culture of peace, and the unification·North Korea policy. This chapter introduces the survey results on the culture of the division, culture of peace, and the unification·North Korea policy.

A. Minds of the Division

1) Attitudes on War and Peace

The attitudes on war and peace were gleaned from four questions among those used in the first-year research (on a scale of 1 to 9, 1: completely disagree, 9: completely agree).³⁷⁾ The results on the respondents' attitude on war suggest that three questions out of four are grouped into one category.

1. Under some conditions, war is necessary to maintain justice in the Korean Peninsula.
2. Although war on the Korean Peninsula is terrible, it has some value.
3. War on the Korean Peninsula is an indispensable means to solve the conflicts between South and North Korea.

The rest is a question on the defensive war.

4. Defensive war against North Korea is justified but other wars are not.

37) Ju-wha Park, *et al.*, *Psychology of Peace: Koreans' Perception of Peace*, p. 101. (in Korean)

Therefore, the three questions above are comprised of questions on the attitude on war. Internal consistency among questions is .93. Below are the questions on the attitude on peace, and internal consistency among questions is .84. <Table II-1> lays out the attitudes on war, preventive war, and peace.

- 1) Our country's first priority should be peace between the two Koreas.
- 2) All conflicts between South and North Korea should be solved in a peaceful way.
- 3) We must devote all our energy to securing peace throughout the Korean Peninsula.
- 4) Living on a peaceful Korean Peninsula is more important than anything else.

Overall, the attitude on war was 3.45, less than the median value of 5. There was a preponderance of negative attitudes on war on the Korean Peninsula. The score of men's attitude on war was higher (3.98) than that of women (2.93). By age group, those in their 20s recorded the highest average mark on their attitude toward war (3.82) while those in their 40s had the lowest score (3.07). The most positive group toward a war was men in their 20s (4.56) while the most negative group was women in their 40s (2.68). Progressives (2.77) marked the lowest point on the attitude on war, followed by centrists (3.53) and conservatives (4.20). A difference was not observed depending on the income level and religion.

<Table II-1> Average of the Attitude on War, Defensive War, and Peace by Demographical Variables (Standard Error)

| Group | | No. of Cases | Attitude on War (3 Questions) | Defensive War | Attitude on Peace |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Total | | (1000) | 3.45(0.07) | 6.06(0.08) | 6.45(0.05) |
| Gender | Men | (496) | 3.98(0.11) | 6.00(0.12) | 6.50(0.08) |
| | Women | (504) | 2.93(0.09) | 6.12(0.12) | 6.40(0.07) |
| Age | 20s | (173) | 3.82(0.16) | 5.82(0.18) | 5.84(0.13) |
| | 30s | (165) | 3.57(0.17) | 6.14(0.19) | 6.01(0.13) |
| | 40s | (197) | 3.07(0.15) | 6.31(0.19) | 6.73(0.11) |
| | 50s | (201) | 3.61(0.17) | 6.07(0.19) | 6.70(0.12) |
| | 60s+ | (264) | 3.30(0.15) | 5.98(0.18) | 6.71(0.10) |
| | | | | | |
| Gender Age | Men in 20s | (91) | 4.56(0.20) | 5.89(0.22) | 5.65(0.18) |
| | Women in 20s | (82) | 3.00(0.22) | 5.73(0.29) | 6.05(0.16) |
| | Men in 30s | (84) | 3.95(0.23) | 6.07(0.27) | 6.28(0.17) |
| | Women in 30s | (81) | 3.18(0.23) | 6.21(0.27) | 5.73(0.20) |
| | Men in 40s | (100) | 3.44(0.23) | 6.36(0.25) | 6.84(0.15) |
| | Women in 40s | (97) | 2.68(0.19) | 6.26(0.29) | 6.61(0.15) |
| | Men in 50s | (103) | 3.99(0.25) | 5.98(0.27) | 6.74(0.19) |
| | Women in 50s | (98) | 3.22(0.21) | 6.16(0.26) | 6.67(0.15) |
| | 60s+ Men | (118) | 4.02(0.23) | 5.73(0.26) | 6.80(0.15) |
| | Women in 60s and Older | (146) | 2.72(0.18) | 6.18(0.24) | 6.64(0.13) |
| Religion | Christianity | (217) | 3.42(0.15) | 6.07(0.18) | 6.48(0.11) |
| | Buddhism | (174) | 3.50(0.17) | 5.97(0.20) | 6.41(0.13) |
| | Catholic | (116) | 3.50(0.21) | 6.33(0.24) | 6.46(0.14) |
| | No Religion | (492) | 3.43(0.10) | 6.03(0.12) | 6.43(0.08) |
| Political Orientation | Conservative | (244) | 4.20(0.16) | 5.96(0.17) | 6.06(0.12) |
| | Centrist | (437) | 3.53(0.10) | 5.95(0.12) | 6.24(0.07) |
| | Progressive | (319) | 2.77(0.12) | 6.29(0.16) | 7.02(0.09) |
| Monthly Household Income | Less than 3 Million Won | (213) | 3.69(0.15) | 5.73(0.18) | 6.16(0.11) |
| | 3 to 5 Million Won | (345) | 3.41(0.12) | 6.17(0.14) | 6.37(0.09) |
| | 5 Million Won and Over | (442) | 3.37(0.11) | 6.13(0.13) | 6.64(0.08) |

On the other hand, the average point of the attitude on the defensive war was 6.06 with no difference depending on major demographic variables. The public, in general, took a position that a defensive war is inevitable contrary to its negative attitude on war. This result indicates that the public attitude could differ contingent on the comprehensive concept of war and the types of war. More research is required on the public's attitude on a possibility of various types of war, including preventive war for defense purposes, an area outside the scope of this research.

The point on the attitude on peace was 6.45. Compared to the attitude on peace of those in their 20s (5.84) and 30s (6.01), a positive attitude on peace was observed among people in their 40s and older (40s: 6.73, 50s: 6.70, 60s and over: 6.71). Men in their 20s (5.65) was a group most negative to the attitude on peace while the most positive group was men in their 40s (6.84). Compared to conservatives (6.06) and centrists (6.24), progressives (7.02) showed a positive attitude on peace. The more income people earn, the more positive their attitude becomes (less than 3 million won: 6.16, 3~5 million won: 6.37, over 5 million: 6.64). There has been no difference observed between gender and religion.

2) *Ways of Realizing Peace*

Two ways of realizing peace—peace through military force and peace through cooperation—were asked of the respondents. Four questions out of the ones used in a first year research, including the attitudes on peace and war, (on a scale of 1 to 9, 1: completely disagree, 9: completely agree) were used for the survey.³⁸⁾ Questions

on peace through military force were as follows with the internal consistency at .85.

- 1) Long standing peace on the Korea Peninsula can best be attained by maintaining strong military forces.
- 2) The only way to attain peace on the Korea Peninsula is 'balance of terror.'
- 3) We have to consider all possible options including military actions to realize peace on the Korea Peninsula.
- 4) Only the militarily strong can negotiate successfully in South-North Korea conflicts.

Below are the questions on the peace through cooperation with the internal consistency at .89.

- 1) Long-standing peace on the Korean Peninsula can best be reached through non-military means and cooperation between the two Koreas.
- 2) Peace on the Korean Peninsula requires the development of programs and institutions to facilitate communication and cooperation among individuals and nations.
- 3) It is possible for conflicts on the Korean Peninsula to be resolved in a way that benefits all nations involved.
- 4) Cooperation between the two Koreas can be achieved with consistent efforts.

38) Ju-wha Park, et al., *Psychology of Peace: Koreans' Perception of Peace*, pp. 104~105. (in Korean)

<Table II-2> Average of Peace via Military Force and Peace via Cooperation by Demographical Variables (Standard Error)

| Classification | | No. of Cases | Peace via Military Force | Peace via Cooperation |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| Total | | (1000) | 5.24(0.06) | 6.28(0.05) |
| Gender | Men | (496) | 5.59(0.09) | 6.26(0.08) |
| | Women | (504) | 4.90(0.08) | 6.30(0.07) |
| Age | 20s | (173) | 5.02(0.13) | 5.98(0.13) |
| | 30s | (165) | 4.86(0.14) | 6.14(0.12) |
| | 40s | (197) | 4.60(0.13) | 6.58(0.10) |
| | 50s | (201) | 5.68(0.14) | 6.46(0.12) |
| | 60s+ | (264) | 5.77(0.13) | 6.20(0.10) |
| | Gender Age | Men in 20s | (91) | 5.54(0.18) |
| Women in 20s | | (82) | 4.45(0.17) | 6.31(0.18) |
| Men in 30s | | (84) | 5.18(0.19) | 6.28(0.17) |
| Women in 30s | | (81) | 4.53(0.20) | 6.01(0.17) |
| Men in 40s | | (100) | 4.71(0.19) | 6.71(0.15) |
| Women in 40s | | (97) | 4.49(0.17) | 6.45(0.14) |
| Men in 50s | | (103) | 6.03(0.20) | 6.41(0.19) |
| Women in 50s | | (98) | 5.30(0.19) | 6.51(0.14) |
| 60s+ Men | | (118) | 6.27(0.19) | 6.16(0.16) |
| Women in 60s and Older | | (146) | 5.36(0.16) | 6.22(0.13) |
| Religion | Christianity | (217) | 5.14(0.14) | 6.33(0.11) |
| | Buddhism | (174) | 5.61(0.14) | 6.36(0.12) |
| | Catholic | (116) | 5.39(0.18) | 6.24(0.16) |
| | No Religion | (492) | 5.11(0.09) | 6.23(0.07) |
| Political Orientation | Conservative | (244) | 6.09(0.12) | 5.74(0.11) |
| | Centrist | (437) | 5.23(0.09) | 6.05(0.07) |
| | Progressive | (319) | 4.60(0.11) | 7.01(0.08) |
| Monthly Household Income | Less than 3 Million Won | (213) | 5.23(0.13) | 6.02(0.11) |
| | 3 to 5 Million Won | (345) | 5.28(0.10) | 6.23(0.09) |
| | 5 Million Won and Over | (442) | 5.21(0.10) | 6.44(0.08) |

An average by demographic variables on two ways of achieving peace was presented in <Table II-2>. First, the average of peace through military force was 5.24. It was affirmed that the public holds a relatively positive attitude toward peace through military force contrary to a negative attitude on war. Women (4.90) were more positive toward peace than men (5.59). When compared by age group, 50s and older (50s: 5.68, 60s and over: 5.77) prefer peace through military force more than those in their 20s (5.02), 30s (4.86), and 40s (4.60). Women in their 20s (4.45), 40s (4.49), and 30s (4.53), and men in their 40s (4.71) had the lowest score on their attitude regarding 'peace through military force,' and men in their 50s (6.03) and 60s had the highest mark (6.27). Centrists (5.23) compared to progressives (4.60), and conservatives (6.09) compared to centrists preferred achieving peace through military force. Religion and income level did not make any difference.

The average of peace through cooperation was 6.28. The average was the lowest amongst those in their 20s (5.98) and was the highest among people in their 40s (6.58). When analyzed by gender of different age groups, men in their 30s and 40s had a relatively higher average score on realizing peace through cooperation than women (men in their 30s: 6.28, women in 30s: 6.01, men in 40s: 6.71, women in 40s: 6.45). On the other hand, women in their 20s and 50s had a relatively higher average score on realizing peace through cooperation than men (men in 20s: 5.69, women in 20s: 6.31, men in 50s: 6.41, women in 50s: 6.51). No difference by gender was observed among those 60s and older (men in their 60s and over: 6.16, women in their 60s and over: 6.22). Men in their 20s showed the lowest point while men in their 40s the highest. There was a stark contrast between men in their

20s and 40s on how to realize peace. Centrists (6.05) compared to conservatives (5.74), and progressives (7.01) compared to centrists are more positive toward peace through cooperation. The higher the income, the more preferable people were toward peace through cooperation (less than 3 million won: 6.02, 3~5 million won: 6.23, 5 million and over: 6.44). There was no difference observed by gender and religion.

3) *Characteristics of Society in Intractable Conflict*

The first-year research introduced the psychological characteristics of individuals living in a society riddled with intractable conflict. Those characteristics are as follows: 1) the faith that in-group (Korea)'s goal is legitimate; 2) the emphasis on individual's safety and collective security; 3) a sense of positive superiority toward in-group; 4) a sense of competitive victimhood; 5) demonization of out-group; 6) the emphasis on solidarity and unity; 7) the emphasis on patriotism; and 8) an abstract perception on peace. Measures that gauge the psychological characteristics of individuals living in an intractable conflict-ridden society are as follows: positive image toward in-group, illegalization of the others, the victimhood, justification of in-group's goal, patriotism, the attitude on peace, the attitude on security, and the perception on solidarity (Ethos of Conflict Scale: EOC).³⁹⁾ This research measures seven characteristics with the use of EOC: zero-sum perception, competitive victimhood, Korea's superiority, demonization, Korea's legitimacy, and division's centrality.

39) Daniel Bar-Tal *et al.*, "Ethos of Conflict: The Concept and Its Measurement," *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, vol. 18, no. 1 (2012), p. 48.

The perception of viewing inter-Korean relations as zero-sum relations was measured with four questions (on a scale of 1 to 6, 1: completely disagree, 6: completely agree),⁴⁰⁾ and the internal consistency reliability among questions was .89. The average of demographical variables was presented in <Table II -3>.

- 1) In the South-North relation, successes of one side are usually failures of the other.
- 2) The South-North relation is like a tennis game—one side wins only when the other loses.
- 3) In most of the South-North situations, interests of the two sides are inconsistent.
- 4) In the South-North relation, when one side does much for other, the former loses.

The average of zero-sum perception was 3.47. Those in their 40s (3.26) had the lowest the zero-sum perception of inter-Korean relations while those in their 20s (3.71) and 50s (3.33) recorded the highest. When analyzed by gender and different age group, women in their 30s and 40s had a relatively higher point in the average attitude on North Korea (men in 30s: 3.28, women in 30s: 3.54, men in 40s: 3.15, women in 40s: 3.37), and men in their 20s had a relatively higher tendency on the average attitude on North Korea than women (men in 20s: 3.87, women in 20s: 3.54). Men in their 40s showed the lowest zero-sum perception while men in their 20s showed the highest. When looked at by religion, Buddhism had the highest zero-sum perception (3.73). Centrists

40) Joanna Różycka-Tran, Paweł Boski and Bogdan Wojciszke, "Belief in a Zero-Sum Game as a Social Axiom," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, vol. 46, no. 4 (2015), p. 529.

(3.56) vis-à-vis progressives (3.03) and conservatives (3.93) vis-à-vis centrists had a stronger zero-sum perception on inter-Korean relations. Gender and income level did not make a difference in that equation.

Competitive victimhood was measured in four questions (on a scale of 1 to 6) building on the preceding studies.⁴¹⁾ Reliability among questions was .84. The average by demographical variables was presented in <Table II -3>.

- 1) Over the last 70 years of “the division,” South Korea suffered more than North Korea.
- 2) Overall, the proportion of trauma due to “the division” has been more severe in South Korea than in North Korea.
- 3) On average, throughout “the division,” more harm has been done to my community than to the other community.
- 4) Overall, victims in my community have not received adequate attention to their needs compared to victims in the other community.

41) Masi Noor, Rupert J. Brown, and Garry Prentice, “Precursors and Mediators of Intergroup Reconciliation in Northern Ireland: A New Model,” *British Journal of Social Psychology*, vol. 47 (2008), p. 488; Noa Schori-Eyal, Eran Halperin, and Daniel Bar-Tal, “Three Layers of Collective Victimhood: Effects of Multileveled Victimhood on Intergroup Conflicts in the Israeli–Arab Context,” *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, vol. 44, no. 12 (2014), p. 783; Nurit Shnabel, Samer Halabi, and Masi Noor, “Overcoming Competitive Victimhood and Facilitating Forgiveness through Re-Categorization into a Common Victim or Perpetrator Identity,” *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 49, no. 5 (2013), p. 869.

<Table II-3> The Average of Zero-sum Perception, Competitive Victimhood, and South Korea's Superiority by Demographic Variables (Standard Error)

| Classification | | No. of Cases | Zero-sum Perception | Victimhood | Superiority | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|---------------------|------------|-------------|------------|
| Total | | (1000) | 3.47(0.04) | 3.40(0.03) | 3.69(0.03) | |
| Gender | Men | (496) | 3.44(0.05) | 3.41(0.05) | 3.68(0.05) | |
| | Women | (504) | 3.51(0.05) | 3.40(0.04) | 3.71(0.05) | |
| Age | 20s | (173) | 3.71(0.07) | 3.56(0.08) | 3.81(0.07) | |
| | 30s | (165) | 3.41(0.08) | 3.28(0.08) | 3.67(0.08) | |
| | 40s | (197) | 3.26(0.08) | 3.27(0.07) | 3.48(0.08) | |
| | 50s | (201) | 3.33(0.08) | 3.26(0.07) | 3.61(0.08) | |
| | 60s+ | (264) | 3.62(0.08) | 3.58(0.07) | 3.86(0.07) | |
| | | | | | | |
| Gender | Men in 20s | (91) | 3.87(0.10) | 3.85(0.12) | 3.90(0.11) | |
| | Women in 20s | (82) | 3.54(0.10) | 3.23(0.10) | 3.70(0.11) | |
| Age | Men in 30s | (84) | 3.28(0.12) | 3.31(0.10) | 3.71(0.10) | |
| | Women in 30s | (81) | 3.54(0.11) | 3.26(0.11) | 3.64(0.12) | |
| | Men in 40s | (100) | 3.15(0.12) | 3.18(0.11) | 3.40(0.10) | |
| | Women in 40s | (97) | 3.37(0.10) | 3.37(0.09) | 3.56(0.11) | |
| | Men in 50s | (103) | 3.30(0.12) | 3.21(0.11) | 3.50(0.11) | |
| | Women in 50s | (98) | 3.37(0.09) | 3.32(0.1) | 3.73(0.11) | |
| | 60s+ Men | (118) | 3.57(0.12) | 3.52(0.10) | 3.88(0.11) | |
| | Women in 60s and Older | (146) | 3.66(0.10) | 3.64(0.09) | 3.85(0.09) | |
| | | | | | | |
| | Religion | Christianity | (217) | 3.46(0.07) | 3.36(0.07) | 3.74(0.07) |
| Buddhism | | (174) | 3.73(0.08) | 3.66(0.07) | 3.89(0.08) | |
| Catholic | | (116) | 3.40(0.10) | 3.36(0.10) | 3.65(0.10) | |
| No Religion | | (492) | 3.40(0.05) | 3.34(0.05) | 3.62(0.05) | |
| Political Orientation | Conservative | (244) | 3.90(0.07) | 3.62(0.07) | 3.87(0.07) | |
| | Centrist | (437) | 3.56(0.05) | 3.47(0.05) | 3.65(0.05) | |
| | Progressive | (319) | 3.03(0.06) | 3.14(0.06) | 3.62(0.06) | |
| Monthly Household Income | Less than 3 Million Won | (213) | 3.57(0.08) | 3.46(0.08) | 3.68(0.07) | |
| | 3 to 5 Million Won | (345) | 3.55(0.05) | 3.49(0.05) | 3.69(0.06) | |
| | 5 Million Won and Over | (442) | 3.37(0.06) | 3.31(0.05) | 3.70(0.05) | |

The average score of victimhood by Koreans was 3.40. Although there was no meaningful difference by age, the difference by gender and age was observed. Men in their 40s (3.13) and 50s (3.21) and women in their 20s (3.23) had a relatively low level of victimhood while men in their 20s (3.85) had a high level of competitive victimhood. In particular, the difference by gender was pronounced among those in their 20s. Buddhism had a relatively high average score on the competitive victimhood (3.66) while those without a religion recorded the lowest (3.34). By political orientation, conservatives (3.62) and centrists (3.47) had a relatively high competitive perception compared to progressives (3.14). No difference was observed by income and gender.

Korea's superiority toward North Korea was measured on an EOC scale (on a scale of 1 to 6, 1: completely disagree, 6: completely agree), and the internal consistency reliability was .75. Specific questions are as follows.

- 1) South Koreans have no fewer negative qualities than do North Koreans.
- 2) Relative to North Korea, we are a very moral nation.

The average of two questions on South Korea's superiority over North Korea was 3.69. The average by demographical variables was presented in <Table II-3>. When analyzed by age, those in their 60s and older had the highest average point on Korea's superiority (3.86) while those in their 40s had the lowest point (3.48). When analyzed by political orientation, conservatives (3.87) had a higher sense of superiority toward North Korea compared to centrists (3.65) and progressives (3.62). No difference was observed depending on gender, income, and religion.

Demonization of North Korea was measured on four questions⁴²⁾ (three questions composed on the basis of preceding studies and the other one question added by authors of this research (on a scale of 1 to 6, 1:completely disagree, 6: completely agree). Internal consistency reliability among questions was .92. The average by demographic variables was presented in <Table II -4>.

- 1) North Korea is evil by nature.
- 2) All that North Korea really wants is to annihilate South Korea.
- 3) North Korea should never be trusted.
- 4) North Korea will never do 'Reform and Opening.'

The average point of demonization of North Korea was 3.74. The average of the demonizing attitude on North Korea was the highest among those in their 50s (50s: 3.84, 60s and older: 4.19) and the lowest among those in their 40s (3.32). Men in their 40s and women in their 20s showed the lowest average of demonization of North Korea while men in their 60s and older had the highest average. When analyzed by gender difference by age, men in their 20s and 60s and older had a relatively higher average score on the demonizing attitude of North Korea than women (men in 20s: 4.04, women in 20s: 3.23, men in 60s and older: 4.34, women in 60s and older: 4.07). Women in their 40s and 50s had a relatively higher average score on the demonizing attitude of North Korea than men (men in 40s: 3.21, women in 40s: 3.44,

42) Shira Kudish, Smadar Cohen-Chen and Eran Halperin, "Increasing Support for Concession-Making in Intractable Conflicts: The Role of Conflict Uniqueness," *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, vol. 21, no. 2 (2015), p. 251.

men in 50s: 3.77, women in 50s: 3.92). Not much difference was observed among those in their 30s (men in their 30s: 3.50, women in 30s: 3.45). By religion, Buddhism (4.11) and Christianity (3.81) had the highest average on the demonizing attitude toward North Korea while those with no religion (3.58) recorded the lowest average. By political orientation, a strong demonization of North Korea was observed in the order of conservatives (4.43)-centrists (3.73)-progressives(3.23). No difference was found depending on gender and income level.

<Table II-4> Average of Demonization, Unity, Legitimacy of South Korea by Demographic Variables (Standard Error)

| Classification | | No. of Cases | Demonization | Unity | Legitimacy of South Korea |
|----------------|------------------------|--------------|--------------|------------|---------------------------|
| Total | | (1000) | 3.74(0.04) | 3.94(0.03) | 3.53(0.04) |
| Gender | Men | (496) | 3.80(0.06) | 3.97(0.05) | 3.66(0.06) |
| | Women | (504) | 3.68(0.05) | 3.90(0.05) | 3.41(0.05) |
| Age | 20s | (173) | 3.65(0.09) | 3.59(0.08) | 3.45(0.10) |
| | 30s | (165) | 3.48(0.09) | 3.59(0.08) | 3.35(0.09) |
| | 40s | (197) | 3.32(0.08) | 3.69(0.07) | 3.29(0.08) |
| | 50s | (201) | 3.84(0.09) | 4.19(0.07) | 3.56(0.09) |
| | 60s+ | (264) | 4.19(0.08) | 4.37(0.07) | 3.87(0.08) |
| | Gender | Men in 20s | (91) | 4.04(0.12) | 3.78(0.12) |
| | Women in 20s | (82) | 3.23(0.12) | 3.39(0.09) | 2.96(0.12) |
| | Men in 30s | (84) | 3.50(0.13) | 3.62(0.10) | 3.44(0.14) |
| | Women in 30s | (81) | 3.45(0.13) | 3.56(0.11) | 3.27(0.12) |
| | Men in 40s | (100) | 3.21(0.12) | 3.56(0.10) | 3.26(0.11) |
| | Women in 40s | (97) | 3.44(0.11) | 3.82(0.10) | 3.32(0.10) |
| | Men in 50s | (103) | 3.77(0.14) | 4.14(0.11) | 3.54(0.14) |
| | Women in 50s | (98) | 3.92(0.12) | 4.24(0.10) | 3.58(0.11) |
| | 60s+ Men | (118) | 4.34(0.13) | 4.58(0.10) | 4.11(0.12) |
| | Women in 60s and Older | (146) | 4.07(0.10) | 4.20(0.09) | 3.67(0.10) |

| Classification | | No. of Cases | Demonization | Unity | Legitimacy of South Korea |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|--------------|------------|---------------------------|
| Religion | Christianity | (217) | 3.81(0.09) | 4.06(0.07) | 3.62(0.09) |
| | Buddhism | (174) | 4.11(0.09) | 4.19(0.08) | 3.80(0.09) |
| | Catholic | (116) | 3.72(0.11) | 3.93(0.10) | 3.57(0.10) |
| | No Religion | (492) | 3.58(0.06) | 3.80(0.05) | 3.39(0.06) |
| Political Orientation | Conservative | (244) | 4.43(0.08) | 4.39(0.07) | 4.03(0.08) |
| | Centrist | (437) | 3.73(0.05) | 3.88(0.05) | 3.55(0.05) |
| | Progressive | (319) | 3.23(0.07) | 3.66(0.06) | 3.13(0.07) |
| Monthly Household Income | Less than 3 Million Won | (213) | 3.84(0.08) | 3.93(0.07) | 3.54(0.08) |
| | 3 to 5 Million Won | (345) | 3.75(0.07) | 3.90(0.05) | 3.51(0.06) |
| | 5 Million Won and Over | (442) | 3.68(0.06) | 3.97(0.06) | 3.54(0.06) |

Unity was measured on three questions utilizing the EOC scale for reference, and the internal consistency reliability was .86 (on a scale of 1 to 6, 1: completely disagree, 6: completely agree). The average of demographical variables was presented in <Table II-4>.

- 1) Korean citizens should show a united attitude toward North Korean issues rather than expressing different views.
- 2) We should not let the North Koreans see that there are disagreements among us regarding the resolution of the South-North Korea conflict.
- 3) Diversity is the strength of South Korea, but it causes more harm than good when it comes to North Korean issues.

The average of three questions on unity was 3.94. The average of people aged 50s (4.19) and 60 and older (4.37) was higher than those in their 20s (3.59), 30s (3.59), and 40s (3.69). Relatively, the demand for unity was the lowest among women in their 20s (3.39) and the highest among men in their 60s (4.58). By religion,

Buddhism (4.19) recorded the highest average demand while no religion (3.80) had the lowest. Centrists (3.88) compared to progressives (3.66), and conservatives (4.39) compared to centrists had a stronger demand for unity. No difference had been observed depending on gender and income level.

Legitimacy of ingroup was measured on two questions based on EOC scale (on a scale of 1 to 6, 1: completely disagree, 6: completely agree). Reliability among questions was .81. The average of demographic variables was presented at <Table II-4>.

- 1) South Korea has the right to the North Korean region because North Korea is an illegal group which is occupying the northern part of the Korean Peninsula.
- 2) The international community should recognize South Korea as the only legitimate country on the Korean Peninsula.

The average of legitimacy toward South Korea was 3.53. Men (3.66) showed a higher perception on in-group legitimacy than women (3.41). A stronger perception on South Korea's legitimacy was shown among those in their 50s (3.56), and in 60s and older (3.87) than those in their 20s (3.45), 30s (3.35), and 40s (3.29). Relatively, a demand for unity was the lowest among women in their 20s (2.96) and highest among men (4.11) in their 60s. By religion, people who believe in Buddhism (3.80) feel that South Korea is more legitimate than North Korea. Centrists (3.55) compared to progressives (3.13), and conservatives (4.03) compared to centrists had a stronger perception toward South Korea's legitimacy and legality. No difference was observed depending on income level.

Centrality of the division is about the influence of the division on people's life, which was measured on four questions.⁴³⁾ Internal reliability among questions was .85. The average of demographic variables was presented at <Table II-5>.

- 1) The experiences of my group after seventy years of 'the division' are completely irrelevant to who I am.
- 2) The experience of my group in the past has influenced my opinions on many social issues.
- 3) I am not very interested in the suffering and pain our society is experiencing from the division of the two Koreas.
- 4) The history and process of the division of the two Koreas is not an issue I am usually concerned with.

The higher mark on the question of the centrality of the division (reverse-question) means that division is not that meaningful to one's life. The average of four questions on the centrality of the division was 3.30. The influence of the division in one's life was relatively lower among those in their 20s (3.55) and 30s (3.54) and the highest among people in their 60s (3.07) and over and in their 40s (3.23). Progressives (3.16), compared to centrists (3.36) and conservatives (3.37), had believed more in the centrality of the division. No meaningful difference was found depending on gender and religion.

43) Johanna Ray Vollhardt, "Victim Consciousness and Its Effects on Intergroup Relations-a Double-Edged Sword?," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2009, p. 191.

<Table II-5> The Average of Division Centrality by Demographic Variables (Standard Error)


| Classification | | No. of Cases | Division Centrality |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|---------------------|
| Total | | (1000) | 3.30(0.03) |
| Gender | Men | (496) | 3.27(0.05) |
| | Women | (504) | 3.33(0.04) |
| Age | 20s | (173) | 3.55(0.08) |
| | 30s | (165) | 3.54(0.08) |
| | 40s | (197) | 3.23(0.07) |
| | 50s | (201) | 3.26(0.07) |
| | 60s+ | (264) | 3.07(0.06) |
| Gender Age | Men in 20s | (91) | 3.65(0.11) |
| | Women in 20s | (82) | 3.44(0.10) |
| | Men in 30s | (84) | 3.53(0.12) |
| | Women in 30s | (81) | 3.56(0.10) |
| | Men in 40s | (100) | 3.13(0.09) |
| | Women in 40s | (97) | 3.33(0.09) |
| | Men in 50s | (103) | 3.20(0.09) |
| | Women in 50s | (98) | 3.32(0.10) |
| | 60s+ Men | (118) | 2.99(0.10) |
| | Women in 60s and Older | (146) | 3.13(0.07) |
| Religion | Christianity | (217) | 3.23(0.07) |
| | Buddhism | (174) | 3.29(0.08) |
| | Catholic | (116) | 3.13(0.08) |
| | No Religion | (492) | 3.37(0.04) |
| Political Orientation | Conservative | (244) | 3.37(0.07) |
| | Centrist | (437) | 3.36(0.04) |
| | Progressive | (319) | 3.16(0.06) |
| Monthly Household Income | Less than 3 Million Won | (213) | 3.35(0.07) |
| | 3 to 5 Million Won | (345) | 3.30(0.05) |
| | 5 Million Won and Over | (442) | 3.27(0.05) |

4) Emotion on North Korea

Emotion on North Korea was measured by 20 questions on a scale of 1 to 6 (1: have never experienced (felt), 6: have completely experienced (felt)).⁴⁴⁾ The average of each emotion was presented in <Picture II-1>.

- | | | | |
|------------|---------------|------------------|-----------------|
| 1) afraid | 6) hatred | 11) irritated | 16) softhearted |
| 2) fearful | 7) anxious | 12) tiresome | 17) empathy |
| 3) nervous | 8) suspicious | 13) pleasant | 18) moved |
| 4) furious | 9) concerned | 14) affectionate | 19) sad |
| 5) angry | 10) despair | 15) happy | 20) warm |

<Picture II-1> The Average of Emotion on North Korea



44) Tania Tam *et al.*, "The Impact of Intergroup Emotions on Forgiveness in Northern Ireland," *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, vol. 10, no. 1 (2007), p. 124.

The dominant emotion toward North Korea felt by respondents was 'concerned' followed by emotions such as 'anxious,' 'suspicious,' 'nervous,' 'angry,' 'furious,' and 'tiresome.' Overall, the negative emotion was prominent while the intensity of positive emotion, including warm, affectionate, and pleasant, was weak.

In general, the older the age gets, the stronger the intensity on the negative emotion becomes. In other words, the negative emotion toward North Korea was the weakest among those in their 20s and 30s and the strongest among people in their 60s and older. For example, those in their 20s (3.23), 30s (3.39), and 40s (3.38) showed the same emotion of 'concern' toward North Korea and the intensity of this emotion was weaker than those in their 60s and older (3.88). Similar patterns were observed among emotions, such as 'fearful,' 'nervous,' 'furious,' 'angry,' 'hatred,' 'anxious,' 'suspicious,' 'despair,' 'irritated,' 'tiresome.' On the other hand, there was no overall difference by age group on positive emotion toward North Korea.

5) *Stereotype on South and North Koreans*

Respondents were asked to choose as many characteristics as they want regarding South Korean and North Korean residents from 28 items below.⁴⁵⁾

- | | | | |
|---------------|-------------|-----------|-----------------|
| 1) surprise | 8) optimism | 15) pain | 22) humiliation |
| 2) calmness | 9) love | 16) fear | 23) shame |
| 3) attraction | 10) passion | 17) anger | 24) guilt |


45) *Ibid.*, pp. 124~125.

- 4) enjoyment 11) elation 18) fury 25) disgust
- 5) caring 12) nostalgia 19) panic 26) melancholy
- 6) excitement 13) admiration 20) fright 27) disconsolate
- 7) pleasure 14) hope 21) suffering 28) disenchantment

The top 10 characteristics of South Koreans were presented in <Picture II-2> and the top 10 characteristics of North Koreans were presented in <Picture II-3>.


<Picture II-2> The Top 10 Stereotype of South Koreans and Its Percentage

(Unit: %)



<Picture II-3> The Top 10 Stereotype of North Koreans and Its Percentage

(Unit: %)



As <Picture II-2> and <Picture II-3> suggest, the stereotype toward South Koreans was positive while no positive stereotype was shown among North Koreans. On the other hand, the stereotype toward North Koreans was negative while no positive stereotype was shown among South Koreans. What is intriguing is that anger was presented as the common feature of both South and North Koreans.

B. Minds for Reconciliation

1) Hope for Korean Peninsular Issues, Trust and Empathy toward North Korea

Hope for inter-Korean relations and a denuclearization negotiation was measured on three questions on the basis of preceding studies.⁴⁶⁾ Internal reliability among questions was .91.

- 1) I am optimistic about denuclearization negotiations with North Korea.
- 2) I am optimistic about diplomatic ties between North Korea and the United States.
- 3) I am optimistic about the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas.

46) Smadar Cohen-Chen *et al.*, "Hope in the Middle East: Malleability Beliefs, Hope, and the Willingness to Compromise for Peace," p. 69; Smadar Cohen-Chen, Richard J. Crisp and Eran Halperin, "Perceptions of a Changing World Induce Hope and Promote Peace in Intractable Conflicts," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, vol. 41, no. 4 (2015), p. 500.

<Table II-6> The Average of Hope and Trust by Demographic Variables (Standard Error)

| Classification | | No. of Cases | Hope | Trust |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|------------|------------|
| Total | | (1000) | 3.41(0.04) | 2.84(0.04) |
| Gender | Men | (496) | 3.43(0.05) | 2.86(0.05) |
| | Women | (504) | 3.40(0.05) | 2.81(0.05) |
| Age | 20s | (173) | 3.55(0.08) | 2.96(0.08) |
| | 30s | (165) | 3.51(0.09) | 3.06(0.09) |
| | 40s | (197) | 3.70(0.07) | 3.03(0.07) |
| | 50s | (201) | 3.34(0.09) | 2.78(0.08) |
| | 60s+ | (264) | 3.11(0.07) | 2.52(0.07) |
| Gender Age | Men in 20s | (91) | 3.39(0.12) | 2.85(0.13) |
| | Women in 20s | (82) | 3.73(0.09) | 3.07(0.11) |
| | Men in 30s | (84) | 3.75(0.11) | 3.10(0.12) |
| | Women in 30s | (81) | 3.26(0.12) | 3.02(0.13) |
| | Men in 40s | (100) | 3.85(0.09) | 3.19(0.10) |
| | Women in 40s | (97) | 3.55(0.09) | 2.86(0.10) |
| | Men in 50s | (103) | 3.31(0.13) | 2.74(0.12) |
| | Women in 50s | (98) | 3.36(0.11) | 2.83(0.12) |
| | 60s+ Men | (118) | 2.97(0.12) | 2.53(0.11) |
| | Women in 60s and Older | (146) | 3.22(0.10) | 2.52(0.09) |
| Religion | Christianity | (217) | 3.47(0.08) | 2.71(0.08) |
| | Buddhism | (174) | 3.19(0.09) | 2.72(0.09) |
| | Catholic | (116) | 3.46(0.11) | 2.96(0.11) |
| | No Religion | (492) | 3.46(0.05) | 2.91(0.05) |
| Political Orientation | Conservative | (244) | 2.88(0.08) | 2.31(0.07) |
| | Centrist | (437) | 3.35(0.05) | 2.90(0.05) |
| | Progressive | (319) | 3.91(0.06) | 3.15(0.06) |
| Monthly Household Income | Less than 3 Million Won | (213) | 3.18(0.08) | 2.79(0.08) |
| | 3 to 5 Million Won | (345) | 3.43(0.06) | 2.91(0.06) |
| | 5 Million Won and Over | (442) | 3.51(0.05) | 2.81(0.06) |

The average of three questions on hope for the Korean Peninsula was 3.41, with the highest point for hope on Korean Peninsular issues among those in their 40s (3.70) and no statistical difference of the average among those in their 20s (3.55), 30s (3.51), and 40s. On the other hand, those in their 60s (3.11) showed the lowest hope. Men in their 40s (3.85) and 50s (3.31) and women in their 20s (3.73) recorded the highest hope while men in 60s and over (2.97) had the lowest. The highest hope was shown in the order of conservatives (2.88)-centrists (3.35)-progressives (3.91). A group with a monthly income of 3 million won and less (3.18) had a lower level of hope than those with over 3 million won (3 to 5 million won: 3.43, 5 million won and over: 3.51). No difference was observed depending on gender and religion.

A total of three questions were used on a scale of one to six: two questions from preceding studies on trust in an intractable conflict society,⁴⁷⁾ one question devised by authors. Internal reliability among questions was .81.

- 1) I can trust them when they say they are sorry.
- 2) I can trust them when they say they want peace.
- 3) I can trust them when they say they will do denuclearization.

The average of trust on North Korea was 2.84, and the average of major demographic variables was presented at <Table II-6>. By age, higher trust was observed among those in their 20s (2.96), 30s (3.06), and 40s (3.03) than those in their 60s and older (2.52).

47) Tania Tam *et al.*, "Intergroup Trust in Northern Ireland," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, vol. 35, no. 1 (2009), pp. 47~48.

Men in their 40s (3.85) showed the highest level of trust toward North Korea while women (2.52) in their 60s had the lowest. No difference was found depending on religion. Progressives (3.15) showed the highest level of trust on North Korea while conservatives (2.31) had the lowest. Centrists (2.90) showed a higher level of trust than progressives but lower than conservatives. No difference was found depending on gender and the income level.

Four questions on empathy toward North Korea were composed on the basis of preceding studies (on a scale of 1 to 6).⁴⁸ Only question no. 2 and no. 3 were grouped into one factor as a result of factor analysis. Internal reliability among questions was .76. Since four questions were not grouped into one factor, the average of question no. 2 and no. 3 (empathy with North Korea), and the average of question no. 1 and no. 4 were presented at <Table II -7>.

- 1) North Korean nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests are mainly for self-protection.
- 2) North Korea has been left with no other choice but to respond with nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests.
- 3) North Korea conducted nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests because the outside world threatened the North Korean regime.
- 4) North Korean nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests cannot be justified for any reason.

48) Masi Noor, Rupert J. Brown, and Garry Prentice, "Precursors and Mediators of Intergroup Reconciliation in Northern Ireland: A New Model," pp. 487~ 488; Masi Noor *et al.*, "On Positive Psychological Outcomes: What Helps Groups with a History of Conflict to Forgive and Reconcile with Each Other?," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, vol. 34, no. 6 (2008), p. 823.

<Table II -7> Empathy with North Korea, Empathy on the Need for Security Guarantee, and Legitimization for Nuclear Test by Demographic Variables (Standard Error)

| Classification | | No. of Cases | Empathy | Security Guarantee | Legitimization for Nuclear Test |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|------------|--------------------|---------------------------------|
| Total | | (1000) | 3.22(0.04) | 4.05(0.04) | 4.56(0.04) |
| Gender | Men | (496) | 3.26(0.06) | 4.15(0.06) | 4.56(0.06) |
| | Women | (504) | 3.19(0.05) | 3.95(0.06) | 4.56(0.05) |
| Age | 20s | (173) | 3.16(0.09) | 3.86(0.10) | 4.41(0.10) |
| | 30s | (165) | 3.28(0.09) | 3.99(0.10) | 4.55(0.09) |
| | 40s | (197) | 3.52(0.08) | 4.03(0.08) | 4.29(0.09) |
| | 50s | (201) | 3.24(0.09) | 4.17(0.09) | 4.61(0.08) |
| | 60s+ | (264) | 3.00(0.08) | 4.13(0.09) | 4.83(0.08) |
| Gender Age | Men in 20s | (91) | 3.15(0.14) | 3.99(0.14) | 4.60(0.14) |
| | Women in 20s | (82) | 3.16(0.13) | 3.71(0.14) | 4.20(0.13) |
| | Men in 30s | (84) | 3.40(0.14) | 4.11(0.14) | 4.71(0.13) |
| | Women in 30s | (81) | 3.17(0.12) | 3.88(0.14) | 4.37(0.13) |
| | Men in 40s | (100) | 3.69(0.10) | 4.20(0.11) | 4.17(0.12) |
| | Women in 40s | (97) | 3.35(0.12) | 3.85(0.12) | 4.42(0.12) |
| | Men in 50s | (103) | 3.29(0.12) | 4.23(0.13) | 4.50(0.12) |
| | Women in 50s | (98) | 3.18(0.13) | 4.10(0.13) | 4.72(0.12) |
| | 60s+ Men | (118) | 2.88(0.13) | 4.18(0.14) | 4.80(0.12) |
| Women in 60s and Older | (146) | 3.10(0.11) | 4.09(0.12) | 4.85(0.10) | |
| Religion | Christianity | (217) | 3.16(0.09) | 4.05(0.09) | 4.66(0.08) |
| | Buddhism | (174) | 3.22(0.10) | 4.03(0.11) | 4.71(0.09) |
| | Catholic | (116) | 3.10(0.11) | 3.94(0.12) | 4.51(0.12) |
| | No Religion | (492) | 3.28(0.05) | 4.08(0.06) | 4.48(0.06) |
| Political Orientation | Conservative | (244) | 2.91(0.08) | 4.09(0.10) | 4.88(0.08) |
| | Centrist | (437) | 3.21(0.06) | 3.93(0.06) | 4.50(0.06) |
| | Progressive | (319) | 3.49(0.07) | 4.17(0.07) | 4.39(0.07) |
| Monthly Household Income | Less than 3 Million Won | (213) | 3.12(0.08) | 3.87(0.10) | 4.43(0.09) |
| | 3 to 5 Million Won | (345) | 3.32(0.06) | 4.08(0.07) | 4.54(0.06) |
| | 5 Million Won and Over | (442) | 3.20(0.06) | 4.10(0.06) | 4.64(0.06) |

The average empathy on North Korea's nuclear test and missile test was 3.22. The highest level of empathy was shown among those in their 40s (3.52), the lowest among those in their 60s (3.00). Men in their 40s (3.69) showed the highest level of empathy while men in their 60s (2.88) had the lowest. Centrists (3.21) compared to conservatives, (2.91) and progressives (3.49) compared to centrists, showed the highest level of empathy toward North Korea. No difference was observed depending on gender, religion, and income level.

The average of empathy towards North Korea for launching nuclear and ICBM missile tests for regime security was 4.05, higher than a median value of 3.5. That number was higher than a sense of empathy that North Korea's nuclear test and ICBM are its last resort and attributable to the external threat posed to its regime. Men (4.15) showed a higher level of empathy on North Korea's nuclear and ICBM tests for the purpose of regime security than women (3.95). No difference was observed by age, religion, ideology, and income level. In other words, at least a consensus is made on North Korea's nuclear and ICBM tests being attributable to regime security.

The average of the answer stating that North Korea's nuclear and ICBM tests cannot be justified was 4.56. People in their 20s (4.41) and 40s (4.29) showed a stronger opinion on North Korea's nuclear and ICBM test being justified than those in their 50s (4.61) and 60s and older (4.83). Progressives (4.39) and centrists (4.50), more than conservatives (4.88), believed that North Korea's nuclear and ICBM test can be justified. No difference was observed depending on religion and income level.

2) Inclusive Victimhood, Identity of Homogenous Ethnicity, and Openness for New Information

Inclusive victimhoodness is a concept in contrast to a competitive victimhoodness. Inclusive victimhoodness refers to a perception that ingroup and outgroup both are perpetrators and victims at the same time, contrary to competitive victimhood where one side competitively views the other side as a perpetrator and views oneself as a victim. Inclusive victimhood is an essential element for peace and reconciliation of intractable conflicts in which a boundary between the perpetrator and victim becomes blurred as violence prolongs for more than a generation. Inclusive victimhood was measured on three questions,⁴⁹⁾ and internal reliability among questions was .64 <Table II-8>.

- 1) The persecution my group has experienced is similar to that endured by others.
- 2) Other groups have experienced the same kinds of injustice, unfairness and victimization as my group has.
- 3) Both South Korea and North Korea are victims of the division of the two Koreas.

The average of three questions on inclusive victimhood was 3.75. By age, those in their 20s (3.16) showed the highest average on inclusive victimhood, and those in their 60s and older (3.00) the lowest. Men in their 30s and 40s and over had a relatively higher average on inclusive victimhood than women (men in 30s:

49) Noa Schori-Eyal, Eran Halperin, and Daniel Bar-Tal, "Three Layers of Collective Victimhood: Effects of Multileveled Victimhood on Intergroup Conflicts in the Israeli-Arab Context," p. 783.

3.40, women in 30s: 3.17, men in 40s: 3.69, women in 40s: 3.35). women in their 20s (3.16) had a relatively higher average on inclusive victimhood than men (3.15). By religion, those without religion (3.81) showed the highest level of inclusive victimhood and Buddhists (3.63) showed the lowest. Inclusive victimhood was the highest in the order of conservatives (3.54)-centrists (3.72)-progressives (3.94). The higher the monthly household income gets, the higher the inclusive victimhood becomes (less than 3 million won: 3.55, 3 to 5 million won: 3.78, 5 million won and over: 3.82). No difference was observed depending on gender.

A sense of identity of homogenous ethnicity with North Korea was measured on four questions (on a scale of 1 to 9). Internal reliability was .91.

- 1) How similar do you feel to North Koreans as a whole in terms of general attitudes and opinions?
- 2) How much do you feel that you identify with North Koreans?
- 3) How glad do you feel about the fact that you and North Koreans share the same ethnicity?
- 4) How much do you feel that you are attached to North Koreans?

The average of four questions on an identity of homogenous ethnicity with North Korea was 4.71 <Table II-8>. Men (4.98) had a higher homogenous sense of identity with North Korea than women (4.44). By age, those in their 50s (5.03) showed the highest level of homogenous identity with North Korea and those in their 20s (4.24) the lowest. Men in all age groups, except for those in their 20s, showed a relatively higher level of homogenous identity

with North Korea than women (men in 30s: 4.92, women in 30s: 3.99, men in 40s: 5.30, women in 40s: 4.45, men in 50s: 5.18, women in 50s: 4.89, 60s and older men: 5.19, 60s and older women: 4.45). No difference was observed by gender among those in their 20s (men in 20s: 4.20, women in 20s: 4.29). By religion, Christianity (4.85) showed the highest average of homogenous identity with North Korea and those without religion (4.62) the lowest. Progressives (5.03) ranked the highest in homogenous identity with North Korea followed by centrists (4.70) and conservatives (4.29). The level of homogenous identity with North Korea was the highest among those with a monthly household income of 3 to 5 million won (4.80).

<Table II-8> Inclusive Victimhood, Identity of Homogenous Ethnicity, and Openness for New Information by Demographic Variables (Standard Error)

| Classification | | No. of Cases | Inclusive Victimhood | Identity of Homogenous Ethnicity | New Information |
|----------------|--------------|--------------|----------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------|
| Total | | (1000) | 3.22(0.04) | 4.71(0.05) | 3.57(0.03) |
| Gender | Men | (496) | 3.26(0.06) | 4.98(0.08) | 3.65(0.04) |
| | Women | (504) | 3.19(0.05) | 4.44(0.07) | 3.49(0.04) |
| Age | 20s | (173) | 3.16(0.09) | 4.24(0.13) | 3.59(0.07) |
| | 30s | (165) | 3.28(0.09) | 4.46(0.14) | 3.61(0.08) |
| | 40s | (197) | 3.52(0.08) | 4.88(0.11) | 3.70(0.06) |
| | 50s | (201) | 3.24(0.09) | 5.03(0.12) | 3.55(0.06) |
| | 60s+ | (264) | 3.00(0.08) | 4.78(0.11) | 3.43(0.06) |
| Gender | Men in 20s | (91) | 3.15(0.14) | 4.20(0.19) | 3.56(0.11) |
| | Women in 20s | (82) | 3.16(0.13) | 4.29(0.16) | 3.63(0.07) |
| | Men in 30s | (84) | 3.40(0.14) | 4.92(0.19) | 3.75(0.10) |
| | Women in 30s | (81) | 3.17(0.12) | 3.99(0.19) | 3.46(0.11) |
| Age | Men in 40s | (100) | 3.69(0.10) | 5.30(0.14) | 3.80(0.08) |
| | Women in 40s | (97) | 3.35(0.12) | 4.45(0.16) | 3.60(0.09) |
| | Men in 50s | (103) | 3.29(0.12) | 5.18(0.18) | 3.60(0.09) |

| Classification | | No. of Cases | Inclusive Victimhood | Identity of Homogenous Ethnicity | New Information |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|----------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------|
| | Women in 50s | (98) | 3.18(0.13) | 4.89(0.16) | 3.50(0.09) |
| | 60s+ Men | (118) | 2.88(0.13) | 5.19(0.17) | 3.55(0.08) |
| | Women in 60s and Older | (146) | 3.10(0.11) | 4.45(0.14) | 3.34(0.07) |
| Religion | Christianity | (217) | 3.76(0.06) | 4.85(0.11) | 3.56(0.06) |
| | Buddhism | (174) | 3.63(0.07) | 4.78(0.12) | 3.59(0.07) |
| | Catholic | (116) | 3.66(0.08) | 4.67(0.16) | 3.49(0.08) |
| | No Religion | (492) | 3.81(0.04) | 4.62(0.08) | 3.58(0.04) |
| Political Orientation | Conservative | (244) | 3.54(0.06) | 4.29(0.12) | 3.31(0.06) |
| | Centrist | (437) | 3.72(0.04) | 4.70(0.08) | 3.50(0.04) |
| | Progressive | (319) | 3.94(0.05) | 5.03(0.10) | 3.85(0.05) |
| Monthly Household Income | Less than 3 Million Won | (213) | 3.55(0.06) | 4.44(0.11) | 3.38(0.06) |
| | 3 to 5 Million Won | (345) | 3.78(0.05) | 4.80(0.09) | 3.61(0.05) |
| | 5 Million Won and Over | (442) | 3.82(0.04) | 4.76(0.08) | 3.62(0.04) |

The effort to embrace new information about North Korea was measured on four questions composed by authors on the basis of preceding studies (on a scale of 1 to 6),⁵⁰ and internal reliability among questions was .82.

- 1) When I watch the news about issues on the Korean Peninsula, I try to think from the perspective of North Korea.
- 2) I am interested in receiving information that contains the perspectives of European countries, which are somewhat different from South Korean views on inter-Korean conflict.

50) Boaz Hameiri *et al.*, "Paradoxical Thinking as a Conflict-Resolution Intervention: Comparison to Alternative Interventions and Examination of Psychological Mechanisms," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, vol. 44, no. 1 (2018), p. 130.

- 3) I am willing to watch movies or read books that reflect North Korea's perspective on inter-Korean conflict.
- 4) I am willing to read the North Korean newspaper 'Rodong Sinmun' or watch the news on the North Korean broadcasting company 'Korean Central News Agency' to know how they cover the issue of denuclearization.

The average of efforts on embracing new information about North Korea was 3.57. Men (3.65) had a higher average in accepting new information about North Korea than women (3.49) <Table II -25>. By age, 40s (3.70) ranked the highest in average of accepting new information about North Korea, those in their 60s and over (3.43) the lowest. By gender difference depending on age, men in all age groups, except for those in their 20s, had a higher average of efforts to embrace new information about North Korea than women (men in 30s: 3.75, women in 30s: 3.46, men in 40s: 3.80, women in 40s: 3.60, men in 50s: 3.60, women in 50s: 3.50, 60s and over men: 3.55, 60s and over women: 3.34). No difference was found by gender among those in their 20s (men in 20s: 3.56, women in 20s: 3.63). Buddhism (3.59) had the highest level of accepting new information and Catholic (3.49) the lowest. By political orientation, progressives (3.85) showed the strongest tendency of accepting new information about North Korea followed by centrists (3.50) and conservatives (3.31). The higher the monthly household income, the higher the average of accepting new information about North Korea (less than 3 million won: 3.38, 3 to 5 million won: 3.61, 5 million won and over: 3.62).

3) *A Sense of Guilt on Issues of North Korea, North Korea's Responsibility, and Forgiveness*

A sense of guilt on North Korean issues was measured by four questions.⁵¹⁾ Internal reliability among questions was .67.

- 1) I believe that our society should reflect on ourselves about our past exploitation of North Korea for domestic political purposes such as in false espionage cases.
- 2) I believe that our society should reflect on ourselves about what we have done to people who have positive views about North Korea.
- 3) I believe that our society treats North Korea unfairly.
- 4) I feel guilty when I look at the poor situation in North Korea.

The average of four questions on a sense of guilt on North Korean issues was 3.58 <Table II-9>. By age, those in their 30s (3.68) showed the highest average of guilt on North Korean issues and those in their 20s (3.48) and 60s and older (3.48) the lowest. By gender difference depending on age, men in their 30s and 40s had a relatively higher average on a sense of guilt toward North Korean issues than women (men in 30s: 3.79, women in 30s: 3.57, men in 40s: 3.90, women in 40s: 3.58). Women (3.53) in their 60s and older tended to have a higher average than men (3.42). Progressives (3.92) compared to centrists (3.53), and centrists compared to conservatives (3.24) had a higher level of guilt toward North Korean issues. A sense of guilt on North Korean issues was

51) Bertjan Doosje *et al.*, "Guilty by Association: When One's Group Has a Negative History," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 75, no. 4, (1998), pp. 875-876.

lower among those with a monthly household income of less than 3 million won (3.48) than those with 3 to 5 million won (3.61) and those of 5 million won and over (3.60). No difference was observed by gender and religion.

<Table II-9> A Sense of Guilt on Issues of North Korea, North Korea's Responsibility, and Forgiveness by Demographical Variables (Standard Error)

| Classification | | No. of Cases | A Sense of Guilt | North Korea's Responsibility | Forgiveness |
|------------------------|--------------|--------------|------------------|------------------------------|-------------|
| Total | | (1000) | 3.58(0.03) | 3.97(0.03) | 3.88(0.03) |
| Gender | Men | (496) | 3.63(0.04) | 4.03(0.05) | 3.89(0.04) |
| | Women | (504) | 3.54(0.04) | 3.92(0.05) | 3.86(0.04) |
| Age | 20s | (173) | 3.48(0.06) | 4.08(0.08) | 3.90(0.06) |
| | 30s | (165) | 3.68(0.07) | 3.80(0.08) | 3.86(0.07) |
| | 40s | (197) | 3.74(0.06) | 3.68(0.07) | 3.98(0.05) |
| | 50s | (201) | 3.57(0.07) | 3.99(0.07) | 3.82(0.06) |
| | 60s+ | (264) | 3.48(0.06) | 4.21(0.07) | 3.83(0.05) |
| Gender Age | Men in 20s | (91) | 3.48(0.10) | 4.38(0.11) | 3.95(0.10) |
| | Women in 20s | (82) | 3.48(0.08) | 3.74(0.11) | 3.85(0.08) |
| | Men in 30s | (84) | 3.79(0.08) | 3.75(0.12) | 3.96(0.09) |
| | Women in 30s | (81) | 3.57(0.10) | 3.85(0.11) | 3.76(0.10) |
| | Men in 40s | (100) | 3.90(0.08) | 3.59(0.10) | 4.00(0.07) |
| | Women in 40s | (97) | 3.58(0.08) | 3.78(0.10) | 3.97(0.07) |
| | Men in 50s | (103) | 3.61(0.11) | 4.04(0.11) | 3.78(0.08) |
| | Women in 50s | (98) | 3.53(0.08) | 3.94(0.09) | 3.86(0.08) |
| | 60s+ Men | (118) | 3.42(0.09) | 4.32(0.10) | 3.81(0.08) |
| Women in 60s and Older | (146) | 3.53(0.07) | 4.12(0.09) | 3.85(0.07) | |
| Religion | Christianity | (217) | 3.57(0.06) | 4.08(0.07) | 3.93(0.06) |
| | Buddhism | (174) | 3.60(0.07) | 4.17(0.07) | 3.89(0.06) |
| | Catholic | (116) | 3.49(0.08) | 3.94(0.09) | 3.85(0.07) |
| | No Religion | (492) | 3.60(0.04) | 3.87(0.05) | 3.85(0.04) |
| Political Orientation | Conservative | (244) | 3.24(0.06) | 4.29(0.07) | 3.65(0.06) |
| | Centrist | (437) | 3.53(0.04) | 3.96(0.05) | 3.81(0.04) |
| | Progressive | (319) | 3.92(0.05) | 3.75(0.06) | 4.14(0.04) |

| | Classification | No. of Cases | A Sense of Guilt | North Korea's Responsibility | Forgiveness |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|------------------|------------------------------|-------------|
| Monthly Household Income | Less than 3 Million Won | (213) | 3.48(0.06) | 4.03(0.08) | 3.77(0.05) |
| | 3 to 5 Million Won | (345) | 3.61(0.04) | 3.94(0.06) | 3.86(0.04) |
| | 5 Million Won and Over | (442) | 3.60(0.04) | 3.97(0.05) | 3.94(0.04) |

North Korea's responsibility was composed of three questions.⁵²⁾ Internal reliability among questions was .82.

- 1) North Korea can only blame themselves that the conflict has not been resolved yet.
- 2) If North Korea had wanted conflict resolution, the conflict would have ended.
- 3) Peaceful resolution is unattainable because there is no partner on the other side.

The average of three questions on North Korea's responsibility was 3.97, with men (4.03) higher than women (3.92) <Table II -9>. By age, those in their 60s and older (4.21) showed the highest average on North Korea's responsibility and those in their 40s (3.68) the lowest. By gender difference depending on age, men in their 20s, 50s, 60s and older showed a relatively higher average on North Korea's responsibility than women (men in 20s: 4.38, women in 20s: 3.74, men in 50s: 4.04, women in 50s: 3.94, 60s and older men: 4.32, 60s and older women: 4.12). Women in their 30s and 40s had a relatively higher average than men (men in 30s: 3.75, women in 30s: 3.85, men in 40s: 3.59, women in 40s: 3.78). By religion, Buddhism (4.17) showed the highest average on North

52) Masi Noor, Rupert J. Brown, and Garry Prentice, "Precursors and Mediators of Inter-group Reconciliation in Northern Ireland: A New Model," p. 487.

Korea's responsibility and those without religion (3.87) the lowest. The highest average on North Korea's responsibility was recorded among conservatives (4.29) and the lowest among progressives (3.75). The average of centrists (3.96) was in between that of conservatives and progressives. No difference was observed by monthly household income.

Lastly, the forgiveness on issues of the Korean Peninsula was measured by four questions (on a scale of 1 to 6).⁵³⁾ Internal reliability among questions was .68.

- 1) The two Koreas will never move from the past to the future, until the two learn to draw a line with the past.
- 2) Only when the two Koreas learn to forgive each other, can we be free of political violence.
- 3) Getting even with North Korea for its misdeeds is not important to me.
- 4) I am prepared to forgive North Korea for their misdeeds.

The average of four questions on the forgiveness of Korean Peninsular issues was 3.88. By age, people in their 40s (3.98) ranked the highest average in the forgiveness of Korean Peninsular issues and those in their 50s (3.82) the lowest <Table II-9>. By gender difference depending on age, men in their 20s and 30s had a higher average on the forgiveness of Korean Peninsular issues

53) Scott L. Moeschberger *et al.*, "Forgiveness in Northern Ireland: A Model for Peace in the Midst of the "Troubles"," *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, vol. 11, no. 2 (2005), p. 205; Miles Hewstone *et al.*, "Intergroup Contact, Forgiveness, and Experience of "the Troubles" in Northern Ireland," *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 62, no. 1 (2006), pp. 103-104; Masi Noor, Rupert J. Brown, and Garry Prentice, "Precursors and Mediators of Intergroup Reconciliation in Northern Ireland: A New Model," p. 487.

than women (men in 20s: 3.95, women in 20s: 3.85, men in 30s: 3.96, women in 30s: 3.76). Not much difference was found by gender among those in their 40s, 50s, and 60s and older (men in 40s: 4.00, women in 40s: 3.97, men in 50s: 3.78, women in 50s: 3.86, 60s and older men: 3.81, 60s and older women: 3.85). By political orientation, progressives (4.14) recorded the highest average in the forgiveness of Korean Peninsular issues and conservatives (3.65) the lowest. The higher the monthly household income, the higher the average of the forgiveness of Korean Peninsular issues (less than 3 million won: 3.77, 3 to 5 million won: 3.86, 5 million won and over: 3.94). Not much difference was found by gender and religion.

C. Unification and North Korea Policy

1) Attitude on Unification

The attitude on unification was measured on 11 questions on a scale of 1 to 5. For the sake of clarity of the term unification, this research measures the attitude on ‘the formation of unified country’ rather than using an expression of ‘unification.’ Two factors were derived as a result of factor analysis on 11 questions. The first factor was named unification orientation (6 questions), and the second factor was named peaceful coexistence orientation. Below are the elements that make up the unification orientation.

- 1) It is necessary that South Korea and North Korea form a single country.
- 2) It is my sincere hope that South Korea and North Korea will

form a single country.

- 3) I feel good when I think about South Korea and North Korea becoming a single country.
- 4) As South Korea and North Korea are the same ethnic group, they should form a single country.
- 5) It will benefit South Korea if South Korea and North Korea form a single country.
- 6) It will benefit me and my family if South Korea and North Korea form a single country.

Internal reliability among questions was .91. Three questions below are about peaceful coexistence orientation.


- 1) It does not matter even if South Korea and North Korea maintain their status as two states unless it causes me significant harm.
- 2) If there is no risk of war, South Korea and North Korea do not need to form a single country.
- 3) South Koreans and North Koreans can live well in two different states.

Internal reliability among questions was .81. The two questions below were not included in those two factors.

- 1) It is necessary that South Korea and North Korea maintain their status as two states while ensuring free movement and making one market.
- 2) While they maintain their status as two states, South Korea and North Korea should make an alliance to establish joint government organizations.

The percentage of agreement on the status of South and North free movement, the Korean Commonwealth, the formation of a unified, single country was presented at <Picture II-4>. 42.1% of the public agreed to forming a unified, single country between the South and the North. 47.7%, agreed to the Korean Commonwealth, showing that more than half of the public had reservations about inter-Korean political integration. By comparison, 67% agreed to forming a single market and inter-Korean free movement.

<Picture II-4> Empathy on Formation of Single Country, The Korean Commonwealth, Human Exchange and Movement, and Formation of Free Market



Only 42.1% of the public agreed to a notion of unification when it is defined as ‘the formation of single country.’ It is in stark contrast to the result of other surveys in which over 60% agree to the necessity of unification. It would be hasty to come to a conclusion on the result of this survey that more than half of the population is negative toward political unification between the two Koreas. Considering that 67.8% made a consensus on human

movement and economic integration, which is an indication of inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, it would be more reasonable to view such a result as a reflection of the people's perception that inter-Korean peace is a more urgent task as opposed to political unification, which will be achieved sometime in the future of the Korean Commonwealth.

<Table II-10> The Average of Orientation for Single Country and Orientation for Peaceful Coexistence by Demographic Variable (Standard Error)

| Classification | | No. of Cases | Orientation for Single Country | Orientation for Peaceful Coexistence |
|----------------|------------------------|--------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Total | | (1000) | 3.17(0.03) | 3.49(0.03) |
| Gender | Men | (496) | 3.33(0.04) | 3.44(0.04) |
| | Women | (504) | 3.01(0.04) | 3.54(0.04) |
| Age | 20s | (173) | 2.89(0.07) | 3.54(0.07) |
| | 30s | (165) | 3.03(0.07) | 3.52(0.07) |
| | 40s | (197) | 3.32(0.06) | 3.46(0.06) |
| | 50s | (201) | 3.34(0.07) | 3.41(0.07) |
| | 60s+ | (264) | 3.18(0.05) | 3.52(0.05) |
| Gender | Men in 20s | (91) | 2.96(0.11) | 3.57(0.10) |
| | Women in 20s | (82) | 2.83(0.08) | 3.50(0.09) |
| | Men in 30s | (84) | 3.22(0.08) | 3.39(0.10) |
| | Women in 30s | (81) | 2.83(0.10) | 3.66(0.10) |
| | Men in 40s | (100) | 3.58(0.08) | 3.32(0.09) |
| | Women in 40s | (97) | 3.06(0.08) | 3.59(0.08) |
| | Men in 50s | (103) | 3.49(0.10) | 3.36(0.10) |
| | Women in 50s | (98) | 3.19(0.08) | 3.46(0.08) |
| | 60s+ Men | (118) | 3.34(0.08) | 3.55(0.08) |
| | Women in 60s and Older | (146) | 3.05(0.07) | 3.50(0.07) |
| Religion | Christianity | (217) | 3.28(0.06) | 3.48(0.06) |
| | Buddhism | (174) | 3.21(0.07) | 3.39(0.07) |
| | Catholic | (116) | 3.18(0.08) | 3.53(0.08) |
| | No Religion | (492) | 3.10(0.04) | 3.52(0.04) |

| Classification | | No. of Cases | Orientation for Single Country | Orientation for Peaceful Coexistence |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Political Orientation | Conservative | (244) | 3.06(0.06) | 3.55(0.06) |
| | Centrist | (437) | 3.09(0.04) | 3.46(0.04) |
| | Progressive | (319) | 3.35(0.05) | 3.48(0.05) |
| Monthly Household Income | Less than 3 Million Won | (213) | 3.01(0.06) | 3.49(0.06) |
| | 3 to 5 Million Won | (345) | 3.17(0.04) | 3.49(0.05) |
| | 5 Million Won and Over | (442) | 3.24(0.04) | 3.49(0.04) |

The average of orientation for a single country was 3.17 <Table II-10>. Men (3.32) had a higher level of orientation for single country than women (3.00). Those in their 20s (2.89) showed the lowest level of orientation for a single country and those in their 40s (3.32) and 50s (3.34) recorded the relatively highest level. The difference of orientation for a single country between women in their 20s (2.83) and 30s (2.83) and men in their 50s (3.49) and 40s (3.58) was the greatest. Progressives (3.35), compared to conservatives (3.06) and centrists (3.09), and income-earners of 5 million won and over (3.24), compared to those who earn less than 3 million won (3.01), showed a high level of orientation for single country.

The average of the orientation for peaceful coexistence was 3.49 higher than that for a single country. No difference was observed depending on all the demographic variables. At least public consensus has been built on the necessity for peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas. As stated above, it would be more reasonable to view it as a result that reflects the public interest that today's peace is more desperately needed than forming a single country of the future.

Next, questions were asked on the detailed meaning of unification. Respondents gave an answer as to whether the four states of inter-Korean relations below are unification or not on a scale of 1 to 5 (1: not at all unification, 5: certainly unification).


- 1) While the two Koreas keep their regimes in place, South Koreans and North Koreans can travel to and stay on a short-term basis in each other's region after undergoing legal procedures similar to those required for overseas travel.
- 2) While the two Koreas keep their regimes in place, they have revitalized exchange and cooperation in various fields such as the economy, society and culture.
- 3) While the two Koreas keep their regimes in place, they have established and are operating inter-Korean alliance organizations, such as inter-Korea joint councils and cabinet meetings.
- 4) In accordance with the Constitution of unified Korea, a single government and a single National Assembly have been established through elections, integrating the two regimes' organizations and systems.

The percentage of 'positive' and average per each question was presented in <Picture II-5>. The highest percentage of 58.4% went to the unification being the formation of politically single country, meaning 'the state in which the institutions and organizations of the two systems are integrated by constructing the single government and single national assembly via election under the unification constitution.' The lowest percentage of 23.1% believed that unification is a state in which 'human movement and short-term residency is allowed in accordance with the legal

procedures that are usually required of for a visit to a foreign country and the South Korean and North Korean systems are maintained.’

<Picture II-5> The Percentage of People Who Believe that Unification is the Formation of a Single Country, the Korean Commonwealth, and Human Movement and Formation of a Free Market

(Unit: %)



It seems natural that the percentage of those who view unification as the integrated state of a single country outnumber those who view it as the state of the Korean Commonwealth and reconciliation and cooperation. In fact, 58.4% of positive answers look insufficient. Another feature is that not many people answered that the Korean Commonwealth, the state of exchange and cooperation, and free human movement ‘cannot be explicitly viewed as unification.’ 36.3% answered that the state of free human movement ‘could not be viewed as unification,’ 31.1% the state of active social and cultural exchange, and 28.3% the state of the

Korean Commonwealth. As high as 40% of people chose 'neutral,' deferring to present any opinion on this question. Unification has long been a protected value in South Korean society. Protected value indicates normative, moral, and sometimes divine value that cannot be a trade-off for other values, in particular economic value.⁵⁴⁾ In other words, it is the value that should be protected at any cost. Explicitly expressing the intention to refuse this protected value is not an easy task given that it is tantamount to violating the protected value. In this sense, the answer 'neutral' on a question about unification, especially the question that involves a value-centered judgment, cannot be simply regarded as 50:50. Although detailed follow-up research is required on this, the following findings indicate that there might have been changes in how people perceive unification: only 60% of the public views the politically single country as unification; and the staggering number of people who chose neutral on whether the Korean Commonwealth and reconciliation/cooperation stage can be viewed as unification.

2) North Korea Policy

The attitude on North Korea policy was measured by eight questions. A factor analysis on eight questions identifies the category of two factors. The first factor is engagement policy and the second factor is pressure policy. Two questions on engagement policy are as follows and internal reliability among questions was .71.

1) Regardless of the sanctions against North Korea, humanitarian

54) Jonathan Baron and Mark Spranca, "Protected Values," *Organizational Behavior Human Decision Processes*, vol. 70, no. 1 (1997), p. 1.

aid should be provided for the vulnerable (e.g. children, pregnant women and senior citizens) in North Korea.

- 2) The Korean government should actively engage in exploring inter-Korean cooperative projects which could be excluded from sanctions and make a request to the UN.

Six questions on pressure policy are as follows and internal reliability among questions was .75.

- 3) As long as sanctions remain, any progress in negotiations with North Korea is not likely.
- 4) Humanitarian aid for North Korea is a violation of the sanctions against North Korea.
- 5) Aid for North Korea will be utilized for military reinforcement in North Korea.
- 6) Until North Korea's complete denuclearization is achieved, sanctions against North Korea should not be eased.
- 7) Inter-Korean relations should be addressed as a country-to-country issue rather than a national issue.
- 8) Transactions between South Korea and North Korea should be pursued only when what the two sides are offering is symmetrical.

The average of engagement policy was 3.72. People in their 40s (3.93) had a relatively higher support for engagement policy than those in their 20s (3.57) and 60s (3.57). The difference by ideological tendency was distinct. Centrists compared to conservatives, and progressives compared to centrists, showed a higher support for engagement policy. No meaningful difference was found

depending on gender, religion and income level. The average for pressure policy was 3.91, slightly higher than the support for engagement policy. Centrist, compared to progressive, and conservative, compared to centrist, showed a higher support for pressure policy. No difference was observed by gender, age, religion, and income level. There was a stark difference by the ideological leaning on North Korea policy.

<Table II-11> Average of Support for Engagement Policy and Pressure Policy by Demographic Variables (Standard Error)

| Classification | | No. of Cases | Engagement Policy | Pressure Policy |
|----------------|------------------------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| Total | | (1000) | 3.72(0.04) | 3.91(0.03) |
| Gender | Men | (496) | 3.69(0.05) | 3.92(0.04) |
| | Women | (504) | 3.75(0.04) | 3.89(0.03) |
| Age | 20s | (173) | 3.57(0.08) | 3.94(0.06) |
| | 30s | (165) | 3.78(0.08) | 3.90(0.06) |
| | 40s | (197) | 3.93(0.07) | 3.79(0.05) |
| | 50s | (201) | 3.78(0.09) | 3.89(0.06) |
| | 60s+ | (264) | 3.57(0.07) | 3.99(0.05) |
| Gender | Men in 20s | (91) | 3.42(0.13) | 4.13(0.08) |
| | Women in 20s | (82) | 3.74(0.08) | 3.73(0.07) |
| | Men in 30s | (84) | 3.89(0.11) | 3.91(0.07) |
| | Women in 30s | (81) | 3.67(0.11) | 3.89(0.09) |
| | Men in 40s | (100) | 4.02(0.10) | 3.71(0.08) |
| | Women in 40s | (97) | 3.85(0.09) | 3.88(0.07) |
| | Men in 50s | (103) | 3.63(0.14) | 3.86(0.10) |
| | Women in 50s | (98) | 3.93(0.11) | 3.93(0.07) |
| | 60s+ Men | (118) | 3.51(0.11) | 4.01(0.09) |
| | Women in 60s and Older | (146) | 3.63(0.09) | 3.97(0.06) |

| | Classification | No. of Cases | Engagement Policy | Pressure Policy |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| Religion | Christianity | (217) | 3.76(0.07) | 3.99(0.06) |
| | Buddhism | (174) | 3.66(0.09) | 3.97(0.06) |
| | Catholic | (116) | 3.70(0.10) | 3.93(0.07) |
| | No Religion | (492) | 3.72(0.05) | 3.84(0.04) |
| Political Orientation | Conservative | (244) | 3.24(0.08) | 4.16(0.06) |
| | Centrist | (437) | 3.67(0.05) | 3.94(0.03) |
| | Progressive | (319) | 4.16(0.06) | 3.68(0.04) |
| Monthly Household Income | Less than 3 Million Won | (213) | 3.63(0.07) | 3.84(0.05) |
| | 3 to 5 Million Won | (345) | 3.75(0.06) | 3.90(0.04) |
| | 5 Million Won and Over | (442) | 3.74(0.05) | 3.95(0.04) |

3. Conclusion

This research affirmed that a divided Korean Peninsula epitomizes characteristics of intractable conflict. The division has ① accompanied physical violence in the form of massive killing, ② prolonged for over 17 years initially locked by war, ③ imbued the country with a dichotomous worldview and internalized the culture of otherness (even hostility), and ④ reproduced social conflicts by approaching inter-Korean relations as a zero-sum game with the divided state being used as an excuse. After all, the division accompanies physical violence and at the same time is internalized in our society in the form of structural and cultural violence.

It is apparent that the psychology of division is an impediment to realizing sustainable peace. However, this research emphasizes that “empathy” not “denial” is needed to go beyond the psychology of the division and intractable conflict. Political and social institutions and individuals and a group’s psychological mechanism in an intractable conflict society are the by-product of adaptation for survival and the result of evolution. From the context of the division, the transition from a conflict-ridden culture and psychology means a change in the core mechanism that has enabled the survival and prosperity of ourselves and our society for the last seven decades. Negating the reality of our society, which has long underpinned our individual and societal identity with a legitimate mechanism for survival, is highly likely to backfire and face resistance to change.

The most important element to transition from intractable conflict, such as the inter-Korean division, to sustainable peace, is reconciliation. However, any approach toward reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula warrants careful attention given that there is

neither a clear definition of reconciliation nor a consensus on the reconciliation process. The biggest challenge is to arrive at an agreement for a definition of reconciliation and the process applicable to the Korean Peninsula. In particular, it is necessary to find a solution through an analysis of Korean Peninsular conflicts as opposed to relying on foreign cases regarding various contending issues on reconciliation, such as the goal, the sequence, and the elements of reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula.

This study laid out the definition of reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula as the first step toward reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula. Adopting the maximalist definition, which puts forth an ideal and normative state and process (inter-Korean trust, friendship, truth, worldview, etc.) as the goal of reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula, is highly likely to impede the reconciliation by shunning the solemn reality facing the Korean Peninsula. Hence, this research saw the minimalist approach to deeply intractable conflict-ridden Korean Peninsula as a more realistic and proper approach, such as ‘the willingness to forge a peaceful relations with North Korea based on cooperation.’

Survey questions comprised of the theory on intractable conflict and the theory of reconciliation affirm that the South Korean people hold the minds of division and of reconciliation at the same time. The attitude on an inter-Korean war was generally negative and the attitude on peace positive. The negative attitude on war and the positive one on peace can be interpreted as South Koreans having a generally high level of reconciliation tendency. However, people’s answers to the question of how to realize peace on the Korean Peninsula illustrate the psychology of conflict and reconciliation. Even though people negatively evaluate war on the

Korean Peninsula, they are either neutral or slightly positive toward realizing peace on the Korean Peninsula through military force. The attitude on achieving peace through cooperation was overall positive.

It was confirmed that South Koreans in general exhibit a psychology of intractable conflict. They view inter-Korean relations as a zero-sum relation and have a higher level of competitive victimhoodness under which they feel that South Korea suffered from more damage than North Korea throughout the history of the division. They think that South Korea is superior to North Korea, and that South Korea's cause and goal is more legitimate than that of North Korea's. There is a preponderance of the tendency to demonize North Korea among South Koreans. They view that solidarity, unity, and self-censorship are required in the face of North Korea as opposed to diversity. The South Korean public view passion, hope, pleasure, optimism, and love as representative characteristics held by South Koreans while suffering, a feeling of loss, fear, pain, and anger are exhibited by North Koreans. The level of trust toward North Korea is low. And a majority of people believe that North Korea should be held accountable for inter-Korean conflicts.

At the same time, the South Korean public shows a predilection for reconciliation. Many people have hopes for resolving the Korean Peninsular issues. The intention to embrace new information about North Korea is relatively high among the public. The percentage of people who feel a sense of guilt toward our society's wrongdoings committed regarding North Korean issues outnumber those who do not. The level of intention to forgive North Korea hovers over the average.

The survey result suggests that people's conflict-oriented minds and reconciliation-oriented minds differ depending on age. This research illustrates that the difference of age on the psychology of division and reconciliation cannot simply be viewed as a U- type pattern issue that is represented by the phenomenon of those in their 20s becoming more conservative. In particular, a distinct difference between men and women in their 20s was observed and such a preference was even reversed depending on an issue. For example, the age difference in the degree of perceiving inter-Korean relations as zero-sum relations follows a typical U-type pattern. The perception of zero-sum among respondents in their 20s and 60s was the strongest and that of their 40s the lowest. On the other hand, competitive victimhoodness in which South Korea sustained more damage than North Korea follows a U-type pattern when simply analyzed by age. However, when age is broken again into gender, women in their 20s and men in their 40s showed the lowest level of competitive victimhoodness and men in their 20s the highest. The attitude on unification also showed a result in contrast to a typical U-type pattern. The attitude on inter-Korean unification does not exhibit distinct dominance in one direction or the other. A favorable attitude on inter-Korean unification was generally low among the younger generations regardless of gender, and women in their 20s and 30s in particular had the lowest level of agreement. On the other hand, people in their 20s had a relatively higher point in hope for inter-Korean relations, trust toward North Korea, and the effort to embrace new information.

What was intriguing was a response to how much division has affected people's lives. People in their 20s and 30s ranked the highest on the division not affecting their lives. Their answer that

division has not affected their life can become a clue to account for a broad range of responses on North Korea and reconciliation among those in their 20s and 30s. At the same time, it can be interpreted as the result showing that people in their 20s and 30s have become numb to the violence of division structurally inherent in our society. Additional research is required on this front.

Building on discussions and analysis laid out thus far, this study presents policy implications below. First, understanding and empathy are needed on the psychology of division and of conflict. Empathy on the psychology of conflict and of division, which has evolved for the purpose of survival in 70-years of the post-war era, should be the beginning of change. In particular, it is easy to assume that South Koreans have a higher level of threat perception due to North Korea's nuclear possession. Nuclear North Korea is the source of triggering the psychology of conflict, which is only part of an iceberg consolidated throughout seven decades of the division. Preceding studies recommend a 'melting approach' to strongly freeze the psychology of conflict that enables minimizing emotional resistance rather than the so-called 'breaking-off' approach. In detail, White's advice to peace activists warrants attention, some of which are described below.⁵⁵⁾

- (1) Do not deny deterrence through military force.
- (2) Do not deny the necessity for possessing an appropriate level of military force.
- (3) Do not hesitate to criticize North Korea, if necessary.
- (4) Be aware of the remarks that could be interpreted as that of

55) Ralph K. White, "Specifics in a Positive Approach to Peace," *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 44, no. 2 (1988), pp. 193~196.

hawks underestimating the horror of war. Respect the fact that hawks want peace as much as you want it. Sometimes criticism about unilateral peace movements could be appropriate.

- (5) Do not hesitate to use words such as 'realistic' and 'practical.'
- (6) Lay out destructive results when the status quo is maintained.
- (7) Present realistic goals rather than wishful foal. Wishful foal is very likely to become a boomerang.

White's recommendation might not be the best advice that can be applied to the context of conflict on the Korean Peninsula since it came out of the context of the U.S.-Soviet conflicts. Hence, it is all the more important to contemplate what kind of approach is necessary in the context of the psychology of the division on the Korean Peninsula.

It is apparent that an approach of acknowledging the psychology of division is a negative approach in that it is designed to minimize the opposing reaction. If reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula is viewed as the "willingness to forge peaceful relations with North Korea on the basis of cooperation" as this research suggests, this approach minimizes the possibility of rejecting even considering the transition to peaceful relations. This negative approach is always prone to criticism that it is the maintaining-status-quo approach. It is apparent that the positive approach in stimulating inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation should be synchronously sought after.

The overarching task in the positive approach to reconciliation is to expand the frequency and scope of experiences on North Korea. However, it is highly likely that South Korea will have a

limited opportunity of directly experiencing North Korea against the backdrop of the political and military process on the path to realizing sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, a realistic policy task should be something that enables expanding the chance of indirect experiences with North Korea. A change in the political and military context on the divided Korean Peninsula, involving issues such as the end-of-war declaration, denuclearization, and a peace regime, is a prerequisite for sustainable peace that is represented by the minds of peace and the culture of peace. A change in the social context will transform individual and societal goals and lay out new social and psychological tasks. A change in social context would not necessarily guarantee social and psychological change. At the end of the day, it is imperative that a change in the social context correspond to social and psychological change to sustain peace. It warrants our attention that a change in the societal context leads to changes in experiences. A change in the social context will bring about an opportunity to experience North Korea that had not been visited or experienced before in spite of the geographic proximity. An advance in inter-Korean relations equals an advance in inter-Korean experience. Therefore, the interactive link connecting a change in societal context and social and psychological change should be experienced first-hand.

Indirect experience toward North Korea primarily comes from information about North Korea. It is important to understand North Korea as 'it is' by having access to objective and trustworthy information. The psychology of the division, the corrective memory of the division, social belief and emotion serve as a prism that accepts and processes new information. Demonization toward North Korea, South Korea's victimhoodness, and hostility and

horror toward North Korea automatically come into play in processing information about North Korea. As a result, South Koreans have no option but to process information about North Korea in a biased way. In other words, ‘confirmation bias’ is likely to occur that selectively processes information that conforms to the existing belief. The information on North Korea should be more objective in this regard.

Then how does the South Korean public obtain information about North Korea? Roughly 75% of the public gets information on North Korea from TV: land-based television stations (60.9%), general service program provider (11.2%), and cable TV (4.2%). About 18% of people obtain information about North Korea through the internet.⁵⁶⁾ It is indicative of the highly biased concentration of information on North Korea that South Korean people have access to. The current ecosystem of information on North Korea does not appear healthy considering the following aspects: three quarters (3/4) of the public is influenced by how and what kind of information TV broadcasting stations provide; a majority of the public is likely to passively accept information about North Korea rather than actively search for information on the North; and cross-checking is difficult due to an insufficient source of information. Efforts are required to improve objectivity and the public aspect of information about North Korea in addition to guaranteeing the freedom of press. A discussion on peace journalism is urgently needed among the media regarding the monitoring system of information about North Korea and the common principal of media coverage and reporting.

56) Sang Sin Lee, *et al.*, *Unification:North Korea Policy Together with the Public* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2019), p. 94. (in Korean)

As stated above, it is impossible to do a cross-check on information about North Korea. It indicates that information about North Korea is prone to fake news. In fact, concerns of the South Korean public about fake news have recently been mounting. 59% of the public is concerned about fake news and especially radical, politically biased news that is produced and propagated on YouTube. Only 38% of the public watches news on YouTube. When the reliability of existing news is very low (only 22% responded that they trust news), the threat posed by fake news will continue to rise over time.⁵⁷⁾ The harmful effect of fake news goes beyond simply providing malicious information and extends into damaging the reliability of accurate information. Roughly 76% of the public responded that ‘I become suspicious even when I watch the real news because of the predominance of fake news.’⁵⁸⁾

Active efforts are required to prevent the production and dissemination of fake news about North Korea. It is necessary not only to operate information channels that check the fake news and right the wrongs, but also enhance the accessibility of the public to information about North Korea. Data Center on North Korea (<https://unibook.unikorea.go.kr/>) and Information Portal on North Korea (<https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/>) run by the Unification Ministry mostly have North Korea’s source book and academic literature. Efforts are needed to improve timeliness, accessibility, and utility by providing information on North Korea tailored to the daily concerns of the general public.

57) Nic Newman *et al.*, *Digital News Report 2019* (Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2019), p. 114.

58) “Fake news makes the real news suspicious,” *Medius*, March 29, 2017, <<http://www.mediaus.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=85752>> (date accessed: June 24, 2019).

