

# The Implementation Strategy of the Establishment for Peaceful Community on the Korean Peninsula

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## **1. Introduction**



This paper aims to propose a peace roadmap to reduce threats from nuclear and missile programs of North Korea and to realize a sustainable and stable peace state. As for the preparation and promotion of the peace roadmap on the Korean Peninsula, its ultimate goal should be to gradually minimize and manage the risk from North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, thereby establishing a stable state of peace on the peninsula. To that end, this paper outlines the strategic roadmap that North Korea pursues with its missile and nuclear programs. In order to take a closer look at the strategic map of North Korea, this article collects pieces of Kim Jong-un's remarks related to the North-U.S. relations, peace negotiation, denuclearization, and North Korea's nuclear policy since Chairman Kim took office. Secondly, three types of peace roadmaps are proposed based on the highly possible advancement of nuclear and missile programs and a practically achievable state of peace. Thirdly, in order to realize the three types of roadmaps, this study presents: 1) multiple diplomatic strategies to deal with stakeholders, 2) an economic and life community for the two Koreas that can further promote peace in the aspect of inter-Korean exchange, and 3) the strategy for exchange and cooperation.



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## **2. Strategy to Design Peace Roadmap on the Korean Peninsula**



The peace roadmap on the Korean Peninsula needs to be strategic and practically achievable considering the current political landscape: North Korea has increasingly intensified the level of advancement and threats of its nuclear and missile programs; and Northeast Asia has become the center of fierce arms race.

First, it does not seem proper to use the peace regime and denuclearization process as a form of roadmap in reaching an agreement with Pyongyang considering North Korea's current level of advancement of its nuclear and missile program. What can be more effective and rational is to limit the negotiation agenda centering on selective and essential issues—agendas that are at the very core of related issues, rather than seeking a comprehensive method designed to establish a roadmp both for denuclearization and a peace regime.

Second, North Korea has made an all-out effort to advance the nuclear and missile technology and insisted on being recognized as a nuclear state corresponding to its nuclear power in negotiations. It is, therefore, becoming more unrealistic either to set denuclearization as the agenda for negotiations and talks or to set the nuclear abandonment (nuclear dismantlement) as a precondition and threshold for resuming negotiations. In fact, there exists a limitation on making grounds for current “denuclearization-first” frame. Looking at their remarks on “denuclearization-first” argument, neither the U.S. nor South Korea have been able to provide a path to implement denuclearization; rather they only laid out conditions to resume talks (the threshold). Since the failure of a system—the September 19 framework—born out of the Joint Statement of the

Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks (hereinafter referred to as “the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005”), both South Korea and the U.S. have failed to suggest an official roadmap for denuclearization or a peace regime. In most cases, they proposed unrealistic prerequisites that a dialogue can be resumed after North Korea’s denuclearization. Rather, a peace agenda that encompasses denuclearization could be a more proper framework for a roadmap that allows North Korea’s acceptability of dialogue and enables flexibility for a resolution. Instead of a roadmap that lays out denuclearization as preconditions for talks, a strategy of a peace roadmap and the peace process can smooth out the entry into a dialogue and help establish a peace regime—a strategy of managing North Korea’s nuclear threats and inducing North Korea into denuclearization in the mid- to long-term.

This article argues that it should be more realistic to propose a peace roadmap that enables reducing North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats and realizing a sustainable and stable peace state. To this end, this paper provides three types of peace roadmap taking into account the most likely situation regarding North Korea’s nuclear pursuit and the practically achievable peace state.

[Type 1] is a roadmap that reapplies the existing nuclear and peace regime process. Type 1 is based on the roadmap established through the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement on February 13, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “the Joint Statement of 13 February 2007”), and Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity on October 4, 2007

(hereinafter referred to as “the North-South Declaration of 4 October 2007”). This is the most standardized type commonly adopted by a majority of discussions on denuclearization and a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

[Type 2] sets denuclearization as a nominal goal and reestablishes the process in a flexible and elastic way. It especially reflects the suggestions and arguments from North Korea, China, and Russia in a realistic and elastic manner. Being deviated from an approach where a peace treaty is suggested as an ultimate reward for denuclearization, Type 2 roadmap flexibly and elastically puts a peace treaty at the front and uses it as a strong drive to induce denuclearization.

[Type 3] is a roadmap to maintain a peace and arms control regime with North Korea retaining its nuclear power, based on which it aims to establish a peace state on the Korean Peninsula. In this roadmap, North Korea possesses nuclear power but does not develop additional nuclear weapons. Type 3 also adopts a missile disarmament regime, with which North Korea’s missiles are not only verified and managed but are also no longer used as an effective threat to neighboring countries. This roadmap aims to ultimately realize de facto denuclearization through the implementation of a long-term and gradual arms control.



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### **3. Strategy to Approach North Korea's Nuclear Issue and Nuclear Roadmap**



## A. Demands of North Korea Analyzed Based on Major Remarks

In 2013, North Korea first announced that it would permanently possess nuclear power and that it has no intention for denuclearization. Since then, it has not revealed its roadmap for strategic nuclear development. Regarding nuclear and missile programs, a peace treaty, and improvement in relations (between North Korea and the U.S. or North Korea and South Korea), the only channels to get a hint of possible dialogue, negotiation, and conditions for resolution have been statements and remarks released by North Korea's Foreign Ministry, its officials, and op-eds of official media outlets. If such information is collected and analyzed in a comprehensive manner, one can grasp the outline of strategic nuclear roadmap that North Korea considers for a possible negotiation with foreign states. The characteristics revealed from North Korea's remarks can be categorized by topics as follows:

<Table 3-1> North Korea's Demands on Nuclear and Inter-Korean Relation Issues

Conditions		Contents of Demands	
Conditions to Stop Nuclear (Missile) Test	Korean Central News Agency (January 9, 2015)	Temporary suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military drills → Temporary halt of nuclear tests	
	Statement of the Spokesperson in the Foreign Ministry (January 15, 2016)	Suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military drills → Halt of nuclear tests	
	Ri Su-yong, Minister of Foreign Ministry, AP interview (April 23, 2016)	Suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military drills → Halt of nuclear tests	
	Choi Sun Hee, Director-General for North America	① Withdrawal of U.S. hostile policies toward	

Conditions		Contents of Demands	
	Affairs, Oslo 1.5 Track Meeting (May 8, 2017)	North Korea ② Lift of sanctions against North Korea ③ Peace treaty between North Korea and the U.S.	→ Halt of nuclear and missile tests
	Kye Chun Yong, North Korea's Ambassador to India (June 23, 2017)	(Temporary or Permanent) Suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military drills → Suspension of nuclear and missile tests	
	The Choson Sinbo (October 9, 2009)	Change in U.S. nuclear policy	
Conditions to Resume the North Korea-U.S. Dialogue	Statement of the Spokesperson in the Foreign Ministry (April 12, 2016)	End to sanctions and pressure and a complete cessation of hostile policies toward North Korea	
	Choi Sun Hee, Director-General for North America Affairs, International Non-proliferation Meeting (October 22, 2017)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No dialogue and negotiations that demand nuclear abandonment and denuclearization as preconditions</li> <li>• Open to dialogue with the U.S. but only with acceptable premises and equal treatment without any conditions</li> <li>• No dialogue forcing North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons</li> <li>• 6-party talks no longer useful</li> <li>• Ultimate goal to achieve the balance of power with the U.S. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ No dialogue and negotiation with an agenda of denuclearization</li> <li>→ No dialogue when sanctions and pressure continue</li> <li>→ Dialogue guaranteeing equal treatment by recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	
Preconditions for Nuclear Negotiation	Kim Jong-un (July 5, 2017, Korean Central News Agency)	Fundamental elimination of the U.S. hostile policy toward North Korea and nuclear threats	
	Rodong Sinmun (December 19,	Without fundamental elimination of the U.S. hostile policy toward North Korea and	

Conditions		Contents of Demands
	2017)	nuclear threat, no nuclear and ballistic missile issues will be put on the negotiation table
Conditions for Trust-building on Denuclearization	Memorandum of the Foreign Ministry (April 21, 2010)	Peace treaty is a trust-building condition for denuclearization
	Rodong Sinmun (October 14, 2009)	North Korea-U.S. peace treaty should be signed first to have peaceful relations and to promote denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula
	Rodong Sinmun (October 14, 2010)	Peace treaty between North Korea and the U.S. is the only way for denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula
Conditions for Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula	Rodong Sinmun (October 14, 2009)	① Withdrawal of the U.S. hostile policy toward North Korea ② Signing of a peace treaty ③ Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the world
	Statement of the Foreign Ministry (January 11, 2010)	Acceleration of the denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula upon signing a peace treaty
	Rodong Sinmun (July 6, 2016)	① Disclosure of all the U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea ② Abolition of all the nuclear weapons and military bases in South Korea and its verification ③ Halt of deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula ④ Pledge on no nuclear threat and no use of nuclear weapons against North Korea ⑤ Announcement of withdrawal of the U.S. troops
Prerequisites for Peace on the Korean Peninsula	Rodong Sinmun (January 15, 2009)	Signing of a peace treaty
Conditions for Improvement on North Korea-U.S. Relations	Ulaanbaatar 1.5 Track (June 23, 2017)	Withdrawal of U.S. hostile policies toward North Korea Decision to sign a peace treaty without any preconditions

Conditions		Contents of Demands
Conditions for Improvement on Inter-Korean Relations	KCRC (June 23, 2017)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>① Improvement in inter-Korean relations independently solely by the two Koreas</li> <li>② Suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military drills</li> <li>③ Unconditional suspension of mutual criticism</li> <li>④ Resolution of the risk of potential military conflict between the two Koreas</li> <li>⑤ Exclusion of the North Korean nuclear issue in inter-Korean talks</li> <li>⑥ Lift of sanctions on North Korea</li> <li>⑦ End to the conservative party's hostile policies against North Korea</li> <li>⑧ Repatriation of female workers of a restaurant in China</li> <li>⑨ Grand gathering of Korean people</li> </ul>

Source: By author based on *Korean Central News Agency, Rodong Sinmun*, etc.

## B. North Korea's Nuclear Roadmap Based on Major Remarks

Based on major remarks, one can draw an outline of North Korea's nuclear roadmap. A possible roadmap is illustrated in Figure 3-1. The roadmap is categorized into three bundles/stages.

Stage 1 is where North Korea demands that the U.S. suspend the ROK-U.S. joint military drills, withdraw hostile policies towards North Korea (no preemptive strike through non-aggression declaration, sanctions relief, and a halt of the use of pejorative languages, etc.), and recognize North Korea as a nuclear state. When all those requests of the North are accommodated, North Korea would cease its nuclear and missile test. The essential condition for the Stage 1 is a transition of the U.S. hostile policy towards North Korea.


Stage 2 aims to institutionalize the establishment of a peace regime. In this stage, North Korea first needs to be recognized as a nuclear state, signs a peace treaty as a party equal to other state parties and then, normalizes relations with the U.S. Although North Korea's basic preference is to sign a bilateral peace treaty with the U.S., it would not refuse three-party or four-party talks, if deemed inevitable.

Stage 3 is the denuclearization stage through a dialogue for denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. In return for denuclearization on the peninsula, North Korea aligns the conditions with the following: 1) disclosure of the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea, 2) abolishment and verification of the U.S. nuclear weapons and military bases in South Korea, 3) permanent suspension of the deployment of the U.S. strategic assets on the peninsula, 4) declaration of the use of no-nuclear weapons toward North Korea, and 5) withdrawal of United States Forces Korea (USFK) from the peninsula. Looking at the remarks made by North Korea, what should be noted is that North Korea has not mentioned its own denuclearization measures at all. Therefore, if North Korea carries out the denuclearization measures corresponding to its demands, the denuclearization process agreed by the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 can be an applicable roadmap.

The above roadmaps focus on North Korea's demands as those were drawn based on its remarks. Corresponding denuclearization measures that are included in Stage 2 and 3 are left as black box as North Korea has not specified the detailed implementation measures. The roadmap and its detailed stages are established

based on the announcements and remarks publicized by North Korea. Therefore, there can be some possible inconsistency between strategic goals of the North Korean authorities and the public messages it has attempted to deliver to the outside world. What is important, however, is to check how the outline of such roadmaps is different from the existing September 19 framework.

**<Figure 3-1> North Korean Nuclear Roadmap based on North Korea's Major Remarks**




Note: Black box (North Korea's denuclearization is not mentioned and the September 19 nuclear dismantlement stage is applied.)  
 Source: By author based on the major remarks of North Korea

### **C. Actual Strategic Goal of North Korea**

A nuclear roadmap that North Korea ideally considers is estimated to be “peaceful co-existence with the U.S. while possessing nuclear power.” As mentioned above, the Kim Jong-un regime has various reasons not to abandon nuclear weapons. Unless a remarkable “quality” transition internally takes place, the current regime can hardly find an alternative to nuclear power, not to mention nuclear abandonment. The roadmap that North Korea considers under the peace treaty–nuclear disarmament framework based on its strategic goal of peaceful co-existence with the U.S. while possessing nuclear power is illustrated in Figure 3-2.

<Figure 3-2> North Korea's Nuclear Approach (Peaceful coexistence with the U.S. with nuclear power in possession: 'peace treaty-nuclear disarmament')



Source: By author.

### *1) Recognition as Nuclear State Equal to the U.S.*

North Korea sets the first goal of being as an equal negotiation partner as the U.S. to the maximum extent in terms of nuclear capability and position. Being equal does not mean as equal quantity and quality of nuclear and missile weapons as the U.S. Instead, North Korea seeks to be recognized as a state with competent nuclear capacity that the U.S. cannot easily look down on.<sup>1)</sup> Equal reputation means the same level of position rooted on homogeneity as a nuclear state. North Korea believes that the U.S. can deceive the North with double standards and force them to abandon the nuclear power when it raises a suspicion on their nuclear capacity and looks down on the potential threats that the DPRK can pose. That is why North Korea has held onto a strategy of doing everything it takes to be officially recognized as a nuclear and missile state.

### *2) Transition in Frame: From “Denuclearization Measure-first Principal” to “Hostile Policy toward North Korea”*

With this strategy, North Korea demands a transition of frame from “denuclearization measure-first”—demanded by the U.S. and South Korea—to “changes of hostile policy toward North Korea.” It argues that the U.S. needs to be an actor taking the initiative. The rationale

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1) In the plenary meeting of the Asia Parliamentary Assembly held in Turkey from November 21 to 23, 2017, Ri Jong Hyuk, the head of North Korean delegation, said “It is our choice to confront the U.S. only with the nuclear power fully balanced with that of the U.S.” Yonhap News(Seoul), November 26, 2017.

of this strategy is that the U.S. needs to take an action first, then the North would make the next move reciprocating trust that the U.S. tries to build in its first move. The September 19 framework follows the structure where North Korea is given rewards in return for implementation of denuclearization measures. Under such structure where the U.S. takes the lead in evaluating the level of denuclearization and deciding on corresponding rewards, North Korea could have felt a huge limitation in its control over alleviating the uncertainty of its position. The North could have felt that the U.S. forces irrational and excessive demands and that an arbitrary decision of the U.S. can suspend or cripple the process. Therefore, North Korea must have learned a lesson that the U.S. should build trust first by recognizing North Korea as an equal counterpart; only then can the North enhance the level of trust in a gradual manner, reduce uncertainty on the roadmap based on trust, and secure a control over power.

### ***3) Strategy to Sign Peace Treaty after Recognition as Nuclear State***

North Korea's strategy is to build a certain level of trust with the U.S. once Washington changes its hostile policy toward Pyongyang. Based on the trust built, it can sign a bilateral peace treaty in a position of recognized nuclear state. In fact, the recent increase of nuclear and missile tests in North Korea can be interpreted as its struggle to urge and even force the U.S. to recognize the country as a nuclear state. It is true that North Korea has insisted on signing a bilateral peace treaty with the U.S. but it can also accept the participation of a third or fourth party. What matters the most for

North Korea is not the number of counterparts. Instead, it wants to sign a peace treaty led by the will of the U.S. It also demands that the effects of such agreement be equivalent to a “treaty” ratified by the U.S. Congress rather than an “agreement” at the level of executive order of the U.S. President. It is highly likely that North Korea prefers setting a more sustainable norm to an executive order that can be easily abolished upon a change of the government.

#### *4) Peaceful Co-existence of North Korea and the U.S. under “Nuclear Disarmament Regime,” as Opposed to Denuclearization*

Under this strategy, North Korea requests for a peace treaty and normalization of relations with the U.S., after which nuclear issues can be dealt with as part of disarmament issues through nuclear disarmament talks. A difference between denuclearization and nuclear disarmament (in North Korea or on the Korean Peninsula) lies in whether its ultimate goal is a complete abandonment of nuclear programs. “Denuclearization of North Korea” enforces the unilateral responsibility to abandon its nuclear power on the North. Therefore, it cannot be easily accepted by the DPRK. On the other hand, the essence of nuclear disarmament is for state parties to objectify and recognize threats arising from nuclear weapons in their possession. Based on this, the state parties involved can reduce the quality and quantity of threats through a “management and restriction agreement.” It is possible for North Korea to suggest building mutual trust through nuclear disarmament first, given that the imminent denuclearization does not seem promising at the moment. Then, based on such trust, the North could suggest

holding an additional negotiation in the future to discuss an issue of nuclear abandonment. The North can ask for a measure to reduce nuclear threats in a bid to build trust calling for other party to stick to “action-to-action” principle. To this end, institutional tools can be proposed such as nuclear weapons management agreement or missile restriction agreement. Meanwhile, a comprehensive arms control can be demanded in parallel with nuclear disarmament.

As a result, it is ideal for North Korea to freeze its nuclear program, while keeping the existing ones in its possession. North Korea is not likely to escalate tensions too intensely. Rather, in a negotiation, the North could suggest actions suspending the further advancement of ICBM that poses a direct threat to the U.S. territory and limiting the number of missiles already developed and deployed. As corresponding measures, Pyongyang is likely to demand that the U.S. reduce the possibility of preemptive attacks and its extended nuclear deterrence. A complete loss of nuclear capacity is far from the most preferred status for North Korea. Instead, it would choose to freeze current nuclear activities and maintain a “reversible nuclear level.” Therefore, instead of relying on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is likely to prefer a regional disarmament regime through “nuclear control agreement on the Korean Peninsula” or “missile restriction agreement” under “OSCK-NEA regime on the Korean Peninsula”<sup>2)</sup> with limited counterparts including the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Russia,

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2) Organization for Security and Cooperation in Korea peninsula (OSCK)-Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) regime.

and Japan. Such nuclear disarmament and arms control regime can be operated as a mutual surveillance and verification system.

## **4. Type of Peace Roadmap Categorized by Scenario**



## **A. Three Types of Peace Roadmap Initiative on the Korean Peninsula**

This study sets three types of practically reasonable peace roadmaps.

[Type 1] “North Korea’s Denuclearization-Peace Regime” Roadmap  
(Modified from the September 19 framework)

- A roadmap that practically revised the existing September 19 framework

[Type 2] “Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula-Peace Regime” Roadmap (Roadmap based on peace treaty momentum)

- Type 2-1: Peace treaty momentum roadmap (with weak flexibility)
- Type 2-2: Peace treaty momentum roadmap (with strong flexibility)

[Type 3] “Nuclear Freeze-Peace and Arms Control” Roadmap

- Gradual and phased peace and arms control roadmap through nuclear freeze

Roadmaps are based on three of the various possible scenarios depending on the status of nuclear and missile development. In this section, three viable roadmaps were suggested in a bid to extend the scope of practical limitations that came out of previous discussions on the denuclearization and peace regime roadmap on the Korean Peninsula. Details of three roadmaps are as follows:

[Type 1] is based on the existing denuclearization and peace regime process, whose explicit goal is “denuclearization of North Korea.” Type 1 reapplies such process to the current situation. This type basically follows the denuclearization and peace regime roadmap proposed by the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the Joint Statement of 13 February 2007, and the North-South Declaration of 4 October 2007. That is, “denuclearization (nuclear abolishment) of North Korea” is set as an explicit goal interlinking economic rewards, normalization of relations, and a peace treaty depending on the stage of denuclearization. Type 1 is the most generalized model applied by a majority of discussions on denuclearization and a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

[Type 2] explicitly aims at “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The fundamental difference from the existing standardized system born out of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 or Type 1 roadmap is that its goal is “denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula,” not “denuclearization of North Korea.” In addition, unlike in the past, Type 2 places the contents of roadmap—stage, rewards, milestone, and momentum—in a flexible and elastic manner. Especially what North Korea, China, and Russia suggested was realistically and flexibly reflected on the roadmap. For instance, in the existing “September 19 framework,” the end of war declaration, establishment of diplomatic relations, and a peace treaty were expected to be proceeded at the final stage or after denuclearization. However, they are flexibly placed at the initial or middle stage of the roadmap process. By doing so, this type plans to utilize a peace treaty signed at the initial stage of roadmap as momentum for its later process of

denuclearization roadmap. Such flexibility is a main characteristic of Type 2 roadmap given flexible placement of existing major momentum and implementation measures on a roadmap.

[Type 3] sets a goal to reach a peaceful state on the Korean Peninsula equivalent to denuclearization by establishing a peace and arms control regime under the nuclear freeze state. This is a type of the initiative that can be developed when North Korea completes its nuclear and missile weapons program and strongly refuses nuclear abandonment and any conversation on the matter. The situation can result in a repeated confrontation between North Korea and the U.S. as well as looming crisis and elevated tensions on the Peninsula. A realistic goal of Type 3 is where: 1) North Korea possesses a nuclear and missile program but gives up developing additional nuclear weapons; and 2) existing missile weapons are consistently controlled by a restriction agreement and arms control regime with no effective threat or related activities to neighboring countries.

## B. Possibility of Reapplication of Existing “September 19 Roadmap” and Its Limitation

<Table 4-1> Existing Denuclearization & Peace Regime Roadmap  
(i.e., the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the Joint Statement of 13 February 2007, the North-South Declaration of 4 October 2007)

Stage	Stage for creating environment	Stage of Denuclearization			
		Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4
Implementation of denuclearization	Return to NPT/IAEA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Foundation of a committee in charge of verification of suspension</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All nuclear program declared to IAEA</li> <li>• Disabling</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dismantlement of nuclear program</li> <li>• Dismantle-</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Completion of nuclear dismantlement</li> <li>• Abolishment</li> </ul>

Stage	Stage for creating environment	Stage of Denuclearization			
		Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>of nuclear facilities and nuclear abandonment</li> <li>• Declare and freeze of nuclear facility</li> <li>• IAEA inspection of shutdown of nuclear facility</li> <li>• Detailed inspection from experts in nuclear-states</li> <li>• IAEA sealing</li> </ul>	nuclear facility	ment of nuclear material and facility	of long-range missile
Peace Regime			Operation of the peace forum on the Korean Peninsula	Declaration of end of war	Peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula (guaranteed by the international community)
NK-U.S Relations		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lift of financial sanctions</li> <li>• Talks on relations improvement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lift of designation as terrorism-sponsoring country</li> <li>• Lift of economic sanctions (Lift of Trading with Enemy Act)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establishment of liaison office in North Korea</li> <li>• Admission of international financial organization</li> </ul>	Normalization of relations with the U.S.
NK-Japan Relations	Resumption of normalization of negotiation			Opening of the North Korea-Japan Trade Representative Office	Normalization of relations with Japan
Inter-Korean Relations	Discussion on expansion of economic cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inter-Korean summit</li> <li>• Inter-Korean arms control</li> </ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disarmament between the two Koreas</li> <li>• Institutionalization of the peace regime</li> </ul>

Source: By author.

Admittedly, the existing denuclearization roadmap based on the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 is somewhat difficult to be applied to reality considering both the circumstantial and content aspects.

Firstly, there have been changes in willingness of the North Korean leadership. The Kim Jong-il regime, no matter what their hidden motive was, ultimately agreed upon denuclearization and put into action their will and related measures for nuclear freeze. North Korea under the Kim Jong-il regime showed the will to resolve the issue, believing in the trust-building measures based on the “action-to-action” principle with the U.S. in the face of uncertain future. However, the current Kim Jong-un regime refuses to have any dialogue promoted under the premise of denuclearization. Rather, it maintains a firm stance that it will not give up its nuclear program and choose to permanently possess it unless the U.S. completely withdraws its hostile policy against North Korea.

Therefore, it is only questionable whether the “September 19 roadmap” is realistic enough to apply to the current situation since it was originally established under the explicit goal of denuclearization when North Korea showed the will for denuclearization. Even if North Korea comes back to the negotiating table and accepts denuclearization as an agenda, North Korea is likely to demand another reward, which would be bigger than the one it requested back in the September 19 roadmap. Examples of bigger rewards include security-related incentives corresponding to their action, such as changes of the U.S. extended deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and of the USFK on the peninsula.

Secondly, North Korea shows distrust toward the U.S. and a distinctive change in their perception on the political landscape. Based on its past experiences, North Korea seems to believe that Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on October 21, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as "the Agreed Framework") or framework based on the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 alone cannot be a guarantee of its survival. In fact, North Korea has repeatedly announced in its public statement that the U.S. policies on North Korea have shown inconsistency and been frequently modified following the changes of power from the Clinton administration to Obama and to Trump. A shift of the U.S. policy on North Korea and the Korean Peninsula depending on the leadership change has made the North perceive the basic notion of the U.S. North Korean policy with a sense of uncertainty and mistrust.

One last blow was the NPR (Nuclear Posture Review) published right after President Bush took office in January 2002. It was evaluated that North Korea felt a strong sense of betrayal when the U.S. listed it as a target country subject to its use of nuclear weapons in that review report. For North Korea, it was a critical sign that had negated the safety and security proposed by the U.S. As the U.S. identified North Korea as an offensive target, not as a counterpart for negotiation, it decided not to trust the U.S. any more since then. It must have been a lesson learned for North Korea that whatever "agreement" it would have with the U.S., its actual stance on North Korea would never change. In fact, it was around 2003 when the North officially declared its nuclear policy insisting on the "strong nuclear deterrence for self-defense" in

earnest.<sup>3)</sup>

As of now, the Kim Jong-un regime seems to believe that, based on the experience and lessons in the past, it is difficult to change the U.S. policy stance unless it has something to be used as a leverage for negotiation and implementation of agreement. In addition, it is true that there has been not much change in the U.S. hostile policy against North Korea but the level of hostility has been severely fluctuated following the changes of the U.S. administration. Such fluctuation becomes one of major factors for uncertainty perceived by the North, leading to mistrust on the U.S. It makes very unlikely that North Korea accepts the existing roadmap as it is.

Thirdly, compared to a time when this roadmap was first introduced, North Korea has greatly enhanced its nuclear and missile capability. Major agreements came into being around 2006 when the first nuclear test was conducted—the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the Joint Statement of 13 February 2007, and Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement on October 3, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “the Joint Statement of 3 October 2007”). Those existing agreements and declarations solely focused on the technical process for nuclear abolishment to prevent nuclear issues that might arise in the future because back then, it was estimated that the North’s nuclear technology was still far from completion.

However, fast forward from the day that Kim Jong-un came to

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3) Min Hong, “Analysis on North Korea’s Major Activities regarding Nuclear and Missile Programs,” (KINU Insight 17-01, Korea Institute for National Unification, Seoul, 2017), p. 18.

power to now (September 3, 2017), the regime has conducted 83 nuclear and missile tests whose frequency was twice that of the Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung regime combined.<sup>4)</sup> Furthermore, a missile range has significantly improved, becoming a greater mid-to long-range threat with an introduction of various types of missiles. Such enhancement indicates that the North's nuclear and missile capability is completely different from that of 2005 to 2007 when this roadmap was first adopted. Therefore, this roadmap has to be reorganized to reflect all the changes of such technical enhancement.

Fourth, the U.S. has shown a sense of perception and attitude much different from the time that the roadmap was first formulated. In the past, the U.S. was more in pursuit of non-proliferation, without perceiving North Korea's nuclear program as a possible threat to its national territory. However, after having been confronted with the first and second nuclear crises, Washington started to cast doubt on the effectiveness of existing agreements, such as the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. Over time, it has become more hesitant to provide North Korea with diplomatic and economic rewards utilizing nuclear program as a means for negotiation. It would be fair to say that a certain level of trust in defensive nature that existed between North Korea and the U.S. is now practically gone.

Currently, the U.S. is reinforcing its basic stance that any negotiation cannot be a basis for a dialogue unless North Korea shows sincere actions first. Now the U.S. does not believe that

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4) Ibid, p. 33.

finding a middle ground by freezing the nuclear program in North Korea can be a fundamental answer. That is why there is little trust but full of distrust between the U.S. and North Korea: trust in defensive nature, which had been a driving force for the existing agreement-based roadmap, is now nowhere to be found.

Lastly, if the level of technological advancement is low, the time and political and diplomatic efforts needed for nuclear elimination would also be small and expectation for a peace regime would be high. On the other hand, when the level of technological advancement is high, it is much harder and more complicated to enter the nuclear abolishment process, not to mention the difficulty in the technical process to dismantle an advanced nuclear program. This will also definitely impact the level of expectation for a possible peace regime whose process is closely interconnected with the status of dialogue and denuclearization. In the end, therefore, one has to seek a new peace roadmap realistic enough considering the current situation even if such roadmap contains more uncertainty compared to the existing denuclearization and peace regime roadmaps.

### **C. Type 1: “North Korea’s Denuclearization-Peace Regime” Roadmap (Modified from the September 19 Framework)**


#### *1) Main Contents of Type 1 Roadmap*

The course indicated in Figure 4-1 can be considered and followed

when formulating a future peace roadmap based on the “September 19 roadmap.” The aim for Type 1 roadmap is explicitly “denuclearization of North Korea.” The whole process of reaching an agreement on the roadmap through a discussion and negotiation is possible only when North Korea and its officials concur with a goal of its denuclearization.

Secondly, denuclearization implementation measures and schedules for both Type 1 roadmap and the September 19 roadmap are the same; only difference is the initial step of “setting conditions and initiating discussions.” In this roadmap, South Korea and the U.S. take actions first to stop or reduce the ROK-U.S. joint military drills and present a “Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula (tentative title).” The Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula can also be reached by six parties: five major countries including South Korea, the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia present a “Proposal for Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” promising the security of the North Korean regime and urging peaceful resolution for tensions on the peninsula; and such move is followed by the participation of North Korea as a reciprocal action.

<Figure 4-1> Type 1: “North Korea Denuclearization-Peace Regime” Roadmap



Source: By author.

Basically, under this roadmap, five countries express their intention to guarantee the security of the North Korean regime, going beyond the U.S. and South Korea's principle of "Four Nos"<sup>5)</sup> when it comes to North Korea. Such Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula can be proposed in a meeting, tentatively titled "Seoul Peace Conference," by five countries, including South Korea, before which the North will be informed of this event through a special envoy. This method aims to induce North Korea's acceptability by having at least five countries participate in the Declaration given the North's mistrust toward the U.S. and South Korea over a promise of security guarantee.

The reason for stopping or reducing the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises and declaring peace on the Korean Peninsula in advance is because North Korea is currently showing no will to engage in a dialogue. Against this backdrop, it may be necessary to provide some kind of security incentives such as stopping or reducing the ROK-U.S. joint military drills as suggested by North Korea, China, and Russia alike in order to encourage the North to join in a talk. This type assumes that by lowering the threshold for a dialogue and respecting its will for the security guarantee, the regime may become more receptive.

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5) ① No hostile policy toward North Korea, ② No intention to attack North Korea, ③ No desire for North Korean regime change or collapse, ④ No unilateral decision to accelerate Korean reunification. In addition to the four nos, the intention of mutual non-aggression between the U.S. and North Korea and to change hostile policy is included.

## 2) *Structural Characteristics of Type 1 Roadmap*

[Circumstance/Situation]

- An additional nuclear test is possible. A series of ICBM/IRBM tests resulted in securing sufficient capability to strike the U.S. mainland. The reentry technology with nuclear warheads mounted is expected to be completed in one year.
- *Pukkuksong-3* (SLBM) and multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) are being developed.
- The North Korean economy is functioning normally despite some difficulties imposed by strong international sanctions.

[Characteristic 1] Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is an explicit final goal and agenda of talks.

[Characteristic 2] The conditions (initiating talks) are initially set by South Korea and the U.S. (halting of *Ssangyong* Exercise among the ROK-U.S. joint military drills and declaration of peace on the Korean Peninsula), not by North Korea.

[Characteristic 3] Upon returning to the NPT/IAEA, this roadmap is identical to the existing September 19 roadmap with a synchronous implementation and linkage of the denuclearization-peace regime according to the action-to-action principle.

[Characteristic 4] Overall contents of the denuclearization and peace regime roadmap are determined in the early talks.

[Characteristic 5] It accompanies the forms of complete agreement,

comprehensive structure, and ratification of the U.S. Congress.

### ***3) Possibility and Methods of Type 1 Roadmap Implementation***

The implementation of Type 1 roadmap is expected to be difficult as it may accompany backlashes and uncertain variables. As of now, the North is highly unlikely to accept the Type 1 approach. As mentioned earlier, the Kim Jong-un regime currently refuses any kind of dialogue under the premise of denuclearization. Rather, it maintains a firm stance that it will not give up its nuclear weapons insisting on keeping them permanently unless the U.S. completely withdraws its hostile policy against North Korea. After the launch of ICBM *Hwasong-15* on November 29, 2017, Kim Jong-un declared that “we have finally realized the great historic cause of having completed the state nuclear force.” Such remarks aim to convey a strategic message that it intends to negotiate with the U.S. on the “peace treaty-nuclear disarmament” as a “nuclear state” or “nuclear-armed state,” regardless of technical recognition of the international community. Against this backdrop, the possibility that the North will accept the dialogue or negotiation under the premise of denuclearization is very low.

It is unclear whether the Trump administration will accept this roadmap. South Korea and the U.S. already stated that they will not give up on the ROK-U.S. joint military drills, which are legal, in exchange for North Korea giving up on the illegal nuclear and missile tests. Even if South Korea, with a strong will, attempts to persuade the U.S. that North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats

are being heightened and setting conditions for dialogue and initiation of talks are absolutely necessary, the chances of succeeding in such persuasion seem very slim. It is also highly likely that opposition within South Korea could emerge against the idea of the halting of the joint military drills.

Comparing the illegality of nuclear tests with the legality of military drills may intensify the controversy. It may fuel distrust and dispute between the parties involved by internationally dragging the issue into a legal fight rather than trying to address it with a political will, resolution, and agreement. Although the violation of the UN Security Council Resolutions is a clear reason for criticism, it is disputable what is “illegal” from the perspective of the international law. A controversy also lies in that North Korea has long regarded the ROK-U.S. joint military exercise as a breach of the armistice agreement. Therefore, refusing to accept on the legal basis may emphasize various issues on the South-North division and the ROK-U.S. alliance, thereby worsening the situation.

In 1993 during North Korea’s nuclear crisis, the Team Spirit exercise, one of the largest joint military exercise in the world at the time, was canceled under the premise of nuclear freeze. As a result, the Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was abandoned in the end, however, it is necessary to consider tactically stopping or reducing the ROK-U.S. joint military drills in order to mitigate tension and encourage dialogue.

Therefore, Type 1 roadmap suggests the stopping of the ROK-U.S. Marine Combined Amphibious Exercise (*Ssangyong* exercise) as a

resolution to the controversy on the ROK-U.S. joint military drills. There are various types of exercises as part of the ROK-U.S. joint military drills that are repeated annually, biannually, and every three to four years.<sup>6)</sup> Normally, people think that there are only large-scale exercises between South Korea and the U.S., such as Key Resolve or Foal Eagle, however, there are other types of drills too. It is necessary to consider tactically stopping or reducing the joint military drills in order to send a positive signal to North Korea. Type 1 roadmap proposes to stop the ROK-U.S. Marine Combined Amphibious Exercise (*Ssangyong* exercise) rather than large-scale theater-level exercises such as Key Resolve or Foal Eagle, which are held at the same period.

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6) The ROK-U.S. joint military activities can be largely divided into exercise and training. Key Resolve (KR) and Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) are major theater-level joint exercises. Foal Eagle (FE)—a field training exercise—and *Ssangyong* (double dragon) Exercise—a marine amphibious landing exercise—are major theater-level drills. “Exercise” takes a form of war game using computer simulation, while “training” is where a large number of forces participate. FE is a comprehensive training that includes joint marine training, carrier strike group training, joint underwater training, Special Forces training, missile warning training, etc. In November 2011, South Korea and the U.S. began a large-scale joint landing operation in 23 years, titled ROK-US Marine Combined Amphibious Exercise (i.e., *Ssangyong* Exercise), which has been held simultaneously during the FE period. Besides, other military training is conducted in response to the North’s nuclear and missile provocations or during a particular period of time when North Korea’s provocation is expected to take place. Such training is conducted by adjusting the schedule of some of theater-level ROK-U.S. annual joint military drills. Min Hong, “Analysis on North Korea’s Major Activities regarding Nuclear and Missile Programs,” p. 11.

## **D. Type 2: “Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula-Peace Regime” Roadmap (Roadmap Based on Peace Treaty Momentum)**

### *1) Purpose of Initiative of Peace Treaty Momentum Roadmap*

The biggest difference between Type 2 roadmap and the existing roadmaps is that: 1) achieving “denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula” including North Korea’s denuclearization is an explicit goal, and 2) denuclearization is proceeded with a priority of sequence of “peace treaty package.” Differently from the September 19 roadmap or Type 1 roadmap, Type 2 roadmap aims to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea as well as that of the Korean Peninsula encompassing the U.S. extended deterrence. Therefore, the step of denuclearization presented in Type 2 roadmap is on the premise of the action-to-action principal in exchange for denuclearization including the extended deterrence of North Korea, South Korea, and the U.S. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the halting of deployment of the U.S. strategic assets, a gradual reduction of extended deterrence, and a change of the U.S. nuclear policy on North Korea. Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula requires a more advanced solution than just denuclearization of North Korea. Considering that North Korea as well as China and Russia also agree with denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea is more likely to accept this roadmap.

Type 2 roadmap modifies the sequence of steps of existing roadmaps


in a more flexible manner, focusing on the feasibility of implementation. The existing September 19 roadmap takes the approach of taking the denuclearization measures first and compensating accordingly in a step-wise manner depending on the level of denuclearization implementation by taking measures to restore relationship and moving toward a peace regime. In other words, this roadmap has a standard sequence of conducting denuclearization measures first and giving the compensation of a peace treaty in the end. This is a method still demanded by the U.S. and South Korea. This method, however, is proven to be a failure through the September 19 framework and is highly unlikely to be adopted again as North Korea currently refuses to start a dialogue under the premise of denuclearization and demands to take measures to restore trust first in the form of a peace treaty.

Alternative to this method is to change existing viewpoints and consider a “reverse design or reverse implementation process.” The method changes the steps and sequences of existing denuclearization and peace regime roadmaps in an unconventional manner and is implemented based on strong incentives and momentum. For example, rather than presenting a peace treaty as a compensation in the final step of denuclearization process, a peace treaty can be achieved first so that it can serve as strong incentive and motivation to accelerate denuclearization. In other words, **rather than just considering a peace treaty as a final compensation, it can be viewed as a starting point to initiate the peace process as well as an important element to guarantee such process.** It can be considered as a preemptive measure to guarantee the entire process of denuclearization.

Basically, the existing denuclearization and peace regime roadmaps fixed in terms of steps, compensation, milestones, and momentum are rearranged in a flexible and elastic manner. The “(strong or weak) elasticity” is deemed meaningful in a sense that **it is necessary to deploy “a series of peace treaty package” as flexible as possible within the roadmap** reflecting the level of North Korea’s nuclear and missile advancement. In fact, the first attempt to bypass the unresolved controversy of whether a peace treaty or denuclearization comes first can be achieved by changing the existing way of thinking. In the past, North Korea stated that “we do not need to get stuck with an idea of keeping the sequence that only puts the discussion of a peace regime in the back burner, thereby wasting our time (February 2, 2010).” In order not to get dragged into a controversial discussion of whether denuclearization or a peace treaty comes first, imagination to restructure the composition of existing roadmaps is required.

In more detail, Type 2 roadmap places a series of systematic peace treaty packages (declaration of the end of war, an interim agreement, a peace treaty, establishment of diplomatic relations, and cross approval) at the front or in the middle of roadmap unlike the existing September 19 roadmap. The reason for such placement is to secure sufficient driver to implement a denuclearization roadmap by using a peace treaty as momentum. This is in line with a proposal put forth by North Korea, China, and Russia insisting on to conclude a peace treaty to restore trust first. In this sense, this roadmap is based on strategic “flexibility” and “elasticity” on the part of South Korea and the U.S., differently from the existing September 19 roadmap.

<Figure 4-2> Type 2: “Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula-Peace Regime” Roadmap (Peace Treaty Momentum Roadmap)



Source: By author.

## 2) *Structural Characteristics of Type 2 Peace Roadmap*

[Circumstance/Situation]

- North Korea's nuclear capabilities are sufficiently proven through additional nuclear tests.
- North Korea has attained the reentry technology with nuclear warheads mounted as well as an ability to strike the U.S. mainland through ICBM/IRBM launch tests. As a result, the mass production and deployment began in earnest.
- SLBM has been deployed upon its completion. The development of multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) is also under way.
- The North Korean economy is functioning normally despite some difficulties imposed by strong international sanctions.

[Characteristic 1] Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is clearly the final goal.

[Characteristic 2] It is structured to conduct peace treaty process first (non-aggression, the end of war declaration, cessation of hostilities, peace, and normalization of relations) and denuclearization measures later (including missile arms control).

[Characteristic 3] This roadmap sets out to stop or reduce the ROK-U.S. joint military drills in exchange for North Korea's suspension (freeze) on nuclear and missile activities in order to set conditions for a dialogue and initiate talks.

[Characteristic 4] Institutional package of a peace treaty—declaration

of the end of war, an interim agreement, a peace treaty, and establishment of diplomatic relations (cross approval)—can be conducted entirely in sequence, or partially by skipping or integrating some steps.

[Characteristic 5] The declaration of the end of war or an interim agreement does not have to be comprehensive or complete, but can be a partial agreement to the extent that can be called “agreement” and serve as an interim agreement in the transition to a peace treaty. It may be realistic to make these two on par with the level of presidential executive order (agreement) in case of the U.S. This is because it could be difficult to conclude the treaty that requires the ratification of the U.S. Congress due to possible strong backlash.

[Characteristic 6] A complete and comprehensive agreement framework is required—a framework at the level of a peace treaty that includes denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and arms control. A form of treaty that requires ratification of the ROK National Assembly or the U.S. Congress would be appropriate in order to build trust and make denuclearization measures binding. However, the procedure and contents of peace treaty package can be lightened according to reality and circumstances.

### *3) Possibility and Methods of Type 2 Roadmap Implementation*

Prior application also requires elasticity and flexibility. Declaration of the end of war, an interim agreement, a peace treaty, and normalization of diplomatic relations are all connected. However,

the sequence is not determined and not all of them need to be followed through. A peace treaty can replace the declaration of the end of war, or such declaration and an interim agreement can be integrated into one. Since it is not easy to initiate a negotiation for the signing of a peace treaty right away, the declaration of the end of war or an interim agreement can be arranged to function as a stepping stone in leading up to a peace treaty. In such cases, the process to the conclusion of a peace treaty can be divided into specific trust-building path. Declaration of the end of war may be required as it can function as momentum to accelerate the conclusion of peace treaty.<sup>7)</sup>

An interim agreement neither has predetermined contents nor is an absolutely necessary process. However, it can serve as a transient framework to manage the situation after the end of war declaration and before the conclusion of a peace treaty. Moreover, it may be necessary to absorb the political burdens of having concluded a peace treaty directly by functioning as a form of interim management agreement. An interim agreement was suggested by North Korea in 1996 under the name of “Interim Peace Treaty,” a peace treaty among three parties including South Korea, North Korea, and the U.S. Back then, North Korea proposed an interim

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7) In the ROK-U.S. Summit held in Hanoi, Vietnam on November 18, 2006, then U.S. president George Bush suggested that South Korea, the U.S. and North Korea sign the “agreement to end the war (declaration of the end of war),” regarding the issue of regime security after dismantling the North’s nuclear weapons. South Korea and North Korea also agreed upon this through the North-South Declaration of 4 October 2007. Based on this, a provisional process of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula (i.e., Declaration of the end of war – Peace treaty – Establishment of a peace regime) was established, and the number of state parties to a peace treaty were decided to be three or four.

agreement so that military conflicts can be controlled before a peace treaty is signed. It consisted of how to manage the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone, address armed conflicts and emergency, establish a joint military organization, and determine its missions among others.

When the end of war is declared, the armistice agreement loses its effect, requiring various military and institutional modifications regarding the United Nations Command (UNC), the management of the Joint Security Area, the status of the Commander of U.S. forces in Korea, and the usage of UNC's Japanese bases. To manage such issues until a peace treaty is reached, the necessity for an interim agreement is sufficient. The Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and Non-Aggression Pact adopted in high-level meetings between the two Koreas not only serve as the first arms control agreement but also as an interim agreement that comprehensively stipulates the peace management on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and Non-Aggression Pact can be used to conclude an interim agreement.

Even if South Korea and the U.S. are keen on tapping into flexibility to speed up the process of peace treaty, however, preconditions to initiate a negotiation for roadmap are positive behavior and consistent signals of North Korea regarding nuclear and missile issues. For example, to proceed with a peace treaty in advance, it is necessary to send a message to North Korea that the treaty is only possible after North Korea's "nuclear freeze." Without North Korea showing any intention of action in advance, a proposal to consider a peace treaty lacks justification. To minimize

the controversy at home and abroad and secure the justification of conducting a peace treaty during the initial stage, it is required to take preemptive measures that are on par with the level of nuclear freeze, showing the possibility of forward-looking changes in North Korea.

### **E. Type 3: “Nuclear Freeze-Peace and Arms Control” Roadmap**


#### *1) Purpose of Type 3 Roadmap*

The Type 3 roadmap aims to preferentially implement and strengthen measures that are feasible to secure “a state of peace.” It is different from the aforementioned roadmaps that aim to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea. This roadmap is on the premise of a situation where there are more threats from North Korea due to its nuclear and missile advancement and the deployment of such weapons. It also takes into account the fact that the past style of negotiation for denuclearization will not be viable anymore as the North-U.S. confrontation and tensions on the Korean Peninsula have become permanent conditions. With an understanding that negotiating for denuclearization will be difficult when North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities have advanced and weapons have actually been deployed, the roadmap seeks to start a regime of “peace and arms control” with a goal of achieving a state of peace equivalent to denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.

As this roadmap focuses on the gradual formation and long-term operation of the peace and arms control regime, it aims to minimize the North's nuclear and missile threats step-by-step and eventually make them manageable. Even when a certain level of peace and arms control regime is achieved, North Korea would still "possess" nuclear weapons but without the intention of usage, and the development of weapons and expansion of facilities would be effectively stopped. Missile provocations that threaten neighboring countries would come to an end, and the threats would be managed through the missile range-based disarmament and missile limitation agreement.

Peace and arms control aims to achieve a complete denuclearization and disarmament of the Korean Peninsula. However, it has a priority of finding the middle ground between denuclearization and the extreme divided state. An initial goal is to "mitigate tension" to stop direct provocations. It includes a long-term process of starting with topics that can be discussed, reaching a feasible agreement on arms control, and implementing them.

<Figure 4-3> Type 3: "Nuclear Freeze-Peace and Arms Control" Roadmap  
 Gradual Peace and Arms Control Roadmap through Nuclear Recognition and Freeze



Source: By author.

## 2) *Structural Characteristics of Type 3 Roadmap*

[Circumstance/Situation]

- Nuclear explosion capability is confirmed through additional nuclear tests. The reentry technology of ICBM and IRBM and the capability to strike the U.S. mainland have been secured and deployed.
- North Korea shows no sign of willingness to give up its nuclear weapons and to denuclearize and claims even more strongly that it will not join in a dialogue unless the U.S. gives up its hostile policy against North Korea first.
- North Korea continues to launch missiles in protest, and the U.S. deployment of strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula is conducted on a regular basis, leading to mutual threats and continued tensions.

[Characteristic 1] It aims to reduce the threats of nuclear weapons and peacefully manage them through a long process of peace and arms control rather than setting denuclearization as its final goal.

[Characteristic 2] After focusing on reducing the threats of nuclear weapons, it evolves into a regime to reduce and manage strategic and conventional weapons.

[Characteristic 3] By politically recognizing North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons rather than institutional or declaratory recognition, peace and arms control is proceeded with a goal of nuclear freeze.

[Characteristic 4] It practically focuses on reducing military tensions through declaratory momentum of mutually changing hostile policies, diplomatic momentum of restoring relations and declaring peace on the Korean Peninsula, and military momentum of stopping hostile actions and initiating arms control regime, rather than through institutional momentum of peace treaty.

[Characteristic 5] It gradually starts from issues that are easy to be implemented. For example, management of military confrontation status or objectification of armament status on the Korean Peninsula can be a starting point.

[Characteristic 6] In case peace and arms control are successfully proceeded, it focuses on the verification of nuclear freeze and management of nuclear facilities through a flexible verification process.

[Characteristic 7] The core of this type is to gradually enhance arms control after establishing trust first.

[Characteristic 8] Securing transparency by controlling the arrangement or operation of existing military force is also included in peace and arms control.

### ***3) Possibility and Implementation Methods of Type 3 Roadmap***

Two major approaches can be taken for peaceful arms control when North Korea has secured nuclear weapons and ICBM

technology. First approach is for South Korea to strike a military balance through nuclear armament in response to North Korea's nuclear threat and demand or implement arms control centered around nuclear arms. Another approach starts by normalizing relations (the North-U.S./South-North) to a certain extent in the mid- to long-term and managing and controlling the North's nuclear and missile threats through peaceful ways. These two approaches similarly move toward arms control. However, the methods to achieve such goal are starkly different. The first one is to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and strike a balance of terror. By suggesting arms control to North Korea under such balanced state, the two Koreas would gradually discard their weapons one by one thereby implementing arms control.

It is unclear, however, what kind of momentum is required to transition to an arms control phase from the nuclear confrontational status. Most of people in support of nuclear armament say that such balance of terror will make it possible for North Korea to give up on nuclear weapons. However, it will be very difficult to remove or modify nuclear weapons once a confrontation occurs with a mutual possession of nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is highly likely that the structure of nuclear confrontation will continue for some time. If the South and North continue to be placed under the confrontational structure with their nuclear weapons, the tension may be escalated and a change toward arms control may become harder to be achieved. North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons may limit the possibility of its change even more. A deployment of tactical nuclear weapons

enhancing the military power of South Korea relies on “non-peaceful” methods, which are the opposite of “peace through peaceful means.”

The other approach is to politically recognize the possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea and address its nuclear and missile issues through the long-term peace and arms control regime. The reason why the word “peace” is included is that this approach pursues “arms control through peaceful means.” Political recognition of North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons shall not be considered equivalent to giving up on the principle of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula or North Korea. It is required to conduct strategies focusing on the practical goals of nuclear freeze, while also strategically considering the final goal of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. To this end, it is necessary to recognize the nuclear possession of North Korea. The word “recognition” does not refer to official approval through institutions such as the IAEA or the NPT. It also does not mean that the U.S. or South Korea are to make declaratory recognition. This method indicates building diplomatic relations equivalent to recognition in the form of political negotiation or normalization of relations without any special linguistic declaration.

Since it is difficult to switch over to peace and arms control right away, it is necessary to normalize relations first. Normalizing the the North-U.S. and the North-Japan diplomatic ties, however, may be difficult when North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. Therefore, setting up “Interest Section” between the U.S. and North Korea to allow contact and communication at any times will be the

basic requirement for establishing peace and arms control. Against this backdrop, it would be adequate to propose a peace and arms control regime that starts with small matters related to military issues on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, major military issues on the Korean Peninsula would not likely to be implemented unless a certain level of normalization of relations between the U.S. and the North is achieved: those issues include the stopping of nuclear and missile tests; mutual objectification of nuclear materials and facilities; negotiation or conclusion of nuclear weapons control agreement; missile limitation based on the range to lower the level of threat; and military trust-building measures such as reducing the level of disclosure of training.

Such improvement of relations may also encourage North Korea to open up its door. Having North Korea simultaneously shift toward opening-up and conducting arms control would be the most ideal scenario. If measures for building military trust are tried without measures to encourage the opening-up (normalization of relations, lifting of sanctions against North Korea, etc.), it might be difficult for the closed regime to find the incentive. In fact, the operation of peace and arms control regime aims to mitigate the level of military tension on the Korean Peninsula by including conventional weapons and the process of nuclear and missile management, control, and reduction. They are added to the existing arms control roadmap of building military trust – arms limitation – arms reduction – guarantee of peace. It refers to a system of mutual monitoring and management of the stopping of nuclear and missile tests, prohibiting transfer or spread of nuclear materials or weapons, and objectification on the development of nuclear

materials, facilities, and missile, through nuclear weapons management agreement and missile limitation agreement, etc. In conclusion, Type 3 is a roadmap with an initial goal of freezing North Korea's nuclear program and achieving the process of peace and arms control equivalent to the level of denuclearization.



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## **5. Conclusion**



There is no formal model or case that can become a standard for the denuclearization and peace regime roadmap on the Korean Peninsula. In the midst of geopolitical conditions, historical legacy, as well as the interests and the will of stakeholders being intertwined with one another, each case differentiates itself from one another whenever it arises. As for peace on the Korean Peninsula, there lies in the structural inertia of the divided state, dynamics with neighboring countries, and uniqueness of the North Korean regime, all of which require pro-activeness, a sense of responsibility, and flexibility of involved stakeholders.

This research suggested three roadmaps considering the available resources and the level of peace that needs to be achieved. In order to design, initiate, and utilize the three roadmaps, the followings should be considered. First, the three roadmaps were invented by taking into account: 1) a situation reflecting practical expectation from South Korea and the U.S.; 2) a situation that is most likely to be realized in the future; and 3) the level of peace state that is practically required. Existing roadmaps have some weaknesses as they excessively took into account expectations of the U.S. or South Korea or showed no development from the viewpoint of 2005 when the September 19 framework was first introduced. Therefore, it is high time to additionally consider the suggestions from China and Russia in a reasonable manner and reflect a most likely situation by considering North Korea's strategy and advancement of its nuclear and missile development. In the meantime, we also have to think about a peace roadmap that accompanies the effort to switch the divided system and the security structure and paradigm on the Korean Peninsula.

Second, each of the three roadmaps is an independent version but can also be utilized flexibly by patch-working each other following the political landscape and timing. Such flexibility is necessary because a roadmap is basically based on the political interest and agreement of stakeholders involved. Thus, a complete control of uncertainty that might arise in implementation of a roadmap is almost impossible. A roadmap is in itself to design future direction and practical process. There is no such thing as “must” in the peace roadmap. The peace roadmap experiences continuous trials and errors following the political and situational changes and advertently finds a way forward. Therefore, such roadmap needs to be continued with the virtue of flexibility going beyond a rigorous design and operation.

Third, roadmaps can be employed in a multiple manner depending on the strategy and purpose. For instance, there can be roadmaps for inducing and persuading North Korea, for coercing cooperation from China and Russia, or for shifting security and peace paradigm of the two Koreas. The multiple use of roadmaps can be proceeded when there is a hidden strategic roadmap inside, based on which other roadmaps are strategically developed.

Lastly, the three roadmaps can be utilized one by one in an order of the most likely development possibility based on the advanced level of nuclear and missile program and changes in the nuclear landscape of North Korea. For instance, Type 1 roadmap is more apt for the current state where nuclear capability reaches a certain level but not enough to complete the ICBM while Type 2 is for a situation where the nuclear and missile advancement is

significantly enhanced from now and leads to an actual deployment on the field. Type 3 can be applied when North Korea becomes equivalent to a nuclear state, and completes the ICBM capability, and the tension escalates to a level of an imminent “nuclear war.”



