Historical Relations between Poland and North Korea from 1948 to 1980*

Nicolas Levi** and Kyungyon Moon***

This article focuses on relations between Poland and North Korea from 1948 till 1980, focusing on places of remembrance of Poles in North Korea, and North Korean citizens in Poland. During this period, bilateral relations between these countries were very close due to their belonging to the same ideological movement. The article focuses on political, ideological, cultural, and economic relations based on three historical phases of the Korean War (1950-1953), Post-Korean War (1953-1960) and disturbance of Poland-North Korea relations (1960-1980). The paper argues that although Poland did make efforts to successfully foster mutual relations, sometimes regardless of Polish interest, the behavior of DPRK authorities reduced the benefits Poland could gain from maintaining relations with this country. The DPRK focused on its interest and not on the interest of fraternal nations. This led to a negative image of the DPRK authorities among the Polish leadership and automatically to negative views concerning the DPRK population among Poles.

Keywords: Asymmetry of relations, North Korea, Poland, Communism, *Juche* ideology

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^{**} Assistant Professor, Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures of the Polish Academy of Science, First Author.

^{***} Assistant Professor, Chonbuk National University, Corresponding Author.

I. Introduction

How were two countries—the Republic of Poland (hereafter 'Poland')¹ and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereafter 'DPRK' or 'North Korea)—which were so different, able to collaborate? Where are Poles remembered in the DPRK, and where are DPRK citizens remembered in the territory of Poland? The aim of this article is to present some key issues concerning the cooperation between Poland and North Korea for the period 1948-1980 when both countries belonged to the same bloc of the socialist countries. The article is not in any case an attempt to collect all issues related to relations between both countries, but rather a consideration of the most important matters that directly concerned bilateral relations between these two states, including Polish memories in the DPRK, and DPRK memories in Poland. Therefore, the paper has a nature that is not only historical but also geographical.

In methodology, the article uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods and source criticism to analyze the mentioned topic. The whole is done to develop important observations and draw conclusions. On the other side, based on statistical data provided by the Polish Ministry of Economy, and by the Archives of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, some elements are quantifiable and may affect the analysis of the considered policy. The paper aims at interpreting the policy of the two countries with a focus on diplomatic, economic, and cultural issues based on archives of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). DPRK documents dedicated to its relations with Poland are scarcely mentioned in this paper. Therefore, oral descriptions of individuals engaged in the described events are highly valuable. This article supports the hypothesis and theoretical conclusion that the DPRK national interest was prioritized in the establishment of relations with Poland and that therefore there is an asymmetry in the quality of relations between both countries.

^{1.} The Polish People's Republic (Polska Republika Ludowa) was the official name of Poland between 1952 and 1989. The country was renamed as the Republic of Poland (Rzeczpospolita Polska) in 1989.

To fulfill these aims, the paper divides the period of relations between Poland and North Korea into four phases. The first phase from 1948 to 1950 is a short outline of bilateral relations until the outbreak of the Korean War. The second phase tackles relations between Poland and North Korea during the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 and will be followed by the analysis of Poland-North Korea relations between 1950 and 1960 when Poland provided multilateral support for post-war recovery of North Korea. This paper lastly deals with the period 1960-1980, emphasizing the rupture of relations between both countries due to an ideological disagreement.

II. Theoretical Background

In international relations, the existing literature seeks to explain how to interpret the behavior of nations and states in the case of alliances or wars. Within the last decades, new approaches dedicated to the theory of International Relations appeared. One of them is the rational theory of international relations. Rational choice theory is rooted in the assumption of instrumental rationality. Rationalism is a behavior that can be optimally adapted to the situation considering the availability of the information. A rational actor is one who, when confronted with "two alternatives which give rise to outcomes, will choose the one which yields the more preferred outcome." Kahneman and Tversky, two Israeli-American researchers, developed a prospect theory to gather these patterns into a theory of choice. Two phases are distinguished.

The first one is the reference point, the options available and potential outcomes. In the present case, the editing phase will be the post-Korean War period when North Korea used as many opportunities provided by the Polish People's Republic as it could. It is also important to underline that the outcomes depend on preferences, which are determined by each entity or states. The American political

^{2.} Howard Raiffa, Duncan Luce, *Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey* (Mineola: Dover Publications, 1989), p. 50.

scientist Kenneth Waltz focuses on three sorts of factors related to security strategies: motivation of a state; its capabilities and the information it collects; and the capacities and intentions of others. The rationalist theory deduces the circumstances under which states will seek to cooperate or compete. It is a strategic choice theory for a state (in the present case North Korea) facing an international environment that presents constraints and opportunities.³ The problem of asymmetric information was also explored by George Akerlof, who argued that, in the case of uncertainty, actors attach probability estimates to the occurrence of events and then attempt to maximize their utility based on these probabilities.⁴ During the considered historical period, in the case of relations between the two considered countries, the behavior of Polish authorities was to a large extent guided by Soviet authorities, thus North Korean authorities may have considered that Poland would keep a particular commitment to North Korean issues considering Soviet authority's commitment to North Korea.

The second phase is the evaluation, which is described within a Utility model (applied in microeconomics) that can be associated with the behavior of North Korea. It assumes that the state will make rational decisions to maximize its gains within its relations with Poland. The potential gain for North Korea will be an inflow of goods and know-how through different channels. In other words, institutional actors will use the expected utility as the basis for their economic and political decisions.

This paper applies this theoritcal framework to the case of Poland and DPRK relations. The research questions of the article are to examine and chronicle relations between Poland and the DPRK in order to show what the relations between ideologically and culturally distant countries looked like, whether the countries belonging to the socialist community could really rely on each other, and why such relations, which were good in the beginning, changed.

^{3.} Charles Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 10.

^{4.} George Akerlof, "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 84, no. 3 (1970), pp. 488–500.

As far as the rationalist explanations are used for the purpose of this article, a hierarchy of preferences shall be established. During the studied period, the primary goal of the North Korean leadership was its welfare. The regime tried to obtain as much monetary suport, but also food and equipment, as it could. During the period 1948-1980, North Korea was not jeopardized by foreign states. As of now, with a growing American interest in North Korean issues, the priority of the North Korean state organizations is their survival instead of welfare issues. As relations between countries are not static, we can also assume that the preferences of North Korea authorities consist of a mix of survival and welfare issues.

III. Chronicle Review of Poland-DPRK Relations

1. Phase I: The Establishment of the DPRK (1948-1950)

On 9 September 1948, the Polish People's Republic was the second country of the socialist block, after the USSR, to establish dialogue with the DPRK shortly after it gained independence. It diplomatically recognized the DPRK on October 16, 1948. The Soviet Union was the first country to recognize the DPRK on September 12, 1948, followed in October-November, 1948 by Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, China, Albania, and East Germany in 1950.⁵

Bilateral ambassadors, however, were not immediately appointed. Choe II, a former employee of the DPRK embassy to China, was nominated by Pyongyang as the first DPRK ambassador to Poland. He arrived in Warsaw in 1951.⁶ Comparatively, Poland established diplo-

Nicolas Levi, "Zarys Stosunków między Polską Republiką Ludową a Koreańską Republiką Ludowo-Demokratyczną" in Świat i Polska wobec globalnych wyzwań, ed. Ryszard Żelichowski (Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN -Collegium Civitas, 2009), p. 345.

^{6.} Since then, the embassy of the DPRK edited newsletters or conveyed newsletters with limited circulation edited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pyongyang, aimed at presenting the vision of the DPRK regarding its role in international affairs.

matic relations with Mongolia in April 1950, followed by appointing ambassadors in 1953, and an embassy in North Vietnam was opened four years after diplomatic relations were established in 1950.⁷

The establishment of the bilateral relations between both countries was only an introduction to the creation of diplomatic missions in both countries. Until September 14, 1954, Polish interests in the DPRK were represented by the Polish embassy in China. The large involvement of Poland in the Far East resulted in creating a special department dedicated to Asian Affairs in the Polish MOFA in 1954, which dealt with this part of the world. Later in August of the same year, Jerzy Siedlecki was appointed as the first Polish ambassador to the DPRK and, at the same time, increasing the rank of diplomatic relations. Afterwards, due to difficulties to recruit people from Poland, wives of diplomats were employed as secretaries and such tradition maintained until present. Many Koreans were also employed at the Polish embassy, especially in the military section.

2. Phase II: The Outbreak of Korean War (1950-1953)

The literature on the Korean War is abundant. The role of Poland in this conflict has been analyzed many times by historians and political theorists. ¹⁰ However, these publications were skewed in favor of the Polish People Republic's own historiography, claiming that the Korean War was provoked by South Korea and 'American Imperial-

^{7.} Wojciech Kowalski, *Polska w świecie 1964-1956* (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1988), p. 547.

^{8.} Gerard Labudy, Waldemar Michowicz (eds.), *Historia dyplomacji polskiej w X-XX wieku* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2002), p. 602.

^{9.} Wojciech Kowalski, *Polska w świecie 1945-1956* (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1988), p. 551.

^{10.} Marceli Burdelski, *Czy Korea będzie zjednoczona do końca XX wieku*? (Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 1995); Christian Birchmeier, Marceli Burdelski, Eugeniusz Jendraszczak, *50-lecie Komisji Nadzorczej Państw Neutralnych w Korei* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2012), no. 1, p. 28.

ists.'11

When the Korean War broke out, Poland and the USSR protested a South Korean and American military operation (under the UN banner). The struggles of the DPRK started to surface in 1950 when the Korean War broke out. 12 Since September 14, 1950, those reports showed the futility of the DPRK defense and on September 23, 1950, the official reports read that 'imperialists' had an overwhelming superiority over communist troops. 13 Movies, such as 'Korea Oskarża' (Korea accuses) from 1951 were filmed thanks to Bronisław Wiernik, the first Polish journalist to visit the Far East of Asia.

In Poland, as in other socialist states, mass meetings were held in solidarity with slogans such as 'Hands off Korea' ('Precz rece od Korei!'). Documents emanating from the Polish Communist Party started to show a stronger involvement of Polish diplomacy in the Korean case. Economic and financial aid for the DPRK was initiated by Poland and other socialist states already in 1951. Machinery, resources and other products were sent to support Korea, amounting to 18 million rubles at the time. On June 2, 1951, Poland and the DPRK signed a treaty to export Korean products as a form of credit. The Presidium of the Communist Party of Poland decided, however, to revise a large part of the treaty due to the Korean War.

Since early spring in 1952, some countries and the DPRK were exchanging views on organizing control commissions in case of the war ended. By autumn in 1952, during the 7th UN assembly, the Polish delegation presented a resolution project entitled 'On avoiding the

^{11.} Władysław Góralski, *Problemy pokoju i bezpieczeństwa w Azji* (Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 1979), p. 30; Stefan Kojlo, Anatol Dikij, Polska-KRLD. *Gospodarka, spółpraca* (Warszawa: PWE, 1975), p. 55; Mieczysław Kunstler (ed.), *historia polityczna Dalekiego Wschodu 1945-1976* (Warszawa: PWN, 1986), p. 139; Kim Jong-suck, "Rola Polski w wojnie koreańskie" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Warsaw, 1996).

^{12.} Janusz Wróbel, "Wojna koreańska w polskiej propagandzie," *Gwiazda Polarna*, August 9, 2003.

^{13.} Trybuna Ludu, "Wojna w Korei," September 14, 1950.

^{14.} Alex Svamberk, "Czechoslovakia in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission," Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society Korea Branch, vol. 88 (2013), p. 4.

threat of new world war and consolidating peace and friendly cooperation between nations.' The project treated directions for peace in Korea, the division of the peninsula and determining the armistice agreement. When the American general William Harrison and the DPRK general Nam II signed a ceasefire agreement putting end to a three-year war on the Korean peninsula at the demarcation line in Panmunjom on June 27, 1953, it was clear that the conflict could not be resolved by military means only and that the formation of organs insuring the respect for the armistice was necessary.

Therefore, two institutions were created to respect the previously mentioned ceasefire: The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) and the temporary Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC).

The NNSC was appointed to make sure no military actions would be undertaken in Korea, to investigate possible violations of the armistice and insure their implementation. The NNSC inauguration took place in Panmunjom on August 1, 1953. According to the arrangement signed in the first weeks of 1952, Poland and Czechoslovakia (both countries were selected by leaders of the Chinese People's Volunteers Army) were stationed in the North and Sweden and Switzerland (chosen by the US Leadership) in the South. 15 These four countries were also chosen by India to be members of the NNRC. During the Spring 1952, Poland and Czechoslovakia prepared special actions that were supposed to be deployed in the DPRK.

In June 1953, a Reconnaissance Group of 30 Polish military officials (under the governance of brigadier general Mieczysław Wagrowski) went on a delegation to the Korean Peninsula. But it was only based on the order no. 0077/ORG, signed on December 10, 1953 of the Polish Ministry of Defense, that a mission called Military Unit 2000 was created. This unit participated also later in peace missions to Cambodia, Nigeria, Vietnam, and in the Middle-East. The first team sent to the Korean Peninsula was checked by the Polish Secret Police

^{15.} Alex Svamberk, "Czechoslovakia in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission," Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society Korea Branch, vol. 88 (2013), p. 2.

(Urząd Bezpieczeństwa, commonly known as UB).¹⁶

This mission was composed of 330 officers and soldiers who were supposed to leave Poland for Korea, but only 301 arrived and started to fulfill their obligations on August 1, 1954.¹⁷ In comparison, the Czechoslovak Reconnaissance Group departed for the DPRK in July 1953.¹⁸ The previously mentioned first team consisted of soldiers for the Polish Army, translators and employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Internal Affairs. After a few months of training (foreign languages, legal and political aspects of the DPRK), the first team of 301 people was sent, including women who usually served as nurses and typists.¹⁹ Due to the economic crisis, and to a lack of infrastructure as the result of the Korean War, the Polish mission brought over the entire requested goods and supplies, such as electronic devices, clothes, and basic items like pens, paper, and beds, but also Polish made cars called Warszawa. Another difficulty for Poles was the presence of exotic diseases and the lack of health infrastructure in case of difficulties. Many soldiers suffered from infections such as diarrhea and dysentery.

Later personnel changes took place regularly every 9 to 11 months²⁰ and concerned less than 100 people. In 50 years of the Polish mission to the DPRK, more than 1,100 officers and Ministry of Foreign Affairs workers were employed. Throughout this time, they took vari-

^{16.} Marek Was, "Polscy misjonarze obrzuceni granatami w Korei," *Gazeta Wyborcza* (Warsaw), August 31, 2015.

^{17.} Przemysław Benken, "Problematyka stosunków między Misją Polską do Komisji Nadzorczej Państw Neutralnych a Sztabem Wojskowej Komisji Rozejmowej strony Koreańskiej Armii Ludowej/Chińskich Ochotników Ludowych w Kaesongu oraz wytyczne w tej sprawie," *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość* 1, vol. 23 (2014), p. 440.

^{18.} Alex Svamberk, "Czechoslovakia in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission," *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society Korea Branch*, vol. 88 (2013), p. 7.

^{19.} Christian Birchmeier, Marceli Burdelski, Eugeniusz Jendraszczak, 50-lecie Komisji Nadzorczej Państw Neutralnych w Korei (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2012), no. 1, p. 28.

^{20.} Marceli Burdelski, "Sytuacja w Korei Północnej po szczycie w Phenianie," In Korea: *doświadczenia i perspektywy*, ed. Elżbieta Potocka, Krzysztof Gawlikowski (Toruń:Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2001), p. 131.

ous actions to secure implementation of the armistice agreement signed in Panmunjom such as controlling the Chinese People's Volunteers Army, who were present in the DPRK until October 1958, through mobile teams traveling all over the DPRK. Poles also investigated violations of the armistice agreement. In the memories of officer Marian Reinberger, we learn that during weekends officials used to go to the Polish restaurant in Pyongyang called Warszawa (Warsaw).²¹ Polish cooks worked there, serving typical dishes of Polish cuisine. It is worth mentioning that this Polish restaurant was only one of three foreign restaurants in Pyongyang. The first one was a restaurant with hot dishes prepared by a Japanese citizen with Korean roots, the second one was a Hungarian restaurant, and the third one the Polish one. The Polish restaurant was located on Changwang Street, around 100 meters from the Koryo Hotel. Interestingly, there was also a DPRK restaurant in Warsaw, under the name of 'Phenian' (Pyongyang in Polish), with the address Senatorska 27, in the center of Warsaw. Half of the working team was Polish, and half came from the DPRK. In the late 1970s, the name of the restaurant changed to *Insam*.²²

It is difficult to consider the NNSC as being neutral, considering the indoctrination of the DPRK MOFA who tried to monitor Poles and Czechoslovakian officers. Poles were also spied on, especially by their DPRK drivers, who were forced to indicate to their superiors who and where they were driving, what Poles bought, who they talked to, etc. Poles were conscious that they were under continuous control by DPRK authorities.²³ These controls were also the result of a situation

^{21.} Marian Reinberger, "Wspomnienia z Korei," Wyd. ZD ZŻLWP, Wrocław, 2005, p. 3, <http://209.85.129.132/search?q=cache:Nrn65Q01BsJ> (date accessed May 4, 2017).

^{22.} Another DPRK restaurant was established in Krakow in the 90s. This facility was co-managed by the sister of the former Prosecuter of the DPRK, Ri Kilsong, and some former DPRK students who lately became responsible for hiring DPRK workers supposed to work in construction projects in Poland. Bertold Kittel, "Polskie interesy z Kim Dzong Ilem," Portalmmorski.pl, May 30, 2006, < http://www.portalmorski.pl/zegluga/2921-polskie-interesy-z-kimdzong-ilem > (date accessed June 12, 2018).

^{23.} Przemysław Benken, "Problematyka stosunków między Misją Polską do Komisji

where Poles provided some information to the U.S. side. A former Polish driver was regularly providing information to U.S. soldiers, but any contact with the Southern side was forbidden. Being caught by the Czechoslovakian delegation, he was quickly removed and sent back to Poland. 24

With time, the team's range of activities changed, thus limiting the number of soldiers in the Polish contingent. This was due to public protests in Korea against Poles, which started at the end of 1953, when the DPRK and ROK authorities jointly criticized the role of Poland and Czechoslovakia concerning their management of the NNRS and their presence on the Southern side of the DMZ. Moreover, the complicated situation may have also been due to incidents involving the killing of some Polish soldiers on November 7, 1955. Meanwhile, three Polish officials, Zygielski, Rudnik, and Zielinski, were killed in the DPRK.²⁵ Due to difficult living conditions, and constant control by DPRK authorities, the size of the Polish mission was regularly reduced over the years. The first decrease of the number of Polish soldiers took place with the dissolution of the NNRC in February 1954. Consequently, in 1969, the Polish mission consisted of only ten people but was still led by a brigadier general.²⁶

3. Phase III: The Post-Korean War Recovery (1953-1963)

a. Polish Economic Support

When parties announced the ceasefire, the Polish government voted on July 28, 1954 for a resolution that guaranteed economic aid to

Nadzorczej Państw Neutralnych a Sztabem Wojskowej Komisji Rozejmowej strony Koreańskiej Armii Ludowej/Chińskich Ochotników Ludowych w Kaesongu oraz wytyczne w tej sprawie," *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość*, no. 1, vol. 23 (2014), pp. 448-449.

^{24.} Marek Was, "Polscy misjonarze obrzuceni granatami w Korei," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, August 31, 2015.

^{25.} Ibid.

^{26.} Wojciech Kowalski, *Polska w świecie 1964-1956* (Warzawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1988), p. 551.

the DPRK and in 1955 signed a treaty enacting non-refundable relief aiming at rebuilding the country. Cotton fabrics, linen, tarpaulin, sugar, meat, bearings, machineries, and mechanical parts, all amounting to 350 million Polish Zloty, were sent.

There was also a global initiative from European communist countries to send medical teams to support DPRK authorities in the development of the medical sectors. Bulgarians, Czechoslovakians, Hungarians, Romanians and Poles sent medical teams and medical products to the DPRK.²⁷ Poles worked first in the city of Huichon, then in Hungnam, 28 in a building that consisted of the former fertilizers plants of the city. One month later they moved to the city of Hamhung, where considering the needs of the population, they set up an orthopedic hospital which is still running today and is considered the best orthopedic institution in the DPRK.²⁹ Polish doctors were rewarded with a salary in Chinese Yuan and DPRK Won.³⁰ Doctors also gave lectures to future DPRK medical employees. Lectures were prepared in Polish, then translated into Russian, due to a lack of Polish translators, then translated into Korean.³¹ When it opened in 1956, it consisted of eight barracks serving as a trauma center. The local Polish team was composed of engineers, technicians and specialists in hospital construction. As of 2017, 'Caritas Polska' is still supporting the hospital in Ham-

^{27.} Aleksandra Frenkel-Czarniecka, "Bratni Szpital," Karta, no. 79, 2014, p. 108; MOFA, Poland, Uchwała nr 277/52 Prezydium Rządu z dnia 5 kwietnia 1952 r. w sprawie szczepionek i środków leczniczych do zwalczania schorzeń zakaźnych dla Koreańskiej Republiki Ludowej, Group 11, Bundle 23, Folder 432.

^{28.} Hungnam became a ward of Hamhung in 2005.

^{29.} The head of the second team of Polish medical doctors servicing the hospital said to PNA: "During my 8-month stay, having 150 at disposition and 12 specialist clinics, doctors made 700 surgeries, provided ambulatory aid to more than 110,000 people. RTG lab made 12,000 x-rays and about 3,500 pictures. There were about 400 prescriptions per day."

^{30.} Aleksandra Frenkel-Czarniecka, "Bratni Szpital," Karta, no. 79, 2014, p. 112.

^{31.} Krystyna Knypl, "Polska misja medyczna w Korei: Szpital Polskiego Czerwonego Krzyża w Korei," Gazeta dla Lekarzy, June 2014, pp. 23-28; Krystyna Knypl, "Polska misja medyczna w Korei," Gazeta dla Lekarzy, May 2014, pp. 25-28.

hung, but medical 'tools' are still from the 60s, to treat current patients.³²

Already in the 1950s, several articles in the Polish press were dedicated to the mission fulfilled by Polish doctors based on the Korean Peninsula.³³ Except doctors, Poland also sent numerous teams of specialists including miners and urbanists engineers who over time trained DPRK citizens. Polish experts also helped rebuild locomotive and carriage factories in Pyongyang and other cities of the DPRK. For instance, Poles participated in modernizing three coal mines, including one in Anju,³⁴ the largest coal producing area in the DPRK.

Polish urbanists also came up with the plan of rebuilding Chong-jin and created projects for two residential compounds in this city. Polish technicians, who arrived in Wonsan, helped to revive destroyed railway companies. In Wonsan, the following companies and Polish cities were involved in this project: a rolling-stock company from Poland, machinery tools produced by Rafmet, lathes from the city of Pruszków and compressors from the company Chrzanowska Fabryka Lokomotyw. A first group of specialists in transportation arrived in Pyongyang on December 7, 1953. In addition, first silicate plants in Korea were established under contract signed between the Foreign Trade panels: Korean Daesong and Polish Polimex-Cekop.³⁵ Concrete came from ZREMB 'Makrum' in Bydgoszcz.

Regarding economic issues, supplies provided between 1954 and

^{32.} Janina Ochojska, "Fundacja Polska Akcja Humanitarna - Raport za rok 2005," https://www.pah.org.pl/app/uploads/2017/06/2017_PAH_RAPORT_PL_2005.pdf (date accessed March 13, 2018), p. 23.

^{33.} Marcin Cegielski, "O pracy pierwszej ekipy szpitala PCK w Korei," *Polski Tygodnik Lekarski*, vol. 11, no. 5 (1956), pp. 193-195; Janusz Daniłoś, Teresa Horzela, Jan Oszacki, "O pracy II ekipy szpitala Polskiego Czerwonego Krzyża w Korei," *Polski Tygodnik Lekarski*, vol. 11, no. 5 (1956), pp.195-197; Jadwiga Kuczyńska-Sicińska J, "Wspomnienia z pracy w szpitalu PCK w Korei," Polski Tygodnik Lekarski, vol. 13, no. 14 (1958), pp. 528-530.

^{34.} The Polish geologist Adam Dudek mentions the Anju coal mine in his book: *Poszukiwacze* (Katowice: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1987), p. 127.

^{35.} Krystyna Konecka, *Koreański koń Czhollima* (Białystok: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1989), p. 40.

1959 were used to implement the Korean '5-year planification plan.' The aid usually consisted of free deliveries of materials, resources, machinery and appliances provided by selected allies of the Soviet Union, mainly European countries and Mongolia. Initially each of these countries was theoretically supposed to be specialized into a specific branch, nevertheless Korean economic needs were so important that these countries were involved in various branches of the Korean economy. For instance, Czechoslovakia provided electronic machines, measuring devices, chemicals, paper and medicine, a car factory in Tokchon, machinery for cement mixing plants, and a few hydrological power plants in Huichon and Unsan. Hungary delivered machine tools, machinery, electrical appliances, pipes, metal wires, and oil products. Hungarians also built a factory producing chemicals, paper and medicine. East Germany built rolling mills and an engine factory.³⁶ Wires, cement, glass and medicine came from Bulgaria. Mongolia is the only country that specialized in one specific area of the humanitarian aid brought to the DPRK. Mongolian authorities provided 10,000 horses, sheepskin and meat. This specialization was because this country likewise needed foreign support.

Poland became the fourth humanitarian supplier to the DPRK in the period following the Korean War. The Polish support was based on a treaty signed on January 14, 1955. In this document, it was stipulated that the DPRK was supposed to receive financial support worth 365 million zloty for the period 1955-1959.

Globally speaking, the DPRK is the country that received the biggest financial support from other socialist countries during the period of the communist alliance (1945-1991).³⁷

^{36.} Balazs Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 46.

^{37.} Blaine Harden, Le Grand Leader et le Pilote (Paris: Belfond, 2016), p. 232.

Providers	Aid (in million. of ruble)	As a percentage of the total aid
Soviet Union	292.5	38%
China	258.4	34%
East Germany	122.7	15%
Poland	81.5	10%
Romania	5.6	1%
Hungary	5.6	1%
Bulgaria	4.5	1%

Table 1. Financial support to the DPRK for the period 1954-1956³⁸

b. Educational and Cultural Support

Poland and other communist countries provided not only economic support, but also provided some free education to the DPRK youth. These young Korean citizens had nowhere to study after the Korean War. The main educational sites were destroyed. The Kim Il-sung University lacked lecturers. That is why those who were sent to Europe and other communist countries were supposed to participate in the intellectual reconstruction of the DPRK and to the replacement of non-DPRK specialists based in the DPRK.

In the early 1950s, there were already more than 500 DPRK students in Poland.³⁹ They usually attended technical majors⁴⁰ in cities such as Gdansk, Gliwice, Poznan, Warsaw (especially at the Technology University of Warsaw, at the University of Warsaw, and at the Warsaw University of Life Sciences). Many of them also studied at the University of Science and Technology (AGH) in Krakow, which prepared

^{38.} Nicolas Levi, "Zarys Stosunków między Polską Republiką Ludową a Koreańską Republiką Ludowo-Demokratyczną," in Świat i Polska wobec globalnych wyzwań, ed. Ryszard Żelichowski (Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN - Collegium Civitas, 2009), p. 351.

^{39.} Paulo de Carvalho, *Studenci obcokrajowcy w Polsce* (Warszawa: Uniwersytet Warszawski – Instytut Socjologii, 1990), pp. 23-25.

^{40.} Ri Chun-su (DPRK Cultural Attaché to Poland) in discussion with the author, April 2006.

them for future work in the mining industry. According to official Polish statistics, there are estimates saying that in 1955 and 1956 out of 575 foreign students, 367 came from the DPRK.⁴¹ Although many DPRK students knew Polish quite well, they lived separately while still maintaining contact with Polish students.⁴²

The first treaty on cultural cooperation between both countries was signed on May 11, 1956 and came into force on January 31, 1957. According to the treaty, both sides were annually supposed to send delegations to both countries to update on its status. Protocols regarding education, religion, radio, film, and health were also mentioned in this global agreement. Nevertheless, cultural cooperation started earlier. During the World Festival of Youth, which took place in Warsaw from July 31 till August 15, 1955, a DPRK delegation of 158 persons came, including 39 athletes, 98 dancers, and 21 journalists. A few months later, the orchestra of the Polish Army came to the DPRK, while at the Dramatic Theater of Pyongyang, an exhibition devoted to the Polish Author Adam Mickiewicz was organized. In 1957, an exhibition of Polish Art was also shown in Pyongyang. In 1960, an exhibition of DPRK arts was presented in Poland.

In 1957 an agreement on technical and scientific cooperation was signed. A Polish-DPRK committee was supposed to hold meetings on a yearly basis. Untill 1971, the committee held ten meetings, signed 122 resolutions in favor of Korea and 60 in favor of the Polish side, i.e.,

^{41.} Meanwhile, there were 53 students from China, 41 from Bulgaria. The figure related to students from Soviet Union is not mentioned, but may be considered lower than 15. Paulo de Carvalho, *Studenci obcokrajowcy w Polsce* (Warszawa: Uniwersytet Warszawski – Instytut Socjologii, 1990), pp. 23-25.

^{42.} Based on the authors' personal correspondence with Janusz Kochanowski, a former Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection of the Republic of Poland, addressed on 20 June 2007.

^{43.} MOFA, Poland, Raport Polityczny Ambasady Polskiej Rzeczpospolitej Ludowej w Koreańskiej Republice Ludowo-Demokratycznej za okres od 1 maja do 30 czerwca 1955 r, Group 12, Bundle 17, Folder 401.

^{44.} Władysław Kutte, "Polska a Koreańska Republika Ludowo-Demokratyczna," in Stosunki Polski z innymi państwami socjalistycznymi, ed. Czesław Mojsiewicz (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1973), p. 261.

allowing Polish scientists to go the DPRK. On the same basis, DPRK engineers and technicians had internships in Poland, for example, in the mining industry, and scientists from Poland learned about breeding and plant cultivation. Botanists, such as Leon Stuchlik, went to Korea for scientific expeditions.

c. DPRK Orphans in Poland

The Soviet Union, China, European communist countries and Mongolia agreed on a global project focusing on taking care of Korean children who lost their parents during the Korean War. Already during the Korean War, as a sign of solidarity with Korean authorities, Polish authorities proposed some social and financial initiatives to DPRK officials in which Poland could undertake the care of some DPRK orphans. This large initiative was not only conducted for humanitarian reasons, but for propaganda as well, criticizing the consequences of the U.S. intervention in the Korean conflict.

Therefore, Poland brought about 200 orphans and placed them in orphanages all around Poland in 1951. Firstly, they found a home in Gołotczyzna (close to the city Ciechanów), then starting from November 23, 1951, they were brought to various parts of Otwock, such as Świder (one orphanage on Komunardów Street) and Sopliców. In particular, the building construction of Świder was partially funded by the DPRK embassy in Warsaw. 46 Pak Jon-suk is the name of the first

^{45.} Jacek Kałuszko, "Z Korei na otwockie wydmy," Linia Otwocka, March 19, 2004, < http://krld.pl/krld/czytelniateksty/kom_osw//[niedatowany]%20 Dwa%20teksty%20z%20gazety%20%27%27Linia%20Otwocka%27%27,%20 na%20temat%20koreanskich%20sierot%20wychowywanych%20w%20 Polsce%20i%20wizyty%20Wielkiego%20Wodza%20Towarzysza%20Kim%20 Ir%20Sena%20w%20Polsce%20w%201956%20r.%20.pdf > (date accessed February 12, 2018). In the 70s Otwock was Sunchon's partner town and a Polish-Korean friendship rural cooperative is located there. See also: Krystyna Konecka, *Koreański koń Czhollima* (Białystok: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1989), p. 49.

^{46.} This building was quickly called the Korean House (*Dom Koreański*).

DPRK orphan registered at this orphanage.⁴⁷ Before their departure in 1959, the orphans planted pines and birch trees; their journey is also commemorated with a stela.⁴⁸

The orphanage of Świder was visited by Kim Il-sung in July 1956. In the assembly hall of this orphanage, there is a commemorative tablet saying: "In this house we gladly exchanged wishes in 1951-1959. Forever we will remember the motherly care of the Polish nation."

Picture 1. A stela and DPRK orphanage in Poland





(left) A monument dedicated to the Polish support of orphans based in Świder. The stele was erected in July 1959, just before the departure of DPRK orphans to their home country; (right) Pines planted by DPRK orphans in the garden of the orphanage of Świder (photographs taken by the author)

Other orphans lived at Bernardyńska Street 13 and Zaciszna Street 54 (regarding the latter, it was a famous building in Otwock called Willa Anulka, which was destroyed in the mid-90s). Children went to primary

^{47.} Jacek Kałuszko, "Z Korei na otwockie wydmy," Linia Otwocka, March 19, 2004, < http://krld.pl/krld/czytelniateksty/kom_osw//[niedatowany]%20 Dwa%20teksty%20z%20gazety%20%27%27Linia%20Otwocka%27%27,%20 na%20temat%20koreanskich%20sierot%20wychowywanych%20w%20Polsce%20 i%20wizyty%20Wielkiego%20Wodza%20Towarzysza%20Kim%20Ir%20 Sena%20w%20Polsce%20w%201956%20r.%20.pdf > (date accessed February 12, 2018).

^{48.} The orphanage in Świder served since 2012 as the Architecture and Construction Department of the administration of Otwock.

school no. 1, 2, and 5 in Otwock, but the majority of them were educated at a primary school located at Wojskiego Street. This school was around two kilometers from the orphanage based at Bernardynska Street. The building at Bernardynska Street was destroyed in 2016, and as of 2017, new homes are being built there. Nearby was a small Korean monument, which is inaccessible as of now, due to construction.

On January 1, 1955, some 1,270 new Korean orphans were placed in Płakowice, near Lwówek Śląski. When DPRK orphans arrived there, they were in touch with other orphans from Greece, Poland and the Soviet Union. This large institution constituted a school, some dormitories and boarding homes, and two pitches. Korean children were educated by Polish teachers and teachers from the DPRK, including Korean people responsible for their security. These young orphans were taught various classical subjects such as Mathematics and biology, but also learnt the Polish language. After a few months, many of them were able to speak proficiently in Polish. Some other orphans were placed in Zgorzelec, close to the German border. 49 Older kids started higher education in technical schools in Warsaw; many of them also went to schools with dormitories, such as City and Suburbs Construction High School of Wroclaw (Wrocławskie Technikum Budowy Miast i Osiedli). Therefore, until 1959, a relatively large DPRK population, mainly composed of young people, lived in Poland.

Some Polish historians consider that the issue of DPRK orphans was kept in secret.⁵⁰ However that is untrue, as inhabitants of the previous mentioned cities were in touch with these young Koreans, for example going together to primary schools, etc. In addition, their quiet life in Poland was interrupted by the visit in July 1959 of Jon In-saen, the DPRK minister of education. This DPRK official came to Poland to discuss the return of DPRK orphans to their home country, providing limited explanations to Polish authorities. The orphans suddenly left Poland and came back to the DPRK. After arriving to the DPRK some of them continued to

^{49.} Oskar Kubrak, "Pamięć i pozostałości po sierotach północnokoreańskich na ziemiach polskich w latach 50 XX wieku–na przykładzie ośrodków w Płakowicach i Otwocku," *Prace Etnograficzne*, no. 4 (2016), p. 388.

^{50.} Ibid.

live in orphanages. They were sent to DPRK orphanages with other orphans from abroad. Orphans grouped themselves based on the country where they were educated. This created factions such as the Chinese one, for those coming from China, the Romanian one, the Polish one, etc., but the most powerful was the Chinese one, due to its population domination.

Initially some of the Polish orphans wrote letters to their tutors in Europe, but finally, it became more or less difficult for them to communicate with those who educated them in Europe. Despite a law forbidding them to do so, some DPRK students formerly based in Poland tried to send 10 letters to Poland, explaining that DPRK orphans based in Europe were badly treated in comparison to those based in China and Albania.⁵¹

The process of the removal of DPRK orphans started earlier, in 1958, when all of them became classified according to their Songbun, a DPRK caste system subdividing the population of the country into 3 classes and 51 categories of ranks of trustworthiness and loyalty to the Kim family. A few years later, a minority of them considered to be less loyal toward the Kim family were supposedly either sent to labor camps or killed.⁵²

The 'return policy' was also applied to DPRK students based in Poland. For the academic year 1960 and 1961, there were only 108 DPRK students out of 740 foreign students in Poland. For the academic year 1965 and 1966, none of the 1364 foreign students were from the DPRK.⁵³ According to Paulo de Carvalho, it does not mean that there were no DPRK students. It simply indicates that the number of DPRK students in Poland was very low and probably less than 5 on a yearly basis.

Their sudden return raised speculation. This situation may have been due to the following elements. First, several events in Europe and in Soviet Union indicated a relative opening of communist minds. The

^{51.} MOFA, Poland, Uzupełnienie notatki z 23 grudnia w sprawie byłych studentów koreańskich w Polsce z dnia 2 stycznia 1963 r, Dept V, Group 32/66, Bundle 1, Folder 0-557.

^{52.} MOFA, Poland, Sprawozdanie z pobytu w Koreańskiej Republice Ludowo-Demokratycznej w latach 1964-1968 Władysława Napieraja, Dept V, Group 15/73, Bundle 2, Folder 0-242-3-68.

^{53.} Paulo de Carvalho, Studenci obcokrajowcy w Polsce (Warszawa: Uniwersytet Warszawski - Instytut Socjologii, 1990), pp. 23-25.

majority of information reaching Kim Il-sung was available in reports prepared by the DPRK Embassy in Warsaw and secret information from journalists and Korean students staying in Poland. He thought that these young Korean citizens, in touch with the relative liberalization, would constitute a danger to his power.

Secondly, Kim Il-sung was afraid of the students who fled from Central Europe. Some DPRK students left Hungary, using the Budapest crisis of September 1956. Some others based in Poland also tried to escape in June 1957, but their attempt was unsuccessful. These DPRK students based in Poland initially contacted the U.S. embassy in Warsaw, but finally, DPRK authorities caught them in cooperation with Polish and French authorities based in Warsaw, who contacted the DPRK embassy there.

Despite a large geographical distance and cultural differences, these events were a warning sign for things that might happen in the DPRK, especially after constitutionalizing (anti-Kim Il-sung) opposition and the possible attempt of triggering 'Korean Poznań.'⁵⁴ Kim Il-sung could not openly question the 20th assembly and provoke the USSR and other socialist bloc states, at least due to all the aid they provided. The 50s and crises in Hungary, Poland and the GDR was a sign for him that the regime must be moderated but attention must be tightened. Very soon after salaries increased by 35%, the processing of some goods decreased by 25%, daily rice shares were increased by 100g⁵⁵ and at the same time repressions against opponents of the system were radically toughened. Exemplary trials against members of the Chondoist Chongu Party with 200 death penalties were publicized in Polish diplomatic notes.⁵⁶

Repatriation of DPRK citizens based in Central Europe was also extended to DPRK officials based there. The previously mentioned events may also have been the reason for the dismissal of the DPRK ambassador to Poland, Ho Guk-bon (1954-1958), considered to be rela-

^{54.} MOFA, Poland, *Notatka z rozmowy z tow. Pieliszenko radcą Ambasady ZSRR z dnia* 26.07.57, Dept V, Group 12, Bundle 427, Folder 18.

^{55.} Waldemar Dziak, *Kim Ir Sen. Dzieło i Polityczne Wizje* (Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych, 2000), p. 245.

^{56.} Polish MOFA Archives: Dept V, Group-12, Bundle 427, Folder 18, Notatka z rozmowy z tow. Pieliszenko radcą Ambasady ZSRR z dnia 26.07.57.

tively open-minded by other diplomats, who openly discussed religious issues in the Polish press. The diplomat indicated as follows:

"This matter is complicated. Our village strictly professes Buddhism. However, only elderly people are sincerely religious. Young Buddhists are rare anymore. The Catholic population prevailed among the urban population, while the war destroyed all catholic temples. The Japanese occupation [...] introduced a third religion to the country, which was used as an instrument of their politics. The war against Japan was also a war against their religion. Our youth, however, is already completely progressive, and the Buddha statues are found only in distant and less accessible mountains."57

Meanwhile, Rim Chum-su, the DPRK ambassador to Bulgaria was also purged and removed from his position in Sofia and sent back to Pyongyang in 1963.⁵⁸

Additionally, relations between Poland and the DPRK worsened after the publication of an article written by the Polish journalist Wanda Melcer entitled Obiad w Pjongjangu, which provided a negative image of the DPRK. As a result, no Polish delegation was invited to the 15th anniversary of the birth of the DPRK.

Some of the older orphans with a higher Songbun were able to study and get jobs working with Eastern European engineers sent to the DPRK. They worked in the following places: the Polish Hospital in Hamhung (DPRK translation: 븰스까병원), the Polish Mission at the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and at the Polish embassy in Pyongyang.⁵⁹ Others worked in fields where Polish specialists were based, and where knowledge of Korean was requested. For fulfilling their jobs, no university degree was requested. As proof we can quote the case of Ri Hang-sik, who worked for 'Fabex-ZREMB' as a transla-

^{57.} Roman Burzyński, "Rozmowa z panem Ho Guk Bon ambasadorem Koreańskiej Republiki Ludowo-Demokratycznej," Przekrój, no. 28, July 7, 1957, p. 3.

^{58.} Christine Loken-Kim, North Korea Handbook (New York: ME Sharpe, 2003), p. 906.

^{59.} Krystyna Konecka, Koreański koń Czhollima (Białystok: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1989), p. 42.

tor in spite of having only a primary education.

Later, some of these orphans came back to Poland for professional matters. For example, Kim Je-ming (born in 1941), who was initially a translator for Polish companies in the DPRK in the 1970s. He came back to Poland in the 1980s and was used as a translator for 5 DPRK artists who worked as cartoonists in the Cartoon Studio of the city of Bielsko-Biała (Studio Filmów Rysunkowych Bielsko-Biała). Another orphan was a translator for a group of overseas DPRK workers delegated to Kleczanów in 2004.60 The Department of Polish Studies at the Kim Il-sung University has been headed since its creation in 2007 by one of the orphans from Płakowice, Jo Song-mu. It is also known that a wife of a DPRK ambassador was also an orphan based in Otwock. She used to return there to visit a doctor at the Marchlewski Sanatorium in Otwock. A military attaché at the DPRK embassy in Warsaw was also an orphan based in Poland. Both names are unavailable. Yun So-hyon, the current officer of the Committee for Cultural Relations of the DPRK, and the secretary of the association of Friendship between France and the DPRK, and between Poland and the DPRK, is the daughter of Yun Myong-jin, a former Secretary of the National Commission of the DPRK to UNESCO and a former orphan based in Poland. Her father taught her Polish, a language she manages perfectly. 61 As of October 2017, Yun So-hyon has traveled five times to Poland.

These Korean children inspired many books, poems and articles. The most famous were authored by Marian Brandys, such as *Dom odzyskanego dzieciństwa* (the book was published for the first time in 1953; two additional editions were made public in 1954 and 1956; there is one edition in Czechoslovakian entitled *Dom na văzvărnatoto detstvo* published in 1954 with the support of the author R. Pečikova) and a similar one entitled *Koreańczycy Gołotczyzny*, a shorter version aimed for younger children. We must also mention the book *Grupa Słowika* (1954) by Marian Bielicki. Monika Warneńska wrote in her book entitled *Karolinka z Diamentowych Gór* of a protagonist who is sent to join a

^{60.} Monika Wojniak, "Korea w Kleczanowie," Słowo, March 30, 2006.

^{61.} Józef Myjak, "Spotkanie z Koreańczykami," Wieści Lipnickie, no. 27, June 2017, p.11.

group of small Korean children who settled in Płakowice, near Wrocław. A 15-minutes movie entitled Dzieci Koreańskie was also prepared by Władysław Marko in 1953, describing the life of Koreans in Poland. Also, according to chronicles from the Polish Television, Radio Pyongyang broadcasted "War orphans, go to Sinuju! From there you will be evacuated to places where there is no War." 62

There is also a particular place for the book Mały łącznik Kim E-cho⁶³ (1951), written by Weronika Tropaczyńska-Ogarkowa. In her book entitled 'Mały łacznik Kim E-cho' there is an 18-page story related to the life of a young DPRK child during the Korean War. It is also worth noting that the first books were introduced to Korean literature appeared at the same time, such as Na południe od 38 równoleżnika. Sztuka w trzech obrazach (1951), Bronisław Troński; Korea walczy. Wiersze poetów koreańskich 1950-52 (1954), Jerzy Ficowski; Korea walczy. Zbiór opowiadań (1952), Marek Lechowicz; Bajki koreańskie (1954), Czesław Jastrzębiec-Kozłowski. Ziemia (1955). Since there were no Poles available to speak Korean,64 these five previously mentioned books were translated from the Russian version.

The history of DPRK orphans in Poland has also been presented many times in the media. Journalist Jolanta Krysowata's program entitled Osieroceni (2003), in which two orphans were found, was awarded the Europa Award in Berlin. She co-directed a similar documentary called Kim Ki Dok (2006), with the famous director Patrick Yoka. This production was focused on the life of the orphan Kim Ki-dok, who lived and was buried in the Osobowicki cemetery in Wrocław in Poland. This film was presented by the Polish embassy in Seoul in 2016, as a part of the Film Festival organized by the European Union

^{62.} Levi Nicolas, "Zarys Stosunków między Polską Republiką Ludową a Koreańską Republika Ludowo-Demokratyczną," in Świat i Polska wobec globalnych wyzwań, ed. Ryszard Żelichowski (Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN -Collegium Civitas, 2009), p. 261.

^{63.} Weronika Tropaczyńska-Ogarkowa, Mały łącznik Kim E-Cho (Warszawa: biblioteka Promyka, 1951), pp. 121-139.

^{64.} The only one was the military official Remigiusz Kwiatkowski, but he passed away in 1962.

National Institutes for Culture.65

The humanitarian support provided to Korean orphans was not forgotten by DPRK authorities. As a sign of gratefulness, the DPRK government gave 3,000 tons of wheat to Poland in 1982.⁶⁶ The DPRK press remembered one of Kim Il-sung's visits to an orphanage in Poland in a document issued by the Korean Central News Agency in 2006.⁶⁷ Furthermore, the city of Otwock maintained contacts with DPRK and its officials by organizing a meeting with DPRK ambassadors. In 1984, an official delegation of representatives from Otwock consisting of four people went to the DPRK.⁶⁸ Another delegation was sent in 1990. Moreover, on the Juche Tower in Pyongyang, among "friendly" cities, there is a tablet from Otwock, being the only Polish city listed.

Other socialist states also took care of DPRK orphans. During his visit to Czechoslovakia in June 1956, as a part of his grand tour of Eastern Europe, Kim Il-sung referred in his speech at a mass rally in Pilsen to the "Numbers of our students and war orphans who are freely studying ... in your country." He went on to observe that, "when they come back to their country after finishing their study, they will become excellent workers in the labor struggle for the development of the national economy." In a report on friendship communication between the DPRK and Czechoslovaki-

^{65.} In the near future, the South Korean producer Chu Sang-mi is preparing a film concerning DPRK orphans in Poland. The working title is 'Children went to Poland.' Principal photography began during Autumn 2016 in Płakowice.

^{66.} Jolanta Krysowata, "Sieroty koreańskie," Karta, no. 42, 2004, p.1998.

^{67.} KCNA, "볼스까에서 김일성주석의 고아원 방문 50돐 기념집회 (Memorial rally for the 50th anniversary of President Kim Il Sung's visit to an orphanage in Poland)" http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/2006/05/05-19/2006-0519-002.html (date accessed August 20, 2014).

^{68.} Jacek Kałuszko, "Z Korei na otwockie wydmy," Linia Otwocka, 19marca, 2004 < http://krld.pl/krld/czytelniateksty/kom_osw//[niedatowany]%20 Dwa%20teksty%20z%20gazety%20%27%27Linia%20Otwocka%27%27,%20 na%20temat%20koreanskich%20sierot%20wychowywanych%20w%20 Polsce%20i%20wizyty%20Wielkiego%20Wodza%20Towarzysza%20Kim%20 Ir%20Sena%20w%20Polsce%20w%201956%20r.%20.pdf > (date accessed February 12, 2018).

^{69.} Direction d'Asie Oceanie no 973/AS Communiqué à: secrétariat général no 974/SGL, Séoul le 18 octobre 1957.

an schools (March 7, 1957), Pyongyang mentioned that children from one Czechoslovakian school had recently combined their talents in "friendship art circles performances" with Korean children of the Kim Il-sung School in Czechoslovakia. It is assumed that around 600 orphans were raised in Czechoslovakia. On 27 December 1956, Pyongyang broadcasted the following dispatch from Budapest: "Hundreds of Korean children who have been attending Hungarian schools left for home by special train yesterday and today. Mostly war orphans, they were invited by Hungary. While in Hungary, the children were studying in 60 schools in Budapest and dozens of other cities.⁷⁰

d. Kim Il-sung's Visit to Poland in 1956

On 1 June 1956, Kim Il-sung and an impressive delegation of DPRK officials left their country by train for a fifty-day tour around the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic and allies of the Soviet Union in Europe. It was not only the longest foreign travel of the DPRK leader, but also his longest absence from his country. The aim of the visit was to collect positive reactions concerning financial and material support, which would be used to fulfill assumptions of the DPRK economic plan covering the period 1957-1961.⁷¹ As a part of his European tour, Kim Il-sung visited Poland between 2 and 7 July 1956. In Warsaw he thanked Poland for its support and asked for continuing the aid and cooperation in realization of the DPRK economic strategy. Implementation of the resolutions of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of Polish People's Republic, including aid for Korea was being discussed at that time. While in Poland, Kim Il-sung visited the orphanage in Świder and in 'Gwardia' Hall where he met with inhabitants of Warsaw. Finally, he was awarded the Order Polonia Restitu-

^{70.} Headquarters United States Army Japan and United Nations Command – Eight United States Army, "North Korean orphans in Hungary," September 18, 1957.

^{71.} Waldemar Dziak, Kim Ir Sen. Dzieło i Polityczne Wizje (Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych, 2000), p. 236.

ta.⁷² Inhabitants of the city of Głogów received a reward as an expression of gratitude for equipping Korean schools destroyed by the War.⁷³

Queries made by Kim Il-sung were only partially fulfilled, which constituted a failure for Kim Il-sung. Edward Ochab, the current Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, did not declare anything above what was promised before. DPRK authorities expected military support, consisting of 200 Polish military men, 45 cars, and food support. Konstanty Rokossowski, then the Polish Minister of Defense, only allowed sending no more than 20 officers.

Visits to other states also did not match the Korean leaders' expectations. Aid from Russia was not as significant as previously thought. In 1956, DPRK received 300 million rubles, but it was much less than after the end of the Korean War. The GDR authorities declined continuing special aid and production support of diesel engines. Hungarians declared that they would not provide 15 million rubles. Romania declined providing 25 million rubles. In total, economic and technical aid did not exceed 500 million rubles, less than 50% of what was expected.⁷⁴

In response to Kim Il-sung's visit in April 1957, Józef Cyrankiewicz, then Prime Minister of Polish People's Republic, traveled to Pyongyang for a three-day meeting. Cyrankiewicz's visit aimed at consolidating friendship and developing cooperation between Poland and the DPRK. Poland continued aiding in the rebuilding of the DPRK and attempted to create a basis for regular economic relations. What needs to be remembered is the fact that although with other Asian countries the basis for trade exchange was established earlier and on a completely different basis, real economic cooperation between the PPR and the

^{72.} Wojciech Kowalski, *Polska w świecie 1964-1956* (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1988), p. 552.

^{73.} Ho Guk-bon, then Ambassador of DPRK to Poland, informed that furniture and learning aids would reach the prominent Kim Il-sung University in Pyongyang. Roman Burzyński, "Rozmowa z panem Ho Guk Bon ambasadorem Koreańskiej Republiki Ludowo-Demokratycznej," *Przekrój*, no. 28, July 7, 1957, p. 3.

^{74.} Kim Ir Sen, *O budownictwie socjalistycznym i rewolucji południowokoreańskiej w KRL-D* (Phenian: Wyd. Literatury w Językach Obcych, 1970), pp. 51-52.

DPRK began only in 1961.⁷⁵

4. Phase IV: Disturbance in Poland-DPRK Relations (1960-1980)

a. Construction of Partnerships, But Ideological Estrangement

The period starting in 1960 was a period announcing a new era in the relations between both countries. From 1965, Kim Il-sung changed his foreign policy: first, he did not want his country to be subordinated neither to the Soviet Union, nor to China. Kim wanted to reinforce his autonomy. This line of thought was exposed in the Juche ideology aiming at tightening relations with Third World Countries and Eastern Europe, including Poland.⁷⁶

Picture 2. The Korean street in Warsaw



The Polish-DPRK friendship was reinforced by the inauguration of the Korean street in Warsaw in 1963. The street is in the Saska Kepa district of Warsaw (photography taken by the author).

^{75.} In June 1961, an agreement for the mutual exchange of products was signed. With other socialist countries the same agreement was signed already in the 1950s (in 1950 the Polish Trade delegation stayed in CPR and in 1955 in Ceylon).

^{76.} Kim Il Sung, Le movement de non-alignement est une puissante force révolutionnaire anti-impérialiste de notre temps (Pyongyang: Editions en Langues Etrangères, 1976).

Kim viewed the Soviet Union as a state where 'modern revisionism' prevailed. He also dismissed the Chinese view of shifting the 'world revolution' with Beijing at its epicenter because, as he said, "it is impossible to shift revolution from one country to another. Moreover, a situation where one country would be the center of world revolution or that any party would stand on top of international communist movement is impossible."⁷⁷⁷

In the 1970s, attempts of DPRK diplomacy to consolidate the relationship and cooperation with Poland resulted in signing yet another agreement on March 26, 1970 forecasting an increase in trade exchange of 35% in comparison to the 5-year plan of 1966-1970. DPRK vice minister, Pak Song-chol, paid a visit to Poland on February 21, 1972. The same year delegates of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly also came to Poland.

The question of the possible unification of Korea was constantly on the minds of DPRK officials. For example, in June 1973, the DPRK Ambassador to Warsaw met with Franciszek Kaim,⁷⁸ then Deputy Prime Minister, to discuss the question of Korean unification. During this meeting, the creation of the Koryo Confederation was suggested and later was agreed upon by Poland. Kim Tong-gyu, the DPRK WPK Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ho Dam, visited Poland in 1974. On May 22, 1974, Tadeusz Białkowski, the Polish Ambassador to the DPRK met with the DPRK Prime Minister Ri Jong-ok, to discuss the reunification issue.

Under some circumstances, Polish foreign policy was supported by the DPRK. The arrangements for normalization and mutual relations between Poland and West Germany, signed on December 12, 1970 by Józef Cyrankiewicz and Willy Brandt were considered by the DPRK government as a victory of the Polish nation. However, Poland

^{77.} Kim Ir Sen, *O dżucze w naszej rewolucji* (Phenian: Wyd. literatury w językach obcych, 1977), p. 571.

^{78.} On 29 June 1973, notes taken during a discussion of Deputy Prime Minister Kaim with DPRK Ambassador in Poland- Kim Hi Soun regarding the unification of Korea [Note from the Author: exact writting of the name of the DPRK ambassador to Poland].

was not the DPRK's ideological ally. A closer country to DPRK propagandists was Romania. Its president Nicolae Ceausescu visited China, the DPRK and North Vietnam in 1974. He came back to Bucharest, fascinated by the mass demonstration of the WPK. After his return to Bucharest he presented July Theses echoing his experiences. The Romanian leader pressed for increasing the role of the Party and ideology in daily life. His following actions were based on Juche. The shared concept of the cult of personality had the effect of tightening DPRK relations with countries such as Romania and Albania, where the Party directory conducted all actions of the state ideologically and economically. The DPRK began looking for allies in African countries that had no previous experience with socialism, drifting way from Soviet and Chinese influences.⁷⁹ Equally, relations with European communist states gained a mainly economic character.

b. The Intensification of Poland-DPRK Economic Relations

Economic relations between the DPRK and communist states intensified in the 1970s. Bilateral government commissions were formed to watch over economic, scientific and technical cooperation. The DPRK had raw materials, such as zinc, silver, talcum powder and graphite. Poland in return provided heavy machinery, car and tractor parts, and control apparatuses. First, a multiannual trade agreement (1962-1965) was signed in 1961. It provided credit on products imported to complete industrial buildings. Credits were given on very convenient terms, with interest rates at 2% per annum and refund payments were supposed to begin after a period of 7 years. The DPRK was supposed to pay back the credit in the form of imports of magnetite, talcum, and graphite. New industrial buildings were constructed in Korea between 1962 and 1970, such as a factory for medical tools, glass polishing, and candy factories, challenging the demand for European products.

In 1969, Poland was the 5th largest trade partner of the DPRK, pre-

^{79.} Kim Jong II, Pour une connaissance précise de l'originalité du Kimilsungisme (Pyongyang: Editions en Langues Etrangères, 1984).

ceded respectively by the Soviet Union, China, East-Germany and paradoxically Japan, a country considered as its enemy. Machineries dominated Polish exports to the DPRK (more than 60%), mostly machine tools, AN-2 aircrafts and coke, also—due to market deficiency—consumer goods, such as glassware or porcelain. Imports from the DPRK consisted mostly of raw materials, such as magnetite or talcum powder. The DPRK-Poland trade exchange represented only 0.2% of the total Polish trade as of 1972, but some interesting facts shall be underlined. For instance, in 1972 the DPRK imports of the following products represented the following percentage of the Polish imports: 56% of the talcum, 49% of magnetite, 18% of fluorite, 49% of porcelain ware, 7% of lead, and 4% of herbal products were respectively imported from the DPRK.

In 1972, an agreement to form an Economic, Scientific and Technical Consultative Committee was signed. Their responsibilities included:

- Examining possibilities for development and expanding cooperation between the two countries;
- Considering the implementation of agreements and protocols concluded by the competent authorities of both parties;
- Taking necessary measures for the further development of cooperation.

During the first sitting of the committee, both parties concluded that by mid-1970 the trade exchange could reach 100 million rubles. On August 13, 1973, a treaty on a scientific exchange between Poland and the DPRK for the years 1973 and 1974 was signed, and they also agreed to pursue a trade exchange agreement for the next four years on February 14, 1976. Then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland made a visit to Pyongyang in June 1977,⁸¹ and Wojciech Jaruzelski, then Defense Minister, followed in September 1977.

^{80.} Stefan Kojło, *Współpraca KRLD z krajami socjalistycznym*i (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1975), p. 169.

^{81.} MOFA, Poland, Wizyta Tow. Ministra E. Wojtaszek w KRL-D w dniach 26-29 czerwca 1977 r., Dept V, Group 28/79, Bundle 3, Folder 220-3-77.

Table 2. Trade exchange between Poland and the DPRK from 1960 to 1972

Year	Trade exchange (million ruble)	Export (million ruble)	Import (million ruble)	Dynamic of increase index 1960=100
1960	2.9	1.2	1.7	100
1961	3.9	1.3	2.6	134
1962	6.6	3.0	3.6	228
1963	7.5	4.0	3.5	259
1964	7.1	3.7	3.4	245
1965	9.8	4.3	5.5	338
1966	11.0	5.2	5.8	379
1067	8.7	6.4	2.3	300
1968	19.1	10.7	8.4	659
1969	18.7	11.2	7.5	646
1970	17.0	7.8	9.2	586
1971	11.0	4.5	6.5	379
1972	14.9	7.2	7.7	574

Sources: Unknown, Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego 1970 (Warszawa: Główny Urząd Statystyczny 1971), p. 26; Unknown, Rocznik Statystyczny Handlu Zagranicznego 1973 (Warszawa: Główny Urząd Statystyczny 1974), p. 31.

Table 3. Trade exchange between the Socialist Bloc and the DPRK (1960-1973/ million rubles).

Country	1960	1965	1970	1973
Soviet Union	102.7	160.0	329.3	357.3
East Germany	8.3	7.0	28.6	27.5
Romania	7.5	7.6	12.5	25.0
Bulgaria	1.5	1.2	5.9	13.7
Czechoslovakia	13.8	11.9	13.7	13.4
Poland	2.9	9.9	17.0	10.3
Hungary	6.7	4.0	6.0	5.6
Mongolia	1.0	1.5	2.3	3.9
Total:	143.0	203.0	415.3	484.6

Source: USSR Academy of Sciences, "Ekonomika i politika zarubieżnych stran socjalizma: Koreanska Narodno-Demokraticzskeja Republika," (Moscow, 1975), p. 128.

The development of trade exchange and imports was followed by increased interest in transportation, especially naval shipping.82 Korean ports in Chongjin, Hungman and Nampho started to receive goods on a regular basis in the early 1960s. On November 19, 1965, a treaty was signed establishing a Polish-Korean Shipbrokers Association (Koreańsko-Polskie Towarzystwo Maklerów Morskich), also known as Chopol (Cho from Choson, and Pol from Polska, the Polish name of Poland) in charge of naval cooperation.⁸³ The shipbroker association had two ships under their command and manned by bi-national crews. The association controlled by Polish and Koreans was supposed to buy, sell and rent ships, and transport coke and magnetite. By comparison, the Polish-Chinese Association of Shipbroker-Chipolbrok was already operating since 1945. Two Polish ships, Narvik and Mickiewicz, were used. Accordingly, per the bilateral agreements, 70% of the fleet of the Mickiewicz was Korean. Poles complained often about the behavior of Korean shipmen, who tried to do some propaganda during journeys. Chopol still exists as of 2017.

c. Poland-DPRK Cultural and Sport Cooperation

During the period 1960-1980, the most important pillar of the educational cooperation between both countries was the partnership signed between the Polish Academy of Sciences and the DPRK Academy of Sciences in 1963. This DPRK institution was supposed to establish a branch in Warsaw, to attract DPRK researchers (especially from technical fields) to Poland. The branch existed between 1968 and 1974 but was suddenly closed in 1974. On a regular basis Polish artist were traveling to the DPRK, such as the Flok Group 'Śląsk' which was in the

^{82.} In 1972, Polish shipyards conducted refurbishment of the Korean Fleet; S. Kojło, "Współpraca KRLD z krajami socjalistycznymi," (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1975), p. 182.

^{83.} On 11 February 1987, the name of the company changed to Koreańsko-Polskie Towarzystwo Żeglugowe Sp z o.o., still emphasing its Korean origin in the name of this economic entity, but from the legal perspective, transforming it into a society with a limited liability (*Spółka z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością*).

DPRK between November 19 and 27, 1966.

Another subject of cooperation became the sport area. Among DPRK students based in Poland in the 1970s, some of them started to teach taekwondo to Poles interested in this sport. Firstly, they were teaching karate, but after a certain period, they begin to teach Poles a karate technique called kyoksul. Kyoksul was already exported to Poland in the 60s, when KAL officials who were in contact with Polish officers discussed this martial art. Furthermore, DPRK sport was at least seen once in Poland, in a match played between the football club of Wisła Kraków and the Amrokkang Football Club, which sold out tickets with a 3-3 draw.84

The first taekwondo section opened in 1977. The first coaches arrived in April 1979. Transportation was ensured by DPRK authorities; other logistical issues were fulfilled by the Polish side. The first invited coach was Han Ho-hun, who coached some foreigners during journeys in the Soviet Union. Han Ho-hun came over to Poland, as he was already known by a student based in Warsaw. He came to Poland for three months. He left in July but came back for a 6-month journey between December 1979 and June 1980.

After June 1980, Han Ho-hu disappeared, but some versions insisted that the Military Unit GROM is the elite counter-terrorism unit of Poland. After his disappearance, he was replaced by a DPRK student based in Warsaw. Some others came to Poland, but their fate changed after 1980, being forcibly recalled to their home country, due to the coldness of relations between DPRK and Poland.

d. Mixed Marriages between DPRK and Polish Citizens

The purge mentioned in the second chapter concerned not only DPRK orphans and students, but also men married to Polish women (the reverse seems to have not existed). Starting from 1963, mixed marriages were considered forbidden by DPRK law. Previously many Polish women who met DPRK students married them.

^{84.} Andrzej Cichowicz, "Dobra Klasa Piłkarzy Koreańskich," Tempo, September 16, 1968.

The most famous example is the story of Halina Ogarek-Czoj. This lady born in 1931 is the daughter of the previously mentioned Weronika Tropaczyńska-Ogarkowa. Halina Ogarek-Czoj, the most famous Polish researcher on Korean issues, also founded the faculty of Korean Studies at Warsaw University. During her studies of Chinese philology at the University of Warsaw, she met her future husband, and both emigrated to the DPRK in the early 1960s. Before, she defended her doctorate at the Kim Il-sung University in 1957, a daughter was born, and the family moved to the DPRK in 1962. Due to the previously mentioned policy, the family was separated in 1965, and Halina Ogarek-Czoj was forced to come back to Poland with her daughter named Anna. In Poland, her DPRK diploma was not recognized and she rewrote her doctorate thesis on the Korean writer Song Yeong and defended it in 1974.

In 1977, with the cooperation of the DPRK student Cho Un-hak, she published a book on the Korean language entitled Teksty do nauki języka koreańskiego. Regarding professional matters as a translator, she later came back to the DPRK as a translator of official delegations, but never saw her husband again. She passed away in 2004. Another example is the situation of the Polish woman, Dorota Kudlak. She married in 1960 and lived with him until 1963, giving birth to a daughter in Pyongyang. Later they were separated, and Mrs. Kudlak and her daughter were repatriated to Poland. Mrs. Krystyna Li and her husband were demoted to Hungnam, but she left for Poland after a few months. Mrs. Rzepko-Łaska tried to commit suicide because she couldn't live with her husband. Another Polish citizen was Mrs. Hanna Marchwicka. 85 Hanna Marchwicka came back to Poland in the mid-60s. She came back to Poland with a son whose name was Ri Jeo-Ran. A similar situation occurred to other mixed-families, such as the Romanian woman Georgeta Mircioiu (1936-2015) and her husband Jo Jung-ho, a former DPRK orphan in Romania. Some DPRK citizens who married abroad (with a Soviet woman in this case), such as Kim Ji-il, a

^{85.} MOFA, Poland, Notatka dotycząca ograniczeń stosowanych przez władze Koreańskiej Republiki Ludowo-Demokratycznej z dnia 7 czerwca 1963 r., Dept V, Group 32/66, Bundle 1, Folder 0-557.

former student of the University of Technology of Kharkov (former Soviet Union, currently Ukraine) managed to flee to South Korea in the 1990s.

IV. Conclusion

The purpose of the article was to present an outline of relations between Poland and the DPRK. Initially the paper aims to show how the relations between idealogically and culturally distant countries looked like and whether the countries belonging to the socialist community could really rely on each other.

Poland and North Korea were in the same ideological family, but the behavior of North Korean authorities reduced the advantages Poland could take from relations with this country. In this case, it can be stated that North Korea focused on its interest and not on the interest of fraternal nations. The size, the type, and the scope of Polish-North Korean cooperation was largely decided by Pyongyang. It was Pyongyang which decided to limit movements of Polish diplomats in North Korea without official approval of the North Korean MOFA starting from 1978. It was Pyongyang that did not support the Polish embassy when it was flooded in 1967. It was again Pyongyang which decided when the Polish envoy could meet Kim Il-sung. It was Pyongyang which dictated payment rules in the case of an economic transaction. Such North Korea's policy changes were justified by the ideological battle against Imperialism. On the other side, it can be noted how much effort the Polish side made to improve mutual relations, sometimes regardless of their interest. From North Korea, we can denote a major calculation on the part of its leadership. This led to a negative image of North Korean authorities among the Polish leadership and automatically to negative views concerning the North Korean population among Poles.

Although Poland-North Korea relations ruptured eventually around 1980s, the memory of people who came from North Korea is still present in the mind of people who were in touch with them

during the Communist era. A perfect example illustrating this situation are the memories of the citizens of cities where North Korea orphans used to live. To a lesser extent, a similar situation can be described with those who lived closely to the Polish Hospital in Hamhung. The importance of cooperation between Poland and North Korea on the issue of orphans was a driver for the deepening of relations between both countries for the next 50 years. In a hermetic society like North Korea, these Polish and North Korean adoptees who lived or traveled abroad played the role of civilian messengers and informal diplomats. Documents released from Polish historical files in recent years have proven that North Korean citizens living in Poland were clearly in communication with Polish citizens. It has also been proven that these people were discussing their experience of living abroad after they came back to North Korea. This element is crucial as it provides a better understanding of the penetration of foreign cultures in the isolated North Korea. The past and European values are then absorbed in the consciousness of the North Korean orphans who lived in Central Europe. Therefore, there is a constant imperative to learn and debate, to have a better chance of finding the right balance when discussing the isolation of North Korean society.

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1. DPRK ambassadors to Poland (1951-1979)

Identity	Korean transcription	Diplomatic position	Employment period
Choe II	최일	Ambassador	1951-1953
Choe Bin	최빈	Ambassador	1953-1954
Ho Guk-bon	허국본	Ambassador	1954-1958
Jaen Myong-su	제명수	Chargé d'affaires a.i.	1958-1959
Kim Hak-in	김학인	Ambassador	1959-1962
Ri Dok-hyon	리덕현	Ambassador	1962-1968
Kwon Bong-ryong	권봉룡	Ambassador	1968-1970
Kim Hi-sun	김희순	Ambassador	1970-1973
Jeon Ju-ji	전주지	Chargé d'affaires a.i.	1973
Jong Jong-ryu	정종류	Chargé d'affaires a.i.	1973-1974
Paek Nam-sun	백남순	Ambassador	1974-1979
O Man-sok	오만석	Ambassador	1979-1998

Source: own document

2. Polish ambassadors to the DPRK (1951-1979)

Identity	Diplomatic position	Employment Period
Stanisław Dodin	Chargé d'affaires a.i.	1948-1950
Juliusz Burgin	Ambasador	1950-1951
Marcin Drewniak	Chargé d'affaires a.i.	January 1951
Ryszard Deperaszyński	Chargé d'affaires a.i.	April 1951
Stanisław Kiryluk	Ambassador	1952-1954
Jerzy Siedlecki	Ambassador	1954-1959
Józef Dryglas	Ambassador	1959-1964
Władysław Napieraj	Ambassador	1964-1968
Józef Dryglas	Ambassador	1968-1971
Tadeusz Białkowski	Ambassador	1971-1978
Jerzy Pękała	Ambassador	1978-1981

Source: own document