

Breaking off the Cold War Chains on the Korean Peninsula: The Relevance of Arms Control Measures

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The global trend of the 1990s is for countries to pursue arms control rather than engage in arms racing. The military confrontation and rivalry that shaped the world order during the Cold War have altogether disappeared in Europe, leaving the Korean peninsula as the last site of the Cold War, the dregs of which continue to affect inter-Korean security matters significantly.

Recently, international attention has been drawn to the Korean peninsula for two reasons. First, North Korea's reckless venture to develop nuclear weapons might have jeopardized world-wide efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime so as to smooth out the extension process of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Second, Pyongyang's conventional military threats could undermine peace and stability on the Korean peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia, even after the collapse of communism in Europe.

Despite some initial successes in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, the two Koreas live in an uneasy situation. This peninsula is the most heavily armed region in the world. There are no signs of either side's reduction of its military threats against the other. Neither government is pursuing arms control

policy in a systematic or consistent manner. Instead, they continue to add advanced and lethal weapons to their existing arsenals.

However, there were some efforts between the two Koreas in the late 1980s and early 1990s to move toward peaceful coexistence away from the forty-year military confrontation, because changes in the security environment of the post-Cold War era compelled them to seek modification in security policies. South Korea pursued its Nordpolitik to create conditions favorable to peaceful coexistence with Pyongyang by establishing friendly diplomatic ties with North Korea's allies, the Soviet Union and China. On one hand, North Korea accelerated its nuclear ambition to hedge against a strategically isolated predicament so as to undercut South Korea's success in Nordpolitik, while seeking inter-Korean dialogue on the other hand in fear of collapse like what happened to communism in Europe.

Those efforts produced two major agreements at the end of 1991: the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the following inter-Korean talks for nuclear inspection agreements, neither side got what it wanted. The stalemate in nuclear talks blocked any further inter-Korean dialogue, and the two sides went their own ways. South Korea resumed Team Spirit military exercises and North Korea announced it would pull out of the NPT in 1993.

Thus, talks between the US and North Korea replaced the inter-Korean dialogue, resulting in the Geneva accord of October 1994. During the nuclear impasse, the Korean peninsula exposed itself once again as to how fragile is the peace and how high the possibility of war. North Korea threatened to go to war if sanctions were imposed. The United States dispatched an aircraft carrier to the Eastern Sea of Korea in a demonstration of force. Pyongyang's threat was seen as an intention to set peace-loving South Koreans hostage to the threatening menace of war.

As of today, approximately the same number of forces as were along the inter-German border are deployed along the Korean Demilitarized Zone, which has a front line one third the length of that dividing Europe during the Cold War. Pyongyang's military goals and doctrines remain unchanged. In addition, no country in Northeast Asia has explicitly declared a restraint in conventional arms buildup, though the magnitude of arms buildup is not so big as it was during the Cold War period.

Against this backdrop, one big question arises: what insights could the Western approach that was taken to resolve East-West security problems—to break off, in fact, the Cold War chains—provide for the Korean security problem? With this question in mind, the article summarizes the tenets of new security concepts that came into being in the 1980s and 1990s in Europe and in the US to address contemporary security issues. By dwelling upon those concepts I will elaborate on some security problems on the Korean peninsula and in the region. If the US approach to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue has been taken within the new security concepts, it will be useful to see the approach in depth, how it worked, and what implications it will provide for the conventional military arena. Finally, we will discover some constructive ways to correct our security problems.

New Concepts of National Security or International Security

As the Soviet Union changed its security policy toward the United States in the second half of the 1980s, the trends of security studies underwent a transformation. Gorbachev's radical defense reforms and the Stockholm Conference of 1986 in Europe created new situations that mandated changes in traditional security concepts and strategies.

It also became critical for security experts to come up with fresh concepts of security to cope with new security problems. Three major efforts are worth highlighting. Those efforts are

directly related to the three concepts of security: mutual security, common security, and cooperative security.¹

Mutual Security

In the modern age security cannot be obtained unilaterally; the security of one nation cannot be bought at the expense of others. The danger of nuclear war alone assures the validity of the proposition.² According to this school of thought, the world faces common dangers and thus must also promote security in common. Mutual security policy strives to improve the security of both sides under conditions of some mutual insecurity. Herein, two sides can mean two nations, two alliances or two militant organizations threatening each other. As we see, the concept of mutual security came about during the Cold War.

The proposals to encourage mutual security are to make the interaction system among nations full of positive-sum games and to convince each side that security is a chief political and military goal for the other side, too. Shared improvement is practically feasible in particular situations where the actors see opportunities for positive-sum interactions. Thus, one party should create conditions in which the other party sees long-term gains to engage the other. In addition, one party should change its own view of security, making it clear that security is its chief goal—because the other side often tends to see the achievement of one side's dominant political-military goals as victory, not security.³

1 Mutual security and common security have been used synonymously but mutual security refers exclusively to East-West security and common security refers to the security of nations in general.

2 Richard Smoke and Andrei Kortunov (eds.), *Mutual Security* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 61.

3 Ibid, p. 72.

Common Security

Nations trying to increase their own security by raising threats against others are ultimately destined to meet a security dilemma: a decrease in security as a paradoxical result of the quest for security.⁴ The more defense measures one nation adopts to increase its sense of security, the more insecure the other feels. The reacting nation takes additional measures, and so on. In the end, each side's national security is reduced.⁵

Advocates of common security (CS) believe that international peace must rest on a commitment by each nation to joint survival rather than the threat of mutual destruction.

World security becomes more interdependent as interdependence rises among nations in political, diplomatic, and economic domains. Therefore, one nation's pursuit of its own security can endanger global security in the world devoid of any authority to control individual nations' pursuit of security. To break out of this security dilemma, the CS school of thought advocates disarmament. The goal of CS has been defined as preventing nuclear war and thus it is urged that nuclear arsenals be reduced. Measures to correct security dilemmas are to make nations aware of the irrationality of their arms competition. In encouraging disarmament, CS contends that nations should adopt a non-offensive defense posture.

Non-offensive defense (NOD) implies that nations change military posture, size, weapons, training, doctrine, logistics, and operational manuals so as to be capable of a credible defense, yet incapable of offense.⁶ NOD is a strategy, materialized in a posture, intended to maximize defensive while minimizing

4 Bjørn Møller, *Common Security and Non-Offensive Defense: A Neorealist Perspective* (Lynne Rienner Publishers 1992), p. 26.

5 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2, January 1978, pp. 169-70.

6 Bjørn Møller, "Non-Offensive Defense as a Strategy for Small States?" Denmark Center for Peace and Conflict Research, *Working Papers*, May 1994, p. 6.

offensive capabilities. Because political intentions are subject to abrupt turnabout, the NOD approach is fundamental in tackling an otherwise intractable arms race problem by targeting military capabilities rather than intentions.

The CS and NOD approaches encourage nations, if it is hard to achieve any agreed-upon measures, to take unilateral action. Unilateral measures would help "enemy nations" to wash away enemy images of other nations. Also, the NOD approach stresses the importance of global collective security in part because collective security measures have the potential to be stronger to deter aggression than those possible within an alliance strategy. This is so in part because small nations can compose offensive capabilities through collective contributions without which one nation would be forced to acquire all offensive capabilities to repel an aggressor.⁷

Regarding the utility of the unilateral approach, a good case in point is South Korea's unilateral action to abandon nuclear enrichment and plutonium reprocessing in November 1991. The United States also announced it would unilaterally withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. Those two initiatives helped to press Pyongyang to accept IAEA inspections after ratifying IAEA full-scope Safeguards Agreements. However, unilateral measures have shown their weakness in dealing further with North Korea, who regards them as something to be taken advantage of.

Cooperative Security

The concept of cooperative security implies that nations intend to achieve national security by pursuing security objectives compatible with other nations and seek to establish collaborative rather than confrontational relationships among national military establishments.⁸ According to this concept, cooperative

7 Ibid., pp. 16-17.

security is similar to common security in that nations should recognize security concerns of other nations, respect others' security interests as legitimate and pursue mutual coexistence. There is a slight difference between common security and cooperative security in that cooperative security tends to stress the need of institutionalized consent and agreed-upon measures in preventing war as well as means to prevent successful aggression so as to ensure the security of nations.

Cooperative security came into being after the Cold War. Its end and the demise of the Soviet Union unavoidably changed traditional security concepts and the foundations of past strategy. Furthermore, the Gulf War awakened the world to how multinational forces could be effectively mobilized with the most advanced defense technology, and render the aggressor Iraqi forces powerless. This most recent experience provided insights to cooperative security advocates about effective means to deal with future aggressors. Those factors together with the recognition that aggression by force is self-destructive and will entail enormous costs have affected quite a few nations to pursue cooperative security.

Under new situations massive-scale land attack and possibility of nuclear war are no longer the issue for defense planning; deterrence, nuclear stability and containment are no longer organizing principles of international security. Instead, security based on cooperation and on the prevention of conflict are the major issues to tackle.

Cooperative security cannot be accomplished by threatening violence. Nations should show mutual restraint, provide reassurances that they will not resort to force, and improve transparency in defense policies and military posture, arms transfers, etc. Cooperative security does not exclude the various existing arrangements that have contributed to the strengthening

8 Janne E. Nolan, *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 5.

of the international regime to prevent war, prohibit proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles, and promote arms control. Mutual restraints should be verifiable and reassurances can be obtained by making transparent all military posture, doctrine, weapons production, and arms sales and acquisition. Thus, this school of thought actively examines new instruments of international mediation, peacekeeping, and collective intervention. Furthermore, they advocate cooperative engagement even with "enemy" nations, which has been clearly demonstrated in North Korea's nuclear issue, to which I will return.

Factors Hindering Application of New Security Concepts to the Korean Peninsula

As pointed out in the introduction, the two Koreas dwell within the residue of the Cold War. The Cold War between the two superpowers is gone, but not its effects. One Korea feels threatened by the other and thus increases defense measures to enhance national security. The two sides, however, end up with greater insecurity due to the security dilemma phenomenon. Before examining policies to resolve the security dilemma on the peninsula, we need to assess current security problems by raising two big questions: What are the major military threats the two Koreas perceive? Is there any inter-Korean security regime to resolve the security dilemma?

Threat Perceptions of the Two Koreas

South Korea's Threat Perceptions

There are four main factors that affect South Korea's threat perception: North Korea initiated the Korean War and is prepared to do so again, has maintained its offensive strategy to communize the peninsula by surprise attack, is maintaining a

military advantage, and is increasing its long-range missiles with an unveiled nuclear weapons program.

The Korean War: The devastating loss incurred during the Korean War and the possibility that Pyongyang may initiate another war make up one of the most serious security concerns to South Koreans.

South Korea was shattered by North Korea's surprise attack. Seoul in 1950 was without prepared defense or sufficient combat capabilities. Without US and UN intervention, the Republic of Korea would not exist. Above all, considering that the losses from another war could be more than twice those in the Korean War, preventing another war is the most important security issue for Koreans.⁹

The Korean War made the division of the peninsula irreconcilable, strengthening each side's enemy image of the other. By splitting the political spectrum in domestic politics followed by a massive purge of the opposition, repression has prevailed in both parts of Korea, creating bureaucratic inertia and deepening mutual political and military confrontation.

Because of the Korean War, the South transferred its right of operational control to the Commander of the UNC which later was given to the US Commander of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), making difficult the restoration of operational control by Korean leadership over South Korean forces.

Even though any real possibility that it could accomplish such a thing is in doubt now, North Korea's policy to communize the peninsula has not changed for the past four decades. The suspicions and misperceptions are so strong that South Korea is reluctant to place much confidence in the utility of negotiating with the North for its security. Bureaucratic and political rigidity still hinder the inception of a policy for improving South-North

9 The ROK Ministry of National Defense estimated that the losses within the first ten days would be twice those incurred in the Korean War throughout three years.

relations. The thinking prevails that there can be no compromise with communists and that only comparative strength wins the competition with them. Such thinking rationalizes reliance on the United States for security on the one hand, which in turn hinders any self-reliance strategy.

North Korea's military doctrine and strategy: The military threat that North Korea poses to South Korea derives not only from the asymmetries in capabilities, but also from the manner in which they might be used. In the Korean War, Pyongyang employed the doctrine of surprise attack on the South, which was reinforced by the Chinese victory in its first and second campaigns in October and December 1950.¹⁰ Their doctrinal basis comes from traditional Communist strategy. It was reinforced by guerrilla warfare experience in the anti-Japanese struggle and refined by reflecting upon the lessons they learned in the Korean War. The late Kim Il Sung established the Four-Point Military Guidelines in 1962: arming the entire population, transforming the entire country into an impregnable fortress, converting the whole army into an army of cadres, and modernizing the military establishment. North Korea is now seen as the most dangerous garrison state in the world.

North Korean strategy has also put more emphasis on breakthrough and maneuver warfare implemented by massing numerically favorable ground forces at chosen points. This maneuver warfare strategy was adopted from the Soviet strategy. The idea is to defeat the enemy (South Korean) forces by first fracturing their defense lines at selected places then advancing rapidly into the rear areas where encircling operations can be undertaken. In this concept the enemy line is broken by massed, highly concentrated assaults against known weak points by successive waves of attacking forces arrayed in echeloned formations.

10 Chinese Academy of Military Science, *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanshi*, pp. 17-71.

From the position of numerical strength today, the importance of maneuver warfare is still being emphasized to overcome perceived disadvantages of being forced to engage in attritional warfare, due to its gap with South Korea in economic and technological capabilities. Defense experts forecast the possibility that North Korea would occupy Seoul within thirty days of battle once Pyongyang initiated a breakthrough warfare.¹¹ The main features of North Korea's military doctrine are well reflected in their organizational structure which consists of an Army Command, Air Force Command, Navy Command, Mechanized Command, Artillery Command, Missile Command, and Special Eighth Corps to conduct organized warfare, with an emphasis on combined war between regular and guerilla combat forces and between maneuver and massive firepower.

Military imbalance: Pyongyang continues to increase its military manpower even beyond the 1.1 million of the early 1990s after surpassing South Korea in 1978. The military manpower of South Korea stays approximately the same at some 600,000 as it was in the 1960s. Two reasons can be noted for such a rapid increase North Korean military personnel.

North Korea is attempting to compensate for its lack of defense resources with military manpower, as demonstrated later in this section in comparing military expenditures between the two Koreas. The other reason is that to Pyongyang, the strategic environment is becoming unfavorable to its security for domestic reasons as well as external ones. Or, it might try to create the opportunity to use its military assets before they become obsolete. This massive asymmetry in military manpower constitutes one important part of Seoul's threat perception.

Another source of threat comes from big gaps in the numbers of offensive weapons between North Korea and South Korea as summarized in Table 1. As of 1994, North Korea had a big numerical advantage in major items of offensive weaponry, for

11 Christopher Bowie and Fred Frostic, et. al., *The New Calculus* (RAND, 1993).

example, a 2.2 to one advantage over the South in tanks and 2 to 1 in artillery units. In armored personnel carriers, they hold a 1.25-to-1 advantage. In addition, North Korea moved more long-range artillery to the forward areas in 1993 and 1994.¹² This is clear evidence that North Korea is augmenting its offensive capabilities continuously despite its repeated peace offensive propaganda to start peace talks with the United States following the agreed framework of October 1994 with the United States.

Table 1. Major Weapons of South and North Korea

	South Korea	North Korea
Tanks	1,900	4,200
Artillery	4,540	9,080
APC*	2,000	2,500
Tactical Aircraft	540	770

*Armored Personnel Carrier

Sources: IISS, *The Military Balance 1994–1995*; "Conventional Forces in North-east Asia," *Arms Control Today*, November 1994, p. 34.

In the category of tactical aircraft, North Korea maintains a 1.42-to-1 advantage over the South. This numerical superiority constitutes an important part of the threat to the South. North Korea has deployed sixty-five to seventy percent of its forces forward, which is one-and-a-half times the South Korean forces deployed forward. Such asymmetric forward deployments coupled with Pyongyang's breakthrough warfare strategy clearly constitutes a major threat.

North Korea's nuclear weapons program and long-range missiles: After the United States withdrew its nuclear weapons from South Korea, North Korea's nuclear weapons development program became a thorny issue to Seoul and to the world.

12 ROK Ministry of National Defense, *Defense White Paper 1994–1995*. According to the MND, North Korea forward deployed 170 mm self-propelled artilleries and 240 mm multiple rocket launchers in 1993 and 1994.

Despite the recent Geneva accord, because of Pyongyang's past bad behavior Seoul's suspicion about Pyongyang's nuclear ambition has not been cleared. Together with North Korea's nuclear weapons program, its continued sophistication of long-range missiles and bio-chemical weapons poses threats to Korean security as well as to regional security. On this point, Japan already expressed deep concerns, and they joined the co-development program of Theater Missile Defense with the United States. The Japanese *Defense White Paper 1994* underlines the importance of Japan's force modernization to counter North Korea's threat of long-range missiles, which will be able to reach the Western half of the Japanese Islands. It will be even more threatening when North Korea succeeds in developing Taepodong-1 and -2 whose ranges may extend as far as 2000 to 3000 km. South Korea will not remain silent against North Korea's long-range missiles. In consideration of North Korea's threat as well as post-North Korea's threat, Seoul's long-term goal will definitely be to acquire long-range missiles and air defense missiles.¹³

North Korea's Threat Perception

To the extent that North Korea truly feels "threatened," there are three main factors that create this perception: North Korea may collapse and subsequently be absorbed by South Korea in the future like the German case; the US-ROK alliance is too strong and their joint operation could inflict devastating damage; and in the long run South Korea has stronger economic capabilities to build more combat capabilities than does the North.

Possibility of Collapse: North Korea responded nervously to the international pressure over the nuclear issue by claiming that the

13 South Korea's ballistic missile program is still short of a maximum range of 180 miles and payload of 300 kg. See *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 30 April 1994, p. 25.

United States intends to strangle North Korea's socialist system. To South Korean representatives in the inter-Korean dialogue, North Korean representatives repeatedly said that there cannot be a true dialogue without throwing away a secret desire to absorb the North. Indeed, North Korea is in a desperate economic situation that results from both economic policy failures during the past five years and substantial cuts or suspension of economic aid from Russia and China. Political insecurity after Kim Il Sung's death and diplomatic isolation adds uncertainty to the already decaying regime.

Continuing the US-ROK alliance: The existence of US troops in Korea is a main source of North Korea's threat perception. They have consistently criticized the United States for blockading the revolutionization of the entire Korea. According to North Korean propaganda, a US nuclear presence has posed threats to them. North Korea insisted that before urging North Korea to sign a nuclear safeguards agreement, the United States would have to remove its nuclear threat against the North. In fact, the United States did so. North Korea has been claiming that Team Spirit US-ROK military exercises and other joint exercises are an expression of US strategy to invade North Korea,¹⁴ and sees the massive scale of Team Spirit, including nuclear-projecting capabilities, as a threat to the peace and stability of the peninsula as Pyongyang defines it. Its duration of more than two months, North Korea alleges, is also clear indication of US strategy of effecting a surprise attack, projecting forces, and conducting maneuver warfare coupled with the air-land battle doctrine that the US has been developing since 1976.¹⁵ Thus, the North criticizes Team Spirit exercises as military training to initiate a surprise attack with an offensive doctrine, disguised as simple military exercise.¹⁶ They also claim that the US air-land battle

14 *Rodong Shinmun*, 3 February 1991.

15 *Ibid.*

doctrine has brought a new threat to the North because of its nature of offensive defense.

They claim that Team Spirit reveals a US-South Korean attempt to achieve reunification through a victory over communism by force should their strategy of peaceful transition, which was designed to obliterate the socialist system of North Korea, not work.¹⁷ North Korea points to the possibility that these maneuvers could create a situation in which nuclear war might break out in Korea. It is construed as significant to the North that the scale and duration of the joint military exercises had been becoming larger and longer up until 1990.

North Korea has issued combat alert orders every year since 1983 to protest Team Spirit exercises, with the exceptions of 1985 and 1987. In fact, mobilized North Korean soldiers and reserves were never able participate in their customary economic activities during Team Spirit. North Korea habitually used Team Spirit as a pretext for postponing or boycotting the ongoing inter-Korean contacts. For the first time in their history, Team Spirit exercises were cancelled in 1992 in return for acceptance of IAEA nuclear inspections on North Korean nuclear sites. In 1993 inter-Korean dialogue was suspended with the resumption of Team Spirit exercises. North Korea announced it would pull out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In 1994 and 1995, Team Spirit was cancelled for the second time in order to support the US-North Korean nuclear talks. It is interesting to observe a change in North Korean attitudes toward a US military presence in general.¹⁸

16 *Rodong Shinmun*, 16 March 1991.

17 North Korean Foreign Ministry Statement: *FBIS-EAS-91018*, 28 January 1991.

18 North Korea has been showing flexibility on the issue of US withdrawal from South Korea, quite different from its traditional position of insisting upon US complete withdrawal as a precondition for peace on the Korean peninsula. See the Korean Institute for Strategic Studies, *Developments and Prospects of the ROK-US Security Cooperation*, (Seoul: Sekyongsa, 1990), pp. 143-45.


Economic and long-term military trends are unfavorable to the North: The South Korean economy as of 1994 is fourteen to fifteen times larger than that of North Korea in terms of GNP.¹⁹ This gap in economic capabilities is expected to widen throughout the 1990s, if we compare estimation of growth rates between the two Koreas. As can be seen in Figure 1, long-term trends of military expenditures of South and North Korea comprise a main source of North Korea's threat perception. Though the North outspent the South in defense until 1975–1976, it was subsequently outpaced by the South by a substantial margin. This spending gap results from a gap in economic and technological capabilities between the South and the North, which is expected to widen in absolute and relative terms. Until 1975–1976, defense spending in North Korea was double or triple that of South Korea. North Korea's economy was superior to that of the South and its early economic success had provided sufficient resources to the defense sector.

However, South Korea's remarkable economic growth throughout the 1970s and 1980s enabled her to spend more on defense, thus passing North Korea in aggregate defense spending. South Korea's defense spending in 1994 amounted to \$12 billion, more than twice that of the North. This gap in defense spending is expected to widen to a ratio of 2.4 to 1 by the year 2000, and South Korea's cumulative real investments in defense are expected to surpass those of the North.²⁰

19 For estimation of South Korean economy, see Charles Wolf, Jr., and Yong-Sup Han, *Korean and US Economic and Technological Capabilities to Support Defense Burdens* (The RAND Corporation, 1991). For North Korean economy, see ROK National Unification Board, *Summary of North Korean Economy* (1994).

20 According to the ROK Ministry of National Defense, the cumulative total real investments in defense (1953–) are expected to equal those of North Korea by the year 1996. See *Hankuk Ilbo*, 3 February 1990. For reference, RAND estimates on cumulative total defense expenditures of South and North Korea between 1968 and 1983 show that South Korea has spent 1.06 times what the North did in 1979 constant dollars. If we add later spending gaps to this differential, we will get a larger ratio. See Charles Wolf, Jr., et al., *The Changing Balance: South and North Korean Capabilities for Long-Term Military Competition*, the RAND

Fig. 1 Military Spending of South and North Korea



Sources: From 1961–1989, IISS, *The Military Balance*, 1961 through 1990–1991; from 1990–2001, the Korean Institute for Strategic Studies, *Developments and Prospects of the ROK-US Security Cooperation*, p. 129.

The long-term economic and defense resource trends will clearly add to Pyongyang's threat perception, as might a major change in the strategic environment resulting from South Korea's improving relationship with China and Russia. With delivery of offensive weapons to the DPRK more difficult than ever,²¹ Pyongyang may have difficulties increasing its advanced weaponry and may become more inferior in military technology to its rival in the South.

Corporation, R-3305, December 1985, p. 43.

21 *Hankuk Ilbo*, 30 October 1990. See an interview coverage of the Soviet deputy foreign minister with South Korean reporters.

In a nutshell, Seoul's far superior socioeconomic capabilities are likely to produce increasing pressure on Pyongyang. There is an imminent danger that once South-North exchanges start the real picture of the South's domestic capabilities may be disclosed to the Northern population. Pyongyang is under dual pressure: one is the direct threat from South Korea's ongoing military build-up and the other is the danger of domestic instability rising from its defeat in the economic and technological competition with the South.

Security Regimes

As of today, there exists no inter-Korean security regime where the two Koreas can address their own security problems. As noted earlier, there have been efforts to establish an inter-Korean security regime through prime ministerial talks that were held in 1990-91. The nuclear issue obliterated prospects of inter-Korean security dialogue.

The Military Armistice Commission (MAC) is the only authority to supervise the implementation of the Armistice Agreement that was signed in 1953 by the United States (representing the United Nations Command), and China and North Korea, although the function of the armistice regime has become obsolete in recent days. China and North Korea withdrew their representatives from the MAC in 1994 that Pyongyang might establish direct channels with the United States.

For forty years South Korea had no right to speak in the MAC plenary session. Ever since a South Korean general replaced the American as the head of the South-side MAC in 1991, North Korea has refused to attend a MAC meeting. The recent helicopter case vividly showed Pyongyang's intent to establish direct military channels with the United States.

The armistice regime has been outdated because peace has been maintained since the Korean War and military situations of today are different from those of the war time. Three nations,

South and North Korea and the United States, share the view that a new security regime to resolve security problems should be formulated. They have different views, however, on how to change the armistice regime.

South Korea's view: Seoul refused to be a signatory to the Armistice Agreement, which generated problems recognized only later. The South Korean government had no channels whatsoever to resolve military problems with North Korea directly. More serious was that South Korea could not take any retaliatory or punitive measures against the North's recalcitrant terrorists and infiltrating actions. It was only through the US chairman of the UNC that South Korea could raise objections to North Korea's violations of the armistice. These limitations had not been foreseen by the Syngman Rhee government in 1953.

As South Korea assumes a self-defense policy, it needs a direct channel to North Korea to improve inter-Korean relations and to pursue security and stability upon which the two Koreas can agree. However, without replacing an already ineffective armistice regime, it is nearly impossible for Seoul to attempt to improve the South-North relationship without the right to speak in the MAC—and North Korea does not recognize South Korea's authority to be represented at the MAC. After the Korean replaced the US commander in the MAC, North Korea has strongly opposed holding any MAC meetings, complaining that South Korea was not a signatory to the Armistice Agreement.²²

It was in 1991 that the two Koreas agreed to endeavor to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace and to abide by the Armistice Agreement of 1953 until such a state of peace was realized. In May 1992, they agreed to establish the South-North Joint Military Commission to discuss matters to implement nonaggression provisions and arms control measures, but to no avail; severe confrontation between the South

22 FBIS-EAS-91059, 27 March 1991, p. 21.

and the North blocked any progress regarding inter-Korean military channels.

North Korea: North Korea also needs to change the armistice regime. However, Pyongyang insists that the United States sign a peace treaty to replace the armistice agreement, because the United States is a legal partner to it. Though North Korea feels the need to discuss political and military issues directly with Seoul, it strongly disagrees on the modalities of meetings.

During the 1970s Pyongyang insisted that tripartite talks with South Korea and the United States be a forum to resolve security issues. The United States and South Korea were opposed to this modality because North Korea's intention was to deny South Korea a role as a legitimate negotiating partner. Now, Pyongyang went to back to its original position that they should sign a peace treaty to replace the Armistice Agreement only with the United States.

The United States: The US holds the view that the MAC's role in developing and enforcing measures to reduce military tension along the DMZ is critical.²³ This view is reflected in the US Department of Defense statement and Joint Communique between US Secretary of Defense and South Korean Minister of Defense that the Armistice Agreement and the UNC must be maintained essentially in their current form.²⁴

However, the United States recently expressed strong support for the South Korean government in negotiating with the North directly so as ultimately to replace the armistice regime.²⁵

23 Richard L. Sneider, "Prospects for Korean Security," in Richard H. Solomon, ed., *Asian Security in the 1980s: Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition*, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Oelgeschlager Gunn & Hain, Publishers, 1979), p. 138.

24 US Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century*, April 1990, p. 15.

25 ROK Ministry of National Defense, *Defense White Paper 1994-95*, p. 261.

Summary

As noted above, threat perceptions resulting from mutual arms race and continued Cold War-type confrontation continue to affect security policy, military strategy and posture on the Korean peninsula. Alliances that came into being during the Cold War period still exist, although Pyongyang's allies are changing their policies. Above all, other than the increasingly impotent 1953 Armistice Agreement a security regime in which all concerned parties can be represented does not exist.

With respect to the need for an arms control regime, South and North Korea and the United States have similar views but do not agree on the modalities. However, it is clear that arms control measures will not be implemented effectively through the armistice regime, and that security interests of South Korea will not be served by the MAC.

Thus, an arms control regime should be created either by direct talks between the two Koreas or by some participation of the United States in this process. Without initial agreement on the modalities of the talks it will be hard to enter any substantive talks between South and North. As observed in the history of South-North talks, most of the effort was spent on debating negotiation channels without involving any substantive issues. The most recent nuclear issue is an exception.

Resolving Security Problems of the Peninsula

As pointed out earlier, the Korean peninsula faces a security dilemma. This situation generates five major items on the security agenda: prevention of war, prevention of North Korean nuclear proliferation, prudent policy to deal with Pyongyang's fear of collapse, conventional arms control, and regional arms control and security cooperation. Herein, policy measures are considered in relation to each item by applying new concepts of security as previously summarized.

Prevention of War

Chances remain high that densely populated forces along the DMZ might cause either an accidental or calculated war between the two Koreas. During the nuclear crisis in mid-1994 there could have been one: North Korea used a war threat against Seoul by promising to respond with war to sanctions, with dialogue to dialogue. In part, North Korea's threat of war was used as a means to squeeze greater concessions from the United States and South Korea. Because the US and South Korea took no punitive actions, Pyongyang can be expected to repeat such behavior whenever the regime feels on the defensive. Thus, prevention of another war on the peninsula has become the utmost security problem.

As suggested by advocates of common security and cooperative security, war prevention is very important. Before those concepts are applied properly, deterrence is still valid on the Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, nuclear deterrence is losing relevance to the Korean situation because in the Geneva accord the United States provided assurances to Pyongyang against the threat or the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, conventional deterrence is becoming more important and the two Koreas will be drawn into a more heated conventional arms race. Trends are already moving in that direction.

South and North Korea agreed in 1991 not to use force or undertake armed aggression against each other,²⁶ but subsequent to this agreement North Korea did specifically threaten to go to war. So as to confirm North Korea's intentions not to use force, there should be measures to guarantee its commitment. By applying new concepts of security to the Korean situation, we can discover many ways to prevent war. The most effective would be for North Korea to withdraw excess forces from the

26 Article 9 of the South-North Basic Agreement ratified by the two Koreas in February 1992.

forward areas and to change its offensive doctrine and posture into defensive doctrine and posture, points to which I will return.

There is a way to affect North Korean leaders to change their minds: Make the interactive mechanism between North Korea and other nations a long-term game so that North Korea's leaders may see the long-term advantage of cooperating with others rather than resorting to an arms race or threatening force for short-term gain. Regarding unilateral measures, South Korea has already forgone the nuclear option unilaterally and has maintained a defensive doctrine with the United States. In the conventional arena there remains nothing to be done unilaterally. We need to create conditions under which North Korea will decide to take unilateral measures. In this connection, cooperative engagement with the North has provided insights as will be seen below.

Prevention of North Korean Nuclear Proliferation

Regarding the nuclear issue a major breakthrough was made, although there have been ups and downs in the negotiation process for some time. Agreements such as the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the US-DPRK Geneva Accord were made possible.

The reasons why the two Koreas succeeded in signing the denuclearization agreements in 1991 can be summarized as: (1) The end of the Cold War and cooperation among four powers surrounding the Korean peninsula served as a catalyst to continue bilateral nuclear negotiations; (2) International pressure reinforced by US unilateral withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea was so high that North Korea could not but accept the request for denuclearization, reluctantly, and; (3) It is clear that the strong measures taken by the United Nations Security Council (Resolution 687) may have helped to cause North Korea to accept some outside demands.

However, South Korea and the United States were unable to influence North Korea further so that the two Koreas could work out bilateral nuclear inspection agreements for three reasons: (1) Rigidity of North Korea's bureaucracy and intention and a great amount of investment already made hindered full disclosure at the earliest time without compensatory measures from the external world; (2) North Korea's intent on linking conventional arms control issues to the nuclear issue served as a barrier to progress in the nuclear issue because North Korea wants to break down the US-ROK alliance once and for all by suspending Team Spirit military exercises and accelerating the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea;²⁷ and (3) South Korea's strong adherence to the need for special inspections and resumption of Team Spirit were not conducive to negotiations.

In taking into account why Seoul and Washington failed in implementing the Denuclearization Agreements and why North Korea announced it would pull out of the NPT regime, the US-North Korean negotiations produced the Geneva accord for the following reasons: (1) Washington accepted Pyongyang's proposals to resolve the nuclear issue within a somewhat broader framework under which the two sides would improve political and economic relations, while North Korea would freeze its nuclear program; (2) Washington provided a security guarantee to the North Korean regime with assurances against threat or use of forces including nuclear weapons and subsequently cancelled Team Spirit exercises for 1994 and 1995; (3) North Korea agreed to suspend all nuclear activities by agreeing to replace its entire nuclear program with less-nuclear-weapon-prone light-water reactors, and with US provision of an energy substitute, oil; and (4) The United States was flexible

27 On 27 January 1993, the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced it would suspend all South-North dialogue including the bilateral nuclear negotiations because South Korea had announced it would resume Team Spirit military exercises the previous day.

towards the timing and modality regarding the special inspections that the IAEA had requested in February, 1993.

Although there are critics who say that the United States made enormous concessions to North Korea without realizing special inspections at an early date, negotiation strategies in Geneva talks are worth highlighting.

- The United States made efforts to apply concepts of common security and cooperative security to the North Korean issue, providing security assurances to North Korea by acknowledging the legitimacy of its security concerns, as shown in the assurances regarding security of the Pyongyang regime, no threat or use of force including nuclear weapons, and cancellation of Team Spirit. Those are reassurances measures that cooperative security advocates regarded as essential in promoting cooperative security. Common security advocates also agree to the point that those assurances are based on recognition of other nations' legitimate security concerns, therefore leading to joint survival. Those measures also reflected China's concern that the more North Korea is pushed into a corner, the higher becomes the possibility that its leaders will opt for nuclear weapons. Apparently, the United States came to the conclusion that it would be better to pursue arms control and common security on the peninsula rather than seeking absolute security through deterrence and arms race. This policy matched very well the unilateral measures that have been taken in withdrawing nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991.
- The United States pursued political resolution by forgoing its previous policy under the Bush administration that the nuclear issue should not be linked to other matters including improving general relations with North Korea. It reluctantly agreed to North Korea's position that nonproliferation and building political trust are not separate issues. Now, it seems that the two nations are pursuing confidence and trust building at the same time as resolving the nuclear issue. From this point on, the United States is predicted to make efforts to link North Korea's conventional arms control to its future normalization of

diplomatic relations.²⁸ The US approach along this broad framework shows us that the arms control approach will be more effective when it is supplemented by political initiatives.

Prudent Policy to Deal with Pyongyang's Fear of Collapse

As indicated North Korea is taking a vigilant policy against the odds of collapse. Its economy is seriously in jeopardy. Its grain harvests are recorded as worse every year. Pyongyang cannot feed its people well with only two meals a day. The food shortage problem disrupts social control structure by forcing the government to allow people to move around without permission because they need to look for food. Social stability is being undermined. In addition to the food shortage, the energy problem is also serious. Oil supply from Russia has long been suspended and the Chinese oil supply is reaching a record low. There was no other option but to beg oil from the United States as well as rice from South Korea and Japan. Trade is also a problem because of shortage of hard currency.

After Kim Il Sung's death, the political leadership has not been restored. While Kim Jong-il is waiting for his power succession, North Korea is on a high alert together with fear of "the collapse of Communism." The military is being requested to be on high vigilance for and mobilize against any political or social turmoil, as shown in Kim Jong-il's New Year's Address.²⁹

North Korea's policy to revitalize the economy and establish a good relationship with the United States is identified in the New Year's Address of 1995. North Korea's policy priority for the year is placed upon four points: improving relations with the United States according to the Geneva accord; minimizing

28 *Dong-A Ilbo*, 5 November 1994. Ambassador Gallucci's interview. Following the Geneva accord, Gallucci indicated that the US will link North Korea's pull-back of its forward deployed forces to normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea.

29 Korean Workers' Party Press, 1 January 1995.

threats to its security through pursuing a peace treaty with the United States, which will in turn resolve military confrontation between the two Koreas; undermining the US alliance with South Korea by enlarging the split between South Korea and the United States; and, by taking advantage of 1995 as the fiftieth anniversary of Korean Liberation, trying to contact South Korean civic organizations directly in order to create divisions between the government and the people and arousing anti-government sentiments.

North Korea's intentions are clearly to circumvent the South Korean government. Whereas Pyongyang is trying to receive benefits such as oil, light-water reactors, US liaison offices and Japanese reparations to help revitalize its economy, it will in the process try to isolate South Korea to the maximum extent.

In addition, Pyongyang will endeavor to establish direct military channels with the United States as it did in the helicopter case of December 1994.

Pyongyang is playing the differences between the United States and South Korea. They know well that South Korea is not satisfied with what is in the Geneva accord—special inspections per se, the US negotiation style. By claiming from the Geneva accord the political victory of "Pyongyang's independent diplomatic policy," they are making a contrast with South Korea's dependency upon American diplomacy. North Korean leaders think that such a propaganda war will be able to ignite anti-Americanism in Seoul. Also, by dividing the South Korean government and people, they think that Pyongyang will earn time to develop its economy while Seoul struggles with induced political and social instability. This raises potential problems to lie ahead in South Korea's relationship with the United States so long as North Korea opposes inter-Korean talks. It seems that all this miscalculation on the part of the North Korean leaders' was cultivated over fifty years of highly closed and isolated society.

However, a prudent balancing act is required in dealing with North Korea, which fears collapse and which could even choose

to initiate a war as a suicidal attack. However small the possibility is, it could happen if they see no hope to revitalize their economy. For fear of war, however, we cannot simply give North Korea whatever they request. They may spend the money and resources to strengthen war-fighting capabilities. Nevertheless, it is not prudent to repeat the Cold War-type confrontation by increasing offense capabilities, which may provoke the North Korean leadership.

Therefore, though now is not time for us to take unilateral measures to alleviate North Korea's concerns of collapse, it is time to engage North Korea on conditional bases. If North Korea follows what we request, we should provide economic assistance and promote economic cooperation and improving relations.

Conventional Arms Control

As explained, the Korean peninsula is not only militarily unstable, but is also engaged in an arms race. Resolving the nuclear issue alone is less meaningful for South Korea than it would be if the conventional arms race were alleviated, too. Arms racing drains resources from the economic sectors, affecting the economy of both Koreas adversely, but the consequences are more serious to the North. Thus, we need to address the asymmetry of conventional capability on the peninsula in addition to addressing North Korea's offensive posture and doctrine.

In the Geneva talks between the United States and North Korea, US Ambassador Gallucci raised the problem of North Korea's excess forces deployed along the DMZ by pointing out that it undermines peace and stability of the peninsula. As he testified before Congress, the US government seems to be planning to pursue the question of North Korea's ballistic missile activities and its threatening conventional force deployments in later talks over diplomatic normalization.³⁰

30 Testimony of Robert L. Gallucci, Ambassador at Large on the Agreed Framework

If that is so, the conventional arms control issue will be naturally raised in the implementation process of the Geneva accord. If the United States is to ensure military stability by reducing North Korea's surprise attack capabilities through negotiations, North Korea will definitely insist on withdrawal of US forces from South Korea and a pullback of South Korean forces from the front area, too. Then, the two Koreas and the United States will engage in more extensive arms control talks.

With regard to conventional arms control, the NOD approach is particularly relevant except for South Korea's unilateral measures. In the conventional arena, there is no room for South Korea who is outnumbered by North Korean forces especially in the forward areas. In fact, South Korea and the United States did make a concession on Team Spirit and with regard to the nuclear issue. If the Geneva accord is being implemented well, it will not be easy to resume Team Spirit. South Korea, then, lacks effective negotiating cards beyond mutually agreed-upon measures.

After taking into account the fact that Seoul suffers an unfavorable situation in the conventional balance and South Korea's military doctrine and posture are intrinsically defensive, we reach the conclusion that—even though expecting Pyongyang to make unilateral measures is not feasible—North Korea should reduce its offensive capabilities, change its posture, and pull back its forward-deployed forces. Thus, linking our request for arms control to other gains that North Korea will request is a way to increase negotiability, as well illustrated in the Geneva accord.

If we apply the Geneva accord to conventional arms control, it is necessary to set up an eight-year plan to match its implementation. Until North Korea receives special inspections (say, in 1998–99), we would not take reduction measures unless North Korea were willing to reduce forces in excess of those of

with North Korea before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1 December 1994.

South Korea. As a first step before 1997–98, establishing a thin-out zone or non-deployment zone along the DMZ would be a good proposal. Certainly, confidence-building and transparency measures will be pursued at the same time. On a reciprocal basis, each side reduces (or pulls out completely) its forward deployed forces, with greater reduction on the part of Pyongyang because it has more. A non-deployment zone would be akin to setting up wider buffer zones on each side of the DMZ than exist now. An agreement could be made that if one party were to penetrate the new wider zone with forces bigger than one division, it would be regarded as military attack against the other party and the other party and its ally would react to the offense immediately. This will help prevent war in advance and enhance stability in the peninsula.

Once we achieve a success in the thin-out zone or non-deployment zone, then we could proceed to a second step, mutually reducing offensive weapons to a level lower than what South Korea has now. In the process, a progressive withdrawal of American military units from the peninsula could be discussed.³¹ Above all, laying out strategies between the United States and South Korea is required now to draw North Korea to the arms negotiation table.

Regional Arms Control and Security Cooperation

Northeast Asia lacks a multilateral security cooperation regime in which concerned nations can address security issues and take collective actions against an attacker for its violation of peace and security in the region. Animosity embedded in the historical rivalry still prevails among the people of the region. A cooperative approach to deal with regional and international conflict has not been taken seriously. Thus, chances for regional conflicts are

31 Aleksis Bogaturov, Mikhail Nossov, and Konstantine Plehakov, "The Korean Problem and Possible Forms of Soviet-American Interaction," in Smoke and Kortunov, *Mutual Security*, p. 230.

still high and the perceived threats vis-à-vis other countries in the region are higher than the real ones.

If conflicts between one of the four powers and a small country were to occur, the traditional security alliance would not be a solution for conflict resolution because the bilateral security alliances were designed to resolve conflicts between the two security blocs during the Cold War. Lack of an arms-control approach to the regional security problem is likely to aggravate the confrontational relationship among countries in the region.

Looking further at each nation reveals that an arms race³² among countries in the region is under way on the conventional level without having been properly noticed because there has long been peace in the region.

As for China, it has very long nurtured the thought of ruling Asia. When China accomplishes its economic goal of becoming an equal competitor with the United States and Japan in gross terms, it will end up with formidable military powers if it arms itself commensurately. China's traditional strategy of maintaining military superiority to advance national interests over neighboring countries is expected to continue, while it can be expected to take advantage of its superior military power in order to convert that superiority into political power and influence over those countries. In the short run, China will keep downsizing military manpower but keep improving naval and air forces quantitatively and qualitatively.

In addition to continuing to develop its strategic nuclear weapons, China has been raising defense spending at an annual rate of ten to twelve percent over the past four years. Peking increased the import of advanced weapons such as T-72 tanks and MiG-29/31 and Su-27 fighters from Russia. It is observed that China has increased power projection capabilities of its navy

32 Paul Bracken says that "arms race" is not a proper term for what is happening in the Northeast Asian nations, but "arms walk": look at it, he says, as merely an increasing rate of defense expenditures.

and air force to be able to reach distant seas. Countries in the region are not sure of whether China intends to turn economic power into military power once it becomes an economic super power.

As for Japan, it has already shown a shift in its defense strategy from territorial defense to regional defense. As Japanese politics reorganizes itself, more independent strategic thinking is frequently observed. Japan wants its own voice in determining its future security policy. Domestic debates over rearmament to take on defense capabilities commensurate with its economic power are seen as a long-term trend.

According to Japan's Mid-term Defense Program (1991-1995), which was designed to overhaul its defense capabilities centering around its most advanced defense technologies, the following areas are worth noting: increased anti-submarine warfare capabilities, introduction of AEGIS-equipped destroyers and AWAC wide-area radar aircraft, large helicopter-carrying destroyers, new Patriot missiles, and P-3C anti-submarine aircraft. In addition, a long-range air-defense system is under development in the name of the Theater Missile Defense as means to counter North Korean and Chinese ballistic missile threats.³³ The THAAD system is aimed at enhancing wide-area defense against longer-range missile threats coming from China and North Korea. Nations in the region are sensitive to Japan's future direction with suspicion that it might add all its technological capabilities together and emerge as quite a military power.

Thus, we need to build trust and confidence in Northeast Asia by regularizing ongoing bilateral and multilateral security dialogue either through participation in the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or by creating a Northeast Asian security forum where the two Koreas and four powers (the United States, Russia, Japan and China) attend. This initiative is in line with CS and with the cooperative

33 *Jane's Defense Weekly*, "The Threat from the North," 21 May 1994, p. 26.

security approach. If nations in Northeast Asia can collaborate to enhance peace and stability in their own security forum, prevention of both war and nuclear proliferation will be accomplished with ease.

The United States, Japan, and South Korea joined the ASEAN PMC as members of ASEAN's seven dialogue partners with along with the six ASEAN countries. As a result of collective endeavors in the PMC on 26 July 1993, the ARF, with for the first time in history the participation of all countries in the region, was held in July 1994. Issues discussed included both political and security matters: territorial disputes, security cooperation such as preventive diplomacy and conflict management, peace-keeping forces, the United Nations Conventional Arms Transfer Register, nonproliferation, political issues including human rights, etc.

The issues discussed in the ARF will be able to be discussed in this Northeast Asia security forum. If such a forum is fully organized, it will definitely help resolve security problems of the Korean peninsula and will be able to replicate the success story of preventing North Korea's nuclear ambition to the other regional nuclear issues, such as reducing China's nuclear arsenals and controlling Japan's use of plutonium. This forum will help alleviate historical enmities among regional nations. Then will we be able to ask for mutual restraints on defense buildup and consequently on changing offensive posture, doctrine, and weapons. The final goal will be to establish a regional collective security system by replacing all bilateral alliances. However, there are several interim steps to reach the final and ambitious goal.

If we suppose that a regional security forum will become a reality in the far distant future, it is an interesting question as to what defense policy the unified Korea will take.

The unified Korea will choose NOD measures. Unified Korea's physical size and armed forces (of course, the size of armed forces will depend on how the two Koreas reach unification) will

be relatively small compared with those of China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Also, alliance with one nation among four surrounding nations would create an entrapment dilemma. Some Korean experts see that common security will become more relevant to Korea during the post-unification era.³⁴ At that time, it will be difficult for Korea to build an offensive posture strongly enough to counter China's nuclear threats or Japan's potential threats. Regional security cooperation regime will be needed for both the unified Korea as well as the neighboring nations.

Conclusion

In this paper, I derived sources of threats to the two Koreas before examining the relevance of an arms-control approach to the Korean peninsula. North Korea's high propensity for war in the past as well as present, its offensive military strategy and posture, the overall conventional military imbalance in its favor, and its recent nuclear ambition and missile program constitute major sources of threats to South Koreans. To Pyongyang, the possibility of regime collapse, a continuing US-ROK alliance, and unfavorable long-term economic trends constitute threats. Those threats make their security dilemma go from bad to worse as time goes on.

To resolve those threats and as well as Seoul's security dilemma, a five-policy agenda was presented: prevention of war, prevention of nuclear proliferation, a prudent policy in dealing with North Korea's fear of collapse, conventional arms control, and regional arms control and security cooperation. In dealing with each agenda constructively, I tested the relevance of new

34 The Korean Presidential Commission on the 21st Century, *Korea in the 21st Century*, (Seoul: 1994), p. 1160. The Commission maintains that the Unified Korea should have defense-oriented weapon systems and contribute to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia by changing the role of its armed forces into one of regional forces in the future.

security concepts, in particular, the common security and NOD approaches.

The NOD approach and cooperative security were useful to explain how the United States was successful in reaching the Geneva accord with North Korea. In particular, the unilateral approach helped to engage North Korea so as to pursue a negotiated settlement later. However, a limitation was discovered in available unilateral measures. It is suggested that the arms control approach should be pursued with supplemental measures other than military ones, within a broader framework under which North Korea sees long-term gains by negotiating with other nations.

It was also suggested that we need to devise a long-term overarching conventional arms control plan in parallel with the implementation schedule of the Geneva accord. First, setting up a thin-out zone or non-deployment zone along the DMZ was suggested, followed by reduction measures after North Korea receives special inspections on their nuclear sites. To prevent war and deal with North Korea's concern about its collapse, it is better for us to make the interactive mechanism between the two Koreas and other nations a long-term, viable one. Along this line, establishing a Northeast Asian security forum is proposed to address the security concerns of the six Northeast Asian nations. What CS intends to accomplish will be well served by such regional cooperation regime in place, and CS will become more relevant to the unified Korea's security policy.