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Dealing with Pyongyang: In Search of a More Effective Strategy

C. Kenneth Quinones

Abstract

The United States and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) both claim equal determination to achieve a peaceful, diplomatic solution to the Korean Peninsula's nuclear issue, but their strategies have failed to achieve progress toward their avowed goal. Here we focus on Washington's preferred strategy of "neo-containment." The Bush Administration, since taking office in 2001, has consistently rejected any engagement of North Korea, diplomatically and commercially. Yet at the same time it has declared its preference for a "diplomatic" solution to the nuclear issue. Achieving a "diplomatic" solution without diplomacy and diplomatic dialogue is impossible. Since the start of his second term, however, President Bush appears to have moderated his rejection of "engagement" by tempering his preference for "containment" with some aspects of engagement. This has yielded a hybrid strategy labeled here as "neo-containment." All the fundamental elements of containment remain in place, such as restrictions on diplomatic contact and economic sanctions, but some dialogue is permitted "under the umbrella of the Six-Party Talks and for the sole purpose of resolving the nuclear issue." Bush's "neo-containment" strategy, however, ignores the fact that even if the Six-Party Talks resume, successful negotiation of a resolution and its implementation will require a strategy of engagement.

Key Words: containment, CVID, engagement, neo-containment, Six-Party Talks

Vol. 14, No. 1, 2005, pp. 1-30.

Introduction

Double failure does not yield success. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and US President George Bush claim they want a "peaceful diplomatic solution" to the Korean Peninsula's nuclear woes, but their strategies have failed to achieve their avowed goals. More effective strategies are urgently needed. But first we need to examine the factors impeding progress on both sides.

Kim Jong Il claims he is defending his domain from Washington's "hostile policy" and wants "friendly relations" with the United States. But his Foreign Ministry finally confirmed on February 10, 2005 that North Korea had broken numerous previous promises and built "a nuclear deterrence capability."[1] Pyongyang claimed that the United States' hostile posture compelled it to do so. North Korea continues to declare that it will return to the Six-Party Talks, once the Bush Administration "switches to a policy of peaceful coexistence."[2] North Korea has since escalated tensions with assertions that it is now a nuclear power. It has also declared an end to its voluntary moratorium on testing ballistic missiles. On March 31, 2005, Pyongyang suggested in an authoritative Foreign Ministry statement that disarmament talks should be considered as a replacement for the Six-Party Talks process.[3] The international response to Kim's assertive stance has been universally negative.

Equally, President Bush's "pre-emptive" nuclear nonproli-

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[1] DPRK Foreign Ministry, "Spokesman Statement," *Korea Central News Agency (KCNA)*, February 10, 2005.

[2] For a discussion of North Korea's perspective of the United States, see C. Kenneth Quinones, "The United States in North Korean Foreign Policy," in Koh Byung Chul (ed.), *North Korea and the World - Explaining Pyongyang's Foreign Policy* (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press 2005).

[3] DPRK Foreign Ministry Statement, March 31, 2005; Yonhap Interview with DPRK Deputy Permanent Representative Han Song-Ryol interviews, *Yonhap News*, April 1, 2005; Barbara Slavin, "North Korea Arsenal May be Growing," *USA Today*, April 19, 2005.

feration strategy, refusal to negotiate with North Korea, and moralistic condemnation of North Korea's leadership have not promoted a diplomatic solution. As recently as April 28 in a nationally televised press conference, Bush labeled Kim Jong Il a "dangerous man," and a "tyrant who starves his people." These comments erased any good will Secretary of State Rice's March tour of East Asia might have nurtured when she referred to North Korea as a "sovereign state." Pyongyang promptly and predictably responded to Bush's rhetoric by declaring him a "dictator."

Common sense dictates that a diplomatic solution requires diplomacy. President Bush, however, began with the opposite. He asserts that the United States has the unilateral right of "pre-emptive" nuclear attack on members of his self-defined "Axis of Evil," which includes North Korea. Since late 2003, Bush has demanded North Korea's complete capitulation, in the form of CVID or complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear programs. He has made this a precondition for direct diplomatic dialogue and dismissed the possibility of any concessions from the U.S. until Pyongyang has accepted his demands. At the same time, President Bush has frequently made it clear that he has no respect for his North Korean adversary with emotive labels such as "pygmy, tyrant, and outpost of tyranny." Neither such a strategy nor rhetoric promotes an atmosphere conducive to a diplomatic solution.

Pyongyang and Washington moved in early May 2005 to quickly temper escalating tensions with a "New York Channel" meeting on May 13, 2005. The meeting followed North Korea's May 8 suggestion that such a meeting be convened in New York. At the meeting, according to press reports, US State Department officers Ambassador Joseph DeTrani and Korea Affairs Director James Foster met DPRK Ambassadors to the United Nations Pak Gil Yon and Han Song-Ryol. The US side offered North Korea:

- Resumption of substantive diplomatic dialogue about outstanding bilateral issues within the New York Channel
- Engagement in direct bilateral diplomatic dialogue within the context of the Six-Party Talks
- Provision of multilateral security assurances, if it would rejoin the Six-Party Talks. China had convened these talks in June 2003, to find a diplomatic means to free the Korean Peninsula of nuclear weapons. China, Japan, the two Koreas, Russia, and the United States had joined the talks and all the participants initially concurred with the goal of pursuing a "peaceful diplomatic solution."

As of mid-May 2005, the second Korean nuclear crisis had reached a decisive junction in the search for a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula. If North Korea accepts the US proposal of May 13, and returns to the Six-Party Talks, the pursuit of a diplomatic solution will continue. On the other hand, a negative response from Pyongyang will intensify already escalated tensions.

Even if Pyongyang agrees to return to the Six-Party Talks, a peaceful outcome is far from being assured. The fundamental impediment to a peaceful resolution will remain the insistence of both sides on fundamentally coercive strategies for dealing with each other. Their mutually confrontational stance is not conducive to diplomatic dialogue and compromise. Obviously, if war is to be avoided, Pyongyang and Washington must replace their current postures and strategies with ones more prone to nurture diplomacy.

The current situation has significant parallels with bilateral US-DPRK relations on the eve of the first Korean War a half-century ago. The primary antagonists today remain the United States and North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea). Fifty years ago the concern was how to halt the spread of communism in the wake of China's "fall to communism," and North Korea's invasion of South Korea. Today, the focus has shifted to how best to halt the spread of

nuclear weapons and associated technology while simultaneously deterring war and pursuing national reconciliation on a still divided Korean Peninsula. Despite profoundly changed circumstances in Northeast Asia and around the world, the options for dealing with the increasingly complex and potentially volatile situation on the Korean Peninsula remain limited to engagement, containment, or armed confrontation.[4]

Back to the Future

The legacies of the Korean War (1950-53) and the Cold War continue to haunt the US-North Korea relationship. The Korean War "armistice" halted the combat but not the hostility. Because of the war, Pyongyang's generals continue view the present through a distorted perception of the past. They point to the "technical state of war" that persists between their nation and the United States. The presence of US military forces in South Korea and Japan is a threat, in their eyes, to North Korea's existence and their justification for maintaining a million-man army, an enormous arsenal of conventional weapons and an increasingly potent arsenal of ballistic missiles and possibly nuclear weapons. Their claim of having defeated United States "imperialism" in the Korean War legitimizes their domination of the Kim Jong Il regime, a reality recognized by Kim Jong Il's motto of "military first government" (*songun chongch'i)*. The sum result is a persistent pursuit of armed parity with the United States.[5]

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[4] For in-depth discussions of US Cold War strategies, see Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Touchstone 1994), and *Years of Renewal* (New York: Touchstone 1999). Also see George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1993). Regarding the transition from containment to engagement in US policy towards North Korea, see C. Kenneth Quinones, "North Korea: From Containment to Engagement," in Dae-sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee (eds.), *North Korea After Kim Il Sung* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1998).

[5] Byung Chul Koh, "Military-First Politics and Building a *Kangsong taeguk*," Institute

President Bush's strategy for dealing with North Korea also remains linked to the Korean War. Four years ago he selected a strategy of containment over engagement. Apparently, his primary motivation was domestic political considerations rather than geo-political realities.[6] Bush sought from the beginning of his Administration to distance and distinguish himself from his Democratic predecessor President Clinton.

Paradoxically, Bush reverted to Democratic President Truman's Cold War strategy of countering communism and communist regimes with "containment." At the same time, Bush dismissed the strategy of "engagement" as tantamount to appeasement. Actually, Republican President Nixon, at the behest of his famous National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, had initiated the strategy of engagement to draw "Red" China away from the former Soviet Union. Later, President Reagan would apply "engagement" to the Soviet Union, a decade after which the "evil empire" collapsed. Then in 1988, President Bush senior joined forces with South Korea to pursue a common strategy of engagement with North Korea. President Clinton merely continued his Republican predecessors' preference of engagement. President Bush junior abruptly and profoundly altered U.S. foreign policy by discarding engagement for "neo-containment."

The Containment Option

The classical form of containment served as the corner stone of US national security strategy during the Cold War of 1947 to 1990. The US strategy concentrated on containing the "global threat of communism." The goals were to:

- Deter aggression by the Soviet Union and its allies by confronting

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of Far East Studies Forum (IFES), forum@kyungnam.ac.kr (March 25, 2005).

[6] C. Kenneth Quinones, "Dualism in the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy," *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2003.

them with superior nuclear and conventional military force possessed by a network of collective alliances
- Isolate diplomatically "communist" nations by discrediting their legitimacy and blocking their entry into international and regional associations; while also
- Erode their economic vitality using economic sanctions and embargoes.

The "deterrence capability" of containment was asserted through a triad of nuclear equipped bombers, submarines, and ballistic missiles. Only the United States' superior economic and technological prowess could maintain such an expensive and sophisticated arsenal. Containment was defensive and reactionary in orientation, not offensive and pre-emptive. Containment also emphasized collective military alliances and multilateral diplomacy, which tempered any unilateral impulses harbored by American presidents.

During the Cold War, the application of containment to North Korea differed little from elsewhere, except in one respect. President Truman had succeeded in gaining the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemnation of North Korean "aggression" against South Korea. Throughout the Cold War, the United States used this moralistic condemnation to justify its championing of South Korea and efforts to isolate and discredit the government in North Korea. US official animosity towards North Korea was translated into extensive economic sanctions and intense global efforts to diplomatically exclude North Korea from the international community.

The presidential administrations of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson applied a similar strategy to North Vietnam. They saw its invasion of South Vietnam as having numerous similarities to the Korean experience. Eventually containment's inability to achieve either an end to the Vietnam War or Vietnam's reunification convinced America's strategists to shift to a new strategy – engagement.

Transition to Engagement

President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger initiated a gradual conversion of containment into engagement beginning in 1971. They first commenced negotiations with North Vietnam, a profound alteration of containment's basic premise of diplomatic isolation of the adversary. They next launched diplomatic and athletic engagement of "Red" China, intending to ensure the separation from the Soviet Union by defusing Chinese hostility and mistrust of the United States. They used diplomatic and commercial inducements to encourage Chinese transformation into an internationally respected nation that would become increasingly democratic and capitalistic. At the same time, the United States maintained the potency of its deterrence capability to defend itself and its East Asian allies from possible armed assault by China and/or its allies. The combination of collective armed deterrence, multilateral diplomatic, and commercial exchange became the hallmarks of their engagement strategy.

Subsequent U.S. presidential administrations retained and refined engagement. Presidents Ford and Carter pursued a similar strategy towards the "Communist bloc" nations of eastern Europe. President Reagan extended the approach to the Soviet Union during the 1980s, after which President Bush began to apply engagement strategy to China after 1988. Even the traumatic events of the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 did not weaken Bush's commitment to engagement with China. In 1993, President Clinton also continued engagement as the United States' preferred global strategy.

Engagement became the preferred strategy for promoting United States' national interests in the three decades between 1971 and 2001. A Republican president had initiated the transition from containment to engagement, and subsequent Republican presidents had refined and extended the strategy around the world. The success of engagement had contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union and communism.

Presidents Carter and Clinton, both Democrats, also adopted the strategy. Regarding North Korea, President Bush senior initiated engagement with North Korea and his successor merely continued the strategy.

Neo-Containment

Since taking office in January 2001, the younger President Bush and his closest advisers have sought replace engagement and its multilateral deterrence capability with a new form of containment. The basic premise of "neo-containment" is that a few "rogue" nations possess weapons of mass destruction (or WMD which includes nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, plus ballistic missiles), which requires the United States adopt a pre-emptive counter posture and build, in addition to its own nuclear umbrella, a "national ballistic missile defense system" to neutralize the threat posed by those nations.

- When the trauma of "9/11" caught the Bush Administration completely unprepared to deal with global terrorism, President Bush promptly merged the two threats. He declared America's "new" worst enemy an "Axis of Evil" and identified its members as Iraq, North Korea, and Iran.[7]

The Bush Administration defined neo-containment on the basis of this new threat. "Cold War" containment was essentially defensive. It aspired to halt the spread of communism and deter invasion and war using military superiority, collective security arrangements, and diplomatic and commercial isolation of the adversary. President Bush discarded multilateralism in favor of unilateralism, dismissed multilateral organizations as ineffective, declared US military supremacy,

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[7] *Ibid*, pp. 197-224.

and claimed the sovereign right to launch pre-emptive military strikes against any nation deemed a potential threat to US security. He determined that all nations should follow the United States' lead. Only then could they demonstrate that they are "either for or against" the United States in its war on global terrorism.[8] This is the essence of neo-containment.

Neo-Containment and North Korea

The Bush Administration's application of "neo-containment" to North Korea is a consequence of several factors, dating from 1994 these include:

- Republican control of the US Congress dating from November 1994
- The assumption that North Korea was on the verge of economic collapse
- The suspicions Americans and South Koreans share about North Korea credibility and intentions
- Similarly common concerns among conservatives in Seoul and Washington about the Clinton Administration's allegiance to the longstanding US-Republic of Korea alliance.

The October 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework, their first bilateral diplomatic accord, stands at the center of a continuing controversy over how to deal with North Korea. It was signed on the eve of Democratic President Clinton's re-election and only one month before Republicans won control of the US Congress. President Clinton regarded the agreement as a key diplomatic success. His critics promptly

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[8] US State Department, *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington, DC: Department of States), December 2002, online at www.whitehouse.gov. White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Ibid*., Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster 2002).

countered that it encompassed the essence of "appeasement." These critics contended then, and many continue today to do so, that the Accord's provision of the annual shipment of 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea and program of gradual normalization of diplomatic and commercial relations between North Korea and the international community would strengthen North Korea's ability to attack South Korea, endanger the US troops stationed there, and perpetuate a ruthless authoritarian regime that could not be trusted to halt its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Similar concerns were voiced in South Korea. The administration of President Kim Yong-Sam deeply distrusted North Korea, but also had reservations about the Clinton Administration's allegiance to the US-ROK alliance. Seoul's distrust was rooted in its claim that the Clinton Administration had not given South Korea's concerns due consideration during the negotiations with North Korea. Also, the Seoul government alleged that the United States, by giving aid to North Korea and engaging it in diplomatic dialogue and negotiations, was undercutting the longstanding US-South Korea defense alliance. Republicans in the US Congress echoed these same concerns.[9]

Contending Factions - Hard or Soft Landing?

Meanwhile, North Korea between 1994 and 2000 struggled to survive. Its economy was in steep decline. No longer could it turn to its

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[9] For insight into ROK President Kim Young-Sam's term, see Donald Kirk, *Korean Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press 1999). President Kim's policy towards North Korea is discussed in C. Kenneth Quinones, "South Korea's Approaches to North Korea: A Glacial Process," in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim (eds.), *Korean Security Dynamics in Transition* (New York: Palgrave 2001). Leon Sigel addressed the tension between the Kim Young-Sam and Clinton Administrations during the first US-DPRK nuclear negotiations. See Leon Sigel, *Disarming Strangers - Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998).

former benefactors, China and Soviet Union, for assistance. Pyongyang's relations with Beijing turned frigid after China normalized relations with South Korea in 1992. Furthermore, China was preoccupied with revitalizing its own economy. The Soviet Union had collapsed and Russia lacked both the political commitment and economic ability to aid North Korea. North Korea appeared on the verge of following the other Soviet "satellite" nations into the dustbin of history.

By the Fall of 1995, North Korea's collapse seemed imminent, as near famine conditions prevailed. For the first time, the Pyongyang government sought international humanitarian assistance. The response was prompt, positive, and profound. Between 1995 and 2001, the international community delivered more than one billion dollars worth of food aid to North Korea. Additional millions of dollars of aid in the form of basic human needs such as medical supplies, household equipment, sustainable development projects, and training were and still are being provided.

Conditions in North Korea gave rise to an intense and continuing debate over whether North Korea would either collapse ("hard" landing) or transform itself ("soft" landing). An underlying assumption of both schools remains the belief that economic conditions in North Korea will determine the North Korea's political fate. Advocates of a "hard landing" claim an economic collapse was imminent, but the strategy of engagement has perpetuated the despotic Kim Jong Il regime. Promoters of a "soft landing" believe a strategy of engagement will promote North Korea's gradual transformation and greatly reduce the possibility of political turmoil or war in North Korea.[10]

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[10] The debate among "Korea" experts peaked between 1997 and 2001. A concise summary of these divergent views appears in Warren I. Cohen, "Compromised in Korea Redeemed by the Clinton Administration?," *Foreign Policy* (May/June 1997), pp. 106-112. The views of those who advocated engagement and a "soft" landing can be found in Kim Kyung-wan and Han Sung-joo (eds.), *Managing*

The advocates of a "soft" landing aligned themselves with the Clinton Administration while critics gravitated towards the "hard" landing advocates. By 1997-98, conditions in North Korea suggested that it was destined for collapse. Many self-proclaimed "Korea experts" emerged in Washington's conservative think tanks, including the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, and the CSIS Pacific Forum. They shared the consensus that North Korea was a "failed system" on the verge of economic collapsed. Furthermore, they argued that once the United States stopped supplying humanitarian aid and the heavy fuel oil being provided under the Agreed Framework, Kim Jong Il's regime in Pyongyang would soon collapse.[11]

By 2001, several of these experts soon found themselves in the first Bush Administration. During the six-month review of North Korea policy, these advocates of a "hard" landing successfully argued that a shift from engagement to neo-containment would be the most effective way to deal with North Korea. President Bush and his closest

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Change on the Korean Peninsula (Seoul: Seoul Press 1998). The opposite viewpoint appears in Henry Sokolski (ed.), *Planning for a Peaceful Korea* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute 2001).

[11] Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute and Michael Green, formerly with the Council on Foreign Relations and currently in the Bush Administration as the senior Asia adviser on the National Security Council, championed the "hard landing" scenario. Nicholas Eberstadt, "Hastening Korean Unification," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1997), "Prospects for Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation in the Sunshine Era," in *To the Brink of Peace* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2001). Michael Green, "North Korean Regime Crisis: US Perspectives and Responses," *Korean Journal of Defense Analyses* (Winter 1997). Marcus Noland of the International Institute of Economics in Washington has maintained a middle position between "hard" and "soft" landing scenarios. His thesis is that North Korea will "muddle through." Marcus Noland, "Why North Korea Will Muddle Through," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August1997). Selig Harrison is one of the more outspoken advocates of a "soft" landing. Selig Harrison, "Promoting a Soft Landing in Korea," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1997). Also see C. Kenneth Quinones, "Beyond Collapse - Continuity and Change in North Korea," *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2, February 2002.

foreign policy advisers clearly agreed.

Neo-Containment Split the Administration

Beginning in June 2001, the Bush Administration's basic strategy for dealing with North Korea has been one of neo-containment. It would be simplistic, however, to suggest that everyone in the Bush Administration promptly lined up against engagement and for containment. On the contrary, from its conception, the Bush Administration has been deeply divided over how to deal with North Korea.

The State Department became, and remains, a bastion for promoters of engagement and a "soft landing." Their number included Secretary of State Colin Powell, who had first learned about engagement while serving President Reagan, and Deputy Secretary of State Armitage. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly also preferred engagement over containment. Although he had served in the former Bush Administration's National Security Council and was an early architect of engagement towards North Korea, Kelly was insufficiently senior to assertively promote his views. One of his close advisers on North Korea, US Army Colonel Jack Pritchard, also favored engagement but finally resigned his ambassadorship in protest at Bush's preference for neo-containment.

These so-called "moderates" had to compete for President Bush's attention with more influential "hard line" advocates of neo-containment, including Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice, and the State Department Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs John Bolton. The shuffling of personnel at the beginning of the second Bush Administration has clearly strengthened the hand of those who advocate neo-containment and North Korea's "hard landing."

The situation during Bush's second term has changed little. Former National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice replaced Powell and promptly began to champion assertive diplomacy as the best way to deal with Pyongyang. By May 2005, she found herself advocating "engagement" in the form of bilateral US-DPRK talks under the Six-Party Talks umbrella. She consequently found herself at odds with Vice President Cheney and his bureaucratic allies who prefer neo-containment.

Meanwhile, South Korea had undergone a shift from favoring containment to pursuing engagement to promote North-South Korean reconciliation. The administration of South Korean President Kim Yong-Sam (1993-97) had vacillated between engagement and containment. After the Agreed Framework's signing, Kim increasingly preferred containment. North Korea's infiltration of commandoes into South Korea in the fall of 1996 understandably played a significant role in Kim's conversion to containment and advocacy of a "hard landing." When the liberal Kim Dae-jung became president early in 1999, however, South Korea reverted to a strategy of engagement, continued by his successor Roh Moo-hyun since 2003.

Consequently, the debate over neo-containment versus engagement not only divided the Bush Administration, it is a fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and South Korea over how best to deal with North Korea.

Converting Carrots into Sticks

Since assuming office in 2001, the Bush Administration has worked to convert the "carrots" of engagement into "sticks" for pursuing the containment of North Korea. Early in his first term, President Bush confronted Kim Jong Il with a dilemma: either forego his entire arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical

and ballistic missile), or face his regime's inevitable demise. Bush declared North Korea unworthy of diplomatic negotiations because conciliatory diplomacy would "reward" North Korea for its "past misdeeds."[12] Material aid such as food was phased out. Instead, Bush held out the promise of a "bold initiative" that could include humanitarian assistance to the people of North Korea, but only after their government had declared its readiness to disarm completely and their leader Kim Jong Il demonstrated greater respect for the North Korean people.[13] The Bush Administration repeatedly claimed that it would "talk" to North Korea, and its subtle distinction between diplomatic

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[12] Leading Congressional critics of the Clinton Administration's engagement policy towards North Korea formed the North Korea Advisory Group. The Republican group was chaired by Congressman Benjamin Gilman, Republican, New York and Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations. Members of Congress on the committee came from the House committees on International Relations, Foreign Operations, Intelligence and Armed Services. Selected Congressional staff, working with the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and Government Accounting Office (GAO) produced a lengthy and detailed assessment of Clinton's engagement strategy. The report was made public in 1999. The report warned that North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities "have improved dramatically." The Clinton Administration was faulted for unsatisfactory monitoring of its food and heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea. Also the aid "frees other resources for North Korea to divert to its WMD and conventional military programs." Key members of the working group subsequently shifted to other jobs. Peter Brookes first accepted an appointment as a deputy assistant secretary in the Department of Defense's Bureau of Asian Policy, but soon after became vice president of the Heritage Foundation. Chuck Downs moved to the American Enterprise Institute. Mark Kirk was elected as a Republican member of Congress. One year later, the Council on Foreign Relations North Korea Working Group reached similar conclusions. The group's Republican co-chairman Richard Armitage became Deputy Secretary of State in the new Bush Administration, James Kelly of CSIS (Pacific Forum) became Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Paul Wolfowitz (then dean of John Hopkins School of Area and International Studies [SAIS] became Deputy Secretary of Defense and Torkel Patterson (CSIS Pacific Forum) and Michael Green (Council on Foreign Relations) were appointed to the National Security Council.

[13] George W. Bush, "Statement by the President on North Korea Policy," White House Press Release, June 6, 2001, online at www.whitehouse.gov. Colin Powell, "Remarks at the Asia Society Annual Dinner," New York City, June 10, 2002, online at www.state.gov. For further background, see C. Kenneth Quinones, "The United States in North Korean Foreign Policy," forthcoming in Byung Chol Koh (ed.), *North Korea and The World* (Seoul: Institute for Far East Studies 2004).

"dialogue" and "negotiation" was not explained until June 2002.

North Korea promptly rejected Bush's proposal. It subsequently and repeatedly threatened to break the Agreed Framework and to resume its nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang squandered the opportunity to engage the United States in diplomatic dialogue in October 2002. First a ranking North Korean diplomat reportedly admitted to a North Korean uranium enrichment program, although denials followed from his superior the next day. The US delegation departed Pyongyang even more suspicious of North Korea's real conduct and actual intentions regarding its nuclear programs.[14]

In Washington, the foes of engagement seized the opportunity to promote containment. In the words of a National Security Agency official, who spoke off the record to US journalists at the end of October 2002, North Korea was guilty of a "material breech" of the US-DPRK 1994 Agreed Framework. A stunned international community aligned with Washington and publicly censured North Korea. The Bush Administration promptly won Congressional approval to halt any further aid to North Korea. By November 2002, even more strident actions were being considered in Washington.[15] It accused North Korea of "nuclear blackmail" and claimed it unworthy of being the United States' negotiating partner.[16]

North Korea's subsequent escalation of tensions made it poli-

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[14] James Kelly, "Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson Center," Washington, DC, December 11, 2002, online at www.state.gov. "Statement of the Foreign Ministry Spokesman," October 15 and 25, 2002, www.kcna.co.jp.

[15] The material breach comment is based on a confidential conversation with a journalist. Regarding the Bush Administration's reaction, see Richard Boucher, US Department of State spokesman, "North Korean Nuclear Program," October 16, 2002, online at www.state.gov. George W. Bush, "Remarks by President Bush and Polish President Kwasniewski," Washington, DC, January 14, 2003.

[16] Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster 2002). George W. Bush, "Remarks by President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi in Joint Press Conference," Tokyo, Japan, February 18, 2002; "Remarks by President Bush and President Kim Dae-jung in Press Availability," Seoul, Republic of Korea, February 20, 2002, online at www.state.gov.

tically impossible in Washington for any one to advocate continuing engagement with North Korea. At the start of 2003, North Korea quickly pronounced the Agreed Framework null and void, expelled the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) nuclear inspectors, restarted its 5 megawatt plutonium reactor at Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center and then announced that it no longer belonged to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Six-Party Talks

Pyongyang's conduct has never conformed to the Bush Administration's expectations. In the case of North Korea, neo-containment is premised on the assumptions that the United States' military supremacy and North Korea's poverty would compel Pyongyang to submit to Washington's will. Obviously, that has not happened nor does it appear imminent in the near future. As of February 2003, tensions in Northeast Asia were being rapidly intensifying as a consequence of the dueling between Washington and Pyongyang over North Korea's nuclear intentions.

Fortunately for all the concerned nations, China in the spring of 2003 intervened. First it brought the US and North Korea together for so-called Three Party Talks. Those set the stage for Six-Party Talks, which commenced in the summer of 2003. These brought together the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. The common avowed purpose was to forge a peaceful diplomatic accord to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula. All the parties to these talks promptly signed up to this goal. However, ever since, the talks have been stalled primarily because of differences between the Washington and Pyongyang.

In summary, President Bush's neo-containment strategy is fundamentally at odds with a strategy of engagement preferred not just by

North Korea's Kim Jong Il, but also South Korea, China, and Russia. From the beginning of the Talks, the United States has refused to engage North Korea in either direct diplomatic dialogue or negotiations. President Bush continues to insist that North Korea cannot be trusted to negotiate in good faith. Instead, he adheres to demands that North Korea "completely, verifiably, irreversibly dismantle" (CVID) all its nuclear programs, both military and civilian. North Korea, furthermore, should do so without any compensation. Once it has accepted CVID, President Bush promises that he will consider giving North Korea appropriate economic rewards.

President Bush's continuing position regarding the Six-Party Talks reflects the essence of neo-containment. His position is unilateral. Only Japan has voiced support, while quietly conveying through diplomatic channels that it would prefer greater US flexibility. President Bush bases his position on a moralistic judgment of North Korea's past conduct. Having accused North Korea of "breaking past promises and of "nuclear blackmail," he refuses to "reward" it by engaging in diplomatic negotiations.

Bush's primary reason for engaging in the talks has been to concentrate multilateral pressure on North Korea, not to pursue a negotiated settlement. Originally, Bush presented Kim Jong Il a choice between submitting to the US demand for CVID, or risking the US "military option." Since the start of his second term, Bush has endeavored to compel China to squeeze North Korea into a choice between submitting to Bush's demands or risk loosing China's economic support. In early May 2005, however, the Beijing government rejected pressure from Washington to at least temporarily halt oil and other economic aid shipments to Pyongyang.[17]

This illustrates the two basic assumptions of neo-containment.

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[17] *Washington Post*, May 7, 2005.

The first is that an adversary would rather submit to US demands than risk war with its a military superior. Secondly, given North Korea's feeble economic situation, Kim Jong Il would not risk the collapse of his regime by jeopardizing China's extensive economic assistance.

Economic Sanctions

At the same time, President Bush has sustained and even reinforced measures beyond diplomacy that are designed to coerce North Korea into accepting his "CVID" goal.

Foremost among these is the Bush Administration's extensive regime of economic sanctions. Most date from the Korean War and fall under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Others were imposed following North Korea's last known act of terrorism, bombing a South Korean airliner in 1987, killing almost 200 people. These sanctions prevent US investment of any kind in North Korea, including any US government "sustainable" developmental aid. Following the previous Bush Administration's 1988 "limited initiative," Americans continue to gain licenses to sell and export to North Korea items classified as "basic human needs," including food, clothing, medicines, and similar materials required to sustain normal life. Commercial investment, however, remains prohibited. North Korea is barred from acquiring "Most Favored Nation" (MFN) status, without which all goods imported from North Korea into the United States are subject to prohibitive import duties and highly restrictive quotas.[18]

The small number of sanctions lifted by previous Admini-

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[18] Rinn-Sup Shinn, *Korea: Procedural and Jurisdictional Questions Regarding Possible Normalization of Relations with North Korea* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service 1994). Dianne E. Rennack, *North Korea: Economic Sanctions* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service 2003). Congressional Research Service, "Memorandum on "Terrorism List" Sanctions," Washington, DC (March 5, 2004).

strations have not been restored. US citizens may travel to North Korea, a barrier lifted in 1982. Telecommunication contact between the two nations is still allowed. US ships and aircrafts are still allowed to deliver humanitarian goods to North Korea, and the US government allows citizens to use US credit cards in North Korea. North Korea, however, does not accept any American credit cards. Although the Clinton Administration phased out some sanctions, the most potent ones remain firmly in place.

International Organizations

The US, with the continuing cooperation of Japan and other key allies, blocks North Korea's entry into all international financial organizations and most international organizations such as the World Trade Organization and OPEC. Consequently, North Korea is unable to enter the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These organizations are the potential source of large, low cost loans and other assistance vital for North Korea's economic modernization. Membership of the United Nations and its related agencies, first acquired during the previous Bush Administration, remains unaffected.

Proliferation Security Initiative

Since December 2002, the United States has increased the economic impediments to North Korean development. Relying on the published research of a few conservative Washington think tanks, the Bush Administration claimed that the Kim Jong Il government relies heavily on various illegal and unsavory exports to sustain itself. These include mind-altering drugs, counterfeit currency, and weapons of mass destruction, particularly ballistic missiles.[19]

To make its point, the US Department of Defense, with the assistance of a Spanish warship, seized a shipment of North Korean-produced Scud C short-range ballistic missiles in December 2002 from a Cambodian registered cargo ship en route to Yemen. The US, however, was ultimately forced to release the shipment as seizure on the high seas is illegal under international law. Moreover, international law does not prohibit the sale of ballistic missiles.[20]

Undeterred, President Bush formally launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in June 2003. The initiative aims to deter and obstruct international trade in illegal drugs, counterfeit money, and equipment, materials, and technology related to weapons of mass destruction. The PSI integrates current international law and advanced technical means to identify and track ships carrying undesirable cargo.

The Bush Administration claims that the PSI is a global effort aimed at proliferators of WMD, not any particular nation. Several nations are known to be responsible for the spread of WMD technology, specifically President Bush's so-called "Axis of Evil." Since the PSI began in earnest in 2003, the list of targeted nations has decreased. Iraq's former leader has been toppled and thorough searches of Iraq have not uncovered evidence of WMD stockpiles. Libya has acted upon its pledge to rid itself of all WMD and normalized relations with the US have followed. Of the original

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[19] "G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation," Text of Joint Statement by G8 Participants, Evian, France, June 2003. John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, "The Bush Administration's Nonproliferation Policy: Successes and Future Challenges," Testimony to the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC (March 30, 2004), online at www.house.gov/international_relations/108/bolto33004. James Cotton, "The Proliferation Security Initiative and North Korea: Persuasion or Pressure?" (Seoul: IFES Forum), June 14, 2004.

[20] "Spain, US Seize N. Korean Missiles," *Washington Post*, December 11, 2002; "Scud Missiles Found on Ship of North Korea (sic)," December 11, 2002, p. 1 (*The New York Times* carried a similar story but it was less accurate than the *Post's* report). Ari Fleischer, Presidential Spokesman, "Press Briefing," December 12, 2002, online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases.

"Axis," Iran and North Korea remain the primary focus of the PSI, which North Korea remains convinced is a "blockade" aimed at impeding its efforts to revitalize its economy.

Conversely, Pakistan has escaped the Bush Administration's condemnation and imposition of sanctions despite a long history of nuclear weapon technology proliferation. Instead, the Bush Administration has taken at face value the Pakistani government's promise that it has discontinued and will not resume its prior proliferation activities.[21]

Japan and Neo-Containment

Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi has consistently but cautiously supported President Bush's preference for neo-containment of North Korea. This has been most apparent in Japan's participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative. Japan has been a key participant in the PSI since its conception. In June 2003, Japanese Maritime Police began inspections of all North Korean ships entering Japan's territorial waters and ports. The intent is to deter any possible North Korean attempts to covertly position a nuclear device or other type of weapon of mass destruction in Japan's territorial waters. On a more practical level, the inspections also aim to block the alleged flow of counterfeit currency and mind-altering drugs from North Korea into Japan and to other nations in East Asia.[22]

New laws passed in the summer of 2004 give the Japanese government authority to block the entry of all North Korean ships

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[21] Leonard Weiss, "Pakistan: It's *Déjà* vu All Over Again," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (May/June 2004), pp. 52-59.

[22] Based on discussions with Japanese officials in the Japan Defense Agency, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, June 2003, November 2003, and June 2004.

into Japanese territorial waters and make them and their cargoes subject to seizure. Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces already have the authority to board, and even fire on, uncooperative North Korean ships. Japan's Diet, much to the approval of the Bush Administration, gave the Japanese cabinet extensive new authority to impose comprehensive economic sanctions on North Korea, if Tokyo deems necessary. All of these activities strengthen the PSI's potency and, if implemented, would most directly affect North Korea.

The flow of Japanese hard currency to North Korea has also subsided significantly since 1998. Japan's Korean population once favored North Korea over South Korea. This minority's ability to share in Japan's prosperity enabled it to make substantial investments in North Korea and contributions to various North Korean educational and political organizations. Since 1998, however, an increasing number of Korean residents in Japan has distanced themselves from North Korea and the pro-North Korean Association of Koreans Resident in Japan, the *Chosen Soren*. North Korea's development and testing of long-range ballistic missiles, combined with Pyongyang's increasingly hostile attitude towards Japan, particularly Pyongyang's inept handling of the Japanese citizen abduction issue, has convinced the Japanese people that North Korea had replaced the Soviet Union as the primary national enemy. South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's decision to allow Koreans living in Japan to visit their ancestral homes in South Korea further eroded allegiance to North Korea.

After 1998, the annual pilgrimage of Koreans from Japan to North Korea dwindled by an estimated 75%. By 2000, membership in the *Chosen Soren* had declined by half. As of June 2004, the *Chosen Soren*'s active membership dropped from its high of nearly 400,000 in the late 1950s to about 10,000.[23]

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[23] Based on June 2004 discussion with *Chosen soren* (Chongnyon) official in Tokyo.

Similarly, the flow of Japanese currency to North Korea for investment and other purposes steadily subsided. In 2001, the pro-North Korean association's primary bank had collapsed into bankruptcy. According to Japanese officials, as reported in Japan's conservative *Yomiuri Shimbun* on June 28, 2003, a total of Yen 12.7 billion (approximately US$ 115,454,000) was transferred to North Korea through registered remittances and cash carried by visitors to North Korea during 2000-03. According to Japanese government reports, the amount of total remittances (registered plus estimated illegal currency transfers) continues to decline despite the increasing registration of money transfers from Japan to North Korea.

Japan's contribution to neo-containment of North Korea is impressive when all the various aspects are taken into account. These include Japan's willingness and military ability to contribute to implementation of the PSI, Tokyo's refusal to facilitate Pyongyang's admission into the Asian Development Bank, inspections of North Korean fishing and cargo ships, and the shrinking flow of Japanese currency into North Korea.

South-North Korean Economic Cooperation

The Bush Administration has also pressed South Korea to restrain its strategy of economic cooperation with North Korea. Seoul has agreed to suspend all public and private commercial investment in North Korea, but continues to supply humanitarian aid. In the spring of 2004, Seoul sent Pyongyang 200,000 metric tons of chemical fertilizer and promised to provide 400,000 metric tons of rice and corn.[24] In 2005, however, Seoul has stiffened its stance when dealing with

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[24] *Agence France-Presse*, "South Korea to Ship 400,000 tons of Rice to the North," July 6, 2004. UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "DPR Korea Situation Bulletin," March through May 2004.

Pyongyang, withholding further aid pending the resumption of bilateral ministerial talks. These did not reconvene until mid-May 2005, and only at the vice-ministerial level. Nevertheless, South Korea renewed its pledge to ship agricultural aid to North Korea once ministerial level talks are held in June, as agreed by Pyongyang.

The United States has concurred with South Korea's desire to continue its development of the infrastructure for the joint North-South Korean Kaesong Industrial Park. Private South Korean investment in the park has been stymied less by government restrains and more by investors' concerns about whether the nuclear impasse with North Korea might lead to a second Korean War.

Washington has failed to convince Seoul to completely end the construction of two light water nuclear reactors (LWR) in North Korea. The project was initiated at part of the 1994 Agreed Framework. After the October 2002 diplomatic collision between the US and DPRK in Pyongyang, Washington halted its annual shipment of 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea, another provision of the Agreed Framework. North Korea declared the accord no longer operative. But the governments in Seoul and Tokyo have refused to shut down the project entirely. Instead, despite Washington's keen displeasure, both US allies agreed to "suspend" the LWR construction project. The US Congress nevertheless voted to end all support for the project in June 2004. Despite Washington's strong objections, Seoul continues to favor resumption of the LWR project as a concession to North Korea if a diplomatic resolution is achieved in the Six-Party Talks.

Humanitarian Aid

The United States has not moved to halt the flow of international humanitarian aid to North Korea, but the Bush Administration has

significantly reduced the amount of food aid it has supplied to North Korea since 2001.[25] US food aid to North Korea totaled 50,000 metric tons in 2004, roughly one-tenth the annual amount provided during the Clinton Administration. The Bush Administration has also made the continuation of this aid contingent on North Korean compliance with World Food Program requirements regarding access to all areas of North Korea, its population, and ability to monitor aid distribution.[26] Like the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration does not allow US sustainable development aid to North Korea.

The continuing gains in North Korean food production and declining US food aid suggest an abrupt end of US humanitarian aid would not undermine the North Korean government, economically or politically. The withdrawal of aid would not necessarily alienate the population from their government. On the contrary, the government most likely would concentrate popular frustration and anger on the United States, blaming the "hostile policy" and alleged efforts to "strangle" North Korea. Hostile North Korean reaction would be directed towards the United States.

Diplomatic Dialogue Becomes a Stick

Despite the numerous "sticks" of neo-containment, Pyongyang has remained adamant in rejecting CVID and refusing to rejoin the Six-Party Talks. In response, President Bush has intensified the pressure on North Korea, since his re-election in November 2004. While continuing

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[25] Edward Reed, "Unlikely Partners: Humanitarian Aid Agencies and North Korea," Paper presented at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, February 12-13, 2004. William Brown, "Prospects for North Korea's Economy: Its All About Money," undated manuscript. Aidan Foster-Carter, "North Korea Chooses Guns over Butter," *Asia Times* (March 31, 2004), www.atimes.com.

[26] Department of State briefing of American NGOs at InterAction, Washington, D.C., April 22, 2005.

to press China, South Korea, and Japan to intensify diplomatic and economic pressure on North Korea, the Bush Administration has continued to convert diplomatic dialogue from a tool of diplomacy into a "stick" of neo-containment.

US diplomats were not allowed to meet face to face with their North Korean counterparts between December 2004 and May 2005. Even telephone contact between them was reduced to brief discussions of technical issues regarding visa issuance for travelers between the two nations and travel permission for North Korean officials wishing to go outside New York City.

Since December 2004, North Korean diplomats wishing to visit the United States have been denied visas, while existing diplomats have been prevented from traveling more than 25 miles from downtown New York. As of May 2005, the situation remained unchanged.

Neo-Containment's Impact

The extensive array of US impediments to negotiation, including diplomatic dialogue, normal economic activity plus international ostracism, and public condemnation, has thus far failed to convince North Korea to submit to US demands at the Six-Party Talks. In other words, the Bush Administration's neo-containment strategy as applied to North Korea has failed promote US national interests.

Neo-containment has arguably made the situation worse. North Korea's attitude towards the United States remains intensively hostile, having become virtually belligerent since the Bush Administration assumed office in 2001. The strategy has failed to halt North Korean nuclear weapon development or the expansion of its "nuclear deterrence capability." On the contrary, North Korea proclaimed itself a nuclear power on February 11, 2005. It subsequently announced that it no longer felt bound by the 1998 moratorium on testing ballistic

missiles. This has raised concerns that it will now quicken development of a nuclear-armed ballistic missile. Pyongyang also announced its the 5 Megawatt power reactor had been shut down to extract the 8,000 spent fuel rods for reprocessing into weapons-grade plutonium and possible fabrication of several more nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, North Korea maintains a huge conventional military force of more than one million personnel. "Supreme Commander" Kim Jong Il has declared a "military first" national strategy aimed that ensuring that his armed forces receive preference over the civilian sector in all areas. Also, neither his rule nor his domain's economy appears to be faltering. On the contrary, Kim Jong Il appears to have the solid support of North Korea's most decisive political force, the military. Also, North Korea's economy, with substantial aid from China, appears to be gradually backing away from collapse and even beginning to achieve some revitalization.

On the other hand, neo-containment has certainly frustrated North Korean efforts to revitalize its economy. The nation's civilian industrial infrastructure remains dilapidated and incapable of producing goods capable of competing in the international market place. The agricultural sector remains unable to supply the nation's food needs despite some steady improvement in food production.[27] Economic sanctions have achieved mixed results regarding technology, but only adversely affect the civilian sector as North Korean munitions

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[27] Bradley Babson, "Economic Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula" (Berkeley, CA: The Nautilus Institute 2003), online at www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook; C. Kenneth Quinones, "Abducted Japanese Issue Blocks North Korea's Entry into Asian Development Bank," *Asahi Monthly* (Tokyo, in Japanese), April 2004; Joseph Winder, "Promoting Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia," *Cooperation and Reform on the Korean Peninsula* (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute 2002); Bernhard Seliger, "Economic Reform in North Korea," *Korea's Economy 2004* (Washington: Korea Economic Institute and Korea Institute of International Economic Policy 2004); Eliot Jung, Youg-soo Kim, and Takeyuki Kobayashi, "North Korea's Special Economic Zones: Obstacles and Opportunities," *Confrontation and Innovation on the Korean Peninsula* (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute, 2004).

and WMD programs retain access to advanced technology. What the United States and its allies have refused to supply, North Korea has been able to obtain from through a global network of covert dealers in arms and technology, particularly the close US ally Pakistan.

At the same time, President Bush's avowed goal of a "peaceful diplomatic solution" to the continuing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula remains an elusive goal. Neo-containment's coercive elements have been met with equally coercive responses from Pyongyang. The sum result is a tension bilateral atmosphere of intensified distrust and disrespect between the United States and North Korea. Neo-containment has not built an atmosphere conducive to diplomatic dialogue and compromise.

Even if the Six-Party Talks resume, restoring the mutual trust essential for diplomatic negotiation and compromise will be far harder to achieve than before neo-containment was implemented. Consequently, achieving a peaceful diplomatic solution remains a distant hope. To achieve peace, a strategy of engagement must be employed.

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Washington and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: From Muddling Multilateralism to Sanctions?

Peter M. Beck and Meredith J. Sumpter

Abstract

The viability of the Six-Party Talks as a medium to resolve the nuclear crisis increasingly is being called into question, particularly as Pyongyang claims to be reprocessing a second batch of spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor and rumors swirl that the North is preparing to test a nuclear device. North Korea is proving adept at finding reasons to refuse to come back to the table, above all waiting for the "right conditions" to be met and now demanding the multilateral talks becomes a broader forum for "nuclear disarmament." Washington has been trying to nudge the process along in vain, so far failing to convince the other four governments to buy into its North Korea approach. At this point, the only thing China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea seem to agree on is that the Bush Administration should be more "flexible." Indeed Washington seems to be in a difficult position these days, together with its fraying relations with South Korea, a key ally in the region and one whose favorable relations are crucial to a constructive resolution of the nuclear issue. Clearly, the present North Korea policy of the second Bush Administration is in need of some serious adjustments if it is to have any hope of stopping the North's nuclear breakout. After examining the second Bush Administration's North Korea team, this paper explores the divergences within the Six-Party framework and considers the United States' role in the multilateral talks. The paper concludes with suggestions for attempting a breakthrough, including the activation of a special envoy or third country to help bridge the deep mistrust between Washington and Pyongyang.

Key Words: Six-Party Talks, nuclear disarmament, the Bush Administration, North Korea, multilateralism

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The viability of the Six-Party Talks as a medium to resolve the nuclear crisis increasingly is being called into question, particularly as Pyongyang claims to be reprocessing a second batch of spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor and rumors circulate of an imminent nuclear test. North Korea is proving adept at finding reasons to refuse to return to the table, above all waiting for the "right conditions" to be met and now demanding the multilateral talks becomes a broader forum for "nuclear disarmament." Washington has been trying in vain to nudge the process along, so far failing to convince the other four governments to endorse its North Korea approach. At this point, China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea only seem to agree that the Bush Administration should be more "flexible." Indeed Washington seems to be in a difficult position these days, accentuated by fraying relations with South Korea, a key ally in the region and one whose support is crucial to a constructive resolution of the nuclear issue. Clearly, the present North Korea policy of the second Bush Administration requires significant adjustment if it is to have any hope of stopping the North's nuclear breakout.

In the current environment, there seems little chance of Northeast Asian governments agreeing on a North Korea policy in the face of strong regional nationalism and Pyongyang's clever divisive tactics. Moreover, recent calls for Washington to negotiate directly with North Korea outside the Six-Party framework illustrate the growing recognition of the failings of the Talks. The fate of the Six-Party Talks remains to be seen, in light of uncertainty in Washington's diplomatic approach that to date has amounted to waiting for North Korea to capitulate or collapse. It is clear that Washington must stop procrastinating and devise a diplomatic strategy that seriously presents North Korea with an offer that the other four parties can embrace. Other regional governments must also do their part to bring North Korea back to the table, and back to reality. Unless it is held to account

by its allies and neighbors, Pyongyang may succeed in avoiding disarmament. After examining the second Bush Administration's North Korea team, this paper explores the divergences within the Six-Party framework and considers the United States' role in the multilateral talks. The paper concludes with suggestions for attempting a breakthrough, including the activation of a special envoy or third country to help bridge the deep mistrust between Washington and Pyongyang.

Ironically, the second Bush Administration's Six-Party Talks strategy is weakening despite recent attempts to be more conciliatory. President George Bush rebuffed his hardliners during the November 2004 APEC summit meeting in Santiago by reaffirming the US policy of seeking a peaceful, diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue. The next month his incoming National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley stressed support for the "transformation" of North Korea by economic means rather than regime change. Bending to pressure from China and South Korea, the US announced at the end of the year that it would join the next round of talks without any pre-conditions. Unfortunately, the rhetoric against North Korea from the Bush Administration has not abated. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's "outpost of tyranny" remark during her confirmation hearings led to demands for an apology by the North, but President Bush himself surpassed her rhetoric by calling Kim Jong Il a "tyrant" during a press conference on April 28. The North reciprocated with a barrage of invectives. This petty trading of insults has led Beijing to express its exasperation with both Washington and Pyongyang.

Almost certainly strong opposition to a hard-line policy from South Korea and China is forcing the Bush Administration to take a more conciliatory approach despite President Bush's visceral hatred of Kim Jong Il. Given the failed North Korea policy of the last Bush Administration and lingering doubts as to the ability of this "neo-conservative"-dominated White House to handle foreign policy wisely,

it is difficult to be optimistic about the Administration's capacity to adopt a more enlightened approach. President Bush seems unable to look beyond his blinding good versus evil dualism to pragmatically resolve the world's most pressing nuclear threat. It seems equally unlikely that North Korea will respond favorably to any package deal - no matter how attractive - to give up its nuclear programs. The Bush Administration must nevertheless make such an offer to gain any endorsement from the other four parties for a more confrontational approach towards North Korea. The test of this second Bush Administration and its Korea staff will be whether they can garner the collective will of the other four parties to see an agreement through with both enticing incentives and the corresponding disincentives.[1]

Washington's New North Korea Team[2]

Only time will tell what approach the new Bush team will ultimately take towards North Korea, but with the second Administration team almost complete, those shaping Northeast Asia policy are now evident. Despite assembling what is arguably the best Korea team to date, it is unclear whether they will be recognized by their superiors. The overriding vision shaping Bush Administration foreign policy remains Vice President Dick Cheney, whose unprecedented influence over US foreign policy during the first Bush term appears unabated in the second term. At the Department of State is former National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, known more for her loyalty to President Bush than for her policy acumen, given the failure to prevent the September 11th attacks and the approval of the disastrous invasion of Iraq. Moreover, she failed to adequately perform the

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[1] International Crisis Group, "North Korea: Where Next for the Nuclear Talks," November 15, 2004, available at www.icg.org.

[2] This builds upon an article which appeared in the December 2004 issue of *Shindonga*.

advisor's traditional role of managing the various personalities of the cabinet. It remains unclear exactly what line the State Department will take as Rice has yet to present her vision of America's place in the world. It is certain, however, that Rice will directly pursue President Bush's wishes in US diplomatic channels more than did Powell.[3] Unlikely to be able to challenge neo-conservatives in the White House, Rice may influence the appointment of former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to the Presidency of the World Bank and of former Under Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Bolton as Ambassador to the United Nations. The appointments reaffirmed that the "neo-cons" remain ascendant and unrepentant for past blunders. On the other hand, neither will have as much influence over policy making as before, as two influential figures from the first Bush Administration are now outside the inner circle of Washington's foreign policy making. Fortunately for Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld remains bogged down in Iraq and consumed by his ongoing reform of the US military services. The hard-core realists, with whom Secretary Rice and her new Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick associate, may well outshine the neo-cons in foreign policy. In reality, it matters little who directs foreign policy if there is no effective diplomatic strategy in place and if working level specialists are ignored.

In most government hierarchies, there tends to be an inverse relationship between power and knowledge. Those with the most power tend to have the least knowledge of specific issues or countries. This is especially true when it comes to the US government and the Korean Peninsula. To compensate for their lack of depth, top officials must rely on the advice they receive from those who monitor and manage Korean Peninsula affairs. Unfortunately, President Bush and his inner circle are not known for taking the views of working level

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[3]David Sanger and Steven Weisman, "Cabinet Choices Seen as Move for More Harmony and Control," *New York Times*, November 17, 2004.

specialists into account when deciding policy. With the exception of former Secretary of State Colin Powell, their approach has lacked appreciation of nuance and ignores inconvenient facts. Secretary Rice is a Kremlinologist by training with little prior experience in Asia Pacific issues or international negotiations. The question remains whether she and the rest of the inner circle will listen to those advising her on Korea.

The impressive lineup of highly capable Asia specialists in the National Security Council and at the State Department gives rise for optimism. Senior Asia Director at the National Security Council, Michael Green, is one of the most knowledgeable senior Bush officials on Asia and the most articulate and persuasive defender of the Bush North Korea "policy." At times, he can be convincing that the Bush Administration had a coherent policy towards North Korea. The new junior NSC Asia Director, Victor Cha, is both the first Korean-American and Korean specialist to be in charge of Asia policy at the White House, a position usually filled by a China or Japan specialist. His articles in recent years have been in line with the views of the Bush Administration, but he is by no means a neo-con. Cha could influence US policy in East Asia given his reported close ties with Rice.

At the State Department, Christopher Hill, the extremely active and able former Ambassador to Korea, has become the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs and the lead US negotiator for the Six-Party Talks. Hill is a career diplomat who honed his skills as one of the key peace negotiators in the Balkans. The Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia, Evans Revere, also has experience in Korea, having served as the Deputy Chief of Mission in the US Embassy in Seoul and as Director of the Korea Desk. He is also fluent in Korean. Hill, Revere, and Korea Desk Director James Foster have an extremely capable group of professionals working with them, so the Bush Administration will have all the information it needs for deve-

loping a more effective strategy to diplomatically resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. However, it remains to be seen if President Bush and his new team will listen to them. Ironically, this is the first time the junior Asia positions at the NSC and the PDAS at State have been filled by Korea specialists, and both Michael Green and Ambassador Hill have more experience working in and on Korea than their predecessors. Assistant Secretary Hill was even in Seoul trying to coordinate North Korea policy when President Bush made his "tyrant" remark on April 28.

Mind the Gap: Divergent Perceptions and Priorities in the Nuclear Talks

Even if Washington decision-makers do listen to their Asia specialists when crafting policy, it will do them little good should their credibility with Six-Party allies be in doubt. The position of the United States in the Six-Party Talks is equal to its standing with its allies. Washington-based Given the intelligence failures in Iraq and the inability to provide incontrovertible evidence of the North's suspected highly enriched uranium program, America lacks credibility.[4] The recent report released by the Washington-based Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction chided the Bush Administration for knowing "disturbingly little" about North Korea's nuclear program.[5] The Bush Administration and Congress are preoccupied with human rights abuses and vilifying North Korea, undermining Washington's credibility with China and South Korea, the two countries most important to dealing with North

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[4] David Sanger and William Broad, "Solving A Deadly Riddle: Who Sold Nukes?," *International Herald Tribune*, April 1, 2005.

[5] Scott Shane and David Sanger, "Blind To Nuclear Dangers, Panel Finds," *International Herald Tribune,* April 2, 2005.

Korea. Seoul still has not forgotten Washington's mistaken claim in 1998 that the North was building a secret nuclear facility in Kumchang-ri, only for inspections to reveal it was just a hole in the ground. After Secretary Rice's March 2005 trip to the region, Washington began to understand how distanced it has become from its partners. It should trouble the Bush team that the five parties have been unable to come up with anything close to a common approach, allowing Pyongyang to exploit their differences to buy time and avoid difficult choices.[6]

President Bush's near-devout adherence to the multilateral framework, despite his unilateralist tendencies, as the only structure within which to deal with North Korea means that for a diplomatic solution to work, Washington must be more responsive to the positions of the other parties. However, a perception gap and diverging priorities among the Six-Party allies are undermining the multilateral framework. Washington tends to focus on nuclear issues and human rights, while the other parties have other priorities to consider, such as stability on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea's quest for a peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula and China's pursuit of stability on its northeastern border cancel out their support for any coercive measures that would put pressure on North Korea towards disarmament. Another ally for North Korea, Russia, is more concerned about US strategic designs in East Asia than Pyongyang's nuclear activities. Although Japan is moving closer to the US position with the implementation of "virtual" sanctions on March 1 that require North Korean ships visiting Japan to have proper insurance, Washington cannot depend solely on Tokyo's backing. The Bush Administration would make greater headway with the Six-Party Talks if emphasis was placed on appreciating Northeast Asian priorities and perspectives on North Korea and the nuclear crisis, most notably of the two countries imperative to

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[6] Michael H. Armacost, "Six-Party Talks Are Looking Useless," *JoongAng Daily*, March 12, 2005.

North Korea's survival: South Korea and China.

Washington and Seoul are drifting apart and it is unclear if the Bush team realizes the extent of the difference between the two long-standing allies. Since taking office in 2003, South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun has maintained his predecessor's policy of engagement towards North Korea. President Roh's approach to North Korea is one of peaceful and flexible diplomacy, devoid of any real threats or pressures on North Korea, ensuring that South Korean prosperity will not be undermined by potential conflict.[7] Government efforts focus more on seeking peaceful engagement and reconciliation with the North than on hindering Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions, the anti-thesis of the US attitude to North Korea. Last November, in a series of speeches, President Roh ruled out any forceful action against Pyong-yang through the Six-Party Talks, including military measures or economic sanctions, and declared he could not cooperate with anyone seeking regime change in the North.[8] In short, Roh frankly warned the hard liners in Washington that their policy preferences would not meet his approval. South Korea wants a nuclear-free Peninsula, the same as the other four parties, but it will not pursue nuclear disarmament at the cost of peace and prosperity. South Korean officials have commented that although the North Korean issue is a matter of "national survival" for South Korea, it is merely a nonproliferation or human rights issue for the United States.[9]

The country with perhaps the most influence over North Korea does not share US priorities for the North or for the Korean Peninsula.

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[7] Republic of Korea National Security Council, "Peace, Prosperity, and National Security: National Strategic Strategy of the R.O.K.," March 2004.

[8] Donald Gross, "South Korea Confronts Hard-liners on North Korea," *Pacific Forum CSIS Comparative Connections* accessed March 22, 2005, http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0404_skorea.html.

[9] David Shin, "ROK and the United States 2004-2005: Managing Perception Gaps?," *Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Special Assessment*, February 2005.

For various reasons - among them stability on its northeastern border and avoiding collapse of a longstanding ally - Beijing refuses to place too much pressure on Pyongyang and is not as forthcoming in its support for the US position on North Korea publicly as it is rumored to be privately.[10] Recent statements by Chinese officials indicate that Beijing is neither ready nor willing to take a more confrontational line with Pyongyang. Uncomfortable at being put in Washington's spotlight, and at the Bush Administration's own reluctance to be more forthcoming in the talks, Beijing has made clear that it sees its own influence over North Korea as limited, even though China is North Korea's largest trader and importer of fuel. Instead, Beijing is limiting its role to arranging the Talks, and putting pressure on the US to deal directly with the North.[11] China's reluctance to do more is a problem for the Bush team, which sees Chinese backing as crucial to "any expanded international response, including United Nations sanctions, a trade embargo, or military action."[12] Without China's backing, the Six-Party Talks and diplomatic pressures would be nugatory for the United States. Without Washington's engagement in the Talks, Beijing feels constrained in its ability to persuade Pyongyang.

The Bush Administration will continue to court Beijing because it believes a lasting solution to the nuclear crisis is possible only with China as a party to any final agreement. During the presidential election debates, Bush stated his belief that North Korea would be reluctant to break yet another agreement with the US and South Korea should China also be a signatory to that agreement.[13] However, most

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[10] Joseph Kahn, "China Questions Data on North Korea," *New York Times*, March 7, 2005.

[11] Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu Jianchao, "Press Conference," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, March 22, 2005.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] "The Presidential Candidates' 2nd Debate: 'These Are the Differences,'" *New York Times*, October 9, 2004.

American observers now acknowledge that Chinese authorities, like the South Koreans, appear to attach greater importance to maintaining stability than to resolving the nuclear crisis. If China is not prepared to get tough with North Korea should Pyongyang refuse to accept a reasonable offer or break another agreement, the Six-Party framework appears pointless. Washington must determine under what conditions, if any, China would accept taking more compelling measures towards Pyongyang. The extent to which China and the United States cooperate in dealing with North Korea despite their differing interests will have a definite bearing on the likelihood of a settlement.

Because Washington's position in the Six-Party Talks depends heavily on that of the other four governments, the palpable divergent approaches of the US and its Asian allies are significant and should alarm Washington's Asian specialists. Devoid of a "unified front" and a sound diplomatic strategy, the US appears increasingly powerless to stop the North's nuclear breakout. As a result, Washington's North Korea policies are facing ever more anxious partners in Northeast Asia. Some scholars in South Korea and China now point to the Bush Administration's harsh rhetoric as being almost equal to the North's increasingly provocative statements and actions during the spring of 2005.

For its part, the Bush Administration has grown frustrated with other parties seeking more US flexibility and incentives to the North, despite the more restrained US position in recent months having met with little to no response from Pyongyang.[14] This particularly looks curious as China, South Korea, and Russia publicly shy away from pressuring the North for more flexibility and moderation. When North Korea issued its February 10th declaration of having nuclear weapons

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[14] Interview with US Government Official, March 29, 2005. See also Joel Brinkley, "Visiting Korea Base, Rice Sends Forceful Reminder to the North," *New York Times*, March 20, 2005.

and of rejecting the Six-Party Talks, these countries issued excuses for Pyongyang rather than reprimands.[15] Appeasement is acceptable if it works. History shows that instead of earning the North's genuine compliance, giving more carrots without sticks will what Pyongyang's appetite for further concessions and give it more time to bolster its "nuclear deterrent." There is also the troubling perception in Washington that South Korea and China could prefer peaceful coexistence with a nuclear North Korea if this will help the Peninsula avoid instability and war or a hard landing for the regime.[16]

Persuading Washington to make policy consistent with the Northeast Asian view of North Korea, or ideally crafting an effective and proactive diplomatic approach would consolidate a diplomatic front to the North among the five parties. Such an initiative, however, would require Northeast Asian countries to fully acknowledge their own responsibilities in holding North Korea accountable, and to take account of Washington's position and policy imperatives. Washington must therefore pay closer attention to the priorities and perceptions of its Six-Party allies. Unless the Bush Administration can find common ground with its allies that combine incentives and disincentives, further Six-Party Talks will be useless.

Washington's Perspective on the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

The United States views the world through a post 9/11 prism in which North Korea's potential if not practice of selling nuclear-related materials to states such as Iran, Pakistan, and Libya is a

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[15] Unification Minister Chung Dong-young's statements right after Feb 10th announcement.

[16] Denny Roy, "China-South Korea Relations: Elder Brother Wins Over Younger Brother," *Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Special Assessment*, October 2004.

considerable cause for concern.[17] While Northeast Asian countries focus on the stability of the Korean Peninsula, US policy is focused chiefly on thwarting proliferation and the use and transfer of nuclear weapons and materials. From Washington's perspective, North Korea's nuclear program is a matter of national security. Many security experts believe a nuclear strike on the US is inevitable from a state or, more likely, a non-state actor who obtains nuclear materials from illicit proliferation networks.[18] Northeast Asian countries underestimate the vulnerability the US feels in the post-9/11 world to threats of nuclear proliferation and WMD, which helps explain Washington's obstinacy towards the North. The Bush Administration regards North Korea's endless conditions to come back to the Talks as proof that the isolated country will find any and every opportunity to evade demands to end its nuclear programs. Washington is therefore skeptical that North Korea is interested in bargaining away its nuclear program, a view that in part may illustrate the Bush team's reluctance to diplomatically engage a situation they are convinced will result in failure.[19] In contrast, the South Korean government believes the North is prepared to make a deal.[20] Pyongyang's recent demand that the Six-Party Talks become nuclear disarmament talks must reaffirm the Bush team's view that the North Koreans will do everything in their power to undermine the Talks or any other attempt, no matter how serious or lucrative, to get them to denuclearize.

The Bush Administration will go to great lengths to avoid dealing unilaterally with North Korea, believing it can only lead to another flawed agreement. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell

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[17] *New York Times*, March 30, 2005.

[18] Kuniharu Kakihara, "The Post-9/11 Paradigm Shift and Its Effects on East Asia," *Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) Policy Paper 292E*, January 2003.

[19] Interview with US Government Official, March 24, 2005.

[20] "The North Korean Question and the R.O.K.-US Alliance," Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, *IFANS Review*, July 2004.

summed up Bush's views during a television interview last Fall:

> "The North Koreans desperately want to make this a US-North Korean problem to see what else they can ask US for; to pay them; to reward them for their misbehavior. And we have chosen··· not to get caught in their trap again."[21]

The Bush Administration may only now be confronting the considerable gap with their Asian allies over handling North Korea. Secretary Rice visited Northeast Asia in March 2005 to convince the other parties that it is in each one's interest to use whatever leverage they have to bring Pyongyang back to the negotiating table. This mission was undermined, however, by Asian views of US policy as potentially damaging to regional stability and by questions of credibility.[22] Washington has seemed all too eager to convince others of North Korea's nuclear pursuits with unverified intelligence meant to stir Six-Party members to adopt more coercive measures towards the North.[23]

Despite these misgivings, the Bush team has in recent months started to respond to calls from Six-Party allies to be more flexible and less confrontational. A truly effective diplomatic strategy nevertheless remains elusive. Since tabling a proposal at the last Six-Party Talks in June 2004, Washington has continued to articulate, though not as clearly as it could, the economic aid and security guarantees Pyongyang would realize should it choose to return to negotiations and begin to disarm. US Asian advisors are reportedly disappointed in the lack of support their June proposal received from Beijing, Seoul, and Moscow.

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[21] Colin Powell interview with Mike Chinoy, *CNN International TV*, October 25, 2004.

[22] Choi Jong Chul, "US-R.O.K. Alliance: Will it Wither or Rebound?," Given at The Council on Korea-US Security Studies 19th Annual Conference, October 7-8, 2004.

[23] Kahn, "China Questions Data on North Korea."

Instead of positively responding to the proposal, Washington's allies were silent and Pyongyang soon after declared the offer null and void, thereby avoiding another opportunity to settle the nuclear dispute.[24] Although pressure is building in Washington for President Bush to take a harder line to force the North to respond, the Bush Administration has so far focused on coaxing North Korea back to the talks. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice even called one of her "outposts of tyranny" a sovereign state during her Northeast Asia tour and has repeated the statement several times since. Time will tell whether the Bush team has finally grasped that threats and insults will not work with Pyongyang. The impasse will continue unabated, however, until Bush gives up hopes of a collapse or capitulation from Pyongyang and finally attempts to seriously engage in talks.

President Bush's restraint and expressed desire to resolve the nuclear issue in a peaceful and diplomatic manner is a positive sign. However, the overall mood in Washington has become increasingly hard line and inflexible towards North Korea, as demonstrated by the unanimous passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act last Fall. For the time being, pressure from China and South Korea has strengthened the voice of US officials favoring a more moderate approach to North Korea, who argue that a hard line risks alienating Washington's Six-Party allies and could further strain an already rocky US-South Korea alliance.[25]

The underlying shift of alliances taking place in the region complicates the Six-Party process has been part caused by the US failure to defuse the nuclear crisis. The dispute over North Korea and concerns about Washington's destabilizing approach are causing countries

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[24] Larry Niksch, "The Requirements of Credible R.O.K.-US Coordination in the Six-Party Talks," Presented at the Second Korea-US Security Forum, Jeju Island, March 30-April 1, 2005.

[25] Kim Choong Nam, "Changing Korean Perceptions of the Post-Cold War Era and the US-R.O.K. Alliance," *East-West Center Asia Pacific Issues*, April 2003.

such as South Korea to assess other potential partners because they see the US as an "obstacle to peaceful relations in the region."[26] President Roh proclaimed a new doctrine in March 2005 in his attempt to pull away from the tripartite alliance and cement South Korea as an independent power, initiating what may become the unraveling of the US-ROK alliance with his notion of Korea as a balancer. Like most Cold War hangovers, the alliance is now seen as passé by progressive South Koreans. Washington can no longer rely on its traditional Northeast Asian allies to support its efforts to force North Korea to disarm.[27]

Six-Party Talks: Exercise in Futility?

The probability of a lasting settlement with North Korea that permanently resolves the nuclear crisis rises dramatically as the North's room to exploit differences among the five other parties diminishes. There are, however, increasing signs of disagreement over how to resolve the nuclear dispute, with the conciliatory tone of South Korea, China, and Russia chafing against the harder line of the US and Japan. Washington is assessing ways to increase pressure on North Korea with the Proliferation Security Initiative and possible sanctions referral to the United Nations Security Council. Indirect pressure tactics include the North Korean Human Rights Act and a renewed call to include human rights abuses in the Six-Party agenda, which can only further complicate and frustrate the process.[28] In March press

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[26] Doug Struck, "Alliances Shifting in Northeast Asia," *Washington Post*, March 23, 2003.

[27] Shin Jeong-rok, "Roh Hints at New East Asian Order," *Chosun Ilbo*, March 23, 2005.

[28] Undersecretary of State Michael Kozak suggested as much in comments made with the release of the State Department's *2005 Human Rights Report* in late March.

interviews, Secretary Rice vaguely threatened to pursue "other options" should Pyongyang not return to the Talks soon, though it remains to be seen how those options will be realized without regional support. Fearing a collapse of the Kim Jong Il regime, South Korea and China, North Korea's primary economic benefactors, are unlikely to consider sanctions or other coercive measures.[29] As an added distraction, fierce nationalist clashes in Northeast Asia weaken the prospect of a unified voice towards North Korea. For example, the Dokto issue provides a useful distraction that Pyongyang can exploit to drive another wedge in the five-party group.

The Six-Party Talks are much closer to collapse than breakthrough. Indeed, evaluation of the Six-Party process over the past two years demonstrates that the multilateral approach has had little if any success. Thanks to divisions among the Six-Party allies, there has been no progress made in even slowing North Korea's nuclear ambitions.[30]

The only glue holding together the Six-Party framework is the common goal of the five parties to end the North's nuclear program. The method to purse this remains a challenge. For the Six-Party Talks to retain legitimacy, the allies must work to narrow gaps to convince the North that negotiation is the only solution. In particular, Washington must devise a more coherent diplomatic strategy and coordinate policy with Seoul and Beijing, taking into consideration their divergent perceptions of and approaches to North Korea. Without a coordinated approach, the Six-Party Talks merely provide a pretence that something is being done to resolve the crisis while little substantial progress is made.

History has shown that North Korea cooperates best when there

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[29] Sebastian Moffett and Gordon Fairclough, "Rice Urges Return of North Korea to Nuclear Talks," *Wall Street Journal*, March 21, 2005.

[30] Charles Pritchard, "The New Administration and the North Korean Nuclear Issue," Sejong-SAIS Workshop on *Korea, United States, and Northeast Asia: Seeking Strategic Cooperation after the Presidential Election*, November 2004.

are clear incentives and disincentives in place, which any solution must clearly articulate in detail. The second Bush team must outline a comprehensive offer that describes the exact benefits to North Korea in exchange for its nuclear programs and weapons. The International Crisis Group has offered such a plan in its new report on North Korea.[31] Only a serious offer from the United States in good-faith would allow the other partners to increase pressure on the North should it not accept a deal. One prominent Korea analyst has suggested the Six-Party format be used to generate "regional ownership" in the implementation of a final settlement, helping to administer security guarantees and economic assistance after an agreement is reached.[32] A solution to the nuclear impasse is not likely to be found in the Six-Party framework until Washington determines to engage the North diplomatically and the other four parties commit themselves to see through an agreement that does not let Pyongyang off the hook, no matter its bluster.

It appears doubtful an agreement will be reached through the multilateral talks. Although Washington's North Korea strategy is based on the Six-Party framework more so than its allies, direct talks with Pyongyang cannot and should not be avoided. Indeed, the United States is the only government not to be engaging in a vigorous bilateral dialogue with North Korea. Secretary Rice indicated in the March 20 press conference in Seoul that bilateral talks between the US and North Korea would be possible within the context of the Six-Party Talks.[33] This subtle change of tone fueled speculation in Seoul that Washington may accept dialogue rather than pressure is necessary to create an appropriate atmosphere for the next round of talks. Alternatively, the changed tone may derive from the Bush team's reali-

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[31] International Crisis Group, "North Korea: Where Next for the Nuclear Talks," November 15, 2004, available at www.icg.org.

[32] Jack Pritchard, "The New Administration and the North Korean Nuclear Issue."

[33] "Rice Delivers Positive Attitude," *JoongAng Ilbo*, March 21, 2005.

zation of the policy divide with its Six-Party allies. Secretary Rice's assertions during her Northeast Asia trip that North Korea's "isolation from its neighbors has deepened" in the midst of the ongoing crisis and that the five parties had a "unity of message and purpose" with regard to North Korea smacked of surrealism more than reality.[34] With the exception of Japan, economic ties between North Korea and its neighbors have flourished since the outbreak of the current crisis in 2002.[35]

For President Bush, a unified front with the other four parties is the only way to diplomatically resolve the nuclear situation. The fraying of the Six-Party framework may explain Washington's slight moderation. President Bush expressed a newfound patience for bringing the North back to the multilateral talks days after his Secretary of State repeatedly expressed her impatience and two days after North Korea declared that it further bolstered its nuclear arsenal.[36] The "patient President" made his comments at a time when officials in Washington warned that if Pyongyang did not return to the talks by June the US would pursue alternative measures, such as a sanctions resolution with the UN Security Council. Even Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, among other hard-line conservatives, are said to be growing impatient with the North Koreans.[37] President Bush may have therefore recognized that for the Six-Party framework to function, the US must be more sensitive to the positions and concerns of the other parties, however temporarily.

The possibility of an enlightened Bush policy, however, seems

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[34] Glenn Kessler, "In Asia, Rice Says North Korea More Isolated From Neighbors," *Washington Post*, March 16, 2005.

[35] See ICG report "North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Embrace the Invisible Hand?," April 25, 2005, available at www.icg.org.

[36] Transcript, "News Conference with Leaders of US, Mexico, and Canada," *New York Times*, March 23, 2005.

[37] Brinkley, "Visiting Korea Base, Rice Sends Forceful Reminder to the North."

overly optimistic. Washington's moderation must be followed by serious engagement with North Korea. Despite the interests of its allies, regime change/collapse (the Arafat model) or capitulation (the Libyan model) remain the only real options for North Korea being considered by the Bush Administration. It is foolish to base policy on the eminent collapse of North Korea. One of the leaders of the collapse school, the American Enterprise Institute's Nicholas Eberstadt, has been "predicting" the collapse of North Korea for 15 years. Faith-based foreign policy will not resolve the crisis. The unified message to the Bush team must be clear:

- This crisis will not be solved until Washington decides to take ownership and directly deal with North Korea
- There will be no settlement until Pyongyang is convinced that Washington will give up seeking or hoping for its downfall. If a diplomatic solution is to be found, Washington must abandon any underlying goals of regime change.

View from Pyongyang: What Will It Take to Get North Korea Back to the Table?

Although Washington insists it has no plans to attack the North, Pyongyang is convinced Bush's underlying goal is regime change and will not earnestly engage in talks until these fears are put to rest. When North Korean Prime Minister Pak Pong-Ju told his Chinese counterpart in late March that Pyongyang really had not abandoned the Six- Party Talks, he stated North Korea would return to the negotiations if conditions were right. Premier Pak repeated the North's call on Washington to abandon its "hostile policy" to allow negotiations to resume. Many in Washington are convinced this oft-mentioned phrase is a diplomatic ploy to stall Pyongyang's return to the negotiating table, while placing the pressure back on Washington.

However, there could be significant meaning in the "hostile

policy" term to which Washington should pay attention to. Pyongyang is not just asking for economic and security assurances (e.g. that the US will not invade), but also assurances that the regime will last beyond the end of the nuclear program. In early March, North Korea's Foreign Ministry issued a memorandum on the Six-Party Talks that articulated their fears and requirements of the US.[38] It declared that the key to the resolution of the nuclear issue lay in the United States "changing its hostile policy to a policy of peaceful North Korea-US coexistence... Unless the United States has the political intention to change its policy and coexist with US, the nuclear issue can never be resolved." The memorandum refers to President Bush's inaugural address announcing an end to tyranny and the declared US agenda of spreading freedom and democracy in the world as proof of Bush's real intention to overthrow the North.

Despite Washington's security assurances, North Korea believes that the Bush Administration intends the North Korean regime to *be collapsed*. Aside from conventional military threats, North Korea fears the United State's non-military threats to the North's existence, which it considers illustrates the Bush Administration's true intention to undermine the Kim Jong Il regime. The memorandum cites the 2004 North Korea Human Rights Act as "the act of financially and materially ensuring system overthrow." The Proliferation Security Initiative, among other diplomatic measures, is identified as further proof of Washington's regime change intent. To North Korea, the US is buying time with the Six-Party Talks in order to exert non-military and indirect pressure on Pyongyang - while Bush seeks systematic change in North Korea, the United States "had no desire for full-fledged negotiations."[39] At the same time, it must be recognized that

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[38] DPRK Foreign Ministry, "Memorandum on 6-Party Talks," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, March 4, 2005.

[39] *Ibid.*

even the most sincere overture will fail if the North has concluded that its nuclear capability is no longer a bargaining chip but instead a key source of the regime's capacity to survive.

Conclusion

The new paradigm demands a more realistic policy for dealing with North Korea's nuclear program and ending the litany of rhetoric directed at the North. Pragmatism must triumph over rhetoric and ideology. The Bush Administration must therefore negotiate with the North and agree to coexist. This radical departure would mirror another Republican maverick president who took a momentous step against his conventional wisdom that led to greater peace and prosperity in the region: Richard Nixon's engagement with China. It will not be easy for Bush, a man who "loathes" Kim Jong Il and who is no favorite of Pyongyang. To do otherwise, waiting for or encouraging Pyongyang to collapse will waste time and could result in utter disaster and chaos in the region.

Aside from declaring intent to coexist with Pyongyang, Washington must temper its human rights campaign and freedom agenda with regard to North Korea and remove the indirect pressures and "behind the scenes" efforts to subvert the North Korean regime. Furthermore, Washington and its Six-Party allies must address Pyongyang's economic difficulties in a comprehensive manner. This could mean that any final settlement would require a pledge by all parties to help the regime with food, energy assistance, and economic development projects to move North Korea into a post-nuclear era. Assisting the present regime entails temporarily sacrificing the principles of democracy and human rights to secure a nuclear-free Peninsula. Given the unimaginable devastation a war would bring, the price is worth paying, as such a settlement could finally bring North Korea back into

the fold of the international community. Such a settlement would work only if it included both incentives and disincentives to hold Pyongyang accountable to any agreement that is reached, and if South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan acknowledge their stake in assuring the North's compliance to the agreement. North Korea's abysmal human rights record will have to be dealt with in time, but the priority of the Six-Party members must be ending Pyongyang's nuclear escapade.

Any discussion on the nuclear issue is not complete without questioning whether North Korea is really willing to give up its nuclear programs. This is North Korea's only bargaining chip, which ensures Pyongyang the world's attention. North Korea's sense of vulnerability must be taken into account in the negotiations to deliver a final and sustainable settlement.

Washington, the most skeptical Six-Party member, has the farthest to go for such a settlement to be reached. To rescue the Six-Party framework from failure, the Bush Administration must craft policy that embraces the perceptions and priorities of the other four governments with regard to North Korea. Moreover, Washington must decide to seriously negotiate with Pyongyang rather than wait at the diplomatic sidelines for other parties to bring North Koreans to the table.

Ultimately, the only way to break out of the current deadlock and bridge the ever-widening gap between Washington and Pyongyang may have to be found outside the Six-Party Talks framework. Given that the other parties place the nuclear issue of secondary importance to other concerns, an internal or external catalyst may be necessary. An internal catalyst would take the form of a special high-level envoy appointed by President Bush, such as Bush's father, former President George Bush, much as former President Jimmy Carter served this role during the first nuclear crisis in 1994. However, given Bush's antipathy to Kim Jong Il, this may be unrealistic. Instead, a third

country may be needed, much as the United Kingdom served as a covert go-between for the United States and Libya before a breakthrough came in 2003. If a country were to step forward to play this role, the Bush Administration might respond favorably. If not, we can expect the North Korean nuclear crisis to continue to deepen.

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The Second Bush Administration and North Korea

Hajime Izumi

Abstract

We cannot neglect the fact that already a year has gone past since the previous session of the Six-Party Talks. Because of North Korea's continued refusal to participate in a fourth session, the onetime momentum of the Six-Party Talks naturally has vanished. The U.S. tolerance might have come close on its limit, but even that Bush administration has no intention whatever of putting an end to the Six-Party Talks at present. No progress in real terms can be expected even if Pyongyang accepted holding a fourth session. Thus the negotiation may roll back into exactly the same state in which it had started. It is hard to imagine the United States would engage itself in direct talks with North Korea. The Bush Administration also would not take drastic measures, such as using military strength or carrying out economic sanctions, until Iraq at the very least becomes politically stable. While asking China to put pressure, the United States, within this year, will not be going to send the stalemated North Korean problem to the UN Security Council. However, North Korea will push nuclear development forward quietly under the closed environment, if the status quo continues.

Key Words: Six-Party Talks, the Bush Administration, North Korea, North Korea's nuclear program, Japan's role

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Emphasizing the American mission of opposing tyrants President George W. Bush's second term inaugural address on January 20, 2005 reached Pyongyang as a hostile message, redoubling their alertness. To North Korea, passages in the address jarred their nerves, as if the second Bush Administration were scheming a split or collapse of North Korea:

> "The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.... So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.... We do not accept the existence of permanent tyranny because we do not accept the possibility of permanent slavery. Liberty will come to those who love it....
>
> "Today, America speaks anew to the peoples of the world: All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the United States will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your oppressors. When you stand for your liberty, we will stand with you.... The rulers of outlaw regimes can know that we still believe as Abraham Lincoln did: 'Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves; and, under the rule of a just God, cannot long retain it.'"

Although the president himself did not mention any tyrannical state in the address, Condoleezza Rice as Secretary of State nominee had identified six "outposts of tyranny," including North Korea, during her confirmation hearing of January 18 before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. The strong Bush warning was undoubtedly directed to the six countries. For North Korea, his address only heightened feelings of insecurity.

On August 18, 2004, at a gathering in Wisconsin on his election campaign tour, Bush denounced North Korea, calling Kim Jong Il a "tyrant." This came as a great shock to Pyongyang, and formed one of the motives for withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks, which were scheduled to resume at the end of September. The frequent use of the word "tyranny" in the inaugural address was immediately linked to the term "tyrant."

After the U.S. presidential election, North Korea waited, hoping for a change in policies of the second Bush Administration, ending the previous inflexible die-hard mentality. Rice's testimony and Bush's inaugural address seemed to suggest the policy line of the second term will be in the same mould of the first. Pyongyang must have realized how tough the American "neo-conservatives" are on North Korea.

Despite taking a hard-line, the second Bush Administration appears unlikely to demand immediate regime change in North Korea. In his inaugural address, Bush assertively declared that "the great objective of ending tyranny is the concentrated work of generations," adding "this is not primarily the task of arms." As long as the Bush Administration has no intention of seeking regime change, North Korea's response will remain prudent.

Bush's Second Term Policy towards North Korea

Colin L. Powell's departure as Secretary of State is one of the key indicators of the second Bush Administration's North Korea policy. The Administration's discreet coordinator has left office, possibly taking with him what little flexibility the United States could show in dealing with North Korea. Although US North Korea policy in the first four years was so strict that it constantly refused any deals, a comparatively flexible response did occasionally emerge in negotiations over minor matters. For example, in the first round of the Six-Party Talks held at the end of August 2003, the representative of the United States expressed "three No's" as follows: "The United States does not threaten the DPRK. The United States does not intend to attack or invade the DPRK. Regime change is not an objective of the United States." He also said that, if the process of verified dismantling of North Korea's nuclear weapons program began, the United States would provide technical assistance. "The Nunn-Lugar program is

worth studying," he suggested. Moreover, on October 19, 2003, when Bush met with Chinese President Hu Jintao, he presented some expanded ideas of the type of security assurances the United States might be able to offer North Korea.

Since these comparatively flexible approaches are believed to have been the product of Colin Powell's hard efforts in guiding the U.S. diplomacy, that flexibility will be lost in the second term. Condoleezza Rice omitted any mention of regime change restraint - the subject of greatest importance to Pyongyang - while explicitly referring to "no intended aggression or attack" by the United States.

Secondly, the bottom-up policy making style in Washington is likely to change to a top-down type. Colin Powell listened to the views of working-level officials before going to the President for his decisions. This was the standard pattern of approach in the past four years, but new Secretary of State Rice will not follow in Powell's footsteps. She will probably hear Bush's decision first and send it down to her officials in different posts. In that case, Rice will basically play the role of translating Bush's instincts into practical foreign policies, which will inevitably reflect his personal dislike of North Korean National Defense Chairman Kim Jong Il.

Thus, the North Korea policy in the second term of Bush Administration may have an inflexible unyielding nature that does not deviate from a hard-line stance. Nevertheless, Washington will avoid applying so much pressure that military tensions are raised on the Korean Peninsula.

The United States is now tied down in Iraq and unable to take the risk of war over the North Korean nuclear issue. 150,000 troops are deployed in Iraq and another 33,000 in Kuwait, which must be rotated frequently. The U.S. Army even uses its Second Infantry Division stationed in South Korea as a source of replacements. A war on the Korean Peninsula should require a minimum of 100,000 troops more

than those already stationed, Washington cannot take any action that may lead to the use of military force against North Korea.

When applying decisive pressure, it is generally considered essential to have a worst-case scenario in which the threat of war is considered one of the possible consequences, even though there is initially no intention to use such a last resort. In 1994, for instance, the United States moved to impose economic sanctions on North Korea. Pyongyang responded with the saber-rattling threat that it would interpret the enforcement of sanctions as a declaration of war. The United States took this threat seriously and prepared itself to repulse a North Korean military assault while it maintained the drive for sanctions. Even the Democratic Administration of President Bill Clinton could not neglect this possibility.

The same applies to the current Bush Administration, which realizes that even if it has no intention of striking North Korea preemptively, imposing sanctions may lead to a military clash and that it cannot apply pressure unless it is prepared to deal with this sort of response. The situation in Iraq thus makes it impossible for the United States to cope with the threat of military response. The situation in Iraq therefore effectively precludes the United States from moving against Pyongyang. Even after the Iraqi situation has settled, the militarily awkward US position will continue until the Pentagon is able to substantially reduce the number of its troops in the Middle East.

Although the second Bush Administration persists with a hard line on North Korea, all hardliners are not necessarily in favor of military action. The United States will not be prepared to conduct military action for a long time. Even if Pyongyang continues to refuse to join the fourth round of Six-Party Talks and the United States refers the North Korean nuclear problem to the United Nations, Washington will not apply decisive pressure to force the North to comply with its demands.

This remains true only if North Korea refrains from any of the following four unacceptable actions:

- Selling nuclear weapons or materials to other countries, particularly if they pass into the hands of international terrorist organizations
- Conducting nuclear tests
- Launching long-range ballistic missiles
- Provoking South Korea with its conventional military forces.

Even in these cases, the United States will continue to make every effort to avoid a military confrontation.

Continued Nuclear Development Program in North Korea

While the United States remains bound to Iraqi affairs, North Korea appears to have not only judged that an agreement such as the one concluded with the previous Clinton Administration cannot be reached with the Bush Administration, but has determined to go continue nuclear arms development until it is able to negotiate with the United States. The DPRK Foreign Ministry statement of February 10, 2005 stressed the reasons for this choice:

> "First, we wanted the Six-Party Talks, but we will inevitably suspend participation in the Six-Party Talks for an indefinite period until it is recognized that the justification for participating in the talks has been made and that ample conditions and atmosphere have been created for us to expect results from the talks."
>
> "Second, now that the United States has clearly disclosed the attempt to by all means eliminate our system by wielding a nuclear stick, we will take a measure to increase the nuclear weapons arsenal in order to defend the ideology, system, freedom, and democracy chosen by our people.... We have already resolutely withdrawn from the NPT and have manufactured nuclear weapons for self-defense to cope with the Bush Administration's policy of isolating and crushing the DPRK, which is becoming stronger. Our nuclear weapons will remain a self-defensive nuclear deterrent under any circumstances."

The North's will to indefinitely suspend participation in the Six-Party Talks and continue the nuclear weapon development program was clear in this statement. Nevertheless, the attention of the majority of the international community has focused on the first open admission of nuclear weapon manufacture. The suspension of participation in the Six-Party Talks came a distant second. As a result, the continuation of the nuclear weapons development program in North Korea - the issue about which the world is most concerned - was almost ignored.

Pyongyang's effort to expand the nuclear weapons arsenal has some serious implications. North Korea currently claims an arsenal of manufactured plutonium-based nuclear weapons. "Increase the nuclear weapons arsenal," therefore, indicates a new arsenal of uranium-based nuclear weapons in addition to the one already in possession. "A measure to increase the nuclear weapons arsenal" may refer to highly enriched uranium production for nuclear warheads.

Over the past four years, North Korea has repeatedly voiced its strong preference for face-to-face direct talks with the United States, but the Foreign Ministry statement seemed to convey a combination of disappointment and irritation over the US attitude:

> "We have shown all the magnanimity and tolerance we could during the last four years since the inauguration of the Bush Administration. Now we cannot spend another four years like this, but there is no need to return to the starting point again and repeat [what we did] for the [next] four years, either."

By all appearances, North Korea for a while would not take the policy of provoking the United States into "bargaining via direct talks," for the international community can easily sense such provocative acts as conducting nuclear tests, launching ballistic missiles, or extracting weapons-grade plutonium.

There is a possibility, on the other hand, that Pyongyang may continue to develop highly enriched uranium, which can be undertaken

in relative secrecy without directly irritating the international community. The eventual goal of the enrichment program is to develop nuclear missiles.

In general terms, uranium-based nuclear weapons are easier to miniaturize than plutonium-based weapons. They are therefore more suitable for producing missile warheads. In May 1998, Pakistan reportedly tested uranium-based nuclear weapons six times in three days, having successfully miniaturized the device. It became a de facto nuclear missile state soon after surviving the storm of criticism. North Korea is well aware of Pakistan's experience. It would not be surprising if North Korea wished to follow the same path as Pakistan.

There are no precise estimates of the North Korean uranium enrichment capability. Although it remains unknown whether the North holds low enriched uranium (LEU) or highly enriched uranium (HEU), the possibility remains that the North may obtain sufficient HEU for a nuclear test within one to two years if the following conditions are met:

- North Korea refrains from provoking the United States
- The North maintains good relations with China and South Korea
- The North receives continuous aid from both China and South Korea
- China and South Korea continue to oppose economic sanctions against DPRK.

For these reasons, blocking North Korea's nuclear weapons development - especially HEU weapons development program - is the primary task facing the international community. Unfortunately, there appears no sense of global urgency. For example, the US-Japan Joint Statement released on February 19, 2005 in the name of the Japanese Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State passed the following simple remark:

> "The Ministers agreed that the statement by the DPRK only further isolates it from the international community and runs counter to efforts by the parties concerned to peacefully resolve the nuclear issue through the Six-Party Talks."

As has been pointed out, the essence of North Korea's Foreign Ministry statement was the apparent will of the Pyongyang government to continue development of nuclear weapons. A sense of urgency among the U.S. and Japanese governments is clearly lacking in the US-Japan Joint Statement on North Korea.

In solving the problem, time is no ally. The international community, not North Korea, is standing at the crossroads. Although pressure may be applied to North Korea to prevent nuclear materials proliferating to other countries and terrorist groups, North Korea's nuclear capability cannot be neglected.

North Korea's Controlled Threat

In April 2005, Pyongyang took several steps toward gaining weapons-grade plutonium. The 5 MWe reactor was shut down after operating for two years. Then, on May 11, a spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry announced the complete removal of the 8,000 spent fuel rods from the reactor. The statement also contained the first clear expression of intent to resume construction of the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors that hitherto had been suspended since 1995. These provocative measures only increase allied fears. Some analysts have argued the North Korea threat has risen.

The threat, however, still remains in the "controlled" stages. Even if North Korea had truly unloaded the 8,000 nuclear spent fuel rods as it claimed, it would require at least a further 9 months to produce any weapons-grade plutonium. The spent rods take a minimum of 3 months to cool and 6 months to reprocess at the

Yongbyon facility operating at full-capacity to extract the largest possible amount of weapons-grade plutonium. In reality, these processes would probably take far longer. North Korea will therefore not gather new weapons-grade plutonium earlier than the summer of 2006.

There is another option for North Korea. As they have not yet declared the commencement of reprocessing, they still can choose to leave the spent fuel rods in cooling ponds for one year or two (or longer), which will further postpone the acquisition of additional weapons-grade plutonium. This would reduce international community fears.

If the construction of the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors were actually resumed, construction would take at least a few years to complete, around 2 years to operate the reactors and unload the spent fuel rods, and around another year to extract weapons-grade plutonium. Thus, a minimum of 5 years would elapse before North Korea gained weapons-grade plutonium from the new reactors. There is therefore little possibility that North Korea will remarkably increase the amount of weapons-grade plutonium in its possession within the term of Bush Administration. North Korea can therefore be considered a "controlled" threat. Both the United States and the international community have strong concerns, but no sense of urgency.

To put it differently, there is sufficient time and opportunities remaining to make North Korea relinquish its nuclear program. Such analysis and evaluation seems to support the efforts of the other nations planning to resume the Six-Party Talks.

A year has already passed since the previous session of the Six-Party Talks. Because North Korea continues to refuse to participate in a fourth session, the former momentum of the Six-Party Talks has vanished. US tolerance may be pushed close to its limit, but even the Bush Administration has no intention of permanently ending the Six-Party Talks at present. In fact, in the 28 April 2005 press con-

ference in which Bush created a stir by calling Kim Jong Il a "tyrant," he reaffirmed the importance of Six-Party Talks for the United States. For the time being, the Bush Administration is likely to concentrate on asking Beijing to use its leverage on Pyongyang, while occasionally alluding to the possibility of referring the issue to the UN Security Council.

The actions of the Bush Administration in and after March 2005 make these intentions evident. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, during her round of visits to Japan, South Korea, and China in mid-March, not only refrained from again naming North Korea as an outpost of tyranny but publicly declared it a "sovereign state." It seemed Washington wanted to give the impression of assuming flexibility towards North Korea as well as helping China act as intermediary.

The DPRK Foreign Ministry statement of February 10, 2005 proclaimed an indefinite halt to its participation in the Six-Party Talks and the resumption of nuclear weapons development. Since then, China has employed positive persuasion to encourage the Kim Jong Il government to reconsider this choice. Furthermore, it has asked the Bush Administration to show a flexible attitude towards North Korea. In response to the US plea for economic pressure on North Korea, the Chinese government has indicated there is a limit to what Chinese could do to North Koreans.

In response, the Bush Administration has displayed a more flexible attitude towards North Korea, while reiterating the same pressure request to Beijing. Rice's statements and attitude during the tour of Asian countries as Secretary of State were based on such a diplomatic concept.

Similarly, in May 2005 China sided with North Korea and pressed Washington to accept Pyongyang offer to reopen the New York channel. The Bush Administration eventually revived the channel on May 13, after an interval of around six months. By reopening the

channel as China recommended, the United States believed it might be able to change DPRK minds. If North Korea was unlikely to come back to the Six-Party Talks, letting Beijing invest exhaustive efforts before shifting discussion to the UN Security Council probably motivated the Bush Administration.

In real terms, no progress can be expected even if Pyongyang accepts a fourth session. Since the end of March 2005, North Korea has continued to claim that the Six-Party Talks should be turned into disarmament talks. Pyongyang argues that to dismantle the nuclear weapons program, the United States must remove all nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula and the region, stop military exercises, and agree on normalizing relations with North Korea. There is no possibility Washington will comply with such demands. The North Korean delegation will therefore probably again refuse to return to the Six-Party Talks.

Thus, the negotiations may roll back into exactly the same state in which it had started. It is hard to imagine the United States would engage itself in direct talks with North Korea. The Bush Administration would also not take drastic measures, such as using military force or engaging economic sanctions, at least until Iraq becomes politically stable. While asking China to apply pressure, the United States will not send the stalemated North Korean problem to the UN Security Council in 2005. Meanwhile, North Korea will quietly push nuclear development forward if the status quo continues.

Suggested Roles for Japan

In the past it was generally considered that North-South reconciliation was the most important element to building peace on the Korean Peninsula and, once reconciliation was achieved, military tensions on the Peninsula would recede. These ideas are now gone. A

certain degree of reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula has not resulted in definite peace or decreased military tensions. The structure of confrontation still exists on the Peninsula.

Reconciliation is certainly in progress between the North and South Koreans. A decade ago it was unimaginable that dialogue and cooperation, as well as interpersonal exchanges in cultural and sports areas would occur so frequently. During the four years after the first North-South Korea Summit in June 2000, ministerial and Red Cross talks were held periodically, and railroad and road connections have been established. The construction and growth of Kaesong Industrial Complex has taken shape. The two Koreas are in the process of a "maintainable and stable relational improvement" as President Roh Moo-hyun stated. This is a major change of situation, considering how much attention was formerly applied to the question of how to realize a dialogue between the North and the South.

The easing of North-South military tensions, on the other hand, has made little progress. North Korea is largely to blame for this state. The North has facilitated dialogues, exchanges, and cooperation with the South and no longer refuses economic aid. It has, however, never concurred with the South on the matters of arms control and disarmament.

North Korea's primary fear is the military power of the United States. No matter how its relations with South Korea are improved, North Korea is unlikely to reduce its military forces until relations with the United States improve and the US military threat reduced.

The military forces of North Korea have actually increased in the past 10 years. The North's ballistic missile capability has risen steadily, and Pyongyang resumed the nuclear weapons program in December 2002. The weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability of North Korea have certainly been upgraded.

Interestingly, during this time, South Korean society has gradually

come to recognize the North Korean military threat. That is, fears about the North's military threat were slightly on the decline among South Koreans, and an atmosphere for a relatively stable "peaceful coexistence" with the northern half of the Peninsula was created in the South.

However, the WMD capability of North Korea is no doubt a threat to peace and security of Northeast Asia. Unless the North gives up WMD, especially its nuclear ambitions, there will be no permanent peace, even if the North and the South maintain their "continuous and stable relational improvement."

For peace of the Korean Peninsula, the North must abandon nuclear weapons. North Korea has a limited, though not negligible, nuclear capability, and Pyongyang continues to develop this nuclear capability with the 5 MWe nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. If the fuel is reloaded and reprocessed, there will be sufficient plutonium for one or two additional weapons. The North is estimated to already possess one or two devices, plus an accumulation of weapons-grade plutonium suitable to manufacture six or seven nuclear weapons.

All other countries in Northeast Asia including Japan, South Korea, China, Russia, and the United States have implicitly admitted the existence of North Korea's limited capability, by deciding to live with a "nuclear-armed North Korea" for the time being. The strategic environment of Northeast Asia has been completely changed by North Korea's nuclear development program.

Terminating North Korea's nuclear development requires a mix of policies - a combination of pressure-based and incentive-based approaches, and all the countries concerned should collaborate and act in concert to change Pyongyang's policies.

Considering North Korea's increasing dependence on aid, China and South Korea as sources of economic support can both apply pressure on Pyongyang by reducing or temporarily suspending their aid

projects.

Japan and the United States, on the other hand, can provide valuable incentives. Pyongyang will consider any commitments such as security assurances useless unless they are endorsed by the United States. Japan is also the only nation capable of providing large-scale economic assistance. Japan and the United States must therefore offer North Korea incentives.

This approach is the best available mix of policies with multiple intent and effectiveness. In reality, however, each pair of nations plays the contrary role. The countries suitable to apply pressure try to provide incentives. Neither China nor South Korea wants to replace their carrots with sticks, while Japan and the United States pressure the North instead of offering incentives. Herein lays the reason for the failure of the current system of negotiation.

If it can move beyond the abduction issue, Japan can contribute to the process and tackle the nuclear issue. The close bond between Japan and the United States allows them to present incentives in another way. When trying to persuade North Korea to terminate its disruptive behavior, for instance, Japan can offer a comprehensive and attractive proposal on condition that North Korea must yield on all the points claimed by Japan and the United States, such as nuclear development, missiles, and abductions.

As a comprehensive resolution advocated by Tokyo and Washington, Japan can assure North Korea that such a resolution would, at the very least, enable normalized relations and huge economic aid. At the same time, Japan can encourage the United States to normalize relations with North Korea.

All concerned parties must work together to find the best blend of pressure and incentives. This task is very difficult and failure or success is dependent on how Japan acts in the group. Japan must provide the necessary incentives and engage in normalization talks

with North Korea while participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Illicit Activity Initiative (IAI). Japan therefore has tremendous significance over the North Korean nuclear issue and must pull its weight for peace and stability in the region.

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*The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Russia**

Alexander Fedorovskiy

Abstract

This article explores Russian-Korean relations in the context of modern security situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. This research begins with an overview of issues of the Six-Party Talks. It then discusses efficiency of negotiations in Beijing taking into account political position and diplomatic activity of DPRK and the other five delegations. Political disputes and low level of confidence between the five negotiators undermine the process of peaceful settlement of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Special attention is paid to Russian policy towards the Korean Peninsula, Russian-South Korean and Russian-North Korean relations as well as to new challenges to the international community in Northeast Asia. In conclusion, this article analyzes issues of regional security and prospects for political cooperation in Northeast Asia. It is necessary for six nations to discuss the situation on the Korean Peninsula in the context of regional security and stability in order to find out the final decision for the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

Key Words: Russian-Korean relations, Six-Party Talks, North Korea's nuclear crisis, political cooperation, Northeast Asia

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A year has past since the previous round of Six-Party Talks finished in Beijing. It seems trivial remark how difficult were the negotiations with North Korea on nuclear, or indeed any, issue. The history of Six-Party Talks and North Korea's announcement on February 10, 2005 are not cause for optimism.

Nevertheless it would be an over-simplification to believe that North Korea's policy is the only cause of difficulties at the Six-Party Talks. Inadequate levels of trust and understanding between the other five delegations, their different priorities on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and ambiguous evidence of nuclear weapons proliferation and terrorism all negatively influence the multinational negotiations in China's capital.

It is impossible to propose a magic solution to the North Korean crisis in the near future. Nevertheless, the international community must understand the main features of the current crisis on the Korean Peninsula to inform joint international efforts to deal with the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

Six-Party Talks at the Crossroads

There was no common value at the third stage of negotiations in Beijing in 2004. The delegations from Russia, China, and to certain extent the Republic of Korea, each believed it possible to take some positive results from the first three rounds of Six-Party Talks, especially the third. Japan and especially the United States were not so optimistic.

Many Russian experts believe it possible to take three main results from the third round of Six-Party Talks:

- All six countries officially agreed with the concept of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula as the main purpose of the multinational negotiations in Beijing;

- Four countries, except the United States, agreed in general to provide economic assistance to North Korea while the United States agreed not to oppose to these efforts;
- There was discussion of the establishment of special subgroups of experts on key issues such as inspections and energy issues. In other words, they took the first steps towards implementing a mechanism of multinational cooperation on the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.[1]

Although the negotiations did not resume in Autumn 2004, many experts believed that the six delegations would meet again in Beijing after the US election campaign.

Meanwhile North Korea's announcement on February 10 worsened the situation. Some experts believe this announcement was a warning to the United States, because Kim Jong Il fears an American invasion. The meaning is unclear, the announcement coming after more positive declarations from the Bush Administration at the beginning of this year. (Although at that time U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice labeled North Korea as one of the "outpost of tyranny."[2])

It seems the crisis is a product of the existing Six-Party Talks. This model of negotiation is very specific. The Talks are neither bilateral nor multilateral. The United States and DPRK are the key negotiators, but final agreements can only be reached with support of the "group of four." The priorities and role of the other four nations remain unclear. Many politicians and experts believe their presence improves the political climate, and the four countries serve as observers and guarantors of possible agreements. At the same time, the "four minor negotiators" try to achieve their own goals. This favors Pyong-

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[1] Security issues on the Korean Peninsula, Round Table Discussions (In Russian and in Korean), *KorusForum*, No. 24, 2004, pp. 23-53.

[2] *International Herald Tribune*, February 11, 2005.

yang by allowing room for maneuver and permitting North Korea to play a leading role in the negotiations.

Pyongyang had many reasons to be satisfied with the main trends of the negotiations, but since August 2004, it has preferred to harden North Korea's position and to engage in political battles with the counterparts. North Korea continues to insist on undisputable guarantees of political security for the regime's survival from the United States. Kim Jong Il also wishes to radically change the political image of himself and his country, preferring to be perceived as a respectable politician. Pyongyang does not want to be criticized by foreign politicians, and the mass media and the regime are angry with the title of one of the centers of dictatorship.

The regime's diplomatic efforts are not the whimsy of the North Korean political leadership but part a modern strategy to transform the DPRK with economic reforms that ends the political isolation. To achieve this, the North Korean leadership does not neglect its proven foreign policy of blackmail.

World reaction, especially among the other participants of the negotiations, has differed regarding North Korea's decision to leave the Six-Party Talks. Many experts believe that North Korea's announcement is a traditional diplomatic maneuvering. Optimists recall previous gloomy North Korean declarations, after which negotiations always resumed. This maneuvering may therefore be interpreted as a bluff. In this case, however, North Korea has gone further by:

- Removing UN seals on mothballed nuclear facilities
- Expelling UN nuclear monitors
- Rejecting the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
- Completing the reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods to extract weapons-grade plutonium
- Announcing the manufacture of nuclear weapons and halting its participation in the Six-Party negotiations.[3]

Although Australian Prime Minister John Howard recently noted the situation "is a quite dangerous," he also stressed that "there's an element of bluff; I am sure there's an element of exaggeration even if she does have some nuclear capacity."[4] According to South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon, North Korea's announcement of February 10 is "a matter of grave concern," but the issue should be solved "through dialogue and negotiations."[5] Unofficially, experts in Seoul consider Pyongyang's announcement "as nothing especially new." One senior Foreign Ministry official in Seoul commented that "we shouldn't put too much weight on it."[6] Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said that his country "would use the power of persuasion" to resolve the issue.[7]

Official reactions of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in both Moscow and Beijing were also cautious. Zhan Yulin, Director of the Asia Pacific Studies Institute under the Chinese Academy of Social Science, stressed that North Korea's decision "will give China difficulties."[8] Nevertheless as experts note, "China is likely to be wary of cutting off all its aid out of fear that it might lead to the collapse of the [North Korean] state itself."[9]

In other words, North Korea's announcement appears to be preparing for a new round of negotiations. It seems that many politicians, diplomats, and experts agree with this interpretation, believing that North Korea will return to the table. The alternative, as

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[3] South Korea calls for calm in the nuclear crisis, *International Herald Tribune*, February 11, 2005, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/02/11/asia/web/0211korea.html.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] http://news.ft.com/cms/s/d98ec91a-7c2a-11d9-8992-00000e2511c8.html.

[6] http://www.koreaherald.co.kr./SITE/DATA/htlm_dir/2005/02/12/20050212000 4.asp.

[7] http://news.ft.com/cms/s/9a19a94e-7b99-11d9-9af4-00000e2511c8.html.

[8] http://news/ft.com/cms/s/d98ec91a-7c2a-11d9-8992-00000e2511c8.html.

[9] *Ibid.*

many observers have stressed, is a conflict that nobody wants.

The approach is consistent with North Korea's traditional policy of blackmail. This model of diplomacy can succeed, if the diplomatic efforts of the five other countries allow Pyongyang to achieve its strategic goals. Pyongyang is more successful than its counterparts, mainly because North Korea focuses on solving the primary issue: a better political, security, and economic environment to ensure regime survival. Meanwhile, the other five negotiators often focus on other issues of more important to them.

Each of these the five countries has officially declared the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is their main foreign policy priorities. In practice, however, their policies toward the Korean Peninsula are focused on other issues. These countries do not ignore the necessity to solve nuclear proliferation, but practically tackling this problem depends on other issues. In other words, political declarations and real policy differ from each other, which is a common phenomenon in modern international relations. It is not the result of cynical political games, but of inadequate Six-Party Talks.

Thus, it seems that for the Republic of Korea the primary task is increasing inter-Korean political, economic, and humanitarian exchanges. As G. Bulychev notes:

> "A new historic period of North-South national reconciliation has begun. It has survived the nuclear crisis and even pressure on Seoul from its allies, and the trend has become (despite the usual ups and downs, especially in 2004) a new factor in the Korean situation at the dawn of the 21st century."[10]

Engagement policy dominates the ROK strategy towards DPRK, and Seoul prefers to save bilateral relations with Pyongyang at all costs. The ROK position on North Korea therefore differs from US

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[10] http://www.japanfocus.org/article.asp.

policy towards DPRK. For example, President Rok Moo-hyun opposes increasing pressure on Pyongyang, which he argues will only aggravate the situation. The South Korean National Security Council refused to accept a US proposal to draft a contingency plan on North Korea in the event of internal turmoil in this country.[11]

In the first half of the 1990s, Russia was excluded from multinational negotiations on Korea issues. Under the Putin Administration, Russia has focused efforts on increasing its political and economic presence on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Russia is therefore seeking support for development of inter-Korean dialogue and improvement of bilateral relations with both Korean states. Russian policy is very close to South Korean policy in main aspects.

China is disturbed by significant American military presence on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, as well as the possible expansion of Japan's military role in East Asia. In concert with Seoul, Beijing cannot agree with new Japanese textbooks "whitewashing and glorifying Japan's past colonization."[12] China, along with South Korea and Russia, has disputes with Japan on territorial issues. As a result, there is strong anti-Japanese sentiment in China and the Republic of Korea. Qiu Wen argues that "under globalization, China has to face tougher challenges rather than sailing into a safe harbor. Its national security situation is getting more severe and the mission of maintaining the security is more difficult."[13]

In turn, Japan pays special attention to growing political and military influence of China in Northeast Asia. The abduction issue is a key concern in Japan and Tokyo has tried to cooperate with Pyongyang on resolving the problem. At the same time, Tokyo is involved in

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[11] http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir2005/04/23/200504230036.asp.
[12] http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir2005/04/12/200504120024.asp.
[13] *China Daily/Asia News Network*, April 14, 2005.

territorial disputes with all of its Northeast Asian neighbors.

Even the United States, the country most deeply involved in the Korean nuclear crisis, focuses on other issues. For example, Washington has rising concerns about China's growing military power. Although the American government has declared proliferation of nuclear weapon is among its top priorities, the United States did nothing to stop illegal cooperation of its ally Pakistan with North Korea in nuclear technology. There is considerable fluctuation of American policy towards North Korea: ranging from dialogue and the KEDO program under the Clinton Administration to preparations for war under the Bush Administration, despite the character and the policies of Kim Jong Il's regime remaining unchanged. The attention of these countries is focused on other important strategic or tactical issues, rather than on proliferation. As a result, North Korea has much room for diplomatic maneuvering and opportunities to postpone any decision on the nuclear issue.

The developing trend of North Korean policy is dangerous. Both the global and Northeast Asian situations are changing the environment for solving the North Korean nuclear crisis. At each new stage of the crisis, it becomes more difficult to resume negotiations.

The situation is now more difficult than at previous stages of the crisis, as new challenges to the international community emerge:

- The threat of nuclear proliferation: It is unknown whether North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, but it would be dangerous for the world community to accept the existence of a new nuclear power. A number of other countries would soon emerge in a similar manner;
- The threat of terrorism: If the North Korean regime possesses nuclear weapons, the threat of nuclear assault by international terrorists must increase;
- The threat of regional instability: Taiwan may be the next country

to declare nuclear weapons. Japan will also increase its military power to meet the growing regional military threat. As a result, regional arms race will ensue;

- The threat of blackmail policy triumphing: Other countries may decide to resolve domestic economic problems by resorting to nuclear blackmail against the outside world.

These challenges affect not only the US, but undermine regional and global stability.

Russia's Foreign Policy towards the Korean Peninsula

The best strategic resolution of the "Korea Issue" for Russia would be unification of Korea. This view prevails among leading Russian politicians and experts. A 2003 report presented by prominent Russian researchers stressed that the Russian Federation "is interested in united Korea as a peaceful, democratic state, playing [an] independent role in international relations."[14] At the same time, the vast majority of Russian experts believe that the two Korean states will continue to exist in the long term. G. Boulychev and A. Vorontsov argue that the Roh Moo-hyun Administration's plan to construct a new national capital south of Seoul is evidence that the Republic of Korea is ready to coexist with DPRK well into the future.[15] The main purpose of the Russia's diplomacy is therefore active support of good neighborhood relations between the two Koreas as well as peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.

Russia's policy towards the Korea Peninsula, however, has not been stable during last decade. During the 1990s there were several

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[14] "Russia and inter-Korea relations" (in Russian). The Report was edited by V. Medvedev Gorbochev-Fund, Moscow 2003.

[15] *Kommersant*, June 22, 2004.

stages of development Russia-Korea relations that featured increasing political and economic exchanges with the ROK and stagnation of bilateral relations with DPRK.[16] After a long period of policy fluctuation, Moscow has sought a balanced policy towards the two Koreas since the mid-1990s. This type of policy did not begin to reach maturity until the Putin Presidency.

The main features of Russian policy towards the Korean Peninsula in the 21st Century may be characterized as follows:

- Political priorities: Development of broad political and cultural relations between Russia and the Republic of Korea, regular consultations on regional and global issues with the ROK on the basis of a strategic partnership; Political dialogue, cultural, and humanitarian exchanges with the DPRK, support of establishment and improvement of political relations between North Korea and other countries
- Security priorities: Nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons; Reduction of military forces of all kind; Support for the Six-Party Talks as a key mechanism of region dialogue on security and political issues. Russia seeks peaceful coexistence of the two Korean states, as well as in security on the Korean Peninsula in general;
- Economic priorities: Development of economic relations with the Republic of Korea as a strategic partner in Northeast Asia and the Pacific region, support for South Korean investments and business activities in Russia's economy; Development of economic relations between Russia and North Korea on market principles, assistance in

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[16] This period of Russia-Korea relations was characterized by the author in previous publications. See A. Fedorovsky, Russia Policy and Interests in the Korean Peninsula in *Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda*, SIPRI. Edited by G. Chufrin (Oxford University Press 1999). A. Fedorovsky, Russian Role in Constructing a South-North Korean Economic Community, *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2000.

resolving social problems, support for North Korea's economic cooperation with Northeast Asia; Trilateral or multilateral economic cooperation with both Koreas on various projects.

Russian policy seems logical, therefore, it may be successful. The Putin Administration has vigorously initiated these policies and the President has paid great personal attention to the issues. There are, however, some problems that make it difficult for Russia to balance its policy towards the Korean Peninsula.

Since the beginning of 2000 the new Administration has sought to develop a flexible policy towards the Korean Peninsula and appropriate for President Putin's doctrine of pragmatic foreign policy. According to the new concept of Russian foreign policy adopted in 2000, Russia will develop relations with foreign countries not on ideological base, but on the principles of confidence and mutual benefit. The domestic economic factor is determining the Kremlin's foreign policy as not pro-West or pro-East, but pro-Russian. Russia must therefore resolve its domestic economic problems while taking into account its role in the world. The Putin Administration can no longer base its foreign policy only on the government' economic activity, and it must now consider the interests of Russia's growing private business sector.

Under these conditions Moscow will reexamine its foreign economic policy. On the one hand, Russia seeks new niches in Western markets. On the other hand, one of the main purposes of Russia's modern foreign policy is to return to traditional markets in the Commonwealth of Independent States, in Eastern Europe, and in some Asian and Middle East countries. At the same time, the Kremlin rigidly denies any attempt to restore old type of "special relations" with former allies.

Consequently, Russia will attempt to improve economic relations with such countries as Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea on the prin-

ciples of market economy. Moscow hopes to increase bilateral trade, investment, and technological cooperation with former Soviet allies by assisting the modernization of the industry and infrastructure originally constructed with Soviet assistance. The results of this policy depend not only on Russia but on the policies of Russia's partners as well. For example, Russia's relations with Vietnam are more fruitful than with other "old partners," mainly because Vietnam successfully reformed and modernized its economy and improved relations with the outside world.

It is therefore difficult to balance Russia's Korean Peninsula policy as South Korea is the more prominent economic partner. South Korea is one of Russia's most important strategic partners for several reasons. Import of goods, investment, and expertise from South Korea is central to the modernization of the Russian economy. Development of economic relations with the ROK is a good way for Russia to diversify its foreign economic relations and to avoid over-dependence on Chinese markets. At the same time, cooperation with the ROK facilitates Russian integration into Northeast Asia. South Korea's positive attitude to Russia's decision to join the WTO is valuable for Russia.

During the 1990s economic ties between the two countries fluctuated. Both sides were unsatisfied with the rate of growth, scale, and quality of bilateral economic relations at that time. Russia and South Korea nevertheless cooperated to improve the situation. Such joint efforts and the improvement of domestic economies in Russia and the ROK were the main reasons for positive trends in economic exchanges between the two countries after 1998. A debt problem has been successfully resolved and bilateral trade reached $6 billion in 2004 - doubled since 2000. It is necessary also to take into account "gray" trade (Russia's export of fish and oil to the ROK as well as Russia's import of some South Korean machinery and electronics).

According to some estimation, Russia-South Korea trade is about $10 billion in general.[17] There are also a number of projects in energy, oil refining, manufacturing, electronic industries, and tourism that have been adopted recently by business and government institutions of the two countries. Several billions of dollars will be invested to realize these projects in the near future.[18]

At the same time, political dialogue between the two countries is steadily developing constantly. Around a dozen meetings have been held between Russian and South Korean Presidents since the establishment of direct diplomatic relations in 1990. Ministers and high-ranking officials of the two governments, members of Russian and South Korean parliaments, military personnel, and activists of public organizations have all been involved in political exchanges. Science and cultural cooperation is expanding in addition to humanitarian exchanges.

South Korea's engagement policy towards North Korea is welcomed by Russia, in light of Russian and South Korean shared views on security issues and political situations on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, according to Moscow, the anti-terrorist struggle is also an area of mutual interest for the two countries.

Prospects for Russian policy towards the ROK in a large scale depend on some important issues. Firstly, the two countries must find new avenues for bilateral cooperation and create adequate political and legal environments. Significant improvement in political and security situation on the Korean Peninsula is necessary for Russia to increase economic cooperation at both bilateral and multilateral levels with both Korean states in such industries as energy and transport. In

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[17] E. Lobatsevich, The Results of President Roh Moo-hyun's Visit to Moscow, *KorusForum* (In Russian), No. 24, December 2004, p. 60.

[18] S. Suslina, New "Dynamic Stage" of Economic Cooperation between Russia and the Republic of Korea in XXI Century, *KorusForum* (In Russian), No. 25, June 2005, p. 129.

order to reach its aims, Russia is ready to support development of inter-Korean political, economic, and humanitarian cooperation. In other words, it is clear for Moscow that in some aspects Russian policy towards South Korea, the Korean Peninsula, and Northeast Asia depends on the situation in North Korea. Under these conditions, Russia seeks market reforms in North Korea, which create better conditions for Russia's trade and economic exchanges both with the ROK and the DPRK.

The other reason for improving bilateral relations with North Korea is political. The Putin Administration has realized the necessity of radical improvement in political relations with Northeast Asian countries. Russia successfully resolved territory disputes with China and has continued negotiations with Japan. It was therefore natural that Moscow paid a particular attention to the Korean Peninsula. The danger of regional conflict, terrorism, and proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction disturbs Russia's political elite. Moreover, improvement of political relations with the DPRK creates new opportunities for Russian foreign policy on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

Russia and North Korea: Issues and Prospects for Bilateral Relations

Under the Putin Administration, Moscow has sought to develop a more pragmatic policy towards Pyongyang. This policy is determined by the following key principles. Firstly, the Putin Administration opposes the idea of political isolation of Pyongyang or introduction of any political or economic sanctions towards the North Korean regime. Moreover, the Kremlin considers North Korean involvement in processes of international cooperation in Northeast Asia vital for Russia, both Korean states, and their neighbors. Moscow therefore prefers a

predictable political dialogue with Pyongyang.

Secondly, Russia prefers to explore opportunities to develop Russian-North Korean economic cooperation taking into account mutual benefits.

Thirdly, Russia considers it vital that North Korea embraces the ideology of nuclear and WMD nonproliferation. At the same time, Russia opposes any possible confrontations on the Korean Peninsula. Military conflicts or an international invasion of North Korea to effect regime change are contrary to Russian interests in the region.

Finally, Russia supports broad scale inter-Korean relations. Moreover, Russia seeks participation in new trilateral and multilateral economic, social, and environment projects on the Korean Peninsula. This type of economic project would improve the regional economic and political climate close to Russia's border. As a result, North Korea would gradually become a more predictable, market-oriented country, peacefully integrated into the Northeast Asian region.

The Russian strategy coincides with the main principles of South Korea's engagement policy provided by President Kim Dae-jung and his political successor. According to President Roh Moo-hyun's announcement in the Spring of 2005 during the talks with German Parliament President Wolfgang Thierse, South Korea "opposes a sudden regime collapse or change in North Korea," while hoping "for a gradual move" by the DPRK towards a market economy.[19]

As the first step to achieving this policy, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov paid an official visit to Pyongyang in February 2000. It was the first visit by a Russian Foreign Minister to North Korea since Mr. Shevardnadze's visit to Pyongyang in 1990. A new Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and "Good-Neighborliness" was concluded during the visit. The new treaty created a legal framework for improving

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[19] http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2005/04/13/200504130027.asp.

bilateral relations after the end of Cold War epoch. Russia-North Korea relations were "demilitarized" by excluding an article on military alignment and excluding any notion of confrontation with a "third side." The treaty and Mr. Ivanov's negotiations with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il symbolized the normalization of bilateral relations between Moscow and Pyongyang as well as providing a basis for political dialogue between the two countries, interrupted a decade ago.

This dialogue continued at Russia-North Korea summits in 2000-02. President Putin's visit to Pyongyang in July 2000 (a historic first visit by the Head of Russia to Pyongyang), as well as Kim Jong Il's visits to Russia in 2001 (Moscow) and 2002 (Vladivostok) allowed the two leaders to determine the main principles of Russia-North Korea relations and to improve bilateral economic and cultural exchanges.

The Russian President confirmed to Pyongyang that stabilization of bilateral relations is the long term purpose of the Kremlin's policy towards the DPRK. Mr. Putin also assured the North Korean leader that Moscow will support development of North Korea's relations with the outside world as well as any improvement of inter-Korean relations. In turn, the DPRK promised that its "missile program does not threaten anyone, and is for strictly peaceful purposes." G. Toloraya notes that President Putin's policy was regarded "as an alternative to the "stick and carrot" tactics vis-à-vis Pyongyang – a policy of dialogue on an equal foot without blackmail and pressure."[20]

At the same time, it was agreed that Russia was not able to resume Soviet-style economic cooperation with North Korea. Firstly, Russia has limited financial resources to aid foreign countries. Moreover, the Kremlin would not restore special bilateral economic relations with Pyongyang to support an inefficient North Korean

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[20] G. Toloraya, President Putin's Korean Policy, *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. XVII, No.1, 2003, p. 40.

juche economic policy. Secondly, Russian government organizations could not force private business sectors to trade and cooperate with North Korea.

Private Russian business is not generally interested in trade and cooperation with unpredictable North Korean partners. Russian businessmen are disturbed by issues such as unstable imports from the DPRK, financial problems of North Korean partners, and low quality of North Korean goods. The absence of market institutions in North Korea also limits an opportunity for Russian business to cooperate. Finally, the structure of Russia-North Korea trade is too small to justify development of bilateral economic relations between the two countries. For example, China exports garments, footwear, and food to North Korea, while importing mainly nonferrous metals and seafood. Russia, however, has no commercial interest in such imports and cannot substitute Chinese exports. The only large scale area of mutual cooperation is North Korean labor migration to Russia, especially to the Russian Far East region. Under these conditions, realization of infrastructure and energy projects in the DPRK with government support of the both countries is the most important area of cooperation as it can stimulate Russia-North Korea economic relations in general.

Development of transport infrastructure on the Korean Peninsula is the only project, which has been discussed by Moscow, Pyongyang, and Seoul at trilateral level. Russia is interested in modernizing the North Korean railway network and connecting the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) and Trans-Korea Railway (TKR). At the same time, a realization of this project would give Pyongyang a chance to radically increase cooperation with Russia and the ROK as well as with other Northeast Asian countries.

Energy is another prominent sphere of interest for trilateral cooperation between Russia and the two Koreas. The energy deficit is one

of the most important factors paralyzing the North Korean economy. North Korean power stations are in poor condition and urgently require modernization. The DPRK has invited Russia to participate in the refurbishment as 70% of the DPRK's energy is produced by Soviet-built power stations. Accordingly, North Korea has requested the reconstruction of Pyongyang's thermoelectrical power plant and east Pyongyang thermal power plant using Russian assistance. A high-ranking team of managers from GASPROM, led by the president of the company Mr. Miller, visited Pyongyang earlier in 2005 to discuss energy projects with North Korean leaders.

None of these discussions has yet to result in any business deals. It seems that Pyongyang is not ready to be involved in big projects based on market principles. Another important reason is a politically unpredictable situation on the Korean Peninsula.

In other words, there are some opportunities for Russia and North Korea to resume trade, investment, and technology cooperation under new conditions. It means that Russia is ready to support North Korea's transition to a market economy and the process of North Korean integration into Northeast Asian regional economy. In turn, cooperation with the DPRK gives Russia an opportunity to increase foreign trade with the two Koreas as well as to expand its economic presence in Northeast Asia. In the five years since the first Russia-North Korea summit, bilateral relations between the two countries are dominated by growing political exchanges at different levels. meetings, conferences, and negotiations have been undertaken by ministers, mayors of major cities, high-ranking bureaucrats of local governments, and members of research groups.

In spite of joint official declarations, nothing has been achieved in practice. During 2002-04 there were no radical improvements of bilateral economic cooperation. Although trade turnover between Russia and North Korea increased in 2004 by 50% to $200 million,

economic exchanges are still at very low level. Development of transport projects is frozen and energy cooperation remains under general discussions.

The economic result of five years of direct, high-level Russian–North Korean dialogue is insignificant, and Russia must be unsatisfied with the slow development of bilateral economic relations. It is clear that the improvement of Russia-North Korea relations will depend on North Korean domestic reforms as well as on political and security situation on the Korean Peninsula.

From the Six-Party Talks to Regional Security System

During the last decade, Russia insisted on multinational negotiations on Korea issues, proposing six- or even eight-party talks (with the current participants of six countries, plus the United Nations and IAEA). The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was therefore satisfied with multinational negotiations that began under the model of Six-Party Talks. North Korea's February 10 announcement therefore exerted significant influence on the Russian political and expert communities.

There is no common point of view among Russian experts on whether North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. For example, the Head of Center for Security Studies at IMEMO, Alexei Arbatov, believes this announcement may be a bluff. At the same time, the Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Alexander Konovalov, warns that "if there is no nuclear weapon in North Korea now it will be possible for Pyongyang to have this weapon in the future." He argues that many Russian experts are certain that Pyongyang has several nuclear devices or may build a number of nuclear devices within six months.[21]

Meanwhile, reactions of some leading Russian politicians were

more rigid than Russian foreign officials' responses. According to the Head of the International Committee of the State Duma, Mr. Kosachev, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcement was "a defeat of the treaty of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. It is necessary to recognize it." He considered that "North Korea's nuclear weapon is a headache for a mankind... and is a real danger for the [Northeast Asia] region as well as for the DPRK's neighbours."[22] A Russian Senator and the Head of the International Committee of Federation Counsel (the Chamber of Russian Parliament), Mr. M. Margelov, characterized the North Korean announcement as "very dangerous." He also stressed that any military operation against North Korea would be inefficient and dangerous.[23] It should be noted that such reaction was expressed by high-ranking parliamentary leaders and members of the ruling party closely connected with the Kremlin.

This tough reaction of Russian officials suggests that North Korea's nuclear political games undermine Russian policy towards the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. During the summit in Bratislava in February 2005, President Putin noted that Russia and the United States have common views on the North Korean nuclear issue. Mr. Putin asserts that proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies must be blocked.[24] During the South Korean Defence Minister Yoon Kwang-Ung's visit to Moscow in April 2005, his Russian counterpart Mr. S. Ivanov stressed that Russia would do its best to return North Korea to the Six-Party Talks.[25]

It will be almost impossible to return to the same stage of negotiation as it was a year ago. Time may be running out for the six

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[21] http://www.polit.ru/event/2005/10/KNDR.html.

[22] *Ibid*.

[23] http://www.rian.ru/politics/foreign/20050211/25649030.htlm.

[24] http://www.1n.mid.ru/brp_4nsf/sps/

[25] http://www.mil.ru/releases/2005/04/221508_9514.shtml.

countries to resolve the nuclear issue. According to Georgy Kunadze, "no country supports [North Korea's] nuclear drive or advocates rewarding blackmail with any degree of conviction. Put differently, everyone seems to be frustrated with behaviors of the DPRK and time is no longer on the North Korean side."[26] Time is not on the other negotiators' side. Moreover, Pyongyang appears to use a time factor in its own favor, employing it as a bargaining tool.

Time is a very sensitive issue for regional security and stability. For example, time is a very important factor for China's foreign policy. If denuclearization of Korea is not on the agenda in the near future, there is a real danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, including such countries as Japan and Taiwan. The regional security situation may therefore radically change against Chinese interests. This threat may be one of the sources of China's ambitious military program. The United States, Russia, and the ROK would be also dissatisfied with this trend.

If denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is not reached in the near future, a growing security threat will stimulate Japan to promote a revision of defense policy. The Japanese government is also under domestic pressure over the abduction issue. Tokyo has little time to resolve the problem.

For the five countries, especially Russia and the United States, the terrorist threat is a real danger. North Korea's announcement on February 10 directly opposes the political and security priorities of the other five countries, which are committed to stopping proliferation immediately. Under these conditions there is a basis for closer cooperation between the five countries on the Korean Peninsula's nonproliferation. In practice, reactions of the five countries may not be equal to North Korea's challenge. The political situation in Northeast Asia

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[26] Georgy Kunadze, Reassessing North Korea, Coping with Korea's Security Challenges, *North Korean Nuclear Issue*, Vol. 1 (Seoul: IFANS 2004), p. 55.

is difficult to predict. It has evidently deteriorated during the first half of 2005. Russia and Japan are still far from agreement over border disputes, despite the recent Russian flexibility on the two islands. Political relations between Japan and the ROK and especially between Japan and China were undermined significantly. Consequently, the DPRK has exploited the conditions to successfully continue its black-mail policy in the near term.

In turn, growing instability of Northeast Asian regional security is not in US interests. It is unclear how the Bush Administration will respond.

There are four real ways to deal with North Korea:

- Military operations initiated by the United States: This seems unlikely, not least because China, Russia, and the Republic of Korea are opposed to war. Furthermore, regional war is not in Japan's interests. The United States does not yet appear ready to solve the "North Korean nuclear issue" by force. According to US Secretary of State Rice, "the North Koreans have been told by the President of the United Sates that the United States has no intention of attacking or invading North Korea"[27];
- Bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea: Mr. Selig S. Harrison, a prominent American specialist on North Korea at the Center for International Policy in Washington, recently said that the United States should consider direct talks with North Korea.[28] There are, however, few other experts and politicians in US and other countries, which agree with this proposal. Any bilaterally approved decision can only be tactical, as the interests of other countries must be taken into account. It is therefore difficult to support the assertion that bilateral dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington could be more efficient than multinational negotiations such as the Six-Party Talks. Under the current conditions, this would be a bad choice;

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[27] http://koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2005/02/12/200502120006.asp.

[28] *New York Times*, April 17, 2005.

- Six-Party Talks: After Pyongyang's announcement, Washington declared it remains committed to the Six-Party Talks and to a peaceful diplomatic resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. According to State Department officials, the "six-way framework remains the best and most effective way" to persuade North Korea to end its program and to achieve acceptance of the North Korean government. The United States will therefore consult its partners in the six nation talks – South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia who all favor Six-Party negotiations – on how to resume multinational negotiations.

There are serious doubts that this model of negotiations will be efficient if the six countries resume the same arguments. After two years of discussions, the six countries could simply return to negotiations on the same issues, but under more difficult political conditions. A new agenda is required for any fresh negotiations. The primary aim of any negotiations must be examined. Previous negotiations were devoted to denuclearization and survival of North Korea. Under these conditions North Korea's nuclear program was successfully employed as an element of blackmail policy. Any new agreement on North Korean nuclear weapons will be tactical and will not solve the strategic issues. There is little doubt that Kim Jong Il's regime will try in the near future to find new opportunities for its traditional blackmail policy, while the other five countries are suspicious of each other. The hierarchy of aims in the negotiations must therefore be changed.

The main task is not to solve the problem of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, but to make a denuclearized Korea as an integral element of Northeast Asian regional security. This should comprise not only a political agreement with (as Americans call it) the "rogue nation," but also a mechanism for regional security cooperation. One of the key elements of any security system on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia is predictable, the market-oriented DPRK in-

tegrated into regional economic cooperation.

This approach proposes the resumption of the Six-Party Talks to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapon program, in return for national security and economic benefits. Denuclearization of Korea is necessary but not sufficient to secure strategic peace and stability on the Peninsula. The real issue is predictable, peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, as well as between North Korea, its neighbors, and the US.

Political and security interests not only North Korea and the United States but all six countries in Northeast Asia must be carefully considered. Instability on the Korean Peninsula threatens Northeast Asian stability, while low levels of confidence and trust in the region will also negatively influence the Korean Peninsula situation.

The security agreement must be closely connected with vital interests of all six countries: both Koreas, the US, China, Japan, and Russia. These countries all have their own, sometimes opposed, views on regional security, but must compromise. Otherwise, they will face an unpredictable regional situation. The correlations between security and economic issues should be reviewed. Denuclearization of Korea is not the last, but the first stage of negotiations. Discussions must transit from denuclearization to a security treaty and economic agreement.

Under current conditions the Six-Party Talks appear a political deal unlikely to achieve long term basic economic changes in North Korea. The five countries are faced with a tragic dilemma. On the one hand, millions of North Koreans may face starvation, while the North Korean regime exploits this humanitarian assistance without any obligations from the international community. North Korean realities cannot be ignored by the international community, but assistance rewards a policy of blackmail. Economic assistance must be connected with implementation of North Korean economic policy as a "package deal" between the five countries and the DPRK.

The measures of such a "package deal" should include the following stages:

- Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula: Support for the civil nuclear program can only occur under the control of UN monitoring. Alternatively, other energy programs may be developed, such natural gas;
- Peaceful coexistence between all Northeast Asian countries: Political guarantees for North Korea, extending adequate obligations to all Northeast Asia
- No support of terrorism in any form: The Six-Party Talks also cannot ignore the Japanese abduction issue;
- Economic assistance to North Korea should be connected to a program of integration of North Korea into Northeast Asian regional economic cooperation under the market principles, including support for:
  - Inter-Korea economic relations
  - Modernization of energy industry
  - Modernization of transport network
  - Development of agriculture and food supply in North Korea.

There is, however, no evidence that the six nations are ready to discuss situations on the Korean Peninsula in the context of regional security and stability. Moreover, Japan's foreign political relations with China and South Korea have deteriorated significantly. The trust and confidence among Northeast Asian countries is now at a very low level. It is therefore difficult to identify a common basis for an agreement on the North Korean nuclear issue. Under these circumstances it is likely that an old mechanism of the Six-Party Talks be resumed. Negotiations will be lengthy or even collapse. At best, tactical issues may be resolved. New issues may be added to agendas of the new Six-Party Talks, but long term peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia seems a distant prospect.

In this context, Russia must modify its policy. The North Korean

nuclear issue may remain unsolved for a long period, and Moscow must therefore be ready for another scenario. For example, Russia should be ready to transform the Six-Party Talks from negotiations on solely the North Korean issues to discussions on wider regional security prospects by changing the format to the "five-party talks plus North Korea." The success of such a transition to regional dialogue will largely depend on US policy in Northeast Asia. The greatest challenge facing the Bush Administration will be to support establishment of an international institution equal to the new Northeast Asian reality. The primary purpose of this institution would not be to confront any country (even North Korea), but to overcome the Cold War legacy and stimulate regional security, economic, and humanitarian cooperation. At the same time, the regional community should be ready to develop joint measures to oppose blackmail policy in Northeast Asia.

Modern North Korea policy cannot be an obstacle to discussions on political and security cooperation with participation of other Northeast Asian countries and the United States. If the DPRK is ready to join negotiations on regional issues, it will be welcomed by the five countries. If not, the negotiations must continue not against North Korea, but for regional security that depends not only on one country policy but on the will of the nations of the region to establish a better political and security climate at their border.

International Journal of Korean Unification Studies

US Policy Planning towards Korean Unification: A New Approach

Edward A. Olsen

Abstract

Unification is the fundamental policy issue for in both North and South Korea. Although American specialists in Korean affairs recognize the importance of this issue, US policy planning for unification and for dealing with a reunified Korea is replete with inadequacies. Planning for US policy could be improved by creating a US Center for Korean Unification Studies to examine the pros and cons of various options and be an instrument for an expanded dialogue between Americans and Koreans from both Koreas. While the United States should develop such a scholarly policy Center on its own, given its track record, it probably will not. Therefore it is the interest of Koreans in both Koreas to back the creation of such a Center and become active participants in the activities of the proposed Center – research, conferences, and publications. This is particularly salient for South Korea's many unification-oriented organizations because of the way such a Center would greatly expand US-DPRK interactions in a manner that would benefit the ROK's stake in the inter-Korean negotiations process.

Key Words: unification, US policy planning, reunified Korea, US-DPRK relations, negotiations process

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Korea's history as a divided nation is replete with Korean efforts to address an evolving set of divisive issues. It is very clear to Koreans in both Koreas and non-Koreans who specialize in Korean affairs that reunification of the Korean nation is the fundamental issue for Korea.[1] It is equally clear to Koreans in both halves of the divided nation that the US role in their division, US policies toward the two Koreas, and the United States' potential roles in Korea's future have been, are, and will be crucially important to Korea. American analysts - across the political spectrum, who follow Korean affairs from different perspectives and draw different conclusions - basically agree that those Korean perceptions are fully warranted.[2] Despite those circum-

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[1] For a cross-section of analyses in English on the importance of Korean unification, see Kim Hakjoon, *Unification Policies of South and North Korea: A Comparative Study* (Seoul: Seoul National University Press 1978); In K. Hwang, *The Neutralized Unification of Korea* (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing 1980); Rhee Sang-woo, *Security and Unification of Korea* (Seoul: Sogang University Press 1984); Kwak Tae-hwan, Kim Chong-han, and Kim Hong-nak (eds.), *Korean Unification: New Perspectives and Approaches* (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University 1984); Choy Bong-youn, *A History of the Korean Reunification Movement: Its Issues and Prospects* (Peoria: Institute of International Studies, Bradley University 1984); John Sullivan and Roberta Foss (eds.), *Two Koreas - One Future?* (Lanham: American Friends Service Committee & University Press of America 1987); Harold Hakwon Sunoo, *Peace and Unification of North and South Korea* (Beverly Hills: Research Institute for Juche Idea in the USA and One Korea Movement in USA 1989); Jay Speakman and Lee Chae-jin (eds.), *The Prospects for Korean Reunification* (Claremont: Keck Center, Claremont McKenna College 1993); Thomas Henriksen and Lho Kyongsoo (eds.), *One Korea? Challenges and Prospects for Reunification* (Stanford: Hoover Institution 1994); Kim Yun and Shin Eui-hang (eds.), *Toward a Unified Korea* (Columbia: Center for Asian Studies, University of South Carolina 1995); Nicholas Eberstadt, *Korea Approaches Reunification* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995); Jong Ri Gun, *Korea's Reunification - A Burning Question* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House 1995); Choi Jinwook and Park Sun-song, *The Making of a Unified Korea: Policies, Positions, and Proposals* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification 1997); Roy Richard Grinker, *Korea and Its Futures: Unification and the Unfinished War* (New York: St. Martin's 1998); Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implications* (Santa Monica: RAND 1999).

[2] For diverse Korean and American analyses of North and South Korean perceptions of the United States' role in Korean affairs (in addition to the views expressed in the previous citations), see Frank Baldwin (ed.), *Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship Since 1945* (New York: Pantheon Books 1973); Harold Hakwon Sunoo, *America's Dilemma in Asia: The Case of South Korea* (Chicago: Nelson-

stances, a strong case can be made, and is made by many of those cited above, that US policy towards Korea as a divided nation, the two Korean states' long quest for reunification, and the prospects for dealing with a united Korean nation state leaves much to be desired. They contend that US policies on those issues are replete with inadequacies.[3] US foreign and defense policy makers and analysts who are not specialists in Korean affairs - who constitute the vast majority of those officials and scholars - pay very little attention to the core issues

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Hall 1979); Claude A. Buss, *The United States and the Republic of Korea: Background for Policy* (Stanford: Hoover Institution 1982); Han Sung-joo (ed.), *After One Hundred Years: Continuity and Change in Korean-American Relations* (Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, Korea University 1982); Ronald A. Morse (ed.), *A Century of United States-Korean Relations* (Washington, DC: Wilson Center 1983); Koo Young-nok and Suh Dae-sook (eds.), *Korea and the United States: A Century of Cooperation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1984); James I. Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1984); Rosemary A. Foot, *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1985); Edward A. Olsen, *US Policy and the Two Koreas* (Boulder: World Affairs Council of Northern California & Westview 1988); Robert A. Scalapino and Lee Hong-koo (eds.), *Korea-US Relations: The Politics of Trade and Security* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California 1988); Chang Jongsuk, *Diplomacy of Asymmetry: Korean-American Relations to 1910* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1990); A. James Gregor, *Land of the Morning Calm: Korea and American Security* (Lanham: Ethics and Public Policy Center/University Press of America 1990); Robert Sutter and Han Sung-joo, *Korea-US Relations in a Changing World* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California 1990); Doug Bandow and Ted Galen Carpenter (eds.), *The US-South Korean Alliance Time for a Change* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 1992); Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading: Addison-Wesley 1997); Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W.W. Norton 1997); Tong Whan Park (ed.), *The US and The Two Koreas* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 1998); Wonmo Dong (ed.), *The Two Koreas and the United States* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe 2000); Marcus Noland, *Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics 2000); Selig S. Harrison, *Korean Endgame, A Strategy for Reunification and US Disengagement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2002); Edward A. Olsen, *Toward Normalizing US-Korea Relations, In Due Course?* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2002); Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow, *The Korean Conundrum, America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2004).

[3] For others who criticize the soundness of contemporary US policies toward Korea, see Alliance of Scholars Concerned About Korea (http://asck.org/).

involved in a divided Korea and are poorly prepared to plan for a reuniting or reunited Korea. The net result of these factors is that US policy planning towards Korean reunification suffers profoundly from that relative inattention.[4] In this context, there is a need to visualize a figurative advertisement stating - "WANTED: A US Center For Korean Unification Studies" that can generate support for such a Center capable of innovatively spawning more thoughtful approaches to US policy planning towards Korean reunification.

Inadequate Planning

There are certainly a number of US universities and think tanks that are deservedly well known for engaging in research on Korean affairs. Readers of this journal undoubtedly are very familiar with them.[5] Many of the US-based studies cited in this analysis are linked

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[4] For examples of American analyses of how the United States might better cope with the challenges posed by Korean unification, see Selig S. Harrison (ed.), *Dialogue with North Korea* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1989); David R. McCann (ed.), *Korea Briefing: Toward Unification* (Armonk: Asia Society and M.E. Sharpe 1997); Henry D. Sokolski (ed.), *Planning for a Peaceful Korea* (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College 2001); Katy Oh and Ralph Hassig (eds.), *Korea Briefing, 2000-2001: First Steps Toward Reconciliation and Reunification* (Armonk: Asia Society and M.E. Sharpe 2002); Robert Dujarric, *Korean Unification and After: The Challenge for US Strategy* (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute 2000); Eberstadt, *Korea Approaches Unification* (*op. cit.*); Grinker, *Korea and Its Future* (*op. cit.*); Harrison, *Endgame* (*op. cit.*); Olsen, *Toward Normalizing US-Korea Relations* (*op. cit.*).

[5] For information about those US centers that deal fully or partially with Korean studies, see the following website and their links to other sites, listed alphabetically: Alliance of Scholars Concerned About Korea (http://asck.org/); American Enterprise Institute (www.aei.org); Asia Society (www.asiasociety.org); Center for Korean-American and Korean Studies, California State University, Los Angeles (www.calstatela.edu/centers/ckaks/); Center for Korean Studies, University of California, Berkeley (http://ieas.berkeley.edu/cks); Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii (www.hawaii.edu/korea/); Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution (www.brook.edu/fr/cnaps/center_hp.html); Asian Studies Center, Heritage Foundation (www.heritage.org); Korea Economic Institute of America (www.keia.com); Korea Institute, Harvard University (www.fas.harvard.edu/~ korea/); Korea Society (www.koreasociety.org); Korean Studies Program, University of

to those universities and think tanks. However, none specifically focuses on Korean unification issues. Equally important, even those universities and think tanks, which also enjoy a sound reputation for US foreign policy studies, do not routinely integrate their Korean studies and US foreign policy studies programs. At most these programs may overlap when American specialists in Korean affairs expound on US foreign or defense policy or when some US foreign policy specialists selectively draw upon the output of the Korea specialists. For most Korean specialists in US-Korean relations who interact with their counterpart specialists in Korea-US relations from the United States at conferences and other meetings, it is all too easy to be reassured by their familiarity with the issues of common concern and therefore about the depth of US expertise.

Most such Korean specialists in US affairs do not regularly interact with US foreign policy specialists who are not - at least in part - focused on Korean issues. In recent years that latter category has expanded to include numerous US specialists in nuclear proliferation and counter-terrorism issues who familiarize themselves with the threats posed by North Korea. However, when it comes to the basic inter-Korean issues centered on Korean reconciliation and reunification, Koreans on both sides of the divided nation would be shocked at how little the great majority of American specialists in overall US foreign and defense policy actually know about the numerous issues involved with Korean reunification and its potential ramifications for US policy. Still worse, these Koreans likely would be appalled if they understood how little such generic US foreign and defense policy specialists pay any attention to the Korean nation's core issue and

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Michigan (www.umich.edu/~iinet/ksp/); Korean Studies Program, University of Washington (http://jsis,easc/koreastudiesprogram.html); National Bureau of Asian Research (www.nbr.org); Nautilus Institute (www.nautilus.org); Pacific Forum, CSIS (www.csis.org/pacfor/); Rand Corporation (www.rand.org); UCLA Center for Korean Studies (www.isop.ucla.edu/korea/).

often treat it as something that is largely irrelevant to US national interests.

While Americans who hold such views have every right to be ignorant of, or indifferent to, the issues at stake in Korea if and when it reunifies, Koreans - on both sides - who disagree with such perceptions have major incentives to educate these Americans about what matters to Koreans and why that should, in turn, matter to Americans. Koreans who favor such an "education" agenda already have allies within US society among the Korea experts in the university-based and think tank-based organizations noted above as well as others who are unaffiliated. There is a sizable pool of empathetic American analysts who are supportive of the inter-Korean reconciliation and reunification agendas' importance to US policy.[6] This situation can be improved by Koreans in both Koreas visualizing the "WANTED" advertisement and responding by backing the creation of such a "US Center" that would be the counterpart of several comparable institutions in the ROK[7] and the DPRK.[8]

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[6] Most of those cited in Footnote 4 are part of the "pool."

[7] The following institutions - listed alphabetically with their websites - are supportive of the ROK's position: Academy of Korean Studies (www.aks.ac.kr); Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University (http://gsis.snu.ac.kr); Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (www.ifans.go.kr); Institute for Korean Unification Studies, Yonsei University (http://suny.yonsei.ac.kr/~ikus/index.html); Korea Development Institute (www.kdi.re.kr/eng/index.asp); Korean Institute for Defense Analyses (www.kida.re.kr); Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (www.kiep.go.kr); Korea Institute for National Unification [with extensive links] (www.kinu.or.kr); *Korea Focus* at Korea Foundation (www.koreafocus.or.kr); Korean Government Homepage (www.korea.net); ROK Foreign Ministry (www.mofat.go.kr); ROK Ministry of Unification [with extensive links] (www.unikorea.go.kr); Sejong Institute (www.sejong.org/e-index.htm); Society of Korean-American Scholars (www.skas.org); *Vantage Point* (http://english.yna.co.kr).

[8] The following institutions - listed alphabetically with their web sites - provide supportive information about the DPRK's position: Center for Korean-American Peace (www.cfkap.com); *Chosun Journal* (www.chosunjournal.com); DPRK.com (www.dprk.com); DPRK-North Korea (www.kimsoft.com); Korea Reunification News (www.tongilnews.com); Korean American National Coordinating Council (www.kancc.org); One Korea (www.onekorea.org); Pyongyang Foreign Languages Publishing House (www.dprk.book.com/english/list); *Pyongyang Times* and

Why and how that should and could be done is worthy of serious attention in Seoul and Pyongyang. Without sanctioning the views of those Americans who are relatively indifferent to the Korean unification agendas' issues, they are correct that the core issues are far more central to Korean national interests than they are to US national interests. This is reflected in the large number of Korean institutions - South and North - that are committed to studying and implementing various options that will shape Korea's future. Had the United States' Civil War been prolonged for five or six decades by major power intervention,[9] comparable institutions may have been created in the 1920s or '30s aimed at restoring the United States as one nation state. Such theoretical parallels between the two nations' civil wars should sensitize Americans to the intense Korean focus on reunification. Although the United States does not need such a "US Center" for the same reasons as Koreans, there is a strong case for Koreans to back the creation of an American counterpart for Korea's various unification-focused institutions. If such a "US Center" existed and was committed to exploring all the reasons why the United States has a stake in the various reconciliation options contemplated by the ROK and the DPRK, Americans would be far better prepared to deal with Korean realities than they are now. The United States would be more familiar with how Korean success or failure in pursuit of the various options would impact international affairs in the rest of Asia, how other countries in the region are likely to cope with Korean success or failure, what options the United States may have to confront regarding Korean reconciliation and reunification, and how the United States should expect to deal with a spectrum of policies emanating from a

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Korea Today (www.kcckp.net/ko/news/foreignlang/times/index.php).

[9] The author explored that civil war parallel's significance for American sensitivities to Korea's plight in *Toward Normalizing US Korea Relations* (*op. cit*.), pp. 106-108.

future united Korean nation state.

Improved Planning Process

Assuming that a plausible case can be made for the merits of such a US research-focused counterpart to Korea's numerous institutions devoted to studying and planning for Korean reunification, Koreans - South and North - should confront the reality that if the US government wanted such an institution, it would create one either within the government or in tandem with a private sector university or think tank. The lack of any such organization in the United States today is arguably indicative of the relative lack of US interest in this issue. That is not to suggest that individuals within the US government - especially those who work on Korean affairs - share that indifference. On the contrary, many of these individuals are likely to be supportive of the concept, but they recognize that they are in a distinct minority and lack the bureaucratic or legislative influence to create any such American entity. Similarly, Korea specialists in academia or think tanks have to be pragmatic about the realities of which Korean issues loom largest for most US officials - hence the relatively low profile of Korean unification issues. They are dwarfed by nuclear and economic issues for the great majority of American foreign and defense policy specialists who pay any attention to Korea. These issues, as well as the broader international, historical, and intercultural issues are the kinds of scholarly themes that enable existing US university- based and think tank-based programs in Korean studies to garner support from either US-based foundations or from the federal government. Consequently, if Americans who would be supportive of such a "US Center" and its ability to interact with Korean counterparts have any chance to pursue such an endeavor, it will not be because of any US-backed initiative.

This creates an incentive for Koreans - South and North - to take the lead on this concept. In theory both Koreas have reasons to back this notion. In practice, because of North Korea's bleak economic situation that severely constrains its ability to play a credible financial role in any such endeavor. If any such "US Center" is ever to be created, financial and institutional support will come largely from South Korea in financial and institutional terms, with political support from both Koreas. Such support might be provided by a range of South Korean entities including the ROK government, foundations, universities, think tanks, and corporate backers. Ideally such support would emanate from a combination of these entities so that the "US Center" would reflect the diversity of those organizations and would be able to utilize a broad support network in carrying out its program activities. While such a "US Center" could be a joint center in terms of being located on two neighboring sites such as a US government educational or research facility and a nearby university, that form of duality probably would be less productive for the proposed Korean sponsors because of the differing bureaucratic mind sets in US governmental versus non-governmental settings. For example, were such a "US Center" to be involved in exchange programs with North Korean researchers or guest speakers, it would benefit from the greater flexibility permitted within a non-federal government academic milieu such as at a private or state-operated university. Consequently prospective Korean backers of any such "US Center" should avoid a joint center in favor of affiliating it with an acceptable university. That type of setting would also help improve the prospects for the "US Center" to broaden its support base over time by drawing upon US-based foundation support and, perhaps, federal government contractual support for some of the specific activities outlined below. To maintain its primary focus of improving US familiarity with the policy perspectives of the two Koreas, however, it would remain in the

interests of Korea to retain primary Korean support for the proposed "US Center."

Planning Agenda

For present purposes this analysis shall assume a proposed "US Center for Korean Unification Studies" becomes a reality at "XYZ State University." Center activities would, of course, be dependent upon the level of funding obtained. Although finance would be a major variable that cannot be predicted with any assurance, the spectrum of activities will be far greater with more funding. Less funding will inevitably mean fewer the activities.

A core activity would be a sequence of conferences or workshops on various aspects of Korean unification options that would bring together a broad spectrum of US specialists in inter-Korean affairs and a cross-section of North and South Korean specialists in unification issues who would present papers and engage in a dialogue before an invited audience of foreign affairs specialists from the US government and influential academics - neither of which is Korea experts. These US, ROK, and DPRK panelists would benefit from interacting with one another, while the audience would benefit from observing their interactions. The papers presented should either be published in edited volumes, in an online web site, or - if it can be arranged - in a special issue of one of the several journals that are interested in these issues.

As funding and space permits, the Center also should host visiting researchers on Korean unification and US policy towards Korean unification, with a conscious effort to have researchers from both North and South Korea interacting with US visiting researchers representing the progressive and conservative portions of the US analytical spectrum. The researchers should be in overlapping re-

sidence for at least a couple of months, possibly - for those on academic sabbatical - for up to a year. In addition to interacting with each other while in residence, and participating in any conferences and workshops held during their stay, all such researchers in residence should be made available to interact with US officials working on Korean issues and with representatives of the US media.

On the publications front, the Center should maintain a salient web site that would present the views of visiting researchers and conference participants. Moreover, this would provide a setting for the Internet dialogue between unification specialists from North and South Korea, their American counterparts, American specialists in Korean affairs, generic foreign, and defense policy specialists, and any Americans who become interested in the issues at stake. In addition, the Center should publish a series of occasional papers based on visiting researchers' work and disseminate the papers to relevant US officials and policy analysts. Based on the frequency of the periodic conferences and the marketability of the topics addressed, the Center should also seek to arrange commercial publication of the collected papers either as edited books or monographs.

Beyond such on-site activities, the Center should set up exchange programs between the United States and North Korea similar to the activities that have transpired between the United States and South Korea for many years. By exposing more Americans to North Korea, and more North Koreans to the United States, this would significantly strengthen the third leg of the triangular relationship in ways that would benefit both inter-Korean relations and US understanding of that relationship's potential to influence reunification.

All such activities would enhance US preparedness for Korean efforts to reunify Korea. To get a sense of how US preparedness would be enhanced by improved policy planning it is useful to consider how past US policy might have been more effective, had such a "US Center"

existed when inter-Korean relations explored new parameters. Two examples illustrate how opportunities may have been lost due to inadequate US attention to crucial nuances. When the Roh Tae-Woo Administration experimented with its *Nordpolitik* version of former West Germany's *Ostpolitik* engagement policies on the cusp of the late Cold War period,[10] the United States was relatively passive in its reactions. South Korea was learning from West Germany's growing ability to induce change and reform in East Germany in ways that helped it accelerate the end of the Cold War. US policy may well have better positioned if the United States had more cogently evaluated how South Korea's initial geopolitical gamesmanship towards North Korea contained the potential for greater expanded ROK multilateralism designed to improve the inter-Korean dialogue process. This would have been predicated on both Koreas' improving bilateral ties with the four major powers that are today members of the Six-Party Talks on nuclear issues. At a minimum the United States would have been better prepared for how the two Koreas adjusted to the end of the Cold War and their efforts to learn lessons from Germany's reunification process. The United States certainly found ways to accommodate these developments, but not as effectively or as quickly as it might have if a "US Center" had analyzed the developments and proposed various options. This would have helped US policy adjust to the changes more effectively, but it might also have led the United States to be more supportive of the dialogue process - especially on the bilateral front with North Korea where US policy remains out of step with Seoul's inter-Korean agenda.

The second example is much better known to many Americans because of the publicity it received when President Kim Dae-jung

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[10] For background on that effort, see Lee Seo-hang (ed.), *Evolving Multilateral Security Regime in Northeast Asia* (Seoul: Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security 1994); Young Hwan Kihl (ed.), *Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War* (Boulder: Westview 1994).

received the Nobel Peace Prize that was a partial by-product of his Sunshine Policy and his North-South summitry.[11] Coming in the wake of the 1994 nuclear crisis that brought the United States and North Korea uncomfortably close to renewed warfare and launched a long term cycle of expanded negotiations, there is no doubt that Seoul's Sunshine Policy received ample attention in Washington and among US specialists in both Korean affairs and overall US foreign and defense policy. Nonetheless, a strong case can be made that expanded US attention to those Korean issues was ultimately skewed and distorted by broader US anti-proliferation policy criteria. Had there been a "US Center" at that time it would have provided more information on developments in North Korea's nuclear agenda and the broader inter-Korean issues framed by the Sunshine Policy. Better-informed Americans would likely have nudged US policy towards a more pragmatic approach to dealing with North Korean brinkmanship employing an approach modeled on South Korea's engagement policies. In short, it could have facilitated a thorough personal debate among US hardliners and softliners, hawks and doves, and other examples of a diverse spectrum of views that almost certainly would have improved the prospects for Americans coping better with the nuclear issue by putting it into the broader inter-Korean context favored by the policies of the United States' South Korean ally.[12] Even if this dialogue had not yielded direct results, it would likely have clarified the nature of the policy planning alternatives. These two

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[11] For background on his policy and its initial results, see Chung-in Moon and David I. Steinberg (eds.), *Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges* (Washington, DC and Seoul: Georgetown University Press and Yonsei University Press 1999); Chon Shi-yong, "President Kim Wins the Nobel Peace Prize," *Korea Herald*, October 14, 2000, p. 1; Young Whan Kihl, "Overcoming the Cold War Legacy in Korea? The Inter-Korean Summit One Year Later," *International Journal of Korean Studies* (Fall/Winter 2001), pp. 1-24.

[12] The author explored that alternative in greater detail in his "A Korean Solution to the United States' Korean Problems," *Journal of East Asian Affairs* (Fall/Winter 2003), pp. 215-240.

past instances are examples of what could have been done then and how those circumstances can be instructive for future evolving problems on the inter-Korean front en route to reconciliation and reunification.

Post-Unification Planning

In addition, looking much further into the future, the Center should conduct the same spectrum of activities focused on US policy towards coping with Korea after it reunifies. These activities should address US options regarding a united Korea bilaterally as well as multilaterally in the context of US relations with China, Japan, Russia, and other countries as they all cope with the economic, political, and strategic realities surrounding a single Korean nation state on the Peninsula. These activities would address the ways Korean nationalism would be influenced by reunification, the impact of the various roles played by external players in Korean reunification upon a post-unification Korea, and - arguably most sensitive for the interim period - what impact reunification will have on the legacy of decades of the US-ROK security alliance relationship.

Lastly, and in part dependent upon the specific range of activities the "US Center" actually would conduct, this Center should do its utmost to interact and cooperate with all the existing US academic and think tank programs in broader Korean affairs for two reasons. Firstly, there is no reason for the proposed "US Center" to replicate any of their activities so it clearly would benefit by drawing upon all those established research programs and interacting with their researchers. Secondly, to the extent possible exposing all those programs to the reconciliation and reunification themes of the "US Center" would be an excellent way to proselytize the policy themes at the core of this Center. This would also be a way to send a clear signal

to all these other research programs that the "US Center" was not intended to replicate or replace any of them, but to supplement what they and the US government are either not doing or are doing in a marginal manner.

That relationship should be underscored by making it clear at the outset that the proposed "US Center" would have a finite purpose. It should be designed to help facilitate a more creative and enlightened US approach to dealing with the two Koreas' and their regional neighbors' approaches to Korean reunification. As those agendas are pursued and fulfilled in ways that resolve inter-Korean tensions and reunite the Korean nation into one Peninsular state, the Center can be helpful in shaping the debate over US policy options and guiding the United States towards a realistic relationship with the new Korea. Once that occurs, the Center can remain useful in the post-reunification era, helping US policy constructively encourage a stable environment that will be a catalyst for successful nation building in the newly reunited Korea. At that stage, however, the proposed "US Center" with its Korean support system should gradually be phased out of existence in recognition of having succeeded in its goals. In short, the ultimate job of this proposed "US Center" should be to work itself out of a job. However, if the track record of the "US Center" proves to be sufficiently successful to have warranted substantial US-based financial and administrative support for its research activities, and if its staff members are so disposed, it might be useful to convert it to a function similar to the other Korea-related research activities carried out at already well-established institutions. Nonetheless, that should not be the intention at the outset. On the contrary, the purpose of the "US Center" should be to innovatively foster an American dialogue over US policy options towards Korean reconciliation and reunification that will help accelerate that process by making the United States a catalyst for positive change as rapidly as feasible.

At that stage the legacy of the "US Center" will be recognized in the form of balanced and normal US relations with one united Korean nation state. The precise nature of those relations will be determined by the juxtaposition of Korean national interests and US national interests. Precisely where a Korea will fit into the United States' larger approach towards Eastern Asia will be significantly shaped by the nature of US-China and US-Japan relations at that juncture. Similarly, the United States' future role within the foreign and defense policies of a reunited Korean nation state will be influenced by Korean perceptions of the United States' global role and its impact on overall Asian affairs, with special salience for a Korean Peninsular state amidst a complex Sino-Japanese relationship. While the potential for Korea-US relations in that future milieu should be promising if Koreans and Americans play their policy cards skillfully in the interim years, one must recognize that "balanced and normal" implies there will also be occasional frictions as there are in any bilateral state-to-state relationship. The "US Center" can help prepare the United States for the future by facilitating harmonious US-Korea relations that can cope with such frictions just as the United States does with many other nation states around the world. In conclusion, using the proposed "US Center" to improve US planning for an uncertain evolutionary diplomatic and geopolitical process will help both Koreas and the United States go through that process successfully in an innovative manner and to maximize their benefits from the results in a unified Korean nation state.

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

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   - Newspaper: Stanley Crow, "US-Korea Relations Strained," *New York Times*, July 30, 2001, p. 2.
   - Magazine: Robert Karniol, "Japan Set to Cut Forces Strength by 20 Percent," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Dec. 9, 1995, p. 3.
   - Dissertation: Andrew J. King, "Law and Land Use in Chicago: A Pre-history of Modern Zoning" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1976), pp. 32-37.
   - Website: Benedict Anderson, "From Miracle to Clash," *London Review of Books*, Vol. 20, No. 8 (1998), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v20n08/2008.html.

B. Use of *Ibid.* and *Op. cit.*
   Ibid. can be used only when indicating the source immediately before the concerned footnote. To indicate sources already mentioned, use an abbreviated form:
   Chang, "Deng's Last Stand," pp. 127-28.
   Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, pp. 55-59.

C. Illustrations such as Tables and Figures should be inserted in the text and numbered consecutively.

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