


Study Series 16-04



Development of Unification Diplomacy Contents

Kim, Jin-Ha
Jung, Sung Chul
Paik, Wooyeal
Lee, Kitae
Woo, Pyong Kyun
Hyun, Seungsoo

Study Series 16-04



Development of Unification Diplomacy Contents

Kim, Jin-Ha
Jung, Sung Chul
Paik, Wooyeal
Lee, Kitae
Woo, Pyong Kyun
Hyun, Seungsoo

Development of Unification Diplomacy Contents

Printed August 2016

Published August 2016

Published by Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU)

Publisher President, Korea Institute for National Unification

Editor Strategy and Public Relations Team, Planning and Coordination Division

Registration number No.2-2361 (April 23, 1997)

Address 217 Banpo-daero(Banpo-dong), Seocho-gu, Seoul 06578, Korea

Telephone (82-2) 2023-8038

Fax (82-2) 2023-8298

Homepage <http://www.kinu.or.kr>

Design/Print Handesigncorporation (82-2) 2269-9917

ISBN 978-89-8479-843-4 93340 : Not for sale

349.11-KDC6 / 327.519-DDC23 CIP2016020547

Copyright Korea Institute for National Unification, 2016

All KINU publications are available for purchase at all major bookstores in Korea.

Also available at the Government Printing Office Sales Center

Store (82-2) 734-6818; Office (82-2) 394-0337

Development of Unification Diplomacy Contents

This is a translated version of the Korean report published in January 2015.
The analyses, comments and other opinions contained in this paper are those of the authors' and do not necessarily represent the views of the Korea Institute for National Unification.

The background of the page features a repeating pattern of thin, wavy, horizontal lines in a light grey color. A horizontal band of a slightly darker grey shade runs across the middle of the page, serving as a backdrop for the title text. The overall design is clean and modern.

Development of Unification Diplomacy Contents

CONTENTS

1. Introduction	8
2. Logic and Strategy of Unification Diplomacy toward the U.S. ..	12
3. Logic and Strategy of Unification Diplomacy toward China ...	22
4. Logic and Strategy of Unification Diplomacy toward Japan ..	32
5. Logic and Strategy of Unification Diplomacy toward Russia ·	40
6. Case Analysis of Diplomatic Failure toward Great Powers of Countries Newly Admitted in the International Community ..	50
7. Conclusion	64



Introduction

1. Introduction

Unification diplomacy refers to broadening international consensus on inducing changes in North Korea and establishing unification of the Korean Peninsula along with reinforcing cooperation among international communities. There is an urgent need to develop contents for unification diplomacy that aims to convince the political sphere, government, and citizens of the states surrounding the Korean Peninsula, including four super powers, the United States, Japan, China and Russia, to hold a positive outlook on Korean unification. Especially, the shift in Northeast Asian order and strategic environment requires adjustment in unification diplomacy direction customized to each country surrounding the Korean Peninsula.

This paper aims at developing specific logic for each country surrounding the Korean Peninsula to gain support for South Korea-led unification, publishing basic resources to assure solid support for South Korea-led unification by allaying concerns of unification costs, and developing dissemination strategy that could effectively deliver contents of unification diplomacy in each country.

With the aforementioned purpose, the paper takes the following structure. Chapter II “Logic and Strategy of Unification Diplomacy toward the U.S.” predicts the possibility of U.S. entrapment in a conflict between its allies/partners and China, and prospects the situation of U.S. alliance/security dilemma. For a convincing unification diplomacy toward the U.S., the paper (1) suggests the incentive beyond the logic to support Korean unification, (2) navigates various channels and level of discussion for the ROK-U.S. bilateral cooperation and dialogue on East Asian regional order, (3) prepares strategy of linking and delinking several issues emerging from the North Korean issue, ROK-Japan relations, and ROK-China relations, (4) calls for the efforts to concentrate on sharing the vision of Korean unification—established by dialogues within the domestic society—with neighboring countries.

Chapter III, “Logic and Strategy of Unification Diplomacy toward China,” lays out the measures to induce China’s support to achieve South Korea-led unification. Also, the author presents the unification costs and benefits that may be imposed on China in detail and suggests a development of logic tailored for China to newly recognize the contribution that Korean unification will bring.

Chapter IV, “Logic and Strategy of Unification Diplomacy toward Japan,” looks into South Korea’s logic and strategy of unification diplomacy toward Japan and proposes the direction of focus for South Korea’s unification diplomacy toward Japan.

Chapter V, “Logic and Strategy of Unification Diplomacy toward Russia” introduces the direction of logic and strategy that South Korea ought to take in its unification diplomacy toward Russia. To this end, the author examines Russia’s stance on Korean Peninsula and unification through Russian opinion groups, government agencies, and President Putin’s views and probes into South Korea’s direction of unification diplomacy toward Russia in three different contexts, Russia’s North Korea initiative and ROK-DPRK-Russia trilateral cooperation initiative; pending issues such as mass migration of North Korean defectors; and diplomacy and security logic.

Chapter VI, “Case Analysis of Diplomatic Failure toward Great Powers of Countries Newly Admitted in the International Community,” analyzes post-Soviet countries’ diplomatic orientation, and substantiates that the cases of newly independent states’ diplomatic failure toward great powers came as a result of their diplomatic orientation, focusing on Ukraine and Georgia.



2

**Logic and Strategy of
Unification Diplomacy toward
the U.S.**

2. Logic and Strategy of Unification Diplomacy toward the U.S.

Asia has become increasingly important to the U.S. China's rise has sparked the interest in U.S.-China relations, increasing the military and economic significance of Asia. Declaring "pivot to Asia," the Obama administration proclaimed that the pivot of U.S. diplomacy is shifting from Europe and the Middle East to Asia. As such, while the US rebalancing strategy towards Asia conveys concerns of U.S.-China confrontation, both countries hope to avoid the breakdown of bilateral relations caused by a direct collision. With evident imbalance in national strength with the U.S. and the absence of survival threat, it is highly unlikely that China will overtly refuse the U.S.-led international order that promises economic growth.

Then will U.S. and China build a harmonious relations? In the belief of low possibility of U.S.-China clash, U.S. experts view two following matters as factors undermining U.S.-China relations. First is China's domestic politics. Although China's government is authoritarian, Beijing may carry out foreign policy catering to nationalism due to the growing importance of domestic opinion.¹⁾ In this case, the Chinese

foreign relations could fall into an unpredictable phase, holding aggressive or hostile views on major powers such as the U.S. and Japan. However, Jessica Weeks, who has analyzed the forms of armed conflicts of different authoritarian regimes, advocates that authoritarian regimes under a non-personalist, civilian audience or leader like the post-Mao China have similar behavioral patterns with democratic states more than any other types of authoritarian regimes.²⁾ According to Weeks, albeit authoritarian, a non-personalist, civilian audience or leader makes prudent decisions heedful of policy outcome and domestic aftermaths because it considers political/military elites, even if it is not the majority of the public.

Second is the alliance dilemma that the U.S. carries. Washington pursues the enhancement and development of its alliance network, pronouncing the Asia rebalancing in its relative decline. Limited in use of domestic resources, it is logical to add weight to external balancing (alliance) rather than internal balancing (military build-up). Conversely, maintaining and expanding influence by alliance and partnership engender the dilemma of alliance politics. When two countries ally under anarchy, the fear of ‘abandonment’ that one ally could abandon

1) See the following for more information about the relations between China’s nationalism and foreign policy after the reform and openness policy. Peter H. Gries, *China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

2) In Jessica L. P. Weeks, *Dictators at War and Peace* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), the author conducted a comparative analysis of various types of non-democratic countries and democratic countries centered around the probability of initiating a conflict and the probability of being defeated in a conflict/war.

the other and the fear of ‘entrapment’ that one ally could drag the other into unnecessary conflict grow.³⁾ One has to take efforts to prevent itself from engaging in a regional conflict that involves nothing of its interest.

Then, what path will the U.S. take to intervene in a conflict in Asia caused by alliances? Michael Beckley defines ‘entanglement’ as an umbrella term of ‘entrapment,’ as “when a state is dragged into a military conflict by one, or more, of its alliances” and lists four different types of entanglement:⁴⁾(1)“cases of intervention to protect an ally in a fight”;(2)“cases of intervention in consideration of trust between allies even its ally is not involved in a fight”;(3)“cases of intervention to expand the scope of its interests because of its ally”;(4)“cases in which an alliance building makes a state a target of the third country.”

The angst related to U.S. entrapment/entanglement in unwanted conflict will entail a broad range of policy recommendations and discussions. First of all, the U.S. will highlight “dual deterrence” – deterring hostile acts of not only potential adversaries and their allies but also its own allies. In detail, it will endeavor to deter provocations and aggression of North Korea and China as well as encourage its allies and partners to remain self-restrained against these countries.

3) Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 180-192.

4) Michael Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances,” *International Security*, vol. 39, no. 4 (2015), pp. 13-14.

Stressing the offshore balancer logic — describing its role and purpose and highlighting peace and stability in Asia — on one hand, the U.S. may negotiate with regional powers including China in detail on the other hand. In his recent publication, Charles L. Glaser proposed ‘grand bargaining’ between the U.S. and China over Taiwan.⁵⁾ He claims that the grand bargaining — that the U.S. withdraws security guarantee on Taiwan and China officially accepts U.S. forces stationing in Asia as well as peacefully resolving territorial disputes in East and South China Seas — could circumvent China-Taiwan conflict and further U.S.-China collision by abandoning an old friend, Republic of China.

Korean Peninsula is still viewed as an unstable region for Washington. North Korea’s nuclear and missile development primarily comes as a (potential) threat to the U.S. As North Korean nuclear capabilities enhance, the threat to U.S. mainland increases and the possibility of nuclear and missile technology transfer or exports of these weapons to other countries or terrorist groups always exists. Non-major power turning into a big power through development of nuclear power would be a big stress to the U.S. which wishes to maintain an unipolar system. After North Korea broke February 29

5) Charles L. Glaser, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” *International Security*, vol. 39, no. 4 (2015), pp. 49-90; Charles L. Glaser, “Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” (Policy Brief, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, July 2015), <<http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf>>. (Date Accessed: November 16, 2015).

Agreement (also known as Leap Day Agreement) in 2012, Washington upholds the principle of “strategic patience” demanding a genuine change in North Korea. Currently, the U.S. and China currently illustrate the initial stages of security dilemma. China has continuously increased defense spending under the economic growth and the U.S. has cut defense budget after the economic crisis in 2008, thus, narrowing the gap in defense expenditure. Meanwhile, the two countries have engaged in a war of nerves surrounding the U.S. deployment plan of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) on the Korean Peninsula and China’s construction of an artificial island in the South China Sea this year. Beijing’s explicit opposition to the U.S. proposition to install THAAD on the South Korean soil to counter gradually heightening North Korean nuclear threat perplexed Seoul and Washington.

Under realistic judgement that a unified Korea will have strong sense of pro-U.S. attitude rather than pro-China one, China will prefer a ‘weak’ unified Korea instead of a ‘strong one’. And the U.S. will possibly accept Chinese demands over issues such as territorial boundary and economic development taking into account the anxiety and backlash. Accordingly, South Korea should actively undertake discussions and consultations with the U.S. on future visions of unified Korea and East Asia. On the North Korea issue, while it is most desirable to proceed with ROK-U.S.-China trilateral consultation and negotiation, but if U.S.-China dialogue and negotiation take place,

South Korea should devise measures so that the U.S. shares interests with itself and assents to its stance.

Viewing these deliberations, what should be the specific aim of South Korea's unification policy toward the U.S.? What is Seoul's strategy in pursuit of South Korea-led unification and integration? Ultimately, South Korea's unification diplomacy should offer incentives for the U.S. beyond addressing logics to support for South Korea-led unification. The current unification diplomacy has been committed to emphasizing the benefits Korean unification will yield to major powers including the U.S. and the costs entailed in the division of the Korean Peninsula. With the consideration of the characteristics and positions of each country, research on traditional and public diplomacy customized for each country has also been actively carried out.⁶⁾

Unification diplomacy should unveil not only the logic to convince the U.S. but also the evidence and initiative to corroborate this in the future. Various empirical studies on Korean unification and U.S. economy, Korean unification and East Asian security should open ways to encourage the U.S. to provide practical support for Korean unification along with declarative support.

Second, along with the U.S., South Korea should actively discuss

6) For example, Jung-ho Bae et al., *Northeast Asian Countries' Foreign and North Korea Policies and South Korea's Strategy of Unification Diplomacy*, Young-ho Park et al., *Actual Conditions of South Korea's Unification Public Diplomacy toward the U.S.* (Seoul: KINU, 2013).

bilateral cooperation and East Asia regional order after unification at various level, in addition to discussion on unification. Korea should assume a huge responsibility in order not to have Korean unification as a product of negotiations between the U.S. and other major powers. Noting that Korean unification is a national issue, South Korea needs to stress that a unified Korea will contribute to stability and prosperity for U.S.-led Asian order.

Both South Korea and the U.S. share the view that major cause of instability in Asia is North Korea issue and South Korea-led unification stands as the fundamental solution to resolve this instability. Then what should the unified Korea be like? In order to contribute to stability and prosperity of the U.S.-led Asian environment? What support do we need from the U.S. for the birth of the unified Korea based on democratic values and market economy and pursuing denuclearization and peace? While taking proactive actions to bring in neighboring countries including China, South Korea and the U.S. should persuade them that Korean unification promotes stability and prosperity in Asian international order.

Third, South Korea should independently ponder and determine what to link and delink among the various issues arising from the North Korea problem, ROK-Japan relations, etc. The U.S. has piled up pressure against North Korea linking North Korean nuclear threat and human rights issue. On the other side, North Korea has put the accent on the necessity of nuclear development, viewing human rights

dialogue as a threat to the regime. South Korea has not clearly come up with the stance to link or delink the two issues. Meanwhile, the U.S. requests South Korea to deal with history issue separately from security and economy issues in the relationship with Japan. China, whereas, expects South Korea to team up with itself in the anti-Japanese standpoint on history issue based on a common historical view, South Korea has not clarified its position on the issue. U.S. is an ally to South Korea, but two countries cannot take identical stances and strategy on North Korea and Japan. In this regard, South Korea should set strategies of linking and delinking various issues and fields in light of its goals and environment. If not, there is a strong probability that South Korea-led unification will probably remain as just a slogan.

Finally, while South Korea laying out the vision for Korean unification through numerous internal dialogues and communication, the vision should be shared with Korea's neighbors including the U.S. By transcending the 19th century banner such as completing a modern state and building rich and powerful state, South Korea should lead a pan-social inclination to unification through 21st century discourse such as "individual happiness" and "national healing." Once these domestic dialogues continued, neighbors' expectation and perception of South Korea-led unification will be changed as a result.⁷⁾ Series of

7) The New York Times editorial that commented that President Park Geun-hye may be the last president pushing for unification due to the differences between South and North Korea and the

questions such as “What country will we build?”, “How could we commemorate 100 years of Korean liberation?”, and “What should we pursue beyond liberty and prosperity?” will accordingly lead to the “paradigm of national prestige.” The U.S. will respect South Korea as a true partner of value alliance and cooperate when South Korea approaches unification not simply from the perspective of “benefit” but from the context of “significance” and “justice.”

disinterest of younger generation while mentioning her efforts to prepare unification such as launching the Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation has profound implications. “Is Peaceful Korean Unification Possible?,” *The New York Times*, December 11, 2014.



3

**Logic and Strategy of
Unification Diplomacy toward
China**

3. Logic and Strategy of Unification Diplomacy toward China

Previous administrations of South Korea had focused its unification diplomacy toward China on the leadership and organization of Chinese party-state authoritarian regime.⁸⁾ Administrations of South Korea have focused its unification diplomacy on the leadership and organization of party-state authoritarian regime. Since South Korea's unification diplomacy toward China has begun in earnest, while the Chinese communist government is negative about South Korea-led unification in the realist view, China has officially supported "peaceful and independent" Korean unification and continued with this policy on Korean Peninsula. In detail, the observation that this Chinese leadership is unlikely to consider prospective policy transition on South Korea-led unification unless an extreme situation such as the collapse of domestic political system in North Korea occurs is the South Korea's perception underlying in the history of South Korea's unification

8) Young-ho Park et al., *Strategy of Unification Diplomacy for Peaceful Unification* (Seoul: KINU, 2012), pp. 85-101.

diplomacy toward China.

Despite the predicament in garnering support for South Korea-led unification from the Chinese party-state leadership, South Korea has displayed its incapability to effectively deal with the circumstance where it had to spur East Asian international opinion and Chinese domestic opinion to envision South Korea-led unification by making use of the situation of “change” in which China as a global power has strived to keep its political-economic rise for the past 36 years while not threatening regional core neighbors.

Here, the section calculates China’s cost for Korean unification to identify the direction for unification diplomacy. Due to the following “costs” incurred by Korean unification, maintaining the current Korean division yields maximum national benefit for China.

(1) Cost 1: China tallies the disappearance of political and military buffer zone, North Korea,⁹⁾ against the U.S., Japan, and South Korea as the biggest unification cost.¹⁰⁾ Since the rise of China, the existence of North Korea has served as a major stumbling block for the U.S. pivot to Asia or rebalancing in Asia after the 2010s.¹¹⁾ North Korea’s presence has also curbed Japan’s political-military advancement to the Korean Peninsula. (2) Cost 2: in light of the East Asian dynamics

9) Interview with a Chinese expert on Korean Peninsula, May 15, 2015.

10) Robert E. Kelly, “China’s Interests in Korean Unification: How Much Longer is the ‘Buffer’ Worth It?,” *The Korean Journal of Security Affairs*, vol. 19, no. 2 (2014), pp. 4-20.

11) Conversely, this is logic of hostile interdependence that the U.S. could pressure China by North Korea.

linked to Cost 1, Korean division brings benefits to China in terms of the environment in which the U.S. is unable to exert absolute clout in China-Taiwan relations by restricting the use of U.S. security capabilities and influence related to Taiwan. This can be converted to cost when the two Koreas unify. (3) Cost 3: a divided Korean Peninsula provides China with numerous opportunities to capitalize on inter-Korean competitions in the several policy sectors such as politics, military, and economy. Moreover, by the Korean division, China could wield North Korea as a card or leverage in various political and military negotiations with South Korea and the U.S. Abandoning this option levies a considerable cost to China. (4) Cost 4: China's means to possess influence on North Korea more than any other country in the region is North Korea's economic dependence on China (more than 90%) which has gradually increased for the last ten years. There is a high possibility that China will lose this absolute economic influence on North Korea once the two Koreas are unified. (5) Cost 5: In the event of Korean unification, China loses the monopoly on North Korean underground resources and relevant economy industries which had been obtained by the political and economic weakness of North Korea such as its closed economy.

China's benefits from Korean unification have comparatively been overlooked. Since benefits can be given when the Korean Peninsula achieves unification regardless of its formality, bigger uncertainty will be followed than its costs. This would be the underlying reason for

China's reluctance of an adventurous policy change that shatters the 'status quo' of the Korean division.

The following is China's potential benefits of Korean unification.

(1) Benefit 1: Korean unification results in the sustainable and fundamental stability in Northeast Asia, ensuring international political stability in Northeast Asia (East of China), the essential conditions for China's economic growth. (2) Benefit 2: Synergic effect of economic integration through Korean unification – it is highly likely for China to achieve rapid economic development in the relatively underdeveloped northeastern region (the three provinces, Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning), to expand its economic sphere of influence to Russian Siberia, and to open a sea route toward the Pacific Ocean via the East Sea. Also, once the reconstruction projects are underway in North Korea, this will bring countless demands for China's infrastructure and related industries in the mid-to-short term. (3) Benefit 3: By cooperating with Korean unification, China could show and ensure its logical consistency and actively propel unification with Taiwan. China could overcome the contradiction of pursuing unification with Taiwan, a vital national interest, on one hand and demurring Korean unification on the other. (4) Benefit 4: Korean unification could stabilize the international political climate in Northeast Asia by removing North Korea's reckless military provocations and threats. Moreover, this will open the opportunity to get rid of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons in

North Korea. (5) Benefit 5: In case of contingency in North Korea, since China will have to heavily finance in maintaining and controlling domestic situation in North Korea, China will be able to transfer or divide this cost with South Korea and other countries when the situation moves toward Korean unification. (6) Benefit 6: By Korean unification, China can improve its “soft power” as a rule maker pursuing global peace.

South Korea note the following in promoting the policy of bridging distance with China in terms of politics and military. (1) It should not expect too much of China relying on wishful thinking because China’s frame of costs and benefits of Korean unification will largely endure due to the strategic interest in North Korea. (2) While maintaining the basic strategy toward China for Korean unification — closing the distance with China in politics and military —, South Korea should cope with continuously impending issues differently for each case in the perspective of ‘harmonious diplomacy toward the U.S. and China.’¹²⁾ (3) Seoul may continue expanding the various official and unofficial dialogue channels between China and North Korea on political and military agendas regardless of short-term ebb and flow in bilateral relations and for example, consider elevating the status of strategic diplomatic dialogue and strategic defense dialogue to 2+2 strategic dialogue.

12) Kyuryoon Kim et al., *Harmonious Diplomacy towards the United States and China* (Seoul: KINU, 2014).

While South Korea has no national power to stop the U.S.-China confrontational structure in the global context, it could play a mediating role in Northeast Asia. Specifically, it would require concrete strategies, and mini-lateralism could be one of them. In a similar logic, Korea should deny that ‘ROK-China strategic cooperative partnership’ is incompatible with ‘ROK-U.S. comprehensive strategic alliance’ — elevated at the Lee Myung-bak-Obama summit in October 2011. The zero-sum approach that the stronger the former, the weaker the latter, is based on realist analysis of international relations and is reasonable in several aspects. However, Seoul should come up with new framework created on liberalistic positive-sum approach. ROK-U.S. relations, ROK-China relations, and U.S.-China relations should be redefined and operated in complementary nature and not mutually exclusive one. To this end, the three countries should officially and unofficially establish and manage ROK-U.S.-China trilateral consultative group.

Another route to China’s foreign policy on Korean unification is public diplomacy. Under the current party-state authoritarian regime in China, the direct and indirect exchanges between Beijing-controlled Chinese NGOs and South Korean NGOs are substantially limited. And South Korea has never actively attempted ‘unification public diplomacy’ through people-to-people exchanges. Despite the public diplomacy directed at the general Chinese public being important, the core of unification public diplomacy is the knowledge diplomacy.

With the unification public diplomacy as a sensitive demeanor in China where the civil public diplomacy is difficult to be conducted in the politics of party-centered control, South Korea's diplomacy for unification has to be centered on opinion leaders such as the government, policy community, academic community, decision-makers in the press. While increasing general public diplomatic activities toward China such as Korean companies' corporate social responsibility in China can be an exception, this could not be expected to be directly associated with unification public diplomacy.

The following are the specific targets of knowledge diplomacy among the unification public diplomacy toward China. Governmental think tanks include Institute of International Strategic Studies at the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Jilin Academy of Social Sciences, People's Liberation Army's (PLA) Academy of Military Sciences, PLA National Defense University, China Institute for International Strategic Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, China Institute of International Studies, China Reform Forum, etc. and think tanks in the academic community encompass Peking University School of International Studies, Tsinghua University Institute of International Studies, Renmin University School of International Studies, Jilin University School of Public Diplomacy, etc. One thing that is worthy of policy improvement is that knowledge diplomacy of South Korea's unification public diplomacy

toward China has been biasedly aimed at government and university think tanks in Beijing and Shanghai and focused on several so-called “Korea-friendly” figures. Diversifying the channels of public diplomacy by discovering experts on Korean unification policy is necessary. It is indispensable for South Korea to expand its unification public diplomacy to regional governments, university think tanks, and high-profile government officials in three Chinese northeastern provinces, Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning, where Korean unification will affect the most.

In China under the party-state system, the core foreign policy decisions are made by the ‘Foreign Affairs Leading Group’ consisting of members of the Politburo Standing Committee and the Politburo and the subordinate agencies of the party and the State Council. However, the ‘public diplomacy’ approach is intricate and formal diplomatic channels handle this segment. With regard to the press, the unification public diplomacy toward the media opinion leaders of private sector along with government circles media is yet in its early stage. Realistically, while the public diplomacy will be difficult to change the perspective of the existing media on Korean unification under the influence of the Chinese government, if it could make efforts on them and also pursue a policy direction of expanding the share of ‘Korea-savvy’ and ‘Korea-friendly’ public by strengthening efforts on opinion leaders of private media, this will have a mid-to-long term effect.



4

**Logic and Strategy of
Unification Diplomacy toward
Japan**

4. Logic and Strategy of Unification Diplomacy toward Japan

Japan has been interested in a number of current affairs issues such as North Korean nuclear and missile, Japanese abductees, and Korean unification scenario. Particularly, the Abe Shinzo government has strived to keep China in check and deal with North Korea threats by consolidating alliance with the U.S. And Japan is pursuing security cooperation with South Korea. The Abe administration has been demanding the U.S. for ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation to incorporate ROK-Japan relations as a subset of U.S.-Japan alliance.

South Korea's goal in unification diplomacy toward Japan is to lead Japan to formulate policy amiable to Korean unification and the resultant process. Here, South Korea should take into account not only the government sector but also the private sector. Thus, it is crucial to understand the perception of Japanese in all walks of life about Korean unification. This is especially so, as there is a high correlation between the public opinion and foreign policy decision-making process in democratic states such as Japan.

The basic direction of Japanese administrations' policy on Korean

Peninsula has been ‘stabilization of the Korean Peninsula.’ This direction indicates the situation of continuing peace and prosperity in East Asia including the Korean Peninsula and not the situation of continuing Korean division.¹³⁾ The continuation of this stabilized Korean Peninsula and Japan has enabled Japan to eliminate factors of security threat and the relations have developed as a stepping stone for post-war Japan to further engross in economic development.

The current Abe administration has steadily stepped up to build Japan as a ‘normal country.’ At this juncture, two conditions sway Japan’s policy on Korean Peninsula, which greatly affects Japan’s security. These are ‘maintenance and reinforcement of robust U.S.-Japan alliance’ and ‘extrication from the postwar system through the amendment of the pacifist constitution.’ These two points are closely intertwined in the security aspect and substantially influence Japan’s policy on the Korean Peninsula. On its policy toward South Korea, the Abe administration aims at establishing ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral security system along with strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. In other words, it maps out a security-focused policy toward South Korea. To protect Japan’s national interests, Tokyo has bolstered alliance with Washington, established relations of security

13) On Japan’s Korean Peninsula policy during the Cold War era, Lee Ki-tae asserts that from the latter point of view, the Japanese government executes security cooperation policy with South Korea in two track approach, ‘diplomacy’ and ‘military security’ for the ‘stabilization of the Korean Peninsula.’ Ki-tae Lee, “U.S. Policy on East Asia and Japan’s Security Assurance Policy on Korean Peninsula: Issue of Withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Korea and Possibility of ROK-Japan Security Cooperation, 1969-1979,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Keio University, 2012).

cooperation with friendly states, and autonomously pursued enhancement of defense capabilities. Hence, even though confrontation surrounding the ‘history issue’ stands in between South Korea and Japan, it holds a positive view in establishing a relationship of security and military cooperation with South Korea.

Japan’s understanding of the Korean unification has a double-faced trait in the context of its national interests. The Japanese government proclaimed that it supports Korean unification through the joint statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2 dialogue) in February 2005. In other words, Japan articulated its view that it “support[s] peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula” as one of U.S.-Japan common strategic objectives.¹⁴⁾ This implies that while Japan basically supports Korean unification, this is merely a passive support. Besides, this half-hearted support for Korean unification from Japan is applicable only when two conditions are met – that the unified Korea is denuclearized and it maintains a friendly policy toward Japan. Therefore, Japan’s most favorable scenario for Korean unification is in which the unified Korea maintains traditional alliance and friendly relations with the U.S. and Japan, and upholds the existing security policy such as denuclearization policy.

By reviewing the circumstances within the Liberal Democratic

14) Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2005.2.19.),” <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/hosho/2+2_05_02.html>. (date accessed: August 22, 2015).

Party of Japan (LDP), South Korea could address the following logic and strategy toward the LDP. First, a joint investigation and even a declaration between South Korea and Japan on the abduction issue are necessary. With *Seiwa seisaku kenkyukai* (Seiwa Political-analysis Council) which strives to tackle the Japanese abductee issue, the precondition for DPRK-Japan rapprochement, South Korea should share the view that the abductee issue is a human rights issue that should never occur and carry out exchanges for mutual investigation and report.¹⁵⁾ Second, South Korea should expand exchanges with the factions with liberal tendencies within the LDP. They can find common grounds on history issue and North Korea issue. South Korea need to establish bonds with liberal or former Tanaka group which has a moderate view on North Korea. For example, there are liberal factions such as Kishida faction led by current Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, Tanigaki faction led by LDP Secretary-General Sadakazu Tanigaki, former Tanaka group such as Nukaga faction led by Nukaga Fukushiro, head of the Japan-South Korea parliamentarians' league, and Oshima faction led by Speaker of the House of Representatives Oshima Tadamori that South Korea could build an alliance.

North Korea's nuclear development poses a direct threat to Japan's

15) Professor Emeritus Inoguchi Takashi of Tokyo University claims that the report of investigation on abduction issue is necessary in the process of Korean unification. Inoguchi Takashi, "Japan's Position and Role in Korean Unification," in *Korean Unification and the Positions and Roles of the Four Neighboring Powers*, Jung-ho Bae ed. (Seoul: KINU, 2011), p. 68.

security and this issue must be resolved to receive Japan's support for Korean unification. The Japanese government's official view is that it cannot accept North Korea's nuclear possession. Also, to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, it asserts that peaceful resolution is necessary through the six-party talks and Japan will demand North Korea's renunciation of nuclear weapons under the close cooperation of members of the six-party talks. The most important thing to address the issue is to maintain close cooperation among the interested parties. Two main arenas exist for these cooperative relations. It is needless to say, but the first one is the six-party talks. The ROK-Japan cooperation is also significant, not to mention the importance of China's role and U.S.-China relations at the same time. On response to the two countries, the U.S. and China, the influence will be obviously increased when South Korea and Japan cooperate together, rather than taking independent action, and 'ROK-Japan initiative' such as joint denuclearization statement may have significant influence as well.

Another important thing is the appeal to the UN and/or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. Recognizing North Korean nuclear issue as a global non-proliferation issue, South Korea could band together with the international community. While the U.S. and China's roles also have heavy weight here, South Korea and Japan acting in tandem could have the same effect as buttressing international norms and pressuring countries supposedly possessing nuclear weapons including North Korea.

Then what unification diplomacy direction should be taken toward Japan? First is the South Korea and Japan's execution of middle power diplomacy. For Korean unification, the stabilization of political environment in East Asia surrounding the Korean Peninsula is an indispensable condition. Moreover, along with the resumption of six-party talks and the North Korean nuclear issue, South Korea should recognize Japan as a feasible partner for cooperation in middle power diplomacy and persuade Japan of this view, in order to respond to great power politics such as the U.S. and China.

Second, South Korea needs to harmonize the unification diplomacy aimed at the Japanese government and the general public. First of all, Seoul should cognize Japanese government's lucid views and stances on Korean Peninsula. Particularly, it has to develop logic and strategy for unification diplomacy to respond to Japan's conservative rightist trend and progression to become a normal country. Reckoning the fact that the number of Japanese experts on Korean unification and North Korea is on rapid decline recently, South Korean research institutes should develop logic and strategies for unification diplomacy with the objective of providing information to educate and persuade Japanese experts in research institutes of Korean unification by South Korean experts. Finally, in the civil society, logic and strategies for unification diplomacy should be developed as a unification public diplomacy to strengthen ROK-Japan friendship through international exchanges, and to relieve alienation and a vague

sense of fear toward North Korea prevalent in Japanese society.

Third, unification diplomacy toward Japan is choice and concentration. This could be analyzed in the following three points. (1) Regarding South Korea, unification diplomacy is necessary for Japan to shape a clear view on the Korean unification. (2) On North Korea, unification diplomacy is essential, considering the protection of Japan's diplomacy, security, and sovereignty — those related to North Korean nuclear issue, Japanese abductee issue, DPRK-Japan normalization of diplomatic relations, etc. (3) Relating to the Korean Peninsula, it is significant to raise the Japanese awareness of Korean unification and create friendly atmosphere. Unification diplomacy toward Japan could be reviewed in these three different levels and priority should be set at each level, and the ensuing unification diplomacy necessitates selection and concentration.

Fourth, this is the issue of overcoming the limits of ROK-Japan relations. Especially, issues such as DPRK-Japan relations, history, and territorial issues call for solutions. Past South Korean administrations have conveyed passive agreement or opposition toward Japan's approach to North Korea. Also, with regard to history and territory issues, South Korea should attempt to resolve the issue at least by “management” — impeding the aggravation of bilateral relations — if the complete resolution is difficult in the short run.



5

**Logic and Strategy of
Unification Diplomacy toward
Russia**

5. Logic and Strategy of Unification Diplomacy toward Russia

Russia possesses the second largest military capability after the U.S. and is a source of the tectonic shift in post-Cold War Eurasia as the annexation of Crimea and crisis in Ukraine have unveiled since 2014. Russia is one of the countries that pay attention to Korean unification and has the intention to assume the central role in it.

Russian views on Korean peninsula could be categorized in terms of different inclinations, “pro-North Korea,” “moderate,” and “pro-South Korea.” Each side has following views.

[Pro-North Korea] Russia, as a successor of the Soviet Union, has the history of antagonizing the West and embracing North Korea during the Cold War era. The collapse of the Soviet Union disturbed this tradition, and the leadership headed by President Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s, the onset of independent Russia, especially estranged from North Korea and was avowedly inclined to South Korea, pursuing stronger ties. However, the Korean Peninsula policy led by the Yeltsin government until the mid-1990s refers to a temporary and exceptional period in viewing Soviet Union’s and current Russia’s diplomacy line

overall. Since the mid-to-late 1990s, re-recognizing the strategic value of North Korea, Russia has convoluted its line to South-North equidistance diplomacy and continued up till today. While the number of government agencies, organizations and expert groups relevant to Korean Peninsula is not very large, Moscow receives opinions of expert panels and intellectuals and communicates with them. While the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) emphasizes the solidarity with North Korea considering the North Korea's current status as natural, it does not make specific comments on its future including Korean unification. The group that espouses "great power nationalism" or "ultra-nationalism" shares the same foreign policy stance with the KPRF emphasizes that as Russia has to formulate and lead a solid union to face the anti-Russia forces of the West that threatens Russia, North Korea is one of the vital forces in Asia for this solidarity.¹⁶⁾ Based on these points, Russian communists, ultra-nationalists, and experts on Korean Peninsula who follow these ideas are presumed to acquiesce with North Korea's idea of a confederate system — "one-state, two-system, and two-government" — with regard to Korean unification.

[Moderate] It can be said that majority of figures that deal with and touch on the Korean Peninsula issue in Russia de facto hold the moderate point of view. While figures can be classified as mentioned

16) Леонид Ивашов, "Северную Корею не сломить," 2013.5.8., <<http://www.pravda.ru/video/pravdablog/11695.html>>. (date accessed: August 10, 2015).

above in formality, but they actually pin closer to pro-North Korea. Moderate figures have plentiful experience of exchange with North Korea in the past and present, and generally the majority of them are members of “DPRK-Russia Exchange Association.”¹⁷⁾ They put an emphasis on the point that while they admit the fact that the North Korean regime has faced limitations difficult to solve by itself, exposing its inherent problem, they protest that the pressure from the outside, especially to mold the situation preferable for the Western bloc such as South Korea and the U.S., will worsen the problem-solving, evoking repugnance from North Korea. In other words, the moderates perceive the Korean problem grounded on the perception that the external forces should accept the current situation in North Korea and cooperate with the North Korean leadership so that the leadership autonomously approaches the problem.¹⁸⁾ Their priority lies in peacefully untangling the conflict through negotiations with North Korea, and they claim that measures daunting or sanctioning North Korea should be excluded in this process. Even on the future of the Korean Peninsula, in line with this logic, they

17) Those who publish opinions on Korean question for the public on Russian websites largely express pro-North Korean/anti-South Korean views. Hence, it is urgent to expand South Korean public diplomacy aimed at Russian civil society.

18) Валерий Денисов, “Корейская ядерная проблема: возможности политического урегулирования сохраняются,” *Аналитические записки научно-координационный совет по международным исследованиям МГУМО(У) МИД России*, выпуск, vol. 8, no. 20 (September 2006), pp. 1-20; “Пхеньян стремится в “ядерный клуб,” *Голос России*, 2013.4.23., <<http://newsland.com/news/detail/id/1165987/>>. (date accessed: November 10, 2014.11.10.).

envisage that North Korea's development should primarily take place by its "soft landing" and the gradual unification ensues in the natural progression of development. They underscore North Korea's self-survival and cooperation with the outside world under the premise that its soft landing serves Russia's national interests.¹⁹⁾

[Anti-North Korea and Pro-South Korea] While only a few number of figures enunciate an anti-North Korea view among the major politicians and expert groups in Russia, this number is gradually growing than the past. Noting that Pyongyang intentionally spurs crisis to reap benefits, they asseverate that the international community is falling for North Korea's such shenanigans, if it would try to compromise with North Korea through compensation. Vice President of Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) at Russia Academy of Sciences Vasily Mikheev is one such expert who opines that North Korea reached an overburdened status in the Kim Jong-un regime and the Soviet Union's course such as the introduction of Gorbachev and the collapse of the Soviet system could be repeated in North Korea.²⁰⁾ Based on the logic similar to him, IMEMO report (Global Outlook 2030) that sketches the possibility of the collapse of the North Korean system in the future caused by

19) Александр Воронцов, "Объединение Кореи: ускользающие возможности," *Фонд Стратегической Культуры* November 9, 2014, <<http://www.fondsk.ru/news/2014/11/09/obedinenie-korei-uskolzajuschie-vozmozhnosti-30329.html>>. (date accessed: August 11, 2015.).

20) Vasily Mikheev, "Collapse of Socialism Comparison: Russia Experience and North Korea," (IMEMO, October 12, 2012).

internal conflict and the highly likely South Korea-led unification process until 2030 was published in Russia and South Korea in late 2011.²¹⁾ The main rationale behind anti-Pyongyang and pro-Seoul view is that because of North Korea's feeble economy, inducing North Korea-led Korean unification is delusive and it is realistically desirable for South Korea to lead the unification process and this corresponds with Russia's interests. That is, they are acutely aware that South Korea should be the major partner to economically advance toward the Asia-Pacific and that Russia, to this end, has to support South Korea-led unification under liberal democracy, demurring the views of the North Korean regime.

Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) is a major body that discusses Korean Peninsula issues at the governmental level. It has published several reports on Korean unification since November 2013 and the majority of authors are Russia's prominent experts on Korean Peninsula. While they have more or less congruent views on pending issues over Korean Peninsula, the following points related to Korean unification are noteworthy among others.

First, in assuming unification scenarios, while the U.S. is unwilling to see the North Korean regime collapse and make preemptive efforts to prevent this from happening, when situation worsens by internal

21) А.А. Дьнкин, Под ред, *Стратегический глобальный прогноз 2030* (Москва: Магистр, 2011); Alexander Dynkin, *Global Outlook 2030: Russia's Strategic Perspective* (in Korean), trans. Hyun-taek Kim and Sang-jun Lee (Seoul: Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Press, 2012), pp. 394-398.

problems and the central command over nuclear weapons is in peril, they view that the U.S., including South Korea, will in all probability dispatch its troops on the North Korean soil. They clearly manifest that the North Korean leadership turning to reform measures to overcome worsening economic hardships is the means most preferable for Russia to expect.²²⁾ Second, while Russia hopes for an independent, neutral, nuclear-free Korea as its neighbor, no country surrounding the Korean Peninsula, including South and North Korea is currently ready for this. They understand that the powers in the region such as the U.S., China, and Japan deem the collapse of the North Korean regime and Korean unification unfavorable due to the disorder and disadvantages by the subversion of the current balance of power. Eventually, the solution to unravel the current situation lies in pulling North Korea out of isolation and embracing it as a member of the international community. For this, the UN should take the driving seat in dealing with the “Korean question.” Third, they predicate cross-agreements as a measure for the settlement of peace on the Korean Peninsula, suggesting that this is possible under the existing framework of the six-party talks.

President Vladimir Putin’s views related to Korean Peninsula are plainly expressed by the interview with the Korean media before his

22) В. Ларин, “Угроза военного конфликта на Корейском полуострове,” *Российский совет по международным делам, Россия и Республика Корея: перспективы двусторонних отношений* (Москва, 2013), pp. 72-73.

visit to Seoul in November 2013. He reiterated the principle that Russia will support Korean unification recognizing it as a natural process. Also, he explicated that Russia holds two prerequisites — that Korean unification has to be absolutely peaceful and that it has to consider mutual benefits of South and North Korea.²³⁾ Russian president's view agrees with the Russian experts on Korean Peninsula and institutes of moderate views, and this alludes to the fact that this view has irrevocably settled as Russia's policy on Korean Peninsula at least during Putin's tenure, in spite of divergent views from some liberals.

Given these Russian perspectives of North Korea, Korean Peninsula, and Korean unification, the following suggests the direction of logic and strategy that South Korea should take regarding Russia's impending issues on Korean unification.

First, the overall course inferring the logic and strategy of unification diplomacy toward Russia could be grouped by issues that requires long-term response and issues that need initiative starting from now. Among the three agendas of logic and strategy of unification diplomacy toward Russia, long-term agenda refers to the inference of diplomatic security logic, pending issues of North Korean defectors and border control could be tackled as currently debatable

23) "Путин: объединение Кореи возможно только мирным путем," *РИА Новости*, November 12, 2013, <<http://ria.ru/world/20131112/976354311.html>>. (date accessed: August 5, 2015).

themes, and Russia's economic cooperation with Korean Peninsula can be dealt as both long-term and short-term agenda that needs continuous efforts. Second, on South Korea's unification diplomacy, taking into account that Russia de facto values U.S.-China, U.S.-Russia, China-Russia relations above and links ROK-Russia, DPRK-Russia relations with these when coping with the Korean question, South Korea should strive for diplomatic efforts to utilize the friendly relations with neighbors to neutralize Russia, a country that could exert influence on Korean unification process. Third, South Korea should esteem the foreign policy principle of solving the Korean question through the UN that Russia highly regards in the unification process. Fourth, South Korea, on Korean government and private sector level, should vary the targets of unification diplomacy toward Russia and intensify the contents. South Korea has mainly contacted research institutes and figures which speak for President Putin and the Russian government. While this will remain unchanged for the time being, South Korea's efforts is required to enhance its public diplomacy capabilities directed toward Russian civil society in which the various opinions are in place unlike the official government position.

6

Case Analysis of Diplomatic Failure toward Great Powers of Countries Newly Admitted in the International Community

6. Case Analysis of Diplomatic Failure toward Great Powers of Countries Newly Admitted in the International Community

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, unlike the central and eastern European countries which succeeded in smooth regime shift as newly acceded members to the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), most post-Soviet states dispute in between the East (Russia) and the West (Europe) and implement survival policy as a weak state — sometimes a strategy of bandwagoning on great powers, and sometimes strategy of balance diplomacy.

However, some countries pursued a clear anti-Russia, pro-West diplomatic line and emerged as a source of dispute in global politics, of which Ukraine and Georgia are such cases. As a consequence of overt pro-U.S. and pro-West diplomatic trajectory under the Mikhail Saakashvili government which inaugurated by the “Rose Revolution” in 2003, Georgia has severed diplomatic ties with Russia after the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 and embroiled in isolation. As for Ukraine, by, relations with Russia have strained since the anti-Russia and pro-West demonstrations that began in late 2013. Eventually, the

situation has deteriorated with Russia annexing Crimea, a Ukrainian territory and pro-Russian armed forces declaring independence in Southeast Ukraine in 2014.

The diplomatic orientation of former Soviet states has been the most important issue in the context of international relations. Currently, these countries' diplomatic orientations differentiate ranging from an extreme pro-West (U.S., EU, and NATO) inclination to an extreme pro-Russia stance. Apart from the three Baltic States, Ukraine and Georgia lie on the extreme pro-Western side; some Central Asian countries such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan hold a neutral stance; and on the extreme pro-Russian side stands Belarus and Armenia.

Among those countries that border with Russia, Ukraine and Georgia have an anti-Russia tendency and Belarus and Kazakhstan strongly lean toward Russia. Hence, the issue of sharing borders does not affect the diplomatic orientation. Instead, the sentiments based on historical relations with Russia and the issue of ethnic identity appear to be more important factors. That is, in the case of Georgia and Ukraine, the two countries had been annexed by Russia in the past and their independence was thought as a project of ethnic nationalism, restoring their own ethnic identity. On the other hand, as ethnic identity in Kazakhstan and Belarus was relatively weak and local people have had a strong historical bond with Russians, anti-Russian sentiments have not emanated in the initial stage of independence in

these countries and their diplomatic orientation.

This confirms that historical records and ethnic identity have more direct influence on post-Soviet countries anti-Russia/pro-West diplomatic orientation than adjacency to Russia, abundance of resources, and economic independence. The reflection of the idea of ethnic nationalism that a specific ethnicity should head the newly-independent state on diplomatic orientation decisively relies on the existence of a conflict with Russia. The territorial and ethnic disputes emerging as a legacy of the Soviet Union evoke Russian intervention and this looms as a threat to post-Soviet states' security. The anti-Russia/pro-West diplomatic orientation portrays this.

[Crisis in Ukraine] The two political upheavals that Ukraine experienced directly relate to Ukraine's diplomatic alignment and the identity crisis faced by the Ukrainian state, and people "between the East (Russia) and the West (EU)" is the underlying cause for the upheavals. It is crucial to comprehend that setting relations with Russia have wholly underlain the domestic and external crises that Ukraine has experienced for 25 years after the independence. In other words, the regional and ethnic disputes in Ukraine deterred Ukraine's balanced diplomacy by encouraging extreme dichotomous diplomatic orientation - whether to side with "the East or the West" - and are framed in a way that renders Russian intervention inevitable. Especially, the five years of Viktor Yushchenko's reign, achieved through revolution, were times that emboldened hostility with Russia

by reinforcing proclivity to the West. However, Russia's level of response against Ukraine has also heightened. Russia has provided gas supply with price benefits, but in December 2005, stopped giving preferential price to some countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia which show a strong tendency against Russia among members of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). And Moscow adopted measures introducing market principles. In the circumstances where Ukraine deeply relied on Russia for energy supplies, the price hike was an element threatening Ukraine's survival. The dispute over gas also affected domestic politics in Ukraine. The conflict between the government and the parliament instigated by this incident inflicted a political scar on Yushchenko at the March 2006 elections, and his pro-West diplomacy was shoved off to a crisis by elements such as EU's lukewarm attitude toward Ukraine's accession.

Sworn in as president in 2010, Viktor Yanukovych launched pro-Russian foreign policy since his inauguration, as a major pro-Russian political figure. Still, he could not annul the EU integration process at once that the predecessor government left off with. In the outset of his term in April 2010, Yanukovych signed the Kharkiv Pact which extended the Russian lease on naval facilities in Crimea to 2042 and at the same time, continued negotiations for Ukraine-EU Association Agreement. However, with the agreement expected to be signed, he suspended the agreement. This provoked a backlash from pro-Western Ukrainians which fomented the

Euromaidan that ousted him from power in February 2014. After the Euromaidan, pro-West politicians grasped power in the central and west Ukraine centered on the capital Kyiv, and Petro Poroshenko, former Minister of Trade and Economic Development in the previous government, was elected president on May 25, 2014. The pro-U.S./pro-West groups achieved a sweeping victory in the following parliamentary elections on October 26. President Poroshenko signed the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement on June 27, 2014.

Meanwhile, in suspicion of the U.S. and the West being behind Maidan forces, Yanukovich, Russia which backs him, and the people in southeast Ukraine with pro-Russian attitude acted unilaterally in a protest against pro-West trajectory by President Poroshenko. Eventually, Crimea was incorporated into Russia via referendum, and armed insurgents in Donetsk and Lugansk oblast initiated a civil war with the central government, de facto declaring independence. Stunned by Russian annexation of Crimea, the West led by Washington imposed economic sanctions on Russia and insisted that Putin administration should cease military assistance to the separatist forces in southeast Ukraine.

Ukraine's existence as a state has rested on relations with Russia. Nevertheless, the support from the West including Washington and Brussels toward Kyiv failed to achieve expected outcomes and Russia's relations with the West directly influenced this as well. Since the birth of Putin government in 2000, Moscow has considered EU

and NATO's eastward expansion as the most formidable threat to its security. On the other side, Ukraine has been the "indispensable" spot of strategic importance that the Europeans should secure in order to guarantee the civilizational superiority over Russia and to expand its geopolitical frontiers. The new regime in Ukraine bears a fraction of responsibility for making extreme diplomatic choices for the recent confrontation between Ukraine and Russia such as Euromaidan, Russia's annexation of Crimea, and the separatist issue in east Ukraine.

[Georgia's Case] Located between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea, Georgia, a small country in the southern Caucasus, consists of 84% ethnic Georgians of the population of 4.66 million, a country with predominant proportion of the nominal ethnicity, Georgians. Georgian hardline nationalists including Zviad Gamsakhurdia held power in Georgia immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.²⁴) Elected in November 1995, President Eduard Shevardnadze, the last foreign minister of the Soviet Union, was loyal to socialist ideology more than nationalism despite being born in Georgia. Diplomatically, both Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze had a pro-Europe stance, but with somewhat different nuances. Gamsakhurdia was a figure with

24) Georgians' ethnicism, that is, ethnic nationalism originates from the ideology of Christian Messiah that was popular among 12th century Georgians. Seungsoo Hyun, "Nationalism in post-Soviet Georgia: Enmeshment of Ethnic Nationalism and Civil Nationalism," in *Ethnic Politics in Eurasia*, Russian&Eurasian Research Unit of the APRC Hanyang University ed., (Seoul: Minsokwon, 2015), pp. 406-407.

strong anti-Russian sentiments and had the intention to induce support and cooperation from Europe in the event of recurrence of Russian imperialist invasion. With regard to Georgia, he laid emphasis on pure Georgianness and the extended identity of Caucasianness, rather than a member of Europe.

Discussions on the inclination to Europe have been made public in Georgian society since the 2000s and “Citizen’s Union of Georgia (CUG)” organized by young reformists in the ruling party was at the heart of this. In April 1999, CUG championed Georgia’s admission to the Council of Europe as a feat that recognized the historical legitimacy of “return to Europe.” Georgia’s return to Europe was the core proposition of the movement aimed at ousting Shevardnadze and the thesis of Rose Revolution. Seated as president by the Rose Revolution in November 2003, Saakashvili believed that the foreign policy balancing act that Shevardnadze promoted obstructed Georgia’s restoration of European identity as it heavily weighed especially on establishing amicable relations with Russia.²⁵⁾ Saakashvili and revolutionary groups perceived that the poverty and corruption rampant in Georgian society and the issue of separatism in regions such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Adjara stemmed from the national vulnerability of Georgia and that this could only be solved by restoring Europeanness.²⁶⁾

25) *Ibid.*, p. 923.

26) Aslan Abashidze, the leader of Adjara region, is known to ignore the authority of the central

Revolutionary groups had confidence that they could rebuild Georgia as a democratic state that accords with “European standards.” Their vision of Georgia was a corruption-free state with an active market and an effectively functioning government and a state that will share values of Western liberalism and ultimately pursue Euro-Atlantic integration. In this context, as the EU was one role model to Georgia and not a mere strategic partner, it was the fact that Saakashvili, a figure that the previous regime ignored, made effort to meet everything existing in Georgia with European standards during his rule. Statements clearly demonstrating inclination toward Europe were inserted in official state documents and institutional integration to Europe has been written as the ultimate objective of Georgia’s foreign policy.²⁷⁾ After the Revolution, Georgia’s considerable improvement in international indexes that corroborate its democratic progress, combat against corruption, and economic development was propagandized as evidence that proves Georgia’s success in returning to Europe.

The problem is that Saakashvili’s radical pro-Western policy was viewed as a geopolitical/security threat to Putin’s Russia. Russia’s official documents such as its security concept and foreign policy concept issued during Putin’s rule mention that NATO’s eastward

government in Tbilisi and did not pay tax. Saakashvili integrated Adjara in 2004 and Abashidze went into exile in Russia.

27) See Stephen Jones, “The Role of Cultural Paradigms in Georgian Foreign Policy,” in *Ideology and National Identity in Post-communist Foreign Policies*, ed. Rick Fawn, p. 98

expansion approaches as the biggest threat that Russia faces. This was a warning to post-Soviet states bordering Russia such as Georgia and Ukraine for their “West-friendly and Russia-distancing” alignment. Russia manipulated the ethnic issue to forestall Georgia’s pro-Western line. It galvanized support for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. When the Beijing Olympics was about to begin in August 2008, Georgia invaded South Ossetia autonomous oblast. Saakashvili calculated that Russia would be impossible to retaliate in the times of peaceful excitement spanning across the globe by the Olympics and that the U.S. and the West will support Georgia once Russia intervenes.

This soon turned out to be a miscalculation. Russian army advanced to Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, on August 9, and widened air strikes to Georgian territory. Contrastingly, western support that Saakashvili hoped for was nowhere and the western criticisms against Russia remained as a mere barrage of words. Occupying South Ossetia, Russia stationed its troops and officially approved the independence of the Republic of South Ossetia. Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, which claimed to separate from Georgia, also obtained Russian approval of independence. While the international law does not recognize these two countries as official states, they persist as “unrecognized states” with their own presidents, parliament, and other state organs, and a few countries including Russia recognize them as official states. Obviously, despite denying their existence, the Georgian government accepts that these countries

are beyond their reach of sovereignty.

In the parliamentary elections in October 2012, “Georgian Dream” coalition led by anti-regime businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili outwitted the ruling “United National Movement” claiming the majority of seats in the parliament. A year later, Georgian Dream candidate Giorgi Margvelashvili won the presidential election. Georgian Dream basically proclaims European aspirations, while stressing the need to engage in the rapprochement with Russia. The new president also signaled his intention to restore ties with Russia through speeches, etc. Once suspended by the severing bilateral diplomatic relations, the agricultural exports to Russia resumed. Georgia-Russia reconciliation has a myriad of hurdles to climb, and its prospects seem dim, unless Georgia abandon’s its inclination to Europe or Russia renounces the rights of unrecognized states.

The cases of Ukraine and Georgia’s diplomatic failure toward great powers offer Korea not a few lessons, as Korea also needs to carry out diplomacy for unification and to achieve national and state integration after unification. First, Ukraine and Georgia share the long history of colonial rule under the dynamics between neighboring ethnic groups and great powers. Therefore, the establishment of national security was of utmost importance when the newly-independent states were created. This directly relates to what the Ukrainian and Georgian elites were convinced of – that the state has to assure their sovereignty and territorial integrity from the neighbors

even if disorder appears in the process of building the nation-state. At this point, the discord with Russia, political, economic, and diplomatic plight that the two countries have suffered from connote the miscalculation of these elites. Whereas South Korea's independent determination and choice, surrounded by four powers, are of supreme value in Korean unification, it is imperative to prepare and implement a meticulous scenario by carefully calculating interests, profits and losses of neighboring four powers in Korean unification.

Second, regarding the solution to the North Korean nuclear issue, South Korea could infer implications from the security dilemma brought by the denuclearization of Ukraine. By the deteriorating relations with Russia in 2014, the Ukrainian press criticized denuclearization as the main determinant that weakened its security. Some claimed that Ukraine was helpless when Russia annexed Crimea reneging on guarantees of sovereignty and security to Ukraine because it renounced the nuclear arsenal "impetuously." This development of event has not only impelled the North Korean regime to pace with the nuclear development to safeguard the regime but also functioned as a decisive factor endangering regional security in Northeast Asia and damaging the cooperative stance of the neighbors of Korean Peninsula which aspire to resolution of the issue under the six-party framework.

Third, the point that the language issue in a specific region has close connections with the internal and external troubles that Ukraine and Georgia currently undergo has ramifications for Korean

unification process. In the case of Ukraine, the forced use of Ukrainian language has appeared as the greatest element of discontent among southwestern people against the central government in Kyiv. As regards Korean unification, the “stereotypical idea” - seemingly taken for granted - that Korea consists of a single ethnic group using a single language should also be reconsidered. While it may not coincide with the discrepancy between Ukrainian and Russian, the national consciousness and language shared between South and North Korea have lost a considerable amount of homogeneity in the 70 years of division. Attempting to standardize language with South Korean framework neglecting North Korea’s linguistic identity in the integration process would trigger a huge disarray and discord in the society.

Fourth, the possibility of overheated nationalism in the integration process is an element that needs to be approached with most caution with regard to Korean unification. Without the careful management of nationalism, it may pose a security threat to neighbors and also create conflict by region, class, and generation within Korea, which needs to integrate as a new nation-state.

Lastly, we should consider the management of Russia in the process of Korean unification. The Ukrainian and Georgian experts that the author interviewed had congruous views that Russia will interfere with the North Korean issue in some form and there is a high possibility of Russia’s diplomatic and military intervention when the unified Korea stands against Russia’s national interests.



Conclusion

7. Conclusion

Here, this section summarizes the conclusions of the chapters that dealt the unification diplomacy strategy toward each country. The unification diplomacy strategy toward the U.S. should focus on (1) providing incentives beyond the logic to support Korean unification to the U.S., (2) proceeding with discussions on bilateral cooperation and regional order in East Asia before and after the unification at various levels and channels, (3) preparing a strategy to link and delink various issues that emanates from North Korean issue, ROK-Japan and ROK-China relations, (4) completing the vision of Korean unification via many dialogues and discussions domestically and sharing with the neighboring countries.

Narrowing political and military distance between Seoul and Beijing, the core implementation strategy in unification diplomacy toward China, will cause gradual development or rapid deterioration depending on North Korea's demeanor. In the case of the latter, limited provocations such as "the sinking of ROKS Cheonan" and "the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island" and military offensive such as "North

Korea's fourth nuclear test" will undermine the gradually-built political and military confidence between South Korea and China at once. Obviously, this is based on the premise that China makes use of North Korea as a geopolitical buffer zone and continuously upholds this benefit. Clearly, despite the ROK-China conflict situation aroused by North Korea's unpredictable military moves, the efforts to narrow bilateral political divide has continued for the past several years.²⁸⁾

As for the strategy toward Japan, the emphasis is needed on unification diplomacy toward Japan and the choice and concentration through prioritization at three different levels, (1) the implementation of middle power diplomacy of South Korea and Japan, (2) the coordination of unification diplomacy toward the Japanese government and private sector, (3) the three different contexts, South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula. The relationship between Seoul and Tokyo is an issue of overcoming the limits. Japan's cooperation is necessary for achieving Korean unification. To this end, the two countries should tackle limits of bilateral relations such as DPRK-Japan relations, history issue, and territory issue through seeking solutions or "controlling" the issues.

On strategy toward Russia, it should be noted that Russia prefers a new Northeast Asian framework built by Korean unification to

28) Jung-ho Bae et al., *Domestic Politics and Foreign Policies of the Northeast Asian Countries in the Era of Obama-Xi Jinping Leadership and the North Korean and Unification Diplomacy Strategy of South Korea*, p. 212.

develop the Far East and to advance to the Asia-Pacific. This operates on the premise that North Korea, the factor of unease on the Korean Peninsula, should be stabilized and maintain a predictable regime. The directionality of the unification diplomacy toward Russia should have three different impending issues such as “Russia’s initiative on North Korea and ROK-DPRK-Russia trilateral cooperation,” “mass migration of North Korean defectors,” and “logic of diplomacy and security.” Furthermore, South Korea should develop the logic to convince Russia by preparing a long-term alternative and cultivate a diplomacy logic based on short-term policy initiative such as economic cooperation issue and measures for migration of North Korean defectors at the same time.

The paper analyzes the diplomatic orientation of post-Soviet states, which has emerged as core regions of discord and conflict in the current global politics. And by giving examples of the newly-independent countries such as Ukraine and Georgia in particular, the paper identifies that the failure of those countries’ diplomacy toward great powers derived from diplomatic orientation. The diplomatic orientation is the direct consequence of the tragedy in world history, that is, the conflict with Russia and the economic hardships and territorial divide ramified from the conflict. The two countries commonly share borders with Russia and even closely tied to the country in terms of history, culture and economy. Russia, which deems NATO’s eastward expansion as the greatest national threat, strategically

manipulated the ethnic and territorial dispute in Georgia and Ukraine to contain their pro-Western diplomatic orientation. As its war with Georgia over South Ossetia in 2008 and its annexation of Crimea in 2014 document, Russia dared to use arms. Ukraine and Georgia's diplomatic failures toward great powers propound meaningful implications for Korea on its diplomacy toward unification and the ethnic and national integration in the post-unification period.

Development of Unification Diplomacy Contents

There is an urgent need to develop contents for unification diplomacy that aims to convince the political sphere, government, and citizens of the states surrounding the Korean Peninsula, including the United States, Japan, China and Russia, to hold a positive outlook on Korea's unification. With this in mind, the researchers have been performing research to develop contents for unification diplomacy for the past two years. This study aimed to develop a specific logic customized to each country surrounding the Korean Peninsula to gain support for national unification. In addition, the research expanded the scope of countries for examination to include the former Soviet Union and key European countries. This report is for use as a fundamental source in devising a plan to comprehensively and systematically persuade Korea's neighbors. The researchers also hope that it will provide meaningful implications to Korea in achieving unification as well as ethnic and national integration in the post-unification period.