

## 남북협력: 새로운 지평을 향하여

인쇄/1998년 5월 8일

발행/1998년 5월 11일

발행처/민족통일연구원

발행인/양영식

편집인/기획조정실 연구기획부

등록/제2-2361호(97.4.23)

(142-076) 서울특별시 강북구 수유6동 535-353

전화(대표)900-4300 (직통)901-2521 팩시밀리 901-2541

© 민족통일연구원, 1998

민족통일연구원에서 발간한 간행물은

전국 대형서점에서 구입하실 수 있습니다.

(구입문의) 한국경제서적 : 737-7498

---

ISBN 89-87509-39-7

9,000원

역술회의 총서 98-01

남북협력: 새로운 지평을 향하여

정부수립 50주년기념 국제학술회의  
스톡홀름대 아태연구소·서울대 국제문제연구소  
공동주최(98.4.3) 발표논문집

민족통일연구원

## 개 회 사

먼저 민족통일연구원이 스톡홀름대 아·태연구소, 서울대 국제문제연구소와 공동주최하는 국제학술회의에 참여하여 주신 사회자, 발표자, 토론자 여러분을 환영합니다. 특히 기조연설을 해주시기 위해 시간을 내주신 강인덕 통일부장관님께 감사를 드립니다. 아울러 통일문제에 대한 각별한 관심으로 이 자리에 함께 하신 내외 귀빈 여러분께도 감사와 환영의 인사를 같이 드립니다.

오늘의 학술회의는 대한민국 정부수립 50주년을 기념하는 행사이지만, 올해는 남북한 분단이 고착화된 지 50년이 지난 해이기도 합니다. 따라서 우리에게만 반세기의 민족분단에 중지부를 찍고 평화적 통일의 계기를 마련한다는 적극적인 자세가 요구되고 있습니다.

주지하듯이 새정부는 과거 어느 정부 보다도 남북간 직접대화과 교류에 적극적인 의지를 가지고 있습니다. 김대중 대통령께서는 이미 취임사에서 '남북기본합의서 이행을 위한 특사교환'을 제안하여 남북 교류에 대한 적극적인 의지를 표명하였습니다. 또한 3.1절 기념사에서는 '최소한도의 대화와 교류'가 필요함을 역설하고 북한당국과 '어떠한 방식, 어떠한 수준의 대화'에도 응할 준비가 되어 있다는 입장을 명확히 밝힌 바 있습니다.

이와 관련, 현재 정부는 교류의 확대와 교류방식의 전향적 변화를 모색하고 있으며, 우선 남북협력의 주요 현안인 이산가족문제의 해결과 정·경분리 원칙에 입각한 남북경협을 적극 추진하고 있는 것으로 알고 있습니다.

남북협력은 이러한 현안에서 한걸음 더 나아가 남북한 동포들의 실생활에 영향을 미치고 있는 환경, 에너지, 통신 및 과학기술 등 다차원적으로 확대되어야 할 것입니다.

또한 21세기 국가간 협력은 비정치·비군사분야가 중심이 될 전망임에 비추어 통일한국을 21세기 정보문화의 선진국으로 향도해 나가기 위한 통일대비 차원에서 남북협력의 지평을 다원화할 필요성이 제기되고 있습니다.

스톡홀름대와 공동주최하는 만큼 오늘의 학술회의에는 유럽의 전문가 여러분이 많이 참석하여 주셨습니다. 국가간 협력관계가 비교적 발달된 유럽의 경험은 우리의 선행모델로서 남북한 협력에 적지 않은 시사점을 줄 것으로 생각합니다.

아무쪼록 오늘의 학술회의가 남북간 화해·협력의 새로운 지평을 제시하는 자리가 될 수 있도록 참석자 여러분들의 활발하고 알찬 토론을 당부드리면서 개회의 인사에 갈음하고자 합니다.

감사합니다.

1998. 4. 3

민족통일연구원 부원장

朴 英 圭

## 기 조 연 설

### - 「국민의 정부」 대북정책 추진기조와 방향 -

학술회의 참석자 여러분,

그리고 자리를 함께 하신 내외 귀빈 여러분.

대한민국 정부수립 50주년을 기념하여 민족통일연구원과 서울대 국제문제연구소, 그리고 스톡홀름대 아태연구소가 공동주최하는 국제학술회의가 이처럼 성황리에 열리게 된 것을 진심으로 축하 드립니다.

정부수립이후 첫 수평적 정권교체라는 역사적 의미를 갖는 새정부의 출범으로 남북관계도 새로운 전기를 맞고 있습니다. 이러한 때에 세계적인 석학 여러분들이 자리를 함께 하여 「남북협력의 새로운 지평을 모색」하는 것은 참으로 시의 적절하고 뜻깊은 일일 것입니다. 아울러 저 자신 통일부장관으로서 또한 오랫동안 남북문제에 깊은 관심을 가져 온 한 사람으로서, 전문가 여러분과 대화를 나누게 된 것을 기쁘게 생각합니다.

참석자 여러분.

정부수립 50주년을 맞으면서, 저는 지난 분단 반세기의 남북관계를 돌아봅니다. 이념과 체제의 대결, 반목과 불신의 역사는 오늘날 남과 북의 모습을 완전히 다르게 바꾸어 놓았습니다. 같은 역사를 가지고 있으면서도 서로 다른 오늘을 살고, 같은 민족이면서도 서로 다른 양식으로 살고 있는 것이 지금의 남과 북입니다. 잘 아시다시피, 새로운 백년의 시작을 눈앞에 두고, 세계는 지금 냉전의 틀에서 벗어나 화해하고 협력하면서 공동의 번영을 추구하고 있습니다. 이념과 체제, 그리고 국경을 넘어 하나의 지구촌을 이루어가고 있는 것입니다.

이제 남북관계도 달라져야 합니다. 서로 멀어지는 것이 아니라, 조금씩이나마 서로 다가가는 관계가 되어야 합니다. 단절의 벽을 넘어 화해하고 협력하면서 상호 이익과 민족전체의 복리를 도모해 나가야 할 것입니다. 이를 위해서는 무엇보다 한반도에서 평화와 공존의 바탕을 공고히 하는 것이 중요합니다. 분단상황을 평화적으로 관리하면서, 교류와 협력을 통해 관계를 개선하고 민족의 염원인 통일을 지향해 나가자는 것입니다.

「국민의 정부」가 북한의 무력도발 불용, 흡수통일 배제, 화해협력의 적극 추진을 대북정책 추진의 3대 원칙으로 설정한 것은 바로 이러한 취지에서입니다. 이러한 원칙에 입각하여, 정부는 앞으로 국민적 합의와 자신감을 바탕으로 「실사구시적」 차원에서 신중하고 유연하게 대북정책을 추진해 나갈 것입니다. 무엇보다 남북 당국간 대화를 통해 민족의 장전인 남북기본합의서를 성실히 이행하는데 정책의 역점을 둘 방침입니다.

참석자 여러분.

오늘 학술회의 주제가 말해 주고 있듯이, 남북간 교류와 협력의 새로운 지평을 열어 나가는 것은 시급하고도 중요한 과제중의 하나입니다. 그것은 남과 북이 민족의 동질성을 회복하고 하나의 공동체를 이루어 가는 가장 현실적인 지름길이기 때문입니다. 또한 포용적인 입장에서 북한의 긍정적인 변화노력을 지원하고 남북관계의 실질적인 개선을 이루는 좋은 방안이 될 것입니다. 이런 견지에서 정부는 남북간에 「보다 많은 접촉」, 「보다 많은 대화」, 「보다 많은 협력」을 모색해 나가려고 합니다.

보다 유연한 입장에서 서로 필요로 하고 실천이 용이한 분야부터 남북간 접점을 늘려 나갈 것입니다. 무엇보다 인도적 견지에서 분단의 가장 큰 피해자인 이산가족의 생사 확인과 상봉을 실현하기 위해

최선을 경주할 것입니다. 고령 이산가족의 방북절차를 간소화하고, 교류에 필요한 경비 일부를 지원할 생각입니다.

또한 북한동포의 식량난을 덜어주기 위한 인도적 차원에서의 대북 지원을 꾸준히 전개할 것입니다. 국제기구의 대북지원에 동참하면서, 민간차원의 지원 활성화를 위한 조치들을 계속 강구해 나갈 방침입니다. 아울러 농업협력과 경협활성화를 통해 북한이 당면하고 있는 식량난, 경제난의 근원적인 해결노력을 지원해 나갈 생각입니다.

정부는 또한 필요하다면, 정부차원의 직접지원도 고려할 것입니다. 북한주민에 대한 본격적인 대규모 지원은 정부가 나서야 한다고 보고 있기 때문입니다. 그러나 이를 위해서는 남북 당국간의 대화가 우선 이루어져야 할 것입니다.

남북간 경제협력은 남과 북이 이익을 도모함은 물론, 민족공동의 발전, 나아가 하나의 민족경제공동체를 이루는 중요한 토대입니다. 이런 점에서 정부는 남북 당국간 대화재개 이전이라도 남북간 경제협력이 보다 적극적으로 이루어질 수 있는 여건을 조성해 나갈 계획입니다. 특히 정경분리 원칙에 따라 경협의 주체인 기업의 자율성을 존중하는 방향에서 남북간 경제협력을 활성화해 나갈 것입니다. 각종 절차를 간소화하고, 투자규모 제한을 폐지하는 등 필요한 조치들을 단계적으로 취해 나가려고 합니다.

새정부의 대북정책에 대해 북한은 아직 직접적이고 공식적인 반응을 보이지는 않고 있습니다. 그러나 국제정세의 흐름과 북한이 처한 경제상황 등을 종합해 볼 때, 북한도 조만간 우리와의 화해협력에 호응해 오리라 기대하고 있습니다.

참석자 여러분.

모든 남북문제는 남북 당사자의 의사에 따라 스스로의 힘으로 해결해야 합니다. 그러나 저는 남북관계 개선과 통일을 위해서는 유관국

가들의 지지와 협조가 중요하다고 보고 있습니다. 한반도의 평화와 안정, 그리고 남북관계의 개선이 동북아, 나아가 세계의 평화와 번영에 밀접히 연관되어 있기 때문입니다. 그것은 또한 냉전의 진정한 종식이며, 21세기 세계공동체시대를 여는 출발점이 될 것이라는데 여기 계신 여러분 모두 공감하시리라 믿습니다.

독일이 그러했듯이 우리도 국제사회의 지지와 축복속에 민족의 염원을 이루려고 합니다. 그리고 그 첫발은 바로 남과 북이 평화와 안정의 토대위에서 교류와 협력을 활성화해 나가는 것이라고 저는 보고 있습니다. 이런 견지에서 저는 오늘 이 자리가 남북간 교류협력을 통해 남북관계의 새 장을 개척하고, 나아가 통일의 큰 길을 여는 소중한 계기가 되기를 기대합니다.

다시 한번 학술회의 개최를 축하 드리며, 이 자리에 참석하기 위해 먼 길을 오신 외빈 여러분 모두 이번 방한이 즐겁고 보람된 여정이 되시기를 기원합니다. 저에게 영예로운 기회를 주신 주최측과 참석자 여러분에게 깊은 감사를 드립니다.

감사합니다.

1998. 4. 3  
통일부 장관  
康 仁 德



**III. Seeking a Proper Role of Government for Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation .....43**

**Seung-Yul Oh**

Introduction ..... 43  
Current Status and Features of Inter-Korean Economic Exchange ..... 46  
Efficiency of Policy Means ..... 59  
Conclusion: Sharing of Roles of the Government and the Private Sector ..... 66  
 국문요약 ..... 71

**IV. North Korea's Food Crisis and Inter-Korean Cooperation .....74**

**Jae-Suk Lee**

Introduction ..... 74  
Some Basic Considerations ..... 75  
North Korea's Food Crisis ..... 78  
Suggestions for Remedy and Rescue ..... 82  
Realities ..... 84  
The Approach of the Kim Dae-jung Government ..... 87  
Concluding Remarks ..... 88  
 국문요약 ..... 90

**V. The Korean Peninsula and Energy Cooperation in Northeast Aisa .....92**

**Reinhard Drifte**

Introduction ..... 92  
Energy Needs & Supply ..... 93

Political Issues .....	98
Economic Issues .....	100
Technical Issues .....	101
Environmental Issues .....	102
Solutions .....	103
Greater Market Openness for Market-based Solutions .....	104
Creating an Economic and Political Regime .....	105
ASIATOM .....	107
Projects .....	114
Conclusions .....	120
<input type="checkbox"/> 국문요약 .....	124

**VI. Mutual Cooperation on Information Technology between South and North Korea: A Bottom-up Approach .....** 126

**Chan-Mo Park**

Introduction .....	126
Informatization Trend in North Korea .....	128
Information Technology Exchange between the South and the North and Mutual Cooperation .....	147
Conclusion .....	150
<input type="checkbox"/> 국문요약 .....	155

종 합 토 론 .....

회 의 일 정 .....

<부록> 민족통일연구원 발간자료 목록 .....

## I

---

# Farewell to a Model? German Experiences with Unification and Its Implications for Korean Strategies

---

Manfred Pohl

(Professor, University of Hamburg)

Everybody knows that as a state as well as a former model of self-reliant development North Korea is already doomed: Any direct confrontation with South Korean economic and political challenges would inevitably result in a sudden collapse and demise of both North Korea's political and social systems - the economy obviously already is in agony, the people are starving.<sup>1)</sup> The latter

---

1) Toshimitsu Shigemura, "What Is Happening in North Korea Today?," Foreign Press Center, Japan, June 1996; Shigemura takes a different position. He argues that in 1996 through international help and partly through domestic production the supply gap of grain was much smaller than generally assumed: North Korean grain production in 1995 was estimated at 2.0 million tons which in turn would have meant a shortfall of ca. another 2.0 million tons; relief supplies from various international organizations and countries like China, Japan and South Korea were approximately 1.8 million tons, so starvation could not be based on insufficient supplies; the true reason probably lies with the very difficult transport situation; big cities can get at least part of the necessary supplies; peasant population in the countryside however are apparently starving.

## 2 남북협력: 새로운 지평을 향하여

facts can be seen by everybody who has visited the country: This author had the chance to pay a visit to North Korea in 1989 as a member of a German business delegation and even then the general impression of everyday life was rather depressing, although the food situation had been much better than today. Apart from directly visiting the country, the author had various opportunities to talk to North Korean functionaries, since the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has kept open its former embassy in the now defunct GDR, East Berlin. It has been transformed into a Bureau for the Protection of the Interests of the DPRK under the umbrella of the embassy of the People's Republic of China, while Germany has a representative in Pyongyang operating under the protective power of the embassy of Sweden. Members of the North Korean bureau rather regularly visit the Hamburg Institute of Asian Affairs which is loosely connected with the German Foreign Ministry (and of which the author is a fellow) to have informal talks, mostly on economic relations; the last high ranking visitor in March 1997 has been the deputy foreign minister of the DPRK.

The North Korean leadership seems to be living in a pipe dream, ordinary people are mostly cut off from outside information, even if they do own a radio or a TV set. But make no mistakes: Party cadres, the military and party technocrats, the elite, are pretty well informed about what is going on the world; they have access to e.g. Japanese broadcasts, German magazines and American papers, although it seems that sometimes the elite is unable to put informations into proper perspective. Those of the North Korean elite who do have contacts with the outside world appear to be quite polished; this author has talked to North Korean diplomats

and economists on a regular basis, since after the unification Germany "inherited" the former North Korean embassy. While representatives of the North Korean government pay lip service (quite convincingly so...) to the late "great and beloved leader, comrade Kim Il Sung" or the "dear leader, comrade general Kim Jong-il" and their *juche* utopia, they quite openly admit to the many difficulties the DPRK is facing right now.

After the collapse of the East European form of Socialism, most of all the Soviet type, and the open-door policy of the Chinese neighbour, North Korea was left out in the cold; all of a sudden the heavily protected North Korean economy was at least partly exposed to the rules of international trade, like hard currency transfers and demands for a minimum of quality standards. As representatives of German companies operating in the DPRK are testifying, North Korean partners are quite willing to adjust and produce e.g. fairly high quality textiles. Encouraged by these very limited successes and obviously impressed by extremely good results of the Chinese Special Economic Zones (SEZ) North Korea now aims at establishing a SEZ of its own in the delta of Tumen River near the borders to Russia and China at Rajin and Sonbong. The plan has received very favorite responses internationally: In September 1996 investment deals with North Korea in the planned SEZ reached US\$282 Million, among the deals were a five-star hotel, a motor cycle plant, prefabricated housing, improvement of telecommunication systems etc.; investors came from Hongkong, China, Thailand and various overseas Korean groups.<sup>2)</sup>

---

2) *The Japan Times*, 16 September 1996

### **Irrational Nuclear Adventurism and Starving People? Pressure Will Not Work**

How then was it possible that the DPRK leadership triggered off an international upheaval concerning its alleged nuclear armament program? North Koreans in Germany have a ready explanation: It was the Americans who used photos taken from spy satellites to (falsely) accuse North Korea of producing plutonium and launching a military program to build a bomb. In talks with the author North Koreans used highly contradictory arguments:

- The DPRK never had the intention to build a bomb, but then South Koreans already are working on a military nuclear program - and have done so since the mid-seventies and
- Japan has "all parts" for a bomb of its own. In this argument they used British informations disclosed among others by *the Hongkong South China Morning Post*.<sup>3)</sup>
- The IAEA is merely a willing tool in the hands of the USA; the DPRK would never bow to the demands for special inspections of its nuclear research facilities, since those demands "originated in Washington and not Vienna."

In the past the nuclear question has been made far too much a focal point by South Korea, the US on the one hand and Japan on the other. Even if the North had been hoarding plutonium with the intention to use it for the construction of nuclear weapons, it remains highly doubtful that North Korea would have been

---

3) *South China Morning Post*, 25 May 1996.

technically able to miniaturize the plutonium load to put it in a nuclear warhead, which then could be installed on top of the (in)famous Rodong 1 rocket, which seems to sell so well in Middle Eastern states... After having lived right on top of a vast nuclear arsenal (and still living next door to French and British nukes), this author has always argued that instead of clobbering the North Korean leadership - and thereby confirming its aggressive Xenophobia - a softer approach would be more appropriate. North Korea's leadership is intensely nationalistic, which translates into Anti-Americanism, although on the other hand the DPRK leadership has worked eagerly to get diplomatic recognition from Washington. In an interview with the North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister in March 1997 the diplomat stressed four points:

1. The people of the DPRK are very proud and would never give in to outside pressure.
2. South Korean President Kim Young Sam has "insulted" the DPRK, because he did not send a message of condolence after the death of Kim Il Sung. Therefore he is not a welcome dialogue partner.
3. Before any talks between South and North Korea can start, the South has not abolish the security laws.
4. With regard to the role of the US in the Northeast Pacific he said: Washington is not really interested in assisting the Koreas to unify, but would rather keep the peninsula divided, maintain troops in South Korea to use as a lever against China and Japan.<sup>4)</sup>

---

4) Interview in Hamburg, 27 March 1997.

A present desperate shortage of food, which forced the North Korean leadership to beg for outside help, has created a situation in which North Korean leaders are probably more prepared to enter into dialogues with her arch-enemies than ever before. This goes for the US, Japan and also for South Korea; China probably has to play a role as intermediary, for the Chinese leadership holds the key for any sort of cautious openness on the North Korean side. The South Korean government thinks that China will never allow North Korea to collapse, but would rather send substantial help if the DPRK reaches a critical point.<sup>5)</sup> To involve China makes it easier for the North Korean leadership to sit down at the negotiation table and overcome its anxious attitude of autistic rejection of any offer for talks. North Korean representatives who have talks with German counterparts have always stressed that they would never bow to outside pressure (s. above), so any offer of e.g. food help to the North Koreans has to be free from conditions to let the DPRK leadership keep face. It is in the best interest of South Korea to help and thereby keep the North going for the time being because a sudden collapse of the Northern system would put an enormous strain both on the social and economic structure of its Southern neighbour.<sup>6)</sup>

South Korean President Kim Young Sam has only limited options in his approaching the North Koreans: On the one hand

---

5) cf. New Korea Party Lawmaker Hwang Byung-tai who is a former ambassador to China, *The Korea Herald*, 22 November 1996.

6) A model calculation based on the German model done by the Dresdner Bank estimates that if unification happens around 2000 and supposed the North Korean income level would be raised to 60% of the Southern level South Korea would have to transfer US\$240 billion, more than half the country's annual GDP. "Putting Korea Together Again," *The Economist*, 10 May 1997, p. 84.

Pyongyang simply used to refuse to talk to the Southern neighbour, on the other hand the USA have taken all the initiatives to a degree which sometimes gave the impression that South Korea was pointedly left out of the dialogue with the North, especially during the Geneva talks. To breathe life into and to intensify intra-Korean dialogue would mean that South Korea gets the chance to act more independently; this however would imply that South Korea has some "carrots" to dangle before the North Koreans and that Kim Jong-il and his power elite is actually prepared to enter direct talks with the South - any offer of substantial help to the North and more flexibility on the side of the South Korean leadership to allow South Korean companies to freely enter into business relations with North Korean partners would lead to a more relaxed attitude on the North Korean side. However South Korea's president has mostly shown an hard-line attitude towards relations with the North, most recently South Korean companies were blocked from attending a seminar on direct investment in the North Korean SEZ at the Tumen River. South Korean students who have advocated more contacts with North Korea are still treated like criminals.<sup>7)</sup>

In the "stick-and-carrot" approach the US provides some carrots, e.g. it would be very attractive to the DPRK to get a diplomatic face-lifting, like a permanent representative office of the US in Pyongyang. South Korea could offer more than food aid, like economic aid which could be camouflaged as "trade under preferential conditions," since it could be very risky for the North Korean leadership to admit to its people that in fact economic aid

---

7) cf. Johan Galtung and Dietrich Fischer, "Proposal for Korean Reunification," *The Korea Herald*, 4 February 1997.

is necessary. For the time being a policy of boycott vis-a-vis North Korea will not work - for two reasons. A country like the DPRK, whose people are already used to starving and whose economy has by now run on continuously shrinking capacity and rapidly declining efficiency, cannot effectively hit by economic sanctions. Secondly, as was shown by many other boycott measures in recent history (e.g. in the former Yugoslavia), such measures never work effectively: In the case of North Korea China would certainly sabotage boycott measures for "old time sake."

#### **German Unification:**

#### **Not a Model, but Still a Few Lesson to Learn**

The first and foremost lesson Koreans can learn from the German unification is - how not to do it. Unification in Germany has certainly not been a planned and orchestrated process, but a historic development which from the beginning was marked by a dynamism of its own: In the GDR a corrupt power elite, totally isolated from both the people and economic reality, presided over a state which was already bankrupt long before the actual collapse in 1989/90. This system was finally toppled by a mass movement which quickly moved from the slogan "we are the people!" to the slogan "we are one people!" demanding national unification. It has been said many times that German unification was the result of a sudden collapse "in heap" of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) - however this is a misleading perception: The demise of the GDR was only a full stop to a very long sentence, starting with the "Ostpolitik" of Chancellor Willy Brandt. On various levels of all sorts of political, social and economic organizations of West

Germany's contacts to GDR mass organizations and individual politicians in the East had been established; the GDR leadership undoubtedly had been convinced that it was merely "using useful idiots" to further its cause, the fact however was, that the GDR was embraced – and then smothered by this embrace.

The events of 1989/90 thus only marked the peak of a development which had begun long before with the West German "Ostpolitik," and which nowadays is echoed by South Korea's "Nordpolitik." The patient West German approach to intensified relations with the GDR probably is the only lesson which could be learned by the South Korean leadership. Former West Germany paid a high political price for improved contacts with the East: The GDR was recognized as an independent state (i. e. the so-called "Hallenstein doctrine" was abandoned) and the GDR was allowed to gain an international reputation as a democratic socialist state – to many observers (e.g. in Japan) the GDR even appeared to be the "better Germany." West Germany however stuck to one important principle and insisted vis-a-vis the EU on intra-German trade not being international trade but domestic trade.

A gradual process of Korean unification therefore is highly desirable, in fact it is the only way to unification on the Korean peninsula; yet this author is not all sure that it can be easily achieved; the German example has clearly shown that events may gain a dynamism of their own, propelling the actors forward without them being able to control the process. However there are strong indicators that both the North Korean leadership (at least the so-called "technocrats") and the South Korean top decision makers are working hard for a "gradual solution." However the question remains, whether the North Korean leadership is still able

to act freely; the recent defection of chief ideological thinker and a member of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, Hwang Jang-yop, in China has been seen as a sign that an intense power struggle is going on in North Korea: The military seems to fight the civilian technocrats, as could be concluded from the fact that generals paid respect to the late Kim Il Sung separately from civilian leaders on 15 August 1996.<sup>8)</sup>

Both international organizations and individual neighboring states as well as the USA and European countries (esp. Germany) have supported these efforts. Apart from the totally erratic and irresponsible attitude of North Korea regarding the nuclear question at the beginning, there are signs which might indicate that North Korea is indeed trying to follow the "gradual model" of unification as it has insisted it would for a long time.

Slowly, under great difficulties and with many backlashes some sort of communication channels between the governments in South and North Korea have been set up. The present desperate food situation in the North certainly helped in this respect, although North Korea is still quite unwilling to talk. Thus the "talks" between the two Koreas are however far from what interactions had been set in motion between the two Germanies long before unification - however there is a beginning.

- Talks between high-ranking American and North Korean officials have been held in Beijing as well as in Pyongyang

---

8) "North Korea is like an airplane without a pilot," Kazuhiko Araki, Modern Korea Institute, Tokyo, *The Nikkei Weekly*, 17 February 1997; for the separate visits of civilians and generals at the Kim Il Sung's "shrine" cf. *Vantage Point*, vol. XIX, no. 9, September 1996, p. 23

and the US; according to unconfirmed reports the US government might be prepared to open diplomatic relations with North Korea if the government in Pyongyang agrees to fully cooperate in the nuclear question and takes a more flexible attitude vis-a-vis the South. Any move in the direction of diplomatic ties must of course have Seoul's blessing.

- As was the case in Germany, the core of a gradual unification process is always business activities. Businessmen obviously find it easier to talk profits rather than politics and thereby further open up channels of communication and thus contributing to a relaxation of tensions.

German unification model might be called an "absorption model" based on unique (and never to be repeated) historical circumstances; also it should be remembered that the former GDR never really has been a sovereign state, the Soviet Union at any time had the last word on political decisions, and it was only after Moscow had decided not to interfere with the move towards unification, that the GDR regime broke down - and unification happened. In the case of North Korea there is no such "big brother," not even China is in a position to influence Pyongyang. In the German case one part of a divided nation, i. e. the richer and more successful one, absorbed the other part; in effect German unification was paid for solely by West Germany, and the financial burden of unification costs will weigh heavily on the country for many years to come and will certainly have a major impact on Germany's ability to comply with the so-called "Maastricht conditions" of European monetary union.

Korea could very well avoid such pressures by using the strong elements of common North and South cultural, historical and ethnic heritages; here the Korean nation has a much better starting point than the Germans: While Germany only became a nation state in the late 19 century by unifying rather reluctant feudal states under Prussian predominance, Korea has been a national entity for many centuries. There are two very different scenarios concerning a very rapid, uncontrolled unification through a collapse of the North: Critical observers predict that there will be millions of people on the move towards the South once the Northern regime has broken down. Others say that the South Korean government will manage to control mass migration and disorder. But how? A chilling answer: By sending in the army and seal the border between North and South. Now this would certainly endanger all achievements of democratic developments during both the Roh Tae-woo and the Kim Young Sam presidency - is it really worth the price? There is no practical alternative to gradual unification in Korea.

### **Laying the Groundwork for Unification**

#### **- Prerequisites in the South**

After President Kim Young Sam took office in 1993 he faced a couple of very tough problems; the successful solution of all or most of these problems is a precondition for managing any imaginable form of unification process. The fact, that South Korea has not yet fully overcome its basically authoritarian structure, might turn out to be blessing in disguise, since it would certainly make it much easier to bring the Northern and Southern systems

together. Any form of unification process will have to pass through transitory period of strong authoritarian centralism. The South Korean government, i. e. the president, will have to work on these problems to lay the groundwork for unification:

1. Inching closer to totally incalculable North Korea to woo the hostile neighbor into closer cooperation, without loudly clamouring for an early unification (under South Korean conditions), although this of course remains the topmost point on South Korea's political agenda. Recent aggressive acts by the North (e.g. the intrusion of a spy-submarine into the South's territorial waters) have made the South Korean government more cautious but has not changed the agenda.
2. A continuous drive for domestic political reforms, above all relentless efforts to wipe out the rampant corruption both in the civil service and in the military; the recent arrest of President Kim's son for alleged corruption has been a depressing setback for these efforts, but also underlined that the president is prepared to act against a member of his own family, which is a major signal in a still mostly Confucian society.
3. Reorganization of the traditional power structure in order to fight vested interests. Creation of a sound organizational base for himself will enable President Kim to lay the groundwork for his successor, which he will certainly select himself and make sure that he will be elected by the people. One of the most important measures Kim will have to take is to transform the ruling New Korea Party into a smoothly operating political organization by overcoming the latent factionalism.

4. Coming to terms with the "coup-like beginnings" of the recent historical development, an heirloom which President Kim Young Sam had to accept, however reluctantly, because it was handed to him by his predecessor Roh Tae-woo. Kim however managed to successfully distance himself from his two predecessors by allowing them to be prosecuted for high treason and graft. The trials against Roh and Chun were certainly revolutionary events.
5. Overcoming unfair income distribution, particularly through revitalizing the huge small and medium enterprise sector and slimming the mammoth *chaebol* groups. President Kim does not have a choice but to gradually open up the domestic markets, since the country has now become a member in the illustrious club of OECD. Protectionistic politics are still very much at work, which is probably the single most disadvantageous or even disastrous "fallout" of following the Japanese model of development strategies.
6. Finally there the vast sector of the underground economy which estimated at about 35 trillion Won, which has to be cleared up. Finally one of the most difficult problems of Korean political culture as a whole has to be overcome: regionalism as a basis for the distribution of power within the institutional framework of the (South) Korean administration. A rapid unification would enormously add to the still lingering resentment between e.g. Cholla province and Kyongsang province: for the last 30 years South Korea was ruled by military man and/or political hailing mostly from the Kyongsang province of South Korea, a unified peninsula would greatly increase the weight of this region

(which have also in earlier centuries always dominated the rest of the country).

Riding a wave of generally favourable public opinion, President Kim Young Sam was able to challenge even the most formidable adversary: the military. Critics have accused Kim of making too much use of his popular drive against corruption and for political reforms as a whole, and they claim his actions lack a sound "philosophy" and therefore also lack an operational system. The strong traditional forces which used to block any efforts for democratization, like the military cliques, the bureaucrats and the huge conglomerates (*chaebol*), are still very much represented in the Kim Young Sam political and administrative setup.<sup>9)</sup>

### **Korean Unification: Only a Gradual Process Will Bring Success**

The Korean unification process had to suffer some very bad setbacks during 1993 and 1994. Only after the food situation in North Korea had become desperate, talks have begun again. Albeit under unfavourable conditions, the North is still rigid and inflexible when it comes to political moves to ease relations with South Korea both in the political and economic field. The reason for this inflexibility seems to be quite obvious: The North Korean leadership has also learned its lesson from the German unification process - if a socialist regime moves too close to a successful capitalist one, the result may well be destruction absorption. However one forecast may well be allowed: Both Koreas will find

---

9) Kim Chang-kuk, "Uprooting Corruption: A Vital Task," *Korea Focus*, vol. 5, no. 1, Jan./Feb. 1997, pp. 14~21

themselves in some sort of unified national "body" well within a ten-years-period, after all setbacks have been overcome:

- Kim Il Sung's nuclear poker play, which has been continued for some time by his son, has paid will for the North: The DPRK will get two light-water reactors, paid for by the KEDO (Korea Energy Development Organization), meanwhile the West will deliver 500.00 tons of crude oil per year to bridge the energy gap until both reactors start operation.
- Through negotiations with the US North Korea has been upgraded internationally, although the DPRK is still a sort of pariah state, and this makes the DPRK even more inflexible vis-a-vis South Korea.
- North Korea makes skilful use of a loss of South Korea's foreign policy decision making sovereignty, because the US have monopolized negotiations with North Korea during the past five to eight years.

Undoubtedly these advantages for North Korea have been outweighed by the recent disastrous developments in feeding the North Korean population. Presently the North is in a disadvantageous position and has to move away from ideologically fixed principles, i. e. the ideology of *juche*, or the idea of "self-propelled development." However looking back to 1993 and 1994 North Korea has made considerable points:

- As a result of the Geneva agreement the Kim Jong-il regime has been greatly stabilized, since the desperate shortage of electric power has led to a nearly complete breakdown of

production. However the stopgap measures to provide North Korea with energy have failed to keep up the food distribution system. Starvation in North Korea is at least partly result of the regime inability to deliver provisions from those regions which still produce grains to those areas which have suffered under the huge floodings during the past three years.

- Calculated brinkmanship has also lent fresh news value to the "Golden Triangle" concept (a rather unfortunate label) which the North Korean leadership has put forward as an indigenous model of a Special Economic Zone/Export Processing Zone where foreign companies might establish joint ventures to make use of cheap North Korean labour and natural resources. The Golden Triangle is to be built near the delta of Tumen River, using the ports of Rajin and Sonbong.
- Seen from the point of view of North Korean ideology, the idea of creating a Special Economic Zone leads to the high risk of being forced to open the country wider to the "evil influences" of anti-socialist ideas and "spiritual pollution." Even if the North Korean leadership might like to think that a special economic zone could be completely isolated against anti-regime ideas trickling out of the enclave and into the North Korean society, a point of no return will soon be reached, where the regime will no longer be able to control the clandestine influx of "subversive" ideas - namely capitalism and its lure..

It is to be noted that both North and South Korea have worked on some sort of commonwealth model of cooperating economically

(and to a certain degree also politically) during a transitory period of mutual "rapprochement." Up to 1993/94 there seemed to be no doubt that South Korea would be able to set the pace, because North Korea's economy went from bad to worse year after year. The nuclear gamble obviously turned the tables for some time, but due to the obvious failure in feeding its people the North Korean power elite has completely lost this advantage, and at the same time has confronted South Korea with a number of new and totally unexpected problems before and after unification:

1. For the time being South Korea will have to shoulder part of the burden to feed its Northern neighbor - without trying to link its help to political conditions from the North; the Pyongyang leadership seems quite prepared to make the people suffer, if only they don't have to admit that the *juche* ideology failed, the present situation of dire need in the North will not make the nomenclatura to give in.
2. At the start of managing the huge task of unification ranks prominently to orderly dissolve the organization of the Korea Worker's Party (KWP); to dissolve the lower echelons of the KWP will probably put to strip high-ranking functionaries and the military leadership off their privileges. Dissolution of Northern mass organizations alone does not form the biggest obstacle. The most difficult problem is to offer an framework to integrate KWP cadres and members into the organizational structure of participatory democracy, Southern style in a united Korea. Political parties in the South, as well as other politically active mass organizations, will have to face the task to absorb and "reeducate" former KWP members.

Only gradual process of unification will also make it possible to dissolve the armed forces of North Korea; a first step could be the use of Northern model of "working soldiers," i. e. to increase the number of units that do construction work and at the same time reduce the number of combat units. The North already has a vast number of working soldiers "who have been engaged in a lot of construction projects like the construction of the gigantic "Mayday Stadium" in Pyongyang or some huge dam project. A simple and quick dissolution of the North Korean people's army would create tremendous social problems, since the Korean labour market (even after unification) will be unable to absorb literally millions of suddenly jobless soldiers from the North.

Unification can only work after years and years of close economic cooperation between the two parts of a divided country; maybe this is another lesson from the German process of unification: Practically all German governments, both conservative and left wing, have skillfully used economic interaction to promote the case of good neighbourhood and to tear down obstacles which mostly the Eastern side had erected. To put it more cynical: The West paid cash for good relations, even to the degree to bail out political prisoners by paying ransom money (in fact this was a fixed amount in the GDR budget).

### **Unified Korea: A Challenge to Other Asian Countries?**

Another lesson from German experience: Unification can only work after years of close economic cooperation between the two parts of a divided country; all German governments since 1972 have tried to do instrumentalize economic interaction to further the

case of good neighbourhood and to tear down obstacles which mostly the socialist side had built. Even after unification it became obvious that the years of economic cooperation had not helped to create a competitive industrial structure in the GDR. Most companies were hopelessly outdated and even after rigorous streamlining would have never been able to compete internationally. Even though Western economists and businessmen did keep a close watch on the East German economy, they were fooled by GDR propaganda: The East German economy turned out to be much more run down than everybody expected. In fact, apart from some showpieces of Eastern industry, most plants had simply to be dismantled. Transfer costs were (and still are) enormous. In the case of North Korea however nobody can have the slightest doubt about the catastrophic industrial (or general economic) situation. Even if South Korea managed to reduce the costs of unification - unlike Germany - the financial burden will be so great that a unified Korea will rather turn into a competitor for those Asian countries which depend on cheap labour rather than challenge the other NIEs or even Japan. Even if South Korean conglomerates do invest in high-level industrial production, it will take at least five to ten years to make these productions internationally competitive. Again there are these problems: Lack of capital, a labour force that has been trained on different (widely obsolete) machineries, a lack of managerial personnel on the middle and lower level and a different work style. Of course, all these deficiencies can be overcome, however, that again will take time.

It is imaginable that - unlike Germany - South Korea will take drastic measures like limiting or even blocking free movement from the North to the South, invest in cheap labour production and

exploit the North's potential of manpower and natural resources. This would result in an "interior colonization process" which would lead to increased resentment in the North - and would after all postpone the necessity to pour money into the North. It is highly doubtful, whether South Korea would be able to raise the necessary transferable capital through increased taxes and additional levies; the tax raising potential of the South Korean government cannot compare with the German state - and even its levies (like the "Solidaritätszuschlag" or solidarity tax) have met increasing opposition from the general population in the West.

However after unification there can be no doubt that a unified Korea will quickly assert itself as one of the leading powers in Northeast Asia. The one common working factor or rather an emotional platform between North and South is a deep rooted aversion against Japan. The government of a unified Korea would certainly be able to instrumentalize this aversion into some slogan like "let's work hard together to beat the Japanese!" and galvanize both parts of the population into a united force of competition.

The archenemy Japan is not the only common denominator of Korea's traditional heritage: During a unification process both Koreas could well make use of an uninterrupted cultural history, of which all Koreans are fiercely proud. Although North Korea has stopped to use Chinese characters in its publications, the *hangul*-writing system is common to both Koreas. Maybe the North can fall back on an elite which was Chinese-trained, while the South is already working on reducing the use of Sino-Korean characters. "Confucian" values are still very much revered in both South and North Korea (cf. The fact that Kim Jong-il carefully observed the traditional periods of mourning for his father). A new

nationalism will help the two Koreas to move closer together and add the anti-Japanese feelings and good deal of general xenophobia, and you have a common base for a "unified nationalism."

At the moment the South Korean government will have to go out of its way to help to stabilize the domestic situation in the North and aid the North's leadership in feeding its people. A sudden collapse of the North Korean system would lead to a development which would compare to the German experience: The South would have to completely finance both a run-down system and the unification - which would certainly be much more than the South could shoulder. Peaceful coexistence and the medium-term goal of creating a "commonwealth" between the two Koreas is the only way to a smooth unification process - beware the German example..

## □ 국문요약

**독일의 통일경험과 한국의 전략에 대한 함의**

독일통일은 이미 오래전의 서독의 동방정책에서 비롯된 것이며 이는 남한의 북방정책에도 반영되었다. 한국이 서독으로부터 배워야 하는 유일한 교훈은 동독과의 관계개선을 위해 꾸준히 노력한 서독의 인내이다. 한반도의 통일도 점진적인 것이 가장 바람직하겠지만 이것은 결코 쉽게 달성될 수 있는 것이 아니다. 왜냐하면 독일의 경우가 극명하게 보여주듯이 통일은 자기역동성을 갖고 전개되었으며, 그 과정은 통제될 수 없었기 때문이다.

국제기구들, 미국과 유럽을 비롯한 세계각국들은 한반도의 통일노력을 지지해왔다. 북한의 경우도, 핵문제에 대한 무책임한 태도를 제외한다면, 그들이 주장하는 바대로 통일을 위한 점진적 모델을 따르려고 노력하고 있는 듯이 보인다. 여러가지 어려움에도 불구하고 남북한 정부는 대화의 채널을 가지려고 노력해왔고 현재 북한의 심각한 식량난은 오히려 대화를 촉진할 수 있는 기회가 될 수 있다.

독일의 경우도 그랬지만 점진적 통일의 핵심은 기업의 활동이다. 기업인들은 훨씬 더 용이하게 공동의 이익을 논의할 수 있으며 그로 인해 대화의 채널을 열고 긴장완화에 기여할 수 있게 된다.

독일통일모델은 '흡수모델'로서 독일의 독특한 역사적 상황에 기인한다. 동독은 결코 하나의 주권국가라고 할 수 없었음을 상기할 필요가 있다. 소련은 언제든 동독의 정치적 문제를 결정할 수가 있었으며, 통일은 소련이 간섭하지 않기로 결정하면서 진행될 수 있었다. 북한의 경우, 설사 중국의 존재가 있다하더라도 그러한 관계는 아니다. 독일통일은 보다 부강하고 보다 성공한 한쪽이 다른 한쪽을 흡수한 것이다. 즉 독일통일은 순전히 서독이 그 비용을 부담하기로 하면서 이루어진 것이고, 그 비용은 앞으로도 긴 기간을 통해 지불되어야 할

것이다.

한민족은 남북한의 문화적, 역사적, 민족적 공통유산으로 인해 독일 민족보다 훨씬 더 유리한 출발점을 갖고 있다. 독일은 19세기말이나 되어서야 프러시아 통치아래 있었던 봉건국가들이 마지못해 통일함으로써 하나의 단일민족국가로 되었지만 한반도는 이미 수세기전에 단일민족을 형성해왔다. 또한 남북한이 공통적으로 갖고 있는 것 중 주목할 만한 것으로 반일감정이 있다. 남북한은 이것을 이용하여 그동안 형성된 상호적대감과 이질감을 극복할 수 있을 것이다.

독일통일이 주는 또 하나의 교훈은, 오랜 기간에 걸친 경제협력이 후에야만 통일이 이루어질 수 있다고 하는 것이다. 동서독은 경제협력을 통해서 좋은 이웃관계를 유지해왔고 서독은 이를 통해서 동독측에서 계속 만들어내는 장애요소를 무너뜨릴 수 있었다. 냉소적으로 표현하자면 서독은 돈을 주고 좋은 관계를 산 것이다.

통일비용과 관련하여, 남한이 아무리 그 비용을 줄이려고 노력한다 하더라도 그 재정적 부담은 클 것이다. 그 결과 통일한국은 다른 아시아국가들에게 도전세력이 되기보다는 값싼 노동력에 의존함으로써 다른 국가들과 경쟁을 해야 하는 나라가 될 것이다. 남한의 기업들이 투자한다 하더라도 최소한 5년내지 10년은 지나야 국제적으로 경쟁력을 갖추게 될 것이다.

지금 가장 시급하게 남한정부가 해야 할 일은 북한의 국내안정과 기아난 해결을 위해 북한지도부를 돕는 것이다. 독일의 경험을 통해 배울 수 있는 것은 북한의 급작스런 붕괴를 막아야만 한다는 것이다. 만일 그렇게 된다면 남한은 체제붕괴와 통일로 인한 비용을 모두 부담하여야 한다. 평화공존과 점진적, 단계적 통일만이 순탄한 통일과정의 유일한 방법이다. 즉 독일식 통일은 피해야만 한다.

## II

---

# Future Inter-Korean Cooperation from a New Vantage Point

---

Geir Helgesen

(Research Associate, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies)

Distrust is probably the strongest feeling characterizing the relations between people in the Northern and Southern part of the Korean peninsula. Fear is another feeling that comes to mind thinking about this relationship, and possibly suspicion, and anger. Negative feelings are plentiful – and understandable – but totally counterproductive from the perspective of peaceful coexistence and ultimately national unification.

No matter what the actual political and economical situation now and in the near future is, even to the point of a total collapse in North Korea and a necessary take-over by the South, the prevailing negative mood of distrust and anger may in practice block otherwise positive developments from being realized. Since the ultimate test of the quality of policy decisions is their successful practical realization, one cannot deal with the division of the country without considering the impact of the mood of the people. The way people relate to each other and understand each other's motives and actions are closely linked to their expectations. It is no secret that promotion of enmity towards the bad brothers

and sisters in the opposite camp has been a part of official policies for both regimes, at least until very recently. Undoubtedly this is colouring people's expectations. The promotion of enmity, however, has had another effect as well.

Let me convey a story that I heard some few years ago here in Seoul. The person who told me the story was a distinguished professor and not in any way some sort of dissident, I remember him as a supporter of the government party at that time. The incident that he described happened back in the sixties, when he was young and serving in the military forces. He was stationed in the area close to the demarcation line. One afternoon, his first day on field duty, he was placed with a pair of binoculars on a hill with good view into enemy lands. He searched the landscape and saw a group of farmers there. This was the first time he saw North Korean people in North Korea.

"I was expecting something else," he told me, "I had no clear idea of what it was, but at least I had not expected those people to look exactly as we did. I remember this as a kind of shock," he said, and continued, "but a little later I got my second shock: how could I believe that people in the North should look any different than us?"

This professor was not a Kim Il Sung supporter, not in his youth and certainly not later. But the story he told me reflected a feeling of having been deceived. He wondered: "was it necessary to make fools of us?" Recalling the past, he said: "when we found that we had been easy targets for some kind of stupid propaganda, we lost a little bit of our self-respect."

It is self-evident that the propaganda was a double edged sword. It is hard to tell where it did most harm. When one is

dealing with propaganda and its results, it is relevant to know an observer's position. What I try to say here is linked to my experience as a Scandinavian Korea observer, and thus to my work and experiences during the last 15 years. It is in many respects a highly subjective project, so I find it relevant to share some of my personal experiences with you. Please excuse the following divergence in my presentation, I will soon be back on a more impersonal track.

Before I went to North Korea for the first time in 1984, the place was to me a fascinating and obviously very different communist country. It had several points where it reminded people from the West of China, and as you know, China was at that time a kind of ideal system in the eyes of young leftists. Who would not support a country with happily singing peasants in the rice fields, making harvest work look like scenes from the Peking opera. Young, idealistic radicalism is probably a universal trait. As a professor who also was a member of your Parliament told me several years ago: "If you have not been a communist in your youth, you're probably an idiot. If you keep your communist sympathies, you're an idiot as well." He used strong words, and I don't necessarily agree totally with his opinion. I would rather say that, even though we all change and become more conservative as we grow older, we should not totally forget our idealistic past.

Well, I visited North Korea for the first time in 1984. To some extent the exotic part of it remained exotic to me. I came through Soviet Union, with a couple of days in Moscow, and a few hours at the airports in Novo Sibirsk and then again in Irkutsk. How dull they were, the Soviet custom officers and policemen! Not a smile nor a kind word. I saw uniforms but not the people behind

them. In Pyongyang it was different. The people I met - with or without uniforms - were people! Of course it was difficult to communicate, but I felt a positive mood. No arrogance and less bureaucracy, at least compared to the Soviet Union. During later visits the exotic aspect of North Korea lost some of its attraction, while the authoritarian and bureaucratic aspects of the communist model became more clear.

I wrote about these experiences in my country's newspapers: both the positive and the negative aspects that I had seen in the North. I knew very well, that although I had seen much, I had far from seen it all. I had been taken to places where most Westerners never came. But still, I had only seen fragments and could thus only present fragmented views. The diplomats at the North Korean Embassy in Copenhagen were not at all satisfied with my contributions. After all, they thought I should repay the good treatment I had received in the North. I understand the expectations of the North Korean diplomats, and many South Korean diplomats would probably think the same way. However, as a person on his way into an academic career it was impossible for me to write the nice stories that the North Koreans felt I owed them. It was, as I saw it, moreover totally counterproductive to keep on writing fantasy stories from the North Korean paradise that nobody believed in. So I insisted on doing it my way.

My more balanced reports from the north of 38th parallel caught the attention of the South Korean embassy in Copenhagen. This was in the mid-1980s, and even though I was perceived as a little biased in the favour of the northern regime, your people at the embassy in my country thought it worthwhile approaching me. As they told me later on in our relationship: "your stories were not as

bad as the ones most of the people sympathetic to the North wrote in those days." So, I was invited to South Korea late in 1988. Or, as the diplomat active in this arrangement phrased it: "we grabbed you over to our side."

It was in South Korea that I began to understand a little about Korea. Before I came here I had seen Korea as two totally different entities. I saw Korea through ideological glasses, as representing two opposing political and economical systems. I saw Korea as many - if not most - people in the West saw it: the way we had learned to understand the world during the Cold War era. No matter which side one took, the perception was that the artificial demarcation line constituted a division between two totally different and opposing entities. That was a grave simplification. Despite years of mutual hostility, despite ideologically guided political socialization, despite lack of normal relations, despite links to totally different international systems, and yes, despite everything else there is to say about the effects of the division, what I felt during my first stay in South Korea was that there seemed to be more uniting Korea than keeping it apart.

I was not the most experienced observer, but I had the advantage of being able to compare my impressions from the South with those I already had from the North. Suddenly I realized that some aspects of the North Korean system that astonished a Westerner, aspects that he automatically linked with the political system in Pyongyang, could be found in South Korea as well. Not because the South had a similar political system, but because both systems operated - and still do operate - within a very similar cultural context. This is nothing new, but it should be mentioned more often.

It should be mentioned more often as a tribute to the development of a common identity. Let me give just one example of a common trait within the political field. When talking about the cult of leadership, North Korea stands out in the world as number one. Nothing can compete with the exaggerations we have seen from the propaganda industry in Pyongyang. Both the borders of sensible politics and the borders of common sense were greatly exceeded. The presentations of the great leader were way out in the area where extreme religious cults usually operate. I could not point at any South Korean political leader and say, it was the same thing with him. That would not be fair. If we go back just a bit in the recent history of South Korea, however, we can find something similar, although in a much more downplayed version.

One of my younger friends here in Seoul was in middle school when the late President Park was shot. The pupils were told about this incident over the loudspeaker in the classroom. He told me about it one day when we talked about the past. "What was the reaction," I wondered, "what did you think," I added. And he said: "At first it was total silence. Everybody just looked down on their desk. Then the teacher dried his eyes, still without a sound. But soon the classroom was filled with the sounds of over forty kids sobbing. But what did you think about, in this situation?" I asked. "Well," my friend said, "it is not very clear any more, but I think we were afraid. We had learned that the president looked after us. We were afraid that the North Koreans would use this opportunity to attack us. But most of all I thought, 'who is going to look after us from now on?'"

This was what a young man remembered of October 26, 1979. Ten years later he told this story to me, and now, almost ten

years later again I share the story with you. It is not important whether this is exactly what the young boy felt, or if it is an elaborated version. I would think that most of you have some kind of similar experience in your life. It would not be very hard to come up with other examples somewhat similar to this. I bring this up to illustrate the point I try to argue here, which is that certain aspects of Korea's political culture are shared by North and South of the 38th parallel.

I am not claiming that it is exactly the same on both sides of the demarcation line. I am not blind to the fundamental differences between the two systems. My purpose in pointing at similarities is not to disregard the impressive achievements of South Korea's democratization. My aim is to emphasize a certain aspect that has been largely neglected because of the hostile relationship between the two parts of the Korean peninsula. In the midst of this system it is impossible to relate to it as an historic phenomenon. But that is what it is: a phenomenon belonging to the past, to a certain period that had its heyday between 1950 and 1990, forty years of the post-war period.

In his book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Huntington says: "With the collapse of communism, culture replaced ideology as the magnet of attraction and repulsion." (p.138) Is there in this sentence a clue explaining the prolonged Cold-War climate here on the Korean peninsula? I would say yes. From a rational and practical point of view, North Korea's communism have collapsed, since it is unable to provide for its own population. From their own ideological point of view they have more than collapsed, since they have totally failed to realize *juche*, the highly celebrated self-reliance strategy of Kim Il

Sung. And since world-communism has collapsed all around, the few remaining fortresses of this political ideology can be regarded as nothing but open-air museums for the rest of the global community. Why then do they still command power, the Worker's Party bosses in Pyongyang? Because they deliberately and with tangible success have utilized traits of the traditional culture in their political and ideological projects. Therefore, the North Korean form of communism has not yet collapsed. I don't know whether you can, but I cannot predict the fate of the North Korean system. When Kim Il Sung died almost four years ago, the outside world expected the immediate breakdown of the system. Then it was given a couple of months, and at most a year. But even if everything else has broken down up North, the system seems to prevail.

If I am right in stressing the impact of the political culture, what is then the impact of this viewpoint? What is the constructive, creative and progressively directed impact of this claim? Related to what I discussed above, I would say that an acceptance of those common aspects which can be found to operate in contemporary politics on both sides of the demarcation line could be a basis for the needed new vantage point for future cooperation between the two halves of Korea. When the soldier whose story I shared with you before looked into North Korea, he began to question his vantage point. The reason was that he felt a discrepancy between what he saw and what he had learned and thus expected to see.

I think that there is a divide in Korea that at first glance has nothing to do with the division of the country. Not directly, at least. But this divide should be explored a little more, because it

holds the possible seed of a new and sounder platform for inter-Korean relations. A precondition for this exploration is an honest and critical stance towards the present political situation, and a correct assessment of the recent past freed from ideological loyalties.

If one attempts to take an objective position, one must admit that Northern communism was twisted to conform to the Korean way. Marx and Lenin was placed in the shadow of Kim Il Sung. From a Western marxist perspective this was more than a simple national reinterpretation of the ideology, it was a total transformation.

The observer of South Korea who attempts objectivity will likewise have to admit that it was only after 1987 that democracy became more than a formal figurehead for changing regimes. If the North Korean regime can be termed totalitarian, it is justifiable to term South Korean governments before 1987 as authoritarian. Then, after 1987, a democratic transition was carried through. This transitional period is now over. Do you now have a universal democracy in South Korea? Is there such a thing as a universal democracy?

I doubt it, but I know that that depends very much upon how politics are perceived. If politics solely concern decisionmaking processes and the institutions wherein these processes take place, then these institutions (for example, political parties, a parliament, a free press) can in and of themselves constitute a universally relevant pattern. It may seem that democracy is ensured when party pluralism, elections, a parliament of political representatives, a comparatively free press, and generally accepted rules to govern the political process are present. However, as soon as the

disturbing element of human social relationships enters the scene, the universal pattern no longer holds. So, how should we relate to politics?

This is a highly culturally sensitive question. In 1985, Lucian Pye wrote in his *Asian Power and Politics* that: "Throughout Asia today the drama of politics is being played out by leaders and followers whose roles are largely prescribed by culturally determined concepts about the nature of power." (p. vii) I have indicated above, that these culturally determined perceptions of power in North and South Korea have much in common. What they have in common is derived from a political tradition, based first and foremost although not exclusively on a Confucian political philosophy. This relationship may be very difficult to see and even more difficult to accept. It is, however, a future-oriented idea that deserves further investigation. It is moreover a future-oriented idea that has a strong historical foundation.

Even though North and South Korea belonged to opposite poles in the Cold War period, it is commonplace to state that the Korean peninsula is located in the heart of East Asia. From history books we know quite a lot about the traditional Korean society and about politics and how it was conducted in earlier times. We know that Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism played a major role as the state ideology in Korea for more than 500 years. We know that learned people in China once described Korea as the land of decorum and etiquette. By this they meant that it was a true Confucian country. From some of the very first Westerners to step on Korean soil, for instance the Dutch sailor Henrik Hamel, we know that this Chinese description is close to what these European people observed, even though they did not know what to call it.

Furthermore we know from works dealing with Korean culture in the post-war period that traditions die hard. Yang and Henderson described Korea as more Confucian than China. Cornelius Osgood, who had his major field experience in China, found that in Korea the Confucian social morality was more widespread and deepseated than he ever had experienced it before.

But then, throughout the years of modernization and economic growth, people dealing with both theoretical and practical politics have talked of the necessity of uprooting tradition. In the process of modernization, and during the last ten years of democratization, the Confucian inspired political tradition has been seen as a hindrance, something that had to be overcome to reach a true, modern, democratic state of affairs. This too tells us that Confucianism was - and still is - a very strong tradition in Korea.

But should it be uprooted? Is it necessarily a negative social force in the country's modernization process? Why can it not be seen as a productive platform for democratization? And, for reunification? I would say that the authorities in modern South Korea seem to have divided minds concerning the positive and negative impacts of tradition, including that part of it we call the political culture. While these traditionally derived values and norms are portrayed as a hindrance to democracy, they are still taught in the school system under the heading Moral Education. This subject provides a general pattern for good, socially accepted behavior, and it is rightly considered a very important subject in the curriculum. It would be an exaggeration to state that this is purely Confucianism, but it would also be a grave understatement to claim that Moral Education stands independent of Confucianism. I would say that the subject strongly reflects ideals rooted in

Confucianism. It may not be traditional Confucianism, or the traditional Neo-Confucianism, but a modernized version, a Neo-Neo-Confucianism. The educational authorities sanction this teaching, and at the same time they include instruction in Western democracy in the curriculum. Both subjects are undoubtedly important. The problem is that these subjects are dealt with independently, as if they had nothing in common, as if they dealt with two matters totally independent of each other. But that is hardly the case.

Anybody observing the political process and especially the political actors in different cultures can point at significant differences. Within cultures differences seldom go beyond what is generally regarded as reasonable. Between cultures differences often cross this border.

To illustrate the link between culture and politics Sidney Verba, one of the founding fathers of the political culture perspective, said that commitment to ideology can be shared throughout a country, but the ideologies to which individuals or groups are committed may vary. (1965, p. 526) This description fits Korea very well. If we then return to the recent statement by Samuel Huntington, claiming that culture now has replaced ideology as the magnet of attraction and repulsion, we can begin to outline a new point of departure in inter-Korean relation.

In his work *Trust* from 1995, Francis Fukuyama states that people around the world have become much more aware of differences between what used to be seen as parts of the same system. He mentions Japan, once seen as a part of the free world, now increasingly seen as a country that "practices both democracy and capitalism according to a different set of cultural norms than

does the United States." (p. 5) The impact of this perspective in the case of Korea is, that we have to see the North as a system that practiced communism according to different sets of cultural norms than did the Soviet Union. And in the case of South Korea I would say that both capitalism and democracy have been - and still are - practiced in different ways compared to what we see in Western countries. This is obviously because Korea has its own culture, different from the Western both in its Russian and its American version.

Why have people become more aware of differences? One answer is that we are much more exposed to differences because of the revolution in communication and media, and because we travel more and over longer distances than our parents did. But contrary to widespread expectations, the so-called globalization process does not immediately produce the global man. It might, on the contrary, promote a stronger regional awareness. This should not surprise social scientists. Referring to Durkheim the aforementioned Fukuyama points to the necessity of norms and rules that bind people together (p. 6). Deprived of such bonding, people may feel socially alienated and develop anti-social ideas and habits.

In the words of Fukuyama, "The ability to associate depends on the degree to which communities share norms and values and are able to subordinate individual interests to those of larger groups." (p. 10) His message is that shared values and norms are necessary for the development of trust, and that trust is what makes a society possible. Conversely, distrust is what makes it impossible. Distrust and division go together very well. Unification presupposes a process by which distrust is transformed into trust. If the ability to associate depends on whether the people concerned share norms

and values, then the divided Korea is in a favorable position. As one of the most homogeneous countries in the world, the Korean people must certainly have this ability to associate.

The question is, does the long common history overshadow the comparatively brief period of division, or is it the other way around? In daily politics, the aspects that divide land and people in Korea are the most visible and talked about aspects. There is little doubt of that. The question is, how to reverse this. Let me suggest a few aspects that must be dealt with in this case.

- A first step towards more trust may be for the parties involved to admit that they have made mistakes during the years of mutual enmity.
- A second step would then be to dismiss ideological confrontations, aiming at mutual political amnesty.
- A third step would be that both parties make an effort to detect and acknowledge similarities, similarities in basic values and norms important for organizing and maintaining a good society.
- A fourth step would be to redirect the policy of globalization, which has to be continued as a consequence of the new world order. Instead of trying to uproot tradition, however, this redirected globalization would be one rooted in Korean mental patterns, in a "third wave" Confucianism.

## References

- Fukuyama, Francis, 1995, *Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, New York: The Free Press
- Helgesen, Geir, 1998, *Democracy and Authority in Korea. The Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics*, London: Curzon Press, and New York: St. Martins Press
- Huntington, Samuel P., 1996, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster
- Osgood, Cornelius, 1951, *The Koreans and Their Culture*, New York: The Ronald Press Company
- Pye, Lucian W., 1985, *Asian Power and Politics. The Cultural Dimension of Authority*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
- Yang, Key P. and Gregory Henderson, 1958, "An Outline History of Korean Confucianism," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 17. and Vol. 2. No. 18

## □ 국문요약

### 새로운 시각에서 본 남북협력의 미래

남북한 국민들이 서로에 대해 느끼고 있는 불신, 공포는 평화적 공존, 더 나아가 민족통일의 관점에서 보면 매우 부정적인 요인이라고 할 수 있다. 이같은 상호 적대감은 사실상 최근까지도 양쪽 체제 모두의 공식적 정책의 일부였다고 할 수 있다. 이러한 적대감은 앞으로 많은 부작용을 가져올 것이다.

필자는 그동안 남북한을 모두 방문한 바 있으며, 그 결과로 내린 결론은, 긴 기간동안 형성되어온 상호 적대감, 서로 다른 이념에 기초한 정치사회화 등 모든 것이 다름에도 불구하고 남북한에는 공통점이 존재한다고 하는 사실이다. 즉 서구인의 눈으로 볼 때, 북한 방문시 색다르게 느낀 점을 남한에서도 똑같이 느끼게 된다. 그 이유는 남북한이 각기 서로 다른 정치체제를 갖고 있음에도 불구하고, 양체제는 모두 비슷한 문화적 맥락하에서 작동되고 있기 때문이라고 여겨진다.

지도자에 대한 이상화는 전세계적으로 북한이 가장 두드러진다. 그러나 남한도 과거에 비슷한 경험을 갖고 있다. 즉 박정희 전대통령에 대한 국민적 감정은 김일성에 대한 북한인민의 감정과 흡사했다고 볼 수 있다.

필자의 목적은 남북한간의 상호적대적인 관계로 인해 그동안 무시되어 왔던 한 측면을 강조하려고 하는 것이다.

헌팅턴은 공산주의의 붕괴와 더불어 강제와 유인의 도구로서 문화가 이념을 대체하게 될 것이라고 예측하였다. 한반도의 상황은 이같은 예측에 적절한 예가 되고 있다. 북한의 공산주의는 이념적인 의미에서나 실질적인 의미에서 이미 붕괴되었다. 그럼에도 불구하고 북한 지도부가 아직도 북한사회를 지배하고 있는 이유는 그들의 정치 및 이념에 전통문화를 활용하고 있기 때문이다.

분계선을 사이에 둔 양체제의 정치원리가 되고 있는 이러한 공통점을 인정하는 것은 남북협력의 미래를 새로운 시각에서 보기 위한 기초가 될 수 있다.

북한 공산주의는, 서구 맑시스트적 시각에서 볼 때 맑스레닌주의의 민족적 재해석이라기보다는 완전한 변형이다. 남한의 경우, 1987년 이후에서야 비로소 민주주의가 형식적인 것 이상의 의미를 갖게 되었다. 만일 북한체제가 전체주의라고 불릴 수 있다면 남한의 정부는 1987년 이전까지는 권위주의였다고 할 수 있다. 남북한은 유교적 정치철학에 기초한 정치적 전통을 공통적으로 갖고 있으며, 이것은 미래지향적인 시각을 갖고 본다면 탐구의 가치가 있다.

유교는 500년 동안 한반도를 지배해 온 국가 이념이다. 오늘날 근대화와 경제성장을 이룩하면서 한국인들은 정치의 이론과 실제에 있어서 전통적 요소를 버려야한다고 주장해왔다. 즉 유교는 근대적이고 민주적인 국가를 이룩하는데 장애가 되는 정치적 전통으로 인식되고 있다. 그러나 이러한 인식 역시 유교가 아직도 한국의 강한 전통이라고 하는 것을 역설적으로 보여주는 것이다. 유교에 대해서 한국인들은 이중적인 태도를 보이고 있다. 즉 유교적 전통이 민주주의를 저해한다고 보면서도 학교에서는 도덕시간을 통해 중요하게 가르쳐지고 있다.

그럼에도 불구하고 남북한을 포함하여 현대인들이 공통점보다는 차이점을 더욱 민감하게 느끼고 있는 이유는 무엇인가? 그것은 통신 및 미디어의 혁명적 발달로 차이점들을 보다 잘 인식하게 되어진 때문이고, 또한 세계화는 그 초기단계에서 세계인을 만들어내기 보다는 강한 지역주의를 만들어냈기 때문이다. 그러므로 현대사회로 올수록 사람들을 하나로 묶을 규범과 규칙의 필요성이 절실해지며, 유대감의 부족으로 사람들은 사회적으로 소외감을 느끼고 반사회적 사고와 습관을 갖게 된다.

후쿠야마에 의하면 연대능력은 공동체가 규범과 가치를 공유하고 개인의 이익을 공동체 이익에 종속시킬 수 있는 정도에 의존한다. 즉

신뢰형성을 위해서는 가치와 규범을 공유해야 하며 신뢰는 한 사회를 형성할 수 있게 한다. 즉 통일은 불신을 신뢰로 바꾸는 과정을 전제로 한다. 그렇다면 한반도는 공통된 문화를 갖고 있으므로 이 점에서 유리한 입장에 있다고 하겠다.

문제는 오래된 동질성의 역사가 짧은 분단의 역사를 과연 극복할 수 있는가 하는 점이다. 그 극복을 위해 다음과 같은 것을 제안하고자 한다. 첫째, 남북한 양측은 상호적대기간 동안에 있었던 서로의 잘못을 인정한다. 둘째, 상호 정치적 사면과 더불어 이념적 대치상태에서 벗어난다. 셋째, 남북한은 하나의 건전한 사회를 조직하고 유지하는 데에 중요한 기본적 가치와 규범에 대한 동질성을 발견하고 그것을 인정하도록 노력한다. 넷째, 새로운 세계질서에서 세계화의 방향을 재조정하며, 전통을 버리기보다는 새로운 세계화가 한국적 사고방식, 즉 '제3의 유교 물결(third wave Confucianism)'에 자리잡게 한다.

### III

---

## Seeking a Proper Role of Government for Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation

---

Seung-Yul Oh  
(Research Fellow, KINU)

#### Introduction

North Korea, lately, is facing a marginal situation because of the unprecedentedly serious shortage of food and low operation of industry. To solve these problems, it is showing some policy change, one of whose example is the formation of the Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone. But the country is not likely to overcome the current economic difficulties with the limited policy change within the system because of the structural problems of a socialist planned economy. It is also likely to face a continuous increase in the cost for maintaining the system due to the economic difficulties and an increasing anti-revolutionary behaviors of its residents.

Even if the North begins reforms of the system, it is much likely to experience negative macroeconomic effects because of the industrial imbalances, backwardness of distribution networks of goods and production factors and lack of necessary legal system.

Because of the low elasticity of supply in adapting to market changes of the North Korean economy, which stemmed from the problems of its corpulent military industry, limited mobility of production factors, the monopolistic enterprise system and shortage of materials in all sectors, the country is likely to experience a serious inflation during the course of reforms. Also due to such factors as its limited capability of trade and repaying its foreign debts, North Korea is not likely to achieve balanced maintenance of current account or succeed in making its currency convertible even if it attempts a drastic devaluation of its currency in the initial stage of reform. Therefore, it is unlikely that North Korea realizes comparative advantages internationally for the time being.

Because of this weakness in its economy, North Korea does not seem to resolve instability and conflicts stemming from the economic reforms and maintain market-oriented reform policy by itself. North Korean economy lacks institutional environments which enable it to absorb the economic shocks that may appear in the course of reforms. In particular, it may find it difficult to mobilize necessary resources to minimize the macroeconomic side effects. If its efforts to change the system would take more time than expected and if the macroeconomic imbalance would continue, the North Korean system would experience a serious political confusion, which would become a threat to maintenance of stability on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea seems to judge that it can overcome the economic difficulties through improving relations with the United States or Japan. But unless the country successfully implements the policy to change its system and succeeds in forming stable environments for foreign investment, improvement in relations with Western

countries is not likely to bring economic benefits to North Koreans. Even if the United States relieves its economic sanctions against North Korea, the activities of US firms in North Korea would remain in a small, limited area for some time. From this point of view, we can say inter-Korean economic cooperation is indispensable for smooth reforms in North Korea. Examining the current status of inter-Korean economic cooperation, we can say that the most important barrier to deepening inter-Korean exchange and cooperation programs is the North Korean suspicion and hostility against the possible South Korean intention to absorb North Korea for reunification. Therefore, it is more desirable for the South to make an active approach toward North Korea to help the country learn the necessity of reform and openness by itself in the course of expanding and deepening economic relations with it rather than to adopt such a passive approach like direct control of inter-Korean trade.

In this context, I would say that the goals of inter-Korean economic cooperation programs should be different in each step of inter-Korean relations. The first-step goal should be expansion of *direct and indirect inter-Korean trade*. The South, as the next step, can invest and support programs in the areas where North Korea wants southern investment. The third-step goal should be the pursuit of joint projects based on inter-Korean agreement. The final goal may be the formation of a joint economic community of North and South Korea through guaranteeing free movement of production factors between the two Koreas. At the same time, the South should exert efforts to institutionalize exchange and cooperation necessary in each step. I think the linkage of economic and political issues need to be avoided in the course. I believe it is

desirable for the South to separate economic issues from political concerns. To achieve the ultimate political and military goal of maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula, I think the policy of separating economic issues from politics can be more effective.

At this stage, inter-Korean economic relations are decided by the interactions of the economic activities in the private sector and the government's political control. The Southern government policy on inter-Korean economic exchange has the dual characteristics of regulation and support. But in the debate of inter-Korean economic relations, the theoretical examination of the roles of the government and the private sector and the efficiency and efforts of the government policy has not been satisfactory. Compared to its importance, the discussions on ways to improve government policy have not been made enough.

This paper is aimed at presenting the desirable roles of the government and the private enterprises in expanding inter-Korean economic exchange and cooperation through analyzing and examining the efficiency and effects of the government measures concerning inter-Korean relations. The next part of the paper will delve into the current status and features of inter-Korean economic exchange, mainly the export and import of goods. It will then attempt a theoretical analysis of the efficiency of the measures and induce a conclusion.

### **Current Status and Features of Inter-Korean Economic Exchange**

Inter-Korean economic relations have developed since the southern government put into force a "guideline on inter-Korean trade" in October, 1988 and the "South-North Interchange and

Cooperation Act" in August, 1990. The economic exchange has been made mainly in the form of indirect trade through mediation of a third country or overseas branches of the South Korean firms. But direct trade is also partly made and the trade in the form of processing on commission is also increasing. Although it was a project in the rudimentary stage, the National Industrial General Company, set up jointly by Daewoo Business Group in the South and the Korea Samcholli General Company in the North in Nampo, which is the first joint venture between the two Koreas, started operation in the summer of 1996. The South's aid to North Korea to help it relieve shortage of food also forms part of inter-Korean economic relations.

Inter-Korean trade amounted to \$1,557,275,000 from January 1989 to December 1997 based on the amount of goods cleared customs procedures in the South. In the same period, the South's import reached \$1,258,879,000 while its export was worth \$298,396,000. In 1997 alone two Koreas exchanged trade worth \$308,340,000, which made the South the third largest trading partner of the North, following China and Japan. But North Korea has not given official recognition to inter-Korean trade. South Korea has also failed to actively seek inter-Korean economic exchanges and cooperation due to the aggravating inter-Korean relations following the continuous policy of the North to estrange the South and its military provocations.

The South-North Interchange and Cooperation Act in the South has made possible the inter-Korean economic exchanges in a wide-ranging area including trade, joint economic projects and investment. But in fact, inter-Korean economic exchanges remain limited to the direct and indirect trade and trade on a processing

on commission basis except the experimental project in Nampo. The trade defined in the South-North Interchange and Cooperation Act refers to export and import of goods between North and South Korea. Export and import mean any transfer of goods between the two Koreas deriving from buying and selling, exchanges, lease, loan of use and donations.<sup>1)</sup> Trade in this sense not only includes simple carrying-in and carrying-out of goods but also other forms of trade like linked trade and trade based on processing on commission. Linked trade refers to trade linking the export and import and includes bartering, compensation trade and corresponding purchase. Trade based on processing on commission mainly stands for the activities of the Southern businessmen sending the entire or part of the materials necessary for goods production to North Korea and processing them there to produce goods after paying the necessary cost, and importing the goods into the country.<sup>2)</sup>

Table 1 shows the trend of inter-Korean trade from January 1989 to December 1997 (based on the amount of goods customs cleared). The amount of trade has continuously increasing since 1991 right after the legislation of the South-North Interchange and Cooperation Act in 1990, except in 1996. The exception was due to the decrease in North Korea's steel export following the severe food shortage in 1995. What is noticeable is that inter-Korean

---

1) Including the goods imported and exported by way of a third country. Ministry of Unification, "Practical Guides on Inter-Korean Economic Exchange" (in Korean), 1992, p. 19.

2) We can think about the case where the South imports raw materials and exports the processed goods to North Korea to earn wages. But when the economic conditions of the two Koreas are taken into consideration, this type of trade must be unusual.

trade increased almost by 8 percent in 1993 despite the political tension on the Korean peninsula deriving from the conflict on the North Korean nuclear issue. In 1994, as the North Korean economic difficulties were deepening, import from North Korea decreased but export more than doubled. The increase was attributed to the growing export of industrial parts and components to North Korea because of a raise in processing-on-commission trade.

**Table 1. Trends of Inter-Korean Trade**

(Based on the Customs Cleared Amount)

(Unit: \$1,000)

Year	Import		Export		Total Amount
	Items	Amount	Items	Amount	
1989	24	18,655	1	69	18,274
1990	21	12,278	3	1,187	13,465
1991	50	105,722	17	5,547	111,269
1992	81	162,863	24	10,563	173,426
1993	77	178,166	21	8,425	186,591
1994	83	176,298	42	18,248	194,546
1995	99	222,855	90	64,435	287,290
1996	125	182,399	102	69,638	252,037
1997	145	193,069	129	115,269	308,338

Source: The Bureau of Interchange and Cooperation, Ministry of Unification, "Monthly Trends in South-North Interchange and Cooperation" (in Korean), No. 78.

The bilateral trade in 1997 exceeded \$300 million, an increase of 23 percent over the previous year. But this figure included private and governmental aid to North Korea, export of raw materials necessary for construction of light-water nuclear reactors and supply of heavy oil from the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). If these are excluded, the bilateral trade increased by 4.6 percent over 1996. The reduction in bilateral trade in 1996 and the stagnancy in 1997 was partly due to the reduced export capability of North Korea for its economic difficulties. The other factors which affected the phenomenon might be that further expansion of inter-Korean economic exchanges had become difficult because of the delay in institutionalizing the inter-Korean trade and that an increasing number of South Korean firms realized the uncertainties in the inter-Korean trade procedure like the difficulty in handling claims in trade with the North.

Meantime, the trade involving processing on commission rapidly grew after the Kolon was given permission to produce student bags in North Korea in December 1991. The amount of trade in this field amounted to \$79 million, accounting for 25.6 percent of the total inter-Korean trade volume and 22.2 percent of the total import. In 1996, in particular, the total trade volume was reduced but the trade involving processing on commission grew. This phenomenon might be attributed to the fact that the economic woes in North Korea had made it difficult to export goods produced with its own materials, while processing on commission was not affected by the domestic crisis as necessary materials were supplied by the South. The processing on commission in North Korea, which is still in its initial stage, has been done mainly by big businesses as it requires a considerable information

and experience in administrative management in searching for business partners in North Korea and transportation and management of raw materials and finished goods.

**Table 2. Amounts of Trade by Processing on Commission**

(Unit: \$1,000, Percent)

Year	Import		Export		Total	
	Total	Processing on commission	Total	Processing on commission	Total	Processing on commission
1992	162,863	638	10,563	200	173,426	838( 0.5)
1993	178,166	2,985	8,425	4,023	186,591	7,008( 3.8)
1994	176,298	14,321	18,248	11,342	194,546	25,663(13.2)
1995	222,855	21,174	64,435	24,718	287,290	45,892(16.0)
1996	182,399	36,238	69,638	38,164	252,037	74,402(29.5)
1997	193,069	42,894	115,269	36,175	308,338	79,069(25.6)

Source: The Bureau of Interchange and Cooperation, Ministry of Unification, "Monthly Trends in South-North Interchange and Cooperation," No. 78.

The number of South Korean private and public firms involved in inter-Korean trade has continuously increased and the participation of small- and medium-size companies is also remarkable recently. But in the size of the trade involved, big business firms have led inter-Korean trade. For example, a total of

442 firms were involved in North-South trade including processing on commission in 1997. But the number of the firms which have imported goods worth over \$10 million since 1989 was only 13 and the combined amount of their import accounted for 69.3 percent of the total import from North Korea during the same period.

Inter-Korean direct trade is made in exceptional cases when North Korea wants. The items are also limited to materials of Korean herb medicine and some agricultural products. Therefore, it is still too early to see it as a general trade practice between the two Koreas. In 1996, indirect trade accounted for 91.4 percent of the total bilateral trade. In indirect trade, negotiations, contracts and payment of money are done through brokers in other countries. In other cases, negotiations are made with North Koreans but contracts and payment are conducted through brokers. In 1996, the amount of direct trade accounted for 9.9 percent of the import from North Korea and 4.7 percent of export. The relatively high percentage of direct trade in import may be attributed to the fact that North Koreans were more willing to discuss with the South Koreans on export to earn foreign currency.

Meanwhile, the countries or regions for indirect trade between North and South Korea and the proportions of indirect trade in total bilateral trade are seen in Table 3. The three most frequent venues of inter-Korean indirect trade are Hongkong, China and Japan. In 1996, the inter-Korean trade mediated by brokers in the three countries accounted for 85 percent of the total bilateral trade. Of the three, the majority of the trade was made through Hongkong and China. The role of China in inter-Korean trade has increased remarkably since August 1992. China has gained further importance as a mediator of inter-Korean trade since the

establishment of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Seoul, which allowed South Korean firms to open branches in China, and because of deepening reform policy of China.

**Table 3. Major Venues of Indirect Inter-Korean Trade**

(Unit: Percent of the Total Number of Cases)

Year	Hongkong		Japan		China		Singapore		Direct Trade	
	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export
1988	75	-	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1989	43.9	-	26.3	100	-	-	24.5	-	-	-
1990	84.0	75	4.0	25	-	-	9.4	-	-	-
1991	67.1	80	18.0	15	7.9	-	2.8	-	0.9	5
1992	63.8	78.3	19.5	2.4	7.9	11.9	1.1	7.1	3.0	4.8
1993	74.5	78.9	14.4	9.2	5.7	4.0	1.5	5.3	2.9	-
1994	66.7	81.5	11.7	3.5	12.8	2.9	1.3	-	3.5	5.8
1995	53.4	64.9	12.1	4.3	22.8	11.8	2.1	0.3	6.1	3.6
1996	41.8	74.2	6.3	1.5	36.9	10.4	1.0	0.1	4.6	4.4
Average	58.1	71.9	12.1	3.6	18.9	9.6	2.1	0.6	4.1	4.1

Source: The Bureau of Interchange and Cooperation, Ministry of Unification, "Monthly Trends in South-North Interchange and Cooperation" No. 67.

From what we have discussed, we can see the growth speed of inter-Korean trade is a little affected by political conditions but the trend of increasing trade has been sustained basically.

This can be explained by several reasons.

First, inter-Korean trade is free from political influence and therefore, is determined by economic demand and supply as it is made by mediation of a third country like Hongkong or through overseas branches of South Korean firms.

Second, South Korean firms have economic motives to pursue continuous import of goods from North Korea despite its backward economy and economic difficulties.<sup>3)</sup>

Third, North Korea strictly controls direct import from South Korea considering changes in economic and political situations but is much lenient in export to South Korea to obtain foreign currency.

The importance of Hongkong and China as mediators of inter-Korean trade, as we have studied until now, is absolute. The fact that inter-Korean trade is mainly done by large South Korean firms can be explained by examining why mediators are necessary.<sup>4)</sup>

---

3) South Korean businesses participate in economic exchange projects with North Korea for short-term profits and to secure a foothold in preparation for the day when inter-Korean economic relations have deepened. In the latter case, the businesses sometimes have to endure short-term losses but in a more comprehensive way, this practice also stems from economic motivations.

4) R.M. Townsend ("Intermediation with Costly Bilateral Exchange," *Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. 45, pp. 417~25, 1978.) attempted an analysis of the role and necessity of intermediators through a model in economic theory. According to his model, fixed costs occur when suppliers and buyers maintain individual transaction networks. An increase in the number of suppliers and buyers can reduce risks in the individual transactions but raises the cost. Therefore, the role of intermediators is

First, North Korea does not want to make its people to know the imported goods are made in South Korea and therefore, wants to make transactions with brokers of Hongkong and China if possible in order to hide the sellers and buyers in the transaction. It wants to contact with overseas branches of South Korean firms or their local corporations if inevitable.<sup>5)</sup>

Second, South Korean exporters and importers not only need to bear uncertainties and risks to open direct business lines with North Korean traders but also pay high cost to obtain necessary information. Therefore, they tend to prefer trade through brokers who are free to contact North Koreans even if they have to pay commissions.

Third, South Korean firms lack understanding of North Korean business practices and their special conditions because of long political and economic separation between the South and the North and their different systems. On the other hand, the brokers in Hongkong and China fully understand both the socialist and capitalist systems from their experiences with China and Hongkong and are capable of mediating the interests of those involved in transactions.

Fourth, in Hongkong and parts of China, such service sectors as commercial information, finance and insurance have been relatively developed and free commercial transactions are guaranteed. Moreover, they have comparative advantages in geography and,

---

indispensable to reduce the cost.

- 5) North Korean goods imported to the South bear tags proving their origin and given tariff exemption benefits. But the South Korean goods imported to the North usually bear labels of Chinese and Japanese firms or the North Korean importer and, therefore, North Korean consumers do not know they are made in the South.

therefore, can minimize the cost for employing mediators.

Fifth, large business firms which maintain a network of its overseas branches and local subsidiaries can save the cost for hiring brokers of foreign countries by utilizing their own networks of local subsidiaries in Hongkong and China. In this method, they can reduce uncertainties in inter-Korean trade compared with when the mother companies in the South are involved in inter-Korean trade directly. At the same time, they can expect income from mediating inter-Korean trade by small- and medium-size firms in the South.

When these aspects of inter-Korean trade are taken into account, North-South Korean trade of goods is likely to depend on brokers in Hongkong and China and the local subsidiaries of big business firms until the system is set up to remove uncertainties and risks accompanying direct trade with the North and until North and South Korea freely exchange commercial information. But the North-South trade through a third country may work against continuous increase in the trade by adding transportation and other transaction costs.

Meanwhile, according to the South-North Interchange and Cooperation Act, export of goods to the North is possible only with the approval of banks when the goods are in the list of automatic export and import approval items. But in the case of goods whose export is restricted, an approval of the Ministry of Unification is necessary. Those who export the goods in the list of automatic approval items also need to report to the authorities that the goods are heading for North Korea and get an approval for the goods as an item of inter-Korean trade. Under the same act, no tariffs are levied on the items imported from North Korea as

inter-Korean trade is regarded as an internal transaction. Exporters are also given benefits prescribed in the Foreign Trade Act and the Export-Import Insurance Act. They may also seek financial support under the South-North Cooperation Fund Act.<sup>6)</sup>

But most inter-Korean trade is made indirectly through brokers or the network of local subsidiaries of big business firms. Transportation of goods are also made by way of a third country like Hongkong and China. Therefore, unless the incentives provided by the government to the traders exceed the interests that may be obtained by concealing trade with the North, those who are engaged in inter-Korean trade are much likely to avoid the government regulations. They also have various methods and channels to do so.

Table 4 shows the number of trade dealings between North and South Korea from 1988 to 1996 and the amounts of money involved.

From this, we can see that the proportion of trade of automatic export and import approval items in total trade has increased since 1990 when North-South trade reached a certain level. In 1995, the percentage of the trade of goods in the list of automatic approval items exceeded 90 percent of the total bilateral trade. This phenomenon is related to the tendency of those engaged in inter-Korean trade to avoid dealings of restricted approval items which require complex procedures to go through and take more time. At the same time, this also reveals that there are not many

---

6) Some say that "the South-North Interchange and Cooperation Act" regards inter-Korean trade as domestic trade but the government applies laws related to foreign trade to export to North Korea, which is a logical contradiction. They also criticized that the act prescribes too many exceptions.

items which need restriction in inter-Korean trade except some agricultural products and strategic goods.

**Table 4. Amount of Bilateral Trade with North Korea by Agency Issuing Approvals**

(Unit: Percent of the Total Amount)

Year	Import		Export	
	Restrictive Approval	Automatic Approval	Restrictive Approval	Automatic Approval
1988	22.5	77.5	-	-
1989	14.5	85.5	-	100
1990	37.8	62.2	-	100
1991	30.9	69.1	60.2	39.8
1992	11.7	88.3	12.0	88.0
1993	5.2	94.8	16.8	83.2
1994	9.8	90.2	30.3	69.7
1995	8.5	91.5	10.5	89.5
1996	9.2	90.8	22.8	77.2

Source: The Bureau of Interchange and Cooperation, Ministry of Unification, "Monthly Trends in South-North Interchange and Cooperation" No. 67.

Compared with its trade, South Korean firms' investment in North Korea is still minimal. Except the experimental project of Daewoo in Nampo, there are no full-scale projects. Since the Seoul

government's measure to activate inter-Korean economic cooperation in November 1994, a total of 29 firms have been given the status as "cooperation partnership" and allowed to start business in North Korea. Only six of them started business with North Koreans after they were given approval of "cooperation project." All the five except Daewoo were given government permission of their projects after May 1997. This shows that the South Korean government has maintained a relatively strict control mechanism in South Korean investment in the North. Except the light-water nuclear reactor construction of the Korea Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO), the projects yet approved do not exceed \$8 million in investment size. This also reveals that the size of investment has been strictly managed.

### **Efficiency of Policy Means**

The government can influence inter-Korean economic relations mainly through such means as economic sanctions, approval system of export-import and investment, provision of subsidy to private-level trade and the system to cover the loss and direct economic assistance on the government level. Economic sanctions and economic support are the form of more active government intervention. On the other hand, the approval system of export-import and investment, and provision of subsidies and compensation money for private-level trade and investment are the means of mediation of the government playing a supporting role in inter-Korean private-level economic exchange. Since 1988, the South Korean government has been involved in North-South economic exchanges through the approval system of inter-Korean

trade, investors and investment projects, and businessmen's North Korea visit. Once there was a discussion on imposing economic sanctions against North Korea when the crisis was high on the Korean peninsula over the North Korean nuclear program. Recently, much has been discussed on economic support for North Korea to help the regime's "soft landing" and to contribute to improvement in inter-Korean relations in general.

I will attempt a theoretical analysis of the efficiency of the policy means of the Southern government mentioned earlier.

### *Economic Sanctions*

Imposing economic sanctions against other countries has become one of major foreign policy recently. Economic sanctions are usually decided in the following three cases - out of security concerns to cope with the military, as a moral or ideological forceful means against an enemy country, or as part of trade policy of an individual state or an economic organization.<sup>7)</sup> The economic sanctions once discussed against North Korea may be a measure made out of security concerns to cope with the military threat caused by its nuclear weapons development program.

But according to experiences and the research results so far, economic sanctions imposed between countries have limitations in many ways. For example, in their comparative study of 115 examples of economic sanctions, Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot<sup>8)</sup>

---

7) W. H. Kaempfer and A. D. Lowenberg, *International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective*, Westview Press, 1992, pp. 1~2.

8) G. C. Hufbauer, J. J. Schott, and K. A. Elliot, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: Supplemental Case Histories*, Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics. 1990.

showed only one third of the cases were successful in drawing expected response from the target countries.

Most economists believe that economic sanctions do not have serious impacts on the economy of the target countries. In order for any economic sanctions to become effective, most countries with economic relations with the target country should participated in the measure and the economic sanctions can have influence on major portions of its trade.<sup>9)</sup> Economic sanctions are also hard to be implemented as they negatively affect not only the target country but also the country which enforces them and, therefore, may cause resistance from or conflicts among the different interest groups.

In view of the current status of inter-Korean economic exchange and its trend, economic sanctions against North Korea has limitations as a policy option in several ways.

First, from the volume and channels of inter-Korean trade at the moment, the economic sanctions imposed by South Korea only would have few impacts. When we take into account the structure of North Korea's foreign trade and their geographical location, unless China, Russia, Hongkong and Japan take the joint steps with South Korea, North Korea would have substitute supplier of goods and substitute markets and, therefore, economic sanctions would bring only limited and temporary effects.

Second, economic sanctions decided by the government cannot be effective as there are many ways and channels for South Koreans to realize inter-Korean trade while avoiding government control as long as the trade is made through brokers in Hongkong

---

9) T. D. Willet and M. Jalaighajar, "U.S. Trade Policy and National Security," *Cato Journal*, Winter, 1983/84, 3, p. 723.

and China and through foreign subsidiaries of big business firms.

Third, unless all the potential trade partners of North Korea actively take actions against North Korea, economic sanctions imposed by South Korea alone would have negative effects on South Korean economy as, by doing so, the South would only allow time for its competitors like Japan, Taiwan and China to advance to the North Korean market.<sup>10)</sup>

### *Import-Export and Investment Approval System*

The approval system of import-export and investment is supporting system to help the government have a grip of the development in North-South trade rather than aimed at controlling the flow of goods. But the system can be instantly diverted as a means to control the quantity of inter-Korean trade. It is in fact used as a means of control concerning the South Korean investment in North Korea and, in this case, an analysis of its effects is necessary.

According to J. Bhagwati,<sup>11)</sup> the effects of quantitative restriction like levying tariffs and an approval system can be summarized by the following three types of directly unproductive activities (DUP).

---

10) In fact, economic sanctions decided by international agencies like the United Nations or under the initiative of the United States are likely to put other countries in dilemma between justice and their own economic interest as long as their economies depend upon economic activities of the private sector. That is, if the private sector violates the government-level agreement for economic motivations, the sanctions would not be effective anymore. Moreover, the governments are highly likely to allow economic exchanges with North Korea through detouring channels.

11) J. Bhagwati "Directly-Unproductive Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities," *Journal of Political Economy*, 1982. Chapter 17.

First, levying tariffs and measures of quantitative restriction may induce illegal activities of pursuing interests by detouring the laws and regulations like smuggling.

Second, if there are groups which gain interests from the existence of those restriction measures, they may be engaged in unproductive lobbying to maintain the restrictions.

Third, in case an approval is given under the system of quantitative restriction, a corresponding premium may occur. This may cause rent-seeking activities for the premium.<sup>12)</sup>

When an analysis is made based on these theoretical discussions, the system of approval of export to and import from North Korea has limitations as follows when it is used as a means of control.

First, inter-Korean trade of goods mainly takes the form of indirect trade or merchant trade through a third country and in the case of investment projects, some South Korean businessmen choose indirect investment through foreign firms to avoid the strict restrictions on the domestic firms. Therefore, even if the present system of approval of trade and investment is maintained and strengthened, as long as economic interests involved are guaranteed, the way to detour the system can be sought.<sup>13)</sup>

Second, the system of approval of trade and investment itself can be a factor causing human, time and financial transaction costs. If this system is strengthened to become a means of

---

12) For general analysis on "rent-seeking activities," refer to A. O. Kruger, "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," *American Economic Review*, 69, No. 3, 1974, pp. 509~514.

13) In this case, ways to control illegal economic activities may be considered but as long as the inter-Korean trade is made in the form of intermediary trade through a third country, the asymmetry in the information on trade contents is inefficient as it may cause principal and agent problems.

inter-Korean trade, unproductive lobbying of newcomers to get approval and those who already get approval to maintain the existing system would be rampant, accompanying high unproductive transaction cost.

Third, the present automatic approval system allows the head of the banks to automatically approve the trade at the request of the trader. But in the case that the person involved doesn't want the contents of transaction to be made public, he or she may try to avoid the related regulation. This practice may cause an additional transactional cost. The same is true with investment projects. If a detouring method is adopted to keep the business secret, it may cause an additional transaction cost.

### *The System to Support Inter-Korean Economic Exchange*

The South Korean government regards inter-Korean trade as a domestic transaction and exempts tariffs on the imported goods. It also gives benefits prescribed in the Foreign Trade Act, the Act on Export-Import Insurance and other laws to exported goods.

In addition, the South-North Cooperation Fund Act legislated in 1990 allows subsidy for loss, loans, guarantee of debts and support of financial institutions for those who are engaged in inter-Korean trade and economic cooperation projects. On top of this, the act stipulates government-level support for efforts to recover the national community.

These institutional supports for private-level economic exchange and government-level direct economic assistance are expected to positively contribute to formation of an economic cooperation system of North and South Korea in the long term by promoting

inter-Korean economic exchanges and easing difficulties facing the North Korean economy. But from the realistic point of view, the government support for expanding inter-Korean economic exchanges has limitations as follows.

First, assistance to private-level inter-Korean trade and joint economic projects may cause the South Korean businessmen to be willing to bear excessive risks. In the worst case, some may want to initiate projects involving North Korea just to get the government assistance.<sup>14)</sup>

Second, unless the government assistance is applied to all cases evenly like enforcement of tariffs and quantitative restriction, it can induce unproductive interest-pursuing behaviors and lobbying.

Third, government assistance may also bring about negative effects like unproductive interest-pursuing behaviors as it gives benefits to the businessmen involved in inter-Korean projects. Direct government assistance for North Korea cannot properly function as a policy means in view of the current status of inter-Korean relations as the assistance is possible only when North Korea requests it or when the North agrees to the South's way of delivering assistance. On the other hand, when the government pursues this policy excessively, it may be made politically used by North Korea and in this case, its contribution to expansion of inter-Korean economic cooperation cannot but remain low. Moreover, direct government assistance to North Korea is

---

14) Also in this case, the gap in the quality and quantity of information held by businessmen and government agencies may cause principal and agent problems which may make impossible the effective use of the government assistance for inter-Korean exchange. To prevent this, an effective evaluation system is necessary but under the special circumstances relating to North and South Korea, it seems very difficult to secure objective evaluation system and methods.

made for political gains in many cases and, therefore, when the North-South relations become strained, it would further aggravate the relations, thus depriving the function of a safety valve of inter-Korean economic exchange.

North Korea seems to have no choice but to use the military tension between the South and the North for its control of people because of its economic difficulties and it has no policy options for reform of the system. Under this circumstance, it seems difficult for the South's unilateral policy of appeasement to bear practical significance. As long as North Korea remains lacking logical confidence in the positive political and economic effects of economic reforms, a large-scale aid to help the "soft landing" of the North Korean system may cause such negative effects as the maintenance of the North Korea's inefficient economic system. Therefore, except aid of humanitarian purposes, assistance to North Korea should be made in a way to support its long-term economic reform programs. The "soft landing" policy, in a true sense, should be a policy which allows us to present long-term economic reform programs to the North and induce its acceptance of the programs.

#### **Conclusion:**

#### **Sharing of Roles of the Government and the Private Sector**

I attempted, in this study, to examine the current status of economic exchanges and make a critical analysis of efficiency of the means of government measures concerning inter-Korean economic cooperation including economic sanctions, the approval system of trade and investment and the government's assistance to private-level inter-Korean trade.

Based on the result of the analysis, I will suggest the desirable role of the South Korean government, which will contribute to enhancing the efficiency of inter-Korean economic exchange and preventing their negative effects, as follows.

First, the government should seek measures to minimize the transaction cost of inter-Korean trade and economic cooperation projects to provide South Korean businessmen with economic incentives to pursue exchange with North Koreans.

For this, it should guarantee autonomous operation in such fields as communications, information, transportation, insurance and finance in order to reduce unnecessary cost to hire brokers in third countries. The government should also minimize its system to control inter-Korean trade and investment in North Korea in order to help the South Korean businessmen less feel the necessity to detour the Seoul government in pursuing economic cooperation projects with Pyongyang. To relieve the problems deriving from transaction procedures, it is desirable for the government to train the local trade brokers and to reduce the dependency of brokers of foreign countries. North and South Korean authorities need to agree on systematization or institutionalization of inter-Korean economic exchange, which is expected to contribute to the epochal development in inter-Korean economic exchange by reducing the transaction cost and uncertainty involved in inter-Korean trade.

The Seoul government may also contribute to expanding the scope of North-South economic exchange when it provides convenience to those in small- and medium-size enterprises to help them accumulate experience in inter-Korean trade using such state-run organizations as the Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Corp. (KOTRA). The government can simplify

procedures of North-South trade to minimize the human and material transaction cost. It can switch its current approval system, which is applied to all trade, to a system under which trade of general items is possible with reports to authorities only and the trade of limited number of strategic goods is restricted. Simplification of necessary procedures is also desirable in that it can help the businessmen involved keep business secrets.

Second, the government should try to prevent any sudden change in its policy from inducing business firms' unproductive, interest-pursuing behaviors. Any sudden measures to support for or control of businessmen involved in inter-Korean economic exchange programs may hurt their business activities based on the economic logic. The government should also try to make clear where the loss and benefit from inter-Korean businesses belong to and seek to increasingly link the North Korean economy with the world economy by providing the private sector with incentives to induce their voluntary participation.

Third, economic sanctions and government-level direct economic assistance are not a positive idea considering their efficiency and feasibility. Therefore, the government should be careful in making proposals concerning the North Korean economy not to unnecessarily stimulate them. The South can present several policy options on the desirable direction of the North Korean economy as much as possible in order to make them understand that the South government is truly supporting North Korean development through reform and open policies.

In summary, the government should play the role in promoting inter-Korean economic exchange by providing service to reduce transaction cost of inter-Korean trade, managing export and import

of a small number of strategic goods and presenting policy options for reform and openness of the North Korean economy.

At the same time, the private sector is expected to play the following roles.

First, the private sector should be careful in selecting and pursuing projects with North Korea rather than to secure benefits from the government and other unproductive interests. They also should accept the economic logic that they are responsible for the loss and interests from their projects. The private sector should also carry out the inter-Korean economic exchange projects with the belief that they are pursuing efficient utilization of production factors through rearrangement of the North and South Korean economies rather than pursuing short-term interests from commercial activities.

Second, they should not excessively promote their projects with North Koreans or intentionally reveal them to the public in order to promote the image of their firms. These behaviors would only stimulate North Koreans and induce them to apply the political logic to economic matters, thus impeding the development of inter-Korean economic relations.

Third, large enterprises are required to be careful in engaging in the joint projects with North Korea because the North prefers to work with them for economic gains only, while still avoiding institutionalization of inter-Korean economic exchange and ignoring the necessity of reform. North Korea, in particular, seems to realize the large business firms in the South as its good economic partner as these firms are capable of mobilizing financial support, cover a variety of industry under their umbrella and maintain foreign subsidiaries, which may make them possible to detour the South

Korean government in striking a deal. That is, North Koreans tend to prefer transaction with large firms in the South as they believe these firms would agree to projects out of their political concerns to secure relations with the North earlier than others, rather than for economic interests from each project.

North Koreans' understanding of the importance of institutional conditions for proper functioning of the market economy and market organization is still in its initial stage. Therefore, the pursuit of a comprehensive cooperation program, without considering the economic feasibility of each project, may negatively affect on the South's effort to induce opening of the North Korean system. Large South Korean firms are asked to accept North Korean demands based on the strict consideration of the economic feasibility of the planned projects.

□ 국문요약

## 남북한 경제협력을 위한 정부의 바람직한 역할모색

신정부는 남북관계 개선을 위해 정경분리 원칙을 천명하고, 조만간 대기업총수의 방북허용과 투자상한선 철폐 및 허가절차 간소화 등 경제협 규제완화조치를 확정·발표할 것으로 알려지고 있다.

그동안 남북 경제관계는 한반도의 특수한 정치적 상황으로 인해 민간부문 경제활동과 정부부문의 정책적 조절수단의 복합적 상호작용에 의해 형성되어 왔으며, 남한정부의 남북경제교류에 대한 정책수단은 規制와 支援이라는 2중구조를 유지해 왔다. 지금까지 남북한간의 경제관계에 대한 논의과정에 있어서 政府와 民間部門의 상대적 역할이나 정부 정책수단의 효율성 및 파급효과에 대한 이론적 분석이 미흡한 감이 있다. 따라서 필자는 대북교역 승인제도, 남북경제교류 지원제도 등 남북경제교류에 대한 정부 정책수단의 효율성에 관해 비판적 시각에서 분석을 시도해 보았다. 분석결과에 의거하여 향후 남북경제협력 추진과정에 있어서 경제적 효율을 제고하고 부작용을 방지하기 위한 남한정부의 바람직한 역할을 다음과 같이 제시해 볼 수 있다.

첫째, 정부는 선언적인 경제협 규제 완화조치 이외에 앞으로 남북한간의 교역과 경제협력사업 추진과정에 있어서의 거래비용(transaction cost)을 최소화하기 위한 실질적·구체적 조치를 강구함으로써 남북경제교류의 경제적 유인을 제공해야 한다.

이를 위해서 우선 남북한 경제교류에 있어서 제3국의 중개자를 經由함으로써 인해 발생하는 불필요한 仲介費用을 절감할 수 있도록 남북경제교류 관련, 통신, 정보, 운송, 보험, 금융분야의 자율적 운용을 보장해야 할 것이다. 또한 남북경제교류 당사자가 우회적 경로를 택해야 할 동기를 축소하고, 제도적 차이에서 오는 거래절차상의 문제점

해소를 위해 남북한간 교역 증개자를 내부적으로 육성함으로써 제3국의 仲介商에 의존해야 할 필요성을 줄이는 것이 바람직하다. 당국자간의 합의에 의한 경험의 제도화는 남북교역의 거래비용 및 불확실성을 낮춤으로써 남북경제교류의 획기적 발전에 기여할 수 있을 것으로 판단된다.

한편 중소기업이 대한무역투자진흥공사 등 국가기관의 서비스를 활용하여 직접적인 대북 교역 경험을 쌓을 수 있도록 정부가 편의를 제공하는 경우 남북경제교류의 저변 확대에 기여할 수 있을 것이다.

둘째, 정부의 급격한 대북 정책노선 변화가 기업의 비생산적 이윤 추구행위를 조장하지 않도록 해야 한다. 특히 남북경협 종사 기업에 대한 갑작스러운 지원이나 통제는 경제논리에 입각한 기업의 활동을 저해할 수 있다. 남북 경제교류 사업으로부터 발생하는 손실 및 이득의 귀속을 뚜렷하게 해야 할 것이며, 경제적 유인에 의한 민간부문의 자발적 참여를 통해 북한경제와 세계경제의 연계성 확대를 도모해야 할 것이다.

셋째, 경제제재 조치나 정치적 동기에 의한 정부차원의 대북 경제 지원 방안은 그 효율성과 부작용을 감안할 때, 다같이 바람직하지 못하다. 정부는 대북 경제정책 대안 제시에 보다 신중을 기함으로써 북한에 대한 불필요한 자극을 피하는 한편, 정부주도로 일시에 남북경제교류가 대폭 증가할 것이라는 지나친 기대를 주는 일도 없어야 할 것이다. 또한 일방적이며 선언적인 경험 규제완화조치에 그칠 것이 아니라, 북한의 경제개혁정책과 연계된 대북한 단계적 지원계획도 밝힘으로써 남한은 정치적 사안과는 관계없이 북한경제의 건전한 발전을 지원한다는 인식을 심어줄 필요가 있다.

요컨대, 정부는 남북한 경제협력 추진과정에 있어서 민간부문의 거래비용 절감을 위한 서비스 제공 및 소수 전략물자에 대한 반출입 관리, 그리고 북한경제의 개혁·개방을 위한 정책대안 제시 등을 통해 남북경제교류를 촉진함을 그 기본 역할로 삼아야 할 것이다.

한편 정부는 남북경협을 위한 스스로의 새로운 역할 정립과 더불어

이와 조화를 이룰 수 있는 민간부문의 역할 유도를 위해 노력해야 할 것이다. 특히 최근 고려되고 있는 대기업 관련 대북정책은 우리 대기업의 특성을 감안하여 부작용을 최소화 할 수 있도록 추진해야 할 것이다.

북한은 아직 남북경협을 제도화를 기피하고 있으며, 단지 경제적 실리획득 차원에서 남한 대기업과의 교류를 선호하고 있다. 특히 북한은 남한 대기업이 금융조달 능력을 갖추고 있으며, 한 기업집단이 다양한 산업영역을 망라하고 있고, 남북한간 직접접촉을 우회할 수 있는 해외 현지법인을 가지고 있다는 측면에서 적합한 경협파트너로 인식하고 있다. 즉 남한 대기업은 북한당국과의 '관계 확보' 동기에서 경제적 타당성이 낮은 거래조건에 동의할 수 있으며, 북한이 원하는 다양한 영역의 도움을 제공할 수 있기 때문에 북한당국이 선호하는 경협파트너인 것이다.

북한은 아직 시장경제의 기능이나 시장기구가 효율적으로 기능하기 위한 제도적 여건 등에 대한 인식이 지극히 초보적인 상태에 머물러 있다. 따라서 개별 협력사업의 경제적 타당성을 감안하지 않은 포괄적 협력계획의 추진은 북한체제의 개혁 유도에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수도 있다. 그러므로 대기업도 남북경협 확대 과정에서 북한측의 요구를 철저한 경제적 타당성에 입각하여 수용할 필요성이 있다.

정부가 구상하고 있는 대북경협 규제 완화조치가 남북경협의 확대·심화를 위한 중요한 한 걸음인 것은 틀림없으나, 신정부의 정경분리 원칙을 현실화할 수 있는 충분조건일 수는 없다. 이제 우리는 겨우 그동안 우리의 손발을 스스로 묶고 있던 규제의 줄을 풀고 있을 뿐이다. 아직도 시장지향적 개혁의 불가피성을 인정하지 못하고 있는 북한과의 바람직한 경제관계 확대를 위해서는 단순한 선언이외에 보다 정교한 정책도구가 마련되어야 할 것이다. 또한 이와 같은 대북정책의 현실화를 위해서는 내부의 법제정비 또한 시급한 과제이다.

## IV

---

# North Korea's Food Crisis and Inter-Korean Cooperation

---

Jae-Suk Lee

(Senior Research Fellow, The Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation  
for the Asia-Pacific Region)

### Introduction

The purpose of the present discussion is to provide a critical review of the policy of the Seoul government around the issue of North Korea's food crisis. It will begin with considering what basic guidelines in interactions between the South and the North can help mould a cooperative relationship between them. Then a survey of background and present state of North Korea's food crisis will be attempted. This leads to suggestions to rescue North Korea from the present crisis and to improve its food supply condition. It is followed by discussions on political complications that made such ideas for rescue and remedy difficult to realize. Later there are a short outline of the basics of Kim Dae-jung government's policy toward the North and some additional informations on what happened to the impending issue after he was elected president. Critical summary remarks conclude the discussion.

### **Some Basic Considerations**

For an orderly management of inter-Korean relations, it is desirable that the following basic considerations guide South Korea's policy toward the North:

- A. The roles of the governments in Seoul and Pyongyang will be most important even in the future development of the situation on the Korean peninsula. Thus for inter-Korean relations to expand in a positive way it is imperative for the two governments to recognize each other as their partners to work with. This basic principle has been neglected in recent years. There were speculations about a possible collapse of the North Korean regime and words like 'unification through absorption' were widely spread. Such conceptions have been impeding elements in developing inter-Korean relations. On the South Korean side, expectations, whether they are grounded or not, about a breakdown of the North Korean system created a barrier to implementing inter-Korean cooperation programs conceived around the time of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North (hereinafter let us call this the 1991 Basic Inter-Korean Agreement). On the North Korean side, it heightened the sense of regime insecurity and dealings with the South became much less attractive.
  
- B. There should be a reasonable conception about the systemic change that are taking place on the Korean peninsula. It is

often said that there has been little change in North Korean attitude toward the South. The term 'North Korean attitude' is a vague one. Anyhow it cannot be expected that the North Korean regime would abandon all their doctrines that have been the supporting pillars of the system. 'Doctrines' adopted by a regime by their nature are difficult to change without altering the basic structure of the regime. Still it is an undeniable fact that the environment of the regime and conditions for its doctrines are changing. So what we are observing now is a North Korean version of process of adaptation to the changing environment and conditions. What is important for us all is that this process should be peaceful and in a right direction. The scope and pace of changes North Korea should decide on. What South Korea and other international actors can do is to facilitate a cultivation of culture in North Korea in which Pyongyang leaders come to assume constructive roles in their relations with the South and in broader international context. In this regard inter-Korean exchanges in various areas are essential.

- C. Situations can arise in which the South and the North should exchange concessions and rewards. It is desirable that such exchanges are reciprocal so that mutual accommodation can be accumulated across various policy areas. Linkage politics can be applied when a concession must be extracted in a crucial issue. In doing so, we should be prudent. It is advisable that mutually beneficial relationship (ex. trade) should be maintained even when linkage politics is exercised to attain an important policy goal (ex. a North Korean

compliance to the IAEA norms). Promotion of exchanges and cooperation is means of creating an atmosphere and conditions for meaningful dialogue in difficult policy questions. Efforts can be made to resolve a security problem like the North Korean nuclear issue by mobilizing other diplomatic means while exchanges in less political areas continue to expand. When it was urgent to settle the North Korean nuclear issue, the Seoul government rather hastily officialized its policy of withholding inter-Korean economic cooperation until the nuclear issue has been resolved. This linkage policy turned out to be ineffective and had negative consequences on inter-Korean relations.

- D. In managing the complex of inter-Korean exchanges, coordination capability of the central leadership will have significant impact on the continuity and development of such exchanges. If the leadership fails to establish a consistent policy profile, disturbing elements may easily intervene in the course. Some of the elite corps in North Korea would be opposed to increasing societal contacts with the South. In the South different ministries may have different perspectives regarding policies toward the North. It is important for the central leadership to develop a coherent and persuasive logic and to have organizational skills to realize inter-Korean cooperative programs.

## North Korea's Food Crisis

### *The Stagnant Economy*

Communist principles were stringently applied to the economic policy of North Korea, and collective farms, state-controlled enterprises, and corporative commercial networks formed its structure. The land reform of 1946 abolished the age-old landlord-tenant relationship, and by 1958, the communization of the whole industry had completed. In foreign economic relations, the idea of Juche was the guiding concept.

Owing largely to hard-driven policy of the government, a certain degree of economic development had been realized in the earlier decades. Despite some fluctuations, collectivization of farms was accompanied by generally rising yields and improvements in the agricultural infrastructure - by irrigation, electrification, and provision of machinery like tractors. In the industrial sector, the pre-Korean War level of production was recovered during 1950s.

However, around the mid-1960s, some structural problems in the economy were apparent. When the size of the economy had grown, technological innovations and managerial efficiency were more important for further growth. The centralized and collectivized system was unable to meet the need. And the concentration of resources in heavy industry and the defense sector caused the general standard of living unimproved. Problems in provisions of energy and raw materials were lingering. In food supply, a strict rationing system had been in effect.

Recognizing that contacts with Western economy were necessary pursuing its development goals, North Korea in the 1970s was

engaged in an expansion of industrial facilities with imported capital and technologies. The share of its trade with non-socialist economies, especially Japan and some European countries, became significant. But it was evident that it had a serious problem in foreign trade management as shown in the default on its overseas debt payment since the mid-1970s. The oil crisis came just when the country had been heavily indebted for sizable import of industrial facilities from non-socialist economies, and the country was unable to cover the cost.

Coming into 1980s the ambitious "ten major targets" for economic development were announced. The Pyongyang leadership stressed the importance of foreign trade, light industries, and agriculture for the economy. And having observed the economic reform programs of China and some East European countries, it introduced the Joint Venture Law in 1984. The Juche-oriented policy had to be readjusted to the actual need. But the scope of readjustment was limited both for internal and external reasons. North Korea was not ready for dynamic interactions with non-socialist economies institutionally and politically, and for foreigners North Korea was not an attractive place to invest as long as tension existed in its relations with the South. Pyongyang towards the end of 1980s announced that the development targets set forth in the beginning of the decade were partially met, but there were indications that the shortages of energy, key industrial raw materials, and food were still unresolved problems.

The situation has been aggravated since early 1990s. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the political changes in Eastern Europe posed new problems to North Korea's economy. Special trade relationships with its traditional alliance partners, the Soviet

Union and China, had supported the relative stability in the management of its economy. But from 1991 Russia began to demand payment by hard currencies while applying international market price to such commodities as oil and coal, and China was also introducing a similar demand from 1992. Since then North Korea fell into a situation in which its industrial facilities stopped functioning and its people suffered from malnutrition.

### *The Chronic Food Shortage and the Present Crisis*

North Korea's food shortage is a structural problem. Since early 1960s its population more than doubled by 1995, but the grain production increase could not keep pace with the population growth. In the said economic development plan announced in 1980, it was stated that it would produce 15 million tons of grain by late 1980s. But reading the official data from Pyongyang, one could see that the agricultural productivity nearly stalemated during the target period.

Thus North Korea relied on import to cover its food shortage. It was from the mid-1980s when grain import increased significantly. In 1991 it imported about 1.3 million tons of grain. China was a main supplier. In 1992 and 1993 import from China amounted about 75% of North Korea's total grain import. In 1994 it faced an adverse condition in food supply. The cold front seriously affected the 1993 harvest in Northeast Asia, and China's grain export to North Korea in 1994 was reduced by more than a half compared to the previous year. The Pyongyang government had to draw on grain reserves to fill the shortfall. Things went from bad to worse in the following years. Hit by heavy floods in 1995, North Korea

for the first time recognized its food crisis and requested South Korea, Japan, and other countries for aid. In 1996 and 1997 the situation was no less acute.

**Table 1. North Korea's Grain Supply, 1991 - 1997**

(Pulses and Tubers Included)

	(unit: thousand tons)						
Year	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Production (Previous Year)	4,812	4,427	4,268	3,884	4,125	3,450	3,690
Imports (Current Year)	1,290	830	1,093	490	962	1,050	1,440

Source: adapted from P. W. Lim, "North Korea's Food Crisis," *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Winter 1997), p. 580.

North Korea's annual grain demand by normal international standard is estimated to be about 6.7 million tons. To feed the people at a mere subsistence level it need at least 5.3 million tons. Table 1 shows that from 1992 North Korea could not meet this minimum level.

Although the present North Korea's food crisis has its immediate cause in the destruction of the base of its agricultural production and the decrease in arable land due to the natural disasters in recent years, the lack of foreign currency earnings and the consequent decline in the use of fertilizers, pesticides, and oil aggravated the situation.

But the more fundamental problem lies in the rigid economic system in which central command and collective farms are the main elements. Many experts agree that there are little possibilities for North Korea's agriculture to develop if it sticks to the socialist collective production system which does not give productive incentives to individuals.

### **Suggestions for Remedy and Rescue**

The following suggestions can be derived from the preceding discussions for North Korea to overcome the present crisis:

#### ***Emergency Food Aid***

Responding to Pyongyang's request, China, Japan, South Korea, the EU, the US and other countries extended emergency food aid. In total it amounted about 1 million tons in 1995 and in 1996 and 1.4 million tons in 1997. But as we saw in Table 1 the total supply of grain was under the minimum subsistence level. South Korea at governmental level provided 150 thousands tons of rice in 1995, but the unnecessary quarrels involved in its delivery discouraged further aid. Later limited amount of aid was given through international organizations. In May 1997 inter-Korean Red Cross talks resumed, but the management of aid business on both sides has been far from satisfactory.

*Provision of Assistance in  
Agricultural Technologies and Materials*

North Korea seems unable to recover reasonable agricultural production capabilities without foreign aid. For reclamation of land and to improve productivity, massive reinvestment is in need. Import of fertilizers, improved seeds, and modern equipments will help a revival. Recently North Korea requested to the South to aid with 200 thousand tons of fertilizer. An enthusiastic South Korean scholar, Professor Kim Soon Kwon, now better known as 'Dr. Corn,' has argued for an inter-Korean agricultural cooperation. He suggested that 50 tons of the improved super-corn seeds would produce 1 million tons corn a year. Another scholar Dr. Chung Hyuk, pointing out that the productivity of North Korean potato fields is about 1/4 of that in Europe and North America, tells us that introduction in the country of the artificial seed potato he developed will double the productivity.

The UNDP has drawn up an agricultural development assistance program aiming at North Korea's self-dependent food supply in three years.

*Innovation of North Korea's Agricultural System*

As mentioned above, the country's agricultural productivity is low because of the collective farming system. Realizing the problem, Pyongyang let a smaller group of 7-8 people form a productive unit, and introduced a kind of market incentive allowing surplus over a certain amount of production to be sold in the market. The impact of this policy remains to be seen, but it is

notable that Pyongyang is introducing changes from the old system, however partial they may be. A total innovation of the agricultural system is not expected for the present, but international assistance program in the country's agricultural development will have certain effect in rationalizing the agriculture.

### *To Develop Export Industries*

Food shortage must be covered by import. If the economy as a whole had fared well and had enough foreign currency earnings, it could have imported the amount of food it need. In fact North Korea began to pay more attention to develop export industries in the 1970s to be able to pay the increased import of goods from non-socialist countries. But the experiment in the decade did not give good results. One basic interest of North Korea during the 1980s was also in promoting manufacturing industry and international marketing of produced goods.

Pyongyang began to suppose South Korea as a significant source of technology and capital, and it was with such expectations that North Korea signed the 1991 Basic Inter-Korean Agreement. But the North Korean nuclear issue was a barrier to inter-Korean economic cooperation.

### **Realities**

The North Korean nuclear question surfaced as a salient international issue from early 1989. Especially when Pyongyang insinuated in September 1990 that it might develop its own nuclear capability, it became a pending task for South Korea and the US

to contain North Korea from such a possibility. In the background of the North Korean verbal politics was Moscow's move to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea, which was perceived by Pyongyang as seriously weakening its security base.

The Seoul government managed the situation by inducing Pyongyang to the conference table to negotiate a basic institutional framework for inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. This resulted in the 1991 Agreement. Seoul exerted parallel efforts to settle the nuclear question. So the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula could be adopted on the eve of 1992. It was after Seoul confirmed that all American nuclear weapons had been removed from South Korea. Later in January 1992 Pyongyang signed the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

But the North Korean nuclear question remained an unresolved problem afterwards. A main reason for this complication was that North Korea intended to use 'the nuclear card' to recover its diplomatic base. This approach was problematic. South Korea and the US responded by making it an official policy to withhold programs for economic cooperation with North Korea until Pyongyang had fully accepted the demand for nuclear inspections. Thus the situation developed in a prolonged confrontation of linkage politics between the two sides. It was a contrast to the approach of the previous years in which a framework for cooperation and the nuclear question were negotiated in parallel efforts for settlement.

Anyhow in 1993 and 1994, the years when the confrontational situation culminated, North Korea experienced a worst ever food supply. We saw above China drastically reduced its grain export to

North Korea in 1994. Also cut off from the expected economic cooperation with the South, the total supply of food in the year was much under the subsistence level.

The nuclear question was somehow settled by the October 1994 Agreed Framework between North Korea and the US. But the death of Kim Il Sung caused confusion in South Korean policy circles. The impending economic crisis and the disappearance of the charismatic leadership in Pyongyang tempted some in the government positions to expect an imminent collapse of the North Korean regime. So why extend aid and cooperation when a 'unification by absorption' is coming closer? This kind of vague expectation with no solid logical ground seemed to have a significant impact on the policy outcome in Seoul.

South Korea provided the North with 150 thousand tons of rice in 1995, but the scope of further aid was limited. As the Seoul government did not overcome such a perception about the future of the North Korean regime, Pyongyang's position toward the South was not relaxed. While the political tension was not lessened, heavy floods and droughts hit North Korea. Plans by the said 'Dr. Corn' and Dr. Chung to visit to North Korea for consultations for agricultural cooperation were discouraged by the Seoul government.

There came to be an awkward situation when Pyongyang demanded large-scale food aid to South Korea and the US as a precondition for it to come to the conference table of the Four-Party Talks. In fact Washington has used aid to and partial relaxation of economic sanctions against North Korea as bargaining chips in its dealings with Pyongyang. Still Seoul should have dealt with the impending food crisis in the North in the perspective of humanitarian aid and in a broader concept of inter-Korean cooperation.

### The Approach of the Kim Dae-jung Government

During his election campaign Kim Dae-jung declared that the following three basic principles would guide his government's policy toward the North: (1) it would not allow any attempt of North Korea to disturb peace on the Korean peninsula with the support of a solid security posture; (2) it does not intend to achieve a unification through absorption, and co-existence and co-prosperity will be the norm; (3) it will improve and develop inter-Korean relations by actively promoting exchanges and cooperation in various areas.

About North Korea's food crisis it was said that it would encourage humanitarian aid at non-governmental level and enlarge the scope of governmental assistance as inter-Korean dialogue would proceed. It was also stated that it would promote inter-Korean cooperation to help resolve the structural problems in North Korea's agriculture. Further he promised that restrictions imposed on South Koreans' visit to the North would be eased and investment in the North especially in labor-intensive industries and by small and medium scale industries would be encouraged.

Actually the Kim Dae-jung government after its inauguration announced that it will provide 50 thousand tons of corn to begin with through World Food Program (WFP), while pursuing inter-Korean dialogue for further aid. Even before the formal inauguration of the new government the visit to the North by 'Dr. Corn' was realized in late January this year and cooperative projects with the North is under way. Later he took initiative to create the 'International Corn Foundation' with the purpose of developing super-corn seeds suitable to the North Korean soil and

climate. Also Dr. Chung Hyuk and his colleague have been in the Rajin-Sonbong area to investigate possibilities of utilizing artificial seed potato in the North. It was by the invitation of North Korea's Committee for External Economic Cooperation. It was later reported that the same committee had proposed a project of commissioned agriculture to South Korea, in which North Korea rents an area of 150 thousand ha. and a South Korean management brings in materials and equipments for collaborative agriculture. A businessmen's delegation headed by a representative of South Korea's small and medium size industries is expected to visit Pyongyang in May.

### Concluding Remarks

A policy confusion in South Korea in the last few years was caused by a perceptual problem concerning the future of the North Korean regime. Diplomatic isolation and poverty of North Korea and later the absence of a charismatic leadership led some in the South to be impatient about the unification question. Increasing numbers of defectors and refugees left North Korea, and it was seen as symptoms of a system collapse. This tempted part of the Seoul government to forget the official principle that relations with the North should be improved with a gradualist approach through exchanges and cooperation. Lack of consistency in Seoul's policy toward Pyongyang seriously damaged their relations.

The complication around the nuclear issue constituted a political context in which the food shortage problem had to be resolved. The confrontation of linkage politics of both sides deteriorated the inter-Korean political atmosphere that had showed signs of

improvement around the time of the 1991 Basic Inter-Korean Agreement. To limit food aid to North Korea for political considerations was inappropriate, to say the least. South Korea's position cannot be strengthened by leaving North Korea to starve. To the contrary, such a policy - I wish it had not been the policy - would weaken South Korea's international standing. North Korea would seek other sources of aid and inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation would be retarded. It is a policy issue in which North Korea's loss cannot be South Korea's gain.

## □ 국문 요약

## 북한의 식량위기와 남북협력

북한의 식량난은 구조적 문제에서 비롯된 것으로, 그동안 북한의 곡물생산량은 인구성장률을 따라가지 못했다. 북한은 식량부족을 메꾸기 위해 수입에 의존해왔으며, 1980년대부터 곡물수입은 급속히 증가하였다. 북한의 주요수입국은 중국이었으나 1993년에 기상의 악화로 동북아시아의 곡물량이 감소되어 중국의 곡물수출량도 줄 수밖에 없었다. 더구나 1995년 북한의 홍수는 상황을 더욱 악화시켰다. 현재 북한은 기아상태만 면하게 하는 최소기준도 충족시키지 못하고 있다.

북한의 식량난의 직접적 원인은 농업생산기반의 붕괴와 최근 있었던 자연재해로 인한 토지의 황폐화도 있지만 외화수입의 부족과 그것에 따른 비료, 살충제, 연료의 부족도 상황을 악화시킨 큰 요인이다. 그러나 보다 근본적인 문제는 중앙집중적 경제체제와 집단농장제도이다. 개인에게 생산의 인센티브를 부여하지 않는 사회주의식 집단생산을 북한이 계속 고수하는 한 북한의 농업생산이 개선될 여지는 거의 없다고 볼 수 있다.

북한이 현재의 위기를 극복하기 위해서는, 첫째, 시급하게 식량원조를 받아야 하며, 둘째, 농업기술 및 재료의 지원을 받아야 하고, 셋째, 농업체계의 혁신이 필요하며, 마지막으로, 곡물을 수입하기 위한 외화를 벌기 위해 수출산업을 개발해야 한다.

1995년, 남한은 북한에 쌀을 지원하였으나 북한의 태도개선이 없다는 이유로 더 이상의 지원을 제한해왔으며 남북관계는 계속 경색되어 왔다. 그러나 북한의 식량난은 인도주의적 원조로, 또한 남북협력이라는 보다 포괄적인 개념으로 다루어져야 한다.

선거기간동안 제시되었던 김대중후보의 대북한 원칙은 첫째, 북한의 어떠한 평화위협을 시도도 단호하게 대처하겠다는 것, 둘째, 남한

은 흡수통일을 기도하지 않을 것이며 공존공영을 규범으로 삼을 것이라는 것, 셋째, 여러 분야에서 교류와 협력을 추진함으로써 남북관계를 개선하겠다는 것이었다. 북한의 식량위기와 관련하여서는, 비정부수준의 인도주의적 원조를 촉구하고 남북대화가 진전되면 정부수준의 지원도 확대하겠다는 것을 원칙으로 제시하였으며, 또한 북한농업의 구조적 문제해결을 위한 남북협력을 추진하겠다고 공약하였다. 실제로 김대중정부는, WFP를 통해 옥수수를 제공할 것이며 이후의 원조를 확대하기 위한 남북대화를 추진하겠다고 발표한 바 있다. 또한 이미 신정부 출범전에 '옥수수박사'가 북한을 방문하여 북한과의 프로젝트를 추진하고 있다.

지난 몇 년간 혼선을 빚어왔던 우리의 대북정책은 북한체제의 미래에 대한 잘못된 예측에서 비롯되었던 것이다. 즉 급속한 북한의 체제붕괴에 대한 기대로 조기통일론이 확산되었으며, 이는 교류와 협력의 점진적 접근을 통한 대북관계의 개선이라는 공식원칙을 도외시하게 했다. 이러한 남한의 비일관된 정책은 남북관계를 더욱 악화시켰다.

그러나 더 이상 대북 식량지원을 제한하는 것은 바람직하지 못하며 한국의 국제적 위상을 실추시킬 뿐이다. 또한 이 경우 북한은 다른 곳에서 식량지원을 받으려고 할 것이며, 따라서 남북교류 및 협력은 늦추어질 수밖에 없을 것이다. 대북식량지원문제는 결코 북한의 손해가 남한의 이익으로 이어지지 않는 문제이다.

## V

---

# The Korean Peninsula and Energy Cooperation in Northeast Asia

---

Reinhard Drifte

(Professor, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne)

### Introduction

The Northeast Asian region, including China and Japan, is one of the most dynamic regions for economic development. The GDP of this region was \$636 billion in 1995 and is predicted to reach \$1080 billion in 2010. This figure is higher than the GDPs of both the European Union and of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) area. Cooperation in this region is therefore necessary to protect the political and security framework for continued economic growth and development, to protect the environment, as well as to cope with the contrasting international trends toward economic regionalization on the one hand and economic globalization on the other hand.

The need of international and regional cooperation is probably felt most acutely in the energy sector. Although the present economic crisis has temporarily eased demand pressures, this will not last very long and it would be dangerous to lose further time.

The most important supplier countries for the energy future of the whole Asian region are both in Northeast Asia, PRC and Russia. Because of their huge energy supply potential, their own high growth rate of energy consumption, and their geographical location, they will have to be involved in addressing the energy future of Asia. Energy cooperation in Northeast Asia is therefore not an option, or a desirable political instrument to ease tensions in Northeast Asia if it can be made to work, but a dire economic necessity. If not properly addressed now, it will only aggravate tensions in this subregion of Asia as well as beyond. At best the tensions on the Korean peninsula could become a catalyst for a speedier and more resolute move towards energy cooperation, at worst these tensions could further increase tensions and even lead to the circumvention of the Korean peninsula in future energy cooperation schemes.

After looking at the energy needs and the supply situation of the major players, the paper will try to assess the political and economic requirements for the Korean peninsula to play the role of a catalyst for energy cooperation in Northeast Asia. The Tumen River Basin Project (TRADP) and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) will be considered as two projects which may illustrate the kind of framework enabling the inclusion of North Korea.

### **Energy Needs & Supply**

All energy forecasts for Northeast Asia have been thrown into doubt by the present economic crisis in the region and energy imports are declining for the time being. But what is worst for the

major concern of this paper is that lower energy prices also means less economic incentives to develop energy resources and build transport facilities in areas which are not only geographically, geologically or climatically difficult, but in addition have considerable political imponderability. Moreover, the present efforts to limit the factors contributing to climatic change and to protect the environment will mean greater focus on a limited range of energy sources, like natural gas and nuclear energy. On the other hand, Asia's energy needs are still huge and growing rapidly. It has been estimated that the increase in primary energy demand in Asia will be at an annual rate between 4 and 5 percent through 2010, in contrast to an annual global rise of about 2 percent.<sup>1)</sup> The situation of future oil supply looks particularly grim if Malaysia, Indonesia and possibly Vietnam will join PRC as net importers of oil over the next decade after contributing so much to Asia's oil supply at present. Middle Eastern crude provides more than 70 percent of the oil used by refineries in Northeast Asia (6 million barrels imported from the Middle East per day), and approximately 20 percent comes from Indonesia.<sup>2)</sup>

Any energy cooperation in Northeast Asia has to be based on an analysis of who are the main energy suppliers, who are the main consumers, and who are the main financiers of energy projects.

The primary regional exporters are Indonesia and Australia and the primary regional importers are Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The demand for natural gas is met almost entirely within the

---

1) Daniel Yergin, Dennis Eklof and Jefferson Edwards, "Fueling Asia's Recovery," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1998, p. 38.

2) Yergin, op. cit., p. 44.

region. Excluding the PRC, about two-thirds of coal demand is met by imports and three quarters of imports are supplied within the region.<sup>3)</sup>

But what is the future of individual energy sources? Lyuba Zarsky writes that the share of oil in electricity generation in Asia Pacific will slip from about 15 percent in 1993 to only about 5 percent in 2010 while growing in absolute terms. According to her the share of nuclear energy, on the other hand, is projected to increase from 12 to nearly 14 percent, hydropower from 15.5 to nearly 17 percent, and natural gas from about 12 to about 14 percent.<sup>4)</sup> According to Vyakhirev, gas covers 27 percent of overall energy consumption in the US and 24 percent in the world, but only 11 percent in Japan and 2 percent in the PRC.<sup>5)</sup>

The demand of oil and gas could increasingly be met by production in the PRC and Russia, and pipelines to transport it would be a vital part. This would need considerable long-term investment born mainly by the private sector. The main financiers would be Japan and South Korea. The buildup of nuclear energy would also require financial as well as technical support from these countries. In addition transport of electricity across national borders would open up new opportunities for taking energy where it is most needed or fetching the best price.

---

3) Lyuba Zarsky, "Energy Markets and the Environment in Asia Pacific," Paper to a Symposium on the United Nations System in the 21st Century, United Nations University, New York, November 14~15, 1997, in: *Connectivity Asia-Pacific Trade, Environment, and Development Monitor*, Vol. 1, No. 14, December 22, 1997, (reproduced in APRNet).

4) Zarsky, *ibid*.

5) R. I. Vyakhirev, "Natural gas in Russia: Potential and Prospects for the 21st Century," Proceedings of the 15th World Petroleum Congress (John Wiley & Sons, London 1997), p. 10.

Here a very summary overview of the main energy suppliers and energy consumer:

**China:** The PRC is still relying for 75 percent of its primary energy on coal.

It is worldwide the biggest coal producer, and its oil production ranks 6th or 7th. The PRC became in 1994 a net oil importer and its energy demand is estimated to grow at about 4.5 percent per year through 2010.<sup>6)</sup> The PRC has considerable oil and gas reserves and resources in the Tarim Basin and the East China Sea. There is great concern that its own growing energy demand will propel the PRC to rely increasingly on military force in the South China Sea.

This concern by the PRC's neighbours is probably the greatest political catalysts for energy cooperation in Asia. In addition the PRC is becoming more conscious of the need to reduce reliance on coal for its own consumption, and there are proposals to do so by developing other energy resources, exporting coal for oil and gas imports, changing inefficient energy consumption patterns, and relying more on market forces.<sup>7)</sup>

The PRC is the main energy supplier for North Korea and therefore an important partner for any joint energy project in Northeast Asia which would involve North Korea. The DPRK has increased fuel imports from the PRC in the face of shortages that allegedly left the country's transport system paralyzed.

---

6) Yergin, op. cit., p. 41.

7) Angang Hu, "Chinese Energy Strategy for the 21st Century: Production, Consumption, Trade and Security," Paper for the International Workshop on Asian Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Their Implications for Europe, Zushi (Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan) 23~25 January 1998.

The DPRK imported 134.8 tons of gasoline and 29.5 tons of diesel oil from the PRC between January 1 and February 11, accounting for 74 percent of DPRK oil imports. The increased import is linked to the lumber harvesting season.<sup>8)</sup>

**Japan:** More than 80 percent of Japan's energy is imported, including most of its oil of which 70 percent is coming from the Middle East (58 percent from Arab countries). Japan plans to focus more on gas and nuclear energy in order to keep CO-2 emissions per capita on the level of 1990. Natural gas (in the shape of LNG) is imported 77 percent from ASEAN countries (46.9 m tonnes in 1997) which is 58 percent of total world trade of LNG.<sup>9)</sup> Japan is worldwide the biggest coal importer. Most of it is coming from Australia. In 1992 it imported 119 million tons or 94 percent of its total requirements. It plays an important role in reducing the dependence on oil imports. Coal consumption increased between 1973 and 1990 by 6 percent while oil consumption declined by 29 percent. Coal consumption until the year 2000 was forecast to increase to 130 million tons and 134 million tons by 2010.<sup>10)</sup>

**Russia:** The biggest energy supplier in Northeast Asia is Russia, and a considerable part of this energy comes from Russia's Asian region. Most of it is consumed at home. In terms of oil production Russia is third after Saudi Arabia and the US.

---

8) "N. Korean Fuel Imports from PRC Increase," *Korea Times*, 5 March 1998.

9) *Financial Times*, 16 April 1998.

10) William F. Martin, Ryukichi Imai, Helga Steeg, "Energy Security in the Global Context," A report by the Trilateral Commission, 1997.

However, for reasons of political, economic and administrative reasons its production has sunk since 1987 by 40 percent. Russia is the leading natural gas producer and exporter. There are notably huge gas fields in Northern Siberia which have hardly been opened up. Offshore Sakhalin is estimated to have 0.4 trillion cubic metre [tcm] and Irkutsk 0.6-0.8 cubic metre in the Kovyktinskoye field alone.<sup>11)</sup>

Most foreign direct investment in the Russian energy sector have been done in the form of joint ventures, mostly in the oil industry. Such joint ventures at present have a share of 5 percent of Russian oil production, but its share in Russian oil exports is 15 percent.<sup>12)</sup>

### Political Issues

In the political realm there are issues which inhibit as well as provide impetus to regional energy cooperation. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea have already become a problem for the prospection of oil and gas reserves by international companies. The disputes could also hamper transport of energy. While this situation would enhance the importance of oil and gas in Northeast Asia, maritime disputes between the PRC and Korea in the Yellow Sea, between Japan and the PRC around the Senkaku/Jiaoyutai Islands Southwest of Okinawa, and between Japan and Russia to the North of Hokkaido are creating problems for energy cooperation

---

11) Mark J. Valencia, "Energy and Insecurity in Asia," *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 3, Autumn 1997, p. 87. For further information on Russian natural gas see also R. I. Vyakhirev, op. cit.

12) Martin, op. cit.

and energy transport such as pipelines in Northeast Asia. Other political problems are:

- Japan's reluctance to invest in Russia, notably in areas bordering the Northern Territories (i.e. Sakhalin) until the territorial dispute is solved
- Russia's political instability and provincial/national power struggle
- Pipelines going through several countries and provinces constitute a particular problem

Valencia makes also a good point by remarking that if the current focus on bilateral energy development of Irkutsk, Sakha (Yakutia) and Sakhalin continues, multilateral cooperation will suffer.<sup>13)</sup> However, in the project Sakhalin II, Japan and an American company are involved.

The PRC is getting increasingly interested in regional energy cooperation and there is awareness that the main financiers of such cooperation are not the PRC and Russia, but Japan and South Korea. It has an interest in reducing dependence on the volatile Middle East, but also to limit American influence in the region.<sup>14)</sup>

Political considerations have increased Japanese interest in regional energy cooperation. The end of the East-West conflict has brought the PRC and Russia together, and economic leverage with Russia is the most important tool for Japan to achieve the return

---

13) Valencia, op. cit., p. 87.

14) See e.g. Ji Zhiye, "Regional Cooperation in Northeast Asia," *Chinese Monthly Contemporary International Relations*, 12 December 1997, reproduced in: NAPSNet Report

of its claimed islands to the North of Hokkaido.

The PRC has become Japan's most important trading partner after the US. This is the background for Prime Minister Hashimoto's 'Eurasia policy' which he launched with a speech last summer. Concrete expressions of this interest particularly in energy was the visit to Tokyo by the Russian Minister for Fuel and Energy, S. V. Kirienko, in March this year, which was preceded by the meeting of the Japan-Russian Federation Energy Consultation in Tokyo on 28 January.

It goes without saying that the political conditions in North Korea are hardly conducive to foreign business. Although the government has been offering special regimes in the Rajin-Sonbong area, mostly South Korean companies or small- and medium-sized companies owned by ethnic Korean residents in Japan have invested.

### **Economic Issues**

Cost is probably the major obstacle for national, bilateral or regional energy development. The most important oil and gas fields in Russia (Irkutsk, Republic of Sakha, Sakhalin) and in the PRC (Tarim Basin) are very expensive to develop, with the exception of the offshore Sakhalin fields, very far from consumers, thus necessitating long pipelines. British Petroleum studied the exploration of an oil field in Irkutsk, but later gave up because of the cost.<sup>15)</sup> The production as well as transport costs of the Sakhalin gas field are also very expensive because of freezing and

---

15) Katsuhiko Suetsugu, "Energi Anzen Hoshō Kozo" (The Concept of Energy Security), *Kokusai Mondai*, June 1997, p. 54.

drift ice. In comparison, the production of gas from the Yakutia gas field in the Republic of Sakha in Eastern Siberia is cheaper.<sup>16)</sup> It is not clear whether pipelines or liquefaction (LNG) is in individual cases commercially the best way. There are many commercial risks connected with tax regimes, fees for countries through which pipelines are going, etc.

There has been involvement of foreign oil companies in prospecting for oil and gas in North Korea, but nothing seems to have come off. If the North Korean government is willing, the country could provide cheap real estate for transport equipment (e.g. pipelines, electricity grid, ports) and processing facilities (e.g. refineries, liquefaction plants) for energy from continental Asia to South Korea and Japan if not further (for LNG).

### Technical Issues

*The geology and topography of the major oil and gas fields notably in China and Russia present huge technical challenges which demand more funding and high technology from outside. The climatic and physical conditions of Sakha and Sakhalin are doubting because of the cold, permafrost, fog, and few hours of daylight. In addition the area through which a Yakutia pipeline would pass is one of the more seismically active zones in Russia.*<sup>17)</sup>

Differences in the technical specifications of the power grids in the region would demand considerable investment in adjustment.<sup>18)</sup>

---

16) Ibid., p. 55.

17) Valencia, op. cit., p. 91.

18) This section on power grid relies entirely on "Economic Integration of

The power grid in the DPRK operates at a nominal frequency of 60 Hz (Hertz, or cycles per second). Frequency control is poor, however, and the actual frequency on the system often reportedly falls to 57 to 59 Hz, and sometimes as low as 54 to 55 Hz. Although the ROK power grid operates at nominally the same frequency as the DPRK grid investment for power condition would be necessary if electricity generated from the new Light Water Reactors would be sold to the South.

Of the neighboring countries, both the PRC and Russia have electricity systems that operate at 50 Hz, while the grid in the Republic of Korea operates at 60 Hz. This difference means that in order to interconnect the DPRK grid with the Chinese and/or Russian grid, as has been contemplated under the Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP), it will either be necessary to convert from 60 Hz to 50 Hz or from 50 Hz to 60 Hz at the intersection of the power grids. Such interconnections are costly: the cost for an interchange to convert 1,000 MW of power has been estimated at \$460 million.

## Environmental Issues

Environmental consequences of the rapid increase in energy production, transportation and use will get more severe.<sup>19)</sup> The greatest concern is directed towards the PRC where the inefficient use of inappropriate coal as energy source is bound to increase, having a considerable impact not only on the PRC's environment,

---

the Korean Peninsula," Special Report 10 of the Institute for International Economics (IIE), January 1998, pp. 77-111.

19) For a thorough analysis see Lyuba Zarsky, op. cit.

but also on that of the Korean peninsula and Japan.

North Korea is contributing to this coal-based environmental degradation while also suffering from transboundary pollution from the PRC. There should therefore be considerable incentive for North Korea to participate in a regional environmental regime which reduces the use of environmentally inefficient energy, arrests further transboundary pollution, and introduces technologies for better use of scarce and expensive energy sources. The external input for this will, however, heavily depend on political as well as economic accommodation.

Lyuba Zarsky suggests the following areas of regional cooperation in the field of environmental protection:

- 1) better energy pricing, especially by removing energy subsidies
- 2) raising and harmonizing energy efficiency standards
- 3) developing innovative financing instruments to cover technological risk associated with new cleaner technologies
- 4) improving ecological information systems and monitoring, including the development of standardized data bases and performance indicators. In addition, countries could cooperate in creating or expanding the voices of scientists, the private sector and citizen groups in regional fora, such as the APEC's Regional Energy Cooperation Working Group.<sup>20)</sup>

## Solutions

It is obvious that the incongruous mix of suppliers and

---

20) Ibid.

consumers, of suppliers and financiers, as well as the tremendous commercial risks, and the political imponderability of energy production and transport demand international and regional cooperation. The better the mix of countries which have a stake, as suppliers, consumers, financiers and transit nations, the higher the chances of realizing energy projects. In the following I will therefore present some approaches.

### **Greater Market Openness for Market-based Solutions**

In Northeast Asia alone (PRC, Japan, Taiwan, North and South Korea), the investment requirements of the power sector are projected to average \$72 billion per year for the next 15 years - a total of \$1.8 trillion.<sup>21)</sup> Asian governments must therefore change their regulatory frameworks in order to provide sufficient incentives for private companies to shoulder the major burden of this investment. The present economic crisis and the conditions imposed by the IMF and other international financial bodies will hasten this process of opening countries like South Korea and even Japan to the international economy. On the other hand, the economic crisis will dampen the Korean willingness to invest e.g. in Russian energy resources, provide its strategic location for pipelines, and make energy-related investments even more than before dependent on the willingness of Japanese banks. Most of the developments of energy resources and related infrastructure such as pipelines will demand considerable capital inflows from Japan and South Korea over several decades.

---

21) Ibid.

However, as Valencia points out, the foreign direct investments of these two countries for energy is declining as part of their structural adjustments. It can only be hoped, as Daniel Yergin does, that the urgency of providing energy for the future will help to overcome these problems.

### **Creating an Economic and Political Regime**

Most of the political and economic problems necessitate some kind of regional codification of technical standards and investment guarantees. Two existing regional organizations, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) have made some minor contributions. The PECC's Mineral and Energy Forum (MEF) has facilitated discussions and consultations on key issues since 1986. But its findings and recommendations are non-official and non-binding. APEC is presently more focusing on market liberalization although these efforts could indirectly support a greater market force approach to the energy sector as well. Moreover, only since this year has Russia become a member of APEC. Paik Keun-Wook has suggested in the interim the establishment of the 'Northeast Asian Energy Regime' (NAER).<sup>22)</sup>

One model mentioned most often in this context is the Energy Charter Treaty. In June 1990, the European Council in Dublin proposed to the then Soviet Union and the Central and Eastern European States an intensive energy cooperation. The US, Canada, Japan, Australia, and other OECD countries accepted this proposal.

---

22) Keun-Wook Paik, *Gas and Oil in Northeast Asia. Policies, Projects and Prospects*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1995, p. 67.

A total of 51 states from East and West, including Japan, signed in 1991 the resulting European Energy Charter, followed in the meantime by Mongolia and Macedonia.

The European Energy Charter evolved then into the Energy Charter Treaty which was signed in Lisbon in December 1994 by 49 countries and opened to ratification. The key points of the Treaty, which encompasses all sources of energy, are the protection of foreign direct investments, easier transit of energy and energy products without discrimination, the application of the WTO rules for energy trade also to non-WTO members, international arbitration of disputes, the development of fair rules of competition, the facilitation of technology transfer, access to capital markets, reduction of environmental pollution and the introduction of the polluter-pays principle, and measures to enhance legal transparency. The Treaty will enter into force on 16 April 1998 after 30 countries have ratified it. The US and Canada have so far not signed the Treaty. The ratification of the Treaty by Mongolia is expected this year after it signed the Treaty on 26 April 1997. Japan signed the Treaty on 16 June 1995 and will probably ratify it this year. It seems that Japan is still waiting for the ratification of the Treaty by Russia. The ratification by the Russian Duma is still pending, but the Russian government has declared to follow already now its guidelines. The Contracting Parties meet in the Charter Conference which is the largest intergovernmental organization dealing with energy.

It is interesting to note that the US did not sign the Energy Charter Treaty of 1994, possibly fearing European domination of this movement or simply confident of its 'strong bilateralism.' At the same time there are efforts under way between Japan and the

US to establish an 'Asia Pacific Energy Treaty' using the 'Japanese-American 21st Century Committee.'<sup>23)</sup> It can be expected that the US will use its considerable security leverage with two of the major Northeast Asian countries, Japan and South Korea, to promote this scheme and shape the regulatory framework more to its own liking. Other leverage consists in American funds and technological expertise. One can expect that the PRC and even Russia will see here an attempt at American domination which they want to prevent through regional energy cooperation.

The simplest, and with regard to the PRC and North Korea diplomatically easiest way, would be to extend the Energy Charter Treaty to Asia through its ratification by all Northeast Asian countries, after the Central Asian have already done so. As mentioned above Mongolia and Japan are likely to ratify this year, and there is an ongoing intensive exchange of information with the PRC. South Korea shows consistent interest.<sup>24)</sup> The Energy Charter Treaty would provide a regulatory framework for the integration of North Korea without WTO membership, ease the legal environment and provide a legally binding dispute settlement which would facilitate the huge and long term commitment needed for energy cooperation in Northeast Asia.

## ASIATOM

A more limited regional regime could be created by focusing only on nuclear energy rather than on all kinds of energy as the

---

23) Suetsugu, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

24) Letter from the Secretary General, Dr. Schütterle, to the author, 10 February 1998.

Energy Charter Treaty does. In view of the building of two Light Water Reactors (LWR) by the Korean Peninsula Energy Organization (KEDO) North Korea might have more or at least more immediate incentives to participate in it. However, such a nuclear energy-focused approach at regional cooperation is more loaded with political issues because of the nuclear arms control aspect. Such a nuclear regime has been tentatively referred to by some such as Kaneko Kumao as 'ASIATOM' which will be used in the following for convenience's sake.<sup>25)</sup>

The production of nuclear energy in Asia is increasing rapidly, with more countries contemplating to use it as a cleaner or alternative energy supply (i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines). In 1995 Asia produced 16.5 percent of the world's total nuclear energy which is to increase to 28.9 percent in 2010.<sup>26)</sup> Problems related to nuclear energy offer various incentives for regional cooperation. There are first of all commercial incentives, i.e. providing a safe regulatory framework for selling and purchasing nuclear power station, reducing development costs of new reactor types (e.g. the Fast Breeder Reactor), and facilitating the transportation of generated energy. The lack of a safe operation system in one Asian country may lead to an accident which not only would hurt the health of people in other countries, but would seriously erode the public acceptance of nuclear energy everywhere. With the growth of a politically more astute middle class in many Asian countries, environmental concerns are

---

25) Kaneko Kumao, *Nihon no kaku, Ajia no kaku* (Japan's Nuclear, Asia's Nuclear), Asahi Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1997.

26) Tatsujiro Suzuki, "Lessons from EURATOM for Possible Regional Nuclear Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific," in: Michael Stankiewicz ed., *Energy and Security in Northeast Asia*, IGCC Policy Paper, no. 24, 24 August 1996, p. 37.

becoming a problem for the promotion of nuclear energy, notably in connection with the issue of the disposal of nuclear waste. The issue of how to manage the various categories of nuclear waste, however, has not been settled in a satisfactory way in the DPRK or, for that matter, in any of the countries of the region. South Korea's storage facilities are approaching their capacity in the next five years. Waste disposal is a sore issue in Russo-Japanese relations. The acceptance by North Korea in 1997 of importing nuclear waste from Taiwan over a two-year period was strongly opposed by South Korea, which feared that the absence of a reliable regulatory framework would cause environmental damage.<sup>27)</sup>

On the political side a regional nuclear energy organization would help Japan to reduce regional fears about its growing plutonium stockpiles and its nuclear energy programme in general. The creation of (a) regional enrichment and reprocessing facility(ies) could enhance safety and the nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as end the discrimination of Japan being allowed by the US to have a full nuclear fuel cycle while South Korea is not allowed one. It would be important to assure, that ASIATOM is not perceived by South Korea as a tool to perpetuate this discrimination. Such an organization would allow South Korea to promote better the denuclearization pledge to abandon reprocessing and uranium enrichment as included in the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, concluded in 1991.

There have been several proposals for a regional nuclear

---

27) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Republic of Korea, "Taiwan's Attempt to Transfer Nuclear Waste to North Korea," 3 February 1997.

energy organization. (See Table 1.) They are variously called ASIATOM, PACIFICATOM, or PACATOM (Pacific Atomic Energy Community). Japanese scholars and members of the nuclear industry are probably the most active in working for such an organization.<sup>28)</sup> An Asia-American group looking at such an organization is the International Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP).<sup>29)</sup> Most proposals include the US, but there is the problem of how Sino-American relations would influence the chances of ASIATOM. Whereas American proposals have a strong interest in nuclear non-proliferation, Japanese proposals are more interested in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. There is no consensus whether the PRC has to be part of such an organization, whether it is simply too big for it, or whether it is at all willing to submit itself to a regional regime, particularly one with a strong American backing of nuclear non-proliferation interests.<sup>30)</sup>

---

28) Murata Hiroshi, *Watakushi no egaku 'Ajiatomu'* (My Plan for ASIATOM); Kaneko Kumao, *Nihon no kaku, Ajia no kaku* (Japan's Nuclear, Asia's Nuclear), Asahi Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1997. For an English summary see Kaneko Kumao, "For Nuclear Safety and Security in Asia: A Proposal of an 'Asiatom' concept," *Atoms in Japan*, April 1997, pp. 14~17. Hiroyoshi Kurihara, "Regional Approaches to Increase Nuclear Transparency," in: *Disarmament (UN)* vol. XVIII, no. 2, 1996, pp. 25~40.

29) See summary of the Seventh Meeting October 30~31, 1997 in: Fukushima, Japan, done by Ralph Cossa, distributed by the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network, 11 November 1997.

30) For a thorough discussion of this point see William Clark & Ryukichi Imai, eds. *Next Steps in Arms Control and Non-proliferation*, Final Report of the US-Japan Study Group on Arms Control and Non-Proliferation after the Cold War, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington D.C. 1996, pp. 94~103.

Table 1. Comparison of Various Proposals for ASIATOM Concept

Proposals	Area of Cooperation									
	Safety	Public Relations	Industry Cooperation	Spent Fuel Management	Waste Management	Regional Safeguards	Pu Management	Nonproliferation Export Control	Nuclear Disarmament	
ASIATOM (Kaneko)	○	○	○	○	○	○		○	○	
PACIFICATOM (Kano)	○	○	○	○	○			○		
Ryukichi Imai (Japan)	○		○ (enrich)	○	○	○				
Atsuyuki Suzuki (Japan)				○	○ (R&D)			○		
Kunio Uematsu (Japan)	○			○				○		
PACATOM (Manning)	○			○	○	○	○	○	○	
William Dirks (USA)	○			○	○	○	○	○		
Jor-San Choi (USA)	○			○	○	○	○	○		
Y. M. Choi (S.Korea)	○		○ (R&D)	○	○		○	○		
J. Carlson (Australia)	○			○	○	○	○	○		

Source: Tatsujiro Suzuki, "International Implications of Proposed 'Asiatom' Concepts - Comparative Assessment of Various Proposals," prepared for the "Japan-Korea Dialogue on Nuclear Cooperation Asia," organized by the Japan Council on Nuclear Energy and Disarmament, Seoul, 20 February 1997.

In view of the PRC's distance from KEDO, however, it may be advisable from a Korean perspective to include the PRC. But because of America's involvement in KEDO, the greater arms control implications of nuclear energy, and the perceived need of balancing big powers like the PRC and Russia, the US may be able to make a stronger case with its regional friends for an organization like PACATOM (including also Australia and Canada) rather than ASIATOM. In any case, South Korean cooperation with Japan, which has a very strong stake in either a ASIATOM/PACATOM, would be most advisable.

Possible tasks of such a regional organization are:

- a regional safeguard system
- a regional fuel cycle agency
- a nuclear power safety regulatory system
- an agency for cooperation on research and development
- a regional waste disposal and transport system

How can North Korea be motivated to become a member? The country is now a signatory of the NPT and has a safeguard agreement with the IAEA which applies to all its nuclear facilities, including the two KEDO reactors now under construction. In order to maintain and develop its nuclear industry and to dispose of its own nuclear waste it will need foreign technology which could be provided through ASIATOM. Membership in ASIATOM and adherence to a regional nuclear waste disposal regime will facilitate gaining foreign currency through the acceptance of foreign waste. Finally, safeguards done later through an agreement between the

IAEA and ASIATOM, involving possibly Chinese and Russians, may ease the acceptance of safeguards in North Korea.

South Korea will have to play an important role in the set-up of such a regional nuclear energy organization. As Kaneko Kumao, one of the main proponents of ASIATOM in Japan put it, it would be preferable if a new initiative would come from a country or a group of countries in the region with the exception of the US or Japan.<sup>31)</sup> This clearly aims at South Korea with its strong civilian nuclear programme. A limited proposal centering on safety, nuclear emergencies and radioactive waste management was made by Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto when he proposed at the Moscow Nuclear Safety summit in April 1996 to hold an international conference on nuclear safety. On 3 November 1996 Japan hosted the Tokyo Conference on Nuclear Safety in Asia.<sup>32)</sup> As far as this author understands, however, Korea's attitude is still very cautious because of fears about more safeguards or constraints on its nuclear programme.<sup>33)</sup> But the more Korea is part of the formative stage of ASIATOM, the more it will be able to alleviate these concerns and draw North Korea into the new regional nuclear energy framework. A beginning was made when Soon-Heung Chang, commissioner of the Nuclear Safety Commission of Korea, suggested in 1997 on behalf of his government the establishment of The Asia Nuclear Safety

---

31) Kaneko Kumao, *For nuclear safety and security in Asia*, op. cit.

32) Participants came from China, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, and the G-7 countries, Russia, Singapore, Pakistan, EU, IAEA and OECD/NEA were represented by observers.

33) Hahnkyu Park, "Comprehensive Security and Regional Nuclear Cooperation in East Asia: The Case of South Korea," Paper delivered at the Workshop on Asian Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Their Implications for Europe, Zushi (Kanagawa), 23-24 January 1998.

Consultation Organization (ANSCO), thus echoing the thrust of the Tokyo nuclear safety conference.

## Projects

### *Tumen*

The Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP) is a regional project of the UNDP to accelerate the development of the Tumen river area in a multilateral fashion.<sup>34)</sup> It was adopted by the UNDP in July 1991. Until January 1994, the UNDP envisaged a "master plan" approach which aimed to achieve balanced development over the whole region. Because of difficulties among the participating countries the "progressive harmonization approach" was adopted instead. It tries to achieve first what is easier, thereby minimizing political difficulties.<sup>35)</sup> The biggest problem is lack of funding because the financially most important country, Japan, is very reluctant. North Korea tries to be admitted to the Asian Development Bank, but member states do not yet agree. Progress is also not helped by great political and economic differences between the member countries. The result is that each of the main countries (PRC, Russia, North Korea) is developing its own part of the Tumen river area without much coordination.

---

34) The full member countries are China, Russia, Mongolia, South Korea and North Korea. Japan and other international organizations including the Asian Development Bank are observers.

35) Ick-Soo Kim, "TRADP: A Mini-Model for Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation?" in: Jang-Hee Yoo & Chang-Jae Lee, eds. *Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation. Progress in Conceptualization and in Practice*, Korean Institute for International Economic Policy, Seoul 1994, p. 129~30.

Coordination is limited to promotional efforts for foreign investment, improvement of cross-border trade through reductions in institutional and border barriers, and attention to pre-feasibility and feasibility studies.<sup>36)</sup>

The most promising area of cooperation of TRADP is transport, notably shipping over the Tumen river and rail connections to Europe. The Tumen River Delta Area Development could therefore play an important role in enabling energy cooperation in Northeast Asia because essential trade and transit cargo transportation links will go through it, linking not only Europe and the region, but also providing links between the interior and sea ports. Land, sea and air routes are being planned, and a first start was made with the overfly rights through North Korean airspace for civilian airliners from this year on.

If agreement could be reached on pipelines or electricity lines going through the area, it would be very beneficial for all concerned countries because it could generate immediate income as well as provide energy. This would encourage true cooperation rather than parallel development since the mix of suppliers, customers and transit hosts would be more ideal.

### *KEDO*

While the creation of ASIATOM or PACATOM is still far off, KEDO is the first regional nuclear energy venture which is closely linked to arms control, and since it involves North Korea, it

---

36) Third Tumen Consultative Commission, Beijing 17 November 1997, Final list of endorsements and resolutions, reproduced by APRENet, 10 December 1997.

deserves special attention here. The idea of swapping safeguards for the supply of LWR is supposed to have come originally from the South Korean government in the wake of the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, concluded in 1991.

According to the Japanese newspaper, *Sankei Shimbun*, North Korea mentioned to the US in July 1993 that President Roh Tae-woo promised to North Korea in July 1992 that light water reactors are to be provided to the North in exchange for an agreement between North and South on nuclear inspection.<sup>37)</sup> After a very tense period during which North Korea threatened to leave the NPT and pursue a nuclear programme suspected by the West as leading to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the US concluded in October 1994 the Agreed Framework with North Korea which led in March 1995 to the establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The members of the Board are the US, South Korea and Japan, joined in 1997 by the EU. In exchange for the delivery of two LWRs and the interim supply of heating oil, North Korea promised to submit its nuclear programme to safeguards and to freeze its existing reactors. Although the PRC is North Korea's biggest supplier of oil, it has not joined KEDO but it was invited to join and become home to the headquarters of KEDO.<sup>38)</sup> The official Chinese position is that it would be more useful outside of KEDO than inside. Recently, the PRC showed interest in supplying oil to KEDO, but the

---

37) *Sankei Shimbun* 2 December 1997. For the best account of the whole issue see Leon Sigal, *Disarming Strangers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

38) *Asahi Evening News*, 18 February 1995; *Washington Post*, 16 April 1995.

proposed oil price was too high for KEDO.<sup>39)</sup> Russia is also not a member but showed great interest in supplying its own LWR. KEDO failed therefore to include the two biggest regional actors, both which have a considerable political stake in North Korea and in the security on the Korean peninsula. Given the commercial circumstances of South Korea providing most of the money and Russia and the PRC not being able to help with oil supplies, this situation is not surprising. However, the PRC and/or Russia could be involved in future as customers for the generated energy.

In the meantime KEDO has surprised most specialists with having survived for so long against many odds. It is the first subregional venture which involves North Korea, if we exclude the Tumen project which so far is being pursued more nationally than multilaterally.

The lesson which can be drawn from KEDO is that a highly focused energy project, backed by the right mix of political supporters, suppliers, consumers and financiers, has the strongest possibilities of realization. However, whereas the US with its leverage over North Korea is absolutely vital for KEDO with its limited membership, its participation in a wider Northeast Asian venture with the most important suppliers of energy (Russia and China) is much more problematic. But it can be argued that a non-nuclear energy venture would be much less political.

---

39) Interview with a former high official of the KEDO Secretariat in New York. 5 March 1998.

### *Other Projects*

The greatest immediate regional energy cooperation may be seen in the building of gas pipelines from the Russian interior to the coast. There are numerous reports about plans, agreements and signed memoranda, but nothing has yet led to a concrete start. Marubeni (together with Mobil, the UNDP and World Bank) and Mitsubishi Shosha (together with Exxon) are competing to build pipelines tapping Central Asian gas for Northeast Asia.<sup>40)</sup> The region of the Caspian Sea - Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, and the Caspian Sea itself - is at present the most talked about area for oil and gas exploration, holding reserves which are said to be only second to those of the Middle East. Instead of only being exported to the West, pipelines may transport it in future also to the East up to the Korean peninsula and Japan.

The improved relationship between Russia and the PRC has encouraged more joint ventures between the two countries of which some will necessarily also involve third parties. Both countries announced a joint venture to explore gas reserves in Irkutskaya Oblast and to build a gas pipeline to South Korea via Mongolia and the PRC. A framework agreement governing the pipeline project - expected to cost \$12 billion - was signed in November 1997.<sup>41)</sup> Gazprom of Russia announced in 1996 that it would sign a contract with the Chinese Oil and Gas Cooperation to develop fields in the PRC. A high voltage power line is also planned from Eastern Siberia to the PRC.<sup>42)</sup> However, Russia has

---

40) Valencia, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

41) Jennifer Anderson, "The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership," Adelphi Paper no. 315, IISS, December 1997, p. 35.

proved to be a very difficult business partner due to its political instability, lack of a firm legal framework, and conflict between the centre and the provinces.<sup>43)</sup>

The PRC is very interested in developing its relations with the new Central Asian states. There have been Chinese proposals for an 'oil bridge' linking the PRC, Central Asia, Russia, the Middle East, Japan and Korea. Chinese companies have secured agreement to assist Mongolia in developing its oil and gas resources, and the PRC expressed interest in two Central Asian oil-pipeline plans. One would link Turkmenistan with the PRC and Japan, the other would run from Kazakstan through the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang to the PRC and Shanghai.<sup>44)</sup> One deal is a planned \$4.3 billion investment by the PRC National Petroleum Corporation to acquire a share of 60 percent stake in Kazakstan's main oil company, Aktyubinsk munaigaz to help develop the country's oil fields and build a 1,900 mile pipeline to the PRC.<sup>45)</sup> This pipeline could become part of a pipeline system going on to other neighbouring countries.

Japan is the most important partner for any multinational energy project because it is the biggest energy importer and richest financier. In order to further diversify its crude oil supplies the country is looking towards Central Asia and Siberia.<sup>46)</sup> It has even

---

42) Anderson, *ibid.*

43) See for more detail, Gilbert Rozman. "Troubled Choices for the Russian Far East: Decentralization, Open Regionalism, and Internationalism," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. XI, No. 2, Summer/Fall 1997, pp. 537-569.

44) Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

45) Yergin, *op. cit.*, p. 42. See also Asahi Shimbun, 11 February 1998.

46) For an interesting although somewhat dated overview of plans and options for pipelines by Japan, see Keun-Wook Paik, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-194.

suggested an Asian version of the International Energy Agency (IEA) of the OECD to establish a system for stockpiling and lending oil and other energy resources, thus indicating its Asian leadership ambitions.<sup>47)</sup> Development of natural gas in Irkutsk has led to the formation of a consortium organized by Russia, the PRC, South Korea and Japan which foresees laying pipelines for transporting pumped gas from Russia to the PRC. Japanese companies are taking part in two of the three crude oil and natural gas development projects now going on in the offshore of Sakhalin.<sup>48)</sup> Further indications of increased Japanese interest also on the government side was a first meeting on the joint development of the Irkutsk gas field which took place in Moscow from 23-24 December 1997, at which representatives from Japan (Sekiyu Kodan), Russia, the PRC, Korea, and Mongolia took part and which resulted in a joint memorandum.<sup>49)</sup>

## Conclusions

Economic cooperation in Northeast Asia is facing many problems. Gilbert Rozman has recently given an interesting overview of all the political, economic and cultural issues involved which account for what he calls Northeast Asia's "flawed regionalism."<sup>50)</sup> The present economic crisis in Asia and the end of the bubble economy in Japan has not made things easier. However, the improvement of Chinese-Russian relations and the new

---

47) *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 28 October 1997.

48) *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 28 October 1997.

49) *Sankei Shimbun*, 24 December 1997.

50) Gilbert Rozman, "Flawed Regionalism: Reconceptualizing Northeast Asia in the 1990s," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1998, pp. 1~27.

Japanese enthusiasm for "Eurasian politics" and improvement of relations with Russia are positive factors, as is the opportunity for a new beginning of North-South relations after Kim Dae-jung's election as president of South Korea.

In contrast to incremental regionalism and diffuse regional cooperation projects, energy cooperation can be more focused and by its very scope and need of capital will have to involve the central governments at the highest level. The urgency of securing energy and generating income for regions which are economically deprived, but rich in natural resources and/or ideal for siting energy-related facilities, will provide the greatest impetus for multilateral regionalism.

It is useful to understand that most economic and technical obstacles to energy cooperation in Northeast Asia have not only a negative effect on the chances of cooperation, but may also have an inherent catalytic element for cooperation which could be developed with sufficient political engineering at the highest governmental level.

The present economic crisis in Asia is temporally dampening energy demand and we may not yet have seen the worst of it. The long-term impact of this crisis might be greater on the willingness of the private sector to meet Asia's energy demand than on the medium-term health of the regional economies. The crisis thus adds another difficulty to the making of heavy long-term investments which are needed to adequately meet future energy demand in Asia. On the other hand, strong demands by international financial organizations for deregulation will create a more benign regulatory framework for domestic as well as foreign investment. Devaluation of regional currencies also facilitates

investment by non-regional companies if the regulatory framework is made more permissive as is happening now in South Korea.

In the end, energy cooperation in Northeast Asia is not an option, or a useful political instrument to ease tensions in Northeast Asia if it can be made to work, but above everything else a dire economic necessity. Oil consumers may have soon to rely more on Asian oil because of the volatile situation in the Middle East which is due to the failure of the peace process between Israel and its neighbours, the confrontation with Iraq and the tension in the Gulf. The question in the first place is therefore not how energy cooperation in Northeast Asia can help to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula, but how the growing energy needs of Asia can prevent the tensions here to grow even more. If the tensions on the Korean peninsula can serve as a catalyst for speeding up energy cooperation in Asia, all the better. Overloading the regional agenda of energy cooperation with the problems on the Korean peninsula may be counterproductive, and the same applies to adding other political considerations like arms control or territorial claims. It will need therefore considerable political investment by all subregional players and overcoming parochial considerations and limitations. Moreover, American efforts to shape the regulatory framework to its own liking, using its bilateral leverage in the fields of security, finance and technology, could create further regional tensions and encounter Chinese and Russian resistance. It may also push international interest to the gas and oil fields of Southeast Asia rather than development of oil and gas fields on the Asian continent, thus defeating the intention of involving North Korea. In view of notably Chinese sensitivities towards the role of the US, the Energy Charter Treaty should be

considered as a politically neutral attempt of creating an appropriate regulatory framework. If it is correct that the pressing financial needs of some Asian countries will hasten the move toward market-based solutions to energy supply, then these private players will demand for their long-term investments political stability and market order which would also be conducive to the easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula. Competitive market forces in a politically volatile environment may not lead to greater energy security, but to sharper political security problems. At worst, the present tensions on the Korean peninsula could therefore further increase and lead even to the circumvention of the Korean peninsula in future schemes of energy cooperation. At best, these tensions may serve as a catalyst or supplementary impetus for regional energy cooperation if skilfully handled by governments.

□ 국문요약

## 한반도와 동북아시아에서의 에너지협력

현재 동북아시아는 지역주의의 부상과 더불어 정치, 경제, 문화 등 제반 분야에 있어서 많은 문제에 접하고 있다. 현재 아시아 - 특히 일본 - 의 경제위기 역시 문제를 더욱 어렵게 하고 있다. 그러나 중러관계 및 러·일관계의 개선, 또한 김대중대통령당선이후 새롭게 맞이하게 된 남북관계개선의 기회는 긍정적 요소로 작용하고 있다.

에너지부문은, 지역주의가 부상하고 지역협력이 분산되고 있는 현실에도 불구하고 협력할 수 있는 부문이며, 그 자본의 범위와 필요에 의해서도 정부간 수준의 협력을 필요로 하는 부문이다. 에너지를 확보하고 소득을 창출 - 특히 경제적으로 빈곤하지만 천연자원이 풍부하고 에너지관련 시설을 설치하기에 적합한 지역에서 - 해야 할 필요성은 다자간 지역주의로 나아가는 추동력을 제공할 것이다.

동북아시아지역의 에너지협력을 저해하는 경제적·기술적 장애요인은 부정적인 것만은 아니며 정부수준의 정치적 조정과 그것에 따른 협력을 촉진하는 결과를 가져올 수도 있다.

현재의 아시아경제위기는 일시적인 에너지수요 감소현상을 보이고 있지만 아직 최악의 상태는 아니다. 이러한 위기는 지역경제의 활성화에 미치는 중기적 영향보다 아시아의 에너지수요를 충족시킬 사적 부문에 끼치는 장기적 영향이 더욱 심각하다고 할 수 있다. 즉 아시아에서의 미래의 에너지수요를 충족시킬 장기적 투자를 유인하는데 어려움이 따른다는 것이다. 반면, 국제금융기구들의 강력한 탈규제의 요구는 국내 및 해외의 투자여건을 보다 완화시킬 수 있다. 현재 한국에서 진행되는 것처럼 규제가 보다 완화된다면 지역통화의 평가 절하는 외부 기업의 투자를 보다 촉진하게 될 것이다.

결론적으로 동북아시아의 에너지협력은 선택사항도 아니며, 또한 동북아시아의 긴장을 완화할 수 있는 유용한 정치적 도구도 아니다. 즉, 동북아시아의 에너지협력은 무엇보다도 경제적 필요이다. 향후 석유소비국들은, 끊이지 않는 분쟁으로 인해 예측이 불가능한 중동보다는 아시아에 보다 의존하게 될 것이다. 그러므로 문제는 어떻게 동북아시아의 에너지협력이 한반도 긴장을 완화할 것인가가 아니라, 어떻게 아시아에서의 증가하는 에너지요구가 이곳의 긴장을 막을 것인가 하는 점이다. 차라리 한반도의 긴장이 아시아의 에너지협력을 촉진할 수 있다면 더욱 좋을 것이다.

아시아지역의 에너지협력문제와 한반도문제를 결부시키는 것은 오히려 역효과를 가져올 수 있으며 다른 정치적 문제들, 예를 들면 군비통제, 영토분쟁문제를 결부시키는 것도 마찬가지이다. 더구나 미국이 안보, 재정, 기술상의 이유를 수단으로 하여 자기 의도대로 통제하려는 노력은 아시아지역의 긴장을 더욱 심화시킬 것이며 중국과 러시아의 저항에 직면하게 될 것이다. 이는 결국 국제적 관심을 아시아대륙의 석유 및 가스개발보다는 동남아시아의 석유, 가스에로 관심을 돌리는 결과를 가져오게 될 것이며, 결과적으로 북한을 포함시키려는 계획은 실패로 돌아가게 될 것이다.

현재 일부아시아국가들의 재정부족의 압박이 에너지공급에 대한 시장적 해결로 나아가게 할 경우, 사적부문들은 자신의 장기적 투자를 위해 정치적 안정과 시장질서를 요구하게 될 것이며 이는 결과적으로 한반도의 긴장완화에 기여하게 될 수도 있다.

## VI

---

# Mutual Cooperation on Information Technology between South and North Korea: A Bottom-up Approach

---

Chan-Mo Park

(Professor, Pohang University of Science & Technology)

### Introduction

With the downfall of the communist Soviet Union and the opening of the People's Republic of China, the ideological Cold War between the Eastern and Western blocks has ceased, and a new era of international cooperation, through APEC, EU and NAFTA, has arrived. Every country is busily preparing for the 21st Century, which is characterized as an era of informatization, globalization and openness. In particular, the rapid spread of the Internet is playing a great role in globalization, in that information flows on it across national boundaries, without time or content constraints.

Riding this world-wide tide, it is anticipated that North Korea will open its tightly closed door, and that a peaceful reunification, strongly desired by the 70 million Korean people, will be achieved sometime in the future.

Already a milestone in this regard has been set. The International Conference on Computer Processing for Korean Language was held annually for three consecutive years beginning 1994 at Yanbian, China, with scores of North Korean scholars participating each year. Paper presentations and discussions were conducted under a very warm atmosphere and a joint agreement among the South Korean, North Korean and Chinese delegates was achieved in 1996 in four areas; information processing terminologies, keyboard arrangement, Korean character ordering and a coding system for Korean characters.

Nevertheless, when we consider that even postal letter exchange is not permitted between the South and the North, it is clear that there are still many hurdles to cross toward reunification. Yet, we should invest great effort to be prepared for such an event. In particular, it is important to understand the degree of informatization in North Korea in order to formulate proper policies toward both reunification and for the coming Information Society. We should learn from the experience of Germany, which faced many difficulties due to the difference in the levels of telecommunication technology between the East and West, even though they had significant information exchange before reunification. They regretted that they did not make the gap narrower before reunification. It will definitely help us to reduce such problems if we understand the current status of information technology in the North and pursue mutual cooperation in order to narrow the gap between the South and the North.

In this paper current status of information technology in North Korea is presented before a bottom-up approach for a mutual cooperation between North and South Korea is suggested.

## **Informatization Trend in North Korea**

### *Current Status of Information Technology*

#### 1. National Policies on Science & Technology

The fundamental policies on science and technology in North Korea are based on the Articles 27 and 51 of the Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which state that science and technology are essential for the nation's economic activities. Also, they state that science and technology will free the workers from labor and reduce the differences between physical work and mental work. The nation's technological development will be promoted by strengthening creative cooperation among the scientists, technicians and producers.

The North Korean government has been driving very hard the so-called Three Great Revolution of Ideology, Technology, and Culture which are considered to be the foundation for the construction of socialism. Besides, North Korea put great efforts on the Self-reliance (Jucheism), Modernization, and Scientification.

With an ambitious goal of raising its high-tech level to that of an advanced country in a short period of time, North Korea has stressed electronics and automation fields from the early 1980s. Kim Il Sung emphasized this in his New Year's messages and the Central Committee of the Party included "how to achieve a technological revolution" in its agenda.

As far as information technology is concerned, the North Korean government realized its importance and started to establish a master plan after Kim Il Sung toured eastern Europe in 1984. He

found that electronics related high-tech was a key to economic development, and signed technical cooperation contracts with many of the countries visited. Also, North Korean students were sent to those countries to learn modern technologies. In 1988, a three-year plan for the promotion of Science and Technology began, and the government started massive funding for the information science and industry.

The first 3-year plan (1988~1991) consisted of 15 general projects and 44 goal-oriented projects which emphasized the production of semiconductors, the establishment of a computer network centered around KCC (Korea Computer Center) as a part of computerization of economic sectors as well as promoting software industry, and hardware and automation components. The second 3-year plan (1991~1994) aimed to computerize all sectors of the nation by the year 2000 and to industrialize the production of IC chips. They developed 16 megabit IC chips, produced 32-bit microcomputers and carried out R&D on 64-bit microcomputers.

On the other hand, North Korea, through the International Cooperations Bureau of the State Commission of Science & Technology, has been asking for help from United Nations Organizations such as UNDP and UNIDO. Also, the North signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the UNU/IIST (United Nations University/International Institute for Software Technology) on a joint effort for software development. North Korea is stressing software sectors more than hardware development due to its poor economic situation and difficulties in importing advanced equipment. This policy is well reflected in a letter sent by Kim Jong-il to the PIC (Pyongyang Informatics Center) on the 10th anniversary in July, 1996. The president of the PIC together with many researchers received the national medal of honor.

## 2. Hardware Status

North Korea built an 8-bit PC prototype "Bongwha 4-1" in 1982. They are now manufacturing 16-bit and 32-bit PCs. In the semiconductor area, they developed 16 megabit IC chips and constructed an IC pilot plant at the Electronics Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences. Although they are trying hard, it is very difficult for North Korea to fully fund a complete hardware industry including semiconductor production. Therefore, they asked for western funds through UNIDO in May, 1992. Table 1 shows those items requested which are related to information industry.

**Table 1. Information Industry Related Items Requested of UNIDO by the DPRK in May, 1992**

* DPK/020/V/92-05	Semiconductor parts, 1.5 million dollars equity, machinery, equipment
* DPK/021/V/92-05	Electronic Computer, 2.4 million dollars equity, management expertise, technical expertise, machinery, equipment, access to foreign market
* DPK/028/V/92-05	Digital controller devices, 6 million dollars management expertise, technical expertise, machinery, equipment
* DPK/032/V/92-05	Telecommunication products, joint venture or decide later technical expertise, machinery, equipment access to foreign market

The details of the electronic computer proposal are as follows:

- Annual production: 20,000 units of 32-bit PCs
- Market: Domestic usage 40 percent, foreign export 60 percent
- Foreign loan requested: 2-4 million dollars
- North Korean organization participating: Korea Computer Center (KCC) of Electronic and Automation Commission
- Location of factory: Pyongyang
- Income expected: 12 million dollars per year
- Number of employees: 70-100, later increase to 1,000
- Evaluation: By making an income of 12 million dollars each year ( $\$600 \times 20,000$  units), the loan can be paid back in 3 years, average monthly salary of \$150, daily production rate of each employee is 5 PC (this is very high compared with 3PC's of Chinese employee per day)
- Domestic usage of products: Educational institutes at the beginning, spread to eleven industrial sectors later
- Foreign export plan: Southeastern countries, Western countries, connections with China and Eastern Europe
- Comparison with South Korea: South Korea produced 2 million PC's in 1988 (2/3 of them exported), corresponding to 1 billion dollars
- Report of a consultant who visited Pyongyang: A consultant to UNIDO who visited KCC in Pyongyang in October, 1991 reported that North Korea was concentrating on CAD and DTP. He also said that North Korea was trying very hard to catch up as a nation which started rather late. The function of KCC is not only to do research

but also to provide consultation on importing computers and parts in North Korea. Another function is to train computer manpower and to support software needs. They preferred Bull of France, Apricot of UK and Siemens of Germany for international cooperation.

It is very difficult to find out exactly what type of computers they have in North Korea. However, it can be conjectured that it would be very hard for them to import large-scale computers due to the COCOM regulations. It is understood that KCC, PIC and Kim Chaek Technical University have many recent model workstations and PCs, including DEC (Digital Equipment Corporation) products with ALPHA Chips.

### 3. Software Status

Since the software industry does not require a huge amount of capital compared to the hardware industry, but rather human brains and creativity, North Korea has been emphasizing the software field. In order to raise software mind of people they have been carrying out an annual competition on programming technology.

From the 17th through 19th in December, 1990, for example, the National Program Contest was held in Pyongsong. About 440 programs developed by scientists, engineers, teachers and students were submitted in the areas of application programs, service programs and system programs.

Some of the topnotch programs were an accounting program by a bank employee, an academic administration program by a Kim Il

Sung University professor and an automatic design program for printed circuit boards by a scientist at the Control Machinery Research Institute of the Academy of Science. Also, a student of Pyongsong Science College submitted an expert system for medical diagnosis, and a researcher at the Mathematics Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences developed a compression program for data storage.

The most recent national competition and exhibition of computer programs was held in Pyongyang from December 8th through December 10th, 1997 which marked an important occasion in the development of the North Korea's computer program techniques and technical revolution. Many new and efficient computer programs were presented, they claim. Changdok 5.0, a program of editing documents in Korean letters from the PIC, Sindong, a program of memorizing Korean characters from Kim Chaek University of Technology, and memory pen, a program of directly-related Korean characters from the Unbyol Computer Technical Trading Center took the first places in the competition.

According to a North Korean scientist, those who win the awards at the contest receive various benefits. For example, if a high school student receives the best award he can easily enter the college of his choice.

North Korea is also striving for international cooperation in the software area.

They invited Prof. Bjorner, the director of the UNU/IIST, twice, in October, 1993 and May, 1994, to give short-term lectures on software technology. Also, a couple of bright scientists were sent to the IIST, which is located in Macau. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Prof. Bjorner and Dr. Hong

Ryun Gi of the SCST, DPRK, on 25 October 1993 which contained the following agreement: Immediate Action - IIST extends an invitation for 2 DPRK computer scientists to a software workshop in Beijing in November, 1993; Short-Term Action - IIST invites 2 computer scientists to an advanced seminar on programming methodology in January, 1994; Medium-Term Action - Prof. Bjorner revisits Pyongyang in May, 1994, to give a formal lecture on RAISE (Rigorous Approach to Industrial Software Engineering) and visits the Academy of Science, Kim Il Sung University, Pyongyang Informatics Center and Telecommunications Technical Center to explore possible future cooperation; Long-Range Action - IIST conducts a two-week training course on RAISE and Duration Calculus in Pyongyang, carries out a joint project lasting 1-2 years and invites 4-5 DPRK computer scientists to Macau for one or two times of typically 9 months each for training. Also, IIST and DPRK jointly establish a software laboratory, which may contain a library, workstations, CASE tools, various PC's and other peripheral devices so that researchers from other institutes and universities can use them.

The major organizations in software development are KCC, PIC and the Department of Computer Science under the Academy of Sciences. Their products will be discussed in a later section. Regardless of the organizations, the programs are developed for IBM PC compatibles, NEC PC9801 series, and Macintosh computers. The products are aimed for domestic uses and foreign exports.

#### 4. Telecommunication Status

Telecommunication technology in North Korea is far behind that of South Korea. According to a scientist who visited North Korea in 1994, the telex exchange systems in the International Communication Center were a 30 year-old Siemens system with 200 lines, and a new 1989 Alcatel Eltex system with 512 lines. International telephone service was provided by 30~40 year-old analogue Siemens equipment. No digital exchange was used at that time according to the report. The International Telecommunication Union and those countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore which have direct communication circuits through COMSAT are suggesting that North Korea install digital exchanges.

North Korea is still a closed country and it is not easy to make international phone calls. Some say facsimiles are easier to exchange, since they can be checked easily. The Internet is not used at this time. However, it may be only a matter of time for North Korea to open to the Internet, when we consider the situation in China, where most major universities are now connected to the Internet. A professor of Kim Chaek Technical University who attended a workshop in Beijing in 1993 mentioned that the North Korean government made a successful test of an Internet connection with Australia, but the government was not planning to implement a full connection at that time.

It is well known that North Korea is very much interested in optical communications. They established a master plan to install optical fiber cable between Pyongyang and Hamhung and to train technical manpower in cooperation with ITU and UNDP. The LVEI

(Low Voltage Engineering Institute) was in charge of the project. However, the project did not materialize due to lack of digital communication and semiconductor technologies. Recently the Roxley Company of Thailand has begun installing optical fiber cables in Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone.

### ***Information Technology Education***

#### **1. Education System in General**

The education system in North Korea consists of a 1-year kindergarten, a 4-year elementary school, a 6-year high school, and a 4 to 6-year college education. The 11 years of primary and secondary education are mandatory. There are also graduate schools for higher education such as masters and doctorates, which are installed in research institutes and universities.

About 10 years ago, North Korea started to designate a First High School in each city and province for gifted young children to foster scientific manpower. The graduates of these schools now play a leading role in the advancement of science and technology in North Korea. Among them are several hundred PhDs and doctoral candidates. The Mangyongdae Children's Palace, which directs extra-curricula activities of bright children, has a computer activity room equipped with tens of PCs for computer education. There are two scrolls on the wall, one saying that "We should use computers for computational tasks in order to compute fast and reduce our labor. - Kim Il Sung" and another saying that "We are in an era of science and technology. We cannot advance even one step without knowing science and technology. Therefore, everyone

should learn modern science and technology. - Kim Jong-il." These show that North Korea is stressing the application of computers and the importance of science and technology. The pamphlet on Mangyongdae published in 1995 shows an indication of big improvement in their computer applications such as computer-aided design when compared with that published in 1990 which showed only character generations.

## 2. Educational Organizations

Computer education and manpower development for computer specialist started right after North Korea started to produce computers in 1983. They expanded the electronics engineering curricula in various universities and established computer research institutes in the Academy of Sciences and Kim Chaek Technical University. In 1985 they also established a College of Computer Technology in Pyongyang and Hamhung. Kim Il Sung University separated computer studies from the mathematics department to set up a computer science department. The major educational organizations on information technology are as follows.

### (1) Kim Chaek Technical University

Kim Chaek Technical University has a school of computer science and a research institute on computers. In accordance with the instruction of Kim Il Sung on 8 May 1993, Kim Chaek Technical University bought many items, including one SUN Sparc workstation, one Apple Macintosh, 130 units of 486 PCs, 100 units

of 386 PCs, and 500 units of 286 PCs, for about 3 million dollars. They have a good LAN system. The major research areas are machine translation (Russian-Korean, etc.), GIS (Geographical Information System), and 3-D computer graphics and character recognition. They are also conducting researches on CAD using AutoCAD and Japanese CAD workstations.

## (2) Kim Il Sung University

Traditionally, Kim Il Sung University has emphasized humanities and social sciences rather than natural sciences. However, it established a computer science department and has started to supply computer scientists to KCC and PIC.

The Computing Center of Kim Il Sung University also offers various courses such as dBaseIII, dBaseIV, Pascal, Turbo-C and Borland C++ to approximately 50 master-level graduate students every year.

## (3) Pyongyang College of Computer Technology

This is a 4-year college established to teach computer technology to those who enter after the 11-year mandatory education. There are approximately 1,500 student in 3 major departments. Both hardware and software technicians are produced and supplied to institutions such as PIC. One lecturer from this college, who attended a software workshop in Beijing in November, 1993, and was an award winner at a national program contest, said that one of the most difficult problems in North Korea, after the

collapse of the Soviet Union, is an inability to access state-of-the-art information in advanced technology.

#### (4) Other Teaching Centers

Realizing that a regular university education is not enough to satisfy the needs of computer specialists, KCC, PIC, Academy of Science and Computer Training Center have programs to educate and train computer specialists. In particular, the PIC, in cooperation with the OIC (Osaka Information Center in Japan), established O & P Training Center in April, 1996 in order to train general public and company workers. Many scientists from the OIC regularly go there to teach.

### *Research on Software Technology*

#### 1. Research Institutes

##### (1) Pyongyang Informatics Center (PIC)

Established in 1986, the PIC has more than 100 research scientists and 20-30 administrative staff members. Mr. Kim Yu Jong, the vice president, is a scientist returned from Japan. Their major research areas are database, desktop publishing and application software.

They have many computers, 1.5 units per person on average, which are imported from abroad. Half of them are IBM compatibles, while workstations are from various vendors such as

SUN and SONY of Japan. Approximately one fourth of the research scientists use workstations. They have an internal LAN using Novell Netware 3.11 but it is not connected outside of the institute.

## (2) DPRK Academy of Sciences

The State Academy of Sciences of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the highest research organization in North Korea in all scientific and technological areas.

Located in Pyongsong city, 32 km from Pyongyang, the Academy of Sciences consists of several Sub-Academies. The Sub-Academy of Automation and Electronics, which is in charge of information technology related research, has several projects including CAD/CAM/CAE applications, implementing electronic dictionaries for 8 languages, and continuous process control. Dr. Jo Sok Je, the director of the Computer Science Research Institute, is very much interested in marketing software abroad.

Recently they started compiling Multilingual Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms (7 languages; Korean, Chinese, English, French, German, Japanese, and Russian) in 18 volumes which are as follows:

- Vol. 1 Mathematics
- Vol. 2 Mechanism
- Vol. 3 Physics
- Vol. 4 Chemistry
- Vol. 5 Biology

- Vol. 6 Geography
- Vol. 7 Geology
- Vol. 8 Electronics
- Vol. 9 Information Processing
- Vol. 10 Electrical Engineering
- Vol. 11 Mechanical Engineering
- Vol. 12 Metallurgical Engineering
- Vol. 13 Construction
- Vol. 14 Mining Industry
- Vol. 15 Atomic Energy
- Vol. 16 Light Industry
- Vol. 17 Agriculture
- Vol. 18 Medicine

### (3) Korea Computer Center (KCC)

KCC was established in October, 1990, to promote the computerization of various economic sectors, to advance software development technology and to activate information exchange in computer fields.

Besides their regular function of development and distribution of computer programs, they also train much needed manpower and take a major role in nurturing the computer industry. They are connected with the Sinhung Company, which takes care of import and export tasks with computer related areas, technical exchange with foreign countries and the transfer of new technology from abroad.

Most of the application software produced were developed for PC compatibles, with an emphasis on user-friendliness by employing GUI (Graphic User Interface) technique.

## 2. Research Status and Efforts for Commercialization

Although they must be doing considerable amount of basic research, it is difficult to gather information on such work. In this section, some of the known software products are introduced.

### (1) Academy of Sciences

According to a brochure published by the Department of Computer Science under the Academy of Sciences, the DCS was established in 1970 for the purpose of theoretical and practical research in computer science.

The long-term plan is for the development of computer programs for domestic use and export, manpower training in software fields, distribution of software technology and products, and introduction of software technology into various economic sectors in North Korea.

Table 2 shows a partial list of software packages developed.

**Table 2. Program Packages Developed by the DCS**

(For IBM PC Compatibles or NEC 9801 series)

Name	Brief Explanation
KORYO	Korean electronic dictionary with 40,000 words
DOVE	Electronic conversation dictionary for travellers. Korean-English, English-Korean, Japanese-English, English-Japanese
Word-Mate	Korean and Japanese words learning software through games(Korean-Japanese, Japanese-Korean)
Pearl	Wordprocessor to be used with mixture of Korean, Japanese and Chinese characters
Eagle	Automatic recognition of Korean characters
Rainbow	Computer-assisted Japanese-English translation system
Study Tetris	Educational computer game for learning English words, physics formulas, etc.
Business	Expert system to aid writing business letters in English
Hand	Korean chess program
Free Ball (Tree Frog 1)	Computer program for intelligence development for children series 1. To catch a ball in a Brownian movement.
Colcon (Tree Frog 3)	An intelligence game to arrange rectangles with colors
Magic Box (Tree Frog 3)	A game to arrange colored boxes horizontally, vertically or diagonally
Dragon (Tree Frog 4)	To guide a dragon moving freely on a display into a fence
Foods-300	Electronic cook-book for more than 300 traditional Korean foods

Current theoretical research includes Korean character recognition, machine translation, data compression, error analysis of input data and relational database systems, while practical research includes program development for office automation, accounting systems, bank management systems, computer-assisted Korean-English translation systems and Korean character recognition. The Paeksong Trading Corporation attempts to export software developed by the DCS. International cooperation is also sought by the DCS in fields such as joint research on software technology, mutual exchange of scientific achievement, commercialization of software developed and other related subjects.

(2) Korea Computer Center (KCC)

The KCC developed many application programs for IBM PCs and compatibles. The following list shows some of them.

● KORYO Acupuncture:

An expert system for traditional Korean medicine which may be used for education and treatment of more than 90 kinds of disease using acupuncture.

● ISDM (Integrated Service Digital Medicine) System:

A system used for diagnosis and treatment of disease by Koryo-medicine. It consists of prediction diagnosis, diagnosis and Koryo medicine system. Even a layman can use the system which supports Korean, English, Japanese, Chinese, Russian and Arabic.

● Color-matching System and CAD/CAM System for Textile:

A textile pattern design system which is used to produce small quantities of any pattern with a reasonable cost.

● KCR-HOPE:

A Korean character recognition program which can also recognize English, Japanese, Chinese and Russian characters. The recognition rate is 5~10 characters per second with an accuracy of over 99 percent.

● MFP-V (Mini-automatic Fingerprint Identification System):

An automatic fingerprint identification system with CCD camera input. It is fast, as it utilizes parallel distributed processing algorithms which can identify a fingerprint within 3 seconds with an accuracy of 99.2 percent.

● MOHO-37:

A fuzzy-based computer control system for ore dressing processes which helps to reduce cost, manpower and chemicals used.

● Dancing Fountain:

A computer controlled device which can be used indoor or outdoor for decoration. Also, it can be connected to a cassette player, tape recorder/player and computer music system to change height and color of water with the music. A Karaoke system may also be connected.

Recently they also announced development of application software utilizing automatic fingerprint identification program such as Golden Horse, a habitude classification and diagnosis system, and an automatic identification system of bank customers. The Air Traffic Control System developed by the KCC is said to be better than a similar product of Russia and has been operating at the Pyongyang International airport since 1993.

### (3) Pyongyang Informatics Center (PIC)

PIC is the leading institute in Korean language processing and word-processor development. The Chang-Duk word-processor of PIC is used most widely in North Korea. A partial list of software developed by PIC follows.

- DTP System:

An electronic publishing system developed for the Macintosh. Its editor, Chung-Ryu, was displayed at the Singapore PC Show '92 in June, 1992.

- Multi-lingual Word-processor:

This program was also displayed at the Singapore PC Show '92. Korean, English, Russian, German, French, Spanish, Latin and Portuguese are supported by the system, in which several different sizes and calligraphic styles of characters could be combined in a document.

- Korean DOS:

MS-DOS was modified to work with Korean.

- Tangun for Window 95:

This is a front end processing program which permits a user to do Korean input/output on top of Window 95 functions. It supports not only North Korean codes but also South Korean KS codes for Korean characters.

- Chang-Duk II and Chang-Duk for Windows:

Reflecting the demand of users who want faster and simpler editor, the original Chang-Duk has been improved greatly. For example, Chang-Duk II now accepts Japanese, Chinese and Russian characters and several new features, such as picture editing, were added. Chang-Duk II kept the special

feature of printing Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il in bigger and darker characters when Ctrl-I and Ctrl-J keys are pressed, respectively. Also, they have developed Chang-Duk for Windows.

● Others:

At the COMDEX-Asia exhibition which was held in Singapore in September, 1996, PIC also demonstrated GOHYANG, a database management system, DEUL, a 2-D CAD system and SANAK, a 3-D CAD system.

Also a brochure disclosed that they have developed a production control system, management activities analysis system, office automation system and computer-aided dress design system.

### **Information Technology Exchange between the South and the North and Mutual Cooperation**

At 3:30 in the afternoon on 8 July 1994, there was a meeting in Seoul organized by the Presidential Advisory Committee on Science and Technology. Several experts from government, academia and research institutions attended the meeting to discuss methods of mutual cooperation in science and technology between the South and the North. The result from the meeting was supposed to be used in formulating an agenda for a meeting between the presidents of the South and the North scheduled on 25 July of that year. No one at that meeting ever dreamed that the North Korean president would die on the same day. Our effort for the mutual exchange should not be diminished because of this tragic event. We should prepare steadily for reunification, which will come to us

eventually.

Information technology development is very important both in the South and the North in the coming 21st Century. The wider the gap in technological levels, the more problems we will face in the future. To resolve this problem, government effort alone is not enough. We need to widen the effort to include mutual exchange among people in order to restore homogeneity and trustfulness. In other words, a bottom-up approach is essential for a smooth exchange between the South and the North, which will lead us to a short cut for reunification.

Like all other areas, the best way to exchange information technology is to permit specialists to visit each other. Since there are many limitations in exchanging information through conferences held in third countries, it is much desired for scientists to visit in person, to find out exact situation so that they can cooperate each other effectively. Another urgent thing for North Korea to do is to allow Internet access, so that scientists in the North have easy access to high-tech information.

Of course, it is understandable that it is not an easy decision to make, but the North Korean government should open its door to the outside world for the benefit of the country and to be ready for the Information Society of the 21st Century. The new South Korean government should ease the tight regulations, formed in more restrictive times, to be more suitable for an era of globalization. Also, it may be worthwhile to provide a way of obtaining correct information on North Korea through the Internet.

The followings are suggested for a bottom-up approach for mutual cooperation on information technology between the South and the North.

First, scientists from the South and the North attend international conferences on information technology being held in third countries and discuss freely on scientific and academic subjects. There were many barriers to doing so in the past, and these should be removed. The North Korean scientists, especially young scientists, seem ready to meet and discuss freely with their South Korean counterparts in third countries.

Second, the South and the North jointly sponsor international conferences on information technology. It will be the best if the location is either in South Korea or North Korea, but a third country could be chosen as a second choice. There have been several such conferences at Yanji City, China, including physics and electronics areas. But, only the International Conference on Computer Processing for Korean Language, which began in 1994, has been held annually for three years where many North Korean scholars have participated each year. It is sad to see that mutual exchange in science and technology area is not very active in this era of high-tech. Other areas such as fine arts and sports have been doing better. We should do our best to be able to hold these conferences in Seoul and Pyongyang in the near future.

Third, North and South Korea jointly establish a research institute on information technology combining the strong hardware technology of the South and the theoretical research and software technology of the North. The cheaper labor cost of software development in the North will contribute in gaining advantages in world market competition. The location of the institute could be Rajin-Sonbong area at the beginning if the North is reluctant to open Pyongyang area.

Fourth, computer scientists should be allowed to visit each other

freely. Both the South and the North should provide ways for the North Korean scientists to come to the South for a seminar and the South Korean scientists to visit the North for a lecture and vice versa. Continuous severance between the South and the North is against the world-wide tide of openness and globalization. In particular, North Korea should open up its door and let science and technology flow in, which would help her economic growth.

Advancement in computer and communication technology has led us to overcome temporal and spatial limitations. The Internet has made the world very small. On the other hand, the high-tech wall is getting higher. Development of high-tech, especially information technology, is most important in order to be a winner in the world market. We should have an active cooperation in the area of information technology between the South and the North to prepare for a trouble-less reunification.

## **Conclusion**

Since North Korea is a tightly closed country it is very difficult to obtain exact information, especially if it is related to high-tech, such as information technology.

Thanks to the Internet, we can get certain facts through the reports of those who have travelled to North Korea and a project on North Korea carried out by the FAS (Federation of American Scientists) which are available on the WWW. Also, there are several homepages such as Korean Central News Agency and Kungangsan International Group whose web sites are located in Japan.

As far as information technology is concerned, both the South

and the North realize its importance, and have strong national development projects. While North Korea has emphasized software development, the South has put significant effort into memory semiconductors, and has become one of the leaders in the world market. Compared to this the South's software industry has been very poor.

Manpower development is also stressed in both countries, although the South is numerically much stronger. North Korea has other disadvantages such as difficult access to up-to-date high-tech information, because of the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as due to the lack of an Internet connection. Yet, software technology in North Korea has advanced remarkably in the last few years. For example, they largely depended on BASIC, COBOL and FORTRAN several years ago but now they are using C++. Some research institutes are equipped with late models of PC's and workstations. However, the South is much stronger in numbers and types of computers.

Although North Korea is far behind South Korea in hardware, application software for PCs, such as word-processors, are tracing the South rapidly. For example, the Chang-Duk II word-processor is very similar to a South Korean word-processor in its functions. Recently the North has developed Chang-Duk and Tangun for Windows 95, which may show that Windows 95 is also popular in the North. Many of the software programs developed by KCC and DCS of Academy of Sciences are edutainment, which teach subjects through games. Some programs employ advanced technology, such as fuzzy theory, expert systems and other AI techniques. It is not possible to confirm but they may have developed military oriented software, such as remote sensing,

which is required to develop guided missiles such as Rodong 1 and 2.

A wide gap in the levels of information technology between the South and the North could bring many problems after reunification. Also, differences in thinking and concepts could add more problems. This means that we should try to meet each other more often, exchange information and cooperate to make the gap narrower. Restoration of homogeneity and trustfulness is best achieved through people contact rather than by government programs.

As we have seen, reunification in Germany came much earlier than most anticipated. Likewise, we do not know exactly when Korea will be reunited. We should do our best to be ready for reunification and proper settlement of an information society in the 21st Century.

## References

### [South Korea]

Korean Language and Information Society, "Special Issue on the '96 International Conference on Computer Processing for Korean Language," Journal, Vol. 9, 1996.

Park, C. M. et. al., "A Study on Computer Science and Electronics Engineering in North Korea," Korea Federation of Science & Technology Societies, 1993.

Park, C. M. et. al., "A Study on Comparison of Computer Science between South and North," Korea Federation of Science & Technology Societies, 1994.

Park, C. M. et. al., "A Trend Analysis of Informatization of North Korea," National Computerization Agency, 1996, 1997.

### [North Korea]

Academy of Sciences, "Reports of the Academy of Sciences."

DCS, Academy of Sciences, "Brochure on Software Products."

KCC, "Brochure on Software Developed."

154 남북협력: 새로운 지평을 향하여

Pyongyang Pictorial News, "Mangyongdae Children's Palace," 1990, 1995.

Bjorner, D., "UN Mission Report on DPRK," 1994.

PIC, "Bulletin," "DPT," "Chang-Duk II User's Manual," "Korean Windows System," "Tangun User's Manual," "10th Anniversary of PIC."

Korean Central News Agency, Internet Web site.

Kumgangsan International Group, Internet Web site.

Materials obtained during my visit to Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone in April, 1997.

□ 국문요약

## 남북간의 정보기술에 관한 상호협력

북한은 그 폐쇄성으로 인해, 다른 분야도 마찬가지이지만 특히 정보기술과 같은 최첨단분야에 대한 정확한 정보를 입수할 수가 없다. 단지 인터넷의 FAS(Federation of American Scientists)에 실린 북한 관련 정보 또는 일본의 Korean Central News Agency, Kumgangsan International Group과 같은 홈페이지를 통해 알 수 있을 뿐이다.

정보기술에 관한 한, 남북한은 모두 그것의 중요성을 인정하고 있으며 중점적으로 개발하고자 하는 국가중점개발사업부문이다. 북한은 소프트웨어개발에 주력하고 있으며 남한은 주로 메모리반도체개발에 힘써 이미 세계시장을 주도하고 있다. 또한 남북한은 모두 정보기술 분야의 인력개발에 힘쓰고 있지만, 수적인 면에서 남한이 훨씬 앞서고 있다.

북한은 소련의 붕괴와 인터넷교류의 부족으로 인해 최첨단 정보에 접근하기가 어려운 실정이다. 그러나 최근 몇 년 동안 북한의 소프트웨어기술은 놀랍게 향상되었다. 특히 워드프로세서분야의 개발은 남한을 많이 따라왔으며 그 기능은 남한의 것과 매우 흡사하다. 또한 일부연구소들은 최신 모델의 PC 및 워크스테이션을 제공받고 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 남한에 보급되어 있는 컴퓨터가 수적인 면에서나 기종면에서 북한을 훨씬 앞서고 있는 것이 사실이다.

남북간 과학기술협력은 남북정상회담을 계기로 추진될 계획이었으나 김일성의 급작스런 사망으로 인해 무산되었다. 그러나 그렇다고 해서 이러한 시도를 중단할 수는 없다. 과학기술협력, 특히 정보기술의 협력은 다가오는 21세기의 남북간 관계에 있어서 매우 중요하다.

왜냐하면 이 분야의 격차가 심화되면 될수록 미래에 당면하게 될 문제의 심각성은 더욱 커지기 때문이다. 이러한 문제의 해결을 위해서는 정부의 노력만으로는 부족하다. 즉 동질성 회복 및 상호신뢰를 위해서는 양국 국민간의 상호교류를 넓히는 노력이 반드시 필요하다. 요컨대 남북한간 원활한 교류를 위해서는 '상향식 접근(Bottom-up Approach)'이 필요하며 이것이야말로 통일로 이끄는 지름길이 될 것이다.

다른 분야와 마찬가지로 가장 바람직한 정보기술교류의 방법은 양측의 전문가들이 상호방문하는 것이다. 전문가들의 상호직접방문만이 양측의 정확한 실정을 파악하고 가장 효과적으로 협력할 수 있게 할 것이다. 북한의 경우, 지금 가장 시급하게 해야 할 일은 인터넷 접근을 허용함으로써 북한의 과학자들로 하여금 최첨단 정보에 쉽게 접근할 수 있게 하는 것이다. 북한은 자국의 이익을 위해서 또한 21세기 정보화사회를 맞이하기 위해서 외부세계에 개방을 해야만 한다. 남한은 세계화시대에 발맞추어 엄격한 규제를 완화해야 한다. 남한은 또한 인터넷을 통해 북한에 대한 정확한 지식을 제공받을 수 있게 해야 한다.

이외의 남북간 정보기술협력을 위한 '상향식 접근'으로는 남북한 과학자들이 국제회의에 같이 참석하거나 공동주최하는 방법이 있다. 또한 남북한 공동으로 정보기술관련 연구소를 설립하는 것도 좋은 방법이다. 이를 통해 남한의 하드웨어기술과 북한의 이론연구 및 소프트웨어기술이 결합될 수 있으며 또한 소프트웨어개발에 있어서의 북한의 저렴한 인건비는 세계시장경쟁에서 유리한 위치를 점하게 할 수 있을 것이다.

컴퓨터 및 통신기술의 발달은 우리의 시공간적 한계를 극복하게 해 주고, 인터넷은 세계를 점점 더 좁게 만들고 있다. 반면 최첨단기술의 벽은 점점 더 높아지고 있다. 최첨단기술 특히 정보기술의 개발은 세계시장에서의 승자가 되는데 매우 중요하다. 또한 무리없는 통일을 준비하기 위해서라도 남북한간의 정보기술협력을 추진되어야만 한다.

## 종합토론

### 제 1 회의

- 사회 : 하영선 (서울대 교수)
- 발표 : Manfred Pohl (함부르크대 교수)  
“독일의 통일경험과 한국의 전략에 대한 함의”  
Geir Helgesen (노르딕 아시아연구소 연구위원)  
“새로운 시각에서 본 남북협력의 미래”
- 토론 : 노경수 (서울대 행정대학원 교수)  
박영호 (민족통일연구원 선임연구위원)

**사회자:** 감사합니다. Pohl 박사님의 발표가 경제적 관점에서 접근했다면 Helgesen 박사님의 접근은 문화적인 요소를 강조하셨습니다. 이러한 두분의 견해에 대해서 여러 가지 다양한 토론이 이루어질 수 있다고 생각합니다. 먼저 서울대 노경수 교수님의 토론을 듣도록 하겠습니다. 노교수님은 국제적으로 남북관계 전문가로 잘 알려져 있습니다.

**노경수:** 토론 이전에 우선 이번 학술회의를 개최해 주신 민족통일연구원, 스톡홀름대, 서울대에 감사드립니다. 두 분 발표자께서는 남북관계에 대한 서로 다른 견해를 피력해 주셨다고 생각합니다. Pohl 교수님은 남북협력 문제와 관련 정치·전략적 구조를 분석해 주신 데 반해 Helgesen 교수님은 문화심리적 차원에서 남북관계의 새로운 지평을 모색해 주셨습니다. 토론자간 역할분담 차원에서 저는 Pohl 교수님의 발표를 중심으로 토론하겠습니다.

Pohl 교수님은 겸손하게 독일의 경험에서는 점진적 접근의 중요성

이외에 다른 교훈이 없다고 말씀하셨지만 한국의 입장에서는 배울 점이 많다고 생각합니다. 점진적인 관계모색은 한국정부 정책·전략의 핵심이자 원하는 바입니다. 강경보다 점진적인 접근, 이른바 햇볕정책을 통하여 북한을 포용하는 것이 김대중정부 정책의 핵심이라고 할 수 있습니다. 즉 신뢰구축을 통해 정치접촉을 확대함으로써 한반도의 긴장을 완화한다는 것입니다.

제 견해가 틀리기를 바라지만 한반도의 경우 점진적 관계모색의 시간이 없을 수도 있다고 생각합니다. 독일의 경우 1960~70년대 빌리브란트의 점진적인 접근 정책이후 1990년대 독일통일의 정점에 이르기까지 30년간의 관계개선의 기간이 있었습니다. 그러나 한국의 경우 이제 막 접촉을 시작했을 뿐이며, 역사적인 상황도 상이합니다. 또한 동서 군사체제나 소련의 입장을 감안했을 때 동독이 서독을 군사적으로 침략할 가능성이 없었지만 북한은 좌절의 결과, 무력 침략의 가능성이 있습니다. 특히 북한의 무력은 상당한 수준으로서 재래식 뿐만 아니라 생화학무기의 위험성이 매우 높은 것이 사실입니다.

Pohl 교수님이 정확하게 지적한 것은 인접국가들을 경계해야 한다는 점입니다. 한반도 통일이 현실로 다가오면 친선 우방국의 입장도 달라질 수 있다는 것입니다. 독일통일의 과정에서 미테랑대통령이 독일통일을 막으려는 전략적 입장에 있었던 것은 사실이었고, 이런 상황은 한반도에서도 얼마든지 재현될 수 있습니다. 따라서 한국정부는 인접국가들의 정책과 입장에 면밀한 주의를 기울여야 하며, 20세기에 주변강대국으로부터 받은 교훈을 잊지 말아야 할 것입니다.

다시 말씀드리지만 한국은 독일과 같은 시간적 여유가 없을 것입니다. 국제사회와 한국이 아무리 지원하더라도 북한은 근본적 개혁이 없는 한 부패와 모순으로 체제유지에 실패하고 붕괴할 것으로 보입니다. 지난 몇 년간 처럼 앞으로 수십년간 북한이 붕괴하지 않도록 지원할 수도 없을 것입니다. 따라서 국제사회와 한국은 북한과의 관계개선을 모색하면서도 이와 병행하여 북한의 붕괴라는 위기적 상황에 대비한 대안을 준비해 두어야 한다고 생각합니다.

**사회자:** 노교수님 토론에 대해 감사드립니다. 다음은 민족통일연구원의 선임연구위원으로 계시는 박영호 박사님의 토론을 듣도록 하겠습니다.

**박영호:** 두 분 발표자께서는 남북관계가 어떻게 경색되었는가에 대한 흥미있는 관찰을 보여주셨습니다. 특히 Helgesen 교수님의 발표는 제가 학생시절 정치문화를 공부하던 때를 회상하게 만드는 인상깊은 내용이었습니다.

두 분 발표자의 대안에서 공통점을 찾자면 첫째, 통일은 장기적인 과정이라는 것, 둘째, 남북한은 역사와 문화의 공유라는 공통분모 덕분에 관계개선의 여지가 많다는 것, 셋째, 교류·협력의 강화가 남북한 간 동질성을 강화하고 통일을 앞당기는데 있어서 매우 중요하다는 점 등입니다. 그러나 이는 다소 추상적인 대안으로서 이러한 대안이 한반도에 적용되기 위해서는 북한이 체제 변화를 시작해야 한다는 전제가 필요합니다. 북한의 체제변화 없이는 남북관계 개선이 불가능하기 때문입니다. 그런데 저의 판단으로는 북한 정치지도부는 당분간 개혁·개방의 의지가 없는 것으로 보입니다. 한국의 새정부가 다양한 접촉을 시도하더라도 이러한 남측의 제의가 수용될 것 같지는 않습니다. 북한의 정치지도층이 아직은 이러한 개혁·개방을 수용할 준비가 되어 있지 않기 때문입니다.

Pohl 교수님께서는 질문만을 한가지 드리겠습니다. 동서독간의 관계에 비추어 지금 금융위기를 겪고 있는 한국이 북한을 대화로 이끌어 내기 위해 할 수 있는 것이 경제적인 면 이외에 어떤 것이 있겠는지 말씀해 주시면 감사하겠습니다.

Helgesen 박사님은 남북관계의 진전을 위하여 공유하는 규범과 가치관을 파악하고 공통점을 늘리라고 하셨지만 정치전략을 연구하는 정치학자인 저로서는 그러한 공통점을 찾는 데 회의적입니다. Helgesen 박사님의 지적처럼 남북한은 문화적 전통을 공유하고 있으며, 유교주의 혹은 신유교주의적 요소가 강하다는 지적은 부인할 수 없는 사실입

니다. 남북한은 이러한 독특한 문화적인 요소에 맞추어 각각 서로 다른 이데올로기를 변형시켜 사용해 온 것이 사실입니다. 그러나 남북한의 문화적 기반은 외형적으로는 공통점이 많은 것 같지만 구체적으로는 매우 다르다는 말씀을 드리고 싶습니다. 한국에서의 유교주의는 서구식 개인주의로 대체되었습니다. 반면 북한에서는 집단주의와 융합되어 전체주의로 변형되었습니다. 이와 관련, 구체적으로 어떠한 조치를 취해야 북한을 끌어내어 공통의 정치문화를 만들 수 있겠는가 하는 질문을 드리고 싶습니다.

**사회자:** 감사합니다. 박영호 박사님께서서는 매우 구체적인 내용으로 토론해 주셨는데 사실 남북관계 모색에 있어서 검토해 볼 만한 이슈라고 생각합니다. 이제 발표자 두 분이 질문에 답하거나 추가적인 코멘트를 할 기회를 드리겠습니다.

**Geir Helgesen:** 두 분의 토론에 감사드립니다. 물론 저의 접근이 다분히 이상주의적인 것은 사실이지만 남북관계에 있어서 이상주의적 접근이 어느 정도 필요하다고 생각합니다. 비관주의로는 아무런 변화도 이끌어 낼 수 없습니다. 한국인들은 신중한 입장을 취할 수 밖에 없겠지만 변화를 위해서는 보다 도전적인 모험이 필요합니다.

남북한의 공통점을 어떻게 이끌어 낼 것이냐는 박영호 박사의 질문과 관련, 제가 한국의 총리실 관계자들에게 전해 들은 한가지 사례를 들겠습니다. 수 년전 남북친선축구대회 참가를 위하여 북한팀이 서울을 방문했을 당시 수행원으로 대거 동행한 북한의 관료들과 접촉할 기회가 있었다고 합니다. 그런데 북한의 관료들이 짜여진 각본에 따라 대화를 진행해서 상호간 전혀 대화의 진전이 없었는데 비공식적인 술자리 모임에서는 서로에 대한 접근이 훨씬 수월했다는 것입니다. 저는 일종의 '맥주의교'라고 할 수 있는 이러한 접근이 필요한 것이 아닌가 생각합니다. 제가 만난 총리실 관료는 이러한 경험을 하고 나서 북한측 사람들을 새로운 관점에서 볼 수 있게 되었다고 합니다.

이러한 점에 비추어 국가의 정책을 이상주의에 입각하여 추진할 수는 없겠지만 적어도 감안은 해야한다고 생각합니다.

**Manfred Pohl:** 토론에 감사드립니다. 남북한은 동족상잔의 비극을 겪어 실제적, 정서적 상처를 입은 것이 사실이며, 이 점에서 동서독과는 차이가 있습니다. 또한 지적해 주신 것처럼 북한의 군사력이 상당 수준에 달하고 있으며, 무력도발의 가능성도 무시할 수 없는 요소라고 생각합니다. 또한 북한 지도층은 소위 북풍이라는 것을 통하여 한국의 선거에 영향을 미치는 등 적극적으로 개입을 해 온 것이 사실입니다.

통일에 대한 주변국의 견제가 있는 것은 부인할 수 없습니다. 독일 통일에 앞서서 어떤 프랑스인은 자신은 독일을 너무 좋아하기 때문에 두 개의 독일이 있는 것이 좋다고 말했다는 이야기는 매우 시사적입니다.

독일은 경제력이 있어서 통일을 이룰 수 있었지만 경제사정이 어려운 한국에게는 어떤 수단이 있겠느냐는 질문을 주셨습니다만, 솔직히 희생이 따르는 세금징수 이외에는 다른 방법이 없는 것 같습니다. 그런데 대부분의 한국 사람들은 아직 그런 부담과 희생을 감당할 준비가 안되어 있는 것 같습니다. 통일이 현실로 다가오면 자본과 재원을 재배분해야 하는데 이는 상당한 경제적 희생을 요구할 것이며, 한국경제는 당분간 성장률의 둔화 등 어려움을 겪을 수 밖에 없을 것입니다.

그러나 통일이 현실로 다가오게 되면 Helgesen 박사님의 지적처럼 공통의 문화적 자산을 기반으로 연대의식과 유대감이 형성되어 비용 부담이 쉽게 이루어질 수도 있다고 생각합니다. 서양인들은 공통의 문화유산에 대해 과소평가하는 경향을 가졌던 것이 사실입니다. 독일의 경우, 동서독 모두 독일의 문화적인 유산들을 소중히 했다는 점은 매우 중요합니다.

**사회자:** 토론을 계속 진행하기에 앞서서 북경에서 있었던 학술회의에 대해 말씀드리고자 합니다. 남북관계 개선에 대한 북한측의 인식을 보여주는 하나의 사례가 될 수 있을 것 같습니다. 당시 학술회의에 참석한 북한 전문가들이 남북관계 개선을 위한 전제조건으로 제시한 것이 세가지였는데 첫째, 새정부가 반제국주의적 정책을 취할 것, 둘째, 반북 적대적인 정책이 아니라 친북 포용정책을 취할 것, 셋째, 북한식 민주주의를 채택할 것 등입니다. 이에 대하여 그러한 전제조건은 쉽게 채택되기도 어렵거니와 남북협력을 논의하는 자리에서 왜 그런 이야기를 하는지 논란을 벌인 기억이 있습니다.

이제 방청객의 계신 분들의 질문을 받도록 하겠습니다.

**청중(1):** Pohl 교수님께서서는 세금을 증대하여 통일비용을 조달하면 된다고 말씀하셨는데 군사비를 절감하는 것에 대해서는 어떻게 생각하시는지 묻고 싶습니다.

**Manfred Pohl:** 군사비 문제는 민감한 사안이라서 고의적으로 회피했는데 불가피하게 언급해야 할 것 같습니다. 군사비 절감에 있어서 절호의 기회가 온 것은 사실입니다. 독일은 수 년에 걸쳐 군사비를 획기적으로 삭감, 그 기금의 일부를 통일비용에 충당하여 동독경제 재건에 활용하였습니다. 물론 한국의 경우에도 통일을 하게 되면 군사비를 절감할 수 있겠지만, 이것을 언제 시작하느냐는 타이밍 문제가 있습니다. 통일이후 직면하게 되는 가장 큰 과제중의 하나는 북한의 엄청난 군대를 축소하는 문제입니다. 아시다시피 북한의 군대는 남한 위협용일 뿐만 아니라 자체내 노동수급 해결을 위한 측면도 있습니다. 만약 전투를 하고 있지 않은 모든 대규모 전투단위가 해체되면 엄청난 실업이 발생할 것이기 때문에 이에 대한 대책이 필요할 것입니다. 북한으로서는 가장 값싼 형태의 노동력이라고 할 수 있는 군인력을 동원해서 하고 있는 댐건설 등 각종 건설사업도 중단될 것으로 보입니다. 이렇듯 군대축소에 따른 비용 또한 만만치 않은 것이 사실입니다.

**Reinhard Drifte:** Pohl 교수님께서는 인접국을 경계하라고 말씀 하셨지만 통일을 위해서는 인접국의 지원이 필요합니다. 한국으로서 는 미국과 일본 뿐만 아니라 중국과 러시아의 지원도 필요할 것인 바, 특히 러시아를 경시하는 정책은 곤란함을 유발할 것입니다. 주변국이 통일한국의 부상에 대한 우려는 별로 안할 것으로 판단됩니다. 통일 이후에 한국이 겪게 될 사회문제가 심각할 것이기 때문입니다.

점진적 관계개선이 최선이라는 데는 이의가 없지만 북한의 현실을 볼 때 급작스런 통일의 가능성이 높다고 판단됩니다. 다만 북한에는 한국이 점진적인 통일을 추진하고 있다는 인상을 주어야 할 것이므로, 급속한 통일의 가능성을 구태여 강조할 필요는 없을 것입니다.

**Manfred Pohl:** 북한 붕괴에 대한 대비계획에는 주변국과의 상호 신뢰구축 방안이 포함되어 있어야 할 것입니다. 상호신뢰구축을 조정·협업할 수 있는 체제가 한국과 인접국가 간에 마련되어야 합니다. 유럽에서는 통일독일의 중부유럽 장악에 대한 우려가 있었습니다. 드골 대통령의 말을 인용하자면 “핵무기가 없으면 진정한 의미의 주권국가가 아니다”라는 말도 있지만 독일의 경우 핵무기가 없기 때문에 주변국의 우려를 덜 수 있었습니다. 또한 통일독일은 대내적 문제해결에 전력해야 하기 때문에 독일의 입지가 약화되어 통일독일에 대한 주변국의 우려가 불식되었습니다.

**노경수:** 주변국을 경계하라는 Pohl 교수님의 지적은 주변국을 의심 하라는 주문이라기 보다는 이들이 한국의 통일보다는 현상유지를 바랄 수 있다는 의미일 것입니다. 사실 한국의 통일에 대해서 절대적으로 반대하는 세력은 없지만 통일에 대한 한국내의 열망과는 대조되는 무기력증이 있습니다. 한편 지정학적 위치와 관련된 문제가 있습니다. 유럽의 중심에 위치한 독일과 전략적 요충지에 위치한 한국에 대한 주변국의 입장은 다를 것입니다.

북한의 급작스런 붕괴를 배제할 수 없다는 의견에 공감하며 북한의

조기봉괴에 대한 대비책을 다시 강조하고자 합니다. 북한과의 협상에 있어서 신뢰증진의 기초단계가 필요한 것은 사실이지만 점진적 협상을 통하여 통일을 달성한다는 것은 논리적으로 모순입니다. 역사적으로 볼 때, 두 개의 국가가 협상을 통해 합친 경우는 없습니다. 북한의 체제안정을 지원하여 북한이 위기를 극복하게 되면 통일협상에 나서게 될 것이라는 가정은 성립되지 않습니다. 협상을 통한 통일은 대안이 될 수 없습니다.

**청중(2):** Helgesen 박사님께서서는 유교에 대한 재인식이 필요함을 강조해 주셨는데 사실 이 문제는 우리나라의 근대화문제를 다룰 때 제기된 것으로 이에 대해서는 많은 고민이 있습니다.

유교를 압축하여 말씀드리자면 충효사상과 삼강오륜이라고 할 수 있습니다. 그런데 충(忠)때문에 권위주의적 경향이 생겨났습니다. 효(孝)는 산업화와 핵가족화 때문에 사실상 많이 사라졌으며, 지금은 오히려 노인복지를 강조하는 입장이 되어 버렸습니다. 또한 부자유친 때문에 기업이나 공조적이 족벌조직을 파생시켜 현재 우리는 이것을 극복하려고 애쓰고 있습니다. 장유유서 역시 조기퇴직 제도 등을 통하여 극복하려는 입장에 있습니다. 부부유별 문제도 마찬가지입니다. 저는 독일의 내무장관이 여성이어서 매우 놀랐습니다. 우리의 경우 바로 '맥주외교' 때문에 여성은 협상하는 자리에 나서지 못하며, 고위직에 진출하지도 못합니다. 이렇듯 유교는 애로사항이고 극복과제인데 Helgesen 교수님께서서는 유교의 어떤 긍정적인 면을 제시할 지 의문입니다.

**사회자:** 한 두개의 질문을 더 받도록 하겠습니다.

**Thomas Hart:** 저는 Helgesen 교수님과 다른 의견입니다. 문화라는 것이 통일에 미치는 영향이 지대하다는 것을 부인할 수는 없습니다. 저도 일종의 아리랑신드림이라고 할 수 있는 허심탄회한 분위기

에 참석하신 적이 있습니다. 그러나 당국자와 국민간에는 간격이 있습니다. 예를 들어 중·대만관계에 대해 당국자들과 일반 대만인들의 인식이 다른 것을 알 수 있습니다.

박교수님은 북한은 유교주의적 전통에 기반해서 집단주의 체제를 구축시켰는데 반해 남쪽에는 개인주의가 더 강하다고 하셨지만 문제가 그리 간단하지는 않아 보입니다. Helgesen 박사님은 평양지도층이 권력을 유지하고 있는 이유에 대하여 한국문화의 특정한 요소를 발견하고 이를 이용함으로써 가능했다고 말씀하셨습니다. 그러나 전체주의적 체제를 유지하는데에는 문화적 요소라고 할 수 없는 공포정치를 비롯한 여러 폭력적 수단이 존재합니다.

이렇듯 북한체제에는 반드시 유교에 기반을 둔 것도 아닌 요소들이 있습니다. 모택동치하의 중국이나 스탈린치하의 소련의 경우만 하더라도 자신들의 문화적 요소에 우상숭배적인 요소가 있다고 말하고 싶지는 않을 것입니다. 우상숭배체제가 문화에 기반을 두지 않은 것이기 때문에 문제가 더욱 심각합니다. 체제위기가 오면 정치체제가 전혀 기능을 수행하지 못하는 마비상태가 올 것이기 때문입니다. 정치체제와 문화의 관계에 대해서는 더 구체적인 논의가 필요하다고 봅니다.

**사회자:** 두 분 발표자님께 마지막 발언의 기회를 드리겠습니다.

**Geir Helgesen:** 이 자리에서 남성우월주의적 유교주의에 대한 비판의 소리를 한국 여성분께 듣게 되어 매우 새로웠습니다. 그러나 현실이라는 것을 무시할 수는 없습니다. 남북간 협상과정에 있어서 술자리를 통하여 속내를 얘기하는 것이 반드시 바람직한 것은 아니지만 현재로서는 차선의 대안이 될 수는 있을 것입니다. 저는 유교의 부정적 측면만 보지 말고 긍정적인 측면을 활용하자는 것입니다.

박영호 박사님이 지적하신 개인주의에 대해 말씀드리면 여론조사 결과를 보면 한국이 여전히 전세계적으로 가장 집단주의적인 나라에

해당된다는 것입니다. 문제는 집단주의와 개인주의에 대한 이해의 방식인데 북한의 집단주의는 명백한 부권주의지만 남한에도 회사나 정부에 여전히 집단주의적 경향이 남아 있습니다.

Hart 교수님은 중·대만관계에 있어서 국민당과 대만인을 분리하여 말씀하셨지만 저는 국민당이건 대만인이건 성향이 비슷하다고 봅니다. 한국의 경우는 정부관료건 정당정치인이건 전부 가족구성원이고, 그들의 규범과 가치관은 다른 이들의 그것과 크게 다르지 않다고 생각합니다.

**Manfred Pohl:** 독일에서의 여성의 역할과 지위는 통일이후 오히려 후퇴했습니다. 이것이 통일의 부정적인 측면중의 하나일 것입니다. 유럽의 관점에서 보았을 때 남북한은 차이보다는 상당히 동질적이고 개별성이 약하다는 Helgesen 교수님의 관점에 동의합니다. 한국이 통일을 향해 나아가기 위해서는 어떤 형태, 어떤 수준에서든 대화의 자리를 마련해야 할 것입니다. 동서독간의 경우에도 자유와 민주주의 등 기본적 개념에 대한 인식이 달랐습니다. 이러한 차이를 이해해야만 진일보하여 다음 단계로 나아갈 수 있을 것입니다. 저는 20년이건 혹은 그 이상이건 간에 북한이 가급적 붕괴하지 않고 통일을 위한 노력을 해나갈 수 있기를 바랍니다.

**사회자:** 발표자와 토론자 두 분께 감사드립니다. 이것으로 제 1회의를 마치겠습니다. 오후에는 좀더 구체적인 남북협력 문제를 가지고 제 2, 3회의가 진행될 것입니다. 감사합니다.

제 2 회의

● 사회 : Thomas Hart (스톡홀름대 정치학과 교수)

● 발표 : 오승렬 (민족통일연구원 연구위원)

“남북간 경제협력을 위한 정부의 적절한 역할모색”

이재석 (아태평화재단 선임연구위원)

“북한의 식량위기와 남북협력”

● 토론 : Lennart Rohdin (스웨덴 국회의원)

Gabriel Jonsson (스톡홀름대 아태연구소)

**사회자:** 그럼 이제 토론으로 들어가겠습니다. 상당히 흥미로운 두 분의 발표가 있으셨는데 우선 Rohdin 의원님께서 말씀해 주시기 바랍니다.

**Lennart Rohdin:** 오늘 심포지움을 통해서 한반도 안보에 대한 새로운 시각을 갖게 되었다고 생각합니다. 사실 오늘 국제학술회의에서 다루고 있는 내용은 주로 소프트한 내용이지만 저는 주로 하드한 안보문제를 다루고 있습니다.

유럽의 입장에서 봤을 때 경제 교류·협력은 안보환경을 구축하고 신뢰를 쌓는 초석이 된다고 생각합니다. 사실 NATO가 1992년 보스니아에서 중요한 역할을 했고 또 신 NATO를 구성하는데도 중요한 역할을 했지만 향후 유럽의 안보에 있어서 가장 중요한 요소는 경제적 통합이라고 생각합니다. 최근 발틱해 연안의 신규 민주주의 국가들이 NATO가입을 서두르는 데는 여러 가지 이유가 있습니다만 이들도 NATO가입 뿐만 아니라 유럽전체와 경제를 통합하는 것이 얼마나 중요한 지를 깨달았기 때문이라고 생각합니다. 소련의 붕괴와 함께 발틱해 연안국가의 독립이 이루어졌고 스웨덴의 안보환경은 상당히

개선되었습니다. 그러나 유고내전의 결과 10만 이상의 난민이 스웨덴으로 오게 되었습니다. 또 그 뒤에 이어진 국제기구의 구호 활동의 결과 안보와 경제가 불가분의 관계에 있다는 사실을 알게 되었습니다.

한국문제, 특히 북한문제 전문가가 아닌 입장에서 제가 말씀드릴 수 있는 것은 오늘 두 발표자께서 말씀하신 것처럼 북한이 좀더 한국과 확대된 교류를 하도록 하는 것이 얼마나 중요한가 하는 것입니다. 물론 한반도의 상황이 잘못되어 군사도발로까지 이어질 가능성이 항상 있지만 지금까지 45년 이상 현 상태가 지속되고 있고, 최근 경제문제에도 불구하고 한국정부는 북한과 좀더 폭넓은 경제협력과 교류를 추진할 수 있다고 생각합니다. 북한보다 한국이 정치적으로나 경제적으로 우월한 입장에 있고 따라서 자신감을 가지고 북한에 적극적으로 손을 내밀 수 있다고 생각합니다. 북한의 경제실정은 이미 주지의 사실이고 현재 식량난은 인도적인 차원에서 재난에 가까운 상태라고 볼 수 있습니다. 북한체제의 근본적인 경제·정치적 문제들은 시급히 해결되어야 합니다.

제 견해는 현재 김정일지도체제하의 북한은 협력을 통해서건 혹은 강압을 통해서건 외부와의 관계를 맺어야 합니다. 최근 북한의 농업 개혁움직임은 북한지도층의 개혁노력을 시사한다고 볼 수 있습니다. 하지만 이러한 개혁정책이 과연 실효가 있을 지는 더 두고 보아야 합니다. 저는 북한의 포괄적인 개혁이 시급하다고 생각합니다. 따라서 오 박사님께서 말씀하신 대로 정부가 경제교류에 있어서 바람직한 역할을 취하고 대북 경제교역 투자가 시장경제원리에 의해 이루어져야 된다고 생각합니다. 또한 중소기업들이 경제성에 따라 북한과의 경제교류에 참여할 수 있는 환경을 마련하여야 할 것입니다. 또한 북한이 시장경제원리와 체제에 따라 경제개편을 이룰 수 있도록 도와주어야 합니다.

김대중 정부의 3대 대북 원칙에 대한 저의 견해를 말씀드리면, 특히 흡수통일 배제원칙이 매우 중요하다고 생각합니다. 이것은 북한으로 하여금 한국이 평화공존의 의도가 있다는 점을 설득하는데 필수적

인 역할을 할 것입니다.

다음으로 이재석 박사님은 주제발표 논문을 통해 식량원조와 같은 대북 지원을 정치적인 조건과 연계시키지 않아야 한다고 말씀하셨습니다. 그러나 남북관계의 관점에서 볼 때, 또 향후 신뢰구축 형성이라는 점을 생각했을 때 북한정권의 붕괴를 의도하지 않는 이러한 지원은 어느 정도 모순이 될 수도 있다고 생각합니다. 특히 현재 북한주민의 고통이 북한정권의 구조적인 문제에서 온다는 점을 감안하면 북한 동포와 북한개혁을 위해서도 북한정권의 붕괴를 연계시키지 않는 구호 역시 의미가 없다고 생각합니다. 북한체제가 사라져야지 북한동포들도 고통에서 벗어날 수 있을 것이다. 현재 북한의 구조적인 문제를 감안할 때 북한정권이 오래 지속되지는 못할 것으로 생각됩니다. 물론 그렇다고 흡수 통일을 하자는 것은 아니며, 적어도 북한의 개혁이 시작된다면 북한정권과의 관계모색을 해 볼 필요가 있습니다. 한 가지 더 말씀을 드리고 싶은 것은 북한이 갑자기 붕괴되었을 때 여러 가지 시나리오가 있겠지만 대량난민이 생길 것이라는 점입니다. 남북한간의 점진적인 협력모색과 단계적인 통일시나리오를 읽다보면 일반 국민들이 이러한 시나리오에 대해 어떠한 반응을 보일 지가 제대로 분석되지 않았다는 느낌입니다. 결정적인 순간에 국민의 목소리가 결정적인 역할을 하는 경우가 많습니다. 정치상황이 국민의 반응에 따라 학자들이 전혀 예상하지 못한 결과를 낳게 되는 경우가 많으며, 북한에서 실질적인 개혁과 진보가 이루어질 경우도 염두에 둘 필요가 있다고 생각합니다.

**Gabriel Jonsson:** 두 분의 발표 그리고 Rohdin 의원님의 견해를 잘 들었습니다. 이와 관련하여 몇 가지 이슈에 대한 제 견해를 말씀드리겠습니다.

먼저 이재석 박사님께서서는 남북한 당국의 역할이 앞으로 계속해서 증대할 것이며 궁극적으로 한반도 통일에 큰 영향을 미칠 것이라고 말씀을 하셨습니다. 이에 대해 제가 덧붙이고 싶은 것은 NGO의 역할

도 계속 증대하고 있다는 점입니다. 물론 북한에는 비정부기구로서의 민간단체가 거의 전무한 상태이며, 발언권이 있는 것은 군부와 노동당 정도입니다. 그러나 한국의 경우는 여러 시민단체들이 있습니다. 또한 전 지구적 차원에서 다원주의가 팽배하고 있습니다. 이러한 민간단체와 다원주의가 한반도 통일에 어떠한 영향을 미칠 지에 대해 말씀해 주셨으면 합니다.

두 번째로, 다양한 차원에서의 남북 관계가 중요하다고 말씀하셨는데, 일본, 중국, 러시아 등 인접국가의 역할이 구체적으로 무엇인지 말씀해 주셨으면 합니다.

세 번째로 이 박사님께서서는 남북 관계를 어떻게 개선해야 하는지를 말씀하시면서, 정치적인 성격이 덜한 비정치적인 분야에서 협력을 확대해 나가야 한다고 말씀하셨습니다. 비정치적인 분야에서 어떤 교류를 말씀하시는지 설명해 주시기 바랍니다. 예를 들면 스포츠, 과학기술, 관광업 등 다양한 차원에서 어떠한 형태의 협력을 도모해 나갈 수 있을 것인지 그 대안을 제시하여 주셨으면 합니다.

마지막으로는 제가 앞서 말한 개혁문제와 연관된 것입니다. 제가 듣기로는 현재 북한의 지도층이 개혁을 하리라고 기대하기는 힘들지만 자체적으로 자구책을 마련하고 있습니다. 특히 식량자급계획을 비롯한 일련의 정책을 취하고 있다고 들었는데, 식량난을 해결하기 위한 북한의 방안에 대해 아시는 것이 있으면 말씀해 주시기 바랍니다.

다음으로 오승렬 박사님의 논문에 대해 말씀드리겠습니다. 북한 노동당내의 개혁주의자들이 얼마만큼의 세력과 발언권을 가지고 있는지, 그리고 그들이 어떤 사람들인지 말씀해 주셨으면 합니다. 또 오 박사님께서서는 북한이 남한의 흡수통일 시도 가능성에 대해 대단히 큰 두려움을 가지고 있다고 하셨는데 이 두려움이 근거가 있는 것인지 아니면 가능성이 없는 데 단지 인식이 그렇다는 말씀이신지 밝혀주셨으면 합니다. 제가 이러한 질문을 드리는 이유는 독일 통일에서 볼 수 있듯이 인식과 실제 상황과는 큰 차이가 있기 때문입니다. 북한이 남한의 흡수통일에 대한 공포를 가지고 있다면 남한측이 공포심을 조성

할 만한 근거가 있는지 아니면 전혀 근거가 없는지 그 점에 대해서도 말씀해 주시기 바랍니다.

마지막으로 오 박사님께서서는 남북 교류를 말씀하시면서 통일 비용이 엄청나겠지만 그 파급효과도 매우 광범위할 것이라고 하셨습니다. 특히 통일에 의해 많은 기회가 발생할 것이라고 말씀하셨는데, 대우가 현재 북한에 투자하고 있는 현황과, 통일을 하게 되면 북한의 노동력이 어떠한 장점으로 작용하게 될 지에 대해서도 말씀해 주시기 바랍니다.

**사회자:** 토론자들의 질문에 대해 이번에는 오 박사님께서 먼저 말씀해 주셨으면 합니다.

**오승렬:** Rohdin 의원님과 Jonsson 선생님께서 어려운 질문을 해주셨습니다. 이에 대해 제가 대답할 수 범위 내에서 말씀을 드리겠습니다.

첫 번째 Rohdin 의원님께서 질문하신 것은 “북한에 있어서 광범위한 개혁(comprehensive reform)이 가능한가, 본인이 생각하기에는 현 김정일 정권 하에서 광범위한 개혁조치가 불가능할 것으로 보이는 데 이것을 어떻게 생각하는가”하는 질문을 하셨습니다. 이에 대한 제 생각을 핵심적인 점만 말씀드리겠습니다. 우리가 사회주의 국가의 개혁문제를 논의하면서 흔히 이것을 정책적인 차원, 또는 인물 중심적인 차원에서 이야기를 하는 데, 저는 경제학자로서 비용(cost)과 편익(benefit) 개념으로 이 문제를 생각하고 있습니다. 물론 이러한 비용과 편익이라는 개념은 단순히 경제적인 이득만을 의미하지는 않습니다. 정책담당자가 하나의 정책을 결정하기 위해서는 정치·경제·사회적 편익을 생각해야 하고, 그것의 비용이 편익보다 더 클 경우 정책을 포기하게 된다고 생각합니다. 김정일 정권이 개혁을 채택하기 위해서는 개혁으로부터 오는 정치·경제적 편익이 개혁을 함으로써 오는 비용보다 커야 할 것입니다. 그러나 문제가 되는 것은 김정일 정권이 개혁을 선택하기에는 정

치적 비용이 매우 크다는 사실입니다.

물론 이러한 상식적인 설명이 현실과는 약간 부합되지 않는 측면도 있습니다. 그것은 북한의 경제상황이 워낙 힘들기 때문에 오히려 북한 김정일 정권의 입장에서 보면 광범위한 개혁정책을 취해서 경제를 조금이라도 낫게 하는 것이 정권 유지에 도움이 되지 않겠는가 하는 점입니다. 그러나 현실적으로 정권 유지라는 것은 김정일 개인차원의 문제가 아니라는 점에 주목해야 할 것입니다. 그렇기 때문에 광범위한 개혁을 시장화와 소유권의 전환이라는 두 가지 문제로 볼 때, 북한정권이 이것을 시행할 경우 물론 경제적으로 상당한 이득이 있겠지만, 또한 이것은 실질적으로 북한의 기득권 세력의 이해관계를 침범할 가능성이 크기 때문에, 아니 제가 보기에는 거의 절대적으로 침범할 것이기 때문에 북한당국이 당분간 본질적으로 광범위한 개혁정책을 취하기가 상당히 어려울 것이라는 Rohdin 의원님의 견해에 저도 절대적으로 동감합니다.

또 하나는 방금 Jonsson 선생님께서도 말씀하셨습니다만 북한의 여러 가지 식량증산정책, 예를 들면 최근에 분조 관리제를 과거와는 상당히 다르게 시행하는 측면을 가지고 있는데, 우리는 이러한 정책변화를 근본적인 체제 개혁과 어떻게 구별해 볼 수 있는냐는 문제에 봉착하게 됩니다. 일부 논자들은 북한이 나진·선봉을 건설하고, 농업 정책을 일정 정도 바꾸고, 또 환율도 부분적으로 조절하는 정책을 펴고 있기 때문에 이것이 개혁의 시단이 아닌가라고 분석하는 경우도 있습니다. 그러나 우리는 다른 사회주의 국가의 변혁사례를 보면서 이러한 지역적이고 부분적인 정책변화는 결코 개혁이라고 이름 붙일 수 없다고 봅니다. 그리고 그 파급효과에 있어서도 결코 중국의 시장지향적인 개혁과 같은 긍정적인 경제회복의 효과를 가져오기 힘들다는 점을 말씀드리고 싶습니다.

마지막으로 Jonsson 선생님이 하신 질문은 대단히 어려운 사항입니다. 즉 “노동당내에 개혁세력이 있는가, 그리고 그 발언권이 어느 정도 인가”라는 질문을 하셨는데, 저는 이렇게 생각합니다. 지금 북한에

암시장이라든가 비합법적인 상거래 행위가 만연하는 것을 보면서 일부 관측자들은 북한이 개혁에 진입하고 있고, 또한 북한이 붕괴할 가능성이 있다고 보고 있습니다. 반면에 북한은 군부에 의존해 북한사회를 통치하고 있으며 김정일의 획일화된 통치구조에 놓여 있기 때문에 그러한 사회적인 일탈현상은 별 심각한 의미를 지니고 있지 않다는 상반된 견해도 존재합니다. 그러나 Jonsson 선생님의 질문에 우선 답변을 드리면, 북한에는 1980년대 초반 중국에 존재했던 것과 같은 적극적인 개혁의지를 가진 세력은 존재하고 있지 않다고 보여집니다. 이것은 물론 제 개인적인 생각입니다. 왜냐하면 북한의 최근 정책에서 보듯이 북한은 개혁이 무엇을 의미하는지, 그리고 시장기구가 무엇인지, 어떻게 해야만 이 광범위한 정책변화를 통해서 경제를 회복할 수 있는지에 대한 구체적인 아이디어가 없다고 생각합니다. 따라서 이러한 포괄적인 경제개혁에 대한 청사진을 그릴 수 있는 인적자원이 없는 상태에서, 북한에 개혁과가 있느냐, 없느냐 라고 질문하는 것은 큰 의미가 없다고 생각합니다. 따라서 북한내의 개혁 지향적인 목소리라는 것은 우리가 흔히 말하는 개혁파, 보수파라는 개념이 아니며, 그나마 최근 황장엽 선생의 남한 망명으로 북한 내부에서 합리적인 세력들의 입지가 좁아졌다고 보여집니다.

또한 북한이 독일 통일을 보면서 흡수통일에 대한 두려움을 느꼈고, 현재 한국경제가 어렵습니다만 그 직전만하더라도 한국경제의 영향에 대해 잘 이해하고 있었기 때문에 북한당국이 두려움을 느끼고 있었다고 봅니다. 독일통일의 역사적 경험과 한국경제 상황, 여기에 하나를 더하자면 주한미군의 존재, 이러한 세가지 측면에서 어느 날 자기들을 한국의 체제로 통일할 수도 있겠다는 두려움을 가졌던 것은 사실이었던 것 같습니다. 그러나 한국이 그러한 정책을 지향하고 있고, 한국이 북한을 흡수통일을 할 수 있느냐 하는 문제에 대해서는 강한 부정적인 대답을 하고 싶습니다. 우리 정부의 외형적인 대북 정책기조가 이러한 흡수통일과는 거리가 있고, 또 실질적으로 남북한 관계는 동서독 관계와는 상당히 다른 측면이 있습니다. 예를 들면 적

개심 문제, 한국전쟁의 기억, 남북한간의 군사적 영향문제, 주변국의 대한반도 정책 등 매우 복잡한 요인이 존재하기 때문에 한국은 북한을 결코 흡수통일할 의사도 없고, 능력도 없다는 것이 저의 솔직한 견해입니다. 그러나 우리가 남북관계를 잘 풀어나간다면 언젠가 점진적으로 북한을 관리할 수 있는 역량이 생길 수 있다고 보여집니다.

마지막으로 우리가 북한의 저렴한 노동력을 곧바로 활용할 수 있느냐 하는 문제인 데, 저는 우리가 현재 북한의 노동력을 이용해 위탁가공교역을 하는 것하고, 통일 이후에 북한의 노동력을 활용하는 문제는 약간 차원이 다른 문제라고 생각합니다. 지금 현재는 우리가 북한의 저렴한 노동력을 활용해서 위탁가공무역을 할 수 있지만, 통일 이후 북한의 저렴한 노동력은 양면을 가지고 있다고 생각합니다. 하나는 저렴한 노동력이라는 측면이 있고, 또 다른 하나는 우리의 사회문제로서의 부정적인 측면을 가지고 있습니다. 그렇기 때문에 체제전환기에 북한 주민들의 복지문제, 교육훈련문제 등 사회문제를 극복하기 위해서는 통일 이후에 북한의 저렴한 노동력이 우리에게 주는 장점보다는 오히려 훨씬 큰 문제를 발생시킬 수도 있다고 봅니다. 따라서 이러한 문제에 대해 우리가 단순히 경제적인 관점에서 저렴한 노동력이다, 아니다 라는 관점만 가지고 보기에선 좀 어려운 측면이 있다고 생각합니다.

**이계석:** Rohdin 의원님의 질문은 제 논문에서 남북협력관계는 다른 요구 즉 정치적 조건을 달지 말고 그냥 원조를 제공해야한다고 이야기하는데 대해 그것이 정말 유효 적절한 접근방식이겠는가 하는 것이었습니다. 또 한편으로 남북간 교류협력이 증대될 때 북한의 사회적인 변화에 대한 전망에 대해 물어 보셨습니다. 제 개인적인 생각으로는 남북교류협력을 추진해 나가는데 정치적 조건을 다는 것은 그렇게 유효한 접근 방식이 아닌 것 같습니다. 전에는 정치적인 조건을 많이 달았습니다. 저는 북한측에게 개혁과 개방을 추구해야 한다는 식으로 일방적인 요구를 하는 경우, 북한의 태도를 위축시킬 것이라고 생각

합니다. 따라서 전술적인 입장에서라도 교류와 협력을 추진해 나가되, 명시적으로는 개혁·개방을 요구하지 않는 것이 적절한 방책이라고 생각합니다. 또한 교류협력이 진전되는 경우에는 북한사회 내에서 문화적인 변모가 크지 않지만 서서히 변화가 일어나리라고 봅니다. 이를테면 사업을 하는 방식이라든가, 농업을 하는 방식이라든가, 공장을 운영하는 방식이 변화될 것이며, 또한 다른 방식이 들어오게 되면 사람의 사고체계도 변화하리라는 기대를 가집니다. 마찬가지로 북한 사람들도, 물론 제한적이기는 하지만 그리고 속도는 상당히 느리겠지만 변화가 있으리라고 기대합니다.

또한 조건의 전제와 관련하여 큰 원칙, 즉 ‘북한의 전체적인 사상체계를 버려라’는 식을 피하는 대신, 기술적이고도 세부적인 사항에 대해서는 북한도 자연스럽게 적응해오지 않을까 생각합니다. 예를 든다면 농업분야에 있어서 계약 재배를 하는 경우에 지금 북한이 가지고 있는 집단농장체제로는 운영이 불가능할지도 모릅니다. 그런 경우에는 기술적 차원에서 조정 가능하리라고 생각합니다. 지금으로서는 이렇게 아주 작은, 부분적인 변화를 통해서 남북 관계가 증진되는 것이 바람직하지 않겠는가 하는 생각입니다.

Jonsson 박사님은 세계 남북교류협력을 추진해 나가는데 있어서 비정부기구들의 역할에 대해 질문하셨는데, 이는 아주 중요한 문제라고 생각합니다. 물론 교회를 비롯한 종교단체들, 민간차원의 개별 수준에서 그리고 사회운동단체에서 남북교류를 추진하고 있고, 또 나름대로 어떤 기여를 할 수 있을 것인가에 대해 고민도 많이 하고 있는데, 저는 앞으로 비정부기구의 역할이 더욱 커지리라고 생각합니다.

또한 주변 여러 나라들이 남북교류에 있어서 주변국의 역할도 매우 중요하다고 생각합니다. 남북한간에는 갈등요인이 많아서, 잠수함 사건, 간첩사건 같은 것이 없어지기 어려울 것입니다. 그러나 이러한 문제가 발생하더라도 남북한 양측이 주변국들에 의한 다자 협조를 속에 묶이게 되면 남북 교류협력사업의 계속성이 유지 될 수 있다는 점에서 주변국의 긍정적인 기여가 기대되고 있습니다. KEDO 같은 경우가 아주 좋은 예입니다.

**사회자:** 감사합니다. 이번에는 청중석에서 질문을 받아보도록 하겠습니다.

**청중(강수천):** 저는 광진구에 사는 강수천입니다. 북한 김정일 정권이 유지되고 있는 것은 역시 군사력 때문이라고 생각합니다. 제 생각으로는 한반도 통일의 장애세력은 중국도, 러시아도, 일본도 아니고, 바로 상호 군사력이라고 생각합니다. 따라서 앞으로 남북대화의 새로운 지평은 남북 상호간에 순전히 불필요한 군사력을 감축하는데 총력을 기울여야 한다고 생각합니다. 이에 대한 박사님들의 고견이 어떠신지 듣고 싶습니다.

**이계석:** 제가 간단히 말씀드리겠습니다. 북한의 군사력문제는 심각하지만 그것을 풀어나가기 위해서는 4자 회담을 통해서 가능하리라고 생각합니다. 하지만 한반도 안보문제를 잘 풀어나가려면 다른 분야에서의 남북협력관계가 형성되지 않으면 북한이 이러한 군축대화 구도에 응하지 않으리라 보여집니다. 왜냐하면 북한이 가지고 있는 체제유지의 유일한 수단인 군사력을 포기하거나 혹은 어떤 구도 속에 묶여들게끔 하지 않을 것이기 때문입니다. 그러한 의미에서도 남북교류협력이 더 증진되어 나가야 된다고 생각합니다.

**사회자:** 제 의견도 말씀드렸으면 합니다. 우선 제가 알고 싶은 것은 한국이 현 남북한 상황을 어떻게 인식하고 있는가 하는 점입니다. 이와 관련하여 제가 정말 걱정하는 것은 서로 상충되는 아이디어들이 제시되고 있다는 점입니다.

첫째 질문은 북한이 얼마나 긴박한 상황인가 하는 점입니다. 그 동안 제가 본 것과 들은 정보에 의하면 북한이 상당히 절박한 상황인 것 같습니다. 북한주민의 1인당 칼로리 섭취량에 대한 통계치를 보더라도 그것이 사실이라면 도저히 용납할 수 없는 상황입니다. 또한 수년간 북한경제는 마이너스 성장을 계속 해왔으며, 최근 민족통일연구

원 자료에 따르면 북한의 농토도 심각히 황폐화된 상태입니다. 이와 같이 이미 수 십년 전부터 누적된 문제가 교류협력 확대와 같은 소극적인 자세로 과연 문제가 해결될 수 있을까 하는 의문을 갖고 있습니다.

한편으로 오승렬 박사님께서서는 북한의 개혁이 어려울 것이라고 말씀하셨는데, 이 점과 관련하여 우리는 심각한 딜레마에 직면하게 됩니다. Rohdin 의원님께서도 지적하신 것처럼, 북한 동포를 위한 원조가 북한정권의 붕괴를 연장시키는 결과를 가져올 것이며, 북한 정권이 유지되면 될수록 점점 상황이 악화되는 결과를 가져올 수도 있다는 점입니다. 이러한 맥락에서 말해 볼 수 있는 것이 신정부의 흡수통일 배제정책입니다. 즉 흡수통일하지 않겠다는 것, 또 적대적이지 않은 입장을 취한다는 것은 사실 대북 정책에 있어서 현명한 판단이라고 생각합니다. 그러나 저는 그러한 정책을 천명하면서도 과연 여러분들의 머리 속에는 어떤 생각이 담겨져 있을까 하는 것이 매우 궁금합니다. 흡수하지 않는다면 북한을 어떤 식으로 통일할 것인가. 한국은 부강한 근대 국가이고 북한은 절대빈곤에 상태에 있는 데, 이러한 두 국가를 도대체 어떠한 형식으로 합할 수 있는 것인가. 제가 보기에 흡수가 아니면 불가능하다고 생각합니다.

또 한가지 지적하고 싶은 점은 ‘북한을 흡수할 용의가 없다, 북한이 붕괴하는 것을 바라지 않는다’는 자세를 천명하면서도, 왜 북한에게 침략하지 않겠다는 불가침, 불침공의 원칙을 약속해 줄 수 없는가도 의문입니다. 1970년대 이미 유럽에서는 이 지역 모든 국가들 사이에 국경의 변경을 위해 군사력을 사용하지 않겠다는 약속을 받아들일 수 있었고 이것을 기반으로 해서 유럽의 안보체제가 구축될 수 있었습니다. 한국뿐만 아니라 여러 아시아 국가들 사이에도, 유럽과는 상황이 다르지만 왜 이러한 불가침의 약속, 무력 불사용의 약속을 서로 해줄 수 없는가에 대해 사실 저는 궁금합니다. 한국뿐 아니라 다른 국가의 사람들을 만나서 이런 이야기를 해도 반응은 마찬가지입니다. 모두 그러한 약속을 할 수 없다는 입장을 밝힙니다. 물론 이것은 제가 이

해할 수 없는 개인적 차원의 문제입니다. 따라서 발표해 주신 분들이나 여러분의 의견을 듣고 싶습니다.

끝으로 개인적인 질문을 추가한다면, 구호의 조건을 연계시키는 문제와 관련된 것입니다. 구호에 대한 전제 조건은 사실 여러 가지 부작용을 가져올 수 있습니다. 하지만 구호를 제공해야 되는 상황을 가져온 원인에 대한 조건조차 결부시킬 수 없는 것은 모순이라고 생각합니다. 구호를 제공할 때에는 현재 북한의 식량난을 완화시킬 수 있는 조건을 요구해야 합니다. 그렇지 않고 무조건 원조를 제공할 경우에는 북한의 상황이 지속되고 더욱 악화될 뿐입니다. 따라서 구호를 제공할 때는 구호를 제공하게 된 근본적인 이유를 감안해야 한다고 생각합니다. 이와 관련, 작년 『Foreign Affairs』지에 기고된 한 논문에 따르면, 북한이 붕괴하지도 또 개혁을 하지도 않을 것이라는, 그래서 현 상태가 유지될 것이라는 견해가 제기되고 있습니다. 저도 사실 이러한 견해에 동의할 수밖에 없습니다. 중국이나 러시아 그리고 심지어 한국도 이 지역의 위기상황을 회피하기 위해서 차라리 현 북한체제를 유지하는 것이 가장 용이하다고 생각하고 북한에 대한 지원을 할 가능성이 크다고 보여집니다.

**Geir Helgesen:** 최근 북한 실정에 대한 암울한 보도가 많이 나오고 있고, 우리 모두 이를 안타깝게 생각하고 있습니다. 1976년 CSIS 보고서에 따르면, 대부분의 주요 경제부문에서 북한이 남한을 앞선 것으로 나와 있습니다. 하지만 이제는 상황이 역전되었습니다.

북한에서의 군의 위치와 위상에 대해 드리고 싶은 한가지 질문은 한국의 군부가 한국경제를 발전시킨 경험을 감안할 때 과연 북한에서도 군대의 비슷한 역할이 가능하지 않을까 하는 점입니다. 물론 남북한의 군체제 성격은 상당히 다릅니다. 하지만 북한에서의 군의 역할이 항상 부정적이기만 한가에 대해서는 의문을 제기하고 싶습니다.

오승렬: Helgesen 박사님께서 질문하신 내용은 북한 군사부문의 역할, 이것이 과연 부정적이기만 한가 하는 것이었습니다. 특히 1970년대 한국의 박정희 장군이 정권을 담당한 이후로 급속한 경제성장이 이루어졌다는 예를 들면서 말씀을 하셨는데 북한의 군사 부문은 한국의 군사정부와는 상당히 성격을 달리한다고 봅니다. 박정희 대통령 같은 경우는 군대에서 나온 장군이지만 한국경제의 빌딩 블록 (building bloc)을 만들 때는 민간인 신분이었고 한국경제 성장의 원동력은 그 누가 뭐라 해도 시장경제에 입각한 경제체제였다는 점입니다. 단지 경제정책 운영과정에서 정부의 역할이 강해졌고 어떤 때는 약해졌지만 이 자체를 가지고 한국 경제성장이 군부에 의존했다고 말할 수는 없다는 점을 이야기하고 싶습니다. 이에 비해 북한의 군사력 부문은 실질적으로 상당히 다른 역할을 하고 있습니다. 비록 남북한이 다같이 매우 강력한 군대를 가지고 있지만, 특히 북한의 경우는 경제부문과 군사부문이 매우 밀접하게 연계되어 있습니다. 북한에서 흔히 자유경제 하에서 지하경제를 의미하는 제2경제는 군대를 의미합니다. 한국의 60년대는 강력한 군대를 가지고 있었고 대통령이 군부에서 나온 사람이기는 하지만 군부와 민간 부문은 경제적으로 철저히 구별되어 있었습니다. 그러나 지금 북한은 자원 물자의 결핍 현상이 매우 심각한 형편이기 때문에 모든 자원이 군수부문에 우선 배당되고, 또 군부가 사회통제 내지 경제에 있어서 상당한 부분을 차지하고 있다고 본다면 북한 군부가 결코 북한 경제에 긍정적인 영향을 미칠 수는 없다고 결론을 내리고 싶습니다.

그리고 Hart 교수님께서 일종의 딜레마를 이야기하셨습니다. 그 논지를 보면 '현 상태 하에서 북한의 개혁이 거의 불가능할 것 같다. 그러나 남한이 북한을 흡수통일하지 않겠다고 한다. 그럼에도 남북간에는 군사력 갈등관계가 지속되고 있다. 도대체 이러한 딜레마를 어떻게 해결할 것인가' 하는 것이었습니다.

우선 제가 말씀드리고 싶은 점은 북한 식량난과 관련된 것입니다. 현재 북한 식량난에 대해서는 여러 가지 통계가 존재합니다. 우리가

관측하고 파악한 바로는 북한의 식량난은 결코 지금 일부 언론이나 국제식량기구에서 이야기하고 있는 것과 같이 절대적인 수치로만 이야기 할 수 없다는게 제 판단입니다. 왜냐하면 북한의 기후조건이나 생산량에 있어서 매우 불리한 것은 사실이지만 더 큰 문제는 배분 체계에 있기 때문입니다.

또 Hart 교수님께서 왜 불가침에 대한 선언을 요구하지도 않고 언급하지도 않느냐고 말씀하셨는데, 이미 1991년 12월 남북한간에는 불가침에 관한 합의가 있다는 점을 말씀드리고 싶습니다. 문제가 되는 것은 죄수 딜레마(prisoner's dilemma)에 있습니다. 즉 양쪽이 지키면 모두 이익이 되는 데 한쪽이 안 지키면 다른 한쪽은 파멸에 이르는 손해를 보게 되는 바로 이러한 딜레마가 한반도에도 작용을 하는 것 같다는 Hart 교수님의 견해에 전적으로 동감합니다. 이러한 딜레마를 해결하기 위해서는 어떻게 하면 구체적이고도 현실적인 접근방법을 택해서 북한과의 공통인식 부분을 넓혀갈 수 있느냐 하는 것인데 아까 제가 내린 결론처럼 김정일 정권이 포괄적인 개혁정책을 취하기는 상당히 힘들겠지만 우리가 할 수 있는 것은 비용과 이득 관계에 대한 인식을 바꾸어 주는 것, 즉 북한이 개혁을 통해서 자기들이 지불해야 비용이 점차 줄어들 수 있다는 확신을 심어주는 정책들이 필요하다고 생각합니다. 이것은 하나의 선언이나 약속으로 이루어지는 것이 아니고 우리가 오랜 시간을 가지고 점진적으로 수행해 나가야 된다고 생각합니다

**곽태환:** 저는 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 소장을 맡고 있는 곽태환입니다. 오늘 학술회의의 이슈에 대해 다시 포커스를 맞춰보고자 합니다. 방금 오 박사께서 아주 좋은 코멘트를 하셨기 때문에 거기에 대해 좀더 구체적으로 물어보겠습니다.

우리정부는 3대 대북 정책원칙을 발표하고 정경분리를 바탕으로 한 남북경제협력을 강조하고 있습니다. 그런데 문제는 두 분의 발표자께서 말씀하신 대로 남북 경제협력을 성공시키기 위해서는 북한의 개혁

과 개방이 필요하다는 것입니다. 다시 말하면 정경분리정책이 성공하려면 역시 우리가 주장하는 3대 원칙이 실증적으로 북한에게 좋은 이득(benefit)으로 될 수 있다는 점을 보여줄 수 있는 정책을 유도해 나가야 한다고 생각합니다. 북한이 지금 4자 회담에서 주장하는 것을 무시해 버리고 북한과의 경제협력을 강조한다고 해서 우리의 정경분리정책이 성공할 수 있겠는가 하는 점에 대해 저는 기본적인 문제 제기를 하고 싶습니다.

그 다음에 북한이 흡수 통일을 두려워하기 하기 때문에 우리는 북한을 흡수통일하지 않겠다는 원칙을 내세웠습니다. 그러나 그런다고 그 사람들이 대화에 나오는 것도 아니라는데 문제가 있습니다. 또한 앞에서 지적한 바와 같이 기본적인 정책선언을 한다고 해서 북한이 개혁과 개방을 하는 것이 아니라고 봅니다. 따라서 좀더 과감하게 우리 정부가 북한이 받아들일 수 있는 정책을 추구해야 한다고 생각합니다. 구체적으로, 4자 회담에 나가서 북한의 주한 미군철수, 북미평화협정 등에 대해서는 우리가 받아들일 수 없다는 입장을 고수해야 될 것이나, 한편으로 남북 경제협력을 성공시키기 위해서 새 정부가 과감히 해야 될 일이 있다고 생각합니다. 다만 IMF 시대를 맞이하여 북한에 대한 새로운 정책적 선언은 당분간 불필요하다고 생각합니다. 좀더 기다리는 것도 때에 따라서는 현명한 정책일 수 있습니다. 그러나 남북경제협력을 성공시키고 기능적 어프로치를 통해 정치적인 분야까지 파고들어 경제 협력을 성공시키려면 우리가 어떻게 해야 하는가를 보다 구체적으로 연구해야 할 것입니다.

**Manfred Pohl:** 제가 말씀드리고 싶은 점은 한국정부가 재벌이건 아니건 간에 기업의 북한 투자에 대해 최대한 자율성을 보장해야 된다는 것입니다. 북한의 군사력이 엄청난 힘을 가지고 엄청난 비중을 차지한다는 것은 주지의 사실입니다. 그리고 이들이 북한 경제의 70% 이상을 장악하고 있기 때문에 북한에 투자할 때 북한당국 내지는 군사분야 관련자들과 협의하게 될 것이 분명합니다. 하지만 북한내부의

변화에도 주목할 필요가 있습니다. 김정일 자신도 기업 사장 내지는 경영진들이 스스로의 의사 결정에 따라 기업을 운영하도록 해서, 유럽 및 독일의 투자기업들은 자율권을 가지고 자체적인 경영체계를 수립할 수 있게 되었습니다. 또한 제가 10년 전에 북한을 방문했을 때 볼 수 없었던 농민시장이 형성되어 있었습니다.

마지막으로 제가 한가지 지적하고 싶은 것은 우리 모두가 협상에 있어서 강력한 정책이 있어야 된다고 생각한다는 점입니다. 그러나 저는 정책의 중요성 못지 않게 유연성에 대해 말씀을 드리고 싶습니다. 지금까지 남북 회담을 준비함에 있어서 사람들이 단 시일내에 달성할 수 있는 성과 이상을 기대했기 때문에 회담 성과가 불만족스러운 것이 아닌가 하는 생각이 듭니다.

**사회자:** 두 분의 발표자 분에게 마이크를 넘기겠습니다.

**이재석:** Rohdin 의원님께서 말씀하시기를 남북협력사업을 추진해나가는 데 있어서 필요한 경우에 구호조건을 요구해야 된다고 하셨는데 전적으로 동감입니다. 예컨대 지금 남북한 협력을 추진해 나가는데 자본이 부족해 IBRD나 ADB에 자본을 요청할 경우에 두 기관의 기준이 있을 것입니다. 그러한 기준에 북한이 적용해 나가야 하는데 이러한 기준에 적용을 해나가는 과정이 사실은 북한이 세계의 실정을 알고 현실적으로 자신들의 문제를 풀기 위해 어떤 식으로 해야 되는가 하는 것을 익히게 되는 과정이라고 생각합니다. 또한 이러한 과정은 사업을 추진하는 가운데 자연스럽게 이루어지는 것이 좋을 것입니다. 그러나 하나의 원칙문제로서 북한에게 개방·개혁, 이를테면 하나의 구호조건을 요구하는 것은 적절하지 않다고 생각합니다.

**오승렬:** 방금 Pohl 교수님께서 북한이 변화 조짐이 있으며, 그 예로서 기업독립채산제, 인센티브 시스템, 그리고 농민시장의 활성화 등을 드셨습니다. 이러한 문제와 관련해서는 두 가지 관점이 제기되고

있습니다. 즉 이러한 변화가 북한 체제를 통제 불가능하게 할 가능성이 때문에, 이것은 곧 북한이 붕괴하는 조짐이라고 보는 관점이 있고, 또 다른 하나는 Pohl 교수처럼 북한이 개혁하기 위한 가장 기본적인 조치들로서, 개혁의 시초로 보는 관점이 있습니다. 그런데 저는 이 두 가지 관점에 모두 동의하지 않습니다. 저는 북한에서의 이러한 약간의 변화가 광범위한 개혁과는 상당히 거리가 있는 정책들이고, 동시에 이러한 변화는 생존을 위한 수단으로서의 의미가 있다고 봅니다. 특히 중국이나 베트남과 같이 경제발전을 위해서 체제를 바꾸겠다는 동기에서 출발했다기보다는 지금 경제가 워낙 힘들기 때문에 살아남기 위해서, 미국과 대적하기 위해서, 또한 남한에 대적하기 위해서 이러한 변화정도는 불가피하게 허용하지 않을 수 없다는 현실상황에서 출발한 정책이라고 보고 있습니다.

또한 4자 회담에 지나치게 기대하고 있다는 Pohl 교수님의 지적에 전적으로 동감입니다. 그 문제는 방금 꼭 교수님께서도 말씀을 하셨는데, 우리가 북한이 받아들일 수 있는 정책을 제시해야하지 않겠는가 하는 것이었습니다. 그러나 저는 북한이 받아들일 수 있는 정책이라는 것은 한국정부가 할 수도 없고 할 필요도 없다고 생각합니다. 저는 북한이 받아들일 수 있는 정책이 아니라 북한이 스스로의 착오와 착각을 깨달을 수 있는, 그래서 북한으로 하여금 세계의 흐름에 대해서 그리고 시장기구의 정확한 기능에 대해서 깨달을 수 있는 정책을 펴야 된다고 생각합니다. 북한이 받아들일 수 있는 정책은 지금 현재 북한의 정책방향으로 보아서는 정치적인 사안이 될 수밖에 없으며, 결국 정치적인 사안과 연계된 경제정책은 또 다시 실패할 수밖에 없는 속성을 지니고 있다고 생각합니다. 따라서 우리가 굳이 북한에 대한 정책에 연계시킨다면 정치적 사안에 연계시킬 것이 아니고, 북한이 경제적으로 합리적인 정책을 취할 것을 조건으로 우리가 북한에 대해 뭔가를 할 수 있는, 즉 북한의 경제정책과 우리의 대북 지원정책을 연계시키는 것은 어느 정도 가능하다고 보여집니다. 그러나 정

184 남북협력: 새로운 지평을 향하여

치적인 사안과 경제적인 사안을 연계시키는 것은 과거 우리의 잘못을 또 다시 되풀이하는 측면이 있다고 보여집니다.

**사회자:** 감사합니다. 발표자와 토론자 두 분, 그리고 토론에 참여해주신 모든 분께 감사의 말씀을 드립니다.

제 3 회의

- 사회 : 박영규 (민족통일연구원 부원장)
- 발표 : Reinhard Driete (영국 뉴캐슬대 교수)  
“한반도와 동북아시아에서의 에너지협력”  
박찬모 (포항공대 교수)  
“남북간의 정보기술에 관한 상호협력”
- 토론 : 김상택 (통신정책연구원 연구위원)  
이 근 (서울대 경제학부 교수)

**사회자:** 많은 새로운 내용들을 발표해 주셔서 감사합니다. 시간관계상 바로 토론을 시작하겠습니다. 그러면 프로그램 순서에 따라 먼저 이근 교수님께서 토론해 주시겠습니다.

**이 근:** 먼저 Driete 박사님의 첫 번째 주장은 풍부한 에너지 자원과 많은 잠재력을 가지고 있는 동북아시아가 정치·경제적인 상황 때문에 에너지 자원뿐만 아니라 잠재력 또한 개발되지 않는 상태에 놓여 있으며, 이를 해결하기 위해서는 국제적인 차원의 노력이 필요하다는 것입니다. 이러한 견해에 대해 기본적으로 동의합니다. 그리고 이것을 전제로 할 때에 나올 수 있는 정책적 시사점은 첫째, 한국에서의 새로운 정권의 등장과 적극적인 대북 정책 구상에 비추어 에너지분야에 있어서 국제적인 차원의 진보가 있을 것으로 예상되며, 두 번째는 이러한 국제적 차원의 진보라는 갑작스러운 상황전개에 대비해 실무부문 또는 에너지분야 종사자들의 준비가 필요하다는 것입니다.

저는 Driete 박사님의 논문과 관련하여 몇 가지 보완적인 견해를 말씀드리려고겠습니다. Driete 박사께서는 현재의 동북아시아 에너지 수급 문제가 굉장히 심각하며, 특히 장래에 에너지 공급부족문제가 해결되

지 않고는 이것이 동북아시아 전체의 경제발전에 큰 장애요인이 될 것이라고 주장하셨습니다. 그런데 저의 견해로는 현재의 에너지 수급 불균형 문제라는 것은 현재의 동북아 경제상황을 기본 전제로 한 예상이라고 봅니다. 즉 동북아 경제 체제가 현재의 상황에서 변화한다면 에너지 수급의 문제는 좀더 다른 각도로 볼 수 있을 것입니다. 경제학 이론에서 보면 사회주의 경제와 자본주의 경제를 구분 짓는 여러 가지 시각이 있습니다. 그 중 한가지가 헝가리 경제학자인 Kornai가 주장한 것으로서, 자본주의 경제는 기본적으로 '수요에 의해서 제약되는 경제'이고, 사회주의 경제는 '자원에 의해서 제약되는 경제'라는 것입니다. 즉 자본주의 사회에서는 수요가 경제발전의 기본적인 관건인 반면 계획경제에서는 풍부한 자원의 확보가 경제발전의 가장 큰 관건이라는 것입니다. 이것은 바로 사회주의 계획경제라는 것이 기본적으로 에너지 소비가 많은 에너지 집약적 경제라는 것을 의미합니다. 그리고 과거의 구 소련이나 중국, 북한 등이 포함된 사회주의 국가에서 쓰이는 에너지의 양을 일관된 기준 하에 자본주의 국가와 비교해 보면 에너지 활용에 있어서 매우 비효율적인 경제라는 평가가 나왔습니다. 따라서 북한을 포함한 동북아시아 에너지 관련 사회주의 계획경제국가들이 시장지향적 경제체제로 변화할 경우에는 에너지 수요를 효율적으로 할 수 있다는 예상이 가능합니다. 이는 앞서 말한 바와 같이 현재 상태를 전제로 한 동북아시아의 에너지 수급문제도 다른 차원에서 볼 수 있다는 가능성을 시사하는 것입니다.

이런 전제하에 보면 북한의 에너지분야의 문제점은 결국 에너지 생산과 분배, 그리고 에너지 관련산업등 세 가지로 나누어 살펴 볼 수 있습니다.

첫째, 북한의 경우 에너지 생산력, 즉 생산량 자체가 낮은 것도 문제지만, 에너지 생산에 투입되는 원료의 비효율성도 문제입니다. 가령 화력발전에서 있어서 북한에서 가장 많이 쓰이는 에너지 생산원료가 석탄입니다. 그러나 저급석탄의 생산 등으로 인한 석탄생산의 비효율성 문제가 결국 화력발전에서 의한 에너지 생산의 문제를 야기하고 있습니

다. 수력발전의 경우에도 많은 새로운 발전소를 지어놓고도 수자원의 부족으로 인해 에너지 생산에 차질을 빚고 있습니다.

둘째, 일단 에너지를 생산하더라도 그것을 분배 또는 수송하는 시스템이 잘못되어 있는 것이 북한의 에너지 문제를 더욱 심화시키는 요인이라는 점입니다. 특히 에너지 생산에 사용되는 석탄의 수송문제 그리고 배분문제가 심각합니다. 화력발전에 소요되는 석유도 과거 소련이 90년대 초까지 약 44만톤을 북한에 공급해 주었는데, 구 소련 체제의 붕괴 이후 10분의 1인 4만톤으로 줄어들면서 공급난을 겪고 있습니다. 이런 것들이 북한의 에너지 생산에 큰 영향을 미치는 것입니다.

셋째, 에너지관련 산업에도 문제가 있습니다. 가령 에너지 생산과 관련된 강철산업에서 많이 쓰이는 석탄도 북한에서는 대부분 수입하고 있는데, 이러한 석탄 수입도 어렵기 때문에 북한의 에너지 생산에 영향을 미치고 있는 것 같습니다.

이와 같이 에너지분야 자체 생산량에 영향을 미치고 있는 여러 가지 요인들이 복합적으로 북한의 에너지 문제를 야기한다고 볼 때 우리는 북한의 에너지 문제가 국제협력차원에 의한 해결도 중요하지만 북한 내부경제 자체의 개혁차원에서도 살펴보아야 할 것입니다. 북한의 자체 전기생산분야가 비효율적이기 때문에 그 해결책으로 전기생산을 수력이나 화력발전보다는 핵 발전으로 하겠다는 것이 최근 많이 논의되고 있는 KEDO문제입니다. 북한의 매년 전기생산은 우리측 추산에서는 700만kw 정도 되고 UN측 추산에서는 900만kw 정도 된다고 합니다. 경수로에서 나올 수 있는 에너지 생산량이 200만kw라는 점을 감안 하면 경수로 사업이 북한의 에너지 문제 또한 상당히 해결할 수 있는 능력을 가진 것으로 보입니다. 그렇기 때문에 저는 국제적 협력의 문제도 상당히 중요하지만 북한 내부의 시장 지향적 경제개혁 자체가 에너지분야를 더욱 효율적으로 만들 수 있다고 생각합니다.

현재 북한의 위기 가운데 중기적 요인으로 볼 수 있는 것이 바로 에너지의 수입 및 공급의 부족이 경기 전체에 파급효과를 미치는 공

급속 승수효과라고 생각합니다. 자본주의 경제에서는 수요가 늘어난다면 수요의 몇 배 이상의 소득증대를 가져온다는 수요측 승수효과가 작동하는 반면 사회주의 계획경제에서는 특정한 원자재 공급이 줄어들면 그것이 경제전체에 몇 배 이상의 생산 감소를 가져온다는 공급측 승수효과가 작동하는데, 바로 이 작동의 가장 큰 요인이 에너지 분야입니다. 따라서 에너지 분야 자체의 개혁이 상당히 중요하다는 점을 재삼 강조하면서 제 코멘트를 마치겠습니다.

**사회자:** 감사합니다. 다음으로 김 박사님 말씀해 주십시오.

**김상택:** 박찬모 교수님의 발표에 대해 몇 가지점을 지적해 보도록 하겠습니다. 박 교수님께서서는 북한의 정보기술 현황 및 정책, 소프트웨어 및 하드웨어 개발현황, 그리고 북한의 연구소 및 대학의 현황 등에 대해서 말씀해 주셨습니다. 또한 남북협력 증진에 있어서 상향식 접근방법의 유용성에 대해서도 역설하셨습니다. 왜냐하면 현재 기술발전에 공헌하고 있는 세대들은 젊고 또 그만큼 융통성이 있어서 서로 민간차원에서 교류를 증진시키는 것이 더 낫지 않을까 하는 이유 때문입니다. 그리고 세 가지 제안을 해주셨는데 그 중에서는 정보기술연구소를 설립하는 것으로 한국의 소프트웨어 강점과 북한의 이론 및 연구의 장점을 겸비한 연구소를 설립하는 것에 대한 제안을 하셨습니다. 그리고 오늘 발표의 핵심이 되는 부분은 이렇듯 남북협력을 증진하는데 구체적이고 도움이 되는 제안을 해주신 것이라고 생각합니다.

박 교수님께서 전기통신분야에 대해 말씀하셨기 때문에 저는 북한의 전기통신분야 서비스업에 대해 말씀드리고자 합니다. 국제전기통신연합의 자료에 따르면 94년도 북한의 전화가입자는 130만 명입니다. 한국의 전화가입자가 2,000만 명인 것에 비교한다면 한국이 북한에 비해 전화회선수가 15배나 많은 것입니다. 그리고 북한의 전체 공중전화는 2,720개인데 한국의 공중전화수는 285,130개입니다. 북한에서

현재 전화가입 대기자는 6,640명이며 한국에서는 신청하는 즉시 전화 개통이 가능합니다. 북한은 94년도 전체적으로 이 분야에 300만불을 투자했는데 한국은 44억불을 투자했습니다. 따라서 여러 수치 면에서 볼 때 북한의 전기통신분야는 한국에 비해서 매우 낙후되어 있습니다. 그렇기 때문에 남북간 통신서비스를 개통을 하려면 목표를 미리 정하는 것이 필요할 것입니다. 첫 번째는 경쟁력을 갖추는 것이고, 두 번째는 북한 내에서 이런 통신서비스에 대한 수요를 창출하는 것입니다. 이 목적을 달성하기 위해서 정부가 업계의 진출규정이나 반독점정책 등의 면에서 분명한 정책을 제시해 주어야 합니다. 그리고 세 가지 옵션이 있는데 한국기업, 북한기업, 외국기업이 북한의 통신시장에 뛰어들 수 있도록 하는 것입니다. 이러한 세 가지 옵션에 대해서 각기 이견이 많은데 최선의 방식을 선택하기 위해서 앞으로 이 분야에 대한 많은 연구가 필요할 것이라고 생각합니다. 북한에 얼마나 많은 기업들의 진출이 필요하고, 이들 진출하는 기업들이 어떤 성격을 띠는 것인지를 결정해야 할 것입니다. 그리고 가격책정의 문제나 보편적 서비스의 문제 즉 모든 북한 주민들에게 전화나 컴퓨터, 인터넷 등을 무상제공 할 것인지 아니면 그중 일부에게만 선별적으로 무상제공을 할 것인지 하는 기준을 어디서 도출하며 또한 그에 필요한 기금들은 어디서 조성할 것인지 하는 것들을 생각해 볼 수 있을 것입니다. 세 번째는 반독점정책을 생각해 볼 수 있는데 시장 진입정책면에서 만약 이 시장에 진출하고자하는 기업이 있다면 반독점정책을 추진함으로써 이 기업이 진입을 방해받는 일이 없어야 할 것입니다. 그리고 그 외에도 많은 다른 문제들이 있습니다. 예를 들면 한국이나 북한은 자체적인 전화번호 부여체계를 운영하고 있기 때문에 서로의 체계가 일치하지 않습니다. 그래서 어떻게 공통의 전화번호를 부여하는 체계를 개발해 낼 것인지가 문제입니다. 이러한 문제를 결정할 때 한가지 명심할 것은 이러한 전화번호자체도 굉장히 귀중한 자원이라는 것입니다. 네 번째로 북한의 방송체계는 PAL방식을 따르고 있는 반면 한국의 방송체계는 NTSC방식을 채택하고 있습니다. 북한 내에서는 현재

200만대의 TV가 보급되어 있고 한국은 이보다 20배가 많은 4,000만대의 TV가 보급되어 있습니다. 따라서 두가지 상이한 방송체계에 속해서 한 방식만 택하게 되면 채택되지 않은 방식에 따른 TV사용체계는 완전히 무용지물이 된다는 것을 의미합니다. 그래서 어떻게 두 국가의 TV운영체계를 통합할 것인가 하는 것이 문제입니다. 마지막으로 저는 통일을 대비해서 양측이 모두 통일을 염원하고 있지만 감정이 아닌 이성으로 대응해야 한다는 말씀을 드리고 싶습니다. 그리고 이성적으로 대비하기 위해서는 많은 연구가 필요할 것입니다.

**사회자:** 감사합니다. 이제 발표와 지정토론이 끝났습니다. 시간 절약 위해 청중들께서 먼저 질문 해주시면 발표자 분들께서는 나중에 한꺼번에 답변해주시거나 보충설명 해주시면 감사하겠습니다. Rohdin 박사님 말씀해 주십시오.

**Lennart Rohdin:** 앞서 말씀하신 분들 중에 북한의 에너지난에 대해 말씀하신 분들이 있었습니다. 사실 현재 한국이 북한 문제 해결을 위해서 지원을 할 가능성도 있지만 한가지 지적할 수 있는 것은 한반도에서 천연자원이 주로 북한 쪽에 치중되어 있다는 점입니다. 따라서 장기적으로는 통일이 되었을 때 오히려 에너지 관점에서 보다 유리한 상황이 전개될 수 있다는 견해도 있습니다. 다만 현재 북한에서 사용되고 있는 석탄은 열효율이 적은 것이라고 하는데 여기에 대해 Drifte 교수님께서 말씀해주시면 좋겠습니다.

**Reinhard Drifte :** 그 문제에 대해서는 나중에 한꺼번에 말씀드리도록 하겠습니다.

**사회자:** 다른 질문하실 분은 안 계십니까? Hart 박사님 말씀하십시오.

**Thomas Hart:** 이근 박사님께 질문하겠습니다. 북한이 에너지난 뿐만 아니라 에너지 효율면에서도 상당히 떨어진다고 하셨습니다. 물론 에너지 공급 확대를 위해서 에너지 효율을 높이는 것도 필요하지만 그렇게 하기 위해서는 외부의 에너지 기술지원이 필요하다고 생각합니다. 예를 들어 중국의 경우 1인당 에너지 공급이 세계의 1인당 에너지 공급의 5분의 1밖에 되지 않음에도 불구하고 중국의 에너지 사용은 효율적이라는 점입니다. 이 점에 대해서 말씀해주시겠습니까?

**청중(이의선):** 평화문제연구소 선임이사로 있는 이의선입니다. 박찬모 박사님께서서는 상향식접근(bottom-up approach)을 제시해 주셨습니다. 앞서 말한 에너지 협력문제에 있어서 주로 KEDO를 중심으로 한 협력방안을 역설하셨는데 남북협력문제의 해결방안으로 Two Way System이 아닌 Triangle System을 제기해 봅니다. 예를 들면 식량협력문제에 있어서도 그것이 남북간 문제이지만 동시에 북한에 인접한 중국 등 동북 3성과도 밀접한 관계가 있기 때문에 남북당사자간 협력방안보다는 KEDO방식이 더 적합할 것이라고 생각합니다. 다시 말하면 식량협력문제를 해결하기 위해 KEDO방식을 응용한 FEDO방식으로, 그리고 동북 3성 및 연변대학과의 협력방식에 있어서도 상향식 접근보다는 Triangle System이 좋을 것 같습니다. 저는 이러한 방법 안에서 우리가 남북협력을 이끌어내는데 중간자적 역할을 할 수 있는 기능을 확보해야 한다고 생각합니다. 그리고 남북대치 상황에 있어서 국경은 남북만이 아니라 동북 3성하고도 국경 못지 않은 분쟁을 예측할 수 있을 거라고 생각합니다. 그래서 동북아 협력모델의 하나로서 식량문제에 FEDO 방식을 도입하면 동북 3성 즉 중국을 주축으로 한 모델을 생각해 볼 수 있지 않을까 생각합니다.

**사회자:** 감사합니다. 질문하실 분들이 또 계십니까? 시간이 많지 않으니 간략하게 질문해 주시기 바랍니다.

**청중(이형환):** 저는 LG정유에 근무하는 이형환입니다. Drifte 교수님께 질문을 드리고 싶습니다. 『Scientific American』이라는 잡지에 기재된 최근 국제적 석유매장 및 석유수요 관련 분석 보고서를 보면 석유공급부족의 위기가 앞으로 10년 이내에 나타날 수 있다고 전망하고 있습니다. 이 글을 읽으셨는지 궁금합니다. 그리고 읽으셨다면 Drifte 교수께서는 동북아시아에서의 에너지 협력구도 형성이 얼마나 시급한지에 대해 말씀해주시기 바랍니다. 만약 이 보고서의 내용대로 10년 내에 에너지 위기가 온다면 이것이 세계적인 에너지 안보상황에 어떤 영향을 미칠지 특히 동북아시아에 어떤 영향을 미칠지에 대해서도 말씀해 주시기 바랍니다.

**청중(전명우):** 저는 주식회사 트라스코 코리아의 전명우입니다. 박찬모 교수님께 말씀드리겠습니다. 박 교수님께서 북한의 소프트웨어가 한국의 소프트웨어보다 경쟁에서 뒤떨어진다고 말씀하셨는데 우리는 북한과 비교해 우위의 입장인 것을 자랑하기 이전에 북한을 우리와 한 민족, 한 형제로 생각하고 함께 공존하기 위한 정책적 노력이 필요하다고 생각합니다. 예를 들어 KEDO 문제에 있어서도 북한과 함께 공유하고 분배할 생각을 해야합니다. 또 우리의 첨단기술을 북한에 지원해 주고 거기에 필요한 과학자나 사업자의 교류를 활성화시켜 남북한의 공동노력으로 외환위기를 극복하는 것이 바람직하지 않을까 합니다. 정부측에서 조금 더 적극적인 지원을 해주길 바라며 학자 분들께서도 그런 방향으로 연구해 주셨으면 감사하겠습니다.

**사회자:** 감사합니다. 그러면 먼저 Drifte 교수님께서 답변해주시겠습니까.

**Reinhard Drifte :** 이근 교수님께서 말씀하신 것처럼 북한에서 에너지 생산효율을 높이는 것이 물론 중요합니다. 그렇지만 제 발표의 주제가 에너지 생산효율을 높이는 방안이 아니라 어떻게 하면 이 지

역의 에너지 개발에 북한의 협력을 이끌어 내느냐 하는 것이었기 때문에 그 분야에 대해서는 구체적으로 논의하지 않았습니다. 하지만 북한도 물론 외부의 기술지원이 필요합니다. 외부의 재원도 필요하고 이를 통해 에너지 생산을 높여야 할 것입니다. 그리고 북한도 에너지 수송에 있어서 중간기지역할을 함으로써 외화벌이도 할 수 있을 것입니다.

한국의 에너지 상황을 살펴볼 때 북한의 에너지 문제를 해결하기 위해 북한의 석탄을 활용해서 에너지 수요를 충족시킨다는 것은 그다지 효율적인 방법이 아닐 것 같습니다. 환경보호라는 측면도 무시할 수 없기 때문에 북한의 석탄 사용이 쉬운 문제가 아닙니다. 그렇지만 다른 효율적인 에너지 활용방식으로 KEDO의 두 개의 경수로를 활용해 한국의 에너지 수요를 충당하는 방식 같은 것도 있습니다. 북한이 만약 이를 최대한 활용하지 못한다면 남한의 에너지 수요를 충족시키기 위해 그 경수로를 사용하는 방법도 있습니다.

그러나 가장 시급한 것은 동북아 지역에서의 광범위한 에너지개발 협력기구를 만드는 것입니다. 그러나 동북아 지역내의 에너지개발 협력에 있어서 기술적인 수준의 협력은 되는데 정치적인 측면으로 인해서 남북한만 협력이 이뤄지지 않는다면 앞으로의 동북아 지역 내 에너지 개발 및 수송계획에서 한반도만 제외되기 때문에 남북한 당사자들이 그로 인해 큰 피해를 입게 될 것입니다. 물론 앞으로 10년 후나 20년 후에 닥쳐올 문제들을 미리 예상하고 지금 예비하지 않으면 앞으로 큰 문제가 발생할 수 있습니다. 그 점에 대해서는 저 자신도 많은 우려를 하고 있습니다. 그렇기 때문에 에너지 관련 문제에 있어서는 정치적 영향력을 배제해야 한다는 것이 제 발표 주제 중 하나였습니다.

다음으로 경수로와 관련한 문제입니다. 북한이 경수로에 투자하게 되면 나중에 북한이 붕괴하게 되었을 때 남한이 이 경수로를 운영하게 되기 때문에 손해볼 일이 없다고 생각하겠지만, 만일 현재대로 북한이 계속해서 핵 개발을 추진해 나가게 된다면 통일 후에는 남한도

핵무기를 보유하게 됩니다. 그렇기 때문에 북한의 핵무기 개발을 방지하지 않는 방향으로 나가길 바랄 뿐입니다.

다음으로 동유럽과 러시아의 경우 여러 기술적인 면과 재정조달 면에서 제한이 있기 때문에 대부분의 기업들이 소프트웨어 개발에 역점을 두어왔습니다. 이런 면에서 남북한간의 상승작용효과를 높일 수 있다면 이보다 더 좋은 대안이 없을 것입니다. 예를 들어 인도 같은 곳에서 남북한이 공동으로 투자를 하게 된다면 양측에 상호상승효과를 높이는 결과가 될 것입니다.

**박찬모:** 제 논문에서 부족한 통신분야를 보충해주신 김 박사님께 감사드립니다. 그리고 질문을 하신 이의선 선생님께서 상향식 접근보다는 Triangle Approach 를 제시하셨는데, 저는 상향식 접근방식을 남한과 북한에만 한정해 주장한 것이 아닙니다. 중국이나 제3국이 문제에 개입하더라도 민간차원에서 해결하자는 뜻입니다. 그 다음 질문하신 전명우 선생님께는 제 의견이 잘못 전달된 것 같습니다. 제가 말하고자 하는 바도 전 선생님께서 말씀하신 내용과 같습니다. 남한과 북한이 공동 협력하여 정보통신분야의 업적을 이루어나가야 하겠으며 저 또한 이것을 위해 최선의 노력을 다하겠습니다.

**사회자:** 마지막으로 이 교수님 부탁드립니다.

**이 근:** 먼저 북한의 에너지 문제 해결을 위해서 북한 내부의 에너지분야 체제개혁뿐만이 아니라 국제적인 지원이 필요하다는 Hart 교수님의 의견에 동의합니다. 현재 북한체제 위기의 원인이 단기적으로는 식량문제이고, 중기적으로는 외환부족이며, 장기적으로는 체제자체의 실패입니다. 그렇기 때문에 외환 지원만 있으면 북한이 그 돈으로 필요한 원자재와 기계를 사올 수 있으며 그런 차원에서 에너지 분야에 많은 도움이 되는 것은 당연합니다.

다음으로 남북한 통일이 에너지분야 문제해결에 도움이 되는 것은

전반적으로 북한이 남한보다 자원이 많기 때문에 그 점에서 통일된 한국경제에 도움이 될 것이라고 생각합니다. 그리고 북한 내부의 석탄 사용문제에 관한 문제는 북한에 현재보다 더 나은 기술이 유입되어서 저급 석탄이 아닌 고급 석탄을 생산할 수 있는 가능성이 있다는 점을 가정한다면 다른 논의도 가능할 것이라 생각합니다.

**사회자:** 간략하게 말씀해주셔서 감사합니다. 제 3회의와 관계는 없지만 제2회의에서 Hart 교수께서 제기한 문제와 관련해서 간략하게 제 생각을 말씀드리고 회의를 마치겠습니다. 제 생각에는 꽤 오랜 시간이 흘러도 그 문제에 대한 답을 명확하게 얻기는 힘들 것 같습니다. 왜냐하면 현재 북한의 상황에 대해 어떤 분들은 북한의 상황이 정권 또는 체제까지도 붕괴로 몰고 갈 수 있는 급박한 상황이라고 평가하는 반면, 또 어떤 분들은 Rohdin 의원께서 말씀하신 것처럼 북한의 내부상황도 그렇게 급박하지 않을 뿐 아니라 주변국가나 국제기구들이 북한을 계속 도와주고 있기 때문에 북한이 쉽게 붕괴되지 않을 것이라는 평가들을 하고 계시기 때문입니다. 이렇게 북한의 상황에 대한 평가가 달라지기 때문에 최근의 김대중 정권의 대북 정책의 효용성에 대한 논의는 아직 이르다는 생각입니다. 그리고 외국에서 오신 참석자들께서 김대중 정부의 정경분리 원칙에 대해 잘못 이해하고 계신 것 같아 보충설명을 드릴까 합니다. 강인덕 통일부 장관께서도 기조연설에서 말씀하셨지만 정부의 정경분리원칙이란 광의의 정경분리 원칙이 아닌 협의의 정경분리원칙을 의미합니다. 협의의 정경분리원칙이란 예를 들어 남북경협 추진의 주체가 되는 우리 민간 기업들이 북한방문을 할 때 복잡한 절차를 간소화해주거나 또는 북한에 대한 투자제한을 폐지하거나 하는 것입니다. 즉 정경분리라고 해서 경제와 정치적인 측면이 전혀 관계가 없다는 것을 의미하는 것은 아닙니다. 오전에 통일부 장관께서도 말씀하셨지만 대북 지원에 있어서 남북한 간의 공식적인 대화재개가 전제인 것이 그 예라 할 수 있습니다. 결국 국 현 정부가 추진하고 있는 정경분리란 민간 경제인들에게 좀더 자

을성을 부여하기 위한 협의의 원칙이지 정치와 경제가 전혀 연결되어 있지 않다는 의미는 아니라는 것을 말씀드리겠습니다. 그리고 정경분리원칙에 대한 효용성 문제는 다음과 같은 이유로 그 판단을 미뤄야 할 것 같습니다. 첫째, 아직 신 정부의 대북 정책에 대한 북한의 구체적인 또는 공식적인 반응이 나오지 않고 있기 때문입니다. 그리고 둘째, 우리의 정책도 정경분리원칙이라던가 또는 세 가지 대북 정책 추진원칙과 같은 하나의 윤곽차원에서의 제시일 뿐 아직 구체적인 내용은 제시되지 않은 상황이기 때문입니다. 그래서 앞으로 우리측의 제의에 대한 북한의 반응이 고려되어야 정경분리원칙이나 신 정부의 대북 정책 추진의 효용성에 대한 판단이 가능할 것 같습니다. 지금까지 신 정부의 정경분리의 원칙에 대해서 간단하게 보충 설명을 드렸습니다.

오늘은 종합토론이 없는 관계로 이제 제3회의를 끝으로 전체회의를 마치겠습니다. 그러면 회의를 조직하는데 호스트역할을 해주신 두 분 선생님께 간략한 마무리 말씀을 부탁드립니다. 먼저 Hart 교수님께서 말씀해 주시기 바랍니다.

**Thomas Hart:** 모든 발표자 및 토론자 여러분께 깊이 감사를 드리고 싶습니다. 저나 여러분 모두 아직 풀리지 않은 많은 의문들을 가지고 있습니다. 앞으로 우리는 그런 의문들을 해결하기 위해 계속 연구를 해 나갈 것이고 여러분께서도 보다 많은 관심을 가져주시기 바랍니다. 우리 모두 남북문제를 연구하는 사람들로서 남북협력이 순조롭게 진척되기를 바랍니다. 감사합니다.

**박상섭:** 회의를 보면서 느낀 점이 상당히 많았습니다. 특히 최근의 여러 가지 정치적 변화와 아울러서 많은 새로운 발상들이 자유롭게 제기될 수 있는 가능성이 있다는 것을 느꼈습니다. 그리고 남북한 문제는 그 동안 정치학 또는 경제학 하는 분들의 전유물로만 생각을 했는데 그 생각 자체가 남북한 문제를 자유롭게 풀어 가는데 상당한

방해가 됐던 것이 아닌가 싶습니다. 오히려 그보다는 앞으로 과학기술이나 문화, 또는 기존의 정치와 관련이 없는 다양한 분야에서 전혀 새로운 발상을 가지고 접근을 한다면, 그리고 거기에 너무 성급한 기대를 갖지 않는다면 의외로 남북한 문제가 쉽게 풀릴 수 있는 대목이 상당히 많을 것이라고 생각합니다. 끝으로 특별히 우리 문제에 대해 관심을 갖고 많은 제안을 해주신 유럽의 학자 분들께 다시 한번 깊은 감사를 드립니다.

**사회자:** 감사합니다. 호스트의 한사람으로써 마지막으로 한 말씀 드리겠습니다. 학술회의는 정책토론회와 달리 명확한 결론을 내리기 보다는 서로 다른 의견을 비교·제시하고 또 그런 것을 발전시키는 계기의 장소입니다. 그러므로 여러분께서는 이 점을 이해해주시기 바랍니다. 그리고 오늘의 학술회의는 최근 개최된 학술회의 중에서 가장 성공적인 것이라고 제 스스로 평가를 할 수 있을 것 같습니다. 늦은 시간까지 참석해 장시간 경청해주신 여러분께 회의를 준비한 한 사람으로써 감사의 말씀을 드립니다. 마지막으로 회의를 성공적으로 끝낼 수 있도록 많은 기여를 해주신 외국 학자 분들께 깊이 감사를 드립니다. 감사합니다.

## <회의 일정>

09:30~10:00 등 록

10:00~10:15 개 회 사: 민족통일연구원 원장  
기조연설: 강인덕 (통일부 장관)  
“「국민의 정부」 대북정책 추진기조와 방향”

10:15~12:15 제 1 회의

- 사회: 하영선 (서울대 교수)
- 발표: Manfred Pohl (함부르크대 교수)  
“독일의 통일경험과 한국의 전략에 대한 합의”  
Geir Helgesen (노르딕 아시아연구소 연구위원)  
“새로운 시각에서 본 남북협력의 미래”
- 토론: 노경수 (서울대 교수)  
박영호 (민족통일연구원 선임연구위원)

12:15~13:30 오 찬

13:45~15:45 제 2 회의

- 사회: Thomas Hart (스톡홀름대 교수)
- 발표: 오승렬 (민족통일연구원 연구위원)  
“남북간 경제협력을 위한 정부의 적절한 역할모색”  
이재석 (아·태평화재단 선임연구위원)  
“북한의 식량위기와 남북협력”
- 토론: Lennart Rohdin (스웨덴 국회의원)  
Gabriel Jonsson (스톡홀름대 아·태연구소)

15:45~16:00 Coffee Break

16:00~18:00 제 3 회의

- 사회: 박영규 (민족통일연구원 부원장)
- 발표: Reinhard Driete (영국 뉴캐슬대 교수)  
“한반도와 동북아시아에서의 에너지협력”  
박찬모 (포항공대 교수)  
“남북간의 정보기술에 관한 상호협력”
- 토론: 이 근 (서울대 교수)  
김상택 (정보통신정책연구원 연구위원)

### 最近 發刊資料 案內

#### ■ 연구보고서

96-01	김정일의 당권장악과정 연구	최진욱	著	6,000원
96-02	통일과정에서 매스미디어의 역할	이우영	著	6,000원
96-03	동·서독 인적교류 실태 연구	김학성	著	6,500원
96-04	동서독간 정치통합 연구	황병덕	著	6,000원
96-05	남북한 환경분야 교류·협력 방안 연구: 다자적·양자적 접근	손기웅	著	7,000원
96-06	북한과 주변4국의 군사관계	鄭永泰	著	6,000원
96-07	韓·美 安保協力 增進方案 研究	金國新	著	4,000원
96-08	東北亞 平和體制 造成方案	余仁坤 金永椿 申相振 외 共著		10,000원
96-09	北韓 經濟改革의 最適方向 研究	吳承烈	著	6,500원
96-10	통일과정에서 민간단체의 역할	조민	著	5,000원
96-12	한반도 평화체제 구축과정에서의 한국의 안보정책 방향	박영호	著	5,000원

96-13	남북교류협력 활성화를 위한 법제도 개선방안	제성호	著	5,500원
96-14	북한 사회의 계급갈등 연구	서재진	著	7,500원
96-15	통일과정에서의 정당역할 연구	김도태	著	4,500원
96-16	KEDO체제하에서 남북한 협력증진에 관한 연구: 협력이론을 중심으로	전성훈	著	5,000원
96-17	남북한 에너지분야 협력방안 연구	박순성	著	4,000원
96-18	북한이탈 주민의 사회적응에 관한 연구: 실태조사 및 개선방안	박종철 김영운 이우영	共著	7,000원
96-19	북한의 경제정책 변화와 남북경협 활성화 방안	허문영	著	5,500원
96-20	미국의 대북한 경제제재 완화와 남북한 관계	김규륜	著	3,500원
96-21	북한의 노동정책과 노동력 평가	남궁영	著	6,000원
96-22	한-러 안보협력 방안 연구	강원식	著	8,500원
96-23	북한 사회주의체제의 위기수준 평가 및 내구력 전망	김성철 정영태 오승렬	共著	8,500원
96-24	북한체제의 변화주도세력 연구	이교덕	著	4,500원
96-25	북한의 농업정책과 식량문제 연구	최수영	著	4,000원

202 남북협력: 새로운 지평을 향하여

96-26 북·미관계 개선과 북한의 대남정책 변화	전망 이헌경 著	6,500원
96-27 한·일 안보협력방안 연구	전동진 著	4,500원
96-28 북한의 유일체제와 정책경쟁	안인해 著	5,500원
96-29 韓·中 安保協力方案 研究	崔春欽 著	3,500원
97-01 한반도 통일과정에서 러시아의 역할	강원식 著	5,000원
97-02 북·일수교와 남북한 관계	이교덕 著	3,500원
97-03 경수로인력의 북한체류시 법적 문제	제성호 著	7,000원
97-04 中·北關係  전망: 米·북관계와 관련하여	신상진 著	4,000원
97-05 북한 환경개선 지원 방안: 농업분야 및 에너지효율성 개선 관련	손기웅 著	5,000원
97-06 한반도 통일문제에 대한 주변4국의 입장 분석: 전문가 인식조사 결과	박영호 배정호 신상진 조한범 共著	5,500원
97-07 통일한국의 위상	옥태환 김수암 共著	6,000원
97-08 북한 간부정책의 지속과 변화	김성철 著	4,500원
97-09 중국과 러시아의 경제체제개혁 비교연구	조한범 著	4,500원

97-10	김정일 정권의 안보딜레마와 대미·대남정책	홍용표	著	4,000원
97-11	북한의 지방행정체제: 중앙·지방관계 및 당·정관계를 중심으로	최진욱	著	5,000원
97-12	북한인권문제와 국제협력	김병로	著	6,000원
97-13	국제기구 및 비정부기구의 인도적 지원사례	이금순	著	6,000원
97-14	미국의 대북한 경제정책: 현황과 전망	김규륜	著	3,000원
97-15	통일교육 개선방안 연구	황병덕	著	5,000원
97-16	통일이후 북한지역 국유재산 사유화방안 연구	조민	著	5,000원
97-17	김정일 문예정책의 지속과 변화	이우영	著	4,500원
97-18	북한의 국방계획 결정체제	정영태	著	5,000원
97-19	'90년대 북한체제의 위기와 변화	박형중	著	4,500원
97-20	북한의 제2경제	최수영	著	5,000원
97-21	미·북관계의 변화와 한국의 대북정책 방향	박영호	著	5,500원
97-22	북한 장래에 대한 일본의 시각	김영춘	著	3,000원
97-23	북한의 관광실태와 남북한 관광분야 교류·협력방안	김영운	著	6,000원
97-24	클린턴 2기 미국의 대북정책	이현경	著	4,000원

97-25 북한과 주변 4국 및 남한간 갈등·협력관계, 1984~1997		
	박종철 著	5,500원
<b>■ 북한인권백서</b>		
북한인권백서 1996	옥태환 전현준 제성호의共著	10,000원
<i>White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea</i> 1996	옥태환 전현준 제성호의共著	10,000원
북한인권백서 1997	김병로 송정호 共著	10,000원
<i>White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea</i> 1997	김병로 송정호 共著	\$11.95
북한인권백서 1998	최의철 송정호 共著	7,000원
<i>White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea</i> 1998	최의철 송정호 共著	\$11.95
<b>■ 연례정세보고서</b>		
96 統一環境과 南北韓 關係: 1996~1997		6,000원
97 統一環境과 南北韓 關係: 1997~1998		5,000원
<b>■ 학술회의 총서</b>		
96-01 북한정세 변화와 주변4국의 대한반도정책		7,000원
96-02 脫冷戰期 韓半島의 戰爭과 平和		9,000원

96-03	북한경제제도의 문제점과 개혁 전망	9,000원
96-04	북한의 대외관계 변화와 남북관계 전망	7,500원
96-05	南北韓關係 現況 및 '97年 情勢 展望	7,000원
96-06	4자회담과 한반도 통일전망	8,500원
97-01	4자회담과 한반도 평화	6,500원
97-02	분단비용과 통일비용	7,500원
97-03	한반도 통일을 향하여: 정책과 국제환경	7,000원
97-04	남북한 사회통합: 비교사회론적 접근	8,500원
97-05	한반도 급변사태와 국제법	4,000원
97-06	북한 경제난의 현황과 전망	7,500원
98-01	남북협력: 새로운 지평을 향하여	9,000원
<b>■ 통일문화시리즈</b>		
96-01	統一과 北韓 社會文化(上)	10,000원
96-02	統一과 北韓 社會文化(下)	9,500원
97	바람직한 통일문화	9,500원
<b>■ 논총</b>		
	統一研究論叢, 제5권 1호 (1996. 6)	10,000원
	統一研究論叢, 제5권 2호 (1996.12)	10,000원
	統一研究論叢, 제6권 1호 (1997. 7)	10,000원
	統一研究論叢, 제6권 2호 (1997.12)	10,000원
	<i>The Korean Journal of National Unification</i> , Vol. 5 (1996)	6,500원
	<i>The Korean Journal of National Unification</i> , Vol. 6 (1997)	9,000원

■ Translation Series

97-01 NORTH KOREA IN CRISIS: An Assessment of 7,000원  
Regime Sustainability

97-02 The Making of a Unified Korea: Policies, Positions, 6,500원  
and Proposals

## 민족통일연구원 定期會員 가입 안내

민족통일연구원은 통일문제가 보다 현실적인 과제로 대두되고 있는 시점에서 그동안 제한적으로 유관기관과 전문가들에게만 배포해오던 각종 연구결과물들을 보다 폭 넓게 개방하여 전국의 대형서점에서 개별구입하거나 본원의 定期會員에 가입하여 구독할 수 있도록 하였습니다.

본원의 간행물 분량이 많아 일일이 서점에서 구입하기에는 번거로움이 있을 것이라는 점을 고려하여 定期會員制를 운영하게 되었습니다. 정기회원에게는 본원의 모든 간행물(연구보고서, 국문 및 영문 저널, 학술회의 총서, 판매되지 않는 수시 「정세분석보고서」 등)을 직접 우편으로 우송해드리는 것은 물론 학술회의 초청 등 회원의 권리를 부여하오니 많은 이용을 바랍니다.

### 1. 정기회원의 구분

- 1) 일반회원: 학계나 사회기관에서의 연구종사자
- 2) 학생회원: 대학 및 대학원생
- 3) 기관회원: 학술 및 연구단체 또는 도서관 등의 자료실

### 2. 회원가입 및 재가입

- 1) 가입방법: 회원가입신청서를 기재하여 회비를 납부하신 入金證과 함께 본 연구원으로 Fax 또는 우편으로 보내주시십시오. 정기회원 자격이 취득됩니다.
- 2) 연 회 비: 회원자격은 가입한 날로부터 1년간입니다.  
일반회원 및 기관회원 10만원, 학생회원 7만원
- 3) 납부방법: 신한은행 온라인 310-05-006298(예금주:민족통일연구원)
- 4) 재 가 입: 회원자격 유효기간 만료 1개월전 회비를 재납부하면 됩니다.(재가입 안내장 발송).

### 3. 정기회원의 혜택

- 1) 본 연구원이 주최하는 국제 및 국내학술회의등 각종 연구행사에 초청됩니다.
- 2) 본 연구원이 발행하는 정기간행물 「통일연구논총」과 The Korean Journal of Unification Studies를 포함하여 그 해에 발행되는 단행본 연구보고서(년평균 25-30권), 학술회의 총서(년평균 5-6권), 정세분석보고서(년평균 10-15권) 등의 간행물이 무료 우송됩니다.
- 3) 본 연구원에 소장된 도서 및 자료의 열람, 복사이용이 가능합니다.
- 4) 시중서점에서 판매되고 있는 본 연구원의 지난자료를 50% 할인된 가격에 구입 할 수 있습니다.

### 4. 회원가입 신청서 제출 및 문의처

서울시 강북구 수유6동 535-353 (우편번호:142-076)  
민족통일연구원 정보자료실 (전화:901-2604, 901-2559, FAX:901-2547)

