

White Paper
on
Human Rights in North Korea

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**The Research Institute for
National Unification**

White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea

The White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea was published by the Research Center for Human Rights in North Korea, Research Institute for National Unification (RINU), Seoul, Korea, as the first of an annual series of reports exposing what we know about the human rights situation in North Korea.

The White Paper will be circulated free of charge to institutions and analysts concerned with the issues of Korean unification and related issues of peace and security in the region of Northeast Asia surrounding the Korean peninsula. To request a copy or to be placed on our mailing list, please write to the center.

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Preface

Today's international mainstream can be marked by mankind's efforts to realize and guarantee democracy and human rights. Two rounds of world wars and Nazi and fascist atrocities have deeply ingrained invaluable lessons into the hearts of humankind how important it is to respect human rights. The United Nations, launched for the sake of world peace and collective security, has been exploring institutional devices to protect and extend human rights.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations prescribes that all men are born with the dignity and rights to enjoy a free and equal life. This embodies the essence of modern thought on human rights. Furthermore, the International Human Rights Covenant plays the very role of international norm for their practical guarantee and opening the era of their internalization.

Not only do UN members acknowledge the universality of human rights and define them in their constitutional laws but they are also making forthright efforts to put the ideal into reality. Moreover, they are reinforcing denunciation and international sanction upon violators of the International Human Rights Covenant. Following the collapse of Soviet and East European socialism, in particular, human rights are gaining more and more attention as a weighty issue in international relations. In consequence, many countries are taking steps in common to protect and promote them and use them to help bring about international order and maintain peace.

Such international efforts to respect the spirit of human rights is indeed embodied in the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Korea. This obliges the Korean people to regard human dignity as the cardinal value. The idea is also reflected in the ROK unification formula, called the Three Stage Unification Formula for the Creation of a Korean National Community. It presents a vision of the unified fatherland as a national community in which seventy million Korean people lead their lives enjoying freedom, welfare and human dignity. Such a vision is in line with the international spirit of respect for human rights.

Yet, frequent reports can be heard on human rights violations in nations that neglect the international human rights movement by emphasizing their ideological and institutional uniqueness. Among them, the country labelled “the dead end of human rights” or “winterland of human rights” is North Korea.

Many renowned international human rights groups including Amnesty International report that North Korea is openly committing oppression of human dignity, human value, freedom and rights. Meanwhile North Korea is still propagandizing that their society is a “paradise on earth” and ranting on about how happily the people are enjoying their lives in North Korea.

The notion of human rights as innate rights of all people is denied in North Korea. They recognize only a kind of civic rights that are endowed by the great leader and the party under the logic of “the one for the whole and the whole for the one.”

Under the ultimate objective of the maintenance and reinforcement of the Kim Il Sung–and–Kim Jong-il one-party dictatorship, North Korea is depriving fundamental human rights of its people. An extremely oppressive state apparatus penetrates into everyone’s private life. The regime operates horrible political concentration camps to alienate and restrain all political opposition. The situation is at its most cruel, literally beyond imagination.

Without democratization and an improvement of human rights, unification by means of building a national community will be impossible. Only a peaceful unification based on democratization and a big improvement of human rights in

North Korea will be able to provide the foundation for national co-prosperity.

This truth necessitated the launch of the Center for Human Rights in North Korea at RINU in December 1994. Since then the center has surveyed and collected information and material and conducted research and analysis on the North Korean human rights situation in various social fields. This volume, finally, is its first production.

Until now, the reality of human rights in North Korea could not be understood beyond the level of common knowledge because the doors to and from its society are sealed shut. Information could usually be attained only through the testimonies of North Korean defectors.

RINU published the *White Paper on North Korean Human Rights* to help us grasp the reality in the North accurately. Its purpose is to realize peaceful unification of Korea in which the Korean people can enjoy a beautiful life of human dignity and rights. Although many weak points can be found in this volume due to limits in available materials, I hope it will contribute to specialists of the field concerned as well as to ROK policy-makers in formulating policy towards North Korea.

February 1996
Lee Byoung Yong
President
RINU

I. The System and Differing Concepts of Human Rights

According to reports from Amnesty International, the US Department of State, and Freedom House, North Korea is the country with the worst human rights record in the world.

Based on the principle of collectivism, the Pyongyang government entirely prohibits individual free political, economic and social activities—emphasizing, however, that when the concept of human rights is interpreted in “our own style,” there is no human rights problem whatsoever in North Korea. Despite such excuses international human rights organizations pinpoint it as the nation with the very worst human rights record. Their reports are backed by testimonies from defectors. We can no longer gloss over the issue.

This is more the case because without headway in the human rights situation in the North there will arise many problems in the process of and even after unification; without a big improvement it will be impossible to establish a democratic regime there and unification will be delayed. Even when the two Koreas do unite, it will be difficult to maintain social stability because victims will seek revenge. Prosperity of the Korean nation, the cardinal goal of unification, would remain a dream.

To minimize the side-effects during and after unification we should do our best to bring about an improvement. It requires us to probe the situation thoroughly and explore

practical measures to prevent further violations. This chapter examines the North Korean perception of human rights, and the characteristics of the socio-political system that cause it to commit truly terrible violations.

The Origins and Development of the Modern Concept of Human Rights

Human rights is the freedom and the rights for one to enjoy in order to live a humane life, and the rights one should be able to exercise as a member of society, the fundamental rights of humankind.

Since the end of the Second World War, most countries have regarded the respect for human rights as a common concern because of the experience of brutality of war and cruelty of human rights violations caused by Nazism and fascism. The United Nations defines international cooperation towards the respect for human rights as one of its original objectives. The UN adopted the “International Human Rights Declaration” at the 3rd session of the UN General Assembly held on 10 December 1948 in order to realize the spirit of respect for human rights embodied in the UN Charter. In order to secure an international guarantee of basic human rights proclaimed in the declaration, the UN adopted the International Human Rights Covenant at the 21st session of UN General Assembly held on 16 December 1966. It comprised the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Covenant A), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant B), and the Optional Protocol on

Covenant B. All three came into effect in 1976.

Emphases upon either Covenant A or Covenant B differ in accordance with systemic and ideological characteristics of various countries. Capitalist states underscore Covenant B, the civil and political rights, while socialist states have emphasized Covenant A, the economic, social and cultural rights. Socialist countries suppress individual rights in favor of collective interests while capitalist states place greater weight upon the individual. Capitalist states have called for international sanctions upon countries that commit human rights violations while socialist states generally oppose sanctions in terms of intervention in national sovereignty. Reflecting this very difference, North Korea argues that they have no human rights problem.

Now after the Cold War international society agrees that we should make common efforts to improve the human rights situation around the world. In this context, the concept of human rights can be understood to include the following three factors: (1) human rights are based on the premise that man's individual value is very important; (2) they are those rights that should naturally be enjoyed by man because they are not endowed by the state and no state can violate those rights; (3) although human rights signifies political freedom together with economic justice, the former has priority over the latter.

“Human Rights” According to Juche Ideology

Juche is the governing ideology of North Korea, the alpha and omega that explains everything. What is its essence? According to the first proposition of juche ideology, man is the master of the world. Second, among people the working masses—not the bourgeoisie—are master of the world, and third, it is the working masses who follow the *suryong* (the “great leader”) who are the master of the world. Juche thought boils down to the theory of the *suryong*. The collectivism advocated in Marx-Leninism takes a leap of logic through the theory of the socio-political organism as the will of the group—but the group that acts in accordance with the will of the *suryong*.

The matrix of the socio-political organism is the unity among the *suryong*, the workers’ party and the people. As members of the socio-political organism, people are linked in blood with the great leader. Only those unified under party and *suryong*, in substantial organization as well as in terms of ideology, can pioneer their fortune in a self-reliant and creative manner. This is because people can possess a “socio-political organic life” only when they follow the *suryong*’s orders unconditionally. Loyalty to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il, then, turns out to be the means of bolstering the revolutionary theory of the *suryong*.

The group implied in the corporate theory of the socio-political organism refers to society, state and party. It, as well, boils down in the end to the *suryong* and implies the idolization of Kim Il Sung. North Korea argues that collective life is

necessary to maintain socio-political life and such life means the life attitude centered totally around the suryong, the creator of life. Those who digress from that attitude are branded as political offenders and deprived of their human rights. The nucleus of the theory is that the suryong is the absolute one who loves the people from the supreme position, so if the people abide by his guidance they can create a happy society. The suryong is, according to the theory, supposed to solve all problems of the people in advance. How can there be any human rights problem? Kim Jong-il mentions human rights in his “Our-own-style of Socialism Centered upon the Masses is Victorious and Invincible”:

Although the imperialists and the reactionaries are disparaging socialism by calling themselves “supporters of human rights,” the true violators of human rights are the imperialists and the reactionaries themselves. The imperialists and reactionaries who inflict political terror on innocent people and leaders and violate the fundamental democratic freedoms and the right to live have no right to talk about human rights. The severe violations of human rights committed in South Korea under the instigation of the US imperialists clearly manifests how hypocritical and impudent is the term “supporters of human rights” cried out by the imperialists. Unlike in capitalist society in which laws become the governing tool of the reactionary ruling class, our socialist laws are legislated reflecting the will of the working people and implemented based on the high awareness of the working people. By means of the most humane socialist legal life, our people as the master of state and society are thoroughly guaranteed by law of their democratic rights and freedoms.

He insists it is the capitalists who have the human rights problem. Whenever North Korea is thus accused they emphasize “socialist democracy,” insisting that unlike bourgeois democracy, North Korea’s democracy executes state administration in full reflection of the opinion of the people. In practice, however, there are very few institutional devices and almost no opportunity for the people to complain. Those taking part in collective action to reflect their interests are stigmatized as destroyers of socialism. Contrary to the basic tenet of *juche* that professes to build a communist society of self-reliant men, the masters of the world, it is instead producing dependent people without personality who worship only Kim Il Sung.

This belies the propaganda that *juche* thought and socialist democracy are the most ideal ideologies to guarantee human rights. The *suryong* is the sole beneficiary of these ideologies.

The North Korean System Itself Is a Violation of Human Rights

North Korea has the most miserable human rights situation fundamentally due to its monolithic socio-political governing system. Based on the *suryong* principle, it relates personally to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il, and has been sustained through the methodical development of Kim Il Sung’s charisma and transferral of as much of that charisma as possible to Kim Jong-il. In order to legitimize his dictatorship Kim Il Sung idolized his family tree, exaggerated the anti-Japanese partisan struggle, and justified the Korean War. Kim Jong-il systematized such efforts and tried to identify his own accomplish-

ments with those of his father.

Although it is possible to point out a great number of exaggerations in the official saga of Kim Il Sung, it must be admitted that throughout the anti-Japanese partisan movement, reconstruction after the Korean war, and the socialist revolution Kim Il Sung was regarded as the father of North Korea. It is true that his regime was partly maintained through spontaneous obedience of the people. Because he founded the DPRK based on the Stalinist dictatorship of the proletariat, however, there was more of the coercive aspect than of spontaneity. He purged his opponents and extended his following through controlling the values placed upon life, liberty and property.

At the beginning Kim Il Sung struggled to transplant Marx-Leninism to North Korea; finally he did succeed. He purged not only the bourgeoisie but also socialists who refused to pay him loyalty, for the crime of possessing an individualistic bourgeois personality. Even differences of personal opinion became reason to be branded a reactionary and eliminated.

Marx-Leninist collectivism rendered justification to Kim Il Sung's coercive policies and suppression until he began to revise it arbitrarily and replace it in the 1950s with this new *juche* principle—professed to be a creative application of Marx-Leninism, a special “North Korean style” of pragmatism. In 1955 he began to accuse his political opponents of toadyism.

Since then *juche* has been refined into modern *juche* thought and Kimilsungism. In 1970, *juche* was mentioned in the preamble of the Korean Workers' Party Statute, and in 1972 it became the official ideology as prescribed by the DPRK

Constitution. North Korea officially translates *juche* into English as “independence and self-reliance,” but Kim Il Sung presented various versions of it as need came about. In addition to toadyism, at one time or another individualism, factionalism, left or right orientation, adventurism, doctrinism, revisionism, formalism, regionalism, personal relations, and family relations have all been regarded as antonyms of *juche*. Based on the pragmatic principle that “whether eaten with right or left hand, meals are vital,” he purged his opponents one by one as suited the situation.

In the theory of the *suryong* that lies within *juche* thought, Kim Il Sung is regarded as God, and Kim Jong-il the son of God. The two Kims are the state and the people are obliged to believe in their infallibility; they tend to believe that disobeying the living God will bring divine punishment. Both Kims are objects of respect and reverence, but Kim Jong-il lacks his father’s charisma and enjoys far less popular support than did his father.

Kim Jong-il has developed the ability to sense the people’s wants and needs. He is also known to possess a bold, unbending will and a capacity to solve problems, as well as an outstanding artistic sense. Just like his father, his style takes on a leftist all-or-nothing form, so many who opposed him have been crushed. As a member of the post-revolutionary generation, Kim Jong-il utilizes manipulation of symbols and slogans to mobilize the people. His father relied more on a coercive policy.

Kim Jong-il’s slogan-centered policies have always placed weight on “remolding the human being through ideological

purification.” With his rise to power in the early 1970s, suppression of human rights intensified under this banner. Training everyone to believe in nothing other than *juche* thought, he has pursued an obscurantist policy and degraded North Korea into a society where only mechanical souls can live, without “self-reliant and creative potential.”

In sum, Kim Il Sung’s partisan method of problem solving that thoroughly purged not only leaders but even regular people, together with Kim Jong-il’s systematized oppressive apparatus, rendered North Korea notorious as having the worst record of human rights violations in the world.

Patrimonial Political Culture and Its Influence on North Korea

Confucianism was transmitted to Korea in the process of exchanges with China in the Shilla (668–935 A.D.) and Koryo (936–1392) eras. Its ideas were structured into ethics of loyalty, piety, propriety and courage in the three-kingdom era (18 B.C.–668 A.D.), and in the first half of the Koryo dynasty it was embodied in social and educational institutions. Confucianism presented loyalty and piety as the norm of the community, and emphasized propriety. It was adopted as the official ideology of the Chosun Dynasty (1392–1876), and a strict hierarchical order took root. The king was characterized as the parent of the nation and his authority was regarded as absolute. A patrimonial socio-political culture took root in which the people had to render absolute obedience to the king and to their elders.

This had side-effects: exaggeration of hierarchy, bureaucracy and blind obedience, identification of the state with the leader, an over-importance placed upon family lineage, and *sadae-ju* (philosophy that weaker states should yield to the stronger) which resulted in a tendency towards toadyism. Due to this kind of cultural disease, Korea could not avoid the Japanese colonial rule despite efforts on the part of an enlightenment group known as Kaehwap'a to make fundamental societal changes.

The Japanese imperialists forced the Koreans to worship the Japanese emperor. Disobedience to the emperor was said to be disobedience to God and those who refused to kowtow before his altar were severely punished. The Japanese also crushed the sprouting buds of liberalism and democracy in post-Choson Korea by emphasizing Confucianist education, which was conducive to their colonial rule. They also degraded the Korean nation as a people inclined to pursue narrow self-interests and squabble over factional interests. They tried to deprive the Korean people of their autonomous power by hammering home the indoctrination that only through the guidance of the Japanese emperor could anyone realize his value.

In order to maintain the regime he formed after liberation from Japan, Kim Il Sung established a proletariat dictatorship with submissive political culture. He placed special emphasis on an "elitist friendship" that had been the governing ethic among people of noble birth, converting it into "revolutionary friendship" to suit the age. He also professed the theory of socialist grand family, in which Kim Il Sung was the father

of the state, Kim Jong-il the heir, and the people their children. He emphasized “familial consideration” that political governance is possible only within parent-child relations. By identifying the father who gives physical life with the suryong who gave socio-political life, he taught everyone to bear the punishment of the suryong as a child endures that of his or her father. Criticizing any of the suryong’s weaknesses was also banned. By means of ideological indoctrination, the people were forced to regard loyalty and piety as cardinal virtues and were brainwashed into believing that becoming a loyal and pious child is the supreme goal of humankind.

Patrimonial political culture is used to justify the father-to-son succession, to routinize or rationalize it as something to be normally expected. Of course, anyone who opposes the succession publicly or complains of violation of human rights will be punished.

The State of Division

North Korea has been trying to earn system legitimacy by proving the supremacy of its socialist system over capitalist South Korea. Its ultimate objective is to make the whole peninsula communist; its political, economic, military, and diplomatic goals are to isolate the South and occupy it or at least induce it to self-collapse. For fear of losing legitimacy should the North be found to be inferior in one social aspect or another, Kim Il Sung and the DPRK leadership has been endeavoring desperately to secure supremacy over South Korea in every aspect through systematic mobilization and iron-chain

discipline. This is why Kim Il Sung has educated the people to endure poverty and lack of political freedom until complete victory against the South has been attained.

It can be said that the South Korean system forced the North to tighten its control over the population. As the South's system is the very antithesis of the North's, Pyongyang formulates its policies under the premise that the South is the object of emancipation. International changes accompanied by the collapse of the East European socialist countries have widened the economic gap between the two Koreas and now Pyongyang is suffering from a collapse complex. This together with the fear of being absorbed by the South is becoming a major factor that renders the human rights situation in North Korea worse than ever.

South Korea's political and economic development is another factor towards the suppression of human rights in the North. Our rapid economic and social growth has widened and made more obvious the gaps between haves and have-nots in South Korea. The Pyongyang leadership exaggerates this phenomenon as a "den of evil," and people believe it. In other words, North Korean people regard the South as rampant with starvation, crimes, corruption and lack of freedom. They believe they must endure the controls that cause human rights violations until the South Korean people can be liberated. It should be noted that such perception makes them feel superior to the Southern people. They indulge in political narcissism and in any consciousness to resist against dictatorship has become paralyzed. The human rights situation has become worse than ever. In sum:

- An inhumane legal system has been established.
- The people have no political rights or freedom of association, and assembly is permitted only for the purpose of maintaining the system. No dissatisfaction can be expressed against Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong-il.
- Many people cannot afford even the basic minimums of food, clothing, and shelter.
- They are thoroughly categorized according to class, and social control is routinized.
- Sexual discrimination is rampant.
- Environmental pollution is severe.
- Human rights are hideously violated in concentration camps.

Terror and purges by Kim Il Sung during the establishment of his regime were inhumane in method and immoral in selection of object. He put to death many innocent people, and most of the victims were reported to have died of accidents or suicide. The victims included his former partisan comrades and even his family members. As a consequence, anti-government activities as could be found in the East European countries and the Soviet Union have been absent in North Korea. Is North Korea a paradise, or is it actually a hell?

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II. Various Aspects of Human Rights Violations in North Korea

1. Legal Aspects

Characteristics of North Korean Law

On its surface the DPRK constitution resembles that of a liberal democracy, so it is difficult to point out human rights violations only in terms of the legal documents. One has to understand the workings of the North Korean system.

The subject of law in North Korea is not the citizenry but the Korean Workers' Party. In its essence the law is the legal expression of the KWP line and policy; its supreme purpose is to perpetuate the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il regime. Indeed Kim Il Sung's guidance together with the party's legal policy have supreme value in North Korea.

Kim Il Sung clarified the class nature of law by saying that "our law is the socialist law and the sovereign law that functions as the tool of proletariat dictatorship." North Korea defines the law in general (especially the penal law) as the "sharp weapon of proletariat dictatorship" that strongly sanctions all sorts of factors that impede the development of socialist system in order to protect self-reliant rights and interests of the people. It also emphasizes the class nature of the law.

Compared with the Western liberal democratic and other

socialist countries, North Korea has fewer laws on the books. Kim Il Sung's guidance or KWP policy normally play the role of laws and it is this that regulates the people's lives in areas untouched by law. North Korea is a nation of guidance rather than a state of law. It is appropriate to point out that the so-called movements to promote a "socialist legal way of life" and "law-abiding spirit" are all political movements to maintain the *suryong* system and the party rather than the legal order as we understand it in a free society.

Using the terminology of law sociology, "dead law" and "living law," North Korea's is dead law; its function is merely ornamental. The guidance of the state president and KWP policy are the living law. For this reason written laws need be, and are, neither detailed nor complex.

The Relationship between Law and Human Rights

Article 11 of the DPRK constitution, revised on 9 April 1992 (hereafter really "the revised constitution"), reads "the DPRK implements all activities under the guidance of the Korean Workers' Party," which implies that party statute or case-by-case determination of issues takes priority over the constitution. The preamble of the KWP statutes states that "the Korean Workers' Party adopts Kim Il Sung's revolutionary thought and *juche* ideology as the unitary guiding principle," which clearly states that the party should follow absolutely the guidance of Kim Il Sung. The words of the great leader are the supreme norm. After that comes the statutes of the KWP;

only in the framework of these do the constitution and the laws have any meaning. This renders huge gaps between legality and reality in North Korea.

The North Korean constitution states that the rights and duties of a citizen are based on the principle of collectivism, thus not based on individual dignity and value but subjected to the value of the group or the whole. Those whom the government does not classify as belonging to the collective whole—such as traitors, anti-revolutionaries or anyone opposing the government—are not recognized as worthy of human rights.

North Korea overemphasizes group and social interests above those of the individual. The people are accustomed to subjecting their individual interests to those of society. This tends to pave the way for violations of human rights.

The rights and obligations of a citizen in North Korea differ from those in a liberal democratic state. The role of law in a country where a single political party has supremacy over the state and society (which means that administrative and jurisdictional independence are not guaranteed) differs fundamentally from that of a liberal democracy where division of powers is guaranteed.

The North Korean citizens do possess comprehensive rights and obligations in every area of their social life, but the North Korean government argues that these rights and obligations are equally important. Citizens are said to have equal opportunity to participate in social production and distribution; benefits they enjoy in society are expanding and developing as the state and society develop.

This is not true. Human rights cannot be secured by a constitution alone. North Korea regards human rights not as natural-born rights but as “citizen’s rights,” and the set of citizens consists only of those recognized as such by the state—the grand goal of which is to realize a dictatorship of the proletariat. That concept of human rights is fundamentally different from rights from birth prescribed in a liberal democratic constitution.

North Korean people do not know the real meaning of human rights, so the regime does not even really need to guarantee their rights. Even so there exist legal and institutional devices such as the Committee for Guidance of Law Abiding Life, which teaches and emphasizes obedience to the law. Layers of reinforcement of control through law is a major vehicle through which systematic human rights violations are perpetrated.

Human Rights Violations Rooted in the DPRK Constitution

The original DPRK constitution was legislated in September 1948. Its goal was to “complete the revolutionary task of a people’s democracy.” Based on the achievements of revolution and socialist construction, North Korea put a new socialist constitution into force in 1972. It was totally revised in 1992, which can be assessed as part of its struggle to survive an overall crisis. It was a defensive response to the collapse of the former socialist countries, worsening economic crisis, increased diplomatic isolation, preparation for power succes-

sion, and a general loosening of popular consciousness due to the inflow of foreign ideas.

The DPRK constitution of 1972 (hereafter, “the socialist constitution”) states in Article 63 North Korea’s grand premise on the guarantee of human rights: the rights and obligation of a citizen are based on the collectivist principle that the individual is for the whole and the whole for the individual. Article 82 then reads “Collectivism is the foundation of social life. Citizens should value social organization and groups and manifest the high morale of sacrificing everything for society and the people.”

The DPRK constitutional law guarantees rights to possession of material things, personal goods actually, by power of the state—but it provides no device to redress violations against the individual committed by the state. Although rights such as equality, participation, and freedom of the press, expression, association and assembly are listed in the constitution, based on the principle of collectivism they cannot be exercised against the state.

Article 69 in the revised constitution stipulates that petition should be submitted following the due procedures and time as prescribed by law. Anyone who raises petition, however, is regarded as having a grievance against the North Korean system itself. Rather than investigating the case the authorities are likely to punish the person for complaining.

Human Rights Violations in the Penal Code

North Korean penal law legislated in 1987 states in Section 1

that its objective is “to guard state sovereignty and the socialist institution and guarantee a self-reliant and creative life for the people through the struggle against crime.” Section 4, however, indicates that it is “to protect the state president, support the revolutionary line and contribute to the historical achievements of revolutionary institutions and societal order founded upon *juche* thought,” thus implying that the real objective of penal law lies in the maintenance of the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il father-to-son succession system.

Anyone who denies the socialist institutions is brutally suppressed, and the heaviest punishment is imposed on those who injure the authority or prestige of the two Kims. Moreover, the North Korean authorities argue that because the interpretation and application of penal law is inseparable from politics, judges should “understand the principles of class struggle” and receive party guidance in order to administer proper sentencing. In other words, they are expected to rule more harshly against people not of the nucleus class. After all, North Korean penal law is a tool of the proletariat dictatorship and a means to support the two Kims and the policy of the KWP. Penal law was designed to maintain the one-party dictatorship and the North Korean system. For the political objective of maintaining the system, penal law violates life and liberty of individual citizens and fosters an atmosphere of terror in order to keep any potential opposition forces in check.

Section 9 defines a crime as any dangerous act that violates state sovereignty and the legal order, purposefully or by negligence. According to a book *On Criminal Law* (1986) written by Kim Kun-shik, a scholar in North Korea specializing

in criminal law, the penal code is “a totality of legal norm that aims to suppress anti-revolutionaries and general criminals.” The order of wording in his definition clearly suggests that the first goal of the law is to prevent *political* crime.

Section 2 of the penal code says the state “should strongly uphold the principle of the working class and place weight on social education while combining with legal sanction in the struggle against crime.” Here is the fundamental spirit and principle of North Korean criminal law.

The DPRK penal code is composed of Basics of Criminal Law (Section 1), General Prescription on Crimes and Punishment (Section 2), Anti-state Crimes (Section 3), Crimes Damaging the Socialist Economy (Section 4), Violations of Socialist Culture (Section 5), Violations of General State Administration (Section 6), Violations of the Socialist Order (Section 7), and Violations of Citizen’s Life and Property (Section 8). North Korean criminal legislation has been widely assessed as a most undemocratic penal code that has nothing to do with that very root of the liberal democratic states: rule by law.

First, it permits arbitrary interpretation of itself. Not only does Section 9 read quite abstractly: “Crime is any action deemed dangerous that violates state sovereignty and the legal order, purposefully or by negligence”; but Section 10 states, “If a crime is not defined in the penal code, it shall be punished in accordance with similar crimes and in accordance to the degree of danger.”

The text itself of the DPRK penal code is meaningless; it merely lists the various types of crimes. Anything judged to

oppose the socialist institution or the policy of the KWP, however, can be interpreted as a violation; “action deemed dangerous” is, after all, ridiculously vague. Priority is always placed on state or social interests and individual rights are ignored.

Second, not only is there no statute of limitation, but the law is even applied retroactivity. Section 42 renders a transgressor liable to prosecution until his very death: “Regarding anti-state crimes and deliberate murder, penal responsibility is applied without any given period.”

Third, those convicted who plead not guilty and criminals of attempt are punished the same as those who plead guilty (Section 15). Abettors are also applied the same degree of punishment as perpetrators (Section 18).

Fourth, those who denounce or oppose the two Kims are prosecuted based on Sections 44 to 55, and Section 105. They are treated as anti-state criminals and sentenced to death or subjected to confiscation of all their property.

Fifth, failure to report or non-interference with a felony (Sections 54 and 55) are criminal offenses, and crimes against the state are prosecuted according to this standard. This is nothing other than guilt by association, an antiquated and inhumane form of criminal law.

Sixth, production of poor-quality goods due either to fault in design or to sloppy manufacturing, or offenses such as accidentally setting a brush fire, are punishable in accordance with Sections 65, 78 and 86. Based on Sections 80 to 94, behavior that in a free society might warrant only a warning or in repeated cases be lightly penalized as “disturbing the

peace” is in North Korea punished quite severely as a “violation of public order.”

Seventh, Section 21 of the penal code calls for five types of punishment: death, forced labor, deprivation of voting rights, confiscation of personal property, and deprivation or suspension of a license or qualification. For crimes against the state a criminal is sentenced, for example, to “hard labor for at least ___ years.” South Korea’s penal code (and that of most countries) reads “. . . up to ___ years.” To be sentenced to a prison camp means little, or usually no, hope of return.

DPRK criminal law specifies all sorts of crimes without giving any consideration whatsoever to individual human rights. The law places weight on crime prevention through heavy punishment or long programs of “corrective labor.” That such harsh punishment is levied in cases of crimes against the state is further indication that the chief purpose of the North Korean penal code is to maintain its totalitarian system.

Violation of Human Rights through Procedure in Criminal Cases

North Korea revised its criminal procedure code on 15 January 1992 and declared the protection of human rights (Section 4). Criminal cases are now to be managed based upon scientific and concrete evidence in the process of criminal proceedings, thus adopting investigation based on legal procedure and administering justice grounded on evidence (Sections 35 and 36). In Section 11 there is an emphasis upon deliberation in arrests and legal dispositions. These changes show that there

should be some improvement in human rights, but elements still exist in the revised procedure code that allow for human rights violations.

First, North Korea's criminal procedure code provides no warrant system for investigation of evidence, arrest, or search and confiscation by investigators, and there is no preliminary jury system (Sections 40, 100, 111 and 129). True, a prosecutor must present to the accused permission to arrest or search and confiscate (Sections 107 and 132), but this is not judicial permission. It is granted to working investigators by a superior level of the same prosecution body. Obviously, this system does not protect human rights as does a warrant system, which is a juridical check on investigative organs. Such lack of judicial control shows that North Korean penal law has been encoded for efficiency of investigation and convenience of governance, not to protect human rights.

Second, people unrelated to a criminal case are allowed to participate in the trial. This is supposedly to pool the power and wisdom of the people (Section 2) as well as to have an educational effect and to help prevent crimes. Workers and farmers are allowed to denounce criminals at trial time (Sections 179, 230). It resembles an antiquated lynching court and fully testifies that the North Korean criminal procedures are not designed to investigate the truth but are primarily a political means to support the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Third, there are among the conventional courts (central, provincial and cities) no clear cut first-trial standards. Provincial and city courts can rule in cases that occur within their domains (Section 181) but the central court also has com-

prehensive jurisdiction to oversee first criminal trials, so the right to petition can easily be abrogated because a higher court can order a lower one to transfer its cases up. In this way the court system can be most arbitrary.

Fourth, political criminals accused of having committed anti-revolutionary crimes against the state are to receive preliminary investigation by the Ministry of State Security (Section 74), even though it will be the provincial and city courts that will end up trying them (Section 181). Spies, anti-party and anti-system criminals arrested by other institutions are transferred to this ministry. Its exclusive rights to investigate and punish political crimes is a major reason for frequent human rights violations.

Fifth, although the 1992 revised criminal code inserted a regulation limiting the admission of a defendant's confession as sole evidence, the law provides no punishment for the act of torturing prisoners. Overall, North Korean criminal proceedings are archaic and barbaric.

Human Rights Violations in the Structure of the Court System

Compared to a liberal democratic constitutional system, the North Korean trial court system contains various aspects unfavorable to human rights. The revised constitution contains regulations on courts and prosecutions. Article 159 reads, "The courts try cases in an independent and lawful fashion." However, the functions of the legal institutions have been reinforced to play efficiently as tools of the dictatorship. The

trial system as a result has structural problems.

One, usually a judge together with two additional ad hoc judges conduct a trial (Article 156 of the revised constitution and Section 31 of laws on courts). These two are not judges, really; they are not experts on jurisdiction nor are they standing members of the court. They are appointed by and serve as representatives of the party, and their purpose is to supervise the trial. This in itself is an infringement of the independence of the courts. Moreover, they participate in the trial on an equal footing with the regular judge. Cases are decided based on majority vote among the three (Article 39 of the law on the courts), which allows the party to dominate the judgement. There is no specified qualification regarding who will be either the regular or ad hoc judges. If there is any qualification, it is party loyalty.

Two, in the North Korean government power configuration, the Ministry of Justice can be seen as an affiliate to the Supreme People's Committee, the president, the Central People's Committee and the Politburo. This in itself reveals that independence of the courts cannot be guaranteed.

Article 120 of the constitution prescribes that the Central People's Committee guide the functions of the legal system, and according to Article 160, the central court. Article 161 holds the central court responsible before the Supreme People's Assembly, the state president and the Central People's Committee. Provincial and city courts as well as people's courts are responsible to the related people's councils. Such responsibilities imposed upon the courts restricts their independence.

Three, according to Article 91 the director of the central

court is to be elected by and is subject to be summoned by the Supreme People's Assembly. Article 101 prescribes that the regular and ad hoc judges of the central courts are elected by and subject to be summoned by the standing council of the Supreme People's Assembly, and Article 136 states for provincial and city courts that both types of judges are elected by the appropriate local people's councils. The party nominates only one candidate for election and summons judges arbitrarily.

Four, Article 157 of the revised constitution upholds the principle of public trials. But a trial may be secret: Section 32 of the law on the courts says that trials may not be conducted in public when national and military secrets are deemed to be at risk, and based upon this clause cases are tried behind closed doors whenever the authorities so wish.

Five, Section 129 of the penal code contains a very clear threat to impartiality and conscience: it prescribes up to two years corrective labor (the old penal code prescribed a sentence of *at least* two years) for judges who hand down incorrect verdicts.

The North Korean attorney system also serves the proletariat dictatorship. Although the system in principle differs not much from that of Western countries, there are great gaps in actual practice. By the very fact that lawyers are employed by the state, their scope of action is quite restricted. Rather than rendering functions such as providing legal counsel, they are actually playing a role of political educator to facilitate the penetration of party and regime policy into the population. Lawyers usually serve to help persuade defendants to confess their crimes.

To put it bluntly, lawyers in North Korea are dutiful servants of the proletariat dictatorship rather than guardians of human rights.

Like other communist countries, North Korea uses the term “rights of a citizen” rather than human rights. This indicates that only those loyal to the system can enjoy such rights. Citizen rights and citizen duty are inseparable in North Korea and, further, they are further thoroughly subject to the principle of collectivism. Thus all individual rights and interests prescribed by the constitution can be enjoyed only collectively and when they are in harmony with the interests of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il.

2. Political Violations of Human Rights

Violations of the Right to Vote and Eligibility for Election

According to Article 66 of the DPRK constitution, all citizens over seventeen years of age and those serving in the DPRK People's Army have voting rights and are eligible to be elected to office. Excepted are those who have been deprived their voting rights due to court sentence or who are mentally ill. No one, however, can exercise opposition and no one may abstain from voting. Party cell members or parents vote on behalf of people on official business trips or patients in a coma.

Serial numbers are printed on each ballot and everyone must line up and vote in turn by number under the supervision of party cadres. According to Chang Gee-hong who defected to the South in November 1991, an unmarked ballot signifies a vote for the single candidate, a marked one against, and it would be almost impossible to mark a ballot without being caught and probably sentenced to forced labor. Anyone who does not vote is regarded as going against the great leader, the *suryong*, and is penalized.

Voting in North Korea is the institution to exhibit popular support for the KWP. Through elections the government attempts to legitimize the one-party dictatorship and propagandizes that the North Korean system is based on democratic support. Any candidate nominated by the KWP leadership will acquire 100% of the vote.

Violation of Liberty of Association and Assembly

Article 67 of the constitution states that “the citizens have the freedom of association and assembly. The state guarantees this condition for free activities of democratic party and social groups.” In reality, however, only association and assembly required by the party are permitted. Association or assembly by individual free will is regarded as group action that creates disorder and it carries a sentence of up to five years in prison.

Social groups in North Korea represent the interests of the KWP and play the role of ideological education. All North Korean residents have to affiliate in social groups such as kindergarten, boy scouts, various educational institutions, the Socialist Working Youth League, Occupation League, the Korean Agricultural Workers’ Union, or the Women’s League, from six years of age until retirement. The KWP controls free thought and group action by means of mutual surveillance, critique, and education within the social groups.

According to the *Country Report on Human Rights Practices* for 1993 published by the US State Department, “No public meetings may be held without government authorization. There are no known organizations other than those created by the government. The state even prohibits apolitical groups such as neighborhood or alumni organizations, and professional associations exist solely as another means of government control over the members of these organizations.”

North Korean defector Yoon Ung testified that when the Soviet and East European communist system fell, Korean

students studying there were summoned back to check for any possible ideological contamination. They were reassigned to local universities. He said that the ones at Kim Il Sung University were all reported to have been arrested in May 1991 by the Ministry of State Security for attempting anti-government activities. Kim Dong-kuk, a 30-year-old student who had been studying in Czechoslovakia and who was sent to Kwangsan Metalurgy College in Chongjin where the defector had been studying, was arrested in connection with the Kim Il Sung University students.

Violations of the Freedom of Press and Publication

The purpose of the North Korean media is to publicize KWP policy objectives. Printed or broadcast criticism—even constructive criticism—is banned. The International Human Rights Declaration, international covenants, and the constitutional laws of democratic countries consider freedom of the press as one of the most basic political rights. In North Korea it is totally ignored. Publications are solely for the purpose of transmitting ideological education, and the KWP exercises complete censorship.

Freedom of the press is guaranteed in Article 67 of the constitution but only under the guidance and control of the party and the state. The North Korean press serves as a mouthpiece of the KWP. Every publication without exception publicizes the activities of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il and their families, and serves as propaganda for government

policies. Their contents must support Kim Il Sung's juche ideology and the unitary ideological system, realization of class and mass party line and revolutionary principles. Private publications are permitted only if they pass KWP censorship based on the above standards.

North Korean defector Kim Seong testified that in spring 1984, while serving in the navy as a guard at a coastal area, a beautiful little sweet-brier flower in a sea breeze inspired him to write a poem. When he submitted it to the DPRK People's Army Publishing Company he was criticized for lack of ideological mind. Regardless of content all literary works must pass the censorship of the party propaganda department.

Based on Section 46 of the penal code, anyone caught publishing anything that violates these standards is either put to death, sentenced to forced labor, or at the minimum is subject to having his personal belongings confiscated. This section, "Crimes of Reactionary Propaganda and Agitation," defines such transgression as "political crime instigating the people to digress from the party and state policy and leading them to oppose the state and socialist institution." It is defined in such a comprehensive manner that anything aired or printed that criticizes the KWP or Kim Il Sung's family is construed as a violation.

Every single North Korean publication and broadcast service contains something that eulogizes Kim Il Sung and praises Kim Jong-il. Reports on the two Kims occupy the front page; their names are printed in special bold fonts. The news is all written for the purpose of embedding the supremacy of the North Korean system in the minds of the people. There are

no critical reports or discussion on touchy issues regarding the system. News on negative aspects of the United States or South Korea are normally dealt with quite concretely.

North Korea blocks the inflow of information. All radio dials are fixed to the DPRK official broadcasting service channels and the Ministry of Public Safety visits each home once every three months. If a seal is found broken the person concerned is assumed guilty of listening to South Korean or other foreign broadcasting services and treated as a political criminal. In areas near the DMZ all television sets have their channels fixed. Chinese TV programs are blocked in bordering regions as well.

Likewise Pyongyang controls the access by foreign reporters. For example the 1993 *Country Report on Human Rights Practices* pointed out that the government controls all outgoing news including access by reporters from Russian publications critical of North Korea. Foreign reporters are often threatened to write favorably, or admonished to write nothing more than what they have seen and heard.

Not only are the North Korean residents totally ignorant of political changes outside the country but they are also unable to criticize the wrongdoings of the authorities. According to a testimony of Yoon Yong, in April 1992 at a soccer game celebrating April 15 held in Chongjin Stadium, Hamkyungbukdo, a young man was arrested by state security members and beaten to death at the site. He had been disseminating leaflets saying "We have no freedom. Kim Jong-il is deceiving us. Let's gain back our freedom."

Residents learn about domestic affairs and those of the

South “through the grapevine.” This substitute serves as the only real news media in North Korea.

For criticizing official propaganda, even a foreigner can be arrested as a spy. Ali Lameda, a Venezuelan communist poet and translator, was invited to work for the Pyongyang government as a translator in 1966. North Korean propaganda usually lacks proof; when he requested revisions for the sake of foreign consumption he was accused of espionage and imprisoned over six years in solitary confinement.

Deprivation of Petition and Shinso Rights

Petition is formal complaint through the courts for the improvement of state or social organizations. *Shinso* is a critique, outside the court system, against unsatisfactory administrative affairs of the state or social organizations. Democratic countries guarantee these rights in their constitutional law.

According to Article 69 of the DPRK constitution, “People can submit petition and *shinso*, which should be reviewed within a definite period of time prescribed by law.” Section 127 of the penal code declares that should “the person in charge of the matter purposefully ignore or dispose of the matter unrightfully, then that person will be punished up to two years of labor reeducation.” The reality, however, is that submitted *shinso* is passed to the Ministries of State Security and Public Safety for handwriting analysis to find out who complained.

Anyone appealing state policy guidelines is punished in accordance with Sections 103 and 105 of the penal code.

Section 103 says, “Those unwilling to follow state orders or who disrupt the social order are subject to up to five years of corrective labor.” This disallows any group protest and discourages petition. Section 105 prescribes up to one year of corrective labor for those who proliferate rumors, which is used to prosecute acts of petition and shinso. According to testimony from North Korean defector Kim Woon-hak, his friend Kim Duk-chul submitted an anonymous shinso at the end of February 1988 declaring that DPRK economic policy was incorrect: a policy of privatization would be needed for economic development. His handwriting was analyzed and he was arrested; he was soon reported missing and his family was sent to prison camp.

Control through Political Organization

North Korean society is tightly organized for the purpose of thorough control over literally everyone. The KWP, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Public Safety play the central roles.

Article 11 of the constitution reads, “The DPRK performs all activities under the guidance of the Korean Workers’ Party.” Indeed, it does exercise absolute influence and leadership in North Korean society. The KWP is above the law and above the state. It is involved in and supervises all projects and activities either directly or indirectly. All state organs, social groups and all the people must abide by its decisions and policies.

Under the pyramidal hierarchy of power, orders from above

must be carried out without question. Korean Workers' Party members occupy major posts in institutions, groups and work places. Not only do they supervise and control the people but they are also responsible for mobilizing them for political and military purposes.

Party cells composed of five to thirty party members are the base of operation of the KWP members, the centers around which to gather the people, the party combat units that directly carry out the party line and policy (Section 41 of the KWP statutes). This cellular principle is extended from the work place to grass-roots party organization to intermediate party organization, and to cities and *kun* unit organizations. Section 11 of the KWP statutes reads, "All party organizations should unconditionally support and realize the party line and policy, and it is the obligation of the low party organizations to follow decisions reached by the higher orders."

The Party Secretariat Department of Organization Guidance controls party officials, members, social groups and individuals. Kim Jong-il took control of this organization in 1974. It comprises five sections and commands all state organs and the party organizations related to them through a system of three lines (party organization, government administration, and national security) together with what is called "three-day report control." Concretely, this department is in charge of guiding party personnel matters of the executive officers as well as probing into their private lives.

The Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Party Secretariat "rearms the officers and the people with *juche* thought," blocks ideological contamination and performs the

role of ideological cleansing.

The Ministry of State Security, directly under the state presidency, has been the avant guard in maintaining the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il system. Through writing and enforcing the ten regulations that parallel the “Ten Points Principle to Establish the Unitary Ideological System,” delivered by Kim Jong-il at a “Lecture to Those in Charge of Ideology” in February 1974, this ministry has been exercising absolute power in North Korea. It was initiated as the Political Security Bureau of the Ministry of Public Safety. Launched as an independent ministry in February 1973 as the state political security ministry, it was renamed the Security Ministry in 1982 and as State Security Ministry in 1993.

Comprising seven vice ministers with eighteen bureaus, its agencies are established in all cities, provinces and *kun* areas. Its officials are also dispatched to the military.

This institution tracks down and arrests anti-party and anti-system conspirators, infiltrates into special areas and arrests spies, collects and analyzes information related to domestic and foreign matters, supervises the guard alert system in the border areas and extraterritorial regions. In wartime it is to take full responsibility in ideological issues by culling betrayers from supporters of the North Korean system, by closely watching the activities of the officials and the general population as well as supervising what are termed “factional elements” and political criminals. The party cannot interfere with matters of the State Security Ministry and must render full cooperation.

The State Security Ministry takes its orders from the Seventh

Section of the Central Party Committee Department of Organization Guidance under the direct orders of Kim Jong-il. Through this channel it actually supervises all state institutions and social groups. North Korean defectors testify unanimously that the people are in a situation of tacit obedience without being able to express their grievances nor criticize the North Korean system, due mainly to the state of terror imposed by the State Security Ministry.

The Ministry of Public Safety is fully responsible for maintenance of social order. It together with its predecessor forms is and has been the mainstay of North Korea. It is the very institution that has maintained the society since liberation in 1945. First founded as one of the bureaus in the Ministry of the Interior in 1948, it developed into an independent department in 1951 and again merged into the Ministry of the Interior in October 1952. It was separated as an independent department in 1962 and became the Ministry of Public Safety with the adoption of the new constitution in 1972.

At its incipient period, the ministry was devoted to eradicate the remains of the Japanese imperialism immediately after liberation, and later played a prominent role in purging factions belonging to the lines of the South Korean Workers' Party, the Yonans and the pro-Soviets. After the Fourth Party Rally in 1961 the institution became an independent body, reinforced in its role, and started to conduct political surveillance with direct orders from the KWP. Its role of political surveillance continued until the Political Security Ministry was established in 1973.

The Ministry of Public Safety, professed to be a body of

the dictatorship of the proletariat that maintains social order and protects people's lives and property, has as its main duty supervision of the entire population for the purpose of maintaining the North Korean system. Its purpose has been to eliminate any factors that might hinder the construction of socialism, and suppress the people to render them obedient to the dictatorship of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il.

The Ministry of Public Safety, an organ of the Politburo, on the state level is composed of the main body and affiliated bodies. In each province there is a Public Safety Bureau and affiliated agencies, and there is Public Safety Department in city and *kun* areas. Its members, called "safety guidance" personnel are also dispatched to factories, enterprises and the military.

Control through Purge

As Marx mentioned that "struggle within the party is needed to reinforce the party and the party is reinforced through purge of itself," purge in the socialist countries seems an inevitable phenomenon in the history of socialism. North Korea once pronounced that "purge is an act of erasing the outworn and negative elements [in society] until there is nothing more to clean up" and "party life will be reinforced by setting right the ideological system among the party members by exposing and struggling against anti-revolutionary factional thought." Political purge that took place in the process of power struggle and the establishment of the Kim Il Sung unitary system was more extensive and more inhumane than it was in other

communist countries.

Immediately after independence many factions that had fought against Japanese imperialism flocked into North Korea. Kim Il Sung's power base was relatively weak, but backed by the Soviet Union he was able to secure an advantage over other power groups. He used terror, machination, accusation. He fostered an atmosphere of fear to purge his political opponents thoroughly and build up his power.

His first victims were an indigenous communist, Hyun Joon-hyuk, and the nationalist Cho Man-shik, both of whom had the solid support of the North Korean people. Hyun Joon-hyuk was assassinated in September 1945 by Chang Shi-woo, instigated by Kim Il Sung. Cho Man-shik refused to kneel before Kim Il Sung's persuasion and threats; he was finally eliminated during the Korean War. Following the assassination of Hyun Joon-hyuk, Oh Kee-sup who was well versed in communism lost authority in North Korea after receiving concentrated attack from Huh Gai, one of Kim Il Sung's followers, and the Soviet theorists.

Massive purges took place during the war; later Kim Il Sung also criticized many communists and heaped upon them the responsibility for losing the war. At the Third Plenum of the KWP Central Party Committee held on 21 December 1950, Moo Jong and Kim Han-jung of the Yonan faction, Huh Sung-taek and Park Kwang-hee of the local faction, Kim Il, Choi Kwang, Lim Choon-choo and Kim Yul of the partisan and pro-Soviet factions were all expelled from their posts. Because the purpose of the meeting turned out to have been to mete out blame for losing the war upon various anti-Kim

Il Sung groups, most of the people were later restored to their positions—but not Moo Jong, the commander of Palro Artillery. Pro-Soviet theorist Huh Gai disputed with Kim Il Sung over issues of party organization and expiation of party members, and finally lost his own position. He removed Huh Gai as vice chairman of the Party Central Committee in November 1951, during the war, for charges of damaging the party organization. He and Park Heon-young were later purged for conspiracy against Kim Il Sung.

The South Korean Workers' Party centered around Park Heon-young lost power during the Korean War. In 1953 Lee Sung-yeop, Lee Kang-kuk and Lim Hwa were put to death on charges of conspiring a military coup and espionage for the US imperialists. Park Heon-young who had political influence in and out of Korea was executed on 15 December 1955 on charges of controlling Lee Sung-yeop and his men, spying, and plotting a coup. After the purge against South Korean Workers' Party members, Choi Won-taek and other remaining members were placed as standby candidates of the Party Central Committee but they were all ousted from their posts in 1957.

Kim Il Sung's next target was the the Yonan faction and the remaining pro-Soviet forces. At the third session of the party rally that was opened to reach a decision on alternatives for post-war restoration, the partisan faction occupied eleven out of seventy-one seats of the Party Central Committee members. On 1 June 1956, two months after the end of the rally, Kim Il Sung set on a trip to nine countries including the Soviet Union to secure funds for the restoration. During

that period Choi Chang-ik, Yoon Kong-hum of the Yonan faction and Park Chang-ok of the pro-Soviet faction collaborated to challenge the Kim regime. Their challenge was openly launched at the August Party Central Committee meeting at which Kim Il Sung was giving a briefing on the results of his fundraising trip. With the so-called August Sectarian Incident, Choi Chang-ik, Yoon Kong-hum and others belonging to Yonan faction were purged. Kim Do-bong, the leader of the Yonan faction, was also purged to laborer status. Park Chang-ok, Park Eui-wan of the pro-Soviets, and Oh Ki-sup of the local faction were purged on charges of joining the conspiracy of the Yonan group and lack of loyalty to the party.

With this, all of Kim Il Sung's political opponents were eliminated. He officially took full control of the party, government and military at the Fourth Session of the KWP Conference held in September 1961. Immediately after the partisan group rose to power, Kim Il Sung began to be idolized. With the advent of Kim Jong-il on the political platform, a monolithic ideological system and a clan system commenced to be established. Naturally there was resistance against the idolization of Kim Il Sung and his family. But the opposition was all purged on charges of anti-party, anti-revolutionary, or "opportunistic and factionalist" behavior.

In 1966 Kim Chang-man, of Yonan faction origin, was eliminated for having launched propaganda activities that went against the monolithic ideological system. At the Sixteenth Session of the Fourth Party Plenum held in July 1967, Lee Hyo-soon and Park Kum-chol were purged as anti-party factionalists. Huh Bong-hak, the man in charge of South

Korean affairs, was replaced with Kim Choong-rin. Later, senior military commanders of partisan origin such as Kim Kwang-hup, Kim Chang Bong, Choi Kwang, Lee Yong-ho and Suk San were purged. It is still not known clearly why the commanders of partisan origin were purged. Choi Min-chol, Chong Byong Kap, Kim Cha-rin and Kim Chang-duk were also on the list. In the process of consolidating the power succession system of Kim Jong-il, Nam-il, Lee Yong-moo, Kim Dong-kyu, Jee Kyung-soo, Jee Byoung-hak and Yoo Jang-shik, all of whom had been against the succession, were purged.

In seizing power Kim Il Sung was harsh towards his political opponents regardless of whether or not they were his revolutionary comrades. When Kim Jong-il took control of the nucleus of power, only those who passed a strict verification process were nominated to official posts. There were no longer any heavy purges or power changes because North Korean politics and society were under thorough control and surveillance through tightly knit, oppressive party and state apparatus.

3. Human Rights Violations in Economic Aspects

Article 20 of the DPRK Constitution states that “the state and cooperative groups may possess productive means” and Article 21 that “there is no limit to the rights of state possession.” The state is the sole owner of all natural resources, all major factories and enterprises, harbors, banks, transportation and postal services. The law prescribes that all state possessions playing a leading role in economic development should be protected and nurtured.

Article 22 defines cooperative groups as the next most important ownership entity, whose possessions are “collective property of workers under cooperative management.” The state is required to guarantee the property rights of cooperative groups. Cooperatives may possess “land, livestock, agricultural equipment, fishing boats, buildings, small and medium factories and enterprises.” The ultimate objective of cooperative property, stated in Article 23, is gradually to nationalize “all cooperative property to state property under the unanimous will of the members of the cooperatives.”

North Korea does permit private property, though in a very limited sense. Article 24 defines it as “property for the purpose of personal use and for consumption.” Workers’ private property consists of “socialist distribution in accordance with labor and additional benefits provided by the state and society.” Also, subsidiary income including “products from gardens of cooperative farm members” can be personal property.

Article 24 states that North Korea does protect individual property: “the possession of workers’ personal property is protected and inheritance rights are guaranteed by law.” State and cooperative property is sacrosanct, however (Article 84), and private property is secondary.

Violations of Property Rights

As prescribed in the constitution, North Korean people can possess only that which has been distributed in accordance to their labor, various additional benefits provided by the state and society, and products from privately tilled gardens and from subsidiary income. The reality, however, is that even such petty property rights are violated by state control as well as by economic difficulties.

North Korea boasts itself as the only nation without taxes, but the government is the employer that sets up wages and prices and exploits profits and surplus. Farmers submit most of their harvest to the state, actually a kind of tax.

State and party control over the household extends even to the purchase of daily necessities. Items including dishes, a rice cooker, shoes, clothes, kitchen utensils, cookware, cupboards, and various textile goods are allocated to teams on a monthly basis. The supply is inadequate and it is difficult to satisfy people’s needs. In rationing, those who are recommended at the *inminban* meetings get priority on receiving purchase tickets. Without such a ticket one cannot buy anything officially, even with sufficient money, and shortages of basic

supplies intensify this problem. Although goods are available on the black market they are too expensive for ordinary people.

Special purchase tickets are required to buy luxury goods such as watches and clocks, television sets, refrigerators and other household electric appliances. For ordinary people to obtain such things they have to tighten up their spending for years; even then they must either participate actively in party events or resort to bribery.

Meanwhile, the so-called additional benefits given by the state and society are actually part of the reward for compulsory extra service. When called out to mandatory labor, people are required to report to the work place even if ill. One needs to participate in the compulsory labor campaigns to demonstrate loyalty to the nation and to avoid becoming a target of criticism. Trivial items such as rice spatulas or wooden basins are usually handed out as compensation for the work; sometimes people are given, perhaps, an electric iron.

In some cases it is unclear if people have the right to possess such articles as private assets, and this applies to state-provided uniforms for children, students, and laborers. In particular, if Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong-il should bestow a gift such as a washing machine, television or electric appliance, the recipient should be very careful because it is regarded as unfaithful behavior to misuse or damage such an item. Anything given directly by the supreme leader should be considered a long-term lease.

Moreover, it is reported that the state frequently conducts arbitrary action against the private property. When the government needed 580 Kg of gold to erect a plated bronze statue

of Kim Il Sung it imposed a special tax. When the Democratic Women's Union in Pyongyang and in the outlying regions were ordered to collect a certain amount of gold, they coerced their members. North Korean propaganda has it that people voluntarily donated gold from their rings and such, but the state simply took it from them.

Koreans in Japan regularly send money and goods to North Korea in the hopes that their family and repatriated relatives will be safe. However, a great portion of that has been funnelled to the North Korean government under official or unofficial pretext. Furthermore, it was reported that the authorities have confiscated two or three firms that had been owned jointly by residents in Japanese Koreans and the Pyongyang government, under the pretext of contribution.

People are also inconvenienced in matters regarding residence because all housing belongs to the state. The state not only controls all housing affairs but is often careless in management. Everyone must comply with orders from above, so whoever receives an order to vacate a house must do so, even though they might have lived there a long time.

Of course the government is responsible for repairing houses, but in reality individual housekeepers must first obtain building materials such as lumber, paint, and sand—then ask for technical support from the House Preservation Office. The excuse offered is that the state does not keep enough materials on hand. Basically, people unable to improve their own lives are hopelessly inconvenienced.

Control of Diet

North Korean people can not buy food with money freely, but are distributed their life-sustaining food rations twice a month. The food distribution system, the most powerful control system in North Korea, began in 1952 upon enactment of a law on the national food distribution system.

The purpose of food rationing, which applies to everyone except members of cooperative farms, is to enhance the value of—call it recognition of the divinity of—labor performed

Table 1. Daily Ration of Grain Accorded by Law, by Occupation

900g	miners, special heavy industry workers, defense industry workers, manufacturing industry workers, ocean fishery laborers
850g	military personnel attached to the cease-fire committee, other high-ranking military officials
800g	air force pilots, special task officials
700g	other officials, light industry workers, office workers, engineers, teachers, government officials, college students, most Pyongyang residents
below 700g	residents outside Pyongyang
400g	high school students, the disabled, women over 55, men over 61
200-300g	preschool children
200g	non-laboring prisoners

Source: Asia Watch and Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee, translated by Chul-bok Song, *Human Rights in North Korea* (Seoul: Koryo-one, 1990), p. 185–186.

within the system, as well as to supervise people and to eliminate idle life. Another purpose is to promote gratitude and loyalty to the distributor, that is, the *suryong*.

Laborers engaged in hard physical work or special tasks should get at least 800g grain per day. For others, food distribution is differentiated into twelve levels by pedigree, that is, by political standing and the type of job.

North Korea has not made official announcement on the details of the food rationing system. However, the highest two levels are the Kim's family and special foreign guests. Next is high-ranking party officials cabinet members or above, whose food is distributed at "No. 10 shops." Prisoners and people classified at the lowest level receive less than 200g—not really enough to support life. Some die of malnutrition.

Due to the serious food shortages the government has under various excuses decreased the rations. Recently distribution has been delayed for several months. Five to ten days of food are also taken off every month in the name of military provisions, unification, cereal conservation, "patriotic cereal." Thus, normal workers are usually given quite a bit less than 600g a day.

Meanwhile, as rations have decreased and the distribution itself has been delayed, North Koreans seek more food on the black market or from rural relatives. This, however, is not easy because the state itself is absolutely short of food and everyone outside the ruling class is very closely watched and controlled. Especially after the great flood of summer 1995 in North Korea the situation went from bad to worse—much worse. The food shortage is closely related to the fact that

North Korean people have increasingly escaped to China; even small-scale riots have occurred at food distribution centers in some of the mountain areas.

Cereal supplied to the North Korean people is mixed, composed of rice and corn or rice and wheat. In Pyongyang the ratio of rice to minor grains was 70-30 before the Thirteenth International Young Students Festival held in 1989, but it was reversed to 30-70 afterwards. Outside Pyongyang the ratio had been 50-50, but that has changed to 20-80 or sometimes even less. Since Korean people prefer rice and the percentage of rice is decreasing, people are complaining more and more. In some areas, wheat and corn are scarce and are replaced with potatoes.

As a stop-gap solution, the authorities developed and are talking up special rice substitutes, including vegetable-grain mixtures, mixed noodles, and “speed-war” flour. They fill the stomach but are hard for Koreans to digest.

As a way of controlling people through the food distribution system, the authorities deduct food rationing from those who are absent from work without leave, under the rule of “no work, no food.” Another type of control is to rouse loyalty by giving people food reserved for the birthdays of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il or national anniversaries.

Control of Clothing Habits

Clothing of the North Korean people is quite inferior in most areas except Pyongyang. The lower class in particular usually wear poor-quality rayon or nylon clothes of limited variety.

The clothing habits of the masses are uniform. Standard working clothes and undergarments are provided at low price or free of charge, according to season. Other clothing, however, is not easily available to normal people because the state has fixed the price quite high. Government control of clothing is designed to moderate people's personal desires—somewhat similar to the psychology behind school uniforms.

Some clothes are provided by the state; others can be purchased like other necessities, but they are always differentiated according to the class. The government provides working clothes to laborers one or two pieces every year free of charge, and two uniforms for summer and winter to students at a low price. In rural areas all clothing is supplied. The upper class are given the opportunity to buy a business suit twice a year at a reduced price.

People can purchase clothes in North Korea, of course, but as is the case for other articles of consumption they need an approved permit issued by a government office. Because the permit cannot be lent to others, personal purchases are a special benefit, a privilege bestowed by the government. The Kim family, of course, is without limit in buying clothes and those classified as loyalists can buy clothes of high quality from special shops selling suits, wool and fur. Those belonging to the unstable or hostile classes are not given permits to buy clothes.

The people in general lack undergarments, socks, gloves, overcoats and other clothing. In summer, they are said to be going without underwear and socks. Shoes are also in short supply. Workers are supposed to be provided with a pair of

working shoes every two months, students with sports shoes, but they get only one pair per year. College students, government officials and white collar workers are said to receive a pair of shoes every two years, in violation of regulations that they should receive one pair per year.

Housing Problems

The next problem North Korea faces is housing. The government has made full housing allocations to party officials above the rank of local cadre, but only somewhat over fifty percent to normal workers. Thus, two families usually live together in one house. North Korea anxiously endeavored to reach the goal of building 200,000 units a year in major cities such as Pyongyang, Nampo, and Wonsan during the Third Seven-Year Plan of 1987–1993. Due to shortages of construction materials and electricity, it has made little progress. Laborers drafted from all points to various building sites have lost the desire to work due to the heavy labor and poor board and lodging.

Housing shows social status. In Pyongyang, party officials live in separate high-class houses or comfortable high-storied buildings, but laborers and clerks reside in very public apartments and members of farm cooperatives in “rural cultural houses.”

Most ordinary people live in tenement houses in which there is no privacy or family-culture life. They are designed only for food and sleep, and private space is sacrificed for communal life. Since the government has differentiated housing size and facilities according to class, it enhances the effect of party

control and gives people an incentive to try to rise in social status.

As said, North Korea designs the living space for the purpose of controlling and mobilizing people. North Korea has recently

Table 2. House structure by class (in Pyongyang)

	type of house	structure	holder
special	independent high-class house	independent multi-floor or two-floor house, garden, flush toilet, air conditioning	above deputy chief of department of the party, above deputy chief of department, national administrative council, above major general of the army
No. 4	new model of high-storied apartments	more than 2 rooms, bathroom and flush toilet, veranda, hot and cold water	above chief of section of the party, above directorship of politburo, professors, brigadiers staff members of literary institutions, managers of enterprises
No. 3	middle class independent house and new model apartment	two rooms, kitchen and storage	guidance member of central organs, deputy chiefs of provincial departments, department chief of enterprises
No. 2	apartment	1-2 rooms, one living room or bedroom, one kitchen	principals of high schools and middle schools, general workers, white-collar workers
No. 1	collectively shared house	1-2 rooms, 1 kitchen	lowest workers and clerks
	agricultural culture house	one storied dwellings, 2 rooms, 1 kitchen, 1 storage room	farmers in collective farms
	old Korean-style house	old houses existing in the countryside with 2-3 rooms	farmers

Source: NUB, *An Overview of North Korea*, 1992, p. 282.

erected five- to ten-story tenements in cities, and two-story buildings in rural areas to institutionalize group life.

In most cases a new apartment is not built for the sake of convenience of the residents but for appearances. Since Kim Jong-il directed modern apartments to be built, the government is quite concerned about the height and the outward appearance, but the interiors of the new buildings are quite coarse. For example, elevators were not installed in many of the ten- to fifteen-floor apartments, or have been stopped from operating to conserve energy. The old and the weak cannot help being confined to their apartments.

People who live in a tenement house adapt themselves to a public toilet system. The situation is more or less tolerable in Pyongyang, but it is very inconvenient to use the public toilets elsewhere. One typical tenement house built in 1988 in Sariwon city has two rooms, 23 square meters, for each family—but there is only one public bathroom for forty families. Furthermore, there are not even wash rooms inside this shell of an apartment building: people wash their face and hands in their kitchens. A large family will even wash in the corridor and pour the waste water out a window. Meanwhile, the ruling class reside in stand-alone houses or high-class apartment buildings supplied with hot and cold water and flush toilets.

The water supply in public apartments is limited due to the energy shortage. Even in Pyongyang water is supplied only five or six hours a day: one or two hours in the mornings, afternoons, and evenings. In local districts the water is on only one or two hours per day. Many families catch rain water

in buckets for drinking and washing. Since most apartment buildings have no shower room, people usually resort to wet-towel sponge baths. Otherwise they can use the public bathhouse installed one per *dong* neighborhood unit, but they face a long wait because it is quite often closed and so very crowded when open. People are supposed to be issued a bar of soap every three months, but even this scant supply is seldom provided at a fixed time and people frequently wash face, hair, and body with laundry compound.

Heating in the winter is a serious problem for North Korean people. Every year people are troubled with lack of firewood, winter *kimchi* (pickled vegetables, mostly cabbage, very important in the Korean diet), cold-weather boots, and winter clothes. Apartments in Pyongyang are individually heated by coal or coal briquet, but about half the families living in briquet-heated apartments have to make the briquets by themselves, and even then it takes two or three days to acquire coal powder and clay under the permission of superiors in a government office. Apartments for normal laborers near the Daedong River in Pyongyang are centrally heated, but to conserve fuel the heating period is very short. Even indoors one must wear layers of clothing and people spread their bedclothes over the floor before sleeping (Korean houses are heated via the floor).

Outside Pyongyang especially in rural areas, twigs, pine needles and cow dung are being used as fuel. Dead tree branches are available under the control of a forestry officer, but there are not enough closeby such trees because they have already been taken. People fell live trees in secret or gather

live pine needles under the tacit approval of forestry officers, offering bribes such as alcohol or cigarettes. The heating problem is one reason North Korean people prefer living in a city over the countryside, and in Pyongyang rather than the other provinces.

Even in Pyongyang, most who are not of the nucleus class live in small, squalid spaces. Some still live in filthy little dwellings that can only be called shacks. Farmhouses are usually independent residences of one or two rooms. The families draw drinking water from a well and use outside toilets. A farmhouse of two rooms would generally be shared by two households, dingy places with serious ventilation problems in the winter from windows sealed with plastic or weather stripping. This, together with being unable to bathe normally, undermines the health.

North Korea has come up with a unique rent scheme called “house sharing.” Under the excuse of difficult circumstances the local party committee directs a family living in anything more than two rooms to make space for another family to join them. Most newlywed couples must either stay in their parent’s flat or live separately for two or three years, or continuously in the worst cases, until assigned to a house. It is common even for newlyweds of the nucleus class to live apart for a year waiting for an apartment.

Control of Jobs

North Korea legally guarantees the freedom to select one’s occupation (Article 70 of the constitution). However, as private

commercial and industrial activities have been prohibited since 1958 and every factory, economic organization, and culture, medical, or health institute has become subject to party control, job affairs are led by the state's human resources supply plan.

A North Korean's job is decided wholly by the party and the government. A laborer may work only upon receipt of a certificate of assignment or a letter of introduction from the ministry of labor of the administrative committee. The basic principle of North's recruitment policy is "cadre-preference policy" which places priority on political credibility. Personal desire, talent, ability are merely secondary references. That is, the freedom of job selection described in the constitution is nominal.

Every high school is required to present to the local labor office of the people's committee a list of graduates (except students who are expected to join the military or go to college) together with food rationing numbers, job applications, and grade reports signed by the school principal. The labor office first maps out a draft recruitment plan with those documents, and then assigns each graduate a workplace such as factory, mine or other enterprise depending upon the need for newcomers. The school notifies the work places of their decision; the students are responsible to send the certificate of assignment and notification of food rationing to their assigned work places. If a graduate fails to show up, food rationing is suspended.

Upon discharge from military service, personnel are dispatched on the basis of family lineage and service record according to the directions of the labor section of the local

people's committee or the central party. Quite common is collective assignment according to the instructions of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il, in which groups of discharged servicemen are deployed to places seriously short of labor such as factories, coal mines, and various fields of construction work. The military sends to each workplace the certificates of discharge, food rationing suspension documents, and movement endorsement cards from the party and the Young Socialist Labor Union. The discharged soldiers collectively assigned are handed over to the management office of the workplace by "convoy officers." Like school graduates they cannot help but report for work because food rationing would be suspended. Dischargees not collectively assigned are assigned according to family connections, but all jobs are decided unilaterally by the local labor office.

Chin Kwang-ho, who defected to South Korea in 1990, said, "If someone is assigned by collective assignment, he is never given the opportunity to go home. In most cases his family will not see him before they die."

On the whole, the government has already investigated the family lineage of high school students before they graduate. Students with low-class lineage—that is, those with a relative who might have been against the Kim Il Sung ideological system or with kin in South Korea, or students one of whose family members defected to the South or agreed to be a member of a South Korean security squad during the Korean War, or students from a land-owning family—will surely be assigned somewhere that requires hard physical labor such as a farm village or a mine. Sons of the cadre of party and

government, that is, from top-grade lineage, are stationed at desirable work places regardless of their ability. Officials of the central party unilaterally appoint the graduates of the law department of Kim Il Sung University as attorneys, judges and public prosecutors.

No one can change his post on his own volition. On 31 August 1953 a law was passed banning laborers and office workers of any enterprise or organization from walking off the job. The purpose was to prevent loss of labor and to carry out the planned economy systematically through full command of labor; to regulate people by job control, however, is also to inculcate obedience and induce them to be loyal to the party.

Labor Problems

Under the principle of “no work, no eat” any worker not included among state-determined exemptions who does not work is deprived of all rights. The DPRK constitution and labor law prescribe eight hours work a day, but most people are forced to work from one to four hours extra each day and must also attend frequent political meetings by order of the party.

Meanwhile, each workplace unit makes up daily, monthly and quarterly labor plans, and launches socialist labor competition campaigns such as Chollima, Three Revolutions, and Red Flag movements, Speed Battle, and more recently the Speed-up Movement of the 1980s. Labor time is unavoidably extended and it becomes far more intense. A digger, for

example may be allowed to rest after 1,000 strokes of the shovel, and naval servicemen and fishermen are required to spend 300 days per year at sea.

Article 35 of the labor law firmly restricts the “mobilization of labor from factories, enterprises, and cooperative farms.” However, the government has mobilized common laborers and even cadre and administrative clerks from every work place with the “Friday-labor system” initiated to fill labor quotas in various construction projects. In addition, the authorities overload the people through implementing various combat slogans and organizing numerous ad hoc labor teams (“storm squads”) such as the April 25 Speed Battle, the Youth Shock Brigade, the Party Shock Brigade, the Socialist Working Youth League Shock Brigade, and the Loyal Night Brigade, to mobilize labor power more easily on the foundation of Kim Il Sung’s command.

Every person able to work is an object of mobilization in North Korea. The mandatory service term of soldiers is supposed to be eight years, but they must serve ten years before discharge and are in general mobilized to fill labor quotas in the construction business. Students are required to volunteer labor. High school and college students in general should serve one month a year. Students are usually dispatched to seasonal farm labor such as rice planting or harvesting; they also have to participate in labor mobilization every Sunday, during vacations, even afternoons after school.

If someone is involved in an accident at work such as losing his fingers, instead of being compensated he could be punished for violation of safety rules, perhaps labor without pay for

several months. Furthermore, he would have to participate in safety classes after medical treatment. If family members of an accident victim protest against the enterprise or the authorities, it is seen as political behavior and they suffer serious consequences.

Every factory and enterprise has a statistics agent who checks attendance. Three times late is to have one day of food is subtracted from the ration card. One absence without leave means loss of fourteen-day yearly vacation and one day of food. Labor unions do not speak for the rights of the workers and protect them, but are rather mobilizing organizations subordinate to the party. The tendency to strike, therefore, is blocked at the root.

Article 71 of the constitution says laborers have the right to take rest, and overtime is banned. In addition, people are supposed to get off work on national holidays and Sundays, and have a fourteen-day vacations every year; there are seven-to twenty-one-day supplementary vacations in some work places. The reality is, however, they rest only on the birthdays of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il and one or two days for big national holidays. Everyone except the nucleus class are forced to work for long hours merely to receive minimum wages and limited food rations. Their right to vacation time is overridden by various labor mobilizations and extensions of labor.

Moreover, there are no leisure facilities at which people may enjoy any rest periods. Movies and plays function as a tool of *juche* ideology education, and sports activity is managed and planned by the state as a part of state sports. Golf has recently been introduced, and *janggi* (Korean chess) clubs

have opened, but this is for the purpose of strengthening unity between the party and the people as a means of keeping the North Korean system secure.

Social Welfare

North Korea has adopted medical insurance, a social insurance system and a social welfare system based on the right to free medical care depicted in Article 72 of the constitution. According to propaganda free medical treatment is performed on the basis of these systems, but one percent is deducted from everyone's salary as "social welfare expenditure." If a patient enters hospital and cannot work, the authorities sometimes deduct twenty to forty percent of his salary during the hospitalization period. If a farm worker receives medical treatment at a city hospital, he is supposed to pay for the treatment.

Medical facilities in Pyongyang are in better condition than those in the rest of the country. However, even hospitals in Pyongyang are short of common medicines due to economic difficulties. Doctors do not attempt complete recovery, but only enough so that patients can start work again. Thus, they give a perfunctory treatment to chronic patients without much follow up.

Since the North Korean people are now living basically on corn, they cannot take in enough nutrition. The quarantined whom the Northern authorities call "number-42 patients" are increasing; they suffer from hepatitis, tuberculosis, and pellagra, and this has become a serious social problem. The state

has established more tuberculosis centers, hepatitis care centers, and hospitals for number-42 patients in every *kun* unit. Originally there had been one of each in every *do* (larger than *kun*), but even now they are unable to accommodate the increasing number of patients.

People usually treat influenza or gastroenteric trouble with folk remedies, and go to a hospital only for serious conditions. Life in a hospital is very uncomfortable and the food substandard. Moreover, patients have often been seen cleaning the wards and even the toilets.

There are many consumptive patients in rural areas, but they cannot be provided with medicine and are usually treated with folk remedies at home.

Letters North Korean people have sent to foreign relatives are filled with requests for medicine, mainly to treat tuberculosis and hepatitis, as well as antibiotics and vitamins. People frequently suffer from gastric ulcers, sterility, neuralgia and hemorrhoids from mental stress and hard physical labor.

North Korea applies the salary-in-proportion-to-work system and pays salaries according to quantity and quality of labor. However, there is no guarantee of minimum wage to the helpless aged who cannot work or to invalids. Even though the state says it takes free care of the helpless aged and invalids, all their rights are deprived according to the principle of "no work, no food." Many reports have said that there cannot be seen a handicapped invalid anywhere in Pyongyang. The reason is that the government have moved them and their families to other areas. Judging from this, the North Korean

government instead of helping invalids and their families seems more to be heaping physical and mental burdens upon them.

Side Effects of Economic Rights Violations

As the basic economic rights are violated and economic difficulties become more serious, economic discrimination has deepened and various absurdities, corruption, and crime have also increased to rise as a social problem in North Korea.

While the common people suffer from shortages of food and daily necessities, high-ranking officials enjoy an affluence, sharing materials through an exclusive supply office. Key party members can buy more than they need, however, and earn a windfall income by reselling the surplus in the black market at twenty times the price. Ordinary people have to purchase more materials at a higher price on the black market. They complain that socialism is supposed to mean living equally, but that economic discrimination is becoming worse.

As economic rights are violated, people are finding ways to bribe party officials to gain more benefits than other people, such that various types of corruption are quite prevalent in North Korea. Offering a bribe such as dollars, wristwatches, clothes, or groceries has been popular in cases of job assignment, house sharing, and even medical care. In self-pity the people frequently say, "You can't get anything without a bribe."

Theft for survival has become prevalent. When a family is out at work, robberies are increasing of staple and subsidiary foods such as rice, soybean paste, and domestic animals such

as chickens and dogs. It frequently happens that members of a visiting work team such as college students on farmland mobilization duty butcher and eat poultry stock in secret. People keep living necessities locked inside their houses and watch their fields all night during the harvest season.

It is also reported that systematic theft is very common. For example, mid-rank managers of a sales section of a factory or supply office, or salespeople at a shop, present false reports and sell stolen items on the black market. Granaries and railway freight warehouses are main targets of theft, so armed agents have to keep watch.

Meanwhile, North Korean people do not usually deposit money in a bank. The interest rate is low and immediate withdrawal is not easy—more important, people do not want their money open to the public scrutiny. The government recommends everyone on a salary to save twenty-five percent per month; deposit certificates are sometimes issued to the members of a cooperative association instead of cash. People prefer cash, though, primarily to shop on the black market.

People have devised ways to survive even in the harsh difficulties caused by the *juche* system's infringement upon their basic economic rights. They have to pay very high prices for food in the black market, so many women take side jobs including domestic work. Since the income from a side job in some cases surpasses a normal salary, people tend to be more engrossed in side businesses.

Basic economic rights are violated all over the North, but the degree differs according to locality. Visiting foreigners can see Pyongyang, of course, but usually nowhere else;

government policy is to invest quite a bit there. Basic necessities are also allotted more to Pyongyang, so life is relatively easier. People in Pyongyang feel they are privileged and others have a serious sense of inferiority due to the gap in an economic life. This has caused complications among localities.

Even when traveling to stay with distant relatives, people must either carry food or give up the visit in order not to create a burden. Disruption of normal human relations, especially *family relations*, is just one more after-effect of violations of basic economic rights.

4. Human Rights Violations in Social and Cultural Areas

Human Rights Violation through Discrimination by Degree of Loyalty

Article 65 of the DPRK constitution stipulates, “Citizens in all walks of life shall have equal rights.” It is asserted that “equal” here means equality in realizing the rights provided by the constitution, but Pyongyang strictly classifies everyone by family background and by the degree of loyalty to the regime. For this North Korea made loyalty surveys on numerous occasions since national liberation in 1945.

Having completed socialistic institutional reforms by August 1958, the DPRK began in December the same year to classify everyone by family background with a view to converting everyone into workers and facilitating socialist construction. It was part of a socialist class policy designed to control the people more effectively by surmising everyone’s political inclination based on family class background and social activities, then categorizing them by their degree of loyalty.

The loyalty surveys were made on a phased basis. They included an intensive guidance program by the central party staged from December 1958 through January 1960; a residents re-registration program between April 1966 and March 1967; a project to classify the people into three classes and 51 sub-classes in 1967 through June 1970; a program toward naturalized foreigners and defectors from the South in April through October 1980; and a program toward repatriates from

Japan in January through April 1981. In the 1980 project toward naturalized foreigners and defectors conducted at Kim Jong-il's instructions, thirteen sub-classes were added to the list.

This classification is difficult to assess precisely because many sub-classes have been deleted or added or shifted from one class to another. North Korean authorities do not admit that it exists, but instructions given by Kim Jong-il in the mid-1980s to relax the loyalty classification policy indirectly reveal that it does indeed.

The film, "Guarantee," produced in North Korea and screened there in 1987, clearly shows that this policy had been in force. The movie was produced with a view to publicizing Kim Jong-il's order to ease the classification system, and accents the need to rectify the discriminatory classification policy. The film vividly describes a worker suffering great social and psychological pain as he undergoes various disadvantages because he has family in the South.

Through this system the authorities ferret out political forces against the North Korean system, suppressing their anti-party and anti-revolutionary activities before they act and further tightening the grip of surveillance. Those classified as reactionary based on family background are discriminated against in every area of life ranging from food rationing to the distribution of dwelling, social movement and the execution of legal provisions.

The entire North Korean population is classified into nucleus, unstable and hostile classes. The nucleus class, comprising about thirty percent of the population, is the ruling

class that spearheads the North Korean system. Included are the families and relatives of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il, high cadres estimated to number about 200,000 or one percent of the population, and mid-level cadres who account for about 29 percent. The mid-level cadres comprise mostly anti-Japan fighters and their families, and the families of those killed in battle or otherwise during the Korean War.

For the education of nucleus class children, North Korea runs various special schools including the Mankyongdae and Kang Ban-sok Institutes for the bereaved children of revolutionary fighters. High cadres live in luxurious residences, send their children to special schools and possess up-to-date home appliances. They have personal telephones, are allowed to subscribe to foreign publications, and have radios capable of picking up foreign broadcasts. Most of them live in Pyongyang and other major cities, enjoying privileges in the recruitment of party, administration and military cadres. In effect they form a feudal hereditary class entitled to favors in all areas such as education, promotion, rations, dwelling and medical services.

The unstable class is the basic stratum of North Korea, comprising those ordinary workers, technicians, farmers, office workers, teachers and their families who do not belong to the nucleus class and who are not party members. They represent about 50 percent of the population. They lead lives with extremely limited incomes and food rations. Most of them live in small cities and rural areas. Health service for them is insufficient. They can travel to Pyongyang only with special

Table 3. Table of Three Class and 51 Sub-Classes

Nucleus Class	People from the families of laborers, employed farmers (farm servants), poor farmers, and administration clerical workers during the Yi Dynasty and the Japanese occupation; Korean Workers' Party cadre members; bereaved families of revolutionary fighters (killed in anti-Japan struggles); bereaved families of patriotic fighters (killed as noncombatants during the Korean War); revolutionary intellectuals (trained by North Korea after national liberation); families of those killed during the Korean War; families of those killed in battle during the Korean War; rear-area families (families of active People's Army officers and men); and honorable families (family members of service members wounded during the Korean War)
Unstable Class	People from the families of small merchants, handicraftsmen, small factory owners, or small and medium service traders; unaffiliated persons hailing from South Korea; families of those who went to the South (1st category); families of those who went to the South (2nd category); people who used to be medium-scale farmers and capitalists; families of those who went to the South (3rd category); those who repatriated from China; intellectuals trained before national liberation; the lazy and corrupt; tavern hostesses and worshippers of superstition; followers of Confucianism; people who used to be locally influential figures; and economic offenders.
Hostile Class	People from the families of wealthy farmers, merchants, industrialists, or landowners, or those whose private assets have been completely confiscated; pro-Japan and pro-US people; reactionary bureaucrats; defectors from the South, Christians; Buddhists; Catholics; expelled party members; expelled public officials; those who helped South Korea during the war; families of anyone arrested or imprisoned; spies; anti-party and counter-revolutionary sectarians; families of people who were executed; anyone released from prison; and political prisoners.

Source: NUB, *An Overview of North Korea*, 1992, p. 268

permits. There have been some instances in which these people have been elevated to the nucleus class.

The hostile class consists of “national enemies,” those branded as impure elements and reactionaries. They are alienated from the rest of society and their human rights are often trampled. The hostile class accounts for about twenty percent of the population. They are families of past landowners and capitalists, public officials under the Japanese rule, religiously active persons and those who collaborated with the advancing South Korean forces during the Korean War. They are denied the right to receive a college education, join the party or be an officer in the military.

The loyalty classification policy unfavorably affects the unstable class, checking their advancement to leading positions in society. Those hardest struck by the policy, however, are

Table 4 Classification of the Hostile Class

Dictatorial Target	Those of the dictatorial target are the people charged with trying to overthrow the existing system. To keep them away from the ordinary people, North Korea keeps them isolated in “safe areas” such as mountainous zones and coal mine areas.
Isolation Target	Those of the isolation target are the people regarded as considerably dangerous, who are prone to side with South Korea in the event of emergency. They are exposed to the general public for their collective surveillance.
Absorption and Indoctrination Target	The absorption target are the type whose social deviation is minor and who are considered likely to return to the system if they are given intense ideological indoctrination.

the hostile class. It includes those sacrificed in power struggles and alienated elites and bureaucrats such as those expelled from the party, dismissed cadres, the family members of those arrested or imprisoned, people released from political prison camps, economic offenders, and anti-party and counter-revolutionary sectarians.

In general the hostile class does laborious and hazardous manual work. For management, they are classified into dictatorial targets, isolation targets and recruitment and indoctrination targets. Dictatorial targets are held in separate areas, isolation targets live in society but are kept under close round-the-clock surveillance, and recruitment and indoctrination targets are intensively indoctrinated for possible absorption into the system.

Persecution of Religious Persons

Since the founding of the regime, pursuant to Karl Marx's statement that "religion is the opiate of the people," North Korea has steadily persecuted religiously active people. It explains religion as a tool for the ruling class to exploit the masses. The basic perception is that in classless North Korea, where there is a "perfect religion" called *juche* thought, religion is entirely meaningless. Many religiously active people in North Korea have been branded as "disloyal" and brutally tortured or executed for their beliefs.

Especially immediately before and during the Korean War, a large number were arrested for execution or banishment. Most religiously active people were categorized as anti-

national and counter-revolutionary hostile elements and subjected to ruthless persecution. Christians in particular were purged as they are regarded as “tools for imperialist aggression.”

All religiously active people have disappeared as a result of the central party’s “intensive guidance program” begun in 1958. Only 60 out of the total 400 or so Buddhist temples survived. The 1,600 monks and nuns and 35,000 Buddhist followers were either killed or forced to recant their faith. Likewise gone are some 1,500 Protestant churches and 300,000 laymen; three Catholic dioceses and 50,000 Catholic followers; and 120,000 Chondo-kyo followers.

Kim Il Sung reminisced in a speech made at the Ministry of Public Safety in 1972:

We cannot carry such religiously active people along our march toward a Communist society. So, we tried and executed all the religious leaders higher than deacons in Protestantism and Catholicism. Among other religiously active people, those deemed malignant were all put to trial. Among ordinary religious believers, those who repented were given jobs while those who did not were held at [labor] camps.

Freedom of religion is guaranteed in Article 68 of the DPRK constitution. The 1972 Constitution mentioned not only freedom of faith but also freedom of anti-religious activity, thus in effect denying freedom of religion. The revised constitution of 1992, however, reflected changes in social conditions in which the North found it unavoidable to authorize freedom of religion, at least on paper. Paragraph 1, Article 68, of the

amended constitution authorizes the erection of religious buildings and the staging of religious activities while the clause “freedom of anti-religious activity” has been deleted.

Nonetheless, a limit upon freedom of religion was not overlooked. Paragraph 2 says, “No person may bring in alien forces under the cloak of religion and use them in damaging the state or the social order.”

During a visit to the United States in May 1991, a North Korean religious mission admitted frankly to the persecution by the North Korean authorities of many religiously active people due to past “misunderstandings.” The North to a fractional degree permitted the freedom of religion by building the Pongsu Protestant Church and Changchung Catholic Church toward the end of 1988 and the Chilgol Church in 1992. The Pyongyang authorities have set up some 10,000 of who they call Christians and about 500 home churches in the North, but as before continues to persecute any truly religious people who may have maintained their faith underground.

Human Rights Violations through Education Policy

The North Korean Constitution, in Article 73, guarantees the people’s right to receive education. According to the provisions, the purpose of education is to enable the people to acquire the kind of knowledge and expertise needed in establishing a socialistic view of the world and in executing the duties imposed by the KWP as well as to build up the people’s physical strength necessary for realizing the ideas of the party.

In other words, North Korea emphasizes the need to occupy an “ideological fortress” for the construction of socialism. To this end it has increased investments in education, setting the immediate education goal as “raising the whole population as intelligentsia.” The eleven-year free compulsory education system in force since 1973 and the Theme on Socialist Education introduced in 1977 were both designed to facilitate the training of communist-type human beings. It is not a true education system but rather is aimed at infusing Kim Il Sung’s unitary thought into the minds of the people with a view to producing stereotype “juche men and women.”

Because educational opportunities are granted in North Korea depending on political status, colleges to which students can advance are determined by the authorities without regard to academic ability or choice. The children of senior party and administration officials and other high cadres are allowed into colleges without entrance examinations. Park Su-hyon, who defected to the South on 1 October 1993, testified that the children of senior cadres advance to universities at the instructions of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il. They are thus called “instructed students” or “mentioned students.”

Meanwhile, students set to advance to leading institutions such as Kim Il Sung University and the Kim Chaek Institute of Technology go through a rigid security clearance. The political status of relatives as far distant as second cousins is checked. For ordinary universities the scope of security check extends only to first cousins. If even a minor defect is found in the security clearance, entrance permission is cancelled. Those denied college must join the military for seven to ten

years' compulsory service; most female high school students are assigned to factory work.

Many defectors have told of cases of those whose college entrance were cancelled due to problematic political status of a relative, which amounts to guilt by association. One, a Mr. Im Yong-son, said that after he was commissioned as an army officer in April 1988, he bribed a cadre of the local politburo for permission to go to a university. The response he received was that he has better give up a college education because the political status of one of his relatives was not good. A certain Mr. Kim of Wonsan High School was a gifted student who earned second place in a Pyongyang quiz contest. He was denied advancement to college, however, because his uncle had defected to the South.

Believing that the Soviet Union and East European socialist countries fell due to insufficient ideological education and control over the youth, the North Korean leadership ruthlessly expels from universities all students deemed to have this kind of defect. All these policies were based on an instruction entitled "Concerning the Reevaluation of Political Status," which calls for valuing one's family background more than one's academic ability in selecting college students.

In the distribution of college freshman quotas, there is a heavy regional discrimination with the lion's share going to Pyongyang. Many students with "good" family background are there, as well as and many senior cadres. Defector Kim Yong-sung testifies that the student recruitment divisions of regional administrative units recommend the children of cadres to the university in accordance with the instructions of regional

party chapters. Lately, the children of former Korean residents of Japan who have been repatriated to the North have been included in the favored group because such families usually possess quite a bit of foreign exchange. He says that these repatriate families will typically donate, for example, a broadcasting van or a truck to a leading institution or perhaps several color television sets to a second-rate college.

Many defectors discussed the control of college entrance for the unstable class. The children of these families are allowed college education only when they pass meticulous security clearance even if they score well in entrance examinations.

Defector Kim Seong says that he had been the top honor student throughout his elementary and secondary schools, but was not invited to take college entrance examinations held in March 1979. When his school master checked with a university recruitment division in his area, the reply was that he had not been invited because someone in his family had defected to the South. His mother's brother had defected in December 1946, *over thirty years previous*.

Control of Residents Through Organizational and Study Activities

Having established *juche* thought as the unitary state ideology, North Korea allows no other ideology or culture. With a view to rallying the people tightly around *juche* thought, it threatens human rights with rigid social control policy.

In various instructions Kim Jong-il ceaselessly emphasizes the importance of being faithful to the value of collectivism. North Korea insists that to realize this principle a project is needed to remodel human beings in a way that befits collectivist conditions and environment. Human remodeling here means that people should be artificially rebuilt, armed with communist traits.

To build a socialist society people need to be imbued with a collectivistic way of thinking. Even to sustain the concept of the great leader in juche thought, the need is felt for communist human remodeling. Here, North Korea is binding the people into organizations for human remodeling through various indoctrination programs and campaigns to “learn after” certain exemplary role models.

Through this human remodeling program, North Korea has mass-produced tamed and politically indifferent people. As part of the program, it implements an idolization policy, forcing from everyone unconditional obedience to a single person, thus producing depoliticized and subservient people. As part of a policy to exact from them unconditional loyalty to Kim Il Sung, every year the government lets students and other young people make pilgrimages along the Four Hundred Kilometer Road to National Liberation.

Pyongyang has been molding the people into obedient human beings through countless campaigns and the invention of symbolic events, which include relay marathons to carry epistles of loyalty, drives to propagate special Kim Il Sung flowers and Kim Jong-il flowers, and the story of the Appearance of the Twin Rainbows. In connection with Kim

Il Sung's death in particular, the press deifies him, emphasizing his inseparability with the people. Altering the people's way of thinking such that they automatically utter praises whenever occur the words Kim Il Sung or Kim Jong-il, is simply one more way North Korea infringes upon their human rights.

The fact that North Korea so emphasizes the importance of collectivism reflects that people's basic rights are restricted arbitrarily under the cloak of collectivism. The concept of collectivist life is explained by Article 82 of the Constitution: "Citizens should value organization and collective groups and display the willingness to serve society and the people at the cost of their physical life."

Individual interests and rights can thus be restricted without limit if necessary for the interests of the party and social organizations. In fact, North Korea contends that sacrificing individual interests for the benefit of the group is the very way to bring about genuine collectivism. Thus, individual rights remain thoroughly subjugated to decisions of the party, the government and social organizations.

The North Korean policy of collectivist social control is reflected in school curricula, resulting in the disregard of even young students' rights. The North Korean constitution stipulates in Article 47, "The State shall educate all students free of charge and shall provide scholarship funds to university and junior college students." Despite the constitutional provisions, however, the right to education is not given equally; it is heavily swayed by politics and class.

Students are intensively taught the works of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il as well as other ideological material. At day

nurseries, two-year-old babies are given sweets and made to say repeatedly, "Thank you, Father Marshall" or "Thank you, Marshall him." At kindergartens, children are taught to believe that all the goods distributed to them are gifts from him. Children are told to express appreciation to Kim Il Sung during lunch and cookie breaks. The idolization of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il is infused into their minds through conditioned reflex education from their pre-school ages before they are capable of making value judgements.

The principle that everyone should be unconditionally loyal to Kim Il Sung and use his instructions alone as absolute guidelines is expressly described in the "Ten Principles for Establishing a Unitary Thought System." A sort of North Korean ten commandments, they serve as the ultimate norm that regulates everyone's life. No traces of any guarantee of the basic rights stipulated in the constitution can ever be found in the Ten Principles enforced upon all party members as well as upon the rest of the people in 1974 when Kim Jong-il seized party hegemony. These are the Ten Principles:

(1) We should fight at the risk of our lives to imbue the whole society with the revolutionary thought of Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung.

(2) We should revere and respect Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung with loyalty.

(3) We should make absolute the authority of Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung.

(4) We should make the revolutionary thought of Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung as our firm faith and turn the great leader's instructions into our creed.

(5) In the implementation of the instructions of Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, we should thoroughly uphold the principle of unconditionality.

(6) We should strengthen the ideological integration and revolutionary unity of the whole party with Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung in the center.

(7) We should learn from Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung and thereby possess a communist attitude and revolutionary and collective methodology.

(8) We should retain and value the political life bestowed upon us by Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung and reward the great leader's great political faith and consideration with high political self-awakening, technology and loyalty.

(9) We should establish strong organizational rules by which the whole party, the whole country and the whole military move as one under the unitary leadership of Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung.

(10) Generation after generation we should inherit and accomplish the great revolutionary tasks pioneered by Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung.

The Ten Principles carry three to ten articles apiece. For example, Principle 3, "We should make absolute the authority of Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, . . ." stipulates in one of its articles, "We should dutifully tend and thoroughly protect the portraits, busts, statues and badges of Beloved Leader Kim Il Sung, publications carrying portraits of the leader, art objects made through the depiction of the leader, plates of the leader's on-the-scene instructions and the basic slogans of the party."

It was based on this principle that the newspaper *Rodong Sinmun*, in its 28 April 1993 issue, highly praised two young women who burned to death while trying to remove portraits of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il from a burning factory. The newspaper described it as “beautiful conduct” in which they practiced the leader’s instructions by deed. Here is a case of utter inhumanity, showing that individual freedom and rights are obliterated in favor of dedicating everything, even life, to the leader.

Article 5 of Principle 4 says, “Without fail we should faithfully attend collective studies such as study meetings and lecture sessions to learn the revolutionary thought of Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung; make it a rule to study for more than two hours a day making study a part of our lives; and wage positive struggles against the phenomenon of neglecting or obstructing studies.”

Article 1 of Principle 5 stipulates, “We should regard the instructions of Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung as laws and paramount orders, and unconditionally and thoroughly carry them out without excuse, displaying the unbounded spirit of dedication and sacrifice.” Article 1 of Principle 8 says, “We should regard our political life as the primary life. . . . We should be able to give up our physical life as if it were a bit of straw in favor of our political life.”

Social Organization and Control

Subject to control not only by overall state control organizations such as the State Security and Public Safety Ministries,

North Korean residents are under tight watchful eyes through *inminban* or people's neighborhood units and the "Five-Family Control System."

An *inminban* consists of fifteen to twenty families and is under the control of a people's committee. The smallest administrative unit, it is superficially designed primarily to ensure the effectiveness of local administration, but its more immediate objective is to intensify collectivism and insure the safeguard of the North Korean system. It is a field organizational tool to watch residents' movements, better organize their mobilization and conduct ideological indoctrination. In rural areas cooperative farms and farm work teams or squads are used to control people instead of *inminbans*.

Inminbans convene every Saturday or Sunday evening to study or discuss issues regarding family and daily life. Self-criticism sessions are also conducted at these meetings. Supervisors are provided with considerable authority to execute *inminban* programs, and even industry cadres are supposed to go through *inminban* officials' strict supervision regarding anything to do with their family lives. In addition, the State Security and Public Safety ministries keep informants at each *inminban*. Their duty is to report on the behavior of hostile class families or any contacts from outsiders.

The Five-Family Control System dates to July 1958 when Kim Il Sung first suggested it. He said, "Local party programs will be carried out more effectively if a paid party member is made responsible for indoctrination and economic production programs over five families." He said such a system would boost local programs: village party chiefs could simply

call in the leaders of each five-family group and hand projects down to them. A dedicated party member began to be assigned to each group.

This policy was intended to sub-divide work teams into squads in the rural areas and strengthen people's home lives and study activities through squad programs. As dedicated squad leaders came to watch the ideological behavior and study activities of other families, however, the system has had the ill effect of damaging human relations among neighborhood families and bringing about mutual distrust and jealousy. In particular, as people were forced to criticize others or themselves during project reviews, the project served to further accelerate the inhumanness of the North Korean system.

The *inminban* and five-family control systems are the smallest units for social control in areas ranging from political control to economic mobilization. The systems dig into even the trivial parts of people's daily life, thoroughly watching and oppressing residents.

In addition, all other organizations and assemblies such as the Women's League, recently established religious organizations and labor unions have always been under government control. Through them it trains members and supporters of the party. No organizations or assemblies independent of government control are tolerated in North Korea. And everyone must be a member of some social organization depending on their occupation, gender and age.

The Korean Workers' Party is responsible for the supervision of more than ten such organizations. They include the League of Socialist Working Youth of Korea whose members

are 14 to 30 years of age, the Korean Democratic Women's Union with members aged 31 to 60, the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea (31 to 65 in age, office workers and laborers) and the Union of Agricultural Working People of Korea (31–65, cooperative farm workers). These four organizations alone have more than ten million membership.

The General Federation of Trade Unions is on paper the organization of laborers and office workers, but is under the complete control of the party, which chooses cadre officials to run the federation who are then elected through a rubber-stamp process. All projects are subject to instructions and supervision from the party.

Its Platform of the General Federation as amended in 1968 demands in Article 1 the “unconditional execution of the instructions of Great Leader Kim Il Sung.” The federation is in effect an organization intended to put all laborers and office workers under the control of the party. It functions as a supervisory organ in areas ranging from campaigns for socialist competition to the private life of its members.

The League of Socialist Working Youth, too, sets forth six major tasks in the general rules of its platform. The first is to “arm the youth with the party's ideological system and have them protect the party with their lives and carry out the party line and policies unconditionally.” The youth league is divided into administrative and production units. Its chapters are organized at city and county people's committees, all work places and factories, industrial sites, major military units and schools.

The Union of Agricultural Working People is another front organization of the KWP, entrusted with the duty of watching and controlling farmers in a way that would thoroughly carry out the orders and instructions of the party, and of mobilizing farmers' labor to the greatest possible extent. The Women's

Table 5. Studies Programs by Organization

Monday Intense Study	Monday evenings, or evenings of other days in some cases	Phased studies, difference between the demands of <i>juche</i> thought and Marxism.
Wednesday Lectures	Wednesday evenings	State policies, international issues, control of liberal conduct.
Overall Weekly Studies	Saturday afternoons	Worship-like sessions in which Kim Il Sung hymns are sung, Kim Il Sung's "masterpiece works" are studied, and self-criticism is conducted.
Inminban Studies	Saturday or Sunday evenings in the urban area; the eve of open market days	Studies are directed to housewives and aged persons. Information on daily lives are exchanged, and Kim Il Sung's masterpieces are studied.
Morning Reading Sessions	30 minutes before the start of daily work	An officiator reads Kim Il Sung's masterpieces or <i>Rodong Shinmun</i> articles and the material is discussed.

Union and the Pioneers Corps, as well, function as mechanisms intended to control the private lives of residents and students.

The major purpose of these organizations is to assist the party, take part in various campaigns to meet the government-set goals, and dedicate themselves to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il. For instance, youth, women's, workers and all other major organizations were mobilized for the Chollima Movement, established to increase production norms.

Children from seven to thirteen all join the Pioneers Corps. They are mobilized and line up along roads leading to the Pyongyang airport when foreign dignitaries visit. It is the obligation of all organization members to take part in these and other such programs—as well, of course, in their rehearsals. Any one who fails to attend is considered lacking revolutionary zeal and faces punitive measures.

In general, workers report to work at 8 A.M. and finish at 6 P.M. This is followed by ideological studies for two hours a day on the average. Studies are heavily overlapping since they are done by work place, by work team and by organization. The studies include Monday Intense Study, Wednesday Lectures and Saturday Overall Studies.

Major social organizations such as the Youth League, Trade Union Federation, Agricultural Working People's Union, Women's Union and Pioneers Corps play a key role in ideological studies, as they are important social control mechanisms intended to “arm the North Korean people with revolutionary thought” and to have them act as the party dictates.

Control of Moving Residence, Travel and Information

The North Korean government prevents deviation that might result from the exchange of information, by restricting people's free activities to the maximum extent. The people are denied the freedom to live where they want or to travel on their own. Anyone who moves residence without official permission is denied a citizen's card, job and food rations.

Decision No. 56 of the Central People's Committee stipulates, "A person who wishes to stay more than ninety days in an area away from his residential district must have a permit from the Ministry of Public Safety." Decision No. 57 says, "Travellers or anyone wishing to accommodate temporary guests other than their family members must obtain permits from the Ministry of Public Safety." According to regulations, when a guest leaves the head of the family with whom he stayed issues a certificate ascertaining his stay, which is required to be submitted to security authorities and to his employer upon return home.

In a socialist society travel is considered a work-loss factor and this is part of the reason North Korea restricts it so rigidly. The more fundamental reason, however, is that discipline of people might slacken and they might criticize government policies through the exchange of information during trips. The government often assigns people to change their location, but most North Korean people reside their entire lives in their birth place and are stuck in the work place to which they were initially assigned.

With the exception of special occasions, it is impossible for North Koreans to make personal trips. Even when they travel on official business they have to carry their citizenship papers, identification cards, letters of credence and official travel certificates. Even such an array of documents does not guarantee the bearer unencumbered travel; travel arrangements are bound heavily in many other respects. A trip to Pyongyang, for example, can only be for reasons such as participation in large public rallies or college entrance, and it is allowed only to those who have no defect in social status.

According to the testimonies made by Kim Chang-hwa and O Song-il, both of whom defected to the South in 1987, travel applications are filed with the workplace chief fourteen days before a planned trip. It is reviewed based upon the applicant's work performance and ideological thought.

If the initial application is approved, the would-be traveller applies for a travel pass at the Certificate Division of a regional Public Safety Ministry office three days before the planned departure. The application is reviewed based upon social status; if approved, the office refers it to a regional State Security Ministry office, which issues the pass through the elementary party secretary of the applicant's work place.

After arrival, the traveller reports to the head of the local *inminban* registers himself on the travel roster, and gets his travel pass stamped by a local Public Safety official. A travel pass carries the date of return, and a traveller can get a train ticket only after applying at the railway station security office four days beforehand. These complicated procedures convince

most people not to travel to attend funeral services of family members, even their parents.

Even during travel people cannot be free of psychological stress. Since work norms are assigned to all workshop members, a person's work evaluation is unfavorably marked when he cannot fulfill his quota due to a trip. Unsatisfactory work appraisals cause one to be branded as a shirker, which in turn affects his food ration and even his children's education.

North Korea introduced a ration system for food and other daily necessities, which has emerged as yet another effective means to control the people. A person is entitled to food only when he belongs to one of the social organizations. With the exception of cooperative farm areas, there are also differences in distribution ratios. Working persons get more food than non-working people, that is, dependents—which stifles at the root any tendency to shun work.

In addition to prohibiting the free movement of residence, North Korea forcibly resettles anyone deemed politically unreliable. It is a common practice. Moreover, residents are forced to move elsewhere whenever need arises in a specific area, for example new industrial districts in the Jagang and Yanggang provinces or the newly set Rajin-Sonbong Special Economic Zone.

According to Mr. An Myong-jin, who defected to the South in September 1993, Kim Jong-il handed down the instructions to "remove unsocialistic elements" in October 1992. Based upon these instructions "task forces" for the removal of unsocialistic elements" were formed in Pyongyang from among workplace delegates, local Public Safety Ministry officials,

State Security Ministry agents and exemplary workers to ferret out idlers, people who violated instructions or who were discontent with party policies. They were deported to remote areas. When any such unwelcome characters were found, as group punishment the entire twenty- to thirty-family *inminban* was denied electricity and water supply for specific periods.

It has been made a rule that the handicapped cannot live in Pyongyang. Physically and mentally disabled persons and the deaf and dumb and their families are deported from Pyongyang and other major cities such as Nampo, Kaesong and Chongjin where foreigners frequent, for resettlement in exclusive areas. They have been shipped to remote mountainous areas or isolated islands. Foreigners invariably testify they saw no handicapped persons in Pyongyang. Recent defectors say that such people are dispatched according to the degree of their disability. In addition, the state chooses spouses for the handicapped; they are required to look after and train them and help them commute to and from the work place.

Evidence indicates that there is a severe discrimination depending on how one is handicapped. At the instruction of Kim Jong-il to study how to eliminate dwarfism, the dwarfs are held within a specific area. When the condition is found to be hereditary, the whole family is taken to a small mountainous village in South Hamgyong Province. Dwarfs have dwindled in number to about 30 couples, and further marriage between them is prohibited.

Control of Literary and Artistic Activities

North Korea regulates literature and the arts as a “means of indoctrinating workers in the communist way and turning the whole society communist for the working class.” In other words, literature and art in North Korea is an important ideological tool to attain a complete socialist revolution. It functions as an important device for ideological mobilization, a device that functions in military precision at the orders of the party.

In purging his foes and consolidating his one-man dictatorship, Kim Il Sung acutely felt the need to control and use writers and artists thoroughly. He organized the General Federation of Unions of Literature and Arts of Korea in March 1961 as a comprehensive organization in the area of literature and arts.

The general federation has under its control the Writers Union, Artists Union, Stage Artists Union, Musicians Union, Filmmakers Union, Choreographers Union and Photographers Union. Under each union are subcommittees, and in the provincial areas there are branch offices of the General Federation and the unions.

Since the creation of the general federation, the emphasis in North Korea’s literature and arts policies has switched from creativity to satisfaction of the demands to respect the style of “socialist realism,” carry through the principle of imbuing party, class and people’s traits into works of art, and base creative works thoroughly on the party policy line. In addition, North Korea has been strongly insisting that all literary and

artistic pieces should be worked out with emphasis on the four themes of revolutionary traditions, war, construction of socialism, and the reunification of the fatherland.

The fact that literary and artistic works should be thoroughly in accordance with the party line means that (1) they should be produced in a plan dictated by the party, (2) all works should be subject to party orders and control in the course of production, and (3) publishing and all stage art activities should be done subject to rigid party supervision and within the scope required by the party.

A 1966 meeting of KWP delegates called for arming the North Korean society with *juche* thought, so the literature and arts area, responding to the call, has produced a literary and artistic concept based on *juche* thought, that is, “the concept of *juche* literature and arts.” This is a graft between *juche* thought and socialistic realism, a new concept emphasizing that to communicate the socialistic and realistic traits of the party, working class and people, the party’s unitary leadership and unitary thought system needs to be solidly established. These traits are considered in North Korea to be the prototype of socialist literature and arts theories.

The *juche* literature and arts theory introduces, as a creative methodology, the “concept of *juche* seeds” and the “theory of speed competition.” This concept of seeds, said to have been invented by Kim Jong-il, asserts, “Our science of literature and arts has explored hitherto unknown politics and has made an immortal contribution toward further enriching the treasure box of human literature and arts science.”

The *juche* theory of literature and arts, therefore, sets forth the first task as depicting Kim Il Sung as the “prototype of an absolute communist.” The theory also calls for the deification of Kim Il Sung’s family parallel with his own idolization.

In the meantime, the *juche* literature and arts theory demands “collective creative works” in the context that because Kim Il Sung is an “absolute being,” his depiction cannot be rightfully done through any single individual’s ability alone. North Korea, which regards creative works as similar to material production, has come to emphasize the importance of the combination of the party’s political projects with revolutionary organizational activities.

Political projects refer to ideological training. Revolutionary organizational activities means the collectivization of writers and artists, for example, the “April 15 Creativity Team,” that would encourage them to do collective creative works.

In this way, North Korea’s literature and arts policies are focused primarily on depicting, under the slogan of “literature and arts revolution,” the revolutionary nature of and struggles by Kim Il Sung and his family members and followers.

To materialize these literature and arts policies, the Culture and Arts Department of the KWP Central Committee is directly responsible for the rigid, merciless control of writers and artists. This is accomplished through the General Federation of Unions of Literature and Arts (GFULA), which though on paper is a social organization is in effect a front organization of the KWP.

Control of writers and artists begins with handing down plans for their creative or stage activities. The party obliges writers and artists and their respective unions to prepare and forward to the party their creative works production plans by month, quarter and year, which are to be worked out based on quota by theme. These quotas always consist of 30 percent on the theme of “revolutionary traditions,” that is, works on the fabricated examples of anti-Japan struggles by Kim Il Sung and his followers, and on the praise and idolization of Kim Il Sung; 30 percent on the theme of the war; 20 percent on the construction of socialism; and 20 percent on unification of the fatherland.

Production plans forwarded to respective unions are compiled by the unions before being submitted to the Culture and Arts Department of the party Central Committee. Writers and artists are obliged to create in strict accordance with the plans under overall control of the leadership of each union.

Writers and artists are classified into those posted at industrial areas, factories, industries and farm villages (called “liberation writers”) and those with jobs at the GFULA, publishing houses and party and administration offices. To ensure effective control over them all, each union holds a session for the general review of party activities once each quarter and the GFULA once a year, during which the activities of the writers and artists are examined and new tasks are assigned.

Whether to permit publishing or staging of creative works is controlled very strictly. For this the KWP steps in directly.

The assignment of themes on works to be published or staged is made at the proportion discussed above, and the annual work plan of each publishing house and stage performance company is reviewed by the politburo of the party Central Committee after first being examined by the central committee of a relevant union. The GFULA and a relevant union routinely supervise the publishing of a work, while both the Culture and Arts Ministry of the Administration Council and a relevant social organization in charge of stage performance will control a stage performance company.

The process of control and supervision is divided into reference, inspection, and publishing or performance. In the stage of reference, a work is reviewed between the author and an editorial department or a stage performance company, which, along with the author, is supposed to be held responsible for anything published or staged. Thus a manuscript is generally reviewed and rewritten some three to four times to improve its ideological implication and artistry.

A manuscript approved by an editorial department or a stage performance company next has to pass inspection by the Inspection Bureau of the General Publishing House of the state administration. Inspection is very rigid. Even if only a few problematic points are found, a manuscript is returned for rewriting.

These are the inspection criteria: (1) Is the work based thoroughly on the socialistic method of realistic creativity? (2) Does it reveal state or military secrets? (3) Does it describe the negative aspects of the social system? (4) Is there any taint of capitalist ideology? (5) Is it helpful to the communist

indoctrination of the masses? (6) Does it fully display combativeness, revolutionalism and class nature? (7) Is the work clumsy in terms of artistry? and (8) Are all words and descriptions used properly?

Any novel, poem, play, opera, art piece or musical item can be published only after it passes inspection and receives an inspection stamp. In particular, meticulous attention is paid to the works of “revolutionary traditions” designed to salute, or to invent, the struggles of Kim Il Sung.

The bottom line is that the most important criterion for inspection is whether or not a work can cater to the taste of the top leaders. An inspector’s duty is very delicate. Inspectors are held responsible if defective works are passed or if something intended to praise Kim Il Sung is rejected due to poor artistry.

Literature and the arts in North Korea thus play the role of propagandist, agitator and organizer, faithful to the construction of socialism at the order of the party and the great suryong.

5. Gender Discrimination and Human Rights Violations

Socialist Liberation of Women

North Korea has pursued socialistic sex equality, at least on the surface, since the founding of its regime in 1945. As a means of establishing a socialist revolutionary regime, it tried to “dismantle the unequal economic substructure of property ownership as well as to liquidate the social structures based on the patriarchal tradition.”

The liberation of women was a key to eliminating the traditional family system. The Law on Agrarian Reform announced in March 1946 called for the distribution of farmlands among families on the basis of the number of work hands including women in each family. In the Law on the Work of Laborers and Office Workers announced in June of the same year, women were given the same right to work and the same obligations as men.

In addition, the Law on the Equality of Men and Women was promulgated in July 1946. Further effecting the Implementation Decree on the Law on the Equality of the Sexes two months later in September, North Korea laid a legal base for liquidating the existing patriarchal social order, promoting the liberation of women and integrating them into the working class.

Along with the statutory measures, substantial and concrete steps had been taken in parallel to facilitate women’s liberation. For instance, in a bid to utilize the female work force for

social purposes Pyongyang promoted the collectivization of the upbringing of children by building nurseries. To encourage women's participation in politics, North Korea founded the Korean Democratic Women's Union in November 1945 and based thereon began to promote the ideological revolutionization and class indoctrination of women.

North Korea thus took statutory and institutional measures within a few years of national liberation to facilitate the liberation of women based on socialistic principles. These measures are generally believed to have been more diverse and more thorough in terms of both quality and quantity than were the women's policies implemented for the forty-odd years thereafter.

Moreover, North Korea's policy changes shown after the Korean War indicates there has been a change in the regime's original intent in pursuing women's liberation. From the 1950s through the 1970s, North Korea took a dual policy: While trying to turn women into part of the working class it emphasized the socialist remodeling of household chores and home life, but at the state level began also to revive the patriarchal system. They were instituting Kim Il Sung's unitary system on the basis of *juche* thought and preparing Kim Jong-il's heirship.

In the course of post-war rehabilitation and the construction of the socialistic economy, the ratio of women's participation in labor rose dramatically thanks to these policies. There are many difficulties, however, in regarding this as the materialization of sex equality. North Korea was then at a level of perceiving women's issues not from the approach of sex

equality but from the theory of classes.

In reality, North Korean women's economic participation concentrated on specific vocational areas only, and the outcome of economic activities (wages and social perception of them) was poles apart from that of men. Another noticeable aspect was that despite the policy for the socialization of children's upbringing and household chores, the regime continued to emphasize the woman's role in the family, as things had been in the past. Thus women had a double burden. Due to the two-faced policy of mobilizing women socially yet while emphasizing their traditional role in the family, there existed quite a difference between women's nominal liberation and reality.

In establishing Kim Il Sung's unitary system through *juche* thought and justifying the succession of Kim Jong-il, North Korea deviated from the basic principle of socialism and began to revive the patriarchal system.

As its economy was in recession while they were solidifying Kim Jong-il's heirship in the 1980s, North Korea cemented the patriarchal view of the state by introducing the "theory of socio-political living being" and the concept of the "large socialist family."

In this period the number of women left jobless swelled due to the deteriorating economy. As a result, family incomes declined and women tended increasingly to depend on men. In a state policy to let male family masters dilute their social discontent through family life, a women's redomestication program was promoted.

At the same time, in the idea of using the female work

force in linkage with family life, home work teams were strengthened and women were encouraged to do volunteer labor. This, of course, ran counter in essence to the basic principle of the socialist liberation of women.

Sex Inequality in Economic Participation

To assess the overall standing of women, look at women's roles in both the public (social participation) and private (home) areas. Of course, women's social participation is in general closely related to their fixed role at home. Women's social participation can in substance be classified into economic activities and political participation. Rather than merely assess the rate of the number of participating women there is a need to note the form in which women's social participation has been carried out.

First, let us examine North Korean women's economic participation. Under the socialist economic system on which North Korea bases its economy, the capitalist exploitation of labor resulting from the private property system disappeared; in its place an equal mechanism was said to have emerged in which all social members, men and women, realize ego through work. They work according to their ability and receive dividends according to the quality and quantity of the work they do.

In the early stage of the regime, North Korea urged rural area women to work under Kim Il Sung's instructions that "rural area women, who account for half the farmers, should participate in agricultural production more passionately than

anyone else.” It also encouraged women to take part in industrial production, urging even busy mothers to work for national construction.

The program to mobilize North Korean women for agricultural and industrial production was further intensified during the Korean War. Women were systematically mobilized for the solidification of the rear area and increased food production and were mobilized in large numbers for factory work. As the male work force fell short of needs in post-war reconstruction, women were mobilized. Female work hands were forcibly assigned in the process of farm collectivization.

The state of women’s mobilization was well shown in Kim Il Sung’s report given to the Sixth Plenary Session of the KWP Central Committee in August 1953. The report, entitled “For Post-War Rehabilitation and Development of the People’s Economy,” said in part, “The women’s work force should be broadly brought in to supplement and expand our labor front. . . . The women’s work force should be extensively used in clerical duties in the areas of commerce, communications, health, culture and education. Various conveniences should be prepared for their work. Male workers at many offices should be replaced with women so that men can be diverted to the production workshops.”

From 1953 through 1958 when farm collectivization was completed, rural area women worked more. The growth of the female work force in this period was related directly with the Chollima Movement of 1957, a campaign designed to boost production by means of a bolstered labor force at a time when the First Five-Year Economic Plan (1957–61) was underway

and there was declining assistance from abroad.

At a plenary session of the KWP Central Committee in June 1958, Kim Il Sung introduced a policy to develop provincial industries extensively in order to multiply consumption goods. He then urged laborers' and office workers' dependent women staying at home to take positive part in factory work. Under this idea, the creation of one or more local industrial plants per *kun* (county) was promoted. By 1980 an average of over eighteen plants had been initiated in each county. The great majority of the employees at these local plants were women. This reflected the growing need for a woman work force including married women in the course of developing local industries.

In addition, as a means of accelerating women's participation in production work, Kim Il Sung laid down a policy of reasonable distribution of heavy and light industries. The policy stemmed from the idea that the creation of heavy and light industries in the same areas would provide opportunities for both men and women to work, men at the heavy industries and women at the light, so that women could run their occupational duties and home lives simultaneously.

North Korea boasted that the policy has brought about not only the effective use of manpower but also increased stabilization of the female work force, leading to a gain in the number of skilled woman workers and thus to better quality and productivity. In the area of various auxiliary facilities for employees, too, much funding and materials were able to be conserved, making it possible to run industries more effectively.

North Korea is known to have taken a set of administrative steps to expand women's participation to many economic areas. They included Cabinet Order No. 3 of February 1962 and Cabinet Order No. 70 of October 1967. Under the measures designed to enable more women to advance to various sectors of the people's economy, male workers on duties that could be performed by women were transferred to other jobs requiring physical strength.

Many women were assigned as mechanics in textile plants, water pump operators, management workers, statistical clerks at factories, and bookkeepers and accountants while male youths were transferred to mines, timber operations and fisheries.

It is questionable, however, to regard these measures as only part of a policy to elevate women's economic standing. North Korea deepened the distinctions between sexes and between job categories by deliberately assigning women to specific duties, jobs considered suitable to women's physical makeup and ability. As a result, woman workers were assigned mainly to the light industrial sector, simple clerical duties and the service area (commerce and convenience services).

In explaining the resolution of the woman question, North Korean officials used to say, "In our country, male workers are usually depicted as laborers and female workers as farmers holding bundles of rice in arm or sickle in hand." Such remarks only reveal the existence of deep gender and job-category discrimination.

To resolve the shortage of work force exposed during the Sixth Economic Plan (1971-76), North Korea emphatically

carried out a “three-point technical revolution” aimed primarily at boosting productivity. One major policy implemented under the project was to prevent the loss of women’s force, because women had been leaving their jobs upon marriage and the number of unemployed women was swelling.

Marriage ages had been set under Section 9 of the Family Law at 18 for men and 17 for women. Now men were being advised not to marry until 30 and women 28. Other drives were also launched to put women into the working class, including various socialist labor competitive campaigns, strengthening of indoctrination, and revolutionalization of families.

It was decided at the Fifth KWP Congress in November 1970 to liberate women from kitchen chores, and at the fourth meeting of the Democratic Women’s League on 7 October 1971 Kim Il Sung made a speech “Turning Women into Revolutionary Working Class” to encourage women to join the labor force. In January 1978 their working obligations were laid out in the Law on Socialist Labor, which set the stage for forcible labor mobilization.

Various conditions were thus laid for women, including those 55 or older, as well as other dependent family members to work and be used to the maximum. Home work teams and home cooperative unions were formed for women unable to report to work.

At the turn of the 1980s Pyongyang felt the need to invest more in light industry, related directly to people’s day-to-day needs. The August 3 Campaign for the Expanded Production of People’s Consumption Goods was launched in 1984,

through which the activities of home work teams intensified. Given that most of the idle work force had been women, the stepped-up home work team programs meant they would be mobilized.

The policy to intensify home work teams was closely linked to the general economic recession. By the end of the Second Seven-Year Economic Plan (1978–84), North Korea's annual economic growth had plummeted to two percent. In the second half of the 1980s the recession worsened and the unemployment rate for married women went up—attributable to a change in the economic structure as well as to the declining growth rate.

At the same time, opportunities increased for women to earn extra money in the black market that began to thrive in the late 1980s. The need of forcible mobilization of married women for vocational work declined as the ratio of economically active population swelled due to a change in the population structure. In other words, as was the case with the capitalist market economy, the phenomenon of women as “industrial reserves” appeared clearly in North Korea's socialist labor policy, though to a different degree.

The industrial reserves, that is, married women, were in fact forcibly mobilized as “volunteers,” not for vocational jobs, and for such a purpose the party carried out persistent indoctrination through the Democratic Women's Union.

To examine the economic standing of women we must study the statistical relationship between gender and job category, but Pyongyang does not use the standard classifications recommended by the United Nations so it is difficult to

compare. North Korea's Central Statistical Bureau classifies job categories into manual workers at state-run farms and industries, public officials and managerial workers, members of cooperative farms, and manual laborers at cooperative organizations and factories.

The ratios of women to total workers in 1987 stood at 57 percent at state-run industries, 16.8 percent in officialdom, 25.3 percent in the farm sector, and 0.9 percent at cooperative industries.

The decree "Concerning Further Advancement of Women to Each Sector of the People's Economy," announced on 19 July 1958, called for boosting women's employment above sixty percent in the education and health sectors and thirty percent in other areas. It also made it obligatory that they be assigned to jobs women are able to do, which reflects the perception that the educational and health assignments are the responsibilities suitable.

This cabinet decision to assign women to jobs according to their unique abilities can be taken to reflect North Korea's economic development strategy focus upon heavy and chemical industries and the concomitant need to make the most of male workers. More basically, however, it seems to stem from a perception that women in general are suitable to light and easy work.

It indicates that the same pattern appearing in the capitalist economy emerged in North Korea. In the early 1970s North Korea's female work force was concentrated in light industry where seventy percent of the total workers were women. Women teachers accounted for thirty-five percent; in the

agricultural sector, sixty.

Of the total 294,000 experts and technicians in North Korea as of 1963, women numbered 43,000 or a mere 14.6 percent. In 1989, however, woman experts and technicians totaled about 500,000 or 37 percent of the total 1,350,000. To understand women's shares in each sector, there is a need to discuss the job categories among North Korea's experts and technicians.

Regarding wage conditions of female North Korean workers, Article 27 of the Socialist Constitution and Section 37 of the Socialist Labor Law insists on the application of "the principle of socialist dividends based on the quality and quantity of labor." North Korea, formalizing this principle of same wages for same work, argues that "all workers shall be paid the same wages for the same work done regardless of differences in sex, age or nationality." Whatever the words, the average monthly wage for women is seventy North Korean *won*, one of the lowest among social layers. As in other socialist countries, the low wage for women is due to this principle of socialist dividends calling for "dividends based on labor." This can be explained by job distinction, that is, women are in a class lower than men and as unskilled workers are largely assigned to job categories socially belittled or relatively easy.

Speaking at a convention of national labor administrative workers in September 1979, Kim Il Sung attempted to stabilize the labor specialization environment and emphasized that people should be engaged in the same job categories generation after generation in professional and technical areas. He crystallized the labor structure and made it hard to change jobs. In general, the area where woman workers are assigned most

heavily is the textile industry whose female workers represent eighty percent of the work force. The share of female managers and management chairpersons is high in some areas such as cooperative farms, but as a whole it is quite low.

In North Korea a woman's job is determined through application of state labor distribution policy rather than through individual preference or by competition. In the early stages of the regime it was relatively easy to change jobs, but as socialist construction began in earnest all labor came to be placed under strict central control. The distribution of labor previously was made by the Labor Affairs Ministry based on an overall plan worked out by the State Planning Committee. In the late 1960s when problems arose in the center-managed manpower distribution, province, city and *kun* labor administration offices were tasked to distribute workers in a way suitable to their areas.

Outwardly it has been known that there is no discrimination against women at the time of labor assignment, but seemingly so considerate a measure to give them appropriate duties places them at less important posts. The criterion for assignment envisioned in Cabinet Decision No. 84 was that "sensitive, emotionally affluent and physically feeble women shall be assigned to duties suitable to their physical conditions while male workers shall be placed at important, laborious and difficult posts."

The idea stems from the need for job distinction by sex in view of difference in the abilities of men and women, as well as from the traditional understanding of the physical and psychological characteristics of women. It should also be noted

that whenever the economy declined married women would be laid off, then re-mobilized as subsidiary labor when needed.

In sum, North Korea promoted the socialization of household chores early in the regime when they faced the need to mobilize the female work force to make up for manpower shortage. Upon the introduction of *juche* thought, however, North Korea, while calling for the liberalization of women through their positive social participation, emphasized in a contradictory policy the importance of women's household role.

Accordingly, women have not worked under the same conditions as have men. They were assigned mostly to areas deemed women's jobs, lowly posts—and they have been discriminated against in terms of wages.

Sex Inequality in Political Participation

The Law on the Equality of Men and Women enacted on 30 July 1946 in North Korea provides in Sections 1 and 2 for the political equality of women (provision of rights equal to those of men to vote and to be elected). The Implementation Decree of the Law on Equality of Men and Women promulgated on 14 September 1946 says in Section 1, "Women shall have equal rights as men to elect, and to be elected as, members of local (province, city, *kun*, *myon* and *ri*) and central people's committees. Like men, women can become members or staff of state offices, political parties and social and public organizations."

An attempt will be made here to look into the political influence of North Korean women by examining how such

statutory equality of women has been implemented.

Early in its regime Pyongyang took steps to ensure sex equality (a one-husband-one-wife system, illiteracy control, same wages for same work) as they claim had been demanded by their women's movement. The purpose was to induce women to take part voluntarily and systematically in social remodeling programs such as agrarian reform and the creation of people's committees. Upon the introduction of the socialist system, North Korea coordinated women's political activities hoping to revolutionize women and convert them to working class.

Under the cloak of social liberalization of women, Pyongyang deliberately orchestrated the mobilization of women in the political sector, through which it has enforced a policy to socialize them politically with a view to enlisting their support for party and state policies.

The policy for women's politico-socialization featured political indoctrination of women and socialist competitive movements among women.

The reality of North Korea's politico-socialization of women shows that their political indoctrination was motivated by the policy to arouse among them a sense of patriotism and loyalty to Kim Il Sung and thereby form a broader base to support the system politically. North Korean women have been trained to emulate model women handpicked by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il.

Who are cited as model women? Kim Il Sung's mother, Kang Ban-sok, and Kim Jong-suk, the wife of Kim Il Sung and mother of Kim Jong-il. Kang Ban-sok is described as

“The mother of Dear Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, a great pioneer in our country’s movement for the liberation of women, and an indefatigable revolutionary communist fighter,” and Kim Jong-suk as “An indefatigable revolutionary communist fighter, an anti-Japan woman hero, and a dedicated *juche*-type communist revolutionary who struggled for the victory of the great revolutionary task pioneered by the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung.”

In this way North Korean women have been asked to display the traditional virtues (obedience and dedication) inasmuch as they are required to live as communist revolutionaries and, at the same time, as the mothers and wives of revolutionaries.

Women’s socialist competition movements, one form of policy program to socialize women politically, were all staged at the orders of the Korean Workers’ Party. When the party would decide upon a competition in some policy consideration and hand the decision down to its subordinate offices, the party’s field organizations, accepting the order unconditionally, would put it into practice by organizing, say, public rallies or “loyalty meetings.”

Since women’s politico-socialization took place mainly through the Democratic Women’s Union, the only national women’s organization in North Korea, the need is felt to discuss briefly how the politico-socialization function of the Women’s Union has changed.

In this connection, the whole period from national liberation to date can be classified into three stages. In the first, covering from 1945 to 1956, the need was stressed to remodel women into communist women. After inaugurating the Korean

Workers' Party on 10 October 1945 North Korea created the Democratic Women's Union on November 11 the same year as an organization entrusted with the duty of training and rallying all the women of North Korea under the direct guidance of the KWP.

The second stage spans a period from 1957 to 1971, during which the ideological revolution of women was emphasized. In the course of working out and implementing the Five-year Economic Plan, greater numbers of women were thrown into economic development projects. The major projects the women's union promoted as part of its duty to remodel women as communists included ones to establish a socialist pattern of life, ideological revolutionalization of women, and communist indoctrination based chiefly on class training. Beginning in 1961, "national mothers' rallies" and "mothers schools" were opened to facilitate women's and home life ideological remodeling programs. Starting in 1968, North Korea called for the revolutionalization of home life and created food processing centers to liberate women from cooking. This series of steps was intended to expand women's social participation in a positive direction through the socialization of household chores.

The third stage (1972 to date) can be regarded as a period for the creation of *juche*-type communist women. In promulgating the Socialist Constitution in 1972, North Korea installed *juche* thought as the party's unitary ideology. Pyongyang emphasized the importance of *juche* thought under the pretext of creating a unique socialism of North Korea's own. Its real purpose, however, was to facilitate hereditary power succes-

sion from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong-il.

In addition, in a policy to occupy “ideological and material fortresses” to attain the complete victory of communism and realize a communist society, North Korea promoted the three revolutions of ideology, technology and culture. To this end, they forged ahead with revolutionizing and intellectualizing the whole society, transforming everyone into the working class.

Through the women’s union’s ideological indoctrination programs designed to facilitate the implementation of the three revolutionary tasks, North Korean women were taught to regard “faithfulness to the party and the Leader as moral ethics, affection for blood relatives as comradely love, and loyalty to the great leader as moral obligation.”

At the same time, the union set the revolutionization of homes as one of its policy goals, emphasizing the need for a more positive women’s role. Regulating what went on in people’s homes, considering them “revolutionary units helping and leading one another for the party, the *suryong*, society and groups,” North Korea defined the whole of the North Korean society as one big socialist family. As part of this theory, the women’s union urged women to raise their children at home as communist successors to the revolution and to be obedient to their husbands.

Beginning the late 1970s, however, the women’s union shrank in size because the scope of its membership was switched from all women to only those who were heads of families or who were fully employed. The union’s political indoctrination programs also changed to reflect the reduction,

and greater emphasis was placed on the aspect of the mobilization of idle work force. In circumstances in which all women were obliged to join relevant workers organizations, the reduced scale of the women's union can be taken to have represented a declining concern about women.

To understand North Korean women's participation in politics, there is the need to look into women's roles and positions at offices of power and workers organizations: Election turnout rates, often used as an index of public concern about politics, are meaningless in a country like North Korea.

In North Korea, the KWP is the highest power. It reigns over the administration, the judiciary and the legislature. Party committees are set up at every office, organization and work place. In principle there is no restriction to admission to party membership because anyone aged eighteen or older is eligible to join regardless of sex, but joining depends on family background and the extent of one's participation in the construction of socialism.

If women wish to become party leaders, they, like men, have to harbor firm loyalty to the party, have good family background and earn the title of "labor hero" at the work place. These woman party leaders, however, can hardly be expected to speak for and defend the interests of women. Their duty is mainly to mobilize the woman work force effectively for the execution of party programs.

There are no exact figures about the ratio of women among the total membership of the KWP, but it is presumed to be about twenty to twenty-five percent, a ratio roughly comparable to the percentage of female members of the Supreme

People's Assembly and local people's assemblies. However, since the voice of the party leadership is absolute in all party programs, the number of women in the ordinary party membership is meaningless. Woman members of the Party Central Committee which is directly involved in party decision making, account for no more than about five percent of the total.

In the case of members of the Supreme People's Assembly, the party center decided upon the ratio of woman candidates, who are then elected through perfunctory rubber-stamp election procedures. One noticeable point is that recommendations for the Supreme People's Assembly and local people's assembly candidates are made by recommendation committees consisting of representatives of the Democratic Women's Union and various other social organizations, political parties, state offices and enterprise workers.

The members of the Supreme People's Assembly are not professional politicians but honorary members, engaged in their original duties excepting their presence at one or two regular sessions a year. Candidates for the Supreme People's Assembly are determined once the central party has decided on details that include distribution of candidates by region, class and sex. The ratio of women has never been regulated in writing, but the percentage hovers around twenty-two or twenty-three percent.

The North Korean people are supposed to join one of the workers social organizations, depending on age and occupation, such as the League of Socialist Working Youth, General Federation of Trade Unions, Union of Agricultural Working People or the Democratic Women's Union (women aged 18

to 55 who have not joined other organizations). Most North Korean women have already joined at least one workers organization in order to pass through the process of politico-socialization.

Workers organizations are supposed to be voluntary organizations of laborers striving to construct socialism. In reality, however, they are indoctrinating bodies playing the role of a party supporter linking the party and people. In theory, this is based on the collectivist principle that social groups are the source of individual life and that since individual interests are included in group interests, individuals' free development is thus a prerequisite to group development.

In sum, North Korean woman politicians' representation is far different from their actual functionality. Since woman politicians function at the orders of the party or other higher offices rather than having the right to make decisions on their own, they fail to represent the interests of all North Korean women.

Women's Standing at Home

At home, as well, women's actual standing is known to be much different from what it is supposed to be under a socialist system. North Korea says that "at the stage of anti-imperial and anti-feudal democratic revolution, one of the important tasks to resolve is to liberate women from colonial and feudal oppression and subordination and assure them rights equal to those of men in every area of social life."

It was emphasized that such a revolution was needed because

the traditional Confucian family system was authoritarian, with strong emphasis on blood affiliation which posed an obstacle to socialist revolution, and because the male-chauvinist feudal family system oppresses women in terms of politics and economy.

This meant that under the concept of socialist families, equality should be assured among the family members, especially between men and women. North Korea envisioned the realization of such a socialist family system in the Law on the Equality of Men and Women effected in July 1946.

With a view to destroying the traditional large patriarchal family system, Pyongyang created a "citizens card system" in 1955 as an identity registration program after abolishing the existing birth registration system symbolic of blood and clan affiliation. At the same time, farms and nationalized major industries were collectivized to eliminate the material base of the traditional family system, and in emphasis of the need to revolutionize the family, household chores and child rearing were socialized.

Meanwhile, the state played the role of a direct meddler instead of an arbitrator in family relations. It adopted a system under which in effect it exercises approval rights in such matters as marriage, setting of marriage ages, and divorce. Similarly, a family can adopt or otherwise support a child only with official approval.

At first Pyongyang effected reforms to discontinue the old family order. Upon the advent of *juche* thought in the 1970s, however, tradition again began to enjoy a spotlight in family relations. Although North Korea pursued the equal family

order outwardly and institutionally, the traditional patriarchal order has been maintained, in which paternal rights are emphasized. In addition, a broad scope of marriage prohibition, the principle of deference to the father, support the extended family, and respect for the aged were envisioned in the 1990 Family Law.

North Korea insists that it has ensured conditions for women's equal advancement in society through statutory and institutional devices for sex equality and through the socialization of household chores and children's upbringing. As discussed above, however, women, though they take part in equal work activities, are obliged to bear a double burden because of the deep-rooted traditional idea that all household chores and children's upbringing are women's duty. Kim Il Sung once remarked that "women's inherent job is to raise children," and the Women's Union regulations say, "Cooking is women's traditional work and women's inborn obligation."

The traditional patriarchal system and the extant thought on the predominance of men have helped restrict the lives of North Korean women. The ideal of women put forth by North Korea reflects the traditional role of mother, wife and daughter-in-law. It says responsibility for family harmony rests with daughters-in-law.

In a paternal society women are supposed to obey men, so cases of violence at home are known to occur—but there are no detailed statistics on this. Interestingly, since home violence has never been publicly discussed in North Korea, we can only assume that it is not regarded as an issue infringing upon women's basic human rights.

As the North Korean economy started to turn from bad to worse, the food crisis has deepened. In general, when an economy turns bad, women's life is are threatened more than men's. For example, at home food is served in the order of father, sons, then daughters; the mother is always the last to eat, if any food is left. Defectors have testified that the responsibility to obtain food for the family has become women's major duty, which has placed women under growing pressure from the other family members.

Issues of Sexual Assault, Adultery, Abortion and Childcare Leave

As for the reality of sexual assaults, considered one of the most basic violations of women's human rights, defectors have testified about rape and other sexual assaults perpetrated as the price of admittance to the party or as condition to receive a job. They say that in many instances senior party officials or others in high positions seduce their woman employees in return for party membership. The tendency to view a woman as a sexual tool can also be seen in the existence of a team of youthful women handpicked by Section 5 of the Security General Bureau, which is Kim Jong-il's bodyguard organization. It is often referred to as "the joy team."

It is known that sexual assaults at the work place are usually not taken as anything serious. In the tradition of valuing women's purity, the prevailing social tendency is to conceal having been sexually assaulted, and no institutional device for taking legal action against sexual assault can be expected in

North Korea.

Officially North Korea emphasizes the importance of abstinence from premarital sex; that or adultery is a crime subject to imprisonment or even execution. Because marriage age limits have been elevated and because men in the military cannot marry until discharge, however, adultery is known to occur quite often.

According to defectors' testimonies, North Korean youths find little means of entertainment or leisure yet are under constant stress, so they tend to seek comfort through sex relations. Accordingly cases of unwed pregnancy are frequent, and it is the woman who suffer most. North Korea makes it a rule to punish those involved as "decadent."

In the past, when an unwed pregnant woman wanted an abortion at a people's hospital, she had to identify herself—always at the risk of being branded as having been involved in "a decadent incident." As some such pregnant women were committing suicide, Kim Jong-il ordered doctors in the early 1980s to perform abortions unconditionally and without demanding identification. The magnanimous policy was in part to control the population increase. North Korea is also known to have forced women to undergo sterilization in the course of promoting its family control plan.

Meanwhile, it is presumed that abortion or sterilization operations are not medically advanced enough to ensure proper health measures. Health regulations and actual health programs for women are directly related to the issue of protecting mothers. On paper, provision is made for 150 days' pre- and post-child-birth leaves—but women are made to return their

child-birth leaves to the party as a token of loyalty.

It is known that North Korea, to protect women's working ability, operates women's counseling centers and women's delivery centers. The government takes due steps to prevent or treat woman's diseases and look after pregnant women, and there is a definite attempt to prevent and treat infants' diseases.

However, because it is quite difficult for ordinary people in general to obtain medical services, it is believed that medical service for women, too, is likely to be insufficient. For example, the Pyongyang Delivery Center is reputed to be one of the largest in the world, but ordinary people cannot use it. Most women deliver their babies at home with the help of midwives or an elderly neighbor woman.

Under a political system oriented toward national liberation, North Korean women have been the victims of a patriarchal authoritarian culture that values military males and force. Authoritarianism, fed by national division, has spread to every corner of this social system that always keeps in mind a possible war with the South. Especially because the use of violence by the state has long been justified and generalized under Communist dictatorial systems, the system has functioned as a mechanism of fundamental restriction upon women's lives.

North Korean propaganda has it that there is no problem of discrimination against women because all policies have been based on socialist gender equality. However, women's life is far from being on a par with men. Social standing is determined in most cases by that of the male head of family; the affirmative effect of a woman's social participation upon

the elevation of her social standing is negligible. In other words, based on socialist sex equality, women have been given the right to take part in labor the same as men, but this has functioned instead as a heavy burden to women because of the prevailing sense of patriarchy among women themselves.

When a basic sense of women's human rights is lacking even among women themselves, no such sense can be expected from society as a whole. Moreover, since North Korea is such a hermetically sealed society, it has been excluded from the flow of global feminist movements aimed at elevating women's standing through the elimination of sex discrimination. Nor has there been any resistance to the state's insistence that their society has perfected sex equality.

Women do not even question the regime that has been forcing them to live under their double burden. Nor can the Democratic Women's Union be expected to grow into any sort of pressure group able to pool women's potentials: it is not a voluntary organization intended to resolve women's problems but rather it is designed to facilitate their mobilization and indoctrination for the sake of the party and the state.

6. Environmental Rights

Pyongyang's Perception of the Natural Environment

North Korea's basic perception is that pollution and environmental damage is a socio-political question, a function of the social system. North Korea contends that although environmental contamination and damage are closely linked to industrialization, they are by no means an inevitable by-product. They are an inevitable product, the North argues, of capitalist society in which state sovereignty and production means rest with an extremely small number of the exploiting class.

Supposedly in a capitalist society the environment is viewed only from the angle of making money and there is no hesitation to damage or pollute it for profit. Capitalists are supposed to be reluctant to invest in pollution control and environmental projects, which they regard as unproductive.

In the North Korean view, therefore, environmental pollution and damage in capitalist society are social mishaps resulting from heated profit competition. North Korea goes on to assert that the legislation of environment-related laws in capitalist society is no more than empty declaration and cheating.

Pyongyang's contention is that genuine environmental protection can be attained only when a socialist system sets in, under which the masses become the master of a state and its society. They say that among all socialist systems, that of the North Korean style, which they insist has embodied the

creative *juche* thought, is the one best implementing environmental programs in the interests of the masses.

They argue that since the key environmental policy under the North Korean socialist system is to protect the environment primarily in the interests of the working masses, all programs designed to protect and manage nature and the living environment are undertaken in the North with a view to assuring the masses of independent and creative living conditions.

The North Koreans insist that their country has been transformed into a people's paradise thanks to the "wise environmental protection policies" of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il. North Korean authorities say they have realized industrialization without pollution and built today's modern economy by taking all available measures emphasizing the elimination of pollution, from the early stages of social construction under the sound leadership of the party and the great leader.

Moreover, Pyongyang says that as a result of the numerous environmental programs undertaken in the past, the basic indices of environmental protection, such as those of air, water and soil, have reached the advanced international standard, making it possible to create in the age of the Korean Workers' Party a paradise of the kind the Korean ancestors so longed for. North Korea has now become a "pollution-free country," "a nation in park" and "a people's paradise on earth," which all the world peoples envy. They insist that as a result, the people are unaware even of the word "pollution" and lead happy lives in an excellent cultural and sanitary environment, enjoying unprecedented longevity.

Several North Korean propaganda films invariably back up these contentions, including:

I Sing of My Picturesque Fatherland

A Beautiful Four-Season Country

In Search of New Landscapes

Country with Time-Honored Tradition

New History of National Construction

Korea that Sprang Up from the Debris

A New Look for Korea

Advancing Fatherland

The Look of Pyongyang

Pyongyang as We Have Seen

A Visit to Pyongyang

Homeland Visit, Kaesong City

Homeland Visit, South Hamgyong Province

Homeland Visit, North Hamgyong Province

Mt. Paekdu

Mt. Kumgang

Let's Go to Mt. Kumgang

Homeland Visit, Kangwon Province

Korean Geography, North Hamgyong Province

Korean Geography, South Hamgyong Province

Mt. Kumgang, Korea's Scenic Mt. Myohyang

Mt. Myohyang

Mt. Oka

*Scenic Underground Sokhwa Palace, Changkwangwon,
Songdown.*

In addition there are science educational documentaries, similar, which include "Natural Monuments," "Our Country's

Natural Monuments: Caves, Vegetation and Mayang Trout” and “Our Country’s Roe Deer and Deer.”

These contentions notwithstanding, North Korea does not recognize the people’s right to environment as a basic human right, a right for the people to ask the state to resolve environmental problems. The Labor Law enacted on 18 April 1978 does purport to guarantee of the protection and promotion of workers’ lives and health in terms of the environment—that is, assure “cultural and sanitary” working conditions. On 9 April 1986 North Korea passed a law on environmental protection, with the contention that it was newly enforcing principles and means to better protect and remodel the natural and living environments so as to assure the masses their “independent and creative life” as well as cultural and sanitary living environment.

The constitution as amended on 29 April 1992 includes a new clause in Article 57 that stipulates, “The State shall, in advance of production activities, establish measures to protect the environment and preserve and improve the natural environment, prevent environmental pollution, and provide the people with cultural and sanitary living environment and working conditions.” The state guarantees sound natural and living environment in a gesture to grant the people a favor, rather than guaranteeing the right to environment.

Examples of Violations of Environmental Rights

Pyeongyang claims that under the leadership of the *suryong* it has constructed “socialism our style,” the best among all

socialist countries, arguing that the state grants the people basic rights before the people even ask for them.

Is this paradise real? It most certainly is not. Environmental pollution and damages have in fact emerged as a serious problem in North Korea. Timberlands have been devastated. Air, water and soils have been contaminated and animals and plant resources depleted. The people suffer very much from environmental damages, not to even mention being assured of a healthy natural environment.

This can be confirmed by an objective analysis. In circumstances where there is no way to make a survey of environmental conditions and where outward flow of information is tightly sealed, we say “objective” because the reality of environmental destruction has been well documented in Kim Il Sung’s speeches. Traces of environmental pollution and damage can also be found in some North Korean movies and videos.

There are three ways we can know that North Korea violates the people’s human rights under the cloak of guaranteeing them a sound natural environment.

The first is that the natural environment of North Korea is so polluted or damaged as a whole that the people are hardly guaranteed the so-called cultural and sanitary environment mentioned by the North Korean authorities.

The second is that in the North Korean socialist society where classes are supposed to have ceased to exist, the privileged ruling class lives under different environmental conditions from the ordinary masses. There exists a wide environmental difference between Pyongyang where only

selected people are allowed to live in other cities and rural areas.

The third is that North Korea uses the need of environmental protection as an excuse to mobilize the people. It also uses it as a means of safeguarding the system by stepping up ideological indoctrination with the excuse that political indoctrination is most important to implement environmental protection programs.

An attempt will be made here to assess how the people's right to a sound environment is being encroached upon in North Korea by examining the environmental conditions under which they live in their paradise on earth.

Environmental Pollution and the Destruction of Nature

Stressing that air, water and soil are the three major elements essential to the existence of organic beings and that their pollution would have profound direct and indirect impact on human health, growth and survival, Pyongyang asserts that through scientific and ideal environmental protection policies the state is ensuring the purity of air, water and soil. They say it is their communist obligation.

Many cases of air, water and soil pollution, however, have emerged, and we have learned that in some areas people suffer from very serious pollution. At the same time, far too many of some animal and plant species have been taken.

Air Pollution

Hamhung is a leading petrochemical industrial area of North Korea. In the Hungnam district of Hamhung, seventy percent of whose area is factory zoned, there are several major industrial facilities including the Joint Hungnam Fertilizer Industry, Hungnam Pharmaceutical Plant, the 2-8 Joint Vinalon Industry and the Hungnam Woolen Textile Plant.

North Korean defectors frequently testify that pollution in the Hungnam area is quite serious. This is due to such pollutants as chlorine gas and carbon monoxide. The seriousness of the situation can also be ascertained by remarks from Kim Il Sung that despite his almost yearly emphasis upon the need to dispel it, pollution has been getting worse.

In a speech entitled "Concerning the Central Task Facing the Provincial Party Committee of the South Hamgyong Province and the Party Committees of Major Plants and Industries," made on 4 June 1979, Kim Il Sung said that whenever he visited Hamhung he would emphasize the need to reduce the harmful gases coming from chemical plants, but that people still smell the fumes.

In another speech made on 10 July 1980 entitled, "Several Tasks in the Implementation of Economic Projects in South Hamgyong Province," he complained that despite his earlier instructions that all party members and people in the province should together prevent pollution in the Hamhung area, smoke from factory chimneys pollute the air. He criticized party cadres for failing to work out steps to prevent pollution and said the managers of factories and industries were unaware of

how harmful the toxic gases from their plants were to the human body.

That this pollution still lingers can be affirmed in his speech of 27 August 1989 entitled, "Taking Good Care of the Majon Resort." He said decisive measures were needed to check the pollution of the Hamhung area and that things would not improve with mere slogans or passive activity, and that obsolete facilities could not be successfully repaired in piecemeal, patchwork fashion.

Pain from pollution is by no means limited to Hamhung. In a 29 April 1977 speech, "Concerning the Land Laws," Kim Il Sung said the citizens of Chongjin were suffering from factory smoke. Other areas where pollution is serious include Wonsan where the Munpyong Refinery and Wonsan Chemical Plant are located, Chongjin with its Kim Chaek Steel Works, Songrim which is the location of North Korea's largest steel mill, Hwanghae Joint Steel Works, and at Rajin a nonferrous metal plant complex.

Pollution scenes can be seen in North Korean movies as well. A documentary, "Korea That Sprang up through the Debris," shows smoke-shrouded factory areas of Pyongyang, Hamhung, Kanggye, Nampo and Wonsan with the narration that the North Koreans have built modern industries from the post-war debris. The documentary, "Homeland Visit, North Hamgyong Province," shows sooty smoke gushing from the chimneys of the Kim Chaek Steel Works which produce pig iron and steel. The movie, "A New Look for Korea," too, displays black factory smoke as a symbol of industrialization.

Among the films taken by officials from the South-North Institute during their visit to the North in December 1992, "Hamhung Revisited" showed black smoke rising from Hungnam fertilizer plants and a mist-like air pollution over Hamhung.

Water Contamination

In one speech Kim Il Sung complained, "In our sewer facilities, there is much we lack or have yet to correct. The project to divert elsewhere the sewage that is ducted into the Taedong and Potong Rivers has not been progressing on schedule. Thus, waste water keeps flowing into such good waters as the Taedong and Potong rivers. . . . We have been struggling for several years, but mining areas continue to dump waste water into rivers."

In another speech on 5 September 1962, "Concerning the Improvement of Urban Management Programs," Kim Il Sung said, "Toxic substances are found in water from mining areas. If they flow into the rivers, it may kill all the fish and harm people's health." Clearly North Korea has long been beset with the problem of water contamination.

In "Concerning the Conservation and Further Development of State Properties" given on 30 June 1960 Kim Il Sung said that though he had time and again stressed the need to prevent factories and mines from dumping toxic substances, some mines were continuing to feed them into rivers. The Pyongyang Textile Plant, he said, dumped unfiltered toxic substances from a dye factory into the Taedong River, and schools of fish that had previously come up as far up as the Okryu Bridge now

turned around near Mankyongdae University because of the smell in the water. In “Concerning the Strengthening of National Land Management Programs” of 10 February 1964 Kim Il Sung said that toxic substances from the Sinpyong Mine in North Hwanghae Province had killed the gray mullets and many other fish in the Taedong River.

The situation was also bad in the 1970s and 80s. On 5 December 1972 Kim Il Sung said in “Concerning Several Tasks to Develop Our Country’s Science and Technology” that “despite the fact that our party puts so much emphasis on the need to prevent pollution, some plants and factories continue to dump toxic substances into rivers.” In “Concerning the Improvement of National Land and Urban Management Programs” on 9 November 1978 he complained that instances had occurred in which the Chongchon River became contaminated, and fish perished from industrial wastes dumped by mines.

At the fifth session of the Seventh Supreme People’s Assembly in 1986, North Korea boasted about the purity of the Taedong River water, saying that the river’s biochemical oxygen demand stood at 1.36mg/liter and the oxygen dissolved in the water was 8.3mg/liter. Kim Il Sung’s speeches, however, have well testified to the contamination of the Taedong. In “Concerning the Improvement of the Urban Management and Supply Programs of Pyongyang City” of 20 April 1989, he said, “Pyongyang uses water from the Taedong River as drinking water and the water from its tributaries is utilized for irrigation in the adjacent areas. Yet, the Taedong has been contaminated because the cities and plants along the river do

not have their own waste water treatment facilities and dump their waste water into the river. . . . In the urban management programs of Pyongyang, there arise many problems such as piped-water management, sewer disposal and pollution prevention problems. But, nothing is going on properly in the urban management of Pyongyang.”

Meanwhile, in “Concerning the Extensive Raising of Rainbow Trout” of 26 April 1984, Kim said crayfish failed to grow well around rice paddies due to sprayed farm chemicals.

In addition, the contamination of the Tumen River is serious because of industrial wastes and urban sewerage from such cities and industrial areas as Namyang, Hoeryong and the iron mine area of Musan, as well as various industries in Chinese areas such as Tumen. The water of the Yalu River, too, has been contaminated so seriously that its water is no longer potable, due to industrial and household wastes from both Korean and Chinese river basin areas. The waste water pollutes not only the rivers but also nearby seas. Pyongyang has indirectly admitted to sea contamination. At the second experts meeting in 1992 of the Northwest Pacific Ocean Preservation Program (NOWPAP), North Korea claimed in a report prepared by the General Bureau of Environment Protection and Land Administration that its West and East Seas are clean, below the permissible contamination level, except that some oil layers had at some times formed in the Hamhung and Wonsan bays.

The report also said that although ocean pollution has so far not been serious, it was feared that complications would arise as industrialization progresses and materials pile up and

there is no biodegradation in the ocean. It said that several problems had been discovered in the estuary of the Yalu River due to the number of factories small and large located in the Sinuiju area and the Dandong zone of China. Of the films the South-North Institute shot in the North, the documentary "A Visit to Wonsan" shows that the sea nearby was heavily contaminated from waste water coming from the Wonsan Industrial Estate and the Hamhung industrial zone.

Notwithstanding the reality, a North Korean documentary, "A Visit to New Landscapes," claims, "Have our factories and mines not installed waste water and material treatment facilities thanks to the lofty idea of our party, which makes it a rule to see to it that no river is polluted when a mine is explored or a plant is built? . . . Our scenic mountains and rivers are overflowing with clean air and water owing to our party's environment policy," and "Schools of fish abound in every river. . . . This is part of the look of our fatherland free of pollution thanks to the great efficacy of the Environment Protection Law."

Kim Il Sung's speeches, however, tell a different story. In his 5 September 1962 speech mentioned above, for example, "Concerning the Improvement of Urban Management Programs," he ordered relevant offices to install piped-water facilities properly so that citizens could have clean water. The fact that his order went unfulfilled even ten years later could be seen in his 23 April 1973 "Let's Accelerate the Rural Piped-Water Project and Carry out Forestation Programs Emphatically," in which he complained that although he had ordered the promotion of an irrigation project in South

Pyong-an Province so as to resolve the issue of potable water for the farmers of Changdong-ri in Sukchon County, Sukchon officials had failed to resolve the issue.

Nor was potable water supplied even fifteen years after the 1962 order. In the 9 November 1978 speech cited above Kim Il Sung said, “Although we have built many modern houses in both urban and rural areas, the people are experiencing considerable inconvenience due to the lack of piped-water and sewer facilities.” He then instructed the urban management offices to manage piped-water and sewer facilities so as to provide better potable water and more timely garbage disposal. Environmental pollution controls have not been implemented properly in the urban areas—even in the capital city of Pyongyang of which North Korea is so proud, let alone the rural areas.

Soil Contamination and Forestry Damage

North Korean soils, too, suffer greatly from pollution and acidification due to too much pesticides and fertilizer. Another reason for the devastation of the topsoil is that to boost food production, rice and maize corn have been cultivated year after year on the same fields—especially so much maize corn which soaks up big amounts of nutrient from the soil. The phenomenon has been especially prevalent since the turn of the 1980s.

Meanwhile, according to speeches of Kim Il Sung the soil has eroded in many areas due largely to extensive forestry damages. Afforestation programs have been promoted as a key state project since Kim Il Sung called for them in a

statement entitled "Let Us Emphatically Carry out Afforestation Programs all over the Nation" on 6 April 1947. However, forestry damages have continued to be reported. In "Tasks Facing the Party and Organizations of Ryangkang Province" on 11 May 1958 he said, "We generally denounce the Japanese for having felled trees at random, but we too have cut down trees indiscriminately in the ten years since national liberation."

On 10 February 1964 Kim Il Sung conceded that due to improper afforestation and forestry management, almost all mountains had become barren of trees with the exception of those in remote areas. In a 25 May 1965 speech entitled "Concerning Several Issues in Improving the Projects of State Economic Organizations at this Time," he complained that afforestation programs had been carried out rather perfunctorily. He said that in some areas of North Pyong-an Province, people had reduced entire mountainsides to ashes with the excuse of exterminating pine caterpillars. In other areas people planted small saplings after felling entire stands of forest on the pretext of creating "economic forests."

In the same speech he complained of soil erosion in the mountains due largely to the creation of illegal makeshift farms on mountainsides. "As I observed while traveling to Hamhung by train, I found mountains in the area from the Sinsongchon river to the Yangdok Pass have been almost denuded. Because of the lack of trees, landslides occur when it rains, and the Taedong River basin grows higher. Rover islands such as Rungra-do have grown."

Soil erosion from makeshift farms on mountainsides could be affirmed in his speech, "Concerning the Further Study of Biology and Improvement of the Mechanics Training Program": "In Jakang-do, they created makeshift farms in violation of cabinet decree, and have left so many mountains devastated. I toured Wiwon, Chosan and Usi this year and found that mountains in the area were rendered useless because people felled trees to create makeshift farmlands. Because of this, the topsoil has washed away in the rainy seasons to spoil even ordinary farms downhill."

Not only have the people damaged forests on their own, but it has also occurred systematically through government policies. One typical example was the creation of terraced farms, to whose failure Kim Il Sung himself admitted. In an 14 October 1976 speech, "Concerning Energetic Promotion of the Nature Remodeling Project to Acquire a Ten-Million-Ton Hill of Grain," Kim Il Sung called for an extensive struggle to create terraced farmlands as a means of boosting grain production, specifically ordering the cultivation of 200,000 hectares of terraced farmlands over a few years.

In a speech on 20 April 1989, however, he said, "We'd better give up the plan to fell trees and create terraced farmlands. . . . We may end in rendering vast areas of lands useless. I am against felling trees and creating terraced farmlands."

In addition to the terraces, there has been another major source of forestry damage. When food rations were not on schedule beginning in the mid-1980s, villagers felled trees on nearby mountains and cultivated patches to raise corn in an

effort to resolve the food problems on their own. Defectors testified that because of insufficient food rations, the authorities did not dare prevent them.

The state of forestry devastation caused by indiscriminate felling of trees and terraced farmlands and farm patches can be seen in the documentaries produced by the South-North Institute. The documentary, "Chongjin and Najin, the Northern Edge of the Nation," clearly shows scenes of desolate forests, traces of landslides and barren hills near villages as seen through the windows of a train from Pyongyang to Chongjin. Scenes of the complete barrenness of hills and mountains were commonplace in another documentary, "Sinuiju and Yongsan, My Hometowns Left Behind."

Meanwhile, trees have been damaged for political purposes, as well. North Korea mass produces "slogan trees," whose bark is peeled for the inscription of words praising Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il. North Korea asserts that many slogan trees carved by anti-Japan guerrillas in tribute to Kim Il Sung were found in various areas on Mt. Paektu. However, circumstantial conditions indicate that they are the politically motivated invention of the Pyongyang regime.

A North Korean film, "Mt. Paektu," shows some of these slogan trees protected by glass tubes under observation by visitors as historical revolutionary sites. Another documentary, "Mt. Oka," asserts that a number of trees bearing inscriptions in praise of Kim Il Sung were found in virgin forests on Mt. Oka.

North Korea has been damaging even natural rock formations for political purposes, let alone land and forests. While

stressing that not a single tree or even grass should be damaged, and that any act of inscribing his name on natural areas such as rocks should be controlled, Kim Il Sung nevertheless said that “it is not wrong to inscribe good slogans on rocks for inheritance to our posterity.”

He personally suggested in a statement, “Let Us Cultivate Mt. Kungang as a Workers Resort,” made on 28 September 1947 that the damage of nature for political purposes can serve as an exception.

The film, “Let Us Go to Mt. Kungang,” shows many huge rocks of Mt. Kungang carrying inscribed slogans such as “Juche Thought,” and “Long Live Kim Il Sung” and “Long Live Our Country’s Socialist System.” Among films shot by the South-North Institute, “Travel to Haeju Area” displays a huge rock on Mt. Suyang that on which has been inscribed slogan, “Leader, We Wish You Eternal Good Health,” and even the picture of Kim Il Sung’s birth house engraved on the rock. Upon Kim Il Sung’s death in July 1994, large rocks on Mt. Kungang and other mountains had to suffer another round of damage: inscriptions of Kim Il Sung eulogies. A slogan appearing on a Mt. Kungang rock formation: “Let Us Be Proud of the Greatest in 5,000 Years of National History, Comrade Kim Il Sung.”

Indiscriminate Hunting of Animals and Harvesting of Plants

Kim Il Sung’s speeches indicate that animals and plants have not been being protected properly. In his 30 November 1966 speech mentioned above as well as another made on 28

February 1973 on the theme, “Let Us Raise Youths as Intelligent and Virtuous Socialist and Communist Constructors,” Kim Il Sung complained that despite his urging that no female deer should be killed, doe were caught on sight, which prevented their proper proliferation. He said that although wild animals such as doe and pheasants should be protected especially during their breeding periods, they had been being caught indiscriminately and eaten.

In a speech on “For the Further Development of the Fishery Industry” made on 11 June 1959, Kim Il Sung said fish species had been exterminated due to indiscriminate harvesting even though they have to be protected and farmed in a systematic manner. He also said in his 30 June 1963 speech that although seaweed should not be collected in order to protect ocean resources, it was cut and collected at random because it is rich in nutrition and it can be used to make textiles. This has resulted in a decline of marine resources. In another speech made on 30 November 1966 he said residents had been catching fish heavily in rivers and ponds.

Structural Causes of Pollution of and Damage to Natural and Living Environments

There are structural reasons behind such environmental pollution and damage despite endless admonitions by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il.

First, under a socialist planned economy system, people tend not to do anything of their own volition. Nor do they feel responsible for environmental pollution; it is regarded as a government problem.

Second, since a planned economy emphasizes only the attainment of short-term growth-oriented quotas, it is difficult to make effective investment in environmental facilities or promote an environment-oriented industrial structure.

Third, since market prices do not control supply and demand, energy resources are used inefficiently. This aggravates environmental pollution.

Fourth, due to North Korea's closed self-reliant system, they have not had the benefit of international exchanges of environmental protection know-how, nor could they take part in international division of labor in the area of environmental protection. Moreover, under the self-reliant *juche* economic concept only locally available resources may be utilized, even though it may aggravate environmental damage.

Finally, the underdeveloped overall technology and weak economy has left North Korea with insufficient know-how and facilities to prevent these problems.

Meanwhile, it can be pointed out that all the major state-level policy programs North Korea has promoted have been anti-environmental. Some examples are the heavy investment in pollution-causing industries such as energy, ferrous and non-ferrous metal, fertilizer and munitions industries; the militarization policy pursued since the 1960s under the Four-Point Military Guidelines; creation of terraced farmlands under the Five-Point Program for Remaking Nature in the 1970s; shore-line reclamation promoted under the Ten Major Prospective Targets in the 1980s; and excessive use of chemical fertilizer and other farm chemicals to boost food production.

In particular, the “fortification of the whole land” policy promoted as one of the Four-Point Military Guidelines and ceaseless military exercises, small and large, held to maintain constant mobilization readiness have inevitably entailed terrain and other environmental damage. The mass production of weapons and munition materials containing hazardous substances, produced to attain the policy goals of “arming the entire people” and “modernizing the whole armed forces,” were yet another source of environmental pollution and damage.

Guarantee of Environmental Rights: Discrimination Depending on Class and Region

The North Korean ruling class enjoys privileges by no means limited to social factors. They are not only accorded very affluent treatment in clothing, food and dwelling—in terms of both quantity and quality—but they are also given culturally better and more sanitary residential and working conditions. They are provided with spacious houses in neighborhoods replete with piped-water facilities and large green areas. They have a clean working environment. Ordinary people, however, live and work in quite inferior environments.

Despite provisions in the Labor Law asserting that North Korea values workers’ health over production, the reality is that they work under poor sanitary conditions. A North Korean film, “Advancing Fatherland,” shows miners working with only cotton masks without gas masks or other protective gear. In other films are scenes of laborers working at steel mills in shabby clothes and nothing more than protective eyeglasses—

no goggles or other better protection used in advanced countries.

Discrimination in terms of environmental and living conditions exists according not only to class but also to region, especially between Pyongyang and other cities and the rural areas. As is well known, only the flawless in terms of ideology, loyalty and family background may live in Pyongyang.

Residing in Pyongyang is in itself a privilege. Pyongyang citizens are given better food rations, and North Korean propaganda films such as "The Look of Pyongyang," "Pyongyang as We Saw It" and "Visiting Pyongyang" showing well-tended streets, curbside trees, and parks indicate that Pyongyang has much more favorable residential and working conditions than do other areas. On the other hand, of the films shot in North Korea by the South-North Institute, "A Revisit to Hamhung" shows dirty paths and shabby slab dwellings in back alleys contrasting well-tended downtown areas. Other documentaries, "Visit to the Haeju Area," "Visit to the Wonsan Area," "Chongjin and Rajin, the Northernmost Edge of the Land" and "Hometowns Left Behind in Shinuiju and Yongsan" all show the scenes of dismal and dirty urban areas of Chongjin, Wonsan, Shinuiju, Rajin and Haeju.

In short, there is a discrimination in environmental conditions depending on classes and regions. The upper ruling class live in well-tended Pyongyang and other areas with cheerful environmental conditions while the ruled masses are forced to live in lowly environmental circumstances without any freedom of residential movement.

Political Use of the Guarantee of Environmental Rights

As was seen in the foregoing, the state of environmental damage is well described in the speeches of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il. Pyongyang tries to resolve environmental problems through stepped-up indoctrination instead of through the rectification of mistaken environmental policies. This only adds to the physical burden of the North Korean people, already overworked and leading destitute lives due to the short supply of daily necessities.

North Korea uses the need for environmental programs in further cementing the party's unitary ideology system and exacting loyalty and support, and has tried to use them to spur the people to volunteer in public campaigns.

The claim that North Korea is a paradise on earth without environmental pollution is being disputed by their own leader. Yet they who live in such a fictitious circumstance are mobilized and controlled on account of protecting the environment!

The situation remains unchanged even under the age of Kim Jong-il who professes to succeed to Kim Il Sung's spirit and instructions.

빈 면

III. Major Human Rights Violations

1. North Korean Prison Camps

One place where human rights are known the world over to be trampled is North Korean concentration camps. North Korean authorities refer to these political prisons officially as “Management Center No. ___.” Unofficially, however, they are known as special dictatorial target areas, places of exile, sectarian dens or resettlement areas.

Prison Camp History

According to North Korean documents seized during the Korean War, which were released later by the US State Department, North Korea has been operating collective camps since 1947, two years after national liberation. The people confined there in the post-liberation years were “malignant” landowners, pro-Japanese and religiously active persons. After the war inmates consisted mostly of those who had served as local security unit members on the side of the advancing South Korean and UN forces during the war.

These political prisons became today’s concentration camps, starting with the “August Sectarian Incident” of 1956. In the course of purging Kim Il Sung’s political foes such as those of the Yen-an Faction, the Pyongyang authorities retaliated against anti-party and anti-Kim Il Sung elements and to contain the proliferation of their influence by holding the ones involved

in the incident but who had escaped execution, together with their families, in remote mountainous areas.

During 1966 North Korea took a census to prepare for the arming of one million people into the Worker-Peasant Red Guards. It included information on everyone's political bent, and the entire North Korean population was categorized from 1967 through 1970 into three classes and fifty-one subclasses.

About 6,000 people among those categorized as belonging to the hostile class who are branded as sectarians or anti-revolutionaries were executed through kangaroo court trials. About 15,000 of them who escaped execution and their family members numbering about 70,000 were held in the remote mountains under Cabinet Decision No. 149. The people who opposed the Korean Workers Party or Kim Il Sung himself were confined separately.

In the early stages the combined area of the camps was about equal to that of a small town. Since the Three Revolutionary Squads activities began in 1973 in a move to consolidate a base for Kim Jong-il's succession to power, the number of inmates swelled phenomenally.

In the course of purging party, military and administration officials who were against Kim Jong-il's succession to power following his seizure of party control at the 6th party congress in 1980, at least four more prison camps were created. As of 1982 more than one hundred thousand were put to hard labor at eight camps, isolated from the rest of the society for the rest of their lives.

The number of camps grew more as the regime tightened its internal control to keep the wave of reforms from reaching

North Korea following the fall of Eastern Europe in the final 1980s, with their inmates reaching about two hundred thousand. In terms of human rights conditions these camps are reported to be worse in many ways even than Nazi Germany's Auschwitz or the Soviet gulag.

Scope and Punishment of Politico-Ideological Criminals

In referring to politico-ideological prisoners, North Korea calls them vaguely "anti-revolutionaries," "people with unsound ideology" or "hostile elements," so that once the leader decides to eliminate someone, he can do it readily through an accusation under one of these counts.

Kim Il Sung once said, "For the victory of the socialist revolution, we should oppress those anti-revolutionary elements who are opposed to and who impede the thought and passion of the revolution as well as hostile elements who stage a compromising struggle against unsound thoughts—especially, those who try to revive capitalism"

For North Korea, then, it is a matter of course either to execute or to hold in prison camps not only the political foes of the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il system but also those who are relatively less cooperative in the construction of socialism. Such people are branded as politico-ideological criminals.

Under the penal code, acts subject to political crimes are "conspiracy to overthrow the state," or "reactionary propaganda and agitation" and "betrayal of the fatherland." The

crime of conspiracy to overthrow the state as envisioned in Section 44 of the penal code, means the act of “a person who took part in a conspiracy to overthrow the Republic or who participated in a revolt.” Anti-party and anti-Kim Il Sung elements have been executed or shipped to concentration camps on this criminal count. It is said that Kim Jong-il purged more than 15,000 people against him on this charge since the turn of the 1980s.

The provisions of Section 46 on crimes of reactionary propaganda and agitation are designed to “discipline those who urge others to overthrow, disturb or weaken the DPRK, or to commit other anti-government criminal acts.” In short, the clause was intended to seal the influx of overseas information and prevent internal restlessness.

In the initial stage the clause was used in punishing habitual complainers among those repatriated from Japan and those hailing from South Korea. Following the collapse of Eastern Europe, however, the provisions were used mainly in punishing those who, upon return home from overseas studies or duties, spread information on overseas situations.

The clause on treason against the fatherland in Article 47 is intended to punish anyone who, betraying the fatherland and the people, tries to run away to another country or to the side of enemy. As more and more people attempt to escape the extreme economic and food difficulties, the numbers executed or sent to concentration camps swell.

North Korea made specific provisions in Sections 44 through 55 of the penal code to punish politico-ideological criminals mercilessly without due trial.

Whether or not to send ordinary criminals to prison is decided through minimum reviews and trial procedures. Cases of politico-ideological criminals, however, are unilaterally reviewed by the State Security Ministry in a single-trial system without judicial trial procedures. Even an innocent politico-ideological suspect can hardly be found not guilty and set free. Punishment is not limited to the person involved; immediate family members and even more distant relatives are punished under the North's system of guilt by association.

The Camps

Prison camps in North Korea are located in remote mountainous areas in South Hamgyong, North Hamgyong, South Pyong-an, North Pyong-an and Chagang Provinces. Their total captives are estimated at about 200,000.

The true picture of the camps has yet to be grasped accurately. Mr. An Myong-chol, however, who before he defected to the South in October 1994 had worked as a guard at the camp at Hyeryong, North Hamgyong Province, said that under the control of Bureau No. 7 (Farm Guidance Bureau) of the State Security Ministry alone, there were ten political prisoners camps.

Later five of them including two in Onsong, North Hamgyong Province, near the Chinese border, and ones near Pyongyang were closed to prevent discovery by the outside world. Pyongyang, of course, is frequented by foreigners.

As remaining he mentioned Management Center No. 14 at Kaechon, South Pyong-an Province; No. 15 at Yodok, South

Hamgyong Province; No. 16 at Hwasong, North Hamgyong; No. 22 at Hyeryong, North Hamgyong; and No. 25 at Chongjin, also in North Hamgyong. He said at these camps prisoners total about 200,000.


Most of these centers are located in remote mountainous or mining areas. As was the case with the Sungho-ri Camp which was closed down in January 1991, some are dug entirely under the ground to keep their secrecy intact.

An Myong-chol further testified that there is another political prisoners camp, a “complete-control district” under the control of Bureau No. 3 of the State Security Ministry, where human rights violations have been perpetrated in a magnitude beyond imagination.

Meanwhile, as international opinion has risen against North Korean human rights abuses, Lee Chang-ha, chief secretary of the DPRK Human Rights Institute, invited a fact-finding team from Amnesty International to visit from 26 April through 3 May 1995. The North allowed it to tour a prison at Sariwon.

The authorities told the AI mission that they had between 800 and 1,000 prisoners at three correctional centers. Among them, they said, political prisoners numbered only 240 and they were being held at the Hyongsan Re-education Center. Defectors, however, have unequivocally stated that these assertions are untrue.

Political prison camps are divided into “complete-control districts” and the “revolutionized districts.” The complete-control districts are exclusively for those given life terms. They slave at mines and logging yards under miserable

Table 6. North Korean Political Prison Camps

Closed-Down Centers			
Name	Location	Time of Closure	Reason for Closure
No. 11	Kwanmobong, Kyongsong, North Hamgyong Province	October 1989	Construction of Kim Il Sung villa
No. 12	Changpyong Labor Region, Onsong, North Hamgyong	May 1987	Proximity to national boundary
No. 13	Chongsong Labor Region, Onsong, North Hamgyong	December 1990	Proximity to national boundary
No. 26	Hwachon-dong, Sungho District, Pyongyang	January 1991	Proximity to Pyongyang
No. 27	Chonma, North Pyong-an Province	November 1990	Reason not known

*Based on testimony from a defector, Mr. An Myong-chol

working conditions. There is no need for them to be ideologically educated because they will never return to society alive.

The revolutionized districts are divided into family and bachelor sections. Prisoners held here may be freed depending on the outcome of reviews made after a specified period from one to ten years. Upon release prisoners must sign an oath not to discuss anything about their experience, and violating the oath means return to the camp.

As hostile class, prisoners released from the revolutionized districts lead the lowest-level life. They are the priority target of watch by the State Security Ministry so they suffer various restrictions in employment, travel, etc. If an ex-political prisoner commits an ordinary crime, ten years' imprisonment is added to the term he or she would normally draw.


Inmates of the revolutionized districts consist mostly of Pyongyang's elites, repatriates from Japan who have personal connections with senior officials of the pro-Pyongyang Koreans association in Japan, Chochongryon, and their families. The policy is to have them go through physical difficulties and thus make them more obedient to the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il system when they return to the society.

The great bulk of other political prisoners are held at the lifetime complete-control districts. Defectors have said that a very small number of life-term prisoners, exceptional cases, are transferred from complete-control districts to a revolutionized district.

Organization and Size of Prison Camps

North Korean concentration camps are said to extend from about 50 to 250 square kilometers holding 5,000 to 50,000 inmates each. Prisoners to be sent to the camps are selected and managed in effect by the State Security Ministry under the supervision of the Guidance Department of the Secretaries Bureau of the Workers' Party Central Committee. The camps

Table 7. Organizational Chart of Prisoners Camp



*The official name for prison camps is “management centers.”

**The organizational chart above is based on An Myong-chol’s testimony

under the control of Bureau No. 7 of the State Security Ministry consist each of a political section, security section, management section, guards section and rear area section.

The duty of the political section is to watch the ideological behavior of people in the security and guards section and punish those who commit any irregularities. The security section watches the inmates and ferrets out malignant elements such as escape attemptees, murderers and habitual complainers for execution or assignment to harsher labor.

The management section is to maximize the work load and attain the production norms allotted to the camps. The responsibility of the guards section is to guard the outer perimeter of a camp and suppress by force of arms any revolt or other commotion inside a camp.

In addition, there are the rear-area section responsible for supplying food for security and guards section personnel, the materials section for supplying materials for various construction projects inside the camps, and a chemical section for supplying dynamite to mines. Other sections include finance, transportation and communications. Most dreaded by the prisoners are security and guards sections, both with the right to determine their fates.

Security at Prison Camps

Around the perimeter of each camp are three- to four-meter-high double or triple barbed-wire fences, and seven-meter watch towers are installed at kilometer intervals along the

fences. Manning the watch towers are guards section troops armed with automatic rifles, grenades and submachine guns.

Heavily armed guardsmen also patrol the perimeter area with military dogs day and night, and ambush teams watch security-vulnerable portions around the clock. Escape can hardly be imagined under such a heavy security, but those who try are hanged or shot dead before a firing squad without trial. About fifteen or twenty prisoners try to escape each year. The other prisoners are forced to watch their executions as a means of terrorizing them into not trying to escape.

Selection of Prisoners and Procedures

The State Security Ministry is responsible to catch counter-revolutionaries. Offenders are selected by local State Security officials and the central ministry makes the final decision without trial. The Maram Secret Guest House in the Maram district in the Yongsong area of Pyongyang is notorious for ferreting out political prisoners.

People subject to banishment are mainly those considered harmful to the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il system such as anti-party and sectarian elements and counter-revolutionaries, previous landowners and pro-Japanese, the religiously active, anyone opposed to Kim Jong-il's succession to power, attempted escapees and their families, and seditious people among those repatriated from Japan.

Following the collapse of Eastern Europe, also targeted came to be those who returned from overseas duties or studies and spread what they had seen and heard abroad.

There are not a few cases in which people are sent to prison camps for reasons incomprehensible. Kim Myong-jun, a bell-boy at the Koryo Hotel in Pyongyang, was investigated at the Maram Guest House for espionage because he failed to report a tip he received for carrying a foreign visitor's luggage. Nothing substantiated the charge, but the investigators unreasonably found him guilty of having "betrayed the fatherland" and had him serve three years' hard labor at Yodok. According to the *1994 Country Human Rights Report* released by the US State Department on February 1, 1995, some among political prisoners were those arrested because they sat on newspapers with a picture of Kim Il Sung.

Kim Kwang-ho defected to the South on March 3, 1987. He spoke of how he had suffered under the policy of control through *inminban* units. Inminban heads sometimes keep the keys to unattended homes, and one day when a certain Kim and his wife were away from home, the inminban head and an inspector from a higher office entered their home and found a collection of Kim Il Sung masterpiece works which contained Kim Il Sung's picture blurred with their baby's urine. The inspector accused him and his wife of improperly keeping the collection of the suryong's masterpieces and the whole family was sent to a concentration camp.

In October 1992 at a rice ration center near Sunchon, South Pyong-an Province, a woman receiving no rice on a ration day shouted, "This is worse than the Japanese rule." Nearby people joined in her complaint and there was a collective protest. They were soon dispersed by Ministry of Public Safety

troops and that night the woman and her family disappeared, never to be heard from again.

People are swept away without advance notice or legal procedures, so that even their neighbors or relatives do not know what happened. For fear of harm, even someone who does know dares not protest to the authorities or inquire after the fate of missing people. Neighbors and relatives can only presume they could have been arrested. Such a rein of terror is how people are made to be subservient to the system of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il.

Daily Duties

Once the condemned enters a political prison camp medical service is suspended and regular food rationing no longer applies. Prisoners are barred from marrying or delivering babies. They are completely insulated from the outside and no visits or letters are allowed from their relatives.

Prisoners finish breakfast and other preparation for a day's work by the 5:30 A.M. roll call. To be late is to be sharply beaten, and three times tardy means loss of one day's food.

A day's work quota is assigned to five-person work teams. In general, prisoners usually must work until 9 P.M. Lunch of boiled corn will typically be eaten at noon. Around 6 P.M. a security section officer, foreman or an *inminban* head makes an interim check of the extent of work done. When the completed work volume is found unsatisfactory, the team must work overtime.

To prevent group activity all mutual visits are banned even within the same camp. With the exception of going to work or class, inmates are prohibited from walking around more than two persons together. Even in the daytime they cannot visit other living quarters inside the camp without a special permit. If anyone is found to be away visiting without permission, an emergency alarm is sounded and a search is launched. Those violating the 10 P.M. midnight curfew are given one month extra-hard labor, and doing so three times means punishment in the camp stockade.

During curfew, security section officers and supervisors in groups of three or four patrol the camp area checking everywhere including the sleeping quarters. The security section also infiltrates undercover agents into the prisoners' world in order to watch them.

Diet

Amounts vary, but laboring prisoners are generally rationed 550 grams of corn per day together with a little salt and a spoonful of acorn paste every week. Rations are said to be reduced 90 by grams for those deemed negligent at work. People need to supplement their diet with wild herbs and roots, and those who cannot identify edible wild plants and mushrooms sometimes end up poisoned. Prisoners will eat scrap livestock feed if it is available and sometimes even kernels of corn or beans that might be found in cattle excrement. They catch on sight and devour frogs, frog spawn, rats and snakes. According to defectors Kang Chol-hwan and An Hyok, camp

prisoners typically lose more than fifteen kilograms in weight within the first year.

Dwellings and Camp Life

In these concentration camps bachelors lead collective lives in barracks while families live in huts they build themselves with wood, mud and straw mats. Because floors and walls are made of earth, the rooms are very dusty. Roofs are made in most cases with wooden boards covered with straw mats. Since roof boards are easily ruined, rain leaks and it is cold in the winter. Floors may be covered with mats made of lime tree bark. Conditions are similar to those in the dwellings of primitive humans.

Electric power is generated at the camps, but power output is so meager that only one light bulb is allowed for a family. Power will be supplied only between 7 to 12 p.m. and 2 to 5 a.m. The voltage is so low and the lights so dim that books and newspapers can hardly be read. Still, camps with such power facilities are envied by others. At some camps only a wooden torch is lit during meals.

The camps have only public toilets—and not many. Long queues of tens of people form each morning. Corn, pumpkin, bean or arrowroot leaves are used instead of toilet paper. Waterborne diseases are spread through drinking untreated stream water.

The supply of fuel, too, is so short that people barely cook meals and never dare to heat rooms. On cold winter nights families usually sleep juxtaposed to share body warmth. Some

freeze to death. Neither is there enough clothing. For an entire internment period a single sheet of blanket material is issued to one family and a pair of padded winter clothes to each person. Work fatigues are rationed to those living with families once in three years. Fatigues are usually not issues to those in the bachelors' barracks, however, they use the same clothes they wore when they entered the camps, patching them when needed.

Work shoes are issued once in one and half a years, and padded winter shoes once in five years. No socks or underwear are given to the prisoners; they often work barefooted in summer. Because of the lack of socks and underwear, many are frostbitten and toe amputations are not rare.

Under such miserable conditions, many prisoners suffer from pneumonia, tuberculosis, pellagra and other such diseases mainly due to malnutrition and heavy labor. Still, everyone without exception is forced to keep working. Many suffer from ailments such as testitis or hemorrhoids, but they are likely to be beaten if they walk or work slowly due to pain.

When one's case of disease grows worse and a foreman decides he or she can no longer work, the patient is sent to a sanatorium and essentially abandoned, as there are no proper medicines or doctors. The prisoners who die due to the lack of proper medical facilities are said to number about 40 to 50 at each center, every year.

Executions and Mass Executions

There have been massacres at the North Korean prison camps. According to An Myong-chol, political prisoners at the No. 12 Management Center in Onsong, North Hamkyong Province, enraged at harsh persecution of their human rights, attacked a security officers village inside the camp in October 1986, killing hundreds of the family members of security guards. A battalion of security troops were mobilized and they killed about 5,000 prisoners including those who took part in the riot.

Without any exception any who, unable to endure the harsh conditions, tries to escape or resist or physically assaulted security officers, are hanged or shot to death at a gathering of the other prisoners.

Kang Chol-hwan, An Hyok and An Myong-chol testified that those who die due to such execution or accidents number in the hundreds in each camp every year. Kang Chol-hwan said that at the closed Sungho-ri Camp, at times more than 300 prisoners died per month.

A prisoner to be executed is confined in the stockade for a day or two before all prisoners at work sites are mobilized, usually around 10 A.M. Two security officers tie the condemned to a pole, blindfolded and gagged. The camp director declares the opening of an execution ceremony, at which time an officer publicly details the crime for about five minutes. Then three security officers fire three shots each at the prisoner and the body is buried in a straw mat.

According to testimony by An Myong-chol, however, North Korea resorted to secret executions in place of some of public killing beginning in 1984. The reason was that although public execution is a device intended to terrorize prisoners into absolute obedience, frequent public executions had formed a sort of immunity as well as repercussion and anger among prisoners.

Anyone aware of irregularities on the part of security officers, attempted escapees, attempted murderers, habitual complainers, and expecting women and their lovers are all subject to secret execution. According to testimony, Security Section No. 1 of a camp would be in charge of secret executions. The method of death is decided by one of the security officers, usually quite brutal such as beating with batons or crushing with stones.

Defector An Myong-chol testified that at the camps under the control of Bureau No. 3, condemned prisoners have been used as living victims on which medical experiments were conducted by camp doctors—just like those done by notorious Japanese army 731 Unit or Nazi doctors on prisoners of war and other prisoners.

All these reports from defectors cannot be confirmed now but we need to remind ourselves that although in the extremely closed North Korea it is hard to verify if such brutality actually does take place in these camps, defectors' testimonies cannot be dismissed simply due to lack of proof. This is all the more so in view of the fact that the Nazi massacre of Jews could only be known wholly after World War II was over. The international community should pay more attention to these

North Korea political concentration camps in the hopes of preventing further cruelty against the human rights of prisoners.

Holding of South Koreans

Since the Korean War armistice until very recently, Pyongyang had been holding a cumulative total of 415 South Korean fishermen along with the 20 crewmen of the ROK Navy vessel *I-2* which the North captured on 5 June 1970. Abducted fishermen range from the ten crew members of *Taesong-ho* seized on 28 May 1955, to the eight of *Woosung-ho* No. 86 abducted on 30 May 1995. Five of these eight were returned alive on December 26, 1995—and the ashes of the other three—through the truce village of Panmunjom. Now 407 fishermen are still missing.

A North Korean agent, Cho Wook-hee, skyjacked Korean Air YS-11 on 11 December 1969. Of the passengers and crew, 39 were released sixty-six days after the skyjacking. The remaining 12 have been held in the North. At present, North Korea is holding 442 South Koreans whom they forcibly abducted.

Abductees include Koh Sang Mun who was kidnapped by North Korean diplomatic personnel in Norway during a training tour there in April 1979, and Rev. Ahn Sung-un who was forcibly taken to North Korea in July 1995 by Pyongyang agents during his missionary activities in Yanji, China.

Some of the abductees such as KAL stewardesses Song Kyong-hee and Chong Kyong-sook were made to work in southward radio propaganda programs. We presumed, how-

ever, that those who proved no longer useful could have been shipped to prison camps—and to our surprise the assumption proved to be true. Amnesty International, in a special report on North Korean political prisoners, made public on 30 July 1994 a list of 49 political prisoners who had been held at the Sungho-ri Camp until 1990. The list included 26 Korean former residents of Japan who had repatriated to North Korea and 11 South Koreans who either defected to the North or were abducted.

In December 1995, Amnesty International made a third special report, following a first in 1993 and a second in 1994. It carries an appendix listing of 63 political prisoners. According to this report, the North Korean authorities insisted that, with the exception of Cho Ho Pyong and Shibata Kozo (whose Korean name is Kim Ho Nam), none of the political offenders listed by previous AI reports was ever imprisoned. According to AI, even Cho and Kim whose imprisonment Pyongyang admitted were said to have died: Cho and his family were killed during an escape attempt and Kim died in a train accident together with his whole family according the North Korean authorities. The list included Choi Yen Dan, Lee Sung Nam and Choi Gyong Ho who were said to have been forcibly returned to North Korea from Russia. Amnesty International presumed they might be imprisoned or punished with death on charges of escape.

Table 8. List of Sungho-ri Camp Prisoners Hailing from the South

Cho Byong Uk	A civilian working at the Naval Transportation Base Depot, Cho defected to the North in October 1976.
Jong Jong Do	A scientist in the United States, Jong was visiting Indonesia when he was abducted by North Korean embassy people. He died in 1989 according to the North.
Kang Jung Sok	Kidnapped to the North by North Korean agents in 1971 while working as a miner in West Germany.
Kim Bo Kyom	Formerly a taxi driver, Kim was abducted by North Korean troops near the truce line.
Koh Sang Mun	Formerly a teacher at Sudo Girls High School in Seoul. During his training in Oslo, Norway, Koh happened to drive to the North Korean embassy due to confusion on the part of a Norwegian taxi driver. He was held in captivity and later shipped to North Korea. Koh actually wanted to report to the South Korean Embassy that he had lost his passport. Soon after AI released the list of Sungho-ri Camp prisoners, a Radio Pyongyang broadcast claimed that Koh had defected to the North on his own and has since been working in the North as a geography researcher. In a response to an inquiry appeal filed with the United Nations by Koh's family in Seoul, Pyongyang sent a letter to the family in 1995 saying Koh had been married in North Korea. The ROK government, however, refuse to accept this claim and is determined to continue to work to obtain his return.
Lee Chi Su	A farmer.
Lee Jang Su	Lee defected to the North along with Cho Byong Uk.
Lee Jun Kwang	Lieutenant colonel, ROK Army. He was disgruntled at his failure to get promoted and defected to the North.
Roh Jun Woo	A farmer.

Ryu Seng Kun	A labor affairs attache at the South Korean Embassy in West Germany, Ryu was visting West Berlin in April 1971 when he was abducted by a North Korean agent. He was taken to the North along with his wife, Chung Sun-sop, and two daughters, Kyong-hee, 7, and Chin-hee, 1.
Shin Sook Ja	A nurse. Accompanied by her husband, Oh Kil-nam, Shin defected to the North through a North Korean embassy in November 1985. The couple lived on Kwangchang Street in Pyongyang until her husband escaped from North Korea. Shin and her two daughters were taken to the Yodok Camp, where she worked as a nurse at the prison tuberculosis clinic from January 1988 through February 1989. She has never been detained according to the North.
Yom Kwi Whan	A pharmaceutical company employee. Yom was visiting Japan in 1981 attending an international meeting when he was kidnapped to the North by the pro-Pyongyang Korean residents organization, Chochongryon.

Sources: Amnesty International reports and testimonies by North Korean defectors

Prisoners of Former Senior Party and Administration Officials

When it is decided that a senior party official is a political prisoner, his or her whole family is taken to a concentration camp. Senior officials turned prisoners are not accorded privileged treatment. Camp prisoners of former senior officials and their families, as confirmed by the Amnesty International and defectors An Hyok, Kang Chol-hwan and An Myong-chol, are as follows.

Table 9. List of Camp Prisoners of Former Senior Officials and their Families

Bang Chol Gap	A naval commander and admiral. He was purged in 1984. He, along with seven other family members, was taken to a prisoners camp. They were freed in 1989 and was given the duty as a security man of the urban construction unit of Yodok County.
Chang Ok Hee	Daughter of a Mansudae writer. She was imprisoned after her father spoke well of capitalism.
Cho Bok Ae	A mistress of Southern Army Commander Lee Hyon Sang. She was purged. AI said Pyongyang claimed that she died in 1984.
Choi Dok Hwan	Section chief of the Mansudae Changjaksu Co., who was in charge of a sculpture of Kim Il Sung's bust. He was imprisoned in March 1986 on the charges that he sculptured Kim Il Sung's face wrong. In December 1988, he was transferred to a Completely Controlled District on the charges of being a habitual complainer.
Choi Soon Ae	Daughter of a People's Armed Forces Ministry colonel. She was taken to No. 22 Management Center in 1974 after her father made a slip of the tongue.
Chong Byong Kap	Commander of the 3rd Collective Army. He was charged with being a sectarian and with disturbing the unitary thought system.
Chun Sung Hun	Son of Ambassador to China Chun Myong Su.
Han Chang Hae	A Foreign Ministry interpreter.

Han Sang Il	Son of Hamhung Party secretary for organization. He was held at the Yodok Camp for three years beginning 1987 before being transferred to the Paekam Cooperative Farm as a farm worker. His charges were that upon his return home from a visit to Burundi as an interpreter for an agricultural mission, he propagated foreign situations to his neighbors.
Hong Song Ryul	Vice premier, purged.
Hong Soon Ho	Head of the Party Military Department and classmate of Kim Jong-il at Politico-Economic Department of Kim Il-Sung University. At special instructions of Kim Jong-il, Hong and his whole family were taken to a Revolutionized District in 1986 before he was released in 1988 and assigned to a cooperative farm at Maengsan County as a farm worker.
Hu Bong Hak	Head of General Bureau of Southward Programs. He was charged with being a sectarian and disturbing the unitary thought system.
Hu Ik (Ko Ik)	Superintendent of a Workers' Party school. He was purged. AI said Pyongyang claimed that he died in 1976.
Hu Kang Chol	Son of vice chairman of State Science and Technology Commission. He was held at the Yodok Camp for three years beginning 1986 at his father's report that his son criticized the North Korean system and spoke well of China's open-door policy. He was freed at the intervention by his father.
Kim Byong Ha	Director of the State Security Ministry. Along with his all family members and relatives in four generations, he was taken to the Yodok Camp in 1987. His nieces were forced to divorce and released while his other relatives were transferred to another camp.

Kim Chang Bong	Vice premier and National Security minister. He was charged with being a sectarian and with disturbing the unitary thought system.
Kim Do Man	A party secretary. He was purged after raising a complaint about a party policy.
Kim Dong Kyu	A vice president, purged while resisting Kim Jong-il's succession to power.
Kim Hui Chol	A senior party official. On charges that his father distorted Kim Jong-il instructions, he and his family were shipped to No. 22 Management Center, where he works as an auto mechanic.
Kim Hyong Rak	Pilot of Kim Il Sung's plane. He, along with his family, was taken to the Yodok Camp in 1977 after being accused of being a man of Kim Pyong-il.
Kim Kil Hwa	Daughter of a high State Security Ministry official. Her family was imprisoned at the time of the purge of Kim Byong Ha. She worked as an automobile painter at No. 22 Management Camp.
Kim Kwang Hyop	A party secretary branded as an anti-party sectarian.
Kim Kyong Ryon	Head of Finance and Accounting Section of the Central Party. Kim was arrested in 1982 on charges of trying to escape to the South. He was taken somewhere unknown while the eight family members of himself and his brother were taken to and held at the Yodok Camp.
Kim Kyong Sook	Daughter of a People's Armed Forces Ministry colonel. At the time of the purge of Deputy Premier Kim Chang Bong, her family were shipped to No. 12 Management Center in 1973. They were transferred to No. 22 Management Center in May 1987 where she worked as a coal miner.

Kim Sang Chol	Son of a People's Armed Forces Ministry officer. His family was taken to No. 22 Management Center at the time of the purge of Deputy Premier Kim Chang Bong, where he worked as an auto mechanic.
Kim Sang Il	Former councillor at DPRK Trade Ministry. AI said Pyongyang claimed that he died in 1991.
Kim Seong Ho	A lieutenant general of the People's Armed Forces Ministry. He was purged along with Deputy Premier Kim Chang Bong. He worked as a chief electric mechanic at No. 13 Management Center and later as a chief repairman at foods plant of No. 22 Management Camp.
Kim Yang Chun	Commander of the 7th Collective Army. He was charged with being a sectarian and also with disturbing the unitary thought system.
Kim Young Su	Vice chairman of the Democratic Women's League.
Kwon Seong Chol	Head of the Office of Councilors, Foreign Ministry. Kwon was charged with failing to keep Kim Jong Min, president of Taeyang Trading Co., from defecting to the South during their visit to Zaire in May 1988. He was taken to the Yodok Camp in 1988 and freed in 1991, upon which he was assigned to a collective farm along the Paekam Valley, Yanggang Province.
Lee Dong Ho	A People's Army Lieutenant General. He was purged after meeting a visiting military mission in 1982.
Lee Jin Wu	A scenario writer. There are many scenarios he wrote, including "An Unknown Hero." He was charged with being a spy recruited by the KGB. His five family members were imprisoned separately.
Lee Ki Seok	Vice chairman of the South Korean Workers Party. He was charged with being a sectarian.

Lee Man Ho	Son of Vice President Lee Jong Ok. He was taken to the Yodok Camp in 1987 on charges that he criticized the North Korean system before a group of fellow students during his study of nuclear physics in the former Soviet Union.
Lee Ra Yong	A historian. He was purged after refusing to fabricate historical facts in connection with Kim Il Sung's idolization. AI said Pyongyang claimed that he died in 1977.
Oh Hui Seong	Son of deputy dean of Construction Materials College. He was held at the Yodok Camp for two years beginning 1988 on the ground that he, during his study in East Germany, fell in love with a German woman and practiced "liberalism."
Park Kum Chol	Vice premier, Pak was purged after raising a complaint about party policies.
Park Kum Nyo	Her husband was a high central party official. Imprisoned on charges of being a spy, she worked as a sewing worker at No. 13 Management Center before being transferred to No. 16 Management Center in December 1990.
Park Won Ho	Son of the dean of Pyongyang Foreign Languages College. He was taken to the Yodok Camp after he, during his study in Zaire, got acquainted with a Greek woman and tried to escape to a third country. After serving at Yodok for two years, he was assigned to the Chongpyong Coal Mine.
Yang Seung Ryong	Ambassador to Libya. He was taken to the Yodok Camp in 1988 for reasons not known. His family was expelled to the Paekam Valley, Yanggang Province.
Yu Chang Sik	A secretary of Secretariat and alternate member of the Party Politburo. He was purged for opposing Kim Jong-il's succession to Kim Il Sung. AI said Pyongyang claimed that he died in 1987.

Yun Sun Dal	Deputy head of Liaison Department of the Party Central Committee. He was charged with being a sectarian. AI said Pyongyang claimed that he died in 1981.
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Sources: Amnesty International reports and testimonies by North Korean defectors.

In addition to the people listed above, countless party, military and administration officials and their families as well as people who studied abroad have been taken suddenly to various concentration camps and are held for one reason or another, to suffer grossly inhumane treatment.

2. Human Rights Violations at Siberian Logging Sites

North Korea is reported to have dispatched over five thousand loggers and other laborers to Russia as of December 1995. According to Russian authorities, in addition to the logging sites North Koreans are working on a contract basis in Russia on farms, construction sites and mines.

Among these, Siberian logging sites have since 1967 been one of the most important means for North Korea to earn foreign currency. These sites are entirely out of Russian jurisdiction and are subject to North Korean suppression of human rights. Many workers have escaped from unbearable labor conditions and are wandering throughout Russia and China.

Despite the increasing occurrences of escape, North Korea is trying to advance into other sectors in Russia simply to reinforce economic relations and earn foreign currency. Negotiations to renew the DPRK-Russia forestry agreement that had been going on for almost a year finally yielded an agreement in February 1995. This would indeed encourage North Korea to dispatch their workers equal to previous numbers. Accordingly, the number of loggers is expected to increase without any improvement in human rights situations in logging sites.

Management of Logging Sites

On a five-year contract basis with the Soviet Union since 1967, Pyongyang has had about fifteen thousand loggers at the sites. According to the contract conditions, Russia supplies forest land, the facilities, transportation, fuel and other materials while North Korea provides labor and meals.

Timber enterprises in Russia can be divided into the representative office, joint enterprises, and adjunct enterprises. The representative office comprises the party committee and departments of security, management, rear guard, foreign affairs, energy, production and various subordinate offices. The highest position of the representative office is occupied not by the general manager but by a party secretary; the party is superior to administration. The second position goes to the chief of security; then comes the general manager. Such a hierarchy applies to the adjunct enterprises as well as to the companies. The organizational structure of the joint enterprises and subordinate enterprises are also similar to that of the representative office.

There are some six or eight hundred loggers in each enterprise. They are divided into company and platoon. A company comprises sixty or seventy people and each platoon about five to seven. Different companies do different work: logging and stacking, transportation, assortment and loading on trains, sawing, processing of left-over lumber; construction and repair of roads and building, vehicle repair, and other auxiliary work concerning production and supply of food. Those who work near mountain areas are called "mountain

people” and those near the train stations the “floors.”

Labor Conditions and Wages

Mountain people work twelve hours a day during the winter. Although the temperatures frequently drop below minus forty degrees, roads are in their best condition and there are no insects. This makes winter the peak time for logging and transportation. During summer labor efficiency declines sharply and the men work something over eight hours a day. Hot and humid weather, muddy roads due to melting snow, and voracious clouds of irritating mosquitos and biting flies make summer unfavorable for logging.

Harsh winter labor conditions and careless safety management generate numerous accidents. The Japanese daily *Yomiuri Shinbun* reports that one of every 150 loggers loses his life in an accident. Departmental Chair of External Medicine Dr. Cherepanov who has been treating North Korean workers over the past twenty years at Chegdomun Central Hospital said, “Among our patients, a constant average ten to fifteen are North Koreans. And about half of those are hospitalized for having been hit by falling lumber.” Usually North Korean doctors perform autopsies of the dead loggers. A Japanese weekly magazine, *AERA*, reported on 28 March 1994 that the Russian Commission on Human Rights sent a letter to President Yeltzin that there should be an investigation by the Russian prosecutors and police over the death of an average of ten North Korean loggers a month. They strongly protested that activities of the North Korean security agencies within

the Russian Federation directly violate Russian law and constitute an infringement of Russian sovereignty.

Platoon units are paid on a contract basis depending upon production. Wages vary between winter and summer, and meals, organization fees and publication fees are deducted in advance. The remainder is remitted to the loggers' families in North Korea in foreign exchange. The foreign exchange that loggers send to their families can be exchanged for local currency for several to ten-fold the official rate on the black market. Therefore the wage that loggers get for their labor can be up to ten times greater than those who work in North Korea. Moreover, loggers can purchase supplies unavailable in North Korea from foreign currency stores or timber industry stores in Russia. Considering severe shortage of goods in other stores due to economic crisis, the foreign exchange is really a big incentive.

Loggers' Food, Clothing and Shelter Conditions

The loggers are supplied with two uniforms, one winter and one summer, to use for two years, one hat every three years, a pair of gloves per month and two pairs of shoes a year, for winter and summer. The loggers generally bring with them one or two sets of underwear and casual clothing from Korea and if they need more, they have to buy it at Russian stores. Toothpaste, toothbrush, and soap are acquired personally. Most articles are made in Russia or North Korea. Working uniforms are not provided to personnel in representative offices and joint enterprises. The loggers clothes are usually filthy and

they suffer from the cold. Recent economic difficulties in North Korea have aggravated even the scant clothing supply to the loggers.

The lumber workers are supplied with rice (700g per day), beans, soybean paste and other food once every ten days. They are better off than workers in North Korea because they enjoy eating radishes, Chinese cabbage and other fresh vegetables raised on site. However, reduced rations due to food shortages in North Korea and appropriation of grains for brewing alcohol by staff officials exacerbate food shortages among the loggers especially during the winter when they are subject to hard labor. Each enterprise manages separate chow halls for staff and workers, which makes the food conditions for workers even worse.

Seven or eight loggers share one room, and there are three or four company staff members per room at the movable camps. Other companies use fixed camps in which three or four staff members, or three or four workers, share one room. The staff chief uses one room. The loggers use personally built or modified apparatus for cooking, bathing and heating, but lack of sanitary facilities and infested surroundings cause the loggers to suffer.

The workers suffer malnutrition, skin disease, tuberculosis and liver inflammation from bad food, clothing and shelter conditions, hard labor, and unhygienic environment. Clinics within the camps lack medicine and necessary treatment facilities. The men have to buy required medicine personally from Russian apothecaries. Many lose their lives in the logging sites from fatal diseases. Previously the dead were cremated

and the ashes shipped to North Korea, but from 1990s the corpses have been being sent back twice a year in coffins, frozen.

The DPRK Timber Industry Representative Office, joint enterprises and adjunct enterprises conduct self-criticism sessions every ten days, monthly or quarterly. Production accomplishments, progress, plans and other agenda are discussed. Sections that have made poor progress are encouraged to step up the pace. Until the mid-1980s all members were subject to at least four hours every Saturday of political ideology education conducted by the Kim Il Sung Revolutionary History Research Institute. In 1985 considerations were given to labor time and efficiency, and now only staff members attend these sessions. Workers now assemble in cultural halls every Saturday in each enterprise to attend two or three hours of lectures on the political situation, receive briefings on new orders, and watch North Korean movies.

Corruption within Logging Camps

Relatively high wages and better food than in North Korea make working at the logging camps in Siberia a desirable job. Therefore competition is high despite the notoriously high death rate.

Corruption, however, is rampant. From the very stage of logger recruitment, bureaucratic corruption can be easily felt. The Department of Timber Industry under the Politburo is in charge of all logging-related matters. Although recruitment is limited to those who have thorough party loyalty and a good

marital relationship, it is an open secret that to be recruited one has to pay the “official” bribe amount. According to testimonies of North Korean defectors, the bribe ranges up to a year’s salary for an ordinary worker.

The corruption extends to personnel management, earning foreign currency and supplies through appointment to positions, lifting of pending punishment, and extensions of stay. Members of the security force receive much in bribery because they have the right to imprison or return the workers and even control matters of life and death. Those who have been proved to have committed crimes may be acquitted if they bribe the security officials.

The DPRK timber industry representative office in Russia has started accruing money to take care its own expenses, selling labor or goods to Russians. The practice violates Russian law but North Koreans are active in the business because they need foreign currency very badly. This is so especially after Kim Jong-il’s orders given in 1993 that the timber industry representative office in Russia become self-reliant. Each enterprise is accordingly devoted to earn foreign currency by assigning workers to the business.

The “floors,” who receive relatively low wages, are in charge of the business. Some five or six people can start earning foreign currency by getting recommendations from the company leader and company cell secretary and finally a permit from the department chair of security. They must return to notify their whereabouts every twenty days. If they do not report after one month, they are regarded as having escaped and are subject to arrest. Because one has to submit bribes to

the people in charge of security and other staff members, actual income is considerably reduced. The chief of the security department in particular encourages workers to go out and earn foreign currency because he can receive bribes for issuing permits.

Besides usual means of earning foreign currency, workers frequently poach and sell wild deer and musk ox. This caused the Khabarovsk state zoo and fish research institute to submit several petitions to the central government beginning in the 1980s complaining of poaching and destruction of natural environment committed by the North Korean loggers. Russian authorities have also officially protested poaching conducted by the DPRK Representative Office.

Harsh Treatment within Logging Camps

The human rights issue in the Siberian logging camps came to be exposed to the world when the Russian weekly magazine *Moscow News* reported on the issue for the first time in March 1991, with the extension of press freedom following the collapse of the communist countries. Since then, press organizations and groups have been indicting human rights violations in and out of Russia. According to reports, the loggers, beyond the jurisdiction of Russian authorities, are working under labor conditions harsher than those of soldiers in barracks life.

In May 1992 ITN, a British broadcasting service, covered twenty prison facilities and the capital punishment system within the logging camps. According to the report, people are

imprisoned without investigation procedures or court hearings. Arbitrary judgement of the management department is the sole standard for imprisonment.

The security department members conduct arbitrary imprisonment, torture and summary execution within the camps. These members actually belong to Department of State Security. According to testimonies of North Korean defectors, in 1993 there were some twenty detention camps in representative offices, joint enterprises and individual enterprises. Violators of party orders or those of the party staff, free riders, criminals and attempted defectors are imprisoned for months at a time. When crimes are not heavy or if a detainee is seen to be willing to keep working, he is released after ideological education. Others are returned to North Korea. Attempted defectors and those who commit serious crimes are severely beaten and tortured. During return to North Korea, the prisoners are chained so that they cannot bend their legs until they reach their destination.

In May 1995, Amnesty International strongly urged North Korea to release all their loggers detained in the camps. Russian authorities also demanded that they not be imprisoned in accordance with DPRK law but be subject to standards of international human rights and Russian domestic law. According to AI reports, sixty-three loggers escaped the camps in 1992 and nineteen of them were arrested and detained and later returned to North Korea. Also, among the defectors fifteen were reported to have requested political asylum in South Korea. AI pointed out that some of the detainees were imprisoned for seeking protection of other governments and

can be classified as prisoners of conscience, and that their coercive return might cause violation of their human rights. AI, therefore, emphasized that Russian authorities should guarantee prevention of their forced return to North Korea.

According to *AERA*, a Japanese magazine, the Russian Commission on Human Rights has discovered special buildings used as prisons in the Siberia logging camps and said the detainees are all illegally imprisoned. According to the report, the North Korean authorities replied that the buildings are for reeducation and that people are held from six days to six months. Notwithstanding such explanations, such arbitrary imprisonment is an illegal act that deprives a foreigner's freedom in Russia.

In the meantime, the Russian Supreme Assembly Human Rights Committee petitioned the government to nullify the timber agreements signed between Russia and the DPRK if no tangible improvements are made on the human rights issue in the Siberian logging camps. In June 1993, the Russian government also warned North Korea to close down the camps if there is no improvement, and proposed a new agreement on timber industry. Accordingly, on 24 February 1995 Russia and the DPRK agreed in principle on issues of free travel, obligation to open the logging camps to the public, improvement of working conditions and other matters concerning devices to protect human rights in the camps. The two countries then signed a new timber agreement effective until 1996. The Russian government legislated procedures for political asylum effective in 1995 and announced that it has examined the linkage of the new laws to the North Korean logger problem.

With this legal device, North Korean loggers can now request asylum from the Russian government.

Defectors

Among loggers who escaped from the Siberian camps, hundreds, have relayed their will to defect to South Korea. As of December 1995, about 40 loggers had already made it Seoul.

The motivation to escape differs among the defectors. Some escaped to secure livelihood by breaking out of institutional human rights violations and economic poverty. There were people who escaped to avoid punishment (criminals are excluded from the legal protection of international law and domestic law). However, most of them have learned the realities of North and South Korean systems and how great is the gap between the two systems through access to outside information. They are now considering seeking political asylum in the South.

The South Korean government announced on 30 March 1994 that it would dispatch an investigation team to Siberia and accept demands for political asylum from the escaped loggers. The DPRK timber industry spokesman made a statement on 9 April that such South Korean remarks are nothing but a conspiracy to damage the authority and solidarity of the DPRK. The statement also emphasized that there was no human rights problem among the loggers and such problem as the South Korean authorities argued simply cannot occur. It maintained that should any loggers found to be lost, the responsibility would be entirely that of South Korea, that the

North will regard the lost loggers as abducted by Seoul for dirty political purpose, and that corresponding measures will be sought to counter such attempts.

As more and more loggers escaped and the problem became severe, North Korea began to seek policies to induce their voluntary return and in the meantime reinforced arrest attempts. Kim Jong-il ordered that no punishment be imposed on anyone who voluntarily returns to camps, but the loggers themselves think of this as ploy to ferret out runaways.

In 1994 the Central Party dispatched many arrest teams to the Khabarovsk and Vladivostok areas. The Ministry of State Security also sent its members to return any loggers they thought might be likely to attempt an escape. Rewards are offered to Korean Russians for catching or giving information on escapees in regions highly likely for escapes to occur.

Under the circumstances, escapees are having difficulties in securing shelter and livelihood. Until the announcement by the Russian foreign ministry to permit escaped loggers to seek asylum in South Korea as a result of a meeting between the foreign ministers of Russia and the ROK held on 14 April 1994, the loggers were not guaranteed of their legal status and were arrested for illegal stay and turned over to the North Korean authorities.

In 1995, however, the UNHCR bestowed international refugee status upon the escaped loggers and permitted defection to South Korea in accordance with the will of the individuals. Refugee status from this UN organization means that North Korea can no longer argue that the South abducted the loggers from the Siberian camps.

3. Korean Japanese Repatriated to the North

According to testimonies from Korean Japanese who repatriated to North Korea as well as reports from defectors and human rights organizations, after the repatriates arrived they and their families have since been suffering with poor food, clothing and shelter and difficult work assignments.

A report from Asia Watch and the Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee said they are called *kuipo* by North Korean authorities, a derogatory term. The ones without economic support from Japan are treated with contempt by other North Korean residents. It is said that such treatment has driven some to suicide and others to try to escape to China or Russia.

Worldwide attention turned to human rights of the repatriated and their Japanese wives when the issue was raised during recent negotiations over DPRK-Japan normalization. In addition, international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International began an investigation about some of the missing repatriates. International concern, not to mention that in Japan, led to the establishment of nongovernmental human rights organizations for the purpose of democratization in North Korea and improvement of human rights for the repatriates. They include the Social Movement for the Realization of Free Coming and Going of Japanese Wives, the Dietmen's League to Promote the Free Coming and Going of Japanese Wives. After 1993, organizations such as the Committee for Keeping

Life and Human Rights of North Korean Repatriates (HRNK: Tokyo), Rescue the North Korean People Urgent Action Network (RENK: Osaka) were established.

Present Situation of the Repatriates

The repatriation of Korean Japanese to North Korea began in December 1959 in conformity with an agreement concluded between the Japanese and North Korean Red Cross societies. The misery started from the afternoon of 6 December 1959 when they arrived at Chongjin port. From that time until July 1984, through 187 separate occasions, 93,000 people including 6,630 Japanese wives (1,830 of the Koreans had Japanese nationality) went over to North Korea. They had been deceived about the paradise on earth in nationalistic appeal and false propaganda by the North Korean authorities and by Chochongryon, the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, which is loyal to the Pyongyang regime.

The North Korean authorities promised Japanese wives that they would be allowed to visit Japan every two or three years, but until now not one has ever returned. News from a great many of them has stopped and no one is able to confirm whether they are still alive. Although there are no exact figures, from testimonies of the North Korean defectors we can estimate that great numbers of them were executed or sent to concentration camps.

The Living Situation of Koreans Repatriated to the North

Treatment of repatriates is entirely different from what is claimed in propaganda by the Pyongyang government and Chochongryon. Most repatriates were forcibly allocated residence and job regardless of experience, ability or desire. Even until the 1970s, the repatriated were banned from joining the Korean Workers' Party and were not accepted in the DPRK People's army.

Except for a very few who had good political background or who had given money and materiel to North Korean authorities, most of the repatriates were classified as unstable or hostile class. Moreover, from January to April 1981, North Korea classified the repatriates into detailed sub-classes and began to keep very close watch on their activities.

There is a wide difference in living standard between Pyongyang and the countryside. Living conditions differ highly in accordance with the amount of economic support sent by their relatives in Japan or other foreign countries.

Children of repatriates are also subject to severe control and discrimination. A Japanese visitor said that a Mr. Kim Won-jo wrote directly to Kim Il Sung about an unfair college admissions committee decision. He claimed that the committee rejected his application because he had not made a big enough donation and he was not connected to the party. He was accused as a counterrevolutionary and arrested; no one heard from him again and he is believed to be in a prison camp.

Such infringement of repatriates' human rights came to be known to the outside by people who visited North Korea. One Korean Japanese revealed that when he visited his relatives they confessed their repressed lives to the effect:

We are still alive, but we are nothing more than dead bodies. Like captive birds locked in a cage, so are we deprived of our freedom. . . . If I want to travel anywhere I need a permit from the resident officer at the agriculture research institute, but that is very difficult to get. . . . We can say life is a kind of hell. We endure for days on thin porridge made from wheat or beans. There were days when I was forced to work on nothing but water. I have even eaten grass, snakes, frogs, and so on. . . . At first I suffered from diarrhea but now I am accustomed to these things.

Asia Watch and the Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee, *Human Rights in North Korea* (Seoul: Koryowon, 1990). Indirect quotation translated from the Korean.

When such news began to be made known in Japan, the number of repatriates decreased substantially. As soon as they arrived in North Korea, they realized they had been cheated and gradually began to speak out their discontent.

The authorities then began to oppress them systematically. According to defector Oh Soo-ryong who escaped in 1995, North Korea began to detain repatriates in camps or executed in public those who submitted petition or protest. Also, every time a political change occurs in North Korea, repatriates who are low in their social position again become the object of purge.

Table 10. Yearly Trend of Japanese Koreans returning to North Korea

Year	Total	Japanese Koreans	Accompanying Family	
			Japanese	Chinese
1959	2,942	2,717	225	
60	49,036	45,094	3,937	5
61	22,801	21,027	1,773	1
62	3,497	3,811	186	
63	2,567	2,402	165	
64	1,822	1,722	99	1
65	2,255	2,159	96	
66	1,860	1,807	53	
67	1,831	1,723	108	
71	1,318	1,260	58	
72	1,003	951	22	
73	704			
74	479			
75	379			
76	256			
77	180			
78	150			
79	126			
80	40	38	2	
81	38	34	4	
82	26	24	2	
83	0			
1984	30			
Total	93,340			7

Note: There were no Returnin to the Fatherland group programs after 1985. Unknown statistics are left blank.

When we put together these testimonies from defectors, it is estimated that many of the repatriates are either dead by now or in labor camps.

Repatriates and Forced Donations

Not only do the North Korean authorities control Chochongryon, they secure donations by holding their family members repatriated to North Korea. After having tricked the repatriates by offering them good housing and job assignments, Pyongyang raises money from their family members in Japan by selling party membership and tickets for university entrance—so families and close acquaintances have been sending money to protect them. Some send goods such as trucks, engines, machinery for light industries, and so on.

It is said that these donations help their relatives obtain better jobs in the North, and a very big contribution enables them to move to Pyongyang. According to Asia Watch and the Minnesota Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, one Japanese repatriate even became a representative of the Supreme People's Assembly through an extremely large donation.

Defectors and people who visited Japan testify that North Korean authorities demand large sums of money from repatriates' families and relatives in Japan in return for allowing them to see them or acquitting them for political offences. Party executives and members of the State Security Ministry actively solicit these donations. According to the Committee for Keeping Life and Safety of Repatriates (Tokyo), the amount of donation to liberate a political offender is about 50 to 100 million yen. According to the testimony of defector Chin Kwang-ho, a donation of at least 50 million yen or equivalent goods is required for permission to see one's

relatives in North Korea. It is also reported that whenever funds are needed for celebrating Kim Il Sung's or Kim Jong-il's birthday or some other big event, the North Korean authorities call individually upon those repatriates who receive frequent remittances, and demand money. In this way the North Korean authorities systematically extort huge amounts of money.

Japanese Wives

The predicament of Japanese wives who went to North Korea with their husbands has become an important question juxtaposed to the problem of Japanese compensation for past affairs in negotiations over normalization between North Korea and Japan. The Japanese wives of the repatriates live in a kind of banishment due to inhumane discrimination policy. We know their economic poverty, lack of freedom and suffering from disease through the letters they send to their families and relatives in Japan.

In the 1960s the primary gist of letters concerned necessities of life such as provisions, stationery, medicine, etc. Such requests simply reflect hardship. Around the latter half of the 1970s, however, on top of the usual pleas demands for financial support began to increase. Perhaps for their private needs—but the suspicion cannot be dispelled that Pyongyang is taking advantage of the Japanese wives to secure foreign currency. Suspicions grew stronger when they began to send letters begging for money and goods not only to their families and relatives in Japan but also to acquaintances from long previous.

Uncle and Aunt, you may think it strange to receive my sudden letter. I am Kumiko, the daughter of Yoshie. Do you remember me? . . . Please send me everything needed for the four seasons such as upper garments, pants and so on. I don't care whether they are new or not. . . . Please send only 30 thousand yen before January and a package of clothes for adults and children. It is safe to send clothes. . . . Also send 30 thousand yen this year and an additional sum of money even if it is not much next year too.

20 August 1990, from Kumiko

These letters also share in common their dearest wish to meet their families in Japan and to return home. In the year 1990 alone the Japanese Red Cross received 771 letters through the North Korean Red Cross from Japanese wives inquiring after news from their families.

In April 1974 a social movement to realize free comings and goings of Japanese wives was organized in Japan. About two thousand families took part in the meeting. And in 1988 every representative in the Japanese Diet excepting those in the Communist Party, 164 in all, started the Dietmen's League to Promote the Free Coming and Going of Japanese Wives.

This movement has tried to realize the return of the Japanese wives who so desired. In January 1988 it began to send necessities of life such as provisions, clothes and stationery. About 450 to 600 boxes of relief goods sent by this organization every year has resulted in increasing numbers of letters of thanks. The letters contain expressions such as, "Thank you for giving sugar after I have not tasted it in thirty years," and "I owe you my life."

Who is Fumiko? Thank you very much. . . . I hid wheat noodles, cans, and sugar to eat them on New year's Day. I saw them for the first time in thirty years. Many clothes were lost. Two pairs of pants, a one-piece dress, a chemise, two skirts, and tools have also been lost. There are five packs of wheat-gluten. . . . Please never send anything else by mail. I cannot claim everything because the tax is too high. . . . Please don't send things made in the United States or South Korea because they are subject to confiscation.

November 1989, Suzuki Dakeno from Eunpa kun, Hwanghaepuk do

In 1988, the first year relief goods were sent to North Korea, about seventy percent of the addressees returned notification that they had received the goods. Since 1990 there have been few replies. At this point President Fumiko Ikeda of the Committee for Free Coming and Going of Japanese Wives, said, "Probably the North Korean authorities have prevented them from corresponding, part of efforts to intercept the wave of liberalization from Russia and the East-bloc socialist countries and prevent information from entering North Korea."

Internment in Concentration Camps

There is little solid information on the present situation of the detained repatriates in prison camps. We do have testimonies of defectors who themselves were in the camps. However, a recently published report by Amnesty International listed the names of some repatriates in the Sungho-ri camp.

According to testimony from Kang Chol-hwan and An Hyok who had been imprisoned at Yodok, many are there. About 600 persons of 100 families were first detained in early 1974, they said, and from then 100 to 200 more families every year; as of 1987 about 5,000 repatriate political prisoners from 800 families, and 300 criminals, a total of 5,300, were living in the “kueup and ipsuk area” villages, a special zone to be revolutionized.

When people are found missing overnight in North Korea, people assume they have been whisked away to prison. Repatriates deported to the camps are usually charged with espionage or provoking social agitation because they gave information about Japan and South Korea. But the repatriates concerned say they have no idea why they should be punished. Defectors say the members of the State Security Ministry who supervise the camps call these prisoners “semi-Japanese” and treat them worse than they do other prisoners.

The death rate of the repatriate prisoners is high because they are treated more severely than others and they cannot easily adapt to the severe circumstances.

Table 11. List of Repatriates and their Families Sent to Prison Camps

An Am Jun	staff member of Chosun Credit Association, confirmed alive in 1990
An Hong Bok	Mother (committee chair of Women's League of Chochongryon) missing after arrest; grandmother, uncle, living in Japan
An Hung Gap	Chochongryon staff, confirmed alive in 1990
An I Jun	
Bae Young Sam	committed suicide; wife dead of malnutrition; sons (Bae Chong Chol, Bae Jong Kwang), daughter (Bae Young Hwa) alive
Byun Joo Mee	imprisoned with others who repatriated to North Korea as road construction team
Chang Baek Il	father (Commerce Committee of the Kyoto headquarters of Chochongryon) and mother alive
Chang Byong Ryol	dead
Chang Duk	illegally entered Japan and returned
Chang Duk Soon	drowned with her daughter; husband (Chochongryon staff) missing; three sons alive
Chang Hae Young	parents alive
Cho Ho Pyong	During an investigation by Amnesty International in April 1995, North Korean authorities said that the Cho Ho Pyong family had been shot to death when they attempted to escape in October 1974.
Cho In Chol	arrested during student days
Cho Jin Hwan	father missing
Cho Jong Kap	confirmed alive in 1990

Cho Sam Rang	died of starvation
Cho Sung Kee	scholar, died of pellagra; wife (Japanese) daughters (Cho Sung Mee, Cho Sung Ae) alive
Choi Chol Ho	father (Chochongryon staff) missing; mother, wife (Shin Soo Im), brothers and sisters (Choi Sung Jin, Choi Soon Hee, Choi Jong Soon), three sons and one daughter alive
Choi Chong Won	repatriated to North Korea from Okinawa; stepson of Chochongryon staff member
Choi Kyong Rim	in prison after divorce with her husband; son alive
Choi Sung Woo	repatriated to North Korea as part of a team to celebrate Kim Il Sung's birthday, father missing
Chon Tae Jong	sons alive
Eom Kee Sung	father (Kyoto Chochongryon staff) missing after being arrested in 1975; mother, brother (Eom Kee Yong) alive
Han Hak Soo	missing in 1976, president of education in Osaka headquarters Chochongryon; wife dead; sons (Han Sung Min, Han Sung Woo) discharged in February 1986
Han Young Duk	father died of pellagra; mother alive
Hong Choong Il	father (Chochongryon staff) missing; mother, brothers (Hong Choong Myong, Hong Choong Joo, Hong Choong Sae), sister (Hong Jung Mee) alive
Hong Man Duk	died of malnutrition; wife, son (Hong Ryong Won) and daughter (Hong Jong Mee) alive
Hong Pak Sun	wife (Japanese) discharged
Hu Chong Sook	father (historian) dead; mother (Japanese) and sister (Hu Young Sook) alive

Hwang Chong Wook	wife dead; sons (Hwang Young Soo, Hwang Young Ho) alive
Jong Chol Jin	died of pellagra; wife and son (Jong Il Bong) alive; daughter (Jong Young Mee) died of pellagra
Jong Gil Song	world wrestling title holder; wife and son alive
Jong Jin Il	karate practitioner, died of pellagra; son (Jong Tae Bong) alive
Jong U Taek	vice chair of central foreign affairs, Chochongryon, moved to labor reeducation center, possibly dead
Kang Dae Yong	
Kang Duk Hyon	South Korean repatriated to the North after illegally entering Japan; sons (Kang Myong Il, Kang Myong Hak)
Kang Su Ho	released; Pyongyang claims he died in 1991.
Kang Tae Hyu	missing in 1977; chair of commerce committee of Kyoto branch of Chochongryon
Kang Yong Su	moved to labor reeducation center
Kim Ae Ryang	husband missing; son (Paik Duk Soo) alive
Kim Byong Hun	moved to labor reeducation center; Pyongyang claims he died in 1969.
Kim Chom Myoung	South Korean repatriated to the North after illegally entering Japan; participated in Vietnamese War
Kim Chon Hae	Central Committee member of Japan Communist Party; the North claims he died in 1969.
Kim Jin Ho	confirmed alive in 1990; Pyongyang claims he departed from North Korea.
Kim Kum Chee	family resides in Nagoya

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Kim Ok Ryang	husband (Chochongryon staff) missing; daughters (Hu Min Hyang, Hu Min Ae, Hu Min Hee) alive
Kim Sang Sae	
Kim Soon Ran	husband (Kyoto Chochongryon staff) missing
Kim Sung Chee	Chochongryon staff, served 14 years in prison; committed suicide after discharge
Kim Yong Kil	opera singer, Pyongyang claims he died in 1986
Kim Yong Won	South Korean repatriated to the North after illegally entering Japan, son (Kim Kwang Sung), daughters (Kim Soon Ok, Kim Soon Bok) alive
Koh Chul Rim	son of Chochongryon staff member, has been serving life in prison since 1977; father missing
Koh Dae Ki	
Koh Hum	Kyoto Chochongryon staff; wife, sons (Koh Chol Gong, Koh Chol Yong, Koh Chol Bae, Koh Chol Rim), one daughter still alive
Kwak Chol (Kwak Jong Ku)	vice chairman of Chochongryon political department; brother (Kwak Young Ho), wife (Shin Sung Ok), sons (Kwak Sung Il, Kwak Sung Kyoon) and daughters (Kwak Hyang Sook, Kwak In Sook, Kwak Jee Sook) alive; father died of pellagra in prison
Kwak Seung Il	mother missing in prison; father (Chochongryon staff) and sisters (Kwak Sung Hae, Kwak Sung A) alive
Kwon Bong Hak	Chochongryon central staff, moved to labor reeducation center
Lee Choon Yong	repatriated alone; later induced his family to stay when they visited the fatherland with a group
Lee Dae Chul	(name not clear)
Lee Myong Soo	staff at Kyoto Chochongryon, died of pellagra; wife (Kim Jo I) alive

Lee Sang Chon	businessman in Chochongryon; wife (Lim Choon San) and sons (Lee Woo, Lee Sung Woo, Lee Chon Woo) alive
Lim Pal Goo	wife (Japanese) and sons (Lim Duk Won, Lim Hwa Won) alive
Min Hong Shik	father (Osaka Chochongryon office staff) missing in 1976, mother and brother (Min Kwon Shik) alive
Min Yong Il	Nikata Chochongryon vice chair (Dept. of Organization), possibly dead of tuberculosis; Pyongyang claims he departed from North Korea in 1973
Oh Chol Shin	second generation Japanese Korean
Oh Hyon (Kim Si Taek)	confirmed alive in 1990
Park Jae Ho	father (Chochongryon staff) missing; mother, brother alive
Park Kang Tae	spent time as a newspaper reporter in Shineuijoo after repatriating to North Korea
Park Kee Hyon	Kyoto Chochongryon staff, missing after arrest in 1976; wife dead; oldest son missing; son (Park Tae Yoon) and daughters (Park Myong Sook, Park Nam Sook, Park Yoo Sook) alive
Park Kee Young	scholar; wife (Japanese) died of pellagra; daughter (Park Soon Ok) possibly dead of tuberculosis and malnutrition
Park Mu	Possibly dead; Pyongyang claims he lives in Pyongyang and works as an instructor in the Mansudae Creation Company
Park Sang Kee	missing after imprisonment for one year with Kim Jae Won (Management Committee, Hamhung Province) on charges of espionage
Park Soon Dae	wife (Japanese) died of pellagra; son (Park Joo Shik), daughter (Park Young Mee) alive
Park Soon Dal	husband (staff Osaka branch, Chochongryon) missing; sons (Hyon Ryong, Hyon Duk Ryong) and daughters (Hyon In Soon, Hyon Jong Soon Hyon Duk Soon) alive

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Park Tae Jong	mother living in Kyoto, Japan
Park Un Chol	Japanese Communist Party staff, Pyongyang claims he died in 1973
Seo Il Sun	father (central committee member of Chochongryon) missing; mother and sisters (Seo Hae Won, Seo Hae Ok, Seo Hae Sook) alive
Seo Jong Bok	illegally entered Japan and repatriated to North Korea; imprisoned for espionage
Seo Yong Chil	discharged
Shin Hak Shik	died of pellagra; wife (Chinese-Korean), son (Shin Yong Bum) and daughters (Shin Do Yon, Shin Chae Yon, Shin Seo Yon, Shin Soo Yon) alive
Shin Jae Wha	Pyongyang claims he died in 1975
Shin Muk	possibly dead
Son Jae Sok	discharged
Son Jong	father (Chochongryon staff) missing; mother, brothers (Son Koo, Son Ryong) and sister (Son Jong Ok) alive
Son Jong Eui	wife, son (Son Chon Kee) and daughter (Son Chon Hae) alive, discharged with the help of his wife's family in Japan
Song Kwan Ho	Director Nikata Chochongryon, the North claimed he died in 1988
Son Kwi Ik	moved to labor reeducation center
Sung Ho Il	father (Chochongryon staff) missing; mother (Japanese) died of malnutrition, brothers (Sung Eui Ho, Sung Young Ho) and sisters (Sung Hyon Sook, Sung Young Sook) alive
Sung Shin Hee	father (businessman in Chochongryon) missing; mother and sisters (Sung Myong Hwa, Sung Kyung Ran, Sung Jong Hwa, Sung Jong Mee) alive

Yoon Duk Woo	missing in 1976; committee chair of Kyoto branch of Chochongryon; wife (Koh Myong Ok) dead; son (Yoon Sang Ryol) and daughters (Yoon Young Hee, Yoon Jong Hee) alive
Yoon Shin Eui	sons (Yoon Choong Nam, Yoon Choong Sung) alive

Note: “Missing” refers to someone who was seen in a camp but later was missed. “Missing after arrest” refers to the very member of a family who was accused of the crime for which the entire family has been sent to a camp.

Source: Based on Amnesty International reports and testimonies of North Korean defectors.

빈 면

Appendix

빈 면

1. Kidnapees and Detainees in North Korea

	Total	Fishermen	Crew of KAL	Navy Personnel	Others
Kidnapees	3,738	3,662	51	20	5
Detainees	442	407	12	20	3

Note: These statistics do not include unconfirmed reports on people kidnapped from third countries. They include the dead.

2. Kidnapees and Detainees by year

Year	Number of New Detainees	Cumula- tive Total	Year	Number of New Detainees	Cumula- tive Total
1955	10	10	1971	16	324
1957	2	12	1972	66	390
1958	23	35	1973	6	396
1964	16	51	1974	28	424
1965	22	73	1975	(1)	425
1966	2	75	1977	(1)	426
1967	43	118	1979	1	427
1968	131	249	1980	(1)	428
1969	21	270	1987	13	441
1970	38	308	1995	1	442

Note: Figures in parentheses are unconfirmed.

3. Fishermen kidnapped and detained in North Korea were as follows:

May 28, 1955	Cho Jong-il, Hwang Deuk-shik, Jung Tae-hyun, Kim Jang-hyun, Kim Sun-kwi, Lee San-eum, Park Pyo-man, Yu Jang-hwa, Yun Seong-woo, Yu Oe-taek
Nov. 9, 1957	Kim Seong-ju, Ma Seung-sup
April 28, 1958	Hong Bok-dong, Park Dong-keun
April 29, 1958	Kim Yung-bok, Park Yung-keun
April 30, 1958	Han Jin-yong, Kim Chang-hyun, Kim Myung-sun, Park Se-un
May 14, 1958	Jang Sun-jong
Nov. 7, 1958	Heo Jun, Lee Yong-taek, Park Dong-jun, Shin Kwang-pil, Song Sang-in, Song Seong-rak
Dec. 6, 1958	Kim Beom-ju, Kim Ke-rak, Kim Myung-eun, Kim Won-ro, Kim Yeo-hun, Kim Yun-taek, Um Kwang-sup, Yun Seung-beom
March 1, 1964	Choi Dong-gil, Choi Jun-su, Choi Mun-gil, Choi Seok-yong, Kwak Hyung-ju, Kwak Jong-hyo, Kwon Oh-dong, Lee Jong-yun, Lim Kwi-bok, Park Tae-gil, Song Eun-seok
July 19, 1964	Han Sang-jun, Park Ki-jeong
July 29, 1964	Mun Seong-cheon
Oct. 16, 1964	Kim Kwang-ho, Yu Han-bok
May 8, 1965	Choi Dong-gi
May 31, 1965	Lee Jeong-ung
Oct. 29, 1965	Hyun Keun-hwa, Jung Yung-nam, Kim Bun-im, Mun Jeong-suk, Na Yong-yul
Nov. 15, 1965	Cheon Tae-ok, Jung Chang-kyu

Nov. 20, 1965	Choi Yung-jung, Han Dong-sun, Ju In-bok, Kim Jang-won, Kim Jeong-gu, Kim Kyung-su, Kim Seong-man, Lee Byung-gi, Lee Chang-yung, Seo Bong-rae
Nov. 26, 1965	Kim Tae-jun
Nov. 30, 1965	Kim Jong-ok, Seo Seok-min
Jan. 26, 1966	Hwang Chang-sup
June 24, 1966	Park Pal-man
April 12, 1967	Choi Hyo-gil, Choi Jong-deung, Choi Myung-hwan, Jang Kil-yong, Jang Yung-sik, Jin Jeong-pal, Jung Hak-myung, Nam Bok-yi, Kim Dae-gon, Kim Hong-il, Kim Jang-hun, Kim Sang-su, Kim Yung-il, Lee Jeong-sik
May 23, 1967	Hong Seung-gyun, Yun Kyung-gu
May 28, 1967	Lee Seon-il
May 29, 1967	Choi Chang-eui, Kim Ok-jun
June 5, 1967	Choi Won-mo, Mun Kyung-sik
June 15, 1967	Kim Bong-su
July 22, 1967	Lee Ki-chul
Nov. 3, 1967	Hong Sun-kwon, Jang Jae-cheon, Kim Ja-jun, Kim Sang-jun, Kim Seong-jae, Lee Chang-sik, Lee Jin-yung, Lee Tae-su, Ma Ki-deok, Oh Won-sup, Park Kyu-chaе, Park Neung-chul, Park Rak-seon
Dec. 20, 1967	Kim Nam-hyun, Kim Seong-ho, Ki Yang-deok, Lee Chun-sik, Lee Jeong-hae, Oh Myung-bok
Dec. 25, 1967	Han Hae-jin
Jan. 6, 1968	Kim Ju-cheol, Yang Sang-eul
Jan. 11, 1968	Park Bok-taek
March 10, 1968	Seo Su-jung

April 17, 1968	Jung Jang-baek, Kang Myung-bo, Kim Hak-rae, Kim Hong-rok, Lee Ok-jin, Lee Tae-yong, Lee Yung-suk
April 27, 1968	Jung Yeon-tae, Kim Yong-bong, Lim Kyu-cheol, Yun Mu-chul
May 9, 1968	Kim Jeong-il, Oh Seong-jae
May 23, 1968	Han Ki-dol, Kim Hong-gyun, Lim Byung-hyuk
May 29, 1968	Jang Chang-su, Kim Jae-gu, Kim Myung-hak, Kim Su-keun, Lee Sang-won, Park Man-bok
June 1, 1968	Gong Mun-ik
June 6, 1968	Choi Dong-jin, Kim Il-oh, Kim Kil-oh, Kim Kyung-du, Ko Jong-hyun, Ko Ju-bong, Kim Yi-bae, Kim Yong-gil, Lee Il-nam, Lee Seon-ju, Oh Pan-cheol, Park Myung-ok, Seo Jong-sul June 8, 1968 Choi Dong-il, Cho Mun-ho, Chun In-man, Ju Jae-keun, Kim Byung-ho, Kim Yong-gi, Kim Yung-uk, Ko Jun-su, Lee Un-gil, Park Hyung-jung, Shin Seong-uk
June 12, 1968	Kim Do-kyung, Seo Yong-sik
June 16, 1968	Kim Kwang-un
June 17, 1968	Hong Sang-pyo, Kim Kwang-geun, Kim Yeong-gu, Son Cheol-sun, Son Eun-ju, Yu Byung-chun
June 21, 1968	Kim Chang-hyun, Shim Kwang-sik
June 23, 1968	Kim Jin-kyung, Lee Il-hwan, Lee Ki-jun, Oh Nam-mun
June 29, 1968	Cha Jong-seok, Kim Dae-man, Lee Sang-eun
July 2, 1968	Cho Kyu-yung, Ham Tae-cheon, Hwang Du-ho, Jang Myun, Ju Yung-sam, Kim Cheol-kyu, Kim Eung-kwon, Kim Myung-hi, Kim Nam-ho, Kim Yong-su, Ko Jong-hwan, Kwak Do-sang, Lee Chun-man, Lee Eun-kwon, Lee Jong-beom, Park Seong-mun, Seon Woo-seok, Yu Kang-yeol, Yun Du-chan, Yun Neung-san
July 4, 1968	Lee Yung-cheol, Yun Kwi-nam

July 10, 1968	Choi Seung-bok, Choi Won-su, Cho Seok-won, Chun Seok-gu, Jang Jin-gu, Kang Bung-un, Kim Jin-yung, Kim Sang-yun, Lee Hae-jun, Park Heung-sik, Park Jong-up
July 12, 1968	Kim Chun-sik, Kim Nam-guk, Lee Yang-jin, Yeo In-eok
Aug. 6, 1968	Han Taek-seon, Hwang Myung-sam, Kim Jae-uk
Aug. 7, 1968	Jang Eul-seon, Jung Han-su, Kang Myung-hwa, Kim In-cheol, Kim Kwang-su, Um Ki-man
Oct. 30, 1968	Chun Man-su, Ham Ki-nam, Jin Ki-bong, Kim Jong-woo, Kim Yi-deuk, Lim Jae-dong
Nov. 7, 1968	Kim Dong-ju, Ko Sun-cheol, Lee Ki-seok, Lee Tae-un, Lee Yung-gi, Mun Won-pyo
Nov. 8, 1968	An Su-seon, Chun Do-min, Jung Yeon-bae, Kim Jong-sun
May 1, 1969	Han Jong-nam
May 5, 1969	Lee Kwang-won
May 10, 1969	Jung Heung-hae, Lee Dong-woo, Lim Pan-gil
June 10, 1969	Cheon Mun-seok, Choi Du-su, Jung Oh-seok, Lee Deok-pyo
April 29, 1970	Choi Jong-yul, Hwang Seok-gyun, Jung Yung-cheol, Kang Byung-il, Kim Tae-rang, Lee Jae-geun, Park Hwi-man, Um Seung-yung
June 22, 1970	Kim Heung-dong, Kwon Hyuk-geun, Lee Sun-bong, Oh Kwan-su
June 30, 1970	Kim Il-yung
July 8, 1970	Byun Ho-shin, Choi Sang-il, Jang Chun-bin, Min Kyung-shin, Sa Myung-nam
Jan. 6, 1971	Hwang Yung-sik, Jung Moksari, Jung Se-yul, Jung Wan-sang, Kim Chang-deok, Kim In-cheon, Kim Sang-dae, Park Cheon-hyang, Park Dong-sun, Park Jeong-gu, Park Gil-yun, Song Ok-cheon
May 14, 1971	Kim Jae-su
Dec. 25, 1971	Hwang Yung-cheon, Kang Heung-gi, Kim Bong-sik

Jan. 10, 1972	Kim Jeong-ok
Feb. 4, 1972	Bae Hyun-ho, Choi Bu-yung, Chun Seung-cheol, Dong Byung-sun, Gong Sun-gyung, Jung Dong-bae, Jung Tae-gap, Kim Cheol-ju, Kim Dal-yung, Kim Dong-sik, Kim Du-seon, Kim Hwi-nam, Kim Il-bong, Kim Im-kwon, Kim Kye-heung, Kim Seok-man, Kim So-ung, Lee Heung-sup, Lee Pyung-il, Lee Sang-rok, Park Bok-man, Park Dal-mo, Park Jang-hyun, Park Sang-guk, Shin Tae-yong, Wi Chun-hwan
May 4, 1972	Kang Yeo-jin
May 12, 1972	Kim Sun-sik
June 9, 1972	Bae Min-ho, Bang Seung-do, Choi Seong-hyun, Kim Jeong-gil, Lee Su-seok, Lee Won-jae, Lim Chang-gyu, Nam Jeong-yeol, Nam Mu-su
Aug. 14, 1972	Kim Yung-sik, Song Rae-gyu
Aug. 21, 1972	Kim Dae-bong, Lee Seok-ryong
Dec. 28, 1972	An Su-yung, Choi Yung-geun, Jung Do-pyung, Jung Geon-mok, Jung Hyung-rae, Kang So-dong, Kim Cheon-gu, Kim Eui-jun, Kim Il-mian, Kim Jong-won, Kim Ok-ryul, Kim Tae-jun, Kim Yong-cheol, Lee Gong-hi, Lee Jae-myung, Park Du-hyun, Park Du-nam, Park Yang-su, Park Yong-gap, Park Yung-jong, Park Yung-seok, Seo Seok-gi, Seo Yung-gu, Yu Kyung-chun
July 27, 1973	Cho In-woo, Cho Sun-rae, Kim Sun-nam, Kim Yung-hi, Na Ki-yong, Seo Deuk-su

Feb. 15, 1974	An Byung-jin, Baek Heung-seon, Choi Bok-yeol, Choi Yung-cheol, Jang Yung-hwan, Jung Jong-yun, Jung Yu-seok, Kim Hyun-nam, Kim Jae-bong, Kim Jong-kwan, Kim Jung-sik, Kim Keun-sik, Kim Seng-rim, Kim Wol-geun, Kim Yong-geon, Kim Yong-gi, Kim Yong-gil, Ki No-seok, Ko Kwang-hi, Lee Cheon-seok, Lee Dae-hong, Lee Seong-yong, Lim Tae-hwan, Park Jong-ju, Park Kyung-won, Park Nam-ju, Song Min-gyung, Yu Yong-seok
Aug. 8, 1975	Kim Du-ik
May 10, 1977	Choi Jang-geun
Jan. 26, 1980	Kim Hwan-yong
Jan. 15, 1987	Choi Jong-seok, Chu Yung-su, Jin Yung-oh, Jung Il-nam, Kang Hi-keun, Kim Sang-sup, Kim Sun-keun, Kim Yung-hyun, Lim Kuk-jae, No Seong-ho, Park Kwang-hyun, Yang Yong-sik

4. Crewmen of ROK Navy vessel I-2

June 5, 1970	Choi Ung-ho, Cho Jin-ho, Cho Tae-bong, Chun Hae-yeol, Do Jong-mu, Ham Yung-ju, Jung Kwang-mo, Jung Su-il, Jung Won-seok, Kim Ki-gang, Kim Tae-jong, Kwon Deok-chan, Lee Deok-ju, Lee Jae-yung, Lim Seong-woo, Meng Kil-su, Mun Seok-yung, Park Jae-su, Seo Keum-seong, Shin Yung-hun
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5. KAL crew members

Dec. 11, 1969	Choi Jung-ung, Choi Seok-man, Chong Kyong-sook, Cho Uk-hee, Hwang Won, Im Cheol-su, Jang Ki-yung, Je Heon-duk, Kim Bong-ju, Lee Dong-gi, Song Kyong-hee, Yu Byung-hwa
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6. Others

April 13, 1978	Koh Sang Mun
July 20, 1987	Lee Jae-hwan
July 9, 1995	Ahn Sung-un