

Global Expectations for Korean Unification



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We would also like to take this opportunity to present our gratitude towards the next generation who will continue on searching for the most desirable future of a unified Korea.

Abstract

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The current research aims to provide analytical understandings on the costs and benefits of Korean unification from political, social, and economic aspects. Upon the two years of earlier works, we constructed an analytical model encompassing both spatial and temporal dimensions of the unification process, and built comprehensive architecture, ‘the Guiding Type of Unification.’ Based on this model, we have broadened the scope of the research by collecting diverse perspectives from the worldwide experts of the leading countries. We expect to observe the global trends of world governance. Indeed, the increasing importance of Group of Twenty (G-20) countries in managing global problems reflects both political and social aspects of the changes occurring in global governance. Another reason for this would be South Korea’s diversified international relations in the recent years. Hence, it seems necessary to take a closer look on the international dimensions of Korean unification. In this vein, we requested thirteen experts of the

leading countries to express their opinions on Korean unification. In order to collect international perspectives in a coordinated manner, scholars were provided with a guideline to include their perspectives on the expected effects of Korean Unification and the potential roles of their countries during and after the process. Participants were also asked to present candid implications for Korean unification.

Argentina, whose food supply is abundant, laid stress on providing assistance in terms of food security during the unification. Australia, who has special concerns in Asian security, suggested a comprehensive support not only as a mediator but also as one of the U.S. alliance. Due to remote distance to Asia, Brazil is relatively less affected by the unification. Brazil, however, expressed that it has a keen interest in transmission of its experience regarding nuclear issues with Argentina. Similar to Brazil's stance, the effects of the unification influence is indirect to Canada. Nevertheless, Canada could play a role in providing humanitarian assistance, and could be a potential destination for North Korean refugee resettlement. France, one of the most influential members in the European Union and the United Nations, made a suggestion to promote institution building in East Asia that can promote stability in the region. Germany, the only country who had experienced unification, presented its interest in participating actively in the process of Korean unification

through public and private sectors. India assumed that the unification of Korea leads to the denuclearization of the peninsula, and would see this as a positive sign for stability of the region, since it would limit or end North Korea's nuclear weapon transmits with Pakistan. Indonesia could contribute to regional peace and stability through ASEAN and its extensions as South Korea can call upon Indonesia to engage in the peace process. Italy, who especially pointed out the role of European Union as a whole, is well-poised to contribute to economic and social development with North Korea through technical assistance. Mexico can, and expressed its willingness to play an active role in the unification process through international organizations. South Africa, who had been successful in national reconciliation and denuclearization, is very likely to provide its experience and can be a strong voice for the NPT and arms control in the international society. Advocating South Korea's policy in Korean unification, Turkey explicitly mentioned that it will side with Seoul if there is a possible conflict in the peninsula. The author emphasized that the international community must be well-informed on how Korean unification will take place. Last but not least, the United Kingdom author suggested that Koreans will have to resolve emotional conflicts for reconciliation. Considering how both Koreas have dealt educational matters concerning the division of the peninsula, this may face a major challenge

in the future generation.

Thirteen countries' diversely manifested positions on the unifying process are indicative of perceptual change that the issue of Korean unification is no longer a regional issue, but an international one, in which multiple actors have their own stakes within. Upon the previously suggested implications, we categorized the countries into three groups: bystanders, supporters, and interveners. This categorization reflects the assertiveness of each country, or coercive level of each country's assistance instrumented towards the two Koreas during the unifying process.

In the conclusion, based on our final analysis, we provided recommendations for the policy makers. First, diversified diplomacy creates an amicable international environment for unification policies beyond the power politics of the Four Powers. Second, activation of leading countries' roles is strategically advantageous to activate the meaningful roles of these leading countries to minimize the Four Powers' concerns. Third, emphasizing the formation of multilateral system would provide leading countries with an additional motivation to actively participate in the unification process. Furthermore, multilateral efforts to achieve Korean unification are also expected to contribute to the furtherance of democratic elements in the dynamics of international relations as a whole. Fourth, it is now high time for us to conduct more public

diplomacy by devising new and creative methodologies. The global research project of this kind could be one of the most effective public diplomatic tools. Lastly, the unification between two Koreas can no longer be considered as a regional issue within Northeast Asia since others, including the leading countries, conceive their national interests along the process of unification on the Korean peninsula in diverse ways. Overall, thirteen countries' recommendations underline the significance of collective efforts in addressing the unification process and suggest South Korea to learn lessons from the experience that they have undergone in the past.

Keywords: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, Expectation, Role, Effect

요 약

본 연구는 ‘통일 비용·편익 종합연구’의 5개년 연구 중 4차년도 연구로 한반도 통일에 대한 국제사회의 시각과 역할을 분석하였다. 2013년 3차년도 연구에서는 미국, 중국, 러시아, 일본의 입장에서 바라본 한반도 통일에 대한 비용과 편익의 연구를 진행하였고, 2014년 본 연구에서는 연구의 틀을 확장하여 아르헨티나, 호주, 브라질, 캐나다, 프랑스, 영국, 독일, 인도네시아, 인도, 이탈리아, 멕시코, 남아프리카공화국, 터키 등 13개 국가의 입장에서 바라본 한반도 통일의 기대와 역할에 대해 파악하였다. 연구대상은 G-20, MIKTA, BRICS 등 국제사회에서 일정한 역할을 담당하고 있어 한반도 통일에 기여할 수 있는 국가들로 선정하였다. 13개 국가들을 대상으로 한반도 통일 과정에서 기대할 수 있는 사항과 담당할 수 있는 역할 사항 등의 요건에 대해 선도형통일 방안을 토대로 분석하고 유형화하였다.

한반도 통일이 일방적이고 단순한 성과 위주보다는 국제사회와의 협조 속에서 장기간에 걸쳐 이루어지는 과정이라는 점을 분석 대상국가들 모두가 공유하였다. 본 연구는 국제사회의 한반도 통일에 대한 의견을 수렴하고, 국제사회에 한반도 통일에 대한 입장을 환기시켜 향후 통일외교 강화차원으로 사용할 것으로 기대한다.

검색어: 국제사회, 기대, 역할, 효과, 아르헨티나, 호주, 브라질, 캐나다, 프랑스, 영국, 독일, 인도네시아, 인도, 이탈리아, 멕시코, 남아프리카공화국, 터키


I . INTRODUCTION

KOREA INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL UNIFICATION



The Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) has run a multi-year research project for comprehensive research on the costs and benefits of unifying Korea for the past four years. Even though the research topic itself has traditionally been considered to be solely reserved for the economists, we decided to broaden our scope to include political, social, and economic aspects in order to analyze all complexities of the topic. Two years into research, we constructed an analytical model encompassing both spatial and temporal dimensions of the unification process. The model is called ‘the Guiding Type of Unification,’ a comprehensive diagram designed to describe all stages of unification.¹⁾

Figure Conceptual Diagram for the Guiding Type of Unification



1) The following explanation on the Guiding type is summarized from Kyuryoon Kim, et al., *The Attraction of Korean Unification: Inter-Korean and International Costs and Benefits* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2013).

The final goal of ‘the Guiding Type of Unification’ is to have leading actors in the international community achieve human security through three major principles: goodness, pluralism, and effectiveness. These three pillars depend on a new peace structure which entails a nuclear-free status, a market economy, and democracy in the Korean peninsula. In order to carry out the concept above, the two Koreas must undergo the following stages: the unification preparation period, the unification process period, and the normal state period. The model further employs three subordinate stages of division resolving, system integration, and nation building in the unification process period to examine the costs and benefits of Korean unification. The model also posits a three-stage, three-area dimension to identify political, social, and economic variables pertinent to evaluating the effects of unification.

For the purpose of achieving a comprehensive scope, we expanded our research to reach new international viewpoints last year. In doing so, we requested experts from the United States, China, Japan and Russia to express their opinions about our research topic.

As we entered into the fourth year of the five-year project in the spring of 2014, we broadened the scope of our research by collecting diverse perspectives of the experts from leading countries of the world. One of the most significant reasons for gathering broad international opinions is the recent trend in global governance. Indeed, the increasing importance of the member

countries of the Group of Twenty (G-20) Summit to manage global issues reflects such aspects of changes occurring in global governance. Although the formation of the G-20 Summit was instigated by the 2008 global financial crisis originated in the United States, demands from the international community for a new type of global governance were frequently voiced. Another reason for including additional leading countries' perspectives is explained by the diversified international status maintained by South Korea. In the past, unification issues were mainly treated in the context of inter-Korean relations. As the South develops to be a major middle power in the international relations, however, it is necessary to consider international dimensions related to unifying the Korean peninsula. Thus, KINU requested thirteen experts from leading countries to express their opinions. These countries are members of the G-20 Summit, and their sphere of influence have recently inflated in the international arena. Along with the opinions collected from the four major powers, we expect to accumulate various perspectives from an extensive group of contributory scholars.

We selected the following thirteen countries to participate: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

In order to combine international perspectives in a coordinated manner, we provided the same research framework to all thirteen scholars in advance. We specifically requested scholars for their

perspectives on the expected effects of Korean unification on their countries and potential roles that their countries can play during the process if the Korean peninsula were to be unified. Opinions about the effects will likely include matters of security and economy, while potential roles can be analyzed at national or regional levels. Participants were additionally asked to express their opinions about the implications involved in unifying Korea before and during the process.

Throughout six months, we shared our framework and collected manuscripts from all thirteen scholars. From their contributed opinions, we systematically analyzed each thirteen countries' roles and derived policy considerations to conclude our research report.

II. EFFECTS AND ROLES

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1 Argentina

a. Overview

The G-20, consisting of both advanced and emerging economies, is gradually taking the leadership place of the Group of Eight (G-8) and becoming a steering committee for the global economy. Nevertheless, there is growing concern that even with the recent limited economic recovery, the momentum of G-20 cooperation is weakening. Inside the G-20 factionalism is becoming increasingly prevalent. So consensus and coalition building can revitalize momentum for cooperation. As middle powers, Argentina and Korea can promote new visions and creative ideas that are acceptable to both their domestic constituencies and other states. This can enhance global governance but can also be decisive in a unification context.

Within and outside the G-20 middle powers, including Argentina and Korea, can provide diplomacy that is issue-driven, informal, and flexible. Moreover, relations between countries like Argentina and Korea do not work hierarchically, but in a networked fashion. And in a networked world, both countries can achieve goals not by power, but through creative ideas, a smart and flexible strategy, and moral leadership. The creation of dialogue mechanisms and policy coordination to support

unification is critical for a peaceful and fruitful unification in the Korean peninsula.

The following paper identifies eight policy areas in which Argentina can be of constructive, useful support to the unification process. Three of them derive from Argentina's own experience: political lessons from democratic transition, social lessons from truth and reconciliation processes and from post-crisis reconstruction and mutual confidence-building lessons in the nuclear field to avoid proliferation. The other five are opportunities in the present, dealing with economic benefits (Argentina providing food security and supply), social (strengthening the role of the Korean diaspora in Latin America and offering an encounter and dialogue platform for Korean youth), diplomatic (Argentina as gateway for generating support in Latin America), and symbolic (the role of the Argentine Pope).

b. Expected Effect

(1) Security Dimension

Since Argentina is not in Asia, the geopolitical implications of Korean unification are not expected to be significant—if any—security implications. Despite this feeling at first that would act towards less involvement of the country, it can work quite to the opposite.

(2) Economic Dimension

In the economic realm, Argentina is expecting commercial positive impacts: increased trade and investment opportunities, renewed diplomatic cooperation and coordination, educational and science/technology exchanges. These are all benefits of scale (quantitative) of a unified Korea.

Qualitatively, there are also economic benefits to be expected: unification is likely to dissolve a security dilemma that would free up resources for productive enterprises that today are captured by security issues.

c. Potential Roles

(1) Country Level

The areas in which Argentina could play a very constructive role are:

- Food security and supply
- Strengthening the role of the Korean diaspora in Latin America
- Offering an encounter and dialogue platform for Korean youth
- Regional diplomatic support in Latin America
- The role of the Argentine Pope
- Political lessons from democratic transition
- Social lessons from truth and reconciliation processes and

form post-crisis reconstruction

- Mutual confidence-building lessons in the nuclear field to avoid proliferation

Food Security and Supply

Argentina is not an actor of relevance in the classic security (military) arena. However, the economic dimension to which Argentina can contribute has a direct security/military implication. Guaranteeing steady and reliable flow of food supplies works towards reducing anxiety and nervousness among North Korean elites and masses. This in turn contributes to tension relaxation and increase ease in negotiations, preventing deadlock and escalation. It reduces incentives for provocation on the part of the North and consequent alert or retaliation from the South, which could lead to dialogue breakdown and even destabilization.

As an efficient producer and exporter of agricultural products, Argentina is in a unique condition to guarantee—as an individual country and also coordinating with other producers—goods that would boost at the same time prosperity and security. Unification will need to create wealth to succeed. Korean companies can increase their business and Korean (northern and southern) consumers will have to be given answers. Argentina can offer these critical goods. because people consume food every day, food products are hard to substitute and shortages are hard to ignore. While societies can tolerate higher oil prices or the

absence of certain manufactures, they cannot survive without agricultural products. If a lack of oil or gas can disrupt the normal functioning of a society, the lack of food and water can cause an abrupt and absolute collapse of social order. Food riots tend to be especially fierce because what is at stake is existential.

North Korean political and economic system has been identified as the ultimate cause of the persistent shortage of food and of the overall decline of the economy.²⁾ This implies that the long-term solution to the problem lies neither in maintaining aid flows nor merely in agricultural restructuring but rather in implementing domestic economic reform and expanding commercial trade relations. The economic gap between the two Koreas remains wide. South Korea's per capita GNI is 18.7 times larger than N. Korea, with the South averaging 24,000 USD versus the North a mere 1,200 USD. This means consumption—specifically food consumption needs—will have to be brought up to level strong and fast.

In such a context, the strategic relevance of Argentine agricultural products comes to the forefront. Since the mid-20th century, an age of abundance and economic development, oil has been regarded as the most critical commodity. But agricultural commodities are much more vital goods. One can substitute driving for public transportation but cannot help

2) Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, *Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform* (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2007).

eating and drinking on a daily basis. If energy scarcity can disrupt the normal functioning of a society, the absence of food and water can cause its sudden breakdown, a scenario to be averted at all costs if a successful, peaceful unification is the objective.

The Korean Diaspora

At a non-state level, Argentina can become the hub of Korean diaspora in Latin America. There are around seven million Koreans living outside the Peninsula, and estimates indicate over a hundred thousand are located in Latin America. The role of Korean expatriates and Latin Americans from Korean descent will be a key economic, social and diplomatic role that is systematically ignored and underplayed. Buenos Aires could play host to delegates of Korean communities in all of Latin America.

For example, the South African apartheid regime, forced black people in South Africa to live away from urban areas where they worked. An isolated, segregated social structure reinforces mental and ideological isolation. This is a critical hurdle that will be difficult to overcome in the Korean peninsula alone. Argentina has an experience in inter-faith dialogue, being the country in Latin America with the most Jewish and Muslims. However, in Argentina, differences have never played out in bloody or violent ways, for populations were removed from the competitive geography in which those conflicts originated and still exert pressures for confrontation. In the same way Argentina, the country “at world’s end,” could offer neutral

ground for “a new world.” North and South can be joined together not only by crossing the 38th parallel in the Peninsula.

The experience of Koreans living outside the peninsula can be sources of social, cultural and economic values to the unification process. Garnering their inputs, political will and economic resources would be a tremendous asset and would generate a snowball process. The diaspora has the potential to articulate non-state networks of business and finance, building international social capital, and capable to generate social support for elite-driven political negotiations, sustaining cross-regional diplomatic supports, lobbying business communities and in nation building, such as the Jewish case exemplified.

Working with the Youth

Argentina can also offer education and training opportunities for young northerners and low-cost relocation for northern elders. All of these could have the effect of partly relieving demographic and economic pressures during unification.

Funding and promoting large-scale exchanges among middle and high school students from the North and the South in such a neutral ground as Argentina could help change and improve attitudes among northerner youth toward their equals in the South. As mentioned before, the latest meeting of ROK-CELAC agreed to enhance mutual understanding and expand the base of their cooperation through more active academic and cultural exchanges. For example, they settled to gradually increase

academic conferences and promote youth exchanges. With this level of political and institutional commitment, encompassing the Korean diaspora in Latin America or using Latin America as a ground for exchanges among the North and South is a fruitful, viable, reasonable and cost-effective idea.

(2) Regional/Global Level

The Role of External Support: Argentina and Latin America

Transition theory acknowledges the impact of the “neighborhood” variable. Not just mere geographic contiguity, but the level of interdependence between countries can create this neighborhood condition: economic communities, political-military alliances and cultural groups based on a common heritage. Neighbors exert a powerful force on the trajectory of countries with which they share interests and destinies. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman explain in *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* that policy options are inevitably constrained by context and that policy makers confusing and difficult trade-offs on the hard road to democracy and inclusive growth. For example, outside pressure propelled Mexico’s political opening during the tenure of President Ernesto Zedillo-the last president of the PRI’s long stretch in power-American business and political leaders, among others, called out Mexico’s democratic shortcomings and advocated electoral reforms. Being next door to the enormous U.S. market

also benefited the country, as did preferential U.S. trade policies.

Argentina is not in East Asia. But geographic distance can be turned into a positive aspect from which Argentina can contribute to garner international support for the unification process. Gathering allies within Latin America—especially South America—is an important diplomatic goal Argentina could play, within and outside the G-20 institutional format. South Korea has exercised diplomatic leadership that befits its middle-power status, and it is thus well positioned to take the initiative in middle-power diplomacy with several other like-minded countries. Expanding on that basis, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico could be Korea's partners of choice, since the three Latin American countries are members of the G-20 also. The informal networking with Latin American countries in the G-20 can be capitalized for harnessing the rest of the region into actively supporting the process of unification in the peninsula, through political support and trade expansion. Working through the institutional regional channels such as The Organization of American States (OAS), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) will also be of critical importance for regional diplomatic support in the unification process.

Support from outside sources can help during fragile and uncertain periods by providing they provide critical economic and technical assistance, by exerting constructive political pressure to bolster unification and democratic transition. Latin

American support will be a constructive support, free of big power rivalries that will play out more selfish interests during the Peninsula unification, which could unintentionally undermine the transition by fostering power-grabbing, corruption, and authoritarian reversals or by simply failing to provide moral, financial, and diplomatic continued support.

Positive outside influences and support provide important leverage for internal reformers intent on challenging entrenched interests and act as a powerful bulwark against backsliding. Although unification will be complex and depend on many factors, support by institutions can restructure interests and incentives. Indeed, Mexico's economy was transformed by the North American Free Trade Agreement, which accelerated trade and foreign direct investment. A broad middle class emerged as incomes rose and poverty and inequality declined, creating a positive feedback loop for the democratic changes under way. Korean policymakers should pay notice of the influence and develop a deeper understanding of the influence international forces can have to leverage their impact.

On July 2, 2014, Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se held their first-ever meeting in Seoul and the third meeting with counterparts from the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the largest regional cooperative mechanism in the region with 33 member states. Both sides agreed to comprehensively expand the scope of the ROK-Latin America cooperation beyond trade and economy to include

politics, society, culture and—especially—regional situations and global issues. Cooperation on the international stage is already an important pillar between the ROK and CELAC, and in the meeting they have agreed to work closely on proposed reform of the UN Security Council, responses to climate change, disarmament, non-proliferation and the post-2015 development agenda and other key international issues related to global governance. Korean-CELAC cooperation will not only promote bilateral economic cooperation, such as trade and investment in various fields, but it will also expand to different areas beyond economics such as politics, society, culture and international relations. As the largest regional mechanism for cooperation and coordination in the region, CELAC could act as a powerful regional mechanism for supporting bilateral dialogue and facilitating a more complex, multi-layered diplomacy.

d. Implications for Korea

(1) Pre-unifying Process

The Role of the Argentine Pope

Major transformations in the economic landscape have a direct effect on the social fabric of societies by disrupting traditional identities and frames of reference. These rapid economic changes are associated with an increasing rift in the division of labor that generates confusion of norms and increase

impersonality in social life. This condition is further exacerbated by the dislocation between the standards or values and the new reality, leading to what is known as anomie. As defined by Durkheim, anomie occurs when the rules on how people ought to behave break down and nobody knows what to expect from one another. The state of anomie is symptomatic of a social fracture or growing lack of social cohesion. If social dislocation continues to worsen, it can discontinue growth and jeopardize development.

The Head of the Catholic Church, Pope Francis, is an Argentine. Argentina can act as a bridge country for religious sectors to be supportive of the unifying process. This was exemplified by the Pope's visit to South Korea last August. From the international relations point of view, this is a tool of soft power. From the domestic point of view, it could also provide the preconditions to generate as a binding and bonding agent through a trust-building process. In April, 2014, Pope Francis urged Koreans to pray and work for the unification of their divided peninsula, saying they should aim to reunite as one family "with no victors or vanquished." This symbolic, non-material, ideational dimension needs to be addressed during unification. A cohesive element, a sense of shared destiny and unity must be found and spread. The head of the Catholic Church is certainly an Argentine's asset of major importance to act as binding and bonding agent within the unifying Korean society.

This year was especially very good because civil institutions

in South Korea have been speaking of “unification” and it matches with the Catholic Church’s stress on “reconciliation.” The essence is the same: the unification of the Korean peninsula, a message carried strongly by Pope Francis’ August visit to Korea. President of South Korea, Park Geun-hye—who had launched a new presidential committee on unification the month prior—and leaders of the Korean Catholic Church capitalized on the visit, partly to give impetus to rapprochement between the North and South. Cardinal Andrew Yeom Soo-Jeong stressed the Pope’s visit was aimed at facilitating inter-Korean relations and should be a gesture of peace to inspire an encounter between Kim Jong-un and President Park. He also remarked the Church has been stressing the need to re-launch negotiations between the two Koreas for years. If bilateral talks resumed this would constitute “the greatest miracle” of the Pope’s pilgrimage. Regrettably, North Korea’s participation in the Pope’s solemn mass for peace and reconciliation did not materialize.

During the years of the “Sunshine policy,” the international network of charitable organizations of the Catholic Church, Caritas, was becoming increasingly involved in humanitarian projects in North Korea. In 2010, a million North Korean children were vaccinated against hepatitis B in a campaign run by the Ministry of Health with Caritas support. The South Korean government withheld transport approval for vaccines and syringes. Catholic Relief Services supports a health program established in collaboration with the Maryknoll Missionaries

since 1998 providing supplies such as x-ray machines, microscopes and medication that are used to diagnose and treat Tuberculosis, a major health concern in North Korea. focused in the northwestern provinces, this program established a relationship between Catholic Relief Services and North Korea's Ministry of Public Health. It would be productive to start building cooperation via the Catholic Church among Health Ministries in the North and South, for example. This is just one of the multiple opportunities that the Catholic Church can facilitate.

Catholic Relief Services also provides financial support to Caritas for the North Korea program administered by Caritas Hong Kong. Over the past eight years, the Caritas network (through Caritas Hong Kong) has provided \$27 million worth of food aid, health equipment and medical supplies, and agricultural projects to millions of North Koreans. Targeted groups include children under five, pregnant and nursing women, orphaned and school-aged children, elderly and people with special needs works mainly in the northeastern provinces. The vast magnitude of people served by and who have benefited from the grassroots actions of the Catholic Church is immense in the North. Moreover, the financial channels already set up to reach them can be further expanded and deepened.

During Pope Francis' visit, Pyongyang did not authorize North Koreans to cross the border, what would have constituted a powerful gesture of reconciliation. But the Catholic Church can provide concrete and operational opportunities to facilitate

dialogue between the North and South under the umbrella of religious exchanges and also very valuable, neutral and reliable diplomatic backchannels for discrete negotiations under the auspices of the Vatican Diplomatic core.

(2) Unifying Process

The Experience From Democratic Transitions

Argentina has experience in dealing with transitions & post/conflict reconstruction through its experience dealing with the military Junta trials and advancing human rights. There are valuable lessons from the grass-roots level dimension in establishing institutions such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (implemented in the early democratic period or Dialogue Tables (established during the 2001 social and economic crisis). They serve to protect or regenerate the social fabric, contributing to stability and equality.

Argentina's experience in its transition to democracy is unique, as its initial conditions were combined with political crisis, economic meltdown, and military defeat after the Malvinas war of 1982. The lessons in transition to democracy could be of use for the political dimension of the unification process, considering the current North Korean government system. The timing, sequencing extent and speed of the process all impact power resources and power distribution of actors and structures, and maneuvering delicately and skillfully is the key to avert regression or breakdown. After more than thirty uninterrupted

years, democratic transition and consolidation is an area in which accumulated experience can be exported to the Korean peninsula.

Thirty years ago—in 1984—after the fall of Argentina’s military dictatorship following defeat in the Malvinas/Falklands war with Britain, Argentina created the National Commission on the Disappearance of Person, CONADEP (the Spanish Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas).

The main purpose of this Human Rights Commission main purpose was to investigate the crimes committed by the preceding military dictatorship and bring its perpetrators to justice. One of the commission’s central tasks was clarifying the fate of thousands of “desaparecidos” or “disappeared”—an ambiguous term used by the military junta to present those killed as “missing,” during the so-called “Dirty War.”

CONADEP was not a result of an armed revolution or imposed by occupying external powers as was the case in the Nuremberg trials after World War II. Rather, it was formed by Argentina’s freely-elected democratic government. Institutionally, CONADEP presented a risky innovation for a country emerging from years of turmoil, exposing alienation of the country’s traditional power players such as former military rulers, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and conservative sectors in and outside of the traditionally majoritarian peronist party. The commission began its work in 1984 in Argentina but had global influence. However, mission, strategy and aim were adapted,

reformulated and appropriated to respective local contexts. In Argentina, CONADEP was a state researcher for the trials. In many other places, however, the need for reconciliation among victims and perpetrators displaced the demand for justice. In South Africa, Brazil, Chile and Peru, reconciliation was added in part to diffuse many of the tensions that Argentina witnessed in its long democratic transition.

CONADEP inaugurated a new pathway for the prosecution of human rights violations and processes of democratization. It became an alternative to the older pattern, similar to the Nuremberg trials. Much of the inquiries and trials by recent truth commissions and tribunals have been overseen by external powers under the United Nations mandate. It implies a cautionary tale for Korea: truth and reconciliation processes can be taken over by external forces, shifting its focus from domestic reconciliation and unification to international exemplification (of interests, ideas or institutions). After the Rwandan genocide, the International Penal Tribunal was created in 1994. The tribunal ruled on more than 700 cases of genocide perpetrators. In Cambodia for example, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia was setup in 2003 after an intense international campaign and as a result of an agreement between the UN and Cambodian authorities. Acknowledging the role of external actors serves both as a means for creating positive domestic-international synergies and for averting international-level counterproductive influences that

could direct unification in unwanted directions.

In December 2001 Argentina experienced the most severe economic crisis in its history, quickly followed by a political-institutional collapse quickly followed. In order to stem the rising tide of political contention, the government launched a consensus-building initiative, the “Dialogue Tables” (Mesas de Diálogo), in January 2002, with the support of the Catholic Church and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Organized in thematic round tables, the Mesa encouraged inputs from a broad range of actors across society including labor, business, NGOs, social movements, political parties and religious groups. One of its most significant initiatives was to push for the adoption of state policies to foster social inclusion. This would lead to the adoption of a program of Citizen Income, which was discussed as a universal right, a form of social inclusion. The recommendation from the Mesa was that the state should guarantee a minimum income to all citizens.

The Mesa went on to recommend three specific areas for urgent action: food supplies, medicines and the creation of income subsidies for the poorest. These recommendations fed into the creation of the Program for Male and Female Unemployed Households, set up in January 2002 initially with funds from export tax revenue, supplemented after January 2003 with World Bank loans. This program broke the traditional link among welfare, employment, and the trade unions, allowing socioeconomic and political incorporation of those without jobs (unions are mandated

to protect the conditions of those already employed).

Moreover, the scheme offered a financial compensation of 50 USD to families in exchange for participation in projects such as community service, construction, school maintenance, rebuilding health facilities, road works, communal kitchens, house building and even small-scale production. Such social and economic linkage nets, gives rise to positive externalities and grassroots social and economic development, and better political representation. Social capital networks are critical in a unification process. Fukuyama defines social capital as an instantiated set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permits them to cooperate with one another. If members of the group come to expect that others will behave reliably and honestly, then they will come to trust one another. Social cohesion is also associated with social integration, which denotes that all sectors of a certain society should have access to minimum level of well-being that is possible at the society's level of development. A socially integrative unification would focus on the ability of a social structure to distribute opportunities with a certain level of equality.

In conclusion, deliberative processes such as the one embodied in the dialogue tables constitute a seeding ground for expanding civic engagement and deepening civic participation. Not only do this instances act as focal points for idea exchange and innovation, but they also improve the quality of the society in which they happen.

Disabling Nuclear Tensions/Avoiding Proliferation

From 1975 to 1995, Argentina built and then dismantled South America's most advanced ballistic missile program. Regional security concerns, national prestige, a technological rivalry with Brazil, and the availability of funding (from Iraq) all encouraged Argentina's pursuit of indigenous missiles. This is very akin to the current situation in Pyongyang. Lessons for how to diplomatically change incentives can be applied in an area of critical weight for the peaceful character of the transition towards unification.

Though both nations had benign reasons for developing the capability to enrich uranium, foreign observers and the military organizations of both countries often interpreted the presence of these research programs as evidence of weapons programs; uncertainty led to reciprocal weapons research. Neither Brazil nor Argentina developed nuclear weapons, but both were conducting weapons research and the two countries' nuclear programs were linked by a mutual suspicion that drove their nuclear ambitions. In this sense, the tensions it generated across borders was not unlike the ones between the North and South today spiraling a security dilemma, even without a preexisting security incentive to engage in an arms race.

The first lesson for the North and South is to move away from who would be victorious in confrontation to acknowledging that confrontation would be detrimental to both parties. For example, Argentina would not have profited from such a contest

against larger, richer Brazil, as Pyongyang today. Brazil would not have profited from an escalation of the potential for violence either, because it already enjoyed military superiority. Hardliners in the South must also agree to this. The benefits for both sides from this comparative experience should make clear of the enormous potential gains of abandoning hawkish postures, especially during unification.

Argentina's nuclear program initially grew from a desire for energy independence. In the 1960s and 1970s, after purchasing and making operational two civilian heavy-water reactors, the government developed plans for two additional reactors, one of which was capable of producing nuclear fuel for the first two plants. Argentina's fear of dependence on foreign sources for nuclear fuel¹⁸ was confirmed when, in 1974, the United States declared it would no longer supply uranium to Argentina. The same nationalist sentiment prompted the government to build a spent-fuel reprocessing plant to produce plutonium and lay the groundwork for Argentina's entry into the international fuel-export market. That facility raised serious proliferation concerns, however, as it could recycle enough fuel to build up to two nuclear weapons every year. Argentina also constructed a plant to produce low-enriched uranium, but it was also capable of producing highly enriched uranium for weapons. Brazil mirrored Argentina's nuclear efforts, rapidly developing its nuclear capability from a nascent program in the late 1960s to a massive investment in nuclear technology in the late 1970s.

The OPEC oil shock in 1973 undermined Brazil's confidence in the reliable importation of sufficient oil, further exacerbating fears of energy dependency. Though badly managed and never close to achieving a nuclear bomb, the program allowed the Brazilian government to claim the capability to enrich uranium and then construct a nuclear test site deep in the Amazon rainforest, further arousing Argentine suspicions. Second lesson: Argentina's web of actors, institutions and incentives are to be studied closely to discover policy areas of intervention to modify behavior in the North. Argentina seems to have pursued weapons capability for reasons of rivalry and prestige as much as energy security considerations. This is indicated by the use of a bizarrely inflammatory behavior, trumpeting their enrichment capabilities and building test sites for nonexistent weapons. Such behavior is incongruous with maximizing the value of building a bomb, or minimizing international backlash, just as the North's current situation. A more cooperative, less confrontational stance on the part of the South was key to deactivating Argentine nationalism.

The third and final lesson is that the key explanatory factor in the two countries' decisions to abandon their nuclear-weapons programs was their eventual political rapprochement. The presence of liberalizing regimes changed the situation: the "benefits" derived by both parties from weapons development were attained by confidence—a political shift from mutual suspicion to mutual confidence—and outweighed by furthering

trade. Moreover, just as in the South African case, leadership played a key role. In the mid-1980s, both countries elected civilian leaders for whom reconciliation was a priority. At the first meeting of Argentine president-elect Raúl Alfonsín and Brazilian president Aécio Neves in 1983, the two agreed that nuclear cooperation would be given special priority, even arranging for inspections of their facilities by the other country. The spirit of openness and transparency led to information-sharing and increasing confidence, decreasing nervousness through clarifying intentions. Interestingly, the new status quo led both governments to replace pursuit of militarized nuclear technology by genuine cooperation. Mutual economic engagement further spurred the improvement of relations. In 1990, both countries announced they would implement full-scope IAEA safeguards, followed by the signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco and subsequent accession to the NPT. This is a complete feasible roadmap and potential scenario for rapprochement between the two Koreas.

Furthermore, this is a point in which Argentina and Brazil also have broader, regional support from Latin American countries. The CELAC July delegation to Seoul made it clear it shares the view of North Korea's nuclear programs as a threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and of the entire world. Furthermore, it conveyed hope that inter-Korean trust will be built through dialogue and that unification will be achieved on the Korean Peninsula.

e. Observation

The results of this paper indicate that there are many areas in which Argentina could contribute positively to Korean unification, within and outside the G-20 institutional format. Through comparative lessons of the past as well through social, economic, diplomatic and symbolic opportunities, this research paper identified at least eight openings to support and strengthen key actors and elements within the elites and the publics, in North and South Korea for unification to run peacefully and productively. Moreover, the areas identified in the paper will open up the possibility of being replicated with other partners across regions both in the public and private sectors.

2 | Australia

a. Overview

In the last few years, Australian policy makers have become increasingly attentive to events on the Korean peninsula. For too long, the Republic of Korea (henceforth South Korea) was overlooked because Australian commercial, political and military interests in Northeast Asia were more focused on China and Japan. This is rapidly changing as Australians recognize the huge importance of South Korea to Australia's future prosperity—South Korea is Australia's third largest export market and fourth largest trading partner.³⁾ The growing Korean diaspora in Australia and the recent conclusion of the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement has served to further underline the importance of Korea to Australia and to highlight to Australia's policy makers the many opportunities presented to Australia by its ever closer relationship with South Korea. This close relationship, however, also presents risks. In the event of instability on the Korean peninsula, Australia's role in any peace-keeping, humanitarian or stability-promoting exercise could be significant, given

3) DFAT, "Republic of Korea Country Brief," (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/ROK/brief_index.html> (accessed: June 12, 2014).

Australia's economic reliance upon South Korea, Australia's growing status as an Asian nation and, of course, historic precedent for such a role. In 1950, under the auspices of UN Resolution 82, units from the Royal Australian Navy, Royal Australian Air Force and the Australian Regular Army were committed in defence of South Korea and remained there for more than three years. Moreover, Australia's current status as a middle power, its diplomatic ambitions (it is currently a member of the UN Security Council) and a history of espousing a desire to defend international norms around peace and security, suggests a willingness on the part of Australia to play a significant role in supporting the international community and the South Korean government in the case of serious disruption on the peninsula. Indeed, the Australian chair of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea, former judge Michael Kirby, stated in his report that 'the international community must accept its responsibility to protect the people of the DPRK from crimes against humanity ... in the light of the role played by [it] ... (and by the great powers in particular) in the division of the Korean peninsula and because of the unresolved legacy of the Korean War.'⁴) Australia is part of that 'international community' so cannot avoid its share of responsibility for protecting the people of the DPRK and ensuring a prosperous and peaceful future for a unified Korean peninsula.

4) United Nations Office of the High Commission on Human Rights, *Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (February 7, 2014), p. 336.

b. Expected Effect

Assessing the exact nature of unification's impact upon Australia is complicated by the impossibility of predicting when or how unification will take place. Australia's geographical location, however, as well as its economic, social and political proximity to Korea and Asia more generally, means that Australia's current and future prospects are integrally linked with those of its Asian partners, not least South Korea. Contemplating a range of possible unification scenarios, the following details some of the foreseeable opportunities and risks for Australia presented by Korean unification.

(1) Security Dimension

The importance of Northeast Asia to Australia's defence and security is recognised in key Australian government policy documents including the 2012 Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, the 2013 National Security Strategy and the 2013 Defence White Paper. In particular, the 2013 Defence White Paper highlights the threat to Australia's interests posed by possible instability on the Korean peninsula.⁵⁾ In response, the White Paper emphasizes the increasing importance of the Republic of Korea-Australia defence relationship and calls for efforts by Australia to deepen cooperation between the two

5) Australian Government Department of Defence, "2013 Defence White Paper," (Department of Defense, Australian Government, May 3, 2013), pp. 11~12, 81, <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf>.

defence forces in order to better ‘understand the likely international response to any contingency on the Korean Peninsula.’⁶⁾ Such a contingency includes unification and Korea’s unification has implications for Australia’s security in three foreseeable areas: first, the possible deployment of Australian Defence Force personnel in the case of instability; second, the potential for a rise in non-traditional security threats; third, opportunities and/or threats arising from the post-unification security and strategic environment.

An obligation to participate: deployment of ADF personnel in the case of instability on the Korean peninsula.

The Australian government’s 2009 Defence White Paper recognised that the collapse of the North would require ‘def management by the Korean people, but also by the major powers of the region… All states would have a common interest in assisting the Korean people to successfully manage any unification of the peninsula.’⁷⁾ The 2013 Defence White Paper noted that the Republic of Korea ‘is an important security partner for Australia and potentially one of our strongest partners in the region. It lies at the strategic crossroads between the United States, China, Japan, Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and stability on the Korean peninsula is critical to the stability of our broader region’⁸⁾. Given that

6) *Ibid.*, p. 62.

7) Australian Government Department of Defence, “2009 Defence White Paper,” (Department of Defense, Australian Government, May 2, 2009), p. 33, <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf>.

8) Australian Government Department of Defence, “2013 Defence White Paper,” p. 62.

Australia's interest will lie in the swift and effective restoration of peace and stability, the participation of the ADF in such efforts—under a UN mandate or at the invitation of South Korea—would be inevitable. Australia also has a vested interest in ensuring that the process of unification does not lead to conflict between other protagonists involved with the Korean peninsula, not least the U.S. and China. Australia's close economic ties with China and the U.S. as well as its military alliance with the U.S. through the ANZUS agreement mean that a prosperous and peaceful China-U.S. relationship is in Australia's interests. Indeed, the 2013 Defence White Paper noted that 'the relationship between the U.S. and China ... will more than any other factor determine our strategic environment over the coming decades.'⁹⁾

Non-traditional security threats

The process toward the unification of the Korean peninsula will inevitably mean the political and economic opening of North Korea. The liberation of the North Korean population from the current regime will be warmly welcomed by Australia but it brings with it a range of local challenges which have the potential to become internationalized non-traditional security threats. Some of these non-traditional security threats have the potential to impact Australia because of its geographic location, its relative prosperity and its attraction as a destination for people

⁹⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

movement. These non-traditional security threats include, first, criminality on the part of the existing regime, or other groups within North Korea, who may seek financial gain in the midst of volatility to proliferate weapons and other contraband to governments and groups adverse to Australia's interests. A second threat relates to Australia's concern regarding the management of potential immigrants (illegal and legal) to Australia. The number of immigrants would be expected to rise in the event of instability on the peninsula. This may lead to the significant tightening of visa rules for Korean nationals (currently South Koreans can apply for Australian visas with relative ease). A third threat relates to North Korea as a source of biohazards that threaten humans and animals. The prevalence of Tuberculosis (TB) and drug-resistant TB, for example, is one of the highest outside of sub-Saharan Africa¹⁰). Agricultural biohazards, including Foot and Mouth disease (endemic in North Korea), may arrive in Australia through smuggling and other illicit activity. These agricultural biohazards should be considered potential security threats given the importance of the agricultural sector to Australia's economy.

The post-unification strategic and security environment

North Korea's unwillingness to engage and cooperate with international security norms has caused deep insecurity and

10) K. J. Seung and Stephen W. Linton, "The Growing Problem of Multidrug-Resistant Tuberculosis in North Korea," *PLoS Med*, Vol. 10, No. 7 (2013).

uncertainty in the region. The need to manage the DPRK has arguably diverted valuable diplomatic, economic and military resources away from productive peace building activities. Under the optimistic assumption that unification would result in the removal of the incumbent DPRK regime and the installation of a democratic authority for the whole of the Korean peninsula, then the strategic outlook for this region and Australia would be positive. Australia has consistently considered a divided Korean peninsula as a potential military flash point and the resolution of this ongoing conflict would be warmly welcomed by all in Australia. Of great importance to Australia, however, will be the nature and interests of the unified Korean entity that emerges from the unification process. Further, Australia will likely pay close attention to the attitudes of regional actors to a unified Korea, not least Japan, China and the United States. From a domestic perspective, Australia will view unification positively only if it results in a vibrant, democratic and economically prosperous Korean peninsula. From a regional perspective, Australia will hope for a unified Korea that is able to balance its relationship with China and Japan and be proactive and pragmatic in facilitating the construction of a regional security architecture to manage the competing interests in this region. This must allow for the participation of key international and regional players including China, Russia, the U.S. and Japan. Lastly, following unification, Korea's attitudes to its own nuclear capability will be a crucial part of this. If a new unified Korean

entity were to retain the North's nuclear capability then Australia would likely consider a nuclear-capable Korean peninsula to be destabilizing. It should be noted that Australia has participated in UN actions and taken bilateral steps against nations that they consider to have breached the NPT.¹¹⁾

(2) Economic Dimension

Australia's two-way trade with Asia is greater than its trade with the rest of the world combined and the countries tied to the success of the unification project—Japan, Korea, China and the U.S.—are Australia's main economic partners.¹²⁾ Thus unification will bring both economic risks and opportunities for Australia across its economy and particularly in key export sectors including services, agriculture and mineral resources.

Service sector exports

Service exports make up an important element of Australia's existing trade relationship with South Korea. In the case of instability on the Korean peninsula resulting from unification, Australia's education and tourism sector would suffer significantly. Korea is the third largest country of origin for

11) DFAT, "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)," (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), <<http://www.dfat.gov.au/security/npt.html>> (accessed: June 12, 2014).

12) DFAT, "Australia's trade in goods and services in 2013," (Australia Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), <<http://dfat.gov.au/publications/tgs/index.html>> (accessed: June 12, 2014).

Australia's international student arrivals.¹³⁾ Nearly 200,000 tourists arrived from South Korea for the 2013 calendar year generating revenue for Australia of 1.1 billion AUD in 2013, with significant growth is predicted for the future.¹⁴⁾ As China and Japan also constitute a significant proportion of Australia's education and tourism revenue, unification-related instability and economic uncertainty in that region presents a grave threat to these key Australian service sectors. Both sectors would also be hit if it was deemed necessary by Australia to tighten up visa regulations for South Koreans in order to control a major movement of people from the Korean peninsula.

However, a successful unification leading to a more prosperous and vibrant Korean peninsula promises many opportunities for Australia's service sector. For example, Korea's unified population of 75 million people will have an immediate and ongoing need for high quality education in a range of technical and academic specialities and across age groups. While South Korea has a high quality educational infrastructure, it will not be able meet all of the demands placed upon it by unification. Australian educational providers would be well placed to play a role in providing education services in areas including English language, vocational and academic training and postgraduate study. Korea's unification may also provide

13) Australian Trade Commission, "International Student Data," (Australian Government Australian Trade Commission), <<http://www.austrade.gov.au/Education/Student-Data/2013#.U5EjEVeyLkY>> (accessed: June 12, 2014).

14) Tourism Australia, "Japan and Korea," (Tourism Australia), <<http://www.tourism.Australia.com/markets/market-regions-japan-and-korea.aspx>> (accessed: June 12, 2014).

opportunity for other areas of Australia's service sector, for example financial services. This may take place through the expansion of existing relationships as well as through new Australian entrants into the Korean market. Macquarie Bank, for example, already has a successful track record in infrastructure financing in the Republic of Korea.¹⁵⁾ Further possibilities for Australia's service sector include provision of health care and care for the aged as Korea would need to dramatically expand its own provision in these areas to meet the demands of the additional population from the North as well as the need to rebuild the North's dilapidated health services.

Agricultural products

Korea is one of Australia's most important export markets for agricultural products—6% of Australia's agricultural exports go to South Korea.¹⁶⁾ Following the conclusion of the recent Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement, there is an expectation that agricultural exports to Korea will continue to grow. A weakened or disrupted Korean economy as a result of unification threatens this key Australian export market. Further, China and Japan are the destination for more than 25% of Australia's agricultural exports and so a unification process that leads to

15) Macquarie Bank Ltd., "Advisory and capital raising," (Macquarie Bank Limited), <<http://www.macquarie.kr/mgl/kr/local-activities/en/corporate>> (accessed: June 12, 2014); Emma Campbell, "Changing South Korea: Issues of identity and unification in formulating the Australia-Korea security policy, foreign policy, and wider relationship," *Korea Observer*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2010), pp. 117-143.

16) Department of Agriculture, "Trade and Market Access," (Australian Government Department of Agriculture), <<http://www.daff.gov.au/market-access-trade>> (accessed: June 12, 2014).

wider regional instability would be of significant concern.¹⁷⁾ A successful Korean unification, however, promises exciting export opportunities for Australia's agricultural sector. Following the unification, Korea's ability to expand its domestic agricultural production to meet the demands of an increasingly prosperous northern population will be limited. Australia's agricultural sector would be well placed to meet the needs of a unified Korean population through exports of staples of the contemporary Korean diet including beef, sugar, rice, barley, and wheat.

Minerals and natural gas

Minerals (excluding natural gas) were Australia's largest export in 2012~2013. This sector contributes 10% of gross domestic product and provides employment to more than 250,000 people.¹⁸⁾ More than any other sector, a peaceful and stable Northeast Asia is essential to its continued growth and success. However, there are a number of specific variables that will further determine unification's impact upon Australia's mineral and gas sector. For example, Korea is the destination for 15% of Australia's coal exports and in total more than 75% of Australia's coal exports go to Northeast Asia.¹⁹⁾ When analysing the impact of unification on the coal sector, one

17) DFAT, "Agriculture and the WTO," (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), <http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/trade_in_agriculture.html> (accessed: June 12, 2014).

18) Geoscience Australia, "Mineral Basics," (Australian Government Geoscience Australia), <<http://www.ga.gov.au/minerals/basics.html>> (accessed: June 12, 2014).

19) *Ibid.*, p. 67.

consideration would be the likely effect of a cheap and plentiful supply of natural gas becoming available to Korea through the construction of a gas pipeline from Russia to the Korean peninsula. Such a pipeline has been long discussed and the unification of the Korean peninsula would remove one of the key obstacles to its construction.²⁰⁾ The possibility of a gas pipeline will also be of close interest to the Australian LNG sector given that all of Australia's LNG exports go to Northeast Asia. Further, Australia is the world's largest iron ore exporter and in 2013 iron ore and concentrates were Australia's single biggest export item to South Korea.²¹⁾ Northeast Asia accounts for all of Australia's iron ore exports closely tying the stability and prosperity of this region to the success of Australia's important iron ore industry.

c. Potential Roles

Australia is particularly well placed to offer support to Korea in the lead up to and following unification for a number of reasons: first, and as already highlighted, Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula is central to Australia's prosperity and

20) Youn Seek Lee, "The gas pipeline connecting South Korea, North Korea and Russia: effects, points of contention and tasks," (KINU Policy Study 11-05), <<http://www.kinu.or.kr/upload/neoboard/DATA02/rps11-05.pdf>> (accessed: June 12, 2014); "Gas pipeline to South Korea could be undersea, or go through North Korea-Putin," The Voice of Russia, October 7, 2013, <http://voiceofRussia.com/news/2013_10_07/Gas-pipeline-to-South-Korea-could-be-undersea-or-go-through-North-Korea-Putin-0081/> (accessed: June 12, 2014).

21) Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Republic of Korea Country Brief," *op. cit.*

security; second, Australia has diplomatic ties with both the DPRK and the ROK and experience of working with North Korea; third, Australia has significant aid and development expertise with particular experience in natural resources, public health, agriculture and public administration, and can assist in the redevelopment of North Korea; and lastly, Australia has strong political, military and trade relationships with countries across the Asian region that can be leveraged in discussions relating to the unification process. This means Australia can work with Korea in a multilateral setting as well as through the Australia-Korea bilateral relationship to ensure a peaceful and successful unification process.

(1) Country Level

The decision of the populations of North and South Korea to begin the process of unification is an internal political matter for the peoples of the two Koreas. However, Australia would be likely to recognize decisions made by legitimate representatives of the Korean people to move toward unification, and to provide any support necessary to achieve this goal in a peaceful and prosperous manner. However, for meaningful discussions on unification to take place, it is critical that the North has a democratically elected authority that can legitimately represent its population in the unification process. In pursuance of this, there are a number of roles that individual countries such as Australia can play in promoting a reformative regime in North Korea.

Australia's interest in ensuring peace and stability on the Korean peninsula means that it would be willing to play an active role in encouraging reform in North Korea in partnership with allies such as South Korea and the wider international community. Indeed, Australia has consistently raised its concerns over social conditions and human rights violations in the DPRK in both bilateral and multilateral forums. At present, Australia's bilateral relationship with North Korea is limited although Australia has publicly stated that it 'hopes to take forward our bilateral relationship with the DPRK but, for this to occur, the DPRK has to make substantial progress towards denuclearization and cease its provocations.'²²) However, should the conditions allow, Australia is well placed to offer the support necessary to engage with all levels of government and private sector individuals within the DPRK in an effort to promote reform. Australia can play a valuable role in the realm of capacity building in the public and private sectors leading up to and following unification through training that can encourage and promote alternative ideological, social and economic pathways for those with influence inside the DPRK. The Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) has extensive experience in the training and development of public officials and bureaucrats in the region including the Southwest Pacific, China, Singapore and Indonesia and could provide similar

22) DFAT, "Democratic People's Republic of Korea Country Brief," (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/dprk/dprk_brief.html> (accessed: September 2, 2014).

programs for North Korean officials, even at this early stage.²³⁾ Another example is the Australian National University's Crawford School of Public Policy which previously hosted a UNDP-funded program for North Korean bureaucrats, training them in subjects including economics, law and public administration.²⁴⁾ These organizations can work with the North and South Korean governments on projects aimed at developing the capacity of public officials in the North and promoting ideas of reform. Many of the leaders of post-Communist blocs had experienced study and exchange in the West and this is a tool that has been under-utilized in efforts to promote change in the DPRK. In the long-run it can also support the establishment functional democratic institutions and processes in the North.

The successful integration of the two Koreas will also be key to a smooth unification process. The pathway to promoting integration needs to begin now to ensure that the social and economic disparities between the two Koreas are dramatically narrowed in a timely fashion. The most basic challenge relates to food and nutrition and the humanitarian well-being of the population in the North. For example, the long-term consequences of the DPRK population's exposure to chronic malnutrition will be borne by a unified Korea and will create barriers for the successful integration of the two Koreas. Chronic malnutrition has long-term implications—stunting in childhood

23) ANZSOG, "About ANZSOG," (The Australia and New Zealand School of Government), <<http://www.anzsog.edu.au/>> (accessed: June 12, 2014).

24) Emma Campbell, "Changing South Korea," *op. cit.*

can impair cognitive development, school achievement, economic productivity in adulthood and maternal reproductive outcomes.²⁵⁾ Thus, targeted and well-monitored aid projects are urgently required. Recognizing political obstacles restricting South Korea, the United States and Japan from re-starting aid programs, and in line with international norms on the provision of humanitarian aid, Australia currently supports UN humanitarian assistance programmes in the DPRK. Recent cuts to Australia's aid programme means that this may not be continued in the longer-term. However, with appropriate encouragement from its allies, Australia may continue this existing support and even extend its aid programme by re-establishing bilateral aid programmes between Australia and the DPRK. Possible bilateral aid could include activities in land management, agroforestry, renewable energy and public health where Australia has expertise. Such projects would provide sustainable means of livelihood for North Korean communities, would benefit Australia by developing expertise on North Korea within its own institutions and would help mitigate some of the challenges that are posed by integrating the extremely poor North with the prosperous South.

In the event of unification, Australia may also have a potential consultative role in designing a future political system for a unified Korea that will support the integration of the two

25) K.G. Dewey and K. Begum, "Long-term consequences of stunting in early life," *Maternal and Child Nutrition*, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 5-18, <<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21929633>>.

countries. Should the two Koreas seek to integrate their social, economic, and political systems through a federal system, then Australia's own federal experience may be of great value to those drafting the constitution of a unified Korea. Australia's federal system divides powers between six states and territories and the central government. States and territories have authority to make laws on matters not controlled by the central government and have their own constitution, structure of legislature, executive and judiciary. Since federal models for Korean unification have been widely discussed in both the academic and political spheres, Australia may provide a useful example for such a system.

Moreover, should the integration of the two Koreas face challenges, and the unification process result in instability or conflict on the peninsula, Australia would be poised to offer both political and military support. There are many examples where Australia's military have played critical roles in international efforts to reduce conflict and promote peace. The most prominent example of Australia's role in peacekeeping in this region was the UN-mandated, Australia-led interventions in East Timor in 1999 and 2006. East Timor experienced serious conflict following its popular vote for independence from Indonesia in 1999. In 2006, violence again erupted between East Timorese government forces and renegade groups. The two Australian-led peacekeeping actions in East Timor are broadly considered to have played an important role in the

restoration of peace and security on both occasions.²⁶⁾ Australia has also participated in peacekeeping operations in countries and territories including Bougainville, the Solomon Islands, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Darfur. As mentioned previously, the 2013 Defence White Paper has recognised the importance of stability on the Korean peninsula and in anticipation of various scenarios that might arise on the peninsula, including unification, the White Paper identified a need for preparedness and for the Australian Defence Force to develop strong and close ties with the ROK military.²⁷⁾

Finally, Australia has an important role in respect to resolving the ongoing nuclear issue. Australia is a member of the IAEA and Australia will continue to offer technical and diplomatic support to the monitoring and negotiation process through this organization. However, there are other precedents for Australia's involvement in negotiations with North Korea on their ongoing development of a nuclear capability. Australia was closely involved in the 1994 Framework Agreement and also dispatched a five member Australian diplomatic mission to Pyongyang in 2003 to discuss the nuclear issue.²⁸⁾ It is unlikely that Australia will be involved in the Six-Party Talks should they restart. But

26) Joanne Wallis, "Timor-Leste and the United Nations: From InterFET to the 2012 Elections," in Charles Hawksley and Nichole Georgeou (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: Case Studies from Australia, New Zealand and the Asia Pacific* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press 2013), pp. 111-114.

27) Australian Department of Defence, "2013 Australian Defence White Paper," *op. cit.*, p. 82.

28) Jeffrey Robertson, "North Korea Nuclear Crisis – Issues and Implications," Current Issues Brief, No. 18 (2002/2003), <http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB/cib0203/03CIB18> (accessed: September 2, 2014).

given the failure of the Six-Party Talks to achieve a significant outcome, if an alternative mode of negotiation with North Korea were to be considered, then Australia might be able to make a valuable contribution. In 2003, before the commencement of the Six-Party Talks, the U.S. proposed the [P5+5] talks and invited Australia to be one of the additional 5 participants.²⁹⁾ If such a diplomatic effort was re-launched, Australia's participation is a real possibility and is made more likely by its current (2013~2014) membership of the Security Council.

(2) Regional/Global Level

As well as working through the Australia-Korea bilateral relationship to support the unification process, Australia can play an important role at the regional and global level in a number of ways. First, Australia can act with South Korea to bring unification-related issues to the attention of key inter-government institutions including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asian Summit (EAS), or the Shangri-la Dialogue. For example, the unification is likely to give rise to large-scale people movements, considered as a non-traditional security threat. Australia will be paying close attention to this issue because of the implications for its own borders and security. However, the management of refugee and migrant movements requires regional action because of the transnational nature of migration-related issues. These include people smuggling, forced labour,

²⁹⁾ *Ibid.*

sex-trafficking, illegal adoptions and other exploitation of vulnerable people. Additional topics that would benefit from regional or global attention include other trans-national issues such as biohazards, criminal activity or environment threats that might emerge in the unification process.

Second, Australia could be an important ally for Korea in efforts to develop the necessary security, economic and political regional architecture to facilitate a peaceful emergence and acceptance of a unified Korean peninsula. There is a striking absence of effective regional institutions in the Northeast Asian region and the lack of an appropriate Northeast Asian regional forum for the management of the unification process should be considered a threat to regional stability. New regional architecture could develop from existing forums such as the Six-Party Talks or the East Asian Summit. Alternatively it may require the establishment of new institutions. Highlighting the role for countries like Australia in the creation of regional institutions and architecture, in a recent article on Northeast Asia's future security environment, Peter Hayes of the Nautilus institute highlighted the role of actors other than the U.S. in helping the ROK achieve long-term security in the region. He wrote that 'although the U.S. leadership is critical, as a middle power, the ROK is well positioned ... to exploit its location in regional inter-state relationships to conceptualize and promote a comprehensive security settlement strategy with each of the key parties, and with other partners such as the EU, Mongolia, ASEAN states, and Australia.'³⁰)

As a pathway to discussions on regional institutions, South Korea might wish to contemplate the establishment of a North Korea regional development fund, first proposed by Geoffrey See, as a source of finance for developing the DPRK in the process leading toward unification.³¹⁾ Australia is well-placed to participate, even lead as a ‘neutral’ chair of a fund. With expertise in many of the industries that North Korea will hope to develop (natural resources, tourism agriculture, large-scale infrastructure projects) it seems a natural fit given Australia’s close political and economic relations with the other key regional players and an existing diplomatic relationship with North Korea. Other areas of mutual interest for regional cooperation might include discussions on potential peacekeeping operations. Australia is likely to be involved with any peacekeeping operation that may be required on the peninsula leading up to or following unification. It will be wise, therefore, for Australia to begin consulting, in partnership with South Korea, with other regional partners on the requirements for peace-keeping and peace-building in the event of unification. Again, Australia’s role in leading such a project is appropriate given its unique regional position of having diplomatic relations with both the North and the South (unlike, for example, Japan and the United States).

30) Peter Hayes, “Policy Forum - ‘Six Party Talks and Multilateral Security Cooperation’,” *NAPSNet Policy Forum*, <<http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/policy-forum-six-party-talks-and-multilateral-security-cooperation/>> (accessed: June 10, 2014).

31) Geoffrey K. See, “An East Asian Development Fund for North Korea?” *East Asia Forum*, July 25, 2010, <<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/07/25/an-east-asian-development-fund-for-north-korea/>> (accessed: June 12, 2014).

d. Implications for Korea

This paper has highlighted the potential for other nations to become closely involved in the Korean unification process. This, however, has an overarching implication for Korea—that its political, bureaucratic, military and commercial institutions must accept that unification cannot be considered a purely domestic issue and that Korea must begin to proactively engage bilateral and multilateral relationships in preparation for unification. Australia is likely to become directly involved in peninsula issues only under certain conditions: if its immediate security is threatened; if there is a UN mandate; in pursuance of its obligations under the ANZUS treaty; or in response to a request from the ROK government. It is understood by the author that the issue of unification is not considered a key issue in the Korea-Australian bilateral relationship. However, in the 2013 Defence White Paper the Australian government signalled its interest in developing closer ties with the ROK military in preparation for various contingencies. Korea should respond by initiating unification-related discussions through bilateral channels and communicate Korea's willingness for Australia to play a role in the unification process. This may involve South Korea urging Australia to play a leading role in the actions of international organizations of which it is a member, such as the Security Council, the IAEA or other UN organizations. It might also entail discussions between South Korea and Australia about possible

bilateral actions on the part of Australia to encourage change and reform in North Korea. Opinion polls in South Korea suggest that there is clear support for the participation of regional powers in the unification process and by opening up to cooperation with allies like Australia, Korea will be able to avail itself of resources and expertise that can assist in the achievement of a smooth Korean unification process.³²⁾

(1) Pre-unifying Process

Promoting incremental change in the DPRK

Current data on the economic gap between North Korea and South Korea suggests that per capita income in the South is nineteen times that of the North.³³⁾ Minimizing this gap will be key to preventing major economic and social discord following unification. Australia's potential roles in the unification process as described above can make a contribution to bridging the economic gap between the North and South in tangible ways through aid, investment and capacity building.

Activities such as people-to-people contact and exchange also have the potential to hasten change in the North. It should be considered that the persistence of the DPRK regime can be in part attributed to its policy of economic and cultural

32) Myoung-kyu Park, Byung-to Kim, Yeong-hun Song, Yong-seok Jang, and Eun-mi Chang (eds.), *2013 Survey of Attitudes to unification* (Seoul: Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, 2013), pp. 362~365.

33) "Trade, economic gaps between 2 Koreas remain wide: data," *Yonhap News*, December 23, 2012. <<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/12/23/3/0401000000AEN20131223003100320F.html>> (accessed: June 13, 2014).

isolation.³⁴⁾ Indeed, among the recommendations made by the Australia former Chief Justice Michael Kirby in the UN Commission of Inquiry Report on Human Rights in North Korea, he called for ‘the promotion of incremental change through more people-to-people contacts’ in areas including ‘science, sports, good governance and economic development’ to ‘provide citizens of the DPRK with opportunities to exchange information and be exposed to experiences outside their home country.’³⁵⁾ The granting of humanitarian aid to the DPRK is another means of promoting people to people contacts. Kirby’s report supported the provision of humanitarian assistance to the DPRK and criticised the withholding of humanitarian aid as a tool to impose economic or political pressure on the DPRK, while acknowledging the importance of strong monitoring systems.³⁶⁾ However, the withholding of humanitarian support for the people of the DPRK risks the precipitation of long-term instability caused by possible civil unrest, public health disasters, criminality and non-existent public infrastructure and institutions. Humanitarian support is an immediate tool for mitigating these risks and it also presents an opportunity for information and data collection on the current situation and future needs of the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, humanitarian engagement has a track-record of promoting

34) Andrei Lankov, “Changing North Korea: An infiltration campaign can beat the regime,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 6 (October/November 2009), pp. 95~105.

35) United Nations, *Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry*, p. 370.

36) *Ibid.*, p. 371.

externalities including a culture of negotiation and compromise, self-sufficiency, the establishment of markets and the questioning of authority. Humanitarian exchanges are capable of encouraging ‘ideological and cultural infiltration’ of ideas. It is recognised that there are particular domestic and international political challenges for South Korea and the United States to participate in large scale aid programmes in the North. Australia is well positioned to act as an important proxy for aid programmes that may have otherwise been undertaken by South Korea or the United States. The major implication for Korea of allowing and encouraging Australia to pursue the various humanitarian and aid options discussed in this paper is that the benefits of engagement can be achieved, for example improving the living standards and narrowing the economic and social gap between the two Koreas. However, this can be done without the potential political costs of the U.S. or South Korea giving aid to the DPRK in the current political environment.

Promoting positive attitudes to the unification in South Korea

Opinion polls in South Korea suggest growing antipathy and anxiety regarding the unification with North Korea. In 2013, a poll suggested that around 24% of people opposed unification and 22% were ambivalent.³⁷⁾ This number increases significantly

37) Park, et al., 2013 *Survey of Attitudes to unification*, p. 272.

among younger age groups. More than 50% of people believe that South Korea will not benefit from unification, with most believing that crime, unemployment, regional division, ideological division and inequality will worsen.³⁸⁾ This suggests that most people feel that South Korea is wholly unprepared for unification. One way to counter this is to improve the perception and reality of Korea's preparedness through increased bilateral and regional cooperation and discussions on the topic of unification. By working with regional partners to prepare for various unification scenarios, and by sharing those efforts with the Korean general public, such efforts may go some way to providing assurance that Korea will be supported during the unification process and that possible destabilizing events, such as conflict between China and the United States, are being pre-empted. The unification will only be successful if the process has the full support of the South Korean population who will inevitably carry the major burden of the costs of unification. Current attitudes suggest that unification is rapidly losing support among the population and South Korea would benefit from any activities that might reverse this trend.

38) *Ibid.*, pp. 288-293.

(2) Unifying Process

A trusted partner with shared values and goals in Korean unification process

Korea is a prosperous and developed country with wide ranging expertise and resources within its borders but its resources are, of course, finite. While the unification will unlock resources in the North to help with the rebuilding process, the experience of German unification demonstrates the need for regional—and potentially global—involvement. Australia is an ideal partner for Korea to share the burden of the challenges that will emerge during the unification process for two reasons in particular: the two countries have an existing partnership and, perhaps most importantly, the nature of Australia's interest in the Korean peninsula is transparent and non-threatening. For example, the potential threats to Australia that might inspire a close interest in unification—conflict, economic instability, people movements, biohazards and transnational crime—are also threats to the long-term interests of a unified Korean entity. Further, Australia's interests in ensuring a peaceful and prosperous Korean peninsula are also very clear: a successful unification and stable Northeast Asian region serves Australia's domestic political, economic, and security goals which are based on protecting Australia's sovereignty, people and assets, building sustainable security in the region and shaping a favourable international environment.³⁹⁾ Alongside the many benefits of

working with Australia in the unification process, Australia's non-threatening character makes it a trustworthy ally and partner for the Republic of Korea and a unified Korean entity.

Establishing a just and democratic unified Korea

It is in the interests of Korea's population and economic future that a unified Korean entity is a vibrant democracy. The unification process, however, presents many threats to domestic stability and to Korea's relatively nascent democracy. These will emerge from the complexity of dealing with the legacy of the DPRK regime and integrating the North into the South's liberal democratic system. Examples of the sorts of issues that will be faced include: prosecuting human rights violations and other crimes committed in the DPRK ("transitional justice"), dealing with the non-traditional security threats discussed above while at the same time protecting human rights and maintaining the rule of law and integrating the North into a unified Korean political, judicial and legal system. While this is a project that should be directed by the people and government of a unified Korea, Korea should take advantage of the experts from other countries including Australia who have participated in state building projects in its own region. For example, Australia has experience in Papua New Guinea (PNG) in projects involved in strengthening the PNG public service and PNG Electoral Commission. It has also worked to help the PNG Government

39) Australian Department of Defence, "2013 Australian Defence White Paper," p. 23.

develop stronger law and justice agencies including building community confidence in PNG's police, supporting police to detect, investigate and prosecute crime and supporting anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and proceeds of crime initiatives.⁴⁰⁾ In Timor-Leste Australia has been working with central government ministries to improve public financial management systems, develop fiscal policy frameworks, and improve procurement procedures.⁴¹⁾ While South Korea already has strong democratic institutions, additional expertise and support will be needed to help those in the North create a democratic culture. The culture that is created must be responsive to its population and must develop its institutions in ways that will help integrate the North into a unified entity. using the expertise of countries such as Australia will ultimately be of benefit to the whole of a unified Korean peninsula by ensuring the establishment of a liberal democratic system.

e. Observation

Australia has much offer the Korean peninsula in the unification process—military support, humanitarian and development expertise, commercial opportunity and diplomatic support in the region. A smooth and successful unification

40) DFAT, "Papua New Guinea," (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), <<http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/pacific/png/Pages/default.aspx>> (accessed: June 14, 2014).

41) DFAT, "Timor-Leste," (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), <<http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/eastasia/timor-leste/Pages/default.aspx>> (accessed: June 14, 2014).

process has the potential to bring tremendous security and economic benefits to Australia. Instability, however, threatens Australia's lucrative economic ties with Korea and Northeast Asian region. Any major interruption to peace and stability in the region may require a response from the Australian government including the deployment of Australian Defence Forces to support stabilization efforts on the Korean peninsula. In preparation and anticipation of the various challenges that might arise in the case of unification, Australia can offer a range of help and support to its ally and partner, South Korea. For example, Australia is well positioned to take the lead in providing humanitarian aid to the North, to develop and deliver capacity building projects and to participate in moves to encourage the North to follow international norms in areas including their nuclear programme and human rights. At a regional and global level, Australia can use its leadership role in key inter-governmental forums such as ASEAN, the East Asia Summit and Shangri-la Dialogue to ensure that unification is on the agenda in order to seek regional solutions to the many challenges that will arise from the unification process. Australia can also help to develop new regional security and economic regional infrastructure to support South Korea in the unification process.

Australia is an ideal partner for these and other efforts. It is in a relatively distinct position of having strong and close ties with the ROK and the United States, yet maintaining a functioning diplomatic relationship with the DPRK. However,

immediate efforts are required on the part of Korea and Australia to develop the necessary understanding between the governments and to identify areas for cooperation in preparation for unification. There are few countries with such similar interests as Australia and South Korea. Located in the Asia Pacific region, both countries are so-called middle powers. They recognize the limits of their military and strategic capacities yet want to shape the global and regional environment to ensure a peaceful and prosperous environment for their respective nations to develop and grow. Further, Australia and Korea's economic strengths are more complimentary than competing, as evidenced by the successful conclusion of the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement. The similarities in interests and complementarity in trade has resulted in strong economic and political ties between Australia and Korea. As a result, unification will have significant implications for Australia's economic, security and political outlook and Australia has a vested interest in ensuring continued political and economic stability in the unification process. It is in the interests of the Korean government and the population of the peninsula to make use of this opportunity to develop a strong and valuable partnership with Australia as Korea and the Northeast Asian region prepares for the challenging process of Korean unification.

3 | Brazil

a. Overview

Brazil and South Korea officially established diplomatic relations in 1949. It was the eighth country in the world and the second in Latin America (after Chile) to have an official relation with South Korea. Following in the footsteps of the U.S., it systematically always voted in favor of South Korea at the UN. In 1965 it opened its embassy in Seoul, while Korea having already set up its first embassy in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro) in 1962.⁴²⁾

Even so, the relationship between Brazil and South Korea, in a generic way, remained at very low levels. In May 1963, a Trade Agreement was signed and entered into and also in February 1963, Korean emigration began when a project of the Korean government and with support from that of Brazil was implemented. Although this official flow was interrupted in 1973, clandestine entry via Paraguay and Bolivia was maintained.⁴³⁾ The current estimate is that there are nearly 50,000 South Koreans, 200,000 Chinese and more than 1 million Japanese in Brazil.

42) Gilmar Masiero, "A Economia Coreana: características estruturais," Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (eds.), *Coreia: Visões Brasileiras* (Brasília: FUNAG, 2002), p. 235.

43) Sangki Lee, *Brasil e Coreia do Sul: aspectos político-econômicos do relacionamento bilateral* (MSc dissertation, Universidade de Brasília, 1995), pp. 58-62.

In fact, mutual interests began to be defined only in the 1990s, on the one hand, after South Korea started a policy of internationalization in the mid-1980s and, on the other, after the Brazilian market opened up in the 1990s.

In the early 1990s, Brazil began to adhere to the liberal trade system, by opening up its internal market and taking measures directed towards the reform of the State.

As a result of these new developments, East Asia began to be seen as a strategic area in Brazil's attempts to be regarded as having a more active role internationally and this had important political and economic content.

In the political field, based on the premises that: ① the process of redefining the international order, in its different aspects, would take long time and demand intense negotiation; ② the difficulty in attaining global arrangements made the case for local solutions that has intensified the tendency towards regionalism; and that ③ South America would tend to remain in the United States' sphere of influence, Brazil began to act, strategically, with two objectives: first, by strengthening the South-American region as a launching pad for international insertion, and, second, by broadening relations with different regional hubs. In this context, despite the more traditional relationships with the United States and with Europe, it became a priority to use relations with Asia as a negotiation instrument with these two major hubs.

Brazil's re-positioning of itself in this way reflected a dual

interest. On the one hand, it was motivated by the perspective of association with a region of the world which presented itself as a model for economic as well as scientific and technological development, with plenty of potential for complementarity and partnerships. On the other, Asia was a region that, politically, was responsive to Brazilian demands in terms of bilateral relations and similarly to Brazil's seeking greater recognition in multilateral forums, with a view to ensuring that Brazilian policy directives for autonomy in its international standing are met and for diversifying its partnerships.

South Korea, for its part and due to its main expectations, kept a distance between itself and Brazil and Latin America. "Up to the 1980s, Korea's diplomatic efforts largely focused on economic, military and security cooperation with the United States. Even its relations with Japan and European countries did not draw fair attention, due to Korea's obsession with military confrontation with North Korea and the importance of its alliance with the U.S., Southeast Asia, South Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Africa remained mostly outside the Korean government's major diplomatic concerns."⁴⁴)

Jyoung, similarly, notes that Latin America was, for a long time, ignored by most Koreans, adding that Korean interest in the Latin American market in the mid-1990s sprung on the one hand, from the domestic potential of this market as well

44) Won-Ho Kim, "Korean Relations with Latin America: Policy Goals and Constraints," Jorg Faust, Manfred Mols, Won-Ho Kim (eds.), *Latin America and East Asia: Attempts and Diversification* (Seoul: KIEP, 2002), p. 163.

as the possibility of strategic access to the North American market.⁴⁵⁾

As a complement to this, and within this process of seeking a greater relationship with Asia, Brazilian diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) were established during the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in 2001. North Korea established its embassy in Brasilia in 2005 and the Brazilian embassy in Pyongyang was opened in 2009. Being one of only twenty-five countries that have an embassy in North Korea, it should not be forgotten that Brazil's decision to recognize North Korea was strongly motivated by the beginning of the Sunshine Policy of President Kim Dae Jung and grounded on the expectation that this would advance his intention of creating conditions for the unification of the Korean Peninsula.

Separate from the recent nature of Brazil's rapprochement with Asia and the Korean Peninsula, this does not mean that Brazil kept and still keeps well away from issues and problems pending solution in Asia. A former Brazilian ambassador presents the reflection that Brazil was one of the pioneers in introducing the topic of "global governance" and started doing so in the early 1960s. A curious irony is that long before the idea of global governance, becoming fashionable, Brazil has been pushing for this since the 60s, with a view to reforming the

45) Taik-Hwan Jyoung, "Economic Relations between Korea and Latin America," Peter H. Smith, Kotaro Horisaka, Shoji Nishijima (eds.), *East Asia and Latin America: The unlikely alliance* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), p. 67.

international system.⁴⁶⁾

This deliberation is even better understood with the image that Brazil built up over time of placing the emphasis on the peaceful resolution of international disputes. “Brazil (···) has historically valued the norms of sovereignty, non-intervention, and peaceful resolution of disputes in international relations.”⁴⁷⁾

Therefore, this article, based on the reality of the division of the Korean Peninsula and the nuclearization of North Korea, focuses specifically on the analysis, on the one hand, of the spin-off from these facts for Brazil and, on the other, the role that Brazil will take in a process of Korean unification.

b. Expected Effect

(1) Security Dimension

The end of the Cold War which included eliminating the defined polarities (in terms of socialism versus capitalism) led to the decentralization of security issues that have taken on a more regionalized character rather than the hitherto universalized one. That is, with the disappearance of their ideological character, conflicts have regained a territorial meaning, which implied that the problem is more of a regional matter than a universal one and that the responsibilities for

46) Roberto Abdenur, “Brasil precisa corrigir algumas distorções e equívocos,” *Valor Econômico*, Junho 4, 2010.

47) Harold Trinkunas, *Brazil's Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2014), p. 2.

the security of the States in the region have been broadened and that regional security schemes should be drawn up.

Stanley Hoffman argues for the idea that the world has become much more complex because, instead of the rigidity of the bipolar scheme, it has entered into a system with a significant increase in the number of independent States that are now engaged in intense competition for economic and financial power.⁴⁸⁾ This means that international insecurity is expanding because of the increase in the number of participants and variables, implying, when States set their strategies, this covers apart from the limited vision of military security also that of economic security.

And, therefore, East Asia stands out because of the presence or reappearance of a series of conflicts that lay dormant during the Cold War period and which indicate a high probability of instabilities, such as the issue of the Korean Peninsula in itself, divided by the 38th parallel due to the Demilitarized Zone and there being an increased threat because of the nuclearization of North Korea; the dispute between Japan and Russia over the Northern Territories; the China-Taiwan conflict, the dispute in the South China Sea over the Spratly and Paracels archipelagos and, in equal measure, the Senkaku/Diaoyu and Dokdo/Takeshima disputes in the East China Sea. Although a relative improvement in interstate relations and a reduction

48) Stanley Hoffman, "Delusions of World Order," *The New York Review of Books*, April 9, 1992, pp. 37~43.

in regional tensions can be observed, Asia on the Pacific remains one of the most heavily armed regions in the world and with a tendency for the arms race to grow.

In the case of the Korean Peninsula, it is understood, generically, that:

- ① North Korea, with a strong pattern of development until the mid 1970s, began, from the 1980s, to present economic problems worsened by the process of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
- ② Diplomatic recognition South Korea/Russia and South Korea/China widened North Korean isolation as a result of the commitments to reduce ties with North Korea and with the promise to work at denuclearizing the Korean peninsula.
- ③ Isolation and lack of options provoke the strategy of accelerating nuclear capability and using this as a bargaining factor. In different crises, using the nuclear issue for political survival and international aid is obvious.

However, the permanence of this insecurity apparently stems from two basic factors: ① the regional players' and the United States' lack of political will to solve the problem and ② the unwillingness of the North Korean government to relax its internal political system.

There is Thus a need for a regional security system to ensure peace. However, a question still lingers: would it be better to maintain the current status quo, with security being ensured

by bilateral military agreements or by the effective presence of the Seventh Fleet than to seek solutions for the Korean Peninsula, as well as for the Taiwanese issue, or for other issues such as the Northern Territories (the Kuril Islands)?

What are the standpoints of the regional players in relation to the subject under consideration, since they all were and are involved with the issue: the United States and Russia (Soviet Union) since they imposed the division; Japan because of its recent past of territorial occupation of the Peninsula; and China as a co-participant of the Korean War, a supporter of North Korea and as it borders the peninsula. Unification is a question that, first and foremost, involves the outlooks of the two Korean States or Governments, but it also directly affects the interests of other States due to the confrontational atmosphere reigning in East Asia.

What would happen if there were American troops in South Korea? How would China react to the maintenance of these troops if moved northwards? Otherwise, with the withdrawal of the U.S. troops, what would the security strategy of the peninsula be?

And would Japan feel safer, if unification took place? Objectively, at present, one of the major unknowns is what exactly is China's role in the unification, and her interest in the process?

Would the United States boycott Six-party Negotiations? Could it be, if it does not, that it cannot be reasoned that the

nuclear crisis in North Korea and China's role in coordinating negotiations between the six participating countries (Six-Party Talks) illustrate the widening of China's strategic role in East Asia? Just as the fact that it is no longer labeled as a "strategic competitor," but as a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system? If the United States accepts the need to share responsibilities, this transfer is nonetheless a pragmatic opportunity for China to show itself to be a responsible and cooperative player. But, at any rate, negotiations have to do solely with the nuclear issue, not with interfering in the path to unification.

Because of the large distance from Asia, the Brazilian population does not directly feel the perception of threat or insecurity due to the Asian conflicts in Asia, or in particular, by North Korea's nuclear development.

However, there is the clear notion that any conflict in Asia will prompt global instabilities, which will immediately affect South America and threaten international peace and prosperity. Therefore, Brazil argues for the need to seek a diplomatic solution either for unification or to reduce the nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula.

(2) Economic Dimension

The present analysis is based on the fact that until the 1970s, Brazil's relations with Asia were basically limited to Japan, while

in the 1990s, they were broadened and undertaken more vigorously and now included not only South Korea and other Southeast Asian countries, but also China, which, as a consequence of its accelerated development, was no longer just a political player but also had a strong consumer and supplier market to offer as well. Broad initiatives such as ‘the Special Partnership’ between Brazil and South Korea for the 21st Century, ‘the Strategic Partnership’ with China, and ‘the Alliance for the 21st Century’ with Japan reflect the perception, on both sides, of the potential of this relationship.

Therefore, in 1993, during the Itamar Franco administration, Asia was defined as one of the priorities of Brazilian diplomacy, due to the potential for cooperation in the fields of science and technology, as well as to its significant import and export markets. In this context, President Cardoso also defined Asia as one of the priorities of his administration’s foreign policy. And similarly, President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva clearly stated the need to strengthen ties with Japan, China and India. This high-level reference to these countries indicated a new interest and direction for relations between Brazil and Asia.

From the 1990s onwards, the rebirth of Brazil’s relationship with Asia had some marked differences to what it had been in previous periods. First, Japan remained, initially, as Brazil’s most important partner in the commercial and investment fields, but gradually its preponderant influence ebbed away to other competitors. Relations with China, South Korea and the

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) were significantly increased. These improvements were, however, affected by the Asian financial crisis, which provoked a drastic reduction in Brazilian exports to Asia. Conversely, Brazilian imports from Asia were not affected and remained at pre-crisis levels.

As a result of this shift, from 2009, Asia became the main destination of Brazilian exports (25.8%), thereby replacing the traditional position held by the European Union (22.3%), and this greater importance of Asia arose, in particular, from the growth of exports to China (+23.1%).

As Asia is likewise the main source of Brazilian imports (28.3%), it also became Brazil's main trading partner, in terms of economic blocks.

Undeniably, Asia's expanding share in Brazil's balance of trade accounts and the United States' and the European Union's relative loss of importance have to do with the changes that are being undergone in the structure of international trade, with Asia (the Pacific rim) taking over a space previously occupied by the Western world (the Atlantic).

As pointed out earlier, the economic and trade relationship with South Korea began to have significance only after the end of the Cold War. In 1989, a Memorandum was signed in Brasilia to set up a Joint Commission to discuss and promote greater cooperation between the two countries in the 1990s.

In accordance with their respective interests, the Foreign

Minister, Francisco Rezek, visited Seoul in August 1991, this being the first visit by a Brazilian delegation at the ministerial level, and signed the Agreement for a Framework on Scientific and Technological Cooperation. Also in 1991, Brazil supported and exercised the leadership role in the process for both South Korea as well as North Korea to become members of the UN.

Although the Agreement of this Framework has not prospered, the business relationship has acquired relevance in the context of restructuring the post-Cold War international system. South Korea's growing share in Brazilian trade appears to have been reinforced by the fact that Korean conglomerates have been showing themselves to be more aggressive in winning markets whether in South America, or in Brazil, by seeking to supplant the traditional role played by Japan.

As a result of this growing economic and political relationship, in September 1996, the South Korean President Kim Young Sam visited Brazil as the head of a delegation of 40 businessmen. On this occasion the Brazil-Korea Commission for the 21st Century was set up and consists of leading figures from civil society in both countries. Its mission is to expand the bilateral relationship.

The Commission met four times between 1996 and 1999, alternately in South Korea and Brazil, "it left a legacy of mutual discovery, through contacts with departments and institutions from the country alternately visited. Knowledge about the accomplishments of each side was accumulated, in the fields

of information technology, telecommunications, electronics, biotechnology applied to agriculture and to health.”⁴⁹⁾

After Kim Young Sam’s 1996 visit, strong business growth was maintained, added to which was the intensification of Korean investments. This trend in investment, however, was reversed after the Asian financial crisis, together with a strong retraction in Korean imports.

In January 2001, Fernando Henrique Cardoso visited Seoul and at the meeting with Kim Dae-jung proclaimed the launch of a “special partnership between Brazil and South Korea for the 21st century.”

In 2004, the South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun visited Brazil, and the following year, Lula visited Seoul in May, when the Brazil-Korea Forum embarked with the objective of evaluating the outlook for bilateral relations. And in 2008, President Lee Myung-bak visited Brazil.

Apparently the relationship between Brazil and South Korea is growing not only in commercial terms, but also markedly in investments. Such trend arise from the Republic of Korea’s current need, to seek external spaces to maintain its international competitiveness and, to reduce its economic dependence on China, who has become its number one trading partner.

Note that in the 1990s, before the Asian financial crisis, South Korea had strongly intended to expand direct foreign investment

49) Amaury Porto de Oliveira, “Os Asiáticos se Preparam para a Sociedade do Conhecimento,” Aldo Rebelo, et al. (eds.), *Seminário Política Externa do Brasil para o Século XXI* (Brasília: Câmara dos Deputados, 2002), p. 323.

in Brazil, with the objective of setting up production plants to serve both the domestic and regional markets.

Even though most of these prospective investments have not been brought into effect due to the onset of the Asian crisis, Korea's intention to increase investment was interesting for Brazil since it was an anomaly from Korea's investment trend and the dominant presence of Japanese investments in Brazil: an emphasis on exploiting or processing Brazil's natural resources to serve the Japanese market. Note that this pattern of investment might not interest Brazil, but the South Korean viewpoint of emphasizing the production of manufactured goods to third markets was more attractive.

Apparently in recent years, South Korea, with a consequent greater dependence arising from its intense financial/productive investment in China, is seeking to diversify its partnerships and searching for a greater presence in the Brazilian market.

Moreover, changes occurred in different players' perceptions, with respect to Brazil due to its new potentialities: its domestic market; its internationalization process which has led to a greater presence of Brazilian companies abroad; its technologies correlated to ethanol and biofuels; its discoveries of oil in the pre-salt layer, etc.

In other words, Brazil is perceivably a regional power, which contributes to raising the quality of international economic development, with its growing dynamism and democratic stability. This image is further complemented by looking at Brazil

as a country of opportunities not only in traditional sectors but also in cutting-edge sectors which thereby entails interaction between capital, technology, natural resources and also the market.

This renewed Korean interest in Brazil has once again proved to be very interesting to Brazil because Korea maintains the perspective of investments which are not directly targeted on the later supply of its domestic market but instead on other overseas markets.

Brazil is Thus, at this moment, dependent on the market, the technologies and Asian investments and also on the political and strategic relationship maintained with the region. Consequently, should conflicts and threats be removed, Asia will be a region that may well best meet its external demands.

c. Potential Roles

Brazil is an international player who is very clear that it very much wishes to participate in the processes of global governance and consequently have a greater decision-making capacity. Thus, there is no doubt that Brazil, labeled as an emerging power, can and equally wishes to demonstrate that it intends to cooperate in seeking a solution to the instability on the Korean Peninsula, whether in the nuclear dimension or in the unification process.

It took part in the Peace Conference in the post-First World

War period and in creating the League of Nations. It was a non-permanent member of the Council of the League of Nations. It participated in the creation of the United Nations and was not confirmed as a permanent member of the Security Council (SC), this having being opposed by the USSR and England who favored France. Brazil and Japan are the two countries that have most often been elected as non-permanent members of the UNSC.

Despite having refused to abide by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT - 1968), Brazil eventually joined the treaty in 1997. To indicate that its intentions were peaceful, Brazil signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty - 1967) and is also a member of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL - 1969), as well as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG - 1996). It formed with Argentina the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). After the Agency was created, in 1991, they also signed the Quadripartite Agreement between Brazil, Argentina, ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the application of safeguards. By having signed this Quadripartite Agreement and establishing a set of safeguards with the IAEA, before joining the NTP, the two countries obtained international legitimacy and reaffirmed their commitment to nonproliferation.⁵⁰⁾

50) Everton Vieira Vargas, "Átomos na integração: a aproximação Brasil-Argentina no campo

Therefore, Brazil can contribute to the process of unification in two dimensions: first, it directly relates to the nuclear issue and second, politically act as an intermediary between the parties and between the regional actors in their respective points of view on the unification of the Koreas.

(1) Country Level

It is obvious that Brazilian and Latin American reality is extremely different from the political-strategic environment observed in Northeast Asia. Brazil has not had experience of a real war situation since the second half of the nineteenth century, whereas the countries in Asia Pacific is have experienced an endless sequence of conflicts.

The interest in nuclear development in Brazil and Argentina were perceived as arising from the objectives of technological autonomy and associated with their respective development projects and as a deterrent. In this climate of rivalry, how the two countries reached a cooperative process of building trust and above all of formalizing control and mutual monitoring is nonetheless an experiment that can serve as inspiration to other countries.

The Argentine-Brazilian cooperation, in fact, is not uncommon in international dialogue. Even with regard to the Korean Peninsula, two countries have had several considerations

nuclear e a construção do Mercosul," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (January/June 1997), p. 53.

and given proposals.⁵¹⁾ It is taken up again hereon the understanding that in advancing Korean unification, the political will and the way to deal with the nuclear issue are prior and fundamental and that, therefore, the bilateral (Argentina and Brazil) and multilateral (Quadripartite) experiences provide elements that can contribute to the design of agreements and institutions that fit the Asian regional scenario.

In the 1970s, the Brazilian-Argentine relationship reached the most critical point of rivalry because of Brazil's decision to build the Itaipu hydroelectric plant, without prior consultation with Argentina. The backwaters soon reached Argentine territory and because processes for the wider use of nuclear power in both countries.

Brazil and Argentina had points in common such as their actions in the negotiations on the Tlatelolco Treaty and their resistance to signing the NPT. Both considered that it was crucial for their industrial development to have access to nuclear technology and thus, were opposed to what they called "technological neo-colonialism." The link with defense was

51) Seongwhun Cheon, "Applying ABACC Experiences to the Korean Peninsula: Possibilities and Action Plans," (The Institute for Science and International Security, 2001), <www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/cheon.pdf>; Carlos Feu Alvim, "Potential Application of the ABACC Model to Other Regions," (The Institute for Science and International Security, 2001), <<http://isis-online.org/conferences/detail/building-nuclear-confidence-on-the-korean-peninsula-proceedings-of-the-july/10>>; Guillermo Pinczuk, "Building Multi-Party Capacity for a WMD-Free Korea: Verification, Dismantlement, and Ongoing Monitoring," (International Federation of Placenta Associations, 2005), <<http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/shanghai/Verification-Briefing.pdf>>; Michael Hamel-Green, "Implementing a Japanese-Korean Nuclear Weapon Free Zone: Precedents, legal forms, governance, scope and domain, verification and compliance, and regional benefits," (Nautilus, 2010), <<http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/apsnet/reports/2010/hamel-green.pdf>>.

clearer in Argentina mainly when considering the rivalries not only with Brazil, but also the almost imminent conflict with Chile over the Beagle Channel.

As there was no alternative and by frustrating military expectations, the Agreement on Nuclear Cooperation with Germany (1975) was complemented by a clandestine parallel program, the Autonomous Program of Nuclear Technology (PATN, in Portuguese). For Morrison, “of the three programs pursued under PATN, the Navy’s was by far the most successful, and ultracentrifuge technology Became the chosen method of attaining enriched fissile material.”⁵²⁾

With the resolution of contentious issues on Itaipu in 1979, there began the process of building mutual trust at the strategic-military level, with the signing of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Argentina in 1980, which restricted the use of nuclear power to peaceful purposes.⁵³⁾ Although much of the literature on Brazilian foreign policy points out that the process of re-democratization, in 1985, was the underpinning factor for the project to integrate Brazil-Argentina, this article considers that re-democratization was undeniably an important factor, but it was not the decisive one. That is, it was the Nuclear

52) Daphne Morrison, “Brazil’s Nuclear Ambitions, Past and Present,” (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2006), <<http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/brazils-nuclear-ambitions/>>; Brazil’s Air force researched laser technology, while the Army focused on graphite reactors and the Navy, in conjunction with the Institute of Energy and Nuclear Research (IPEN) on the ultracentrifuges.

53) Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro (Brazil) and Carlos W. Pastor (Argentina), “Cooperation Agreement between Brazil and Argentina for the Development and Application of the Peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy,” (The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material, May 17, 1980), <<http://www.abacc.org.br/?p=530> &lang=en>.

Cooperation Agreement of 1980 which established the basis for rapprochement undertaken by Presidents Sarney and Alfonsín.

All phases of the integration process were complemented with a specific nuclear agreement. The Declaration of Iguazu in 1985 is complemented by its own text, entitled “Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy,” and reiterated “their commitment to develop nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes.”

In the 1986 “Act for Brazilian-Argentine Integration,” they reiterate the international commitments made by both countries for the exclusively peaceful application of their nuclear programs; and their common interest in expanding the autonomy of their respective nuclear programs.

Even with regard to the nuclear dimension and especially the broadening of the political will to establish a cooperative process, the Declarations of Viedma (1987), Iperó (1988) and Ezeiza (1988) were signed. Steps of the utmost importance since Viedma received the visit of President Sarney to the facilities of the Pilcaniyeu Enrichment Plant, the secret Argentine uranium enrichment project, unknown to the Brazilian authorities and even to western intelligence services.⁵⁴⁾ President Alfonsín visited Iperó, the Aramar Experimental Center where the equally secret Brazilian facilities of PATN were.

In Ezeiza, Sarney visited the Laboratory of Radiochemical Processes of the National Atomic Energy Commission, while

54) Vargas, “Átomos na integração,” p. 47.

the Declaration of Ezeiza presents the joint decision to: “continue to encourage, through the Permanent Committee on Nuclear Policy, a close political contact, the various joint projects and the fluent exchange of information, experiences and technical visits, as a means to ensure the definite enhancement of the cooperation mechanisms in the nuclear field and their permanence as a result of the existence of solid bases of friendship and of a firm commitment towards peace and development.”⁵⁵⁾ Along with the Declaration of Ezeiza, the Treaty for Integration, Cooperation and Development Brazil-Argentina was signed, with a commitment to establish a free trade area within a period of 10 years.

The 1990s began with changes of government in both countries and their simultaneously taking up the liberal trading system. As to the nuclear question, previous measures were maintained and re-enforced, with a significant institutional advancement. In the Declaration on a Common Nuclear Policy, Presidents Collor and Menem signed the approval of the Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC).⁵⁶⁾

In the whole process, it was patent that the negotiations were conducted directly and permanently by the presidents of the two countries, thereby demonstrating political will and

55) Jose Sarney (Brazil) and Raul Alfonsin (Argentina), “Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy Declaration of Ezeiza,” (ABACC, 1988), <<http://www.abacc.org.br/?p=615&lang=en>>.

56) Fernando Collor de Mello (Brazil) and Carlos Saul Menem (Argentina), “Declaration on a Common Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Policy,” (ABACC, 1990), <<http://www.abacc.org.br/?p=629&lang=en>>.

interest in maintaining transparency in the nuclear activities of each country. Thus, with the approval of the SCCC, the process was completed with the creation of ABACC and the Quadripartite Agreement.⁵⁷⁾

ABACC and the Quadripartite Agreement made it possible, in a regime of trust and with international legitimacy, to continue nuclear activities in these countries with annual inspection and control by the IAEA. The fact that Brazil and Argentina refused to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) has not generated retaliation. In 2011, the NSG approved new rules for exporting materials for enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) for those who did not sign the AP, provided they have “appropriate IAEA safeguards including regional accounting and control arrangement, such as ABACC.”⁵⁸⁾

Therefore, it is believed that Brazil can contribute to tackling better the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula using its experience with ABACC and the Quadripartite Agreement. First, by establishing confidence-building measures, initially based on the presence of political will between the parties and, secondly, by using a schema for arranging a system of verification and control.

57) Fernando Collor de Mello (Brazil), Carlos Saúl Menem (Argentina), Hans Blix (AIEA), Jorge Coll (ABACC), “Agreement between Brazil, Argentina, the ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Quadripartite Agreement),” (ABACC, December 13, 1991), <http://www.abacc.org.br/?page_id=150&lang=en>.

58) Mark Hibbs, “The IAEA Additional Protocol after the 2010 NPT Review. status and Prospects,” (The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), January 2013), p. 6.

(2) Regional/Global Level

Although geographically, politically and strategically distant from East Asia and with no cultural connection to Asian reality, it is not absurd to reason on the possibility of Brazil intending to take a role in the Korean unification process and even to be accepted by this region for this cooperation.

This intent, although not officialized, has already been raised by the first Brazilian ambassador to North Korea, Arnaldo Carrilho, in an interview given in Pyongyang in 2010, “Brazil’s central objective of Brazil is the opening of dialogue in all directions, including as to the nuclear issue and the permanent state of readiness for war of the People’s Army … Brazil has been seeking more and more strongly a prominent international role and, Thus, has been trying to strengthen its campaign to win a permanent seat on the Security Council … a mediator role from Brazil in the Korean question … implies opening spaces for this, which has not yet occurred. But I have hopes, said the ambassador.”⁵⁹⁾

And even though it may not be considered as a real and feasible intention, as Uehara and Casarões pointed out, “although Brazil has recently demonstrated some interest in building political bridges between the two Koreas, thus far initiatives have been elusive.”⁶⁰⁾ The important thing is that

59) “Brasil quer diálogo com Coreia do Norte, diz embaixador em Pyongyang,” *Folha de São Paulo, Caderno Mundo*, October 26, 2010.

60) Alexandre Uehara and Guilherme Casarões, “Brazil, East Asia, and the Shaping of World Politics,” *Perceptions*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring 2013), p. 94.

besides having been demonstrated, it represents a tradition of Brazilian diplomacy to seek to act in the pursuit of negotiated solutions.

First, the reasoning is directly focused on what refers to the unification and not specifically to negotiations for North Korea to slow down, reduce or renounce its nuclear development. On the one hand, because the objective is not that of proposing a new way of negotiating beyond what already exists and working with relatively positive results (Six-Party Talks) and this represents a space for China to show itself to be a cooperative regional player who assumes responsibilities for establishing and maintaining a stable and peaceful environment. On the other hand, because the nuclear issue is an issue that naturally and mandatorily must be addressed in the discussion on and the process of unification.

Six-Party Talks mechanism may still have the ability to deter North Korea from its intentions to continue with nuclear tests. Given North Korea's apparent objective of obtaining recognition as a nuclear weapons state, gaining an explicit commitment from North Korea's top leader to denuclearize truly may be a "mission impossible." However, in the absence of such a statement, Park is right that it simply makes no sense to resume Six-Party Talks unless there is a real chance that they can achieve their originally designated main purpose of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula.⁶¹⁾

61) Scott A. Snyder, "Is It Really Possible To Get Back to Six-Party Talks?," (CFR Asia Unbound,

Second, clearly, although it has a large deficit in hard power capacities (no significant military resources), “Brazil has sought major power status to facilitate its own economic development and to maximize its autonomy in the international system.”⁶²⁾

And it is evident that it advocates that, as a result of this tradition of taking part in negotiated solutions to conflict, it demonstrates its ability to take a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Thus, the mediation played by Brazil and Turkey on an agreement with Iran; “represented an effort of Brazilian diplomacy to avoid the renewal of sanctions towards that Persian country in the UN Security Council. However, the initiative can also be interpreted as an attempt to leap further towards international recognition of Brazil’s capability to build dialogues on hard topics on the world security agenda and, in this sense, to advance its quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Despite the UN Security Council’s refusal to accept the agreement as a confidence building move, it is worth saying that it was the first time that a developing country assumed a proactive position in core negotiations on world security and stability.”⁶³⁾

Thirdly, it is not only rhetoric and willingness to assume a status. Brazil is a player with a presence and continuous participation in the main international institutions, being,

May 15, 2014), <blogs.cfr.org/asia/author/ssnydet/page/2/>.

62) Harold Trinkunas, *Brazil’s Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance*, p. 2.

63) Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa e Manuela Trindade Viana, “Security Issues during Lula’s Administration: from the reactive to the assertive approach,” *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, Vol. 53, Special Edition (2010), p. 98.

however, a player with the ability to influence, but not to take decisions.

Even so, Brazil's participation in G-77 it is more than recognized, within the UN General Assembly, in UNCTAD and in the GATT/WTO System. In the most recent international trade negotiations it had a significant presence in the Doha Round and, during the recent global financial crisis, became part of the financial G-20.

Fourthly, and of relatively great importance, is the fact that Brazil is not located in Asia and is not involved in the conflicts, rivalries, resentment and above all suspicion as normally occurs among the countries of Northeast Asia and even East Asia. "This allows Brazil to seek out collaborators with common interests in revising the international system in the hope that the sum of the parts will have greater impact than any one part alone. Brazil also has an advantage in seeking collaboration with other critical powers because it is not a regional rival of any of them."⁶⁴

More than this, Brazil has good relations with countries that have more direct interests in Korean unification. China and Brazil are presented as "strategic partners" and have been working together since diplomatic relations were established in 1974 and have a strong record of voting similarly at the UN, besides having a very intense economic-trade and investment relationship.

The intense rapprochement between Japan and Brazil during

64) Harold Trinkunas, *Brazil's Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance*, p. 15.

the Cold War suffered a setback as a result of the debt crisis of the 1980s, but even then the two countries maintained the practice of joint international cooperation with African countries and the PRODECER project which focused on developing soybean production in Brazil was also maintained.

On the other hand, there has been no occurrence of Brazil having disputes with Russia nor with the United States. But there is, with the United States, a large area of contention regarding trade issues, while in the political and strategic dimensions there is a cooperative strategy.

Similarly, it is believed that Brazil has a very recent relationship with the Koreans, but that it is a relationship built on trust and cooperation with there being no precedents that might lead to Brazil being rejected as an intermediary.

And finally, not directly correlated with the unification, but because it is a player with an increasing presence in East Asia, Brazil has maintained and maintains with India a constant partnership since the early 1960s, in the international economic forums.

It is not being suggested that Brazil has the capacity to bring about unification, but rather that it is a neutral player, with free transit between the different players involved besides the two on the Peninsula, and that Brazil has the political will and an acknowledged record of emphasizing and acting as an intermediary in solving conflicts by negotiated and peaceful means.

d. Implications for Korea

First of all, both ROK and DPRK, despite divergences and different standpoints, have always set out their goal as the unification of the Korean Peninsula. As the basis of this similarity of thinking is the recognition that the separation was arbitrarily defined by the United States and the Soviet Union, without any type of consultation with or support from the Korean population.

This intention was already observed in the Cold War, in particular from the speech of President Park Chung-hee (President Park's August 15 Declaration) proposing "peaceful coexistence, to replace the logic of military confrontation by socioeconomic cooperation" and better defined in 1973, with Park's "Special Foreign Policy Statement Regarding Peace and Unification," and this has continued with new proposals being added by the other Presidents, among which the one that stands out is the signing of the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North," December 1991, which represented a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations, interrupted, however, with the death of Kim Il-sung. And resumed with much more intensity at the start of the 21st century, June 2000, when a Summit Meeting was held between the Presidents of North Korea, Kim Jong Il and of South Korea, Kim Dae Jung, and the launch of the Sunshine Policy.⁶⁵⁾

Secondly, up to and including the 1970s, the two Koreas had strong economic growth, and from the 1980s and more intensely in the post-Cold War period, North Korea began to show wide-ranging economic problems because of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and of its progressive isolation, while South Korea which was engaged on regional dynamism increased its growth margins. Thus, at present, what is seen is that South Korea has a strong economic capability and North Korea has a completely debilitated economic structure and is dependent on foreign aid.

Thirdly, with the loss of economic capacity, North Korea advanced its nuclear development and uses it as an instrument of “negotiation.”

Fourthly, in January 2002, North Korea announced the beginning of reforms for “Improving Economic Management.” This project is of great importance because it succeeds an extensive series of attempts since the early 1990s and seeks to establish coexistence between Central Planning and the Market in order to sustain the partial introduction of the capitalist system, and, on the other hand, it is also a process to reinforce the traditional socialist system based on the principle of self-reliance (juche).

The program of reforms, apparently inspired by the Chinese

65) Norman D. Levin and Yong-Sup Han, *Sunshine in Korea: the South Korean debate over policies toward North Korea* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), pp. 5-21; Martin Pérez Le-Fort e Alejandra Chacón Morales, “Políticas de Unificación Coreanas y su Vinculación con las Alianzas Regionales,” Henrique Altemani de Oliveira e Gilmar Masiero (eds.), *Coreia do Sul: Visões Latino-Americanas* (Curitiba: Juruá, 2009), pp. 185-224.

model, is auspicious because it leads to reducing the fact that the nuclear program, or the threat from it, was the only instrument that North Korea had to reduce its poverty and insecurity. On the one hand, it is good news as it represents a new strategy to seek a solution with proposals for generating the transfer of financial, material and human resources. On the other hand, it can be viewed with suspicion if it establishes a close relationship between the Nuclear Program and the very survival of the regime. It was, however, discontinued in its initial stage whether because of the resumption of the nuclear crisis, or because of the U.S. decision to classify North Korea as one of the countries of the “axis of evil.”

Fifthly, a hypothesis always remembered is that of using the Chinese model of “one country and two systems.” However, the Chinese formula only worked with Hong Kong and Macau, recovered from English and Portuguese control and did not work exactly with Taiwan which continues to have a certain similarity with the issue on the Korean Peninsula.

Therefore, the initial result of unification, regardless of the formula applied, will have a humanitarian effect of greater value, which is the resumption of the family ties of Korean society. From the perspective of a unified Korean State, in the long run, it is probable there will be a significant expansion of Korean skills (power) and, at the regional level, that of removing a strong source of tension and instability will force a reformatting of alliances and redistribution of regional power.

Since, however, unification and lessening of the sources of instability is of interest not only to South Korea, but more directly to the region and indirectly to the International System as a whole, by force of circumstance, the process will involve the participation of different regional States and even of those outside the region.

Thus, one returns to the starting point of there being an absolute need for there to be the political will to negotiate the nuclear issue peacefully and to remove the particular interests of each player involved. Without mutual concessions, both between the two Koreas, and between the different players most directly involved (United States, China, Russia and Japan), there will be no progress towards the unification.

In the first instance (the pre-unifying process) what is basic is the fact that the different parties should demonstrate a real political will to seek mechanisms that make it possible to lessen mistrust and for there to be joint action for the removal of current constraints. Objectively, there is the absolute need to establish CBMs, particularly with regard to nuclear development.

Is the objective denuclearization or targeting towards peaceful activities? How can one be sure of the effectiveness of full denuclearization or moving towards peaceful activities if the technology is dual? So, apparently, only a process approach, of negotiation and agreement on limits and controls can make it possible for there to be a relative level of trust.

On the other hand, if the objective is unification, it is obvious

that it can only be reached after a solution of South and North Korean expectations about nuclear activities and with concessions from both sides on the basis of an environment of trust.

At any rate, for any negotiation process it is a priority to get beyond the Armistice Agreement and sign the Peace Treaty without any conditionality as placed in 2006 by the United States that formalizing the end of the war and drawing up a peace treaty would only be feasible “if North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons”: “From Pyongyang’s perspective, the ‘peace treaty’ is an instrument for ‘eliminating the military confrontation on the peninsula’ and ‘solving the problem of establishing mutual trust between the DPRK and the U.S.’ and should be established prior to denuclearization.”⁶⁶⁾

Pang also defends the idea that the six-party process can be the basis of formulating a reliable mechanism for regional security on demonstrating cooperation among the great powers as the key to regional security.

Therefore, the period before drawing up the ABACC system is gone back to, when there were progress meetings between the heads of state of Argentina and Brazil, thereby promoting a cooperative effort on a commitment to use nuclear capabilities only for peaceful purposes. That is, it was not an aggressive

66) Pang Zhongying, *The Six-Party Process, Regional Security Mechanisms, and China-U.S. Cooperation: toward a regional security mechanism for a new Southeast Asia?* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, March 2009), <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2009/3/northeast%20asia%20pang/03_northeast_asia_pang.pdf>.

process of seeking elimination of nuclear facilities, but simply accepting their possession and that they had a peaceful purpose. And finally, with broadened trust, setting up mechanisms of control and surveillance, including safeguards with the IAEA.

The Kaesong Industrial Complex and even the Tourist Complex of Mount Kumgang are very illustrative of the possibilities of maintaining and advancing in an inter-Korean cooperative process that can contribute to sedimenting the unification process, with the participation of non-governmental sectors. On the other hand, skeptics emphasize the challenges of those process such as the sustainability of the cooperation and the consensus within and outside the country.

As a result of North Korea's difficulties in having access to energy sources and to contribute towards building trust, it would be interesting to take up the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) once more, or devise something similar, with the involvement of the international community, particularly the United States, China and Japan.

As a demonstration of political will and part of the confidence-building process, there should be a project coming out of an agreement between ROK and DPRK and no longer in the way that KEDO was created in 1995 based on the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. An inter-Korean agreement would demonstrate more effectively the real interest of both governments, favoring talks about the nuclear cooperation would be more stable and not subjected to the American party-political disputes.

The presence of the international community does not specifically refer to financial support, but mainly political and strategic support for the solution of nuclear development and also for the advancement of the unification process.

To this end, the need to reduce the American rhetoric of destruction of North Korean nuclear facilities by military action. In this case, international forums, with emphasis on the IAEA, are spaces favorable to Brazil and other states putting pressure on the United States to encourage a commitment on the Korean peninsula for exclusively peaceful use of nuclear technology or even denuclearization.

The consideration that is very complicated, at this moment, is to think about transforming Asia Pacific into a zone free of nuclear weapons. This does not impede designing an agreement for control and supervision on the Korean peninsula and can also encourage the building of regional mechanisms for greater control of nuclear installations in Asia Pacific.

Due to its responsibility in ensuring the maintenance of stability in the Asia Pacific, the United States is a key player in this process. The withdrawal in 2008, by President Bush, of North Korea from the list of countries that sponsor terrorism, and despite strong pressure from conservative sectors that North Korea be put back on the list, the opposition of President Obama is an apparently positive sign for the political negotiation of greater control of nuclear activities on the peninsula.

The setting up of an American diplomatic representation

office in Pyongyang would be key to a better understanding of the North Korean regime, their needs and their willingness to take part in the International System better. Barnaby & Ritchie even hypothesized in 2004 that “if the U.S. had had a presence in North Korea from 1994, the current crisis would not have happened.”

On the other hand, one must be sure of what intentions the U.S. will have at the time of the unification: will it keep its troops on the Korean peninsula? If the U.S. decides the withdrawal of its troops, how and when will it take place? This definition is also crucial to have the answer and the support of China. It can be stated, with ample margin of safety, that China will seek to prevent any kind of unification if American troops are transferred from the 38th Parallel to the Chinese border.

And, with regard to Japan, a clearer and more definitive statement from North Korea on the kidnapped Japanese would satisfy a considerable part of Japanese priorities.

The resumption of the negotiations between the participants of the six-party process appears to be increasingly urgent given that, in previous negotiations, North Korea’s nuclear program (and therefore unification itself) was secondary to the priorities, concerns and interests the participating countries.

On the other hand, one should not subordinate the resumption of negotiations to prior changes such as the previously mentioned of “abandonment of nuclear ambitions.”

It is increasingly clear that the need for a regional security mechanism in Northeast Asia, a region that today is the center of the international economy and that is equally characterized by the strong presence of sources of insecurity. Threats arising from North Korea's nuclear program are one of these sources and a solution to this will provide more effective conditions for deepening the integration process as well as for seeking measures to advance the formalization of a regional security institution.

e. Observation

This reflection did not give attention to analyzing stages, costs and the time required to conclude the unification process. It was based on a previous Korean arrangement and equal regional and international consideration of the need to seek a peaceful solution that does not involve conflicts rising from different interests involved.

This regional awareness is relatively consolidated with the current process of redefining the International System and Order, but likewise because the Asian Regional System presents itself as the new hub of international power and economically the most dynamic area in the world. That is, the reorganization of Asia in the post-Cold War period also involves the need to solve the conflicts inherited from the Cold War.

Asian (economic, political and strategic) interdependence

requires the regional players to take part in the process but considering the international scope of the problem, external players should also take roles.

Therefore, the expectations and possible roles of Brazil will form the basis for its participation in Korean unification. Historically, Brazil has raised its international position by actively participating in international multilateral institutions. It has also taken part in the process for negotiated solutions. More importantly, Brazil has developed its interest in Asia by forming partnerships with various Asian nations.

But, on the other hand, regardless of the effectiveness of a Brazilian role in the unification process, the unprecedented way Brazil and Argentina negotiated maintaining their respective nuclear installations, their commitment to peaceful purposes, the mechanisms for mutual monitoring and submitting to the guidelines of the IAEA is nonetheless a valuable experience which, if adapted to Korean reality can be useful and instrumental in finding a solution.

And, without being a utopian, an appropriate balanced view of the nuclear problem in the Korean Peninsula can be a factor that will stir up the discussion of transforming East Asia into a nuclear weapons free zone. If one cannot go so far, Brazil, at least, can seek for mechanisms that can broaden the process of building trust in the Asian region.

4 Canada

a. Overview

Canada is an Asia-Pacific country, a founding member of both the G-20 and APEC. Canada's interest in the Asia-Pacific is longstanding. As far back as the 19th Century, Canadian missionaries were active on the Korean Peninsula and contributed to opening cultural relations between Korea and the West. Canada was an active participant in the UN forces during the Korean War (1950~1953) and before that was involved in the UN commission that attempted to reunify the peninsula through elections prior to the founding of both the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).⁶⁷⁾ Canada established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea in 1949.⁶⁸⁾

Canadians began engagement of the DPRK as part of the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue in 1990.⁶⁹⁾ Canada formally established diplomatic relations with the DPRK in 2001. Well before Canada opened diplomatic relations with the North,

67) Kurtis Simpson, "Pacific Paradox: Canadian Foreign Policy in Korea, Vietnam and the People's Republic of China 1947-1970," (Ph.D. dissertation, York University, 2002).

68) Government of Canada, "Canada-Korea Relations," (Government of Canada), <http://www.canada.international.gc.ca/korea-coree/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/>.

69) Paul Evans, "Canada and Asia Pacific's Track-Two Diplomacy," *International Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Autumn 2009).

Canadian NGOs began engaging the North. As early as 1988, a delegation of the Canadian Council of Churches visited Pyongyang and was hosted by the official Korean Christian federation. Canadian NGOs and the Canadian government were active players in humanitarian aid during the food crisis of the late 1990's and the beginning of this century. The first resident director of the World Food Program in Pyongyang was a Canadian, Erich Weingartner, who pioneered the first World Council of Churches contact in the 1980's and has continued to take an active interest in North Korean affairs.⁷⁰⁾ There is even an NGO devoted to the resettlement of North Korean refugees in Canada Han Voice.⁷¹⁾

Canada's position on the DPRK's military provocations, flouting of UN resolutions on weapons of mass destruction and nuclear proliferation has been clear and unequivocal. On May 24, 2010, Prime Minister Harper held the DPRK responsible for the sinking of the Cheonan and denounced the DPRK in the strongest terms, adding the DPRK to the Area Control List for which no trade and investment without prior permission, as well as suspending all high level visits or exchanges.⁷²⁾

70) Erich Weingartner, "Is Canada quietly feeding North Koreans?" (CanKor report #340, December 2011), <<http://vtncankor.wordpress.com/2011/12/09/is-canada-quietly-feeding-north-koreans-by-erich-weingartner/>>.

71) "Toronto program offers training for north korean defectors," *CTV News*, August 13, 2013, <<http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/toronto-program-offers-training-for-north-korean-defectors-1.1399473>>; Han Voice, "Our Organization," <<http://hanvoice.ca/about/ourorganization/>>; Jack Kim, "Mr. Jack Kim (Special Adviser, HanVoice) at the Foreign Affairs and International Development Committee," *Open Parliament*, June 4, 2013, <<http://openparliament.ca/committees/foreign-affairs/41-1/84/jack-kim-1/only/>>.

72) Stephen Harper, "Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada in regards of the announcement

As a result of the DPRK's nuclear activities and military provocations against South Korea, since October 2010, Canada's relations with the DPRK have been frozen under the policy of "conditional engagement." These limit official contact with the DPRK to four subjects: ① regional security concerns; ② the human rights and humanitarian situation in North Korea; ③ inter-Korean relations; and ④ consular issues.⁷³⁾

Canadians across the political spectrum are likely to applaud and encourage any political opening that promises a peaceful and democratic unification of the Korean peninsula. Not only would this accord with Canadian values, but would also contribute to the relaxation of international tensions both regionally and globally. Canada has been committed to nuclear non-proliferation and arms control from the very beginning of the nuclear age. Effective and permanent denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is in the interest of the international community and consistent with longstanding Canadian foreign policy. Likewise, the improvement of human rights and the safeguarding of human security in North Korea are vital Canadian interests.⁷⁴⁾

by President Lee Myung-bak of the Republic of Korea," (Prime Minister of Canada Stephen Harper, May 24, 2010), <<http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2010/05/24/statement-prime-minister-canada-regards-announcement-president-lee-myung-bak#sthash.OMT6f9Dt.dpuf>>.

73) Government of Canada, "Canada-Korea Relations," *op. cit.*

74) In March 2013, Canada co-sponsored the resolution at the United Nations Human Rights Council that called for a special rapporteur to investigate human rights violations in the DPRK. <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/korea-coree/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada-dpr_korea-rpd_coree.aspx?lang=eng>; Foreign Minister John Baird issued a statement applauding the report of the special rapporteur when it was presented in February 2014. See John Baird, "Statement on Situation of Human Rights in North Korea," (Foreign Affairs,

At the same time it must be acknowledged that until there are visible signs of an opening in the North Korean regime and evidence of compliance with the international community on a broad range of issues from nuclear proliferation, weapons of mass destruction and human rights, including religious freedom, Canada, at least under the current government, will not re-engage with Pyongyang.⁷⁵⁾ Unlike the situation in the 1990's when the Canadian government made cautious moves to engage the DPRK in the hopes of incentivizing its cooperation with the international community, following repeated DPRK provocations these efforts have dissipated. It is unlikely that Canada will re-engage with the North until there are clear signals from the ROK encouraging such actions. Canada will undoubtedly look with favor on the peaceful unification of Korea and welcomes steps for peaceful reconciliation between North and South, but is not, at present, likely to take any initiative towards this on its own.

b. Expected Effect

Distance from the Korean Peninsula means that the actual dynamics of Korean unification are unlikely to exert a direct

Trade and Development Canada, February 17, 2014), <<http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communications/2013/09/09a.aspx>>.

75) See for example, John Baird, "Baird Comments on North Korea's Anniversary," (Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, September 9, 2013), <<http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communications/2013/09/09a.aspx>>.

impact on Canada's security. Whatever effects Canada experiences are likely to be indirect. For example, should a sudden collapse of the DPRK regime precipitate a humanitarian crisis, Canada will play a role in providing humanitarian assistance but is also a likely destination for the resettlement of refugees, based on our experience in the past.

Canadian civil society takes an active role on questions of North Korea. There are over 200,000 Korean immigrants to Canada many of whom are active in the Christian community, both in mainstream churches like the United Church and the Catholic Church but also in Korean congregations.

In 1988, Rev. Sang-Chul Lee became the 32nd Moderator (head) of the United Church of Canada, the largest of the mainstream Protestant churches of Canada with over 2 million members in over 3000 congregations. Dr. Lee's family originated in North Korea. He was born in the Soviet Union and grew up in Japanese occupied Manchuria and has maintained an active interest in the fate of North Korea.⁷⁶⁾ Senator Yonah Martin, the first Korean-Canadian to be appointed to the Canadian Senate was appointed by the current Prime-Minister, Stephen Harper in 2009 and represents British Columbia for the ruling Conservative Party of Canada.

The current government is highly critical of the North. It builds its opposition to the current regime around human rights

76) Phil Kim, "Rev. Sang-chul Lee, A Wanderer with the World in His Heart: A Journey from Vladivostok to Toronto," (Join the Leaders, March 19, 2011), <<http://www.jointheleaders.com/page/Rev-Sang-Chul-Lee.aspx>>.

and the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.⁷⁷⁾ Its policy around unification is likely to be built around the following three pillars: first, the complexion of the regime moving towards unification; second, the views of the U.S., and in concert with that the views of Republic of Korea.

Having reached a free trade agreement with the ROK earlier this year and sharing a broad agenda of views based on democratic ideals, the rule of law and human rights, as well as respective alliance relationships with the U.S., Canada views the Republic of Korea as a principal partner in the Asia-Pacific. It is likely to view favorably movement towards unification where the ROK played a dominant and steering role. Should unification maintain the current 'Paektu' Kim family regime of the Korean Workers Party, the Canadian government in particular and Canadians generally would likely take a dim view. However, an opening in the North Korean regime which allowed NGO activity by churches and other civil society organizations will undoubtedly gain widespread support within and outside the government.

77) Gerard Hervouet, "Reassessing Canada-North Korea Relations," *Canada-Asia Agenda*, Issue 23 (January 10, 2012).

c. Potential Roles

Phases of integration

The prospect of Korea's unification should involve three distinct but overlapping processes: ① immediate humanitarian relief and human security; ② planning for unification ③ implementing integration plans. I would anticipate that Canada would take the position that the implementation of integration plans is a matter for the Korean people alone. Moreover, given Canada's previous experience, Canada would not be as likely to be directly involved in negotiating the security posture of a unified Korea with its neighbours as would the non-Korean partners in the currently suspended Six-Party Talks. However, if invited and welcomed by Koreans, Canadians may actively participate in the first and second phases.

Security

We should not anticipate an extensive Canadian role in security arrangements. While Canada is an Asia-Pacific nation and has participated in military operations in Asia both during the Second World War and the Korean War, Canada has never premised its own security on conditions in the Western Pacific.⁷⁸⁾ Our core security interests are with NATO, North America (NorAD) and the Arctic. Limitations of personnel equipment,

78) David Haglund, *The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canada's Grand Strategy at Century's End* (Toronto: Irwin, 2000), p. 73; Kurtis Simpson, *op. cit.*

budgets and existing deployments, constrain any extensive role for Canada notwithstanding Korea's relative distance as a core diplomatic and security interest for Canada. While there is much talk and certainly important prospects for Canada to become a major energy exporter to the Asia-Pacific including Korea, it is unlikely that the infrastructure for such exports will be in place before the end of the decade. Once the political, environmental, fiscal and logistical obstacles have been overcome, Canada's strategic interest in the Western Pacific will inevitably rise. Until that happens, Canada's strategic focus remains firmly anchored on the North Atlantic.

Canada's role in any genuine opening leading up to unification is likely to be a supporting one. The kinds of initiatives where the government of Canada might play a significant role might be in training-of officials, human rights workers and even police. Other kinds of roles might include retraining or planning the retraining of lower rank DPRK security personnel for civilian trades. Specialized assistance within Canadian expertise might include de-mining of the DMZ and a supporting role in decommissioning WMD are the kind of activities that could be supported through the Canadian Armed Forces. Another possible role would be in decommissioning and securing nuclear reactors and fissile materials, securing and stabilizing uranium mines and mine waste and transforming radiological facilities to civilian purposes.

Humanitarian Assistance, training and devising a new political framework

Canada is likely to play an extensive and substantial role in humanitarian roles as in the past in the direct provision of food aid and the organization of food distribution through both official channels and through civil society organizations.⁷⁹⁾ Canada would likely provide some of the “software” for economic reform such as training officials, helping to devise a regulatory framework, and business training for budding entrepreneurs.⁸⁰⁾ A further area where Canadians might provide advice and consultation would be in devising new models of confederation and regional governance based on our own experience with federalism. Canada provided assistance to post-Soviet states to devise legal frameworks, it also advised South Africa in framing a post-Apartheid constitution. This type of role is one that Canadians are happy to engage in.⁸¹⁾

Canada is most likely to funnel the bulk of its aid through multilateral organizations, including the United Nations. We

79) Here is a report detailing the range of Canadian official humanitarian activities in East and Central Europe in the late 1990's: Canadian International Development Agency, “CIDA Central and Eastern Europe Branch: Humanitarian Assistance,” (Relief Web, August 11, 1999), <<http://reliefweb.int/report/armenia/cida-central-and-eastern-europe-branch-humanitarian-assistance>>.

80) Canada has already attempted some training for officials involved in North Korea's transition. Kyung-Ae Park, “The Canada-DPRK Knowledge Partnership Program(KPP),” *38 North* (November 19, 2012), <<http://38north.org/2012/11/kapark111912/>>; Tristin Hopper, “North Korea's Canadian Classroom,” *The National Post* (January 1, 2013) <<http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/01/01/north-koreas-canadian-classroom-ubc-exchange-with-hermit-nation-quietly-draws-to-a-close/>>.

81) As an example of such transitional assistance, see Canadian International Development Agency, “Canada and the Baltics: Partners in Transition,” (Government of Canada Publications, 2004), <<http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/CD4-13-2004E.pdf>>.

would anticipate that a peaceful North Korea moving towards the unification with the South would gain access to multilateral aid organizations, such as the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank. As an influential shareholder in those organizations Canada is sure to contribute to funds for the economic reconstruction of North Korea. Funding North Korea's economic reconstruction is very likely to be a topic of G-7 deliberations where Canada is also a member. Judging from past experience, Canada will channel most of its assistance through multilateral channels but will have a significant but modest bilateral program which will be a hybrid of direct government assistance for specific purposes where Canada has particular capacity and expertise, and considerable NGO involvement with the support of the government. Direct bilateral assistance will assuredly be coordinated with the government of the Republic of Korea as well as the G-7 and the OECD DAC donors. It is possible that in a crisis situation the government will match donations to NGOs by private citizens. Canadian presence in the field may therefore be much larger than its probably modest contribution to bilateral aid may indicate.

***Multilateral Assistance - The Global Level:
G-7 and G-20***

Despite some reticence in recent years during the conservative government of Stephen Harper, the consistent trend in Canadian foreign policy is to emphasize global leadership

through participation in multilateral institutions.⁸²⁾ Canada is a partner of the ROK in the G-20 and is a member of the G-7. Should the impetus towards the unification take the form either of a catastrophic collapse of the DPRK or an uncertain democratic opening, the G-7 countries as the organization of the most influential developed liberal-democratic states will necessarily play a role. Given the general recognition that the full cost of the unification cannot be borne by the ROK alone, and the interest of the G-7 countries that North Korea evolve in the direction of liberal-democracy to consolidate a process of peaceful and democratic the unification of the Korean people, the G-7 will likely be called upon to organize some kind of plan in that direction with the participation of the ROK. Given the indifference, tending to hostility towards liberal-democracy displayed by the People's Republic of China and Russia, especially over the recent months of the Ukrainian crisis and the agitation in Hong Kong for political reform, we cannot expect these neighbours of the Korean Peninsula, parties in the Six-Party Talks and key players in the G-20 to take a benign or encouraging attitude towards a democratic opening in North Korea, regardless of their ultimate posture towards Korean the unification and its impact on regional and global stability. Canada can be expected to take a positive role in the G-7 to

82) Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002); David Dewitt and John Kirton, *Canada as a Principal Power* (New York: John Wiley, 1983); John Kirton, "Canada as a G-8 and G-20 Principal Power," (G-8 Research Centre, 2010), <www.g8.utoronto.ca/teaching/312/cfp-24-2010.pdf>.

work cooperatively with the other major liberal-democratic countries towards a liberal outcome in North Korea. Canada, as it has with NATO in the Ukrainian crisis, and with the U.S. coalition to defeat ISIL in Iraq, can be expected to take an active, positive, and significant role in concert with its regional and global allies. As the only G-7 country beside the U.S. that is both an Asia-Pacific nation and a member of NATO, Canada can play a key role in persuading its European partners in the G-7 that active assistance towards a democratic opening in North Korea is in their interest.

The United Nations and its specialized agencies

At the United Nations Canada will act to support a process of peaceful integration of the Korean Peninsula and work with the specialized agencies to devise and support programs of humanitarian relief, support for transitional institutions, and human security during the process of the unification.

Immediate humanitarian relief will be channeled through the World Food Program where Canada has already been a major participant in providing humanitarian relief to North Korea and other UN programs such as UNICEF. On the presumption that the lead-up to the unification will open channels for aid from multilateral economic development programs beyond the UNDP for support in the reconstruction of North Korea's agricultural and industrial infrastructure and the transformation of its financial and economic mechanisms,

Canada is a shareholder in the ADB and a major participant in the World Bank and the IMF. The IMF may play a role in supporting currency unification as well as moves to reform financial institutions. Much of the expertise that Canada has is embedded within multilateral organizations.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Given that both Canada and the ROK are members of the OECD that organization also may also play a role in coordinating transitional assistance to North Korea, especially through the DAC group of donor nations.

Regional Organizations - The Asian Development Bank

As a shareholder in the ADB, Canada is likely to rely on the expertise within that organization to plan and finance the transitional economy of North Korea alongside the World Bank and UN agencies. Relying on the expertise found within these bodies, it is expected that most of the support for economic reconstruction provided by Canada will be channeled through multilateral organizations. This will help to ensure coordinated planning reduce redundancy and waste in projects and help to coordinate international activities. Canada's commitment of long-term assistance will most likely follow on the assessment of needs informed by specialized multilateral organizations.

Direct Bilateral assistance

Assistance with legal reform and training of judicial officials and human rights training is also likely. These activities are modeled on the type of assistance Canada provided following the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as to People's Republic of China.

Targeted support from Canada official development program will most likely be provided in the areas of training for government officials, economic managers, and perhaps support for judicial reforms as well as targeted legal reforms, for example in the area of minerals and mining, where Canada has particular experience and expertise. Given that mining and minerals are a key factors in commercializing the North Korean economy, this is an area where Canadian expertise may be valuable.⁸³⁾ This is also an area where Canadian corporations may be interested in playing a role in investment and commercialization of mineral deposits. Given competing interests by corporations from the People's Republic of China already involved in exploiting North Korea's mineral wealth, a united Korean government may be interested in diversified investment with Canadian participation in this area.⁸⁴⁾

83) Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, "Natural Resources Management: Advancing Global Prosperity through Responsible Resource Development," (Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, February 17, 2014), <<http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/FRA-102311492-LK7>>.

84) Lin Shi, "The Mineral industry of North Korea," U.S. Department of the Interior and U.S. Geological Survey (U.S. Geological Survey World Mineral Report 2012, 2012), <<http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2012/myb3-2012-1kn.pdf>>; "Chinese businessmen Seek Profitable Opportunities in North Korea," *The South China Morning Post*, November 12, 2013, <<http://www.scmp.com/>

Support for NGO activity

Canada has traditionally leveraged its assistance programs by providing support for Canada-based NGOs including church-based NGOs in humanitarian and development assistance. This was a policy pioneered by the government of Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1968 and henceforth maintained under successive government both Liberal and Conservative.⁸⁵⁾ It would be anticipated that these would be expanded in any broad-based assistance program in the lead-up to the unifications, with the expectation that grass-roots NGOs with their linguistic and cultural competence and capacity to partner with civil-society actors in North Korea who will play a significant role in North Korea's transformation. The Canadian government may play a role both through direct contracting with Canadian NGOs and through matching donations. As a way of encouraging civil society participation, the Canadian government has often matched private donations to humanitarian relief with equivalent donations from the government treasury. NGOs also play a role in providing advice and feedback to how best to meet grass-roots humanitarian needs through direct consultations with the Department of Foreign Affairs International Trade and Development.

Canadians may therefore be able to play a role both in direct

business/commodities/article/1358724/chinese-businessmen-seek-profitable-opportunities-north-korea>.

85) Steven Kendall Holloway, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Defining the National Interest* (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2006), p. 232.

humanitarian assistance through NGO activity but also in fostering the development of a vibrant civil society in North Korea that may play a role in its transformation and democratization as a free society. Our existing NGO relationships with the DPRK are a base on which to expand and develop.⁸⁶⁾

Our generally thin security commitment to the Western Pacific and our lack of alliance partnerships in that region may allow us to play a facilitating role in the context of the complicated relationship that a uniting Korea might face in relation to the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation and Japan. Canada will not be suspected of trying to gain strategic regional advantage at the same time as having both the economic and technical capacity to play a role of some significance. While not currently the preferred policy of the current government, Canada has in the past tried to play a brokerage role as a helpful intermediary between hostile and suspicious parties. Canada may favor playing such a role again in the future. At the same time, Canada is highly unlikely to carve out a role outside the framework of its alliance and diplomatic partners and the United Nations.

86) Erich Weingartner, *NGO Contributions to DPRK Development: issues for Canada and the international community* (Vancouver: Program on Canada-Asia Policy Studies, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, 2001).

d. Implications for Korea

Canada is unlikely to take a lead in providing advice to the ROK except by request from the government of the ROK and under the auspices of the G-7. Nevertheless, from the author's perspective, a key to successful unification will be close coordination and consultation with Korea's neighbours. China especially will want to be reassured that the ROK-U.S. alliance will not be extended to its border. Moreover China's extensive interests in the North and its close relations with officials including the Korean People's Army may give it a vital role and voice in its demobilization. Japan should also play a constructive role based on its past through its past participation in KEDO and the Six-Party Talks, as well as a provider of aid and investment. The extent of Japan's role will be calibrated by its relationship with the Republic of Korea. Canada will always defer to Seoul in that regard, as it likely will with respect to the involvement of the People's Republic of China and Russia. Russia would demand reassurance of its interests and role and would obviously want to be involved in any potential construction of a Korean energy corridor. Canada may well ask to participate in the construction of a new Korean energy infrastructure, both because of its extensive experience in oil and gas exploration and pipelines and also as a provider of nuclear technology, as in the construction of the ROK's Wolsong heavy water reactors. The ROK may wish to revive the Six-Party

Talks and expand its outreach to stabilize the transition. The experience of NATO's eastward expansion and the Ukraine crisis provides valuable lessons on what Seoul may wish to avoid.⁸⁷⁾

Secondly the ROK's coordination with the interim North Korean administration needs to think long and hard about issues such as currency unification. Certainly, there is a role here for international expertise and advice. North Korea will require extensive investment, as well as humanitarian assistance, and there are complex issues of employment as well, some of which have been well reviewed by Marcus Noland.⁸⁸⁾ It is also important that some vital economic assets remain in the hands of North Korean people. Care must be taken to ensure that talented officials and administrators of the KWP regime who are genuinely committed to human rights and democracy are enrolled and engaged in the regime's reconstruction.

Care must be taken to foster a civil society in North Korea with genuine local roots and local accountability. Having endured more than a century as pawns of geopolitics, North Koreans must become stakeholders in their own future. Recognized civil society actors must not be only organizations with links to the South and abroad. For democratic institutions

87) John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 93, No. 5 (September/October 2014), <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-west-s-fault>>.

88) Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinon, and Tao Wang, "Modelling Korean Unification," *Journal of Comparative Economics*, Vol. 28 (1999), pp. 400-420; Marcus Noland, *Avoiding the Apocalypse: the Future of the Two Koreas* (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 2000).

to take root in North Korean society, and for North Korean citizens to develop a genuine identification with democratic institutions, voluntary association and active participation must replace and dissipate the fear and terror associated with government in a totalitarian regime. Civil society, and civil society organizations represented by NGOs are a key. However, such organizations must be allowed to develop genuine local leadership alongside grass roots participation if they are to succeed in their mission. Here expanded educational opportunities both at home and abroad will be an important training ground for democratic ideas and free association. North Korea must not be allowed to become a colonial hinterland either of its neighbours, or of the South.

In this author's belief the Republic of Korea cannot absorb the cost of Korean unification alone, but neither can it rely on its allies and neighbours to share the responsibility fully and fairly. The experience of the Framework Agreement of 1994 and the subsequent history of KEDO amply demonstrates this.⁸⁹⁾ The Republic of Korea will have to engage its neighbours and allies as well as multilateral organizations, while doing everything possible to ensure that the people of North Korea are fully engaged in their own salvation and democratic reconstruction. The North Korean people cannot be made passive

89) Leon Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy With North Korea* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1998); also Jonathan Pollack, "The United States North Korea and the End of the Agreed Framework," *U.S. Naval College Review* (2003), <<https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/d65ed211-2e16-4ef3-828d-5308248ab652/United-States,-North-Korea,-and-the-End-of-the-Agr.aspx>>.

observers of their own reconstruction if they are to emerge as active citizens of a democracy and active participants in a vibrant market economy. The biggest risk is that disillusionment by the people in North Korea will lead to a dangerous political vacuum. This is also a lesson learned in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the current crisis on the borders of Ukraine and Russia demonstrates that China and Russia should not be provoked by extending Cold War alliances to their borders.⁹⁰⁾ Care must be taken to assure Korea's neighbours that a united Korea will not destabilize or threaten its neighbours and that the Korean nation has no expansionist designs. This may be especially important along the northern border of the Korean peninsula in China's Northeast provinces where a substantial number of ethnic Koreans reside. The dilemma faced by the ROK in pursuing the unification is that it must reassure its non-democratic neighbours even as it seeks support from its democratic allies to build a prosperous, united and democratic Korea.

While the experience of the integration of Europe and within it the unification of Germany has been relatively successful, the experience of state-building and democratization elsewhere, including Ukraine, Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan has been much less so. The conditions of the DPRK resemble aspects of both of these two contrasting examples. The presence of a vibrant and fully consolidated and institutionalized democracy and a

90) Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault," *op. cit.*

thriving market economy in the ROK as well as thriving market economies in the immediate region of East Asia make North Korea resemble the conditions in Europe. However, the near absent history of electoral democracy and a civil society with a deep legacy of authoritarianism added to the deficiencies of non-market economy with severe infrastructure deficits make North Korea more closely resemble post-conflict states in Asia the Middle East and Africa. It will be important to consider both positive examples from Europe as well as the more sobering examples from elsewhere in devising integration plans.

Viewed from the present perspective it is fair to state that the current crisis in Ukraine has its roots in the process that began with the unification of Germany. Not only must we make sure that the unification of Korea does not lead to future crises, we must also acknowledge that the current crisis and antagonism between Russia and its European neighbours will have an impact on how a future process of Korean unification may be regarded by Moscow and Beijing.

e. Observation

Canada has a role to play in promoting and facilitating the reintegration of the Korean community once the political conditions arrive for dissolving the sovereign division of the Korean Peninsula. Canada's role is most likely to be modest and supporting, but Canada can play a critical role in mobilizing

global resources through multilateral institutions as well as regional institutions where Canada is a member, well-targeted bilateral support in areas of particular Canadian expertise, humanitarian assistance as well as fostering the growth of a vigorous civil-society in North Korea through support to Non-governmental Organizations. Canada certainly lacks the political leverage and resources to promote the unification template of its own, nor does it have the interests or intimate political experience needed to pursue such a role. Canada would welcome requests to advise and support the legal and political infrastructure to reintegrate the Korean national community internally, and is certain to play a diplomatic role in ushering a denuclearized reintegrated Korea into the international community externally.

5 France

a. Overview

The objective of this paper is neither to question the basic assumptions of the KINU research project which is the emergence of reformative regime in the North and the South Korean government's initiative to hold political talks in order to lead the peninsula towards the unification, nor to discuss South Korea's current inter-Korean policy. However, it is clear that the details of these political talks and the nature of the unified Korea, which will adopt a fusion of two equal entities under a new structure or absorption of the North by the South under South Korea's institutions, will have tremendous impact on the benefits of the unification. This paper considers a German-like unification, the South absorbing the North, a sovereign country, as a result of a clear will, from the North Korean people, to achieve such a unification.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, France takes on its global responsibility for the international security. Just as France stated during the German unification process in the 1990s, the Korean unification may be first and foremost Korean's issue, but it clearly has global consequences which could disrupt France's national interests. Korea cannot achieve

the unification process on its own. Surrounding powers and more distant powers, such as France, can help smooth the unification process, or in some cases block it. South Korea must coordinate with all its neighbors, close or far, in order to damage-control the unification and not hurt any of its partners' national interests.

France's national interests, shared by many other powers, rely mostly on the stability of the Asia-Pacific which would be mostly guaranteed by a respect of regional powers' national interests; a solving of existing territorial disputes prior to unification and a strict respect of agreed territorial borders; and a lock in of Korea into an institutional framework. These three main actions would drastically reduce uncertainties about the future of a reunified Korea.

For France to get directly involved in the Korean unification process is an unlikely scenario. France may call itself a power in the Indian and Pacific Oceans but it is clearly not an Asia-Pacific power which could influence heavily the unification process in the Peninsula.⁹¹⁾ Moreover, regional players such as South Korea, China and the U.S. do not consider France as a first rank power on that matter. France appears as a second rank power able only to support the unification process. However, before the unification becomes a reality, France can

91) Antoine Bondaz, "La pensée stratégique française vis-à-vis de l'Asie-Pacifique: intérêt stratégique accru dans un contexte de déclassement stratégique," au sein du panel Les Relations internationales dans l'espace académique francophone (II): le champ des études stratégiques, 23^{ème} Congrès mondial de Sciences Politiques (IPSA), Montréal, juillet 21, 2014.

promote a reformative regime in North Korea incentivizing the regime on key sectors: education, economy and its WMD program. France can also offer its political support in international organizations, including the UN Security Council, and present innovative ideas along the DMZ in order to make the unification a peaceful and stable process for the entire region.

b. Expected Effect

France's is one of few states to have a dual identity which is a clear asset for its global influence. France is both a leading member of the international community and a leading member of the European Union. As a leading member of the international community, France, is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) in Korea. France holds the second widest diplomatic network worldwide and is the world's fourth biggest Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) donor in terms of budget.⁹²⁾ Its national identity combines with its European identity which reinforces France's direct interests especially in regional stability and non-proliferation of WMDs. The European Union is a figurehead in terms on non-proliferation efforts not only on a political basis,⁹³⁾ but also on an academic one.⁹⁴⁾

92) France is contributing almost €10 billion annually, and is the second biggest in terms of percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) at 0.46%. Africa is the primary beneficiary of France's ODA (55%).

93) A European Strategy against the proliferation of WMD was adopted by the European Council

Thus, France's foreign and security policy goes well beyond the immediate scope of the defense of its sole national interests.

The April 2013 White Paper on Defense and National Security strongly emphasize both the Asia-Pacific and the European security interests in France's geopolitical entity. Such notion was further stressed in the latest White Paper publication.⁹⁵⁾ It clearly states that "in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world from which a new multi-polarity has emerged, risks and threats of all kinds affecting the Asia-Pacific have led France to play an active role in ensuring the region's security and stability." The importance of Asia in our environment is linked to our exposure to common threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The document expressly mentions North Korea. This makes the French authorities to assess that "despite

on December 12, 2003, in parallel with the adoption of the European Security Strategy. See Council of the European Union, "EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of mass Destruction," Brussels, December 10, 2003, <<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?!=EN&f=ST%2015708%202003%20INIT>>. On December 2006, the Council endorsed a concept paper outlining how to monitor and enhance further the consistent implementation of the EU WMD Strategy through a WMD Monitoring Centre.

- 94) In July 2010, the Council of the European Union decided to create a network bringing together foreign policy institutions and research centers from across the EU to encourage political and security-related dialogue and the long-term discussion of measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. The EU Non-Proliferation Consortium is managed jointly by four institutes: the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique in Paris, the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt (HSFK/PRIF), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
- 95) Ministry of Defense, France, "White Paper on Defense and National Security," (Ministry of Defense, France, April, 2013), <<http://fr.calameo.com/read/000331627d6f04ea4fe0e>>; Ministry of Defense, France, "France and security in the Asia-Pacific," (Ministry of Defense, France, April, 2014), <<http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/261113/3194598/file/PlaqueetteAsiePacifique2014ENBD.pdf>>.

the geographical distance between our continents, our security and prosperity are now inextricably linked.” Indeed, our regions are linked because any crisis or conflict occurring in one of the two continents will inevitably affect the interests of the other. Since the White paper mentions that “the Korean peninsula remains divided by one of the last borders resulting from the Cold War. It is the most heavily militarized border in the world” and despite being a faraway located country, France has a national interest in the stability of Northeast Asia, the unification of Korea could either disrupt or foster.

If France considers itself as a power in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, it is clearly not an Asia-Pacific power. As a consequence, its influence in Asia Pacific is limited despite its permanent seat at the UNSC. France will clearly not be at the forefront during the unification process as China, the United States, Japan and Russia would be. Moreover, being further away and due to its shrinking relative global influence, France’s interests in the Korean peninsula are limited. However, France is still seeking to protect its national interests, be they security, economic, human rights or overall interests.

(1) Security Dimension

North Korea is not a direct threat to France but North Korea’s illegal activity, including its nuclear and WMD program, and its proliferation activities especially to the Middle East, infringing international laws and UNSC resolutions France voted for, is

an indirect threat to France and to Europe. A unification of the Peninsula would obviously promote France's main security interests in solving the WMDs issue. However, a key condition for doing so is for a reunified Korea, just like a reunified Germany did in 1990, to "reaffirm its renunciation of the manufacture and possession of and control over nuclear, biological and chemical weapons."⁹⁶⁾

(2) Economic Dimension

As regards the economic impact of the unification, France is clearly not the first beneficiary. France-South Korea bilateral trade topped 8 billion USD in 2013, to be compared with 230 billion USD for China-South Korea bilateral trade. Korea only ranks at the 19th position among France's trade partners with France exporting mostly aeronautics, chemical products, cosmetics and machinery to Korea. A unification would not instantly boost France-Korea trade as it would boost Korean trade with its neighbors. Moreover, French investments in South Korea are limited to 4 billion USD and are not likely to expand at a faster pace than South Korea's other partners during the unification process.

96) Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, September 12, 1990: "The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic reaffirm their renunciation of the manufacture and possession of and control over nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. They declare that the united Germany, too, will abide by these commitments. In particular, rights and obligations arising from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968 will continue to apply to the united Germany."

Human rights interest

As François Hollande reminded during the 67th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 25, 2012, “France wants to set an example, not to teach others a lesson but, because it’s our history, our message. Setting an example in promoting fundamental freedoms is our battle and a matter of honour for us.” In response to the systematic denial of basic freedoms in the country, the United Nations Human Rights Council unanimously established the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in April 2013 to investigate whether such abuses amount to crimes against humanity. The report was released in February 2014 and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay clearly mentioned that “its findings need to be treated with the greatest urgency, as they suggest that crimes against humanity of an unimaginable scale continue to be committed in the DPRK.” A reformative regime in North Korea could drastically improve the human rights records of the country and then promote France national interests.

Overall interest

France’s utmost national interest in the unification of the Korean peninsula remains the stability of the Northeast Asian region. As mentioned in the White Paper on Defense and National Security, “Asia therefore plays a vital role in globalization. Today it is the main driver of growth worldwide,

but also a region where the risks of tension and conflict are among the highest in the world.” Any crisis in Asia-pacific or instability in the Korean peninsula would have far-reaching consequences even to Europe, first economically, then in security terms. Any major crisis in the peninsula would hamper China’s economic development and question the legitimacy of its leadership, generating instability to China. Hence, the key concept in Korean unification process should be stability, as stability is the major common interests of all parties relevant.

c. Potential Roles

It is clearly in France’s national interests to promote a reformative regime in North Korea. However, as stated before, France’s room of maneuvers, even increased by its European identity, is limited. Alternatively, France can incentivize the regime to change but must avoid a regime change or a regime collapse that could disrupt its interests. If France and the European Union cannot influence the structure of the North Korean regime, it can still develop some leverage to influence the path it adopts. Moreover, any French initiative should be a multilateral one to increase France’s leverages. France should then consult Seoul but also Beijing and the United States before shaping its own policy towards the Peninsula.

Political and educational role

France should not talk about North Korea but with North Korea. France could take advantage of the window of opportunity created with the second power transition in North Korea and enhance its relations with Pyongyang, even without formally establishing diplomatic relations. For instance, in 2011, France opened its first French Cooperation and Cultural Action Office in Pyongyang.

The question is not whether we should engage but how we should engage. Coupling an international sanctions policy with direct engagement and contacts is a challenge. However, France should wonder what it can do that the U.S. or China cannot. For example, educational exchanges could be promoted. North Korean students can be invited to French universities and academic exchanges can be expanded to graduate students rather than being limited to professors and diplomats. This will enhance understandings of North Korea among young Europeans. Academic scholarships could be provided to promising North Korean graduate students on merit-base systems, so that they can be trained in key sectors in Europe. Moreover, foreign orchestras can tour in Pyongyang and North Korean orchestras may also be invited more often to France. In fact, in March, 2012, such as Unhasu Orchestra performed together with the Orchestre Philharmonique de Radio France.

Educational exchanges can have a huge impact as underlined by Russian expert Andrei Lankov. In a paper presented at

Stanford, he underlines that among the first four Soviet students selected in 1958 by Moscow to enter Columbia University for a one year program, two of them have become top leaders of Perestroika.⁹⁷⁾ The young KGB operative Oleg Kalugin became in the 1980s the first KGB officer to openly challenge the organization from within, whereas his fellow classmate, Alexandr Yakovlev, a Communist Party Central Committee secretary, became the closest associate of Mikhail Gorbachev. Exchanges are a factor of change and will entail a gradual weakening of the official ideology from within North Korea. Thus, France could promote educational, cultural and people to people exchanges what is much more difficult for the U.S., Japan or South Korea.

Economic role

In line with educational exchanges, France should support any attempt by North Korea to shift its focus to economic development and the improvement of people's conditions of living, a precondition to regime stability and, as a consequence, regional stability. No country, including South Korea, can force the North Korean regime to reform the country against the will of its authoritarian elite. However, France and its European partners can pave the way for these reforms and prepare the country and its human capital for the day it decides to open

97) Andrei Lankov, "North Korea and the Subversive Truth," (Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University), <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/5605/Lankov_on_North_Korea_and_the_Subversive_Truth.pdf>.

and reform, and that day might come sooner than expected despite North Korean provocations on the international arena. France could follow the path of its European partners and further develop training programs in order to form North Korean junior and senior executives in key sectors such as finance, banking, market transition and international law so that the country can respect international norms and adapt to the globalized world economy.⁹⁸⁾ France and the European Union can then play a decisive role in assisting North Korea in its reforms.

Economic engagement, integrated into the current system of UN sanctions France supports, can help North Korea to better provide for its people's welfare. We should always keep in mind that "addressing the root causes of poverty and vulnerability and creating conditions for success are part of a long-term engagement agenda."⁹⁹⁾ However, economic engagement resulting in suddenly opening the doors to massive French investment is not conceivable. European firms would not invest in a country which is below investable status, where the rule of law is not respected and where even Chinese firms are reluctant

98) At the beginning of the year 2013, it was reported that the North Korean regime had enlisted the assistance of German economists and lawyers to lay the groundwork to reform its laws relating to foreign investments exactly towards a partial opening up of the country in order not to rely exclusively on Chinese investments. See "Media Report: North Korea Enlists German Help to Prepare Economic Opening," (Spiegel Online International, January 4, 2013), <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-paper-reports-north-korea-preparing-economic-opening-a-875844.html>>.

99) Katharina Zellweger, "Aid and Development Co-operation And North Korea: A Window of Opportunities or pushing at a Closed Door?," (paper presented at Stanford University, March 2012). Involved in providing humanitarian aid and development assistance to North Korea since 1995, Katharina Zellweger was the president of the office of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation in Pyongyang from 2006 to 2011.

to invest in. Moreover, if investments were made in the hope that it would transform the regime, it would end up in a major failure since the regime would close the door once the system survival is threatened. This might result in an utter loss of all European investments. European investments should concentrate on very few sectors, enabling the country to become food sufficient for instance. These private investments could also focus on newly created special economic zones, where investments are safer due to a more stable environment, which could in the same time reinforce our economic cooperation with South Korea (Kaesong) and China.

Role as regards the WMD programs

France, while continuing to call on the DPRK to fulfil its international obligations since non-proliferation is our main objective, strictly applying the UNSC Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087, 2094, and supporting IAEA's initiatives, should focus more on the ballistic and the chemical weapons issues where it could play a more important role.¹⁰⁰⁾ Indeed, it is now clear that the United States is the main country able to solve the North Korean nuclear issue. The Leap Day Deal agreement signed

100) The ballistic issue was not on the agenda of the Six-Party Talks and North Korea is not a party to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); North Korea possesses the third largest chemical weapon stockpile in the world and is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). See Bondaz, Antoine. "Why North Korea Should Dismantle Its Chemical Weapons Arsenal" (WeiheChaoxianyinggaichaichuhuaxuewuqiku), (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2013); Third party countries can play a major role in these two issues as the Israeli precedent partly demonstrated in 1993, when Israel tried to prevent North Korea from selling missiles to Iran in exchange of economic aid before the deal was blocked by Washington.

in February 2012, and canceled few weeks after due to North Korea's announcement of its satellite launch, was revealing. Even though many analysts presented the agreement as a success for the Obama administration, it was actually a success for Pyongyang. First, it clearly demonstrated that the United States was ready to negotiate with North Korea. Second, it clearly demonstrated that the nuclear issue was a bilateral one, and not a multilateral one, since the agreement was not signed by the Six-Party Talks. Third, it clearly demonstrated that the denuclearization as a prerequisite was just a word since the agreement entailed first a freeze in exchange of food aid.

Moreover, and only if coordinated with other powers, France and the European Union could shift from denuclearization as a prerequisite to “damage limitation” as a prerequisite, using its unique experience of Comprehensive Threat Reduction (CTR) after the collapse of the USSR.¹⁰¹⁾ It must be clear that France will not give up denuclearization as the ultimate goal and consider a more realistic approach such as freezing North Korea's nuclear activities as a prerequisite. We should not forget that “the DPRK's objectives are regime survival, national security, and economic strength” and that “nuclear deterrence, military confrontation, and diplomatic negotiation are only means to those ends.”¹⁰²⁾ Linking complete, verifiable and irreversible

101) Bruno Tertrais, “Korean security dynamics and the succession process, the stakes for the European Union and its potential role,” (Asia Centre, Paris Conference, May 25, 2012).

102) Chung-in Moon and John Delury, “Analytical Failure and the North Korean Quagmire,” (38 North, April 2011).

denuclearization to any improvements in the bilateral relations has led to a failure. France, with the support of the European Union should negotiate with North Korea about its chemical and biological weapons and try to make Pyongyang sign new international treaties such as the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) or the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) which does not alter its national security, constitutes a first step while sending a message of willingness to the international community.

France could also press the international community to target both end of the proliferation system. The EU and its key partners could expand sanctions to both suppliers and providers, not only North Korean in order to deter other countries or terrorist groups from dealing with North Korea. One red line should be clearly maintained: any export of nuclear weapons material or technology and ballistic missiles or technology.

d. Implications for Korea

France can have a role in the unification process not as a neighbor, not even as a European leading power, but as a global power, since it is a permanent member of the UNSC. With its unique experience of the German unification, France is well aware of the stakes of any unification process and would underline, the same way it underlined more than two decades ago, that uncertainty should be reduced to a minimum. France

can then give general advices to South Korea on how to promote the common interest which is to maintain regional stability.

Indeed, Korea's neighbors first fear regional instability but more broadly, uncertainties. Korean unification should not equal opening a Pandora's Box.¹⁰³⁾ Unification should be clearly defined and presented before the process even starts, leaving no room for interpretation. From clarity and transparence will grow trust, a trust that is promoted by current President Park Geun-Hye.¹⁰⁴⁾ France could offer its political support, at the UNSC and in any international organization, to foster stability in East-Asia.

Regional structure and the future of U.S. alliances in the region

Since the unification process could prove to be detrimental to Korea's neighbors, South Korea should reduce uncertainties and reassure its neighbors that the unification could serve their national interests, the way Germany did in Europe. The main countries to be reassured are today China and Japan.

First, and before talking about the unification process, it should be noted that if Pyongyang may be on more stable ground domestically than it has been in the past years, the loss of its role as the remaining international patron would still trigger

103) Antoine Bondaz, "The Fear of Opening Pandora's Box: China's Limited Policy Options in Resolving the North Korean Issue," *Korean Review of International Studies* (Summer 2014), forthcoming.

104) Geun-Hye Park, "A New Kind of Korea, Building trust Between Seoul and Pyongyang," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 5 (September/October 2011).

a regime collapse, opening Pandora's Box. This course of action would be particularly dangerous. If regional actors, especially China and the United States, were unable to cooperatively develop a contingency plan to respond to a North Korean regime collapse. There would be a high risk of misunderstanding, collision, and potential escalation between these actors as they reacted to a crisis that could result in disaster. But until these major regional players move past their diplomatic constraints and are able to work through their strategic distrust of one another, no such planning will occur. A priority of the South Korean government should be to discuss the unification issue with China, on the assumptions of this research project: the emergence of a reformative regime in North Korea willing to unify with the South.

Second, Korean unification is not the same as German unification for several structural reasons. A unified Korea cannot become the dominant power in East Asia since its unification would not severely alter the regional balance of power. The Korean unification would also not entail a domino effect such as regime collapse of communist regimes across East Asia. And last but not least, North Korea is not a satellite of China, the way East Germany was a satellite of the USSR. North Korea is clearly an independent country, following its own national interest and reluctant to obey its main patron, China.¹⁰⁵⁾

105) Antoine Bondaz, "Failure to launch: the North Korean satellite test and China's influence on the Korean peninsula," (Gaming North Korea, China Analysis, European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2012).

However, the structural landscape in East Asia clearly differs from the European one at the end of the 1980s. The main patron of North Korea, China, is a dynamic rising global power whereas the main patron of East Germany, the USSR, was a breathless declining power. As a consequence, China has much to lose and at the same time in a much better position than the USSR to influence Korean unification. The stakes at play about the future of North Korea are bigger to China than the future of East Germany to a collapsing USSR, focusing mostly on its own survival. Clearly, the unification process should not go against China's interests or else, China could block it, as a signatory to the Armistice of the Korean War and as one of the two major regional powers.¹⁰⁶⁾

The same way the U.S., the USSR, France and Great Britain allowed Germany to reunify when they signed the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany in Moscow, on September 12, 1990. China will be, with the U.S., a key country in shaping the unification process. China has analyzed the German precedent and the role of the USSR during the unification process. Xi Jinping, or any Chinese top leader, will not become a second Gorbachev. Russia was trapped and could not prevent NATO from expanding to former Soviet satellites, explaining partly Putin's current assertive policy in Ukraine. China's perceptions of U.S. encirclement in Asia-Pacific are

106) Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, *China's impact on Korean Peninsula unification and questions for the Senate* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 2012).

already strong, even expanding, and shape China's foreign policy. It's clearly against China's national interest to let the U.S. web of alliances enlarge and China will try its best to prevent it, preventing a unification if necessary.

Strategic mistrust between China and the U.S. is deep and widening as China gets closer to power parity with the U.S., North Korea being embedded in an alliance with China and South Korea being a U.S. ally, a reunified Korea should reassure its neighbors about its strategic alignment which should be clearly stated and maintained. If the ROK-U.S. alliance is maintained, no troops should be stationed North of the 38th parallel¹⁰⁷⁾ and the *raison d'être* of the alliance should be clearly expressed. Indeed, if the North Korean threat, the target of the ROK-U.S. alliance, disappears, what will be the next target? Chinese scholars invariably believe that their country would become the new target of the alliance. The U.S. neutrality for a unified Korea, or a double web of alliances with China and the U.S. could prove to be the best scenario to reassure its neighbors. A reunified Korea, if it becomes a neutral state between China and the U.S., could also become a central intermediary in the Asia Pacific region and a hub of security organizations. South Korea needs to choose its future before it even starts the unification process.

107) Under the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, only German forces were supposed to be deployed in the area of the former East Germany.

Territorial disputes and integrity

France has a unique experience as regards the German division and unification process. It was one of the four occupying powers of Germany that signed the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany in order to grant full sovereignty to a unified Germany. A key aspect of the German unification has been a border agreement since then respected. France could share its experiences with South Korea.

Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany
September 12, 1990

ARTICLE 1

- ① The united Germany shall comprise the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and the whole of Berlin. Its external borders shall be the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic and shall be definitive from the date on which the present Treaty comes into force. The confirmation of the definitive nature of the borders of the united Germany is an essential element of the peaceful order in Europe.
- ② The united Germany has no territorial claims whatsoever against other states and shall not assert any in the future.

Territorial disputes, maritime or continental, are one of the key disrupting factor of regional stability in the Asia-Pacific, be it between India and Pakistan, China and India, in the South China Sea, in the East China Sea, etc. Territorial dispute ignites nationalist passions, putting pressure on politicians to appear tough and ultimately making any possible resolution even harder to find. Historical disputes should not become political ones. China faces today several territorial disputes, including one with South Korea over Ieodo islets. One of China's fears with the unification is that it could lead a unified Korea to become more assertive and claim part of China, including Yanbian Korean autonomous prefecture. China needs to be reassured that any unification would solve these disputes rather than creating new ones.

Before unification, Korea should not only solve maritime disputes with China, but also reassure its neighbor that the borders define prior to unification will remain consistent. The current border between North Korea and China should be clearly defined at the early stages of the unification process. Korea should also clearly state that the country will not have territorial claims, be them land or maritime claims. Korea should then seize the unique opportunity of the unification to solve, once and for all, its territorial disputes.

Building a regional institutional framework

Locking Korea into an institutional framework is one of the best ways to reassure its neighbors, the same way France and Great Britain were reassured by Germany being a member of the European Economic Community and, most of all, Germany agreeing to join the French proposal about adopting the euro as a common currency. Indeed, France and French President Mitterrand wanted to guarantee that unification took place within a larger European framework. A reunified Germany was in the middle of an institutional trap (economic, diplomatic and strategic) which reduced uncertainty about the future of Germany.

Korea should continue to promote institution building in East Asia, including a security framework to reassure its neighbors about the future of its power. Being entrapped in such an entanglement of institutions, Korea would deliberately choose to constrain its future moves, not to reduce its sovereignty, but to reassure its neighbors and reach its final goal: the unification of the peninsula. By becoming a neutral power in the region, Korea could reduce its exposition to bilateral disputes among regional players, play the role of an intermediary, and host regional institutions as a symbol of its neutrality.

Transforming the DMZ into a symbol of unification

The DMZ, along the 38th parallel and 900km² big, symbolizes the division of the Korean peninsula since 1953. Any unification process should transform the DMZ into a “peace belt” not dividing

but uniting Korea. The DMZ could be easily transformed into a “green belt” coupled with an “infrastructure belt” gathering renewable energy facilities and transportation networks. Korea could find some inspiration with the German Green belt (Grünes Band), an initiative taken by German NGOs and supported by the federal government in order to transform the former border into a national ecologic network.¹⁰⁸⁾ The newly created ecozone could become the showcase of Korean modernity and help shape foreign perceptions, further reinforcing Korea’s national image.¹⁰⁹⁾

Such an initiative would directly refer to President Park’s ambitions as stated in front of the U.S. Congress, in May 2013: “the Demilitarized Zone must live up to its name, a zone that strengthens the peace, not undermines it. It is with this vision in mind that I hope to work toward an international park inside the DMZ. It will be a park that sends a message of peace to all of humanity.”

Moreover, the former DMZ could easily host headquarters of newly created regional or international organizations, especially offices of the UNDP or related to the green economy. France could strongly support Korean initiatives within the UNSC and push the European Union to do so. Such an initiative, bi partisan, would easily find an international consensus.

108) Suk Kyung Shim, “Governance of the German Green Belt Ecological Network: Implications for the Korean Demilitarized Zone,” (Ph.D dissertation, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2012).

109) Antoine Bondaz and Olivia Ih-Prost, “South Korea trying to improve its Nation brand,” (Korea Analysis, Asia Centre, July 2014).

e. Observation

As a general observation, the main difficulty for South Korea is not to convince its neighbors and the international community that a unification is beneficial, it is to convince its own public opinion and, the trickiest part, the North Korean leadership. So far, North Korea has criticized the Unification Preparatory Committee and rejected the Dresden Doctrine presented by President Park. How could the North Korean leadership accept a unification that they believe would be an absorption of the North by the South? South Korea also faces a dilemma of how to negotiate with a regime that is threatening its national security? Can South Korean officials accept negotiations with an autocratic leadership and find an honorable future for the North Korean leaders? If they are not included, how can the two sides even start a negotiation? As long as they hold power, what can South Korea offer as security guarantees to the North Korea leadership that unification will not destroy their privileges? In a way, the use of the word “jackpot” (daebak) is intended to the South Korean public opinion and clearly not to the North Korea leadership, yet the one in charge.

On a more regional level, unification raises the question of the future of a reunified Korea and its alignment of regional power. If a unified Korea wants to receive the assistance of the international community, South Korea should not only share the costs but also the benefits of the unification. South Korea needs to reassure its partners, the main ones being China and

the United States, that any unification process would not be against their national interest. Korea's main goal should then be to reduce uncertainties about the unification giving other powers reassurances. Seoul should solve existing territorial disputes prior to unification and sign an agreement in which it bounds itself to a strict respect of agreed territorial borders; and lock itself into an institutional framework so as to partly constrain its prospective moves. France could support South Korea's initiatives as long as they don't disrupt regional stability.

If France can play a role in the unification process, mostly as a supporter state as a UNSC permanent member, the bigger player should clearly be the European Union. Being further away, with no historical and emotional burden, with no combat forces stationed anywhere close to the Korean Peninsula and no alliance with neighboring countries, the European Union can play the card of an honest broker. It can be an arbitrator on which Pyongyang has little leverage, being unable to play the European Union and China or the European Union and the United States against each other. Moreover, the EU can be a reliable partner since it has no geopolitical ambition in East Asia. Suspicious of Chinese intentions and worried about being heavily dependent on China, North Korea is eager to diversify its diplomatic relations and may partially adopt the Burmese way of opening. In this case, the European Union stands out as a credible partner.¹¹⁰⁾

110) Rüdiger Frank, "The World Economic Forum on East Asia 2012: Burmese Lessons for Korea?," *38 North*, June 20, 2012.

6 Germany

a. Overview

In March, 2014, South Korean President Park Geun Hye turned to reunited Germany for inspiration as she and other Korean politicians push for an end to the Korean peninsula's six-decade divide. "Germany and Korea have a special relationship through the painful experience of division," President Park said at a joint news conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. "Germany is an example and a model for a peaceful unification of our own country."¹¹¹⁾

Indeed, looking around the world, there are not many examples that two different political systems can reach unification peacefully. German unification was one of the central events of the process sealing the end of the so called Cold War. Since then, Germany has undergone a process characterized by many positive, but also some negative experiences. What effects will Korean unification have on Germany? What role could Germany play in the process of unification? And what are the lessons that can be learned from the German experience? This article tries to analyze these questions.

111) "Park Says Once-Divided Germany Is Model for Korea unification," *Bloomberg*, March 26, 2014, <<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-25/park-looks-to-once-divided-germany-to-spur-korean-unification.html>>.

b. Expected Effect

In the 1980s, when the division of Germany lasted more than 40 years, there were a growing number of people who had settled down into a general acceptance of the existence of two German states. Some even believed—particularly in the younger generation—that the unification of Germany would not be desirable. But the future cannot be predicted. In 1989, with the end of the cold war and the breakdown of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the window of opportunity for German unification was open. The unification of 1990 demonstrated that the re-establishment of the unity of a country even after a long period of division is possible and that unification can be achieved in a democratic, peaceful way.

Korea is one of the last countries divided along Cold War lines: communism versus market economy, a despotic autocracy versus a liberal democracy.¹¹²⁾ Korea was arbitrarily divided by external powers against the will of its people, the North Korean regime violates the human rights of its citizens, and North Korea's nuclear weapons pose a threat to peace and stability in Asia, as well as a global proliferation risk. Therefore, despite the monumental challenges that the Korean people is facing after many decades of division, the unification of Korea must remain a key policy objective—not for the Republic of Korea alone but also for its international partners.

112) Geir Helgesen, *Democracy and Authority in Korea: The Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics* (New York, N.Y: Routledge, 2013), p. 41.

The argument of this chapter is that Germany should play a more active role in Korea's unifying process. However, since Germany is a member state of the European Union (EU), its foreign policy is to be seen in the context of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. A peaceful transition in North Korea which would ultimately make Korean unification possible must remain a goal of both German and European foreign policy.

(1) Security Dimension

Today, North Korea is one of the most critical security challenges not only in Northeast Asia but in the whole world. The North Korean regime remains a security threat because of its willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks on South Korea, its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of its international agreements and United Nations Security Council Resolutions.¹¹³⁾

Since South Korea is not a member of NATO, in the case of an inner-Korean conflict Germany would have no formal obligation to support the ROK militarily or to deploy its armed forces in Korea. But the possibility of a German engagement in a Korean war is not a groundless question: The NATO member state U.S. is a close ally of South Korea, and the North Korean regime did not rule out ballistic missile attacks on Guam (which

113) United States Department of Defense, *Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (Washington: Department of Defense, 2012), p. 1.

is U.S. territory), the U.S. state of Hawaii or even the continental United States in the case of a military escalation. According to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, a missile attack on a NATO state, however, would undoubtedly be regarded an attack on all NATO members. In addition, North Korea probably¹¹⁴⁾ has the wherewithal to develop longer-range ballistic missiles, possibly including an intercontinental ballistic missile, based on components from the former Soviet Union, which could reach Western Europe.

Under what circumstances North Korea might use nuclear weapons is a matter of conjecture.¹¹⁵⁾ Most analysts assume that North Korea would only do so as a last resort if the regime were on the verge of military defeat.¹¹⁶⁾ But apart from any future use, North Korea's nuclear weapons also serve another dangerous purpose. North Korea has been one of the world's leading exporters of ballistic missiles and it has assisted nuclear weapon programs in at least two countries. Interdiction efforts under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the UN Security Council Resolution 1718's ban on North Korean arms exports may have restricted sales.¹¹⁷⁾ But North Korea is

114) "U.S. sees North Korea becoming direct threat, eyes ICBMs," *Reuters*, January 11, 2011, <<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE70A1XR20110111>>.

115) Mark Fitzpatrick, "North Korean Proliferation Challenges. The Role of the European Union," *EU Non Proliferation Consortium: Non Proliferation Papers*, No. 18 (2012), p. 5.

116) J. R. Clapper, "Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 16, 2011), <http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20110216_testimony_sfr.pdf>, p. 7.

117) The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and

apparently still supplying missile components and technology to countries like Iran and Syria.

Despite the fact that North Korean missile exports have declined since the 1990s, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by the North Korean regime represents a massive threat to international security. The European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted by the European Council in 2003, even calls proliferation “potentially the greatest threat to our security.”¹¹⁸⁾ In this context, the ESS also stated, that “Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly …. In an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe.” Therefore the EU has pursued policies against proliferation over many years.

Concerning the specific North Korea issue, however, the EU and Germany are by and large “bystanders.”¹¹⁹⁾ Like the U.S., South Korea and Japan, both Germany and the EU say they cannot accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. Germany and the EU support the Six-Party Talks to find a peaceful resolution to the security concerns that result of the North

from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. It was launched in 2003 by the U.S. President George W. Bush and has now grown to include the endorsement of 103 nations around the world, including Germany.

118) European Security Strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” (Brussels, December 12, 2003), p. 3, <<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>>.

119) Fitzpatrick, *North Korean Proliferation Challenges*, p. 12.

Korean nuclear weapons program and call for a resumption of the talks.¹²⁰⁾ In support of the talks, the EU in 2007 provided 1.7 million EUR to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct verification of North Korean dismantlement activity. The EU has also joined sanctions actions. But neither Germany nor the EU are participants in the Six-Party Talks.

That doesn't mean that Germany and the EU have no influence at all. Germany and 26 other EU countries maintain diplomatic relations with North Korea.¹²¹⁾ In May 2001 the European Union established diplomatic relations with North Korea, although agreement was never reached on accreditation of ambassadors. However, seven member states maintain resident embassies in Pyongyang: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

Therefore, Germany is one of only seven Western powers that have more or less direct access to the North Korean regime. Political relations between Germany and North Korea date back to the period immediately after the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was founded in 1948. The former German Democratic Republic (GDR) had maintained diplomatic relations with North Korea from 1949 onwards. The Federal Republic of Germany and North Korea established diplomatic relations on 1 March 2001. According to the agreement reached in this connection, diplomatic relations are aimed "at securing the non-proliferation

120) The Six-Party Talks including the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the United States of America, China, Japan and Russia were discontinued in 2009.

121) Except France and Estonia.

of weapons of mass destruction, advancing inner-Korean dialogue and improving the human rights situation in North Korea.”¹²²⁾ This reflects the strategy of German diplomacy concerning the North Korea issue: talking with North Korea but being critical of its policies and practices, including proliferation and human rights.

Germany is also actively involved in international efforts. During its UN Security Council membership (2011~2012) Germany supported the efforts towards denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, Germany makes sustained contributions to avoiding the transfer of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors and leads a working group in the committee responsibly for this pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 1540.¹²³⁾ Germany, like other EU members, is also committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), entered into force in 1970. Germany had been a driving force behind the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, using its political influence to convince other nations to support this milestone in international non-proliferation efforts.

Along with its European partner countries and within the framework of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative

122) Federal Foreign Office, “Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of),” (Federal Foreign Office, Germany), <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Nodes/Korea-DemokratischeVolksrepublik_node.html>.

123) The Permanent Mission of Germany, “Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” (The Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations-New York), <<http://www.new-york-un.diplo.de/Vertretung/newyorkvvn/en/05/non-proliferation.html>>.

(NPDI), Germany is lobbying for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The main target group comprises the eight countries that have not yet ratified (China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the United States) or signed (India, Pakistan and North Korea) the Treaty.

As far as the Six-Party Talks are concerned, it is unlikely that Germany will seek a direct role in future negotiations. But under the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as in bilateral relations, Germany is trying to get North Korea to resume the six-party talks on ending its nuclear weapons program. When the talks resume, the European Union should become engaged more directly in the process. Any solution to the North Korean proliferation problem will require economic and technical assistance of various forms, and it is very likely that the EU (including Germany as the EU's strongest economic power) will be looked to for contributions.

In a 2005 resolution, the European Parliament with an overwhelming majority already had called for a participation of the European Union in the Six-Party Talks. The Parliament asked the EU Commission and the EU Council "to make the necessary approaches regarding EU participation in the future 'Six-Party Talks' and at the same time make it clear that 'No Say, No Pay' is a principle which the EU will follow regarding the Korean Peninsula."¹²⁴) But an EU participation in the talks

124) European Parliament, "European Parliament Resolution on the Non-Proliferation Treaty 2005 Review Conference – Nuclear arms in North Korea and Iran," (European Parliament, March 10, 2005), <<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2005->

would make sense not only from a financial perspective. As Ford/Kwon pointed out, Europe, having no historical baggage and a wealth of soft power, could act as an “honest broker” with North Korea and to help ease it out of its belligerent defense posture and isolating economic policies.¹²⁵⁾

So far, there is no significant cooperation between Germany and South Korea on a military level. But with a unified, democratic Korea, a closer military cooperation with Germany could become possible. Despite the long distance, Germany has always regarded South Korea as an important partner in tackling global challenges and further developing world order. Korean engagement in the international arena such as in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa or now in the Middle East are a good basis for a deeper cooperation. After a peaceful unification of Korea, the armed forces of Germany and Korea could expand cooperation in international peacekeeping operations. Both countries could continue working together in fighting international terrorism and other threats to international security like cyber-crime and drug trafficking.

0075&language=EN&ring=B6-2005-0148>.

125) G. Ford, and S. Kwon, *North Korea on the Brink: Struggle for Survival* (Pluto Press: London, 2007), p. 11; Fitzpatrick, *North Korean Proliferation Challenges*, p. 14.

(2) Economic Dimension

In the 1960s and 1970s, Germany was instrumental in laying the foundations for Korea's economic miracle. The credit of 150 million DM that was agreed upon in 1964 as well as subsequent German credits was key contributions to build Korean economy at a time when no other country seemed to be willing to grant credits to Korea. For Germany the overriding consideration at the time was helping a country that was separated as a result of the Second World War and later the Cold War just as Germany was.¹²⁶⁾

Today, South Korea is no longer a recipient of international aid, but itself a donor and the 12th largest economy in the world. South Korea has achieved rapid economic growth in the past decades. Economic cooperation between German and South Korea remains strong. The Republic of Korea is one of Germany's principal trading partners in East Asia. The volume of bilateral trade reached its highest-ever amount of 27.2 billion USD in 2013 with a balance of trade surplus of 11.4 billion USD in Germany's favour. South Korea is the third-biggest importer of German goods in Asia (after the People's Republic of China and Japan), and in 2013 Germany's goods-trade surplus with South Korea increased 8.1% compared to a year earlier. Germany is the third largest European investor in South Korea, with actual foreign direct investment totalling

126) Rede von Botschafter Mafael vor der Daegu Gyeonbuk International Exchange Association, "Germany and Korea: Building a partnership for excellence," November 22, 2013, <<http://www.seoul.diplo.de/contentblob/4054704/Daten/3712216/DaeguFriendshipd.pdf>>.

approximately 9.1 billion USD (from 1962 to 2013). In 2013, German companies invested 248 million USD in South Korea.¹²⁷⁾

There are also strong economic relations between South Korea and the European Union (EU) On 15 October 2011 the European Union and the Republic of Korea signed die “EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement,” which has been provisionally in force since 1 July 2011 while the final ratification is taking place. The agreement would be the second largest free trade agreement, second only to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It is also the most comprehensive the EU has ever negotiated. Over the last decade, EU exports to South Korea more than doubled, from 16.5 billion EUR in 2003 to a peak of 39.9 billion in 2013. EU imports from South Korea grew more modestly, from 26.1 billion to 35.8 billion, but remained below the peak of 41.7 billion recorded in 2007 (see Table 1).

Table 1 EU International Trade in Goods with the Republic of Korea

	(billion EUR)										
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Export	16.5	17.9	20.2	22.8	24.7	25.5	21.6	28.0	32.5	37.8	39.9
Import	26.1	30.8	34.6	40.9	41.7	39.7	32.5	39.5	36.3	38.0	35.8
Balance	-9.7	-12.9	-14.3	-18.1	-17.0	-14.2	-10.9	-11.6	-3.8	-0.2	+4.1

Source: Release 163/2013, “A surplus of 1.0 bn euro in EU28 trade in goods with South Korea in the first half of 2013,” EuroStat News November 6, 2013, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/6-06112013-BP/EN/6-06112013-BP-EN.PDF>.

127) Federal Foreign Office, Germany, “Korea (Republic of),” (Federal Foreign Office), <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Nodes/KoreaRepublik_node.html>.

Concerning North Korea, the situation is entirely different. North Korea is one of the last countries that adhere to a rigid centrally planned economy. North Korean trade went through significant change as states in the former socialist camp like the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries began to transform into market economies.¹²⁸⁾ The former German Democratic Republic (GDR), for instance, was one of North Korea's main trading partners. In 1990, the year Germany was reunited, the GDR still was North Korea's fifth largest trading partner in imports (behind Japan, China, Tunisia, and Turkey) and sixth largest in exports.¹²⁹⁾

Since then, trade between Germany and North Korea has decreased dramatically. In the 2013 ranking of Germany's trading partners in foreign trade by the German Federal Statistical Office,¹³⁰⁾ the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ranked no. 178 out of 240 states and territories—behind Barbados and South Sudan. In 2013, imports from North Korea amounted to only EUR 10 million, exports to EUR 11 million. No bilateral agreements have yet been concluded on economic, financial or scientific and technological cooperation. There are no major German companies investing in North Korea. From the EU perspective, the situation is basically the same: In 2013 EU exports to South Korea shrank 43.9% compared to 2012 to a record low amount of 27 million EUR (see Table 2).

128) Hyung-Gon Jeong and Hokyung Bang, *An Analysis of North Korea's Principal Trade Relations*, (Paris: Ifri Centre for Asian Studies, 2010), pp. 1-29.

129) *Ibid.*, p. 12.

130) Federal Statistical Office, "Foreign trade. Ranking of Germany's trading partners in foreign trade," (Wiesbaden, 2014), p. 5.

Table 2 EU International Trade in Goods with North Korea

(million EUR)

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Export	235	234	164	127	59	96	73	68	42	48	27
Import	76	117	54	154	63	111	51	99	117	23	118
Balance	+169	+117	+110	-27	-4	-16	+22	-31	-75	+24	-92

Source: European Commission, European Union, "Trade in Goods with North Korea," August 27, 2014, <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113428.pdf>.

For years, Western economic relations with North Korea have primarily taken the form of development assistance and aid for humanitarian relief. Currently, Germany is not engaged in bilateral development cooperation with North Korea. Humanitarian aid has played an important role in bilateral relations in recent years, but this was terminated by the North Korean government in 2006. Since then, assistance has continued in the form of emergency and transitional aid under the umbrella of the European Union.¹³¹⁾ Since 1995 the EU has provided North Korea over EUR 366 million in food aid, medical, water and sanitation assistance and other forms of agricultural support, financed under the Food Security Thematic Programme of the European Commission's regional development cooperation instrument for Asia.¹³²⁾ At the same time, the European Commission has committed over EUR 135 million in humanitarian aid to some 130 projects, with special

131) Korea (Democratic People's Republic of), Federal Foreign Office, Germany, *op. cit.*

132) European Union External Action, EU relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)," (European Union External Action), <http://eeas.europa.eu/korea_north/index_en.htm>.

focus on food assistance, the improvement of health services and access to clean water and sanitation for the most vulnerable populations.¹³³⁾ In 2011, the EU provided EUR 10 mill. in emergency aid following a severe food crisis. Adapting to the changing needs, the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department, formerly known as the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), closed its office in Pyongyang in 2008 and phased out its humanitarian aid operations.

Germany's economic relations with North Korea remain on a low level. There has been no change since Kim Jong-un assumed the leadership in 2012. However, the year of 2013 had started with optimistic expectations. According to an article published in January 2013 by the daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ), the communist regime in Pyongyang at that time considered preparing to open up the country's economy to foreign investors. Moreover, it had enlisted the assistance of German economists and lawyers to lay the groundwork for the move.¹³⁴⁾ On New Year's Day 2013, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un called for a radical economic renewal for his country and an end to decades of conflict with South Korea. One of the economists told the FAZ that the country was primarily interested in modernizing its laws relating to foreign investment.

133) European Commission, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, North Korea (DPRK), Factsheet," (European Commission, September 2014), p. 2, <http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/dprk_en.pdf>.

134) "Nordkorea bereitet baldige Öffnung der Wirtschaft vor," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 4, 2013.

North Korea allegedly was not intending to follow the Chinese model, which called for the creation of special economic zones for foreign investors, the economist told the FAZ. “Rather, they are interested in the Vietnamese model, in which specific companies were chosen as recipients of investments,” the source said.¹³⁵⁾

Such a move would have been revolutionary for North Korea. But North Korea’s third nuclear weapons test in February 2013, and the UN Security Council Resolution 2087, which condemned Pyongyang for the launch of Kwangmyŏngsŏng-3 Unit 2 missile, caused an escalation of tensions just a few days later. As a consequence of this “North Korean Crisis” of 2013, at present an opening of the North Korean economy is no longer a topic.

Given the fact, that there are almost no economic relations with North Korea, currently there is no room for influencing the situation in North Korea through use of Germany’s economic power. However, if North Korea moves towards market reforms in the future in order to overcome its poverty trap, there may be opportunities for a greater German role. Germany could pursue a dual-track strategy of financial incentives (aid and investments) and disincentives (sanctions) to encourage North Korea to (further) liberalize its political and economic system.

135) “North Korea Enlists German Help to Prepare Economic Opening,” Spiegel online, January 4, 2013, <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-paper-reports-north-korea-preparing-economic-opening-a-875844.html>>.

c. Potential Roles

There are three scenarios how Korean unification can be achieved.¹³⁶⁾ The first scenario is that “soft-liners” gain influence in the North Korean regime, which begins a gradual process of internal reform and external cooperation.¹³⁷⁾ South Korea and other nations, including Germany, would support North Korea in that process by humanitarian and cooperative projects and through economic aid. In the course of negotiations, North Korea would have to reduce and to denuclearize its military. This scenario would lead to a North Korea being a market economy (perhaps after the Chinese model) and a more democratic political system. Eventually it would pave the way to Korean unification.

The second scenario would be the sudden collapse of the North Korean regime due to complete economic failure and the social upheaval following it. The popular uprisings in Egypt, North Africa and the Middle East during the so-called “Arab Spring” serve as a reminder that sudden change is always possible. The outcome of such a sudden change is not predictable. The removal of the North Korean regime might lead to a transitional government set up to prepare the way for political reform and national unification. But it is also conceivable that after the revolution violent conflicts arise between reformers

136) Su Mi Terry, “A Korea Whole and Free. Why Unifying the Peninsula Won’t Be So Bad After All,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 93, No. 4 (July/August 2014), pp. 153~162.

137) Guillermo O’Donnell, and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 15.

and those North Koreans who had enjoyed a privileged position during the communist regime. A mass migration of North Korean refugees would ensue in this, producing a flow of refugees to South Korea, China and Japan.

The third scenario is unification through military conflict, in which, following an attack from the North, South Korean and the U.S. forces finally defeat the North Korean regime. It is clear that from the perspective of South Korea, this scenario is not a desirable option. A military conflict on the Korean peninsula—even after a victory of the South Korean Army—would destroy the country and cost millions of lives.

But scenario two involves certain risks and uncertainties, too. The Arab Spring is a warning example of the kind of chaos that a sudden regime change can produce. The revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests during the “Arab Spring” (2010~2011) forced a number of authoritarian rulers from power, but the aftermath of the revolutions in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia is characterized by extensive civil wars, millions of refugees, regional instability, and economic and demographic decline.

Therefore, taking into account the risks of a sudden regime change, South Korea would be well advised to favor scenario one which envisions a gradual progress. The so-called “Dresden initiative” which South Korean President Park Geun Hye proposed during her visit to Germany in March 2014, seems to aim in that direction. South Korea should give a signal to the North Korean regime—particularly to the soft-liners within

the political elite—that a process of reform and cooperation would pay off. The removal of North Korea’s political leadership should not be a priority. As O’Donnell/Schmitter observed in their famous book in “Transition from Authoritarian Rule,” there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence of divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners. Brazil, Spain (and the Soviet Union) are cases of such a direct causality: “In these countries the decision to liberalize was made by high-echelon, dominant personnel in the incumbent regime in the face of a weak and disorganized opposition.”¹³⁸⁾

The argument of this chapter is that three measures have to be taken by South Korea to support such a development.

Confidence Building Measures

The concept and development of confidence-building measures (CBMs) as an instrument of diplomacy are deeply rooted in Europe’s environment.¹³⁹⁾ In the cold war the main rationale behind CBMs was to prevent a sudden, unexpected, large-scale armed attack from either side of the East-West divide. As the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) put it, the rationale of CBMs was: “to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities

138) *Ibid.*, p. 19.

139) Z. Lachowski, “Confidence and Security-Building Measures in the New Europe,” *SIPRI Research Report No. 18* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004).

which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where states lack clear and timely information.”¹⁴⁰) There can be no doubt that the Helsinki accords and other bilateral agreements were a significant step toward reducing Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, which was the guarantor power of the GDR. They were also instrumental in developing “good neighborly relations” between the two German states.

In 1972, representatives of the two German states met for unconditional bilateral talks on several occasions. The outcome of these negotiations was the so-called German-German “Basic Treaty” of 1972. In this document the two German states committed themselves to developing normal relations on the basis of equality, guaranteeing their mutual territorial integrity as well as the border between them, and recognizing each other’s independence and sovereignty. They also agreed to the exchange of “permanent missions” in Bonn and East Berlin to further relations. In this climate of *détente*, the GDR later was willing to relax border restrictions and to allow more people-to-people contacts.

In view of these developments in Germany, a genuine peace and security evolution on the Korean peninsula should have a strong confidence-building component based on reciprocity, predictability and openness. Confidence-building measures

140) Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “Helsinki Final Act” (1975), (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), <<http://www.osce.org/fsc/22154.html>>.

should be taken to reduce fear of attack by both parties in a situation of tension. CBMs have a military dimension such as the exchange of military personnel, the establishment of direct telephone lines between the military authorities for use at times of heightened tension, prior notification of large-scale military exercise, the establishment of a bilateral open skies agreement, the invitation of international observers etc. Both sides could establish liaison offices to promote exchanges not only of military personnel, but also of experts, professors, managers, teachers, workers, journalists and other groups. For above all, CBMs have a psychological dimension such as communication, perception and intentions. The establishment of basic trust is a critical requirement.

CBMs should not be limited to North and South Korea, but should include all regional actors. Currently, there is no common vision among the regional powers on the finalité for the two Koreas. Specifically, the prospect of an eventual unification is not wholly attractive for some actors like China and Japan. It may well be that a veto-power (like the USSR in Germany in 1989~1990) will be part of the Korean unification process. China will seek to avoid the U.S. dominance in a unified Korea. Therefore, all parties involved should develop a clear vision on the final status of Korea. Particularly China must be convinced that a unified Korea would not pose a threat to its security. In order to ensure this, the nations that participate in the Six-Parts-Talks could sign an agreement following the model of the

“Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany” (the so-called Two Plus Four Agreement which was negotiated in 1990 between East and West Germany and the Four Powers which occupied Germany at the end of World War II). Under the terms of the treaty, Germany was free to make and belong to alliances, but was to limit its armed forces. Germany reaffirmed its renunciation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The treaty also states that only German forces may be deployed in the area of former East Germany.

A multi-lateral agreement that guarantees that no foreign troops be deployed on what is now North Korea would take into account Chinese security interests. Furthermore China should be convinced that it would even benefit from a unification of China. For example, a reunified Korea would reduce wasteful subsidies to Pyongyang and create a huge market for Chinese exports.¹⁴¹⁾

Sooner or later, CBMs require an institutional framework (like the CSCE/OSCE in Europa). However, North Korea will have no interest in a multilateral format in which it would be outnumbered or even driven into a corner. At most, North Korea would accept a six-party arrangement, in which it assumed that it would have China and Russia on its side to balance the U.S. and Japan on South Korea’s side.¹⁴²⁾ Therefore, The Six-Party

141) Gregory Macris, “China on Korean unification: Spoiler, Beneficiary, or Something in Between?,” *U.S. Naval War College Publications* (2012), <<https://www.usnwc.edu/Lucent/OpenPdf.aspx?id=156>>.

142) Fitzpatrick, *North Korean Proliferation*, p. 14.

Talks between North and South Korea, the United States, Russia, China and Japan that broke down in 2009, could be an ideal framework for CBMs. They should be resumed.

External help and assistance may be of special value. Third parties which have fewer stakes in North East Asia than the United States, China or the other actors in the Six-Party Talks process, could support the confidence building process using mediation and facilitation techniques. If a broader regional forum to promote and support a Korean confidence-building process is sought, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, established in 1994) with its broad agenda of building confidence and its membership including both Koreas and the other prominent North-East Asian actors appears to be the most obvious choice.¹⁴³⁾ And—as recommended earlier in this article—given its experience, resources and record of assistance and aid to North Korea, and its ‘soft security’ capabilities—including negotiation, mediation, and the like—the EU could play a significant role in promoting the security process in the region.

Given the fact that North Korean regime highly depends on its nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that nuclear disarmament will occur soon. The international community has tried a number of policies to encourage North Korea to halt its nuclear testing and missile development programs, as well as its proliferation of missile technology. These efforts have included sanctions and

¹⁴³⁾ Zdislaw Lachowski, et al., *Tools for Building Confidence on the Korean Peninsula* (Stockholm/ Zurich: SIPRI and the Center for Security Studies, 2007), p. 30.

export controls. In addition, the U.S and South Korea repeatedly have tried initiatives in which the two countries would give aid in exchange for North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons program. But so far, there is no sign of that happening any time soon. serious efforts for confidence building therefore should be considered before rather than after the attainment of irreversible nuclear disarmament.

Regular people-to-people contacts

Crossing the inner German border remained possible throughout the Cold War; it was never entirely sealed in the fashion of the border between North and South Korea. West Germans were able to cross the border relatively freely to visit relatives in the East. East Germans were only permitted to travel to the West on “urgent family business” such as the marriage, serious illness or death of a close relative. East German pensioners could visit the West for up to four weeks in a year. In the early 1980s, the GDR began to relax border restrictions. The number of legal East German border-crossers rose from 66,000 in 1985 to 573,000 in 1986, 1.2 million in 1987 and 2.2 million in 1988. The “pensioner traffic” increased as well, from 1.6 million a year in 1985 to 3.8 million in 1987.¹⁴⁴) There can be no doubt that during the division of Germany, these people-to-people contacts helped keep the idea of German unity alive.

¹⁴⁴) David Childs, “The SED faces the challenges of Ostpolitik and Glasnost,” David Childs, et al., *East Germany in comparative perspective* (London: Routledge), p. 5.

In Korea the situation is quite different. No contact, including phone calls or letters, is allowed between North and South. Family reunions take place only on rare occasions, and only small numbers of Koreans are allowed to make contact with relatives they haven't heard from since the Korean War.

South Korea should try to find an agreement with North Korea that more reunions be held so that aging Koreans can meet their relatives before they die. Such reunions would help ease relations between the two Koreas. They would—just like in Germany—help keep the idea of a common Korean nation alive. In addition, people-to-people contact will help improve North Korean views of the South, following decades of isolation and propaganda.

Economic assistance

The communist German Democratic Republic (GDR) for many years depended on economic assistance from West Germany. The GDR took advantage of the benefits that resulted West German special status grants such as an interest-free loan to the GDR (the so-called swing, worth hundreds of millions of DM) and the exemption of all GDR products from all duties and tariffs. West Germans paid annual subsidies of about 1.5 billion USD (approximately 1 billion USD) to the GDR.¹⁴⁵⁾ Some argue that this economic assistance stabilized the GDR and kept

¹⁴⁵⁾ Peter W. Sperlich, *Oppression and Scarcity* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2006), p. 140.

its regime alive. But on the other hand the communist regime in East Germany had to pay a political price for this. For instance, in 1983, shortly after the GDR had received a West German credit of 1 billion DM, the communist regime removed all land mines along the intra-German border, and restrictions on the travel to the West were eased in the following years. Another effect of West German economic assistance to the GDR was that the state of East Germany's economy was not as bad as it could have been, when unification came in 1990. Thus, mass migration from East to West could be avoided.

The North Korean economy is far more distorted than the East Germany economy was at the time of German unification. North Korea's economy is about a thirtieth of the size of South Korea and often has trouble feeding its people. Its economy is also much more geared towards meeting military requirements than East Germany ever was. South Korean governmental and private aid for North Korea has decreased significantly over the last five years. South Korea therefore should start the work of preparing for unification and offer to help develop the North's economy, agriculture and social infrastructure. The South could also help the North join the international financial system. Other G-20 countries, including Germany, should offer their assistance, too. This should primarily be a conciliatory gesture. The economic aid should not be linked to political issues. But just like in Germany, sooner or later the communist regime will make political concessions. Economic aid to North Korea will

also facilitate the process of merging the two Korean economies after the unification.

d. Implications for Korea

German unification was achieved in October 1990. Germany was not well prepared: Other than in Korea, the Germans had no unification ministry. Historic models of how to contrive a unification did not exist. There was no roadmap how to organize the transition.

The factors that made German unification possible

In retrospect, there were five factors which made the unification of Germany possible:

The first important factor was a favorable international environment. In 1985, the Soviet Union's Communist Party appointed Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary. Although the new Soviet party leader had no comprehensive reform concept, his policy of glasnost and perestroika indicated the advent of far-reaching changes. Beginning in 1987, Gorbachev's reform concept also led to a revision of the Brezhnev Doctrine with which the Soviet leadership had explicitly reaffirmed its backing for the socialist systems in the East European countries. The withdrawal of this guarantee threatened the very foundation of the GDR, which had never been able to claim politically legitimate existence based on free elections.

A second factor was the economic failure of the GDR. At the end of the 1980s, many production facilities, and in particular the infrastructure was in poor condition. Almost no East German product was competitive on world markets. The GDR's currency had become worthless outside its own borders. Debts of the GDR grew in the course of the 1980s to over 40 billion Deutsche Marks owed to western institutions. It is true that basic needs were always tolerably well provided for in the GDR, but variety, quality and novelty were rarely available. Compared with West Germany, its wage level and the tremendous range of goods available there, the differences were huge. But, as political scientists know, material living conditions are a powerful reason for the legitimacy of a political system. Hence, the East German government since the 1980s was no longer able to claim economically legitimate existence.

The third important factor that contributed to German unification was of the so called "peaceful revolution." As a consequence of the suppression system and the poor economic performance of the GDR, in the late 1980's more and more GDR citizens fled to West Germany. At the same time the numbers of protests and demonstrations inside the GDR increased. In October 1990, the demonstrations in the City of Leipzig had swelled to more than 300,000 people. This pressure ultimately led to the rise of soft-liners within the communist leadership. Hard-liner party chief Erich Honecker was forced to step back and replaced by Egon Krenz. His government saw

no saw no other way but to open the Berlin wall.

The fourth factor in the German unification process was the crucial role played by the West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl who, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, clearly declared his intention to reunify both parts of the divided German state. On October 28, he gave an important speech in German parliament in which he emphasized necessity of a speedy unification of both German republics. On November 28, 1989 he presented so-called ten-point plan for German unification. The most important was the fifth point of the plan in which Helmut Kohl mentioned a possibility to "develop confederate structures between the two states in Germany with the objective of creating of a federal order in Germany." In February 1990, he visited the Soviet Union seeking a guarantee from Mikhail Gorbachev that the USSR would allow German unification to proceed.

Last but not least, the fifth important factor that contributed to German unification was that it eventually was based on international consent. As Allan Riding noted in the *New York Times*, surrounding states, particularly Poland and France, worried about the repercussions of a united Germany, given its aggressive history.¹⁴⁶⁾ But after lengthy negotiations, not only the former victor powers of the Second World War but also Germany's neighbors accepted that Germany would be a unified country.

146) "Upheaval in the East: Western Europe; On Germany, Not All Is Joy," *The New York Times*, February 15, 1990, p. 1.

Inner unity

On October 3, 1990, Germany was formally reunified through an extension of the political, structures of West Germany into the former German Democratic Republic. The institutional framework of West Germany's political system remained more or less untouched. Following the federative model of West Germany, five new states were formed in East Germany. According to the will of the huge majority of the people in both East and West, the Basic Law (West Germany's constitution) became the constitution of united Germany. Thus, the political transformation of East Germany could be completed within a few years. The fairly smooth transition was owed to the fact that an exchange of the political, economic and military elites in East Germany was much easier than in other post-communist countries. Administrative and financial assistance from West Germany were other crucial factors in the process of institutional unification.

More difficult was the economic and mental transformation. There can be no doubt that much progress has been made in the eastern part of Germany in the 25 years since unification. Berlin, a divided city for forty years, won new importance as the country's capital. The Reichstag building has been newly designed and the open Brandenburg Gate has become the symbol of unity. Within a few years, the "Treuhandanstalt," as the privatization agency was called, was able to privatize more than 13,000 East German companies. An estimated 1.3 trillion EUR

of subsidies have flowed from the former West Germany to the former East Germany between 1990 and 2010 alone. Since 1991 a 5.5% solidarity tax has been collected from the population. It generates several billion EUR annually, most of which has gone into improving roads and building new infrastructure. Historic neighborhoods have been restored, new autobahns built and the telephone network brought up to date. Productivity of East German companies now is about 80% of the West German level, higher than any of the former Communist countries in Eastern Europe. As a result, most East Germans are better off than they were 25 years ago.¹⁴⁷⁾

However, many problems remain. The eastern German economy still lags behind the West. At present, GDP per capita reaches only 71% of the West German level.¹⁴⁸⁾ In August 2014, the unemployment rate in the East was 9.4%, whereas in West Germany only 6.0% were unemployed. Income in the East is still lower than in the western part of Germany. Workers earn 20% less than their western colleagues. The proportion of household income derived from welfare payments is 20% higher in the east than in the west. Of Germany's 100 largest industrial companies and service providers, not one has its headquarters in eastern Germany.

Another problem, mainly resulting from unemployment in

147) All figures: Bundesministerium des Innern, *Der Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Neuen Bundesländer: Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung zum Stand der Deutschen Einheit 2013* (Berlin, 2014).

148) Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, *Wirtschaftsdaten Neue Bundesländer* (Berlin, 2013), p. 4.

East Germany, is the migration of young people from East to West Germany. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the population of eastern Germany has declined by more than 1.8 million people. Many higher educated people have moved West in search of better jobs and more opportunities. Such a brain drain leaves an aging population behind: Germany's eastern states have a higher share of over-65-years-old people.

The East Germans had to reorganize their lives. Today about 70% of East Germans pursue different professional careers than before 1989. Preparing oneself personally to deal with this rapid change was truly a great challenge. But there were also several people who had no opportunity to start all over again in order to benefit from unification.

Many Easterners are disappointed because change and a better life have not come fast enough. They long for “the good old days” when the state cared for them. Today, most of those people are supporters the Left Party, a successor to the Communist party of eastern Germany. Many differences between the former East Germany and West Germany remain, and it is therefore still common to speak of eastern and western Germany distinctly.

But not only East Germany is affected by the consequences of unification. The transfer payments from the West for a long time weakened the economic development of West Germany. Since unification, public debt as a share of GDP has increased from 41.8% (1989, West Germany only) to 78.4% (2014),

implying high interest payments and a reduced scope for action in the public budgets.¹⁴⁹⁾ Only recently we have begun to notice a more positive development in the form of better economic growth and decreasing unemployment rates. In the first six months of 2014, the federal government accumulated a surplus of 4 billion EUR in the first six months of 2014—the first time it has not registered a deficit in the period since 1991. These figures put Germany on track of a third consecutive budget surplus for the full year, following surpluses of 0.3% in 2012 and 0.1% in 2013.¹⁵⁰⁾

e. Observation

What can Korea learn from Germany? One lesson from the German unification is evident: unification is possible, even after many years of separation. However, Korean unification will be more difficult. The German unification of 1989~1990 had a specific, favorable external environment: soft-liners in the Communist Soviet Union pursued political reforms, dramatic changes took place in Poland and other Eastern European states, and relations between the Soviet Union and the West improved dramatically. In Korea, the situation is more complicated. It will be crucial for Korea to foster an international climate which is positive for its unification process. All countries having

149) EuroStat, September 2, 2014, <<http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/>>.

150) Statistisches Bundesamt: Press release 307, September 1, 2014, <https://www.destatis.de/EN/PressServices/Press/pr/2014/09/PE14_307_813.html>.

political and other interests in the region must be involved—China, Japan, the United States, Russia, the ASEAN countries. Despite the territorial disputes or historical issues that cause tension in the region, Northeast Asian countries must find a common peace structure before Korean unification will be possible.¹⁵¹⁾ Korean unification requires the assistance and consent of the world community.

Another lesson of the German case is: Normalization is a precondition for unification. In Germany, steps toward improving the relationship between East and West began twenty years before unification. The two Korean states should try to conclude agreements to reduce tensions and develop good neighborly relations. Confidence-building measures and economic assistance can help establishing basic trust. These steps should not be linked to political issues. It must be assumed that North Korea is unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons straight away. This does not mean that negotiations are hopeless. While maintaining an end goal of North Korean denuclearization, the negotiating partners may be able to obtain secondary objectives in the nearer term (like a rollback of the enrichment programme, a moratorium on testing and a ban on nuclear proliferation).¹⁵²⁾

During the division of Germany, people-to-people contacts

151) InterAction Council chaired by Helmut Schmidt, February 17-18, 1993, Paris, France, The Lessons of the German Unification Process for Korea," <<http://interactioncouncil.org/the-lessons-of-the-german-unification-process-for-korea>>.

152) Fitzpatrick, *North Korean Proliferation*, p. 5.

helped keeping the idea of a common nation alive. For that reason but also from a humanitarian point of view, both governments should permit visits and communications between members of separated families in South and North Korea. To further enhance mutual confidence, travel by the citizens of the two Koreas to and from the South and the North should be legalized.

Korea should avoid rushing or getting pressurized into unification. It should preferably be a gradual process under controlled conditions. Of all scenarios that could lead to Korean unification, a step-by-step unification involves the least risks and uncertainties.

There can be no doubt: Korean unification will be expensive—even more expensive than the German case was. For the giving side, the more prosperous partner, the backlashes of the unification process are enormous. Like the West in Germany, South Korea will be the giving part: “It is necessary to explain the big sacrifices and risks frankly and from the very beginning, but still convince the population, that unification is a goal that justifies every effort and sacrifice.”¹⁵³⁾ Korea should also learn from the mistakes the Germans made. In 1990, when German unity was achieved constitutionally, expectations were too high and were bound to be disappointed afterwards. Even today, 25 years later, German politicians have to grapple with a loss

153) Klaus-Dietmar Henke, “The German unification: An Analysis a Quarter Century After 1989/90,” *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2014), p. 21.

of credibility. It can be argued that the government should have prepared itself better by soliciting sacrifices from the population in the East and the West (for example through higher taxes) and preparing them to cope with hardships. The opposition, entrepreneurs and trade unions are equally to blame for their failures in that regard. A wave of disappointment has set in as a result of the fact that the benefits of unification took much longer than expected. Korea should avoid these mistakes. All South Koreans should be aware that their country will have to resort to higher domestic taxation and external borrowing on a large scale.

It is unlikely that Germany will seek a direct role in future negotiations concerning the Korea issue. However, based on its own unification experience, Germany should cooperate with South Korea on preparation for unification on the Korean Peninsula by forming a bilateral cooperation structure. As President Park suggested during her visit to Germany, the two countries should form cooperation networks involving financial authorities and economic policy research institutes in order to systematically study economic integration and financial issues surrounding German unification. During the unification process, German government officials as well as private actors could provide active assistance for Korean authorities coping with the challenges of unification. For instance, Germany could share its experience in the military integration of armed forces of formerly divided countries.

Through the fact that Germany maintains diplomatic relations with North Korea and is one of only a few Western countries that have a resident embassy in Pyongyang, Germany has a more direct access to North Korea than others. That does not mean it has more influence at the moment. But should the regime in Pyongyang consider opening up the country's economy to foreign investors, Germany would be in a good position to provide advice and economic assistance.

The European Union is the broader framework within which the bilateral Korean-German relationship should be developing. The EU does not only have the potential to coordinate the policies and relations of the EU member states towards Korea; the EU could also watch over the denuclearization of North Korea; and it has a great potential to support the economic dimension of the unification process.

The EU, the G-20, and other international organizations should develop cooperative arrangements to assist Korea in what is an incredibly complex and difficult process. Germany, one of the strongest economies in the world and close ally of South Korea, will support this effort.

a. Overview

India has rarely advertised its policy regarding Korean unification. However, India continues to be involved in the Korean peninsula. India is deepening its strategic partnership with South Korea. Despite concerns over North Korea's nuclear programme and assistance to Pakistan's nuclear missile programme, India has maintained diplomatic relations and at times had provided humanitarian assistance. In March 2014, South Korea's President Park Geun-hye spoke in Dresden, Germany about the country's plan for Korean unification—a process focused on increasing inter-Korean exchange, cooperation and denuclearization of North Korea. As India is strengthening its Look East policy, the developments in the Korean peninsula assumes significance for its diplomacy in the region.

India supports the unification of Korea. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in a report stated that 'India had welcomed the South-North Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000 and favours reduction of tension in the Korean peninsula and unification of the two Koreas through peaceful means and through direct dialogue between them.'¹⁵⁴) India continues to

watch nuclear developments in the Korean peninsula with concern and at times had cautioned against provocative actions for the sake of peace and stability in the region.

India's relations with South Korea have been steadily intensifying.¹⁵⁵⁾ Despite its misgivings about North Korea's proliferation activities, India had extended humanitarian food assistance to North Korea in 2011 through the World Food Programme (WFP).¹⁵⁶⁾ This suggests that India aims to maintain strategic interest in the Korean peninsula therefore invested in the peaceful negotiation of the unification between the two Koreas. India has also voiced its concerns about North Korea's nuclear tests because in its view, the tests violated international commitments. The wish to see a peaceful and stable Korean peninsula and its urging of North Korea to 'refrain from such actions' imply that its regional diplomacy is also aimed at encourage North Korea to work towards dialogue rather than confrontation.¹⁵⁷⁾ At the same time, it had professed to see a 'proportionate' response to the developments in North Korea.¹⁵⁸⁾

India's interest in the Korean Peninsula in contemporary times started in 1947 as a Chair in the UN Commission to oversee

154) MEA, "India-DPRK Relations," (Ministry of External Affairs, India, July 31, 2013).

155) MEA, "India-ROK Relations," (Ministry of External Affairs, India, February, 2014), <http://www.mea.gov.in/ortal/ForeignRelation/Korea__ROK__February2014.pdf>.

156) MEA, "India's Humanitarian Food Assistance Arrives in DPR Korea," (Ministry of External Affairs, India, July 5, 2011), <<http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/511/indias+humanitarian+food+assistance+arrives+in+DPR+Korea>>.

157) MEA, "India Concerned At the Launch of Rocket by Democratic People's Republic of Korea," (Ministry of External Affairs, India, December 12, 2012).

158) MEA, "Response of Official Spokesperson To a Question On An Event in DPRK," (Ministry of External Affairs, India, April 6, 2009).

the Korean elections and later the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. India played a pivotal role in the Korean War armistice and later established diplomatic relations with North and South Korea in December 10, 1973. Its role in the Korean War was much appreciated and remains its most intense phase in Indian diplomacy. As talks of unification have resurfaced, India can yet again play a constructive role in the region as per the needs of both the parties.

While analyzing the course of India's relationship with both North and South Korea, it emerges that India would likely to foresee a unified Korea, with strong democratic structures and institutions. Most of all, India would likely to seek a people's mandate involved in the unification process that would lend legitimacy, whether it is sudden or a gradual process. While it is questionable whether Korean unification would repeat the German experience, Indian support to the unification would greatly amplify if such a process leads to peace and stability in the region. Moreover, given the economic, social and cultural challenges that accompany unification process, India can contribute to humanitarian and institutional assistance and lend procedural legitimacy to the integration process. Since India views the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a multilateral institution in nuclear efforts, India's role in IAEA could be enhanced to provide assistance in the denuclearization process in North Korea if such a role is sought by both parties.

The unification process in the Korean peninsula would

eventually depend on the receptivity of North Korea to proposals regarding the unification. The unification process would require North Korea to accept wide-ranging structural changes in its economy and cooperation projects in crucial sectors such as fertilisers, food, health, and agriculture. If such projects would come under multilateral efforts through the UN, India could play a constructive role in management of agricultural projects, healthcare and nutrition.

President Park drew the lessons of Germany to the Korean unification, which would depend on willingness from North Korea for unification. This remains the most fundamental task for South Korea. India's role would likely to be substantial if international conditions permit Indian participation in addition to the acquiescence of both the parties. India's overt involvement would likely to be minimal if it considers its involvement to be being viewed as interference in domestic affairs. However, India could be urged to play a stabilising role in bilateral forums to encourage both parties, in particular North Korea to negotiate with South Korea. North Korea would incur more negotiating space for itself because inter-Korean cooperation would reduce its dependency from other countries such as China.

b. Expected Effect

Korean unification would have several impacts for India.

(1) Security Dimension

Strategically, India and South Korea have already articulated their interest in expanding strategic partnership in their joint statement during President Park Geun-hye's visit to India in 2014.¹⁵⁹⁾ Of interest are the various bilateral mechanisms that are constituted between the two countries. This might suggest that once the unification process is underway, both countries could use India-ROK Joint Commission, Foreign Policy and Security Dialogue (FPSD) and India-ROK Defense Ministers' Meeting for consultations on the unification process and possible Indian assistance. Especially, the FPSD could be used for garnering consultation in the unification process. Moreover, North Korean nuclear and military cooperation with Pakistan, which India finds it as a destabilising factor in South Asia would be greatly reduced based on the assumption that a unified Korea would take steps towards denuclearization. Moreover India considers nuclear tests by North Korea as 'deep concern' and viewed it as a violation of the international commitments eliciting an official statement from India for creating 'adverse impact.'¹⁶⁰⁾

159) Press Release, "India-Republic of Korea Joint Statement for Expansion for Strategic Partnership," (Indian Embassy in Seoul), <http://www.indembassy.or.kr/press_detail.php?nid=205>.

160) MEA, "India Says North Korea Nuclear Test 'Of Deep Concern'," (Ministry of External Affairs, India, February 12, 2013), <<http://www.mea.gov.in/>>.

Thus, the mechanisms that are already set in place would encourage greater consultation, and steps towards security and stability of the region would lead to greater Indian support and cooperation in the region. In addition, it would address Indian concerns regarding nuclear proliferation and nuclear security enabling trust in the relationship and reducing the prospect of nuclear and missile cooperation with Pakistan. A democratic and independent Korea would be of advantage to Indian interests in East Asia. A unified Korea would be better able to support Indian interests such as permanent seat in the Security Council in the UN and other multilateral institutions where India and Korea could play a major role.

A unified Korea would be a stabilizer in the region in a changing international strategic situation as the U.S. rebalancing to Asia-Pacific and a unified Korea would not just remain an anchor for U.S. rebalancing in the East Asia. Moreover, India has no existing tensions as to expanding relations with a unified Korea as it lacks the controversial historic past as with Japan in East Asia or lacks the territorial and sovereignty disputes as with China. As India and Korea has shown little interest in any groupings against the containment of China, it has the ability to play a role in broadening the scope of security and political cooperation towards an objective of peace and stability in the region, which underscores Indian disinterest in multilateral forums that argue for strategic competition against China.

(2) Economic Dimension

Korean unification would be beneficial to India due to several factors. Economically, India's trade with North Korea could be improved and several conditions restricting India's involvement could be mitigated. For instance, India's trade relations with North Korea suffers due to "limited foreign exchange with DPRK, non-availability of direct shipping, non-guarantee of payments through an established banking and insurance system."¹⁶¹ Thus, a unified Korea presents a better roadmap for increasing economic and trade relations. For India, this would represent a move from a totalitarian government to democratic structures that would encourage greater Indian participation. Moreover, as per the Indian experience, the involvement of private sectors in the Korean economy would improve market access to such companies. Because of the existing 'Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) agreement, it would facilitate developing free trade links with a unified Korea. Moreover, a unified Korea could do a better role in regional multilateral institutions such as SAARC and consequently, could work to further the idea of Asia Economic Community.

During the integration phase of the unification process, South Korea has called for increasing investment projects in North Korea to improve its economy in order to gear up for unification. Since North Korea's economy seems to be failing in crucial

161) MEA, "India-DPR Korea Relations," *op. cit.*

sectors, the process of unification provides Indian investors and companies to play a role in these crucial sectors. The role of private players would increase the legitimacy of the process and ensure that these sectors would gain from Indian investments. The structure and process of Indian involvement could be managed in the industrial parks, where South Korea seeks international assistance.

c. Potential Roles

Korean unification might offer several challenges due to the fluidity of the political unrest and unpredictability. India has maintained that the peace and stability in the Korean peninsula is important. It implies that India would like to a gradual reduction of tensions between North and South Korea and a unification leading to a democratic process. Secondly, it implies that this process would contain the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Therefore, any potential role for India would contain within these principles of peace and stability in the Korean peninsula.

As mentioned earlier the unification would impinge on regime of North Korea being receptive to the call for dialogue and cooperation. Since Indian influence in the Korean peninsula is limited and its own desire for non-interference in internal affairs, Indian involvement would likely to stem from its regional diplomacy to urge North Korea to view the benefits of the Korean

unification. This would not lead India to postulate any overt involvement. However, if regional powers such as China, Japan or the United States are viewed with suspicion and concern from North Korea, India could hold bilateral discussions with North Korea after consent from them. India has exchanges with the DPRK regime through the mechanism of Foreign Office Consultations (FOC). Moreover, India held its first Joint Secretary-Director General Talks in Pyongyang during April 2013. Such bilateral meetings could be used to express India's views on the Korean peninsula and seek North Korean consent for any processes.

India's role during the armistice agreement was different as international conditions were different. However, the international security scenario has changed to allow more positive Indian role. However, Indian role in the Korean peninsula would be contingent upon the consent of both parties.

Economic and Humanitarian Aspects

Korean unification would lead to severe burden on the South Korean economy due to the weaknesses of the North Korean economy. The unification process hinge on the economic integration and raising the living standards of the North Korean people. India could offer the most in economic and humanitarian efforts during the Korean unification. President Park declared that the Republic of Korea (ROK) will expand humanitarian assistance with the United Nations especially in healthcare. India

would be poised to contribute in these areas. North Korea's want for food, fertilisers and medicine could use huge ground-level Indian cooperation. India could ensure that similar to its efforts in Afghanistan, its presence is not obstructive and in line with the local needs of the population. During the food crisis in North Korea in 2011, India had distributed pulses amounting to 1 million USD.¹⁶²⁾ In the past, India had contributed in 2002, 2004, and 2006.¹⁶³⁾

In addition to healthcare, the immediate need for food imports for the population could also be obtained from India as per needs of the population and the capacity of the South Korean government. The challenges during the unification such as the displacement of manpower and requires several rehabilitation programmes. In such cases, India could offer its own experience during the Partition in accommodating property, jobs and legal processes.

In this case, India offers the best expertise in legal, political and humanitarian issues. While India would not likely support any robust military assistance such as troops other than through UN initiated mechanisms, its contribution could entail assistance to South Korea that is humanitarian in nature. Indian aid would also be contingent on accepting the sovereignty of the unified Korea and therefore would likely follow the needs of the government of a unified Korea. India has extended training

162) "India Gives Food Aid as U.S.-SK Think," *Daily NK*, March 28, 2011, <<http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?catald=nk00100&num=7506>>.

163) *Ibid.*, p. 1.

assistance to several countries crippled by war and strife. In the Korean unification, because of the lack of institutional capacity and democratic structures in North Korea, India could lend training Foreign Service officers, military officers, and other technical training to officers in an effort to help South Korea to bear the economic costs of unification. In addition, training of civil servants could be encouraged and Indian experience in state building could be imparted to them, which could mean that the trained civil servants are proficient in the knowledge of democratic institutions and the rule of law.

India has engaged in various experience in assimilating various groups and interests in the Indian Union. India has also unique experience in resettling in the refugees after the partition of the India and the experience that succeed such processes. Most importantly, as a pivotal role in making the armistice agreement, India could be involved in ending the armistice agreement resulting in a unified Korea. Indian expertise in international law and contribution to international dispute is substantial. India could provide assistance if there was a consensus on elections in a unified Korea. India played an arbitrary role in the Korean elections earlier in 1947 and such roles could be revived if there is a greater interest in both Korea and India.

The economic integration and cooperation has emerged as an essential task for improving the North Korean economy. In the Dresden speech, South Korea has highlighted the investment

and trade opportunities for India. Already, India and South Korea held discussions on Kaesong Zone being part of the agreement.¹⁶⁴⁾ The Kaesong is significant for the kind of economic integration said to crucial for the unification process.

Security Aspects

India is strengthening its Look East Policy to deepen its engagement with other Asian powers including the Korean peninsula. India has bilateral mechanism with both North and South Korea. India has concluded the Agreement on the Protection of Classified Military Information with South Korea ensuring that high-level confidence in bilateral relations and could be used for Indian engagement. Along with Foreign Policy and Security Dialogue with South Korea, India could expand its engagement on issues of unification. For India, it would increase its regional clout and showcase its diplomacy as a neutral observer in managing regional conflicts. Already in their FPSD dialogue in 2013, India and South Korea had discussions on East Asian regional issues.¹⁶⁵⁾ The dialogue in 2014 could used be also for exchanging views on the Korean peninsula and unification.

For the unification to occur, the most essential task would depend on North Korea denouncing nuclear weapons. This

164) "Ever Heard of Gaesung? Gear Up For Its Products," *The Economic Times*, February 15, 2009, <http://articles.economicstimes.indiatimes.com/2009-02-15/news/28381665_1_partnership-agreement-india-south-korea-south-koreans>.

165) MEA, "3rd India – Republic of Korea Foreign Policy and Security Dialogue," (Ministry of External Affairs, India, September 2, 2013), <<http://www.mea.gov.in/>>.

remains the fundamental challenge. India could play a role in the denuclearization process in the Korean peninsula. In India's joint statement with Korea on deepening the strategic partnership, it noted that the India and Korea had discussed their views on "importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Korean peninsula including its denuclearization."¹⁶⁶) India's role in the denuclearization if North Korea agrees to denounce its nuclear weapons can be utilized through a multilateral institution such as the IAEA. It could involve the dismantling of nuclear materials, which could also enhance India's contribution to disarmament.

India has shown its support to the sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear programme. India had twice detained and searched North Korean vessels for suspected WMD. The Directorate of Foreign Trade banned trade for certain lists supporting the sanctions on North Korea.¹⁶⁷) In addition, statements were released to view the nuclear tests as destabilising and threat to the peace and stability of the region. This suggests that despite its diplomacy to give humanitarian assistance to North Korea, India has been firm with regard to the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. In 2013, a meeting requested by North Korea at the ASEAN meeting, the Foreign Minister Park Ui-Chun discussed nuclear non-proliferation with Indian Foreign Minister

166) MEA, "India-Republic of Korea Joint Statement: Deepening the Strategic Partnership," (Ministry of External Affairs, India, March 25, 2012), <<http://www.mea.gov.in/>>.

167) "India Bans Trade of Nuke Items, wagons with N Korea," *The Hindu*, June 3, 2013, <<http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/india-bans-trade-of-nuke-items-wagons-with-n-korea/article4778527.ece>>.

Salman Khurshid to explain his country's position.¹⁶⁸⁾ This bilateral engagement about nuclear issues are crucial as it reflects the change in attitude from North Korea to engage with other countries. If North Korea is keen to talk to India about nuclear non-proliferation to end its diplomatic isolation, then India could play a role in persuading to start process on denuclearization or dialogue with South Korea. For instance, in 2013, three Indian MPs visited North Korea for the 60th Anniversary of the Armistice Agreement in Pyongyang.¹⁶⁹⁾ India's concerns partly rise due to the connection between Pakistan and North Korea regarding nuclear and missile proliferation.¹⁷⁰⁾

Several factors would emerge during the process of unification for North Korea. First, like the German unification, the integration phase would concentrate on people responsible for violations of human rights. Moreover, the building of institutions, law enforcement, currency conversation, repatriation, so that integration could be achieved would require North Korea to open towards such proposals. South Korea might not be able to conduct such projects alone due to the cost of unification on its economy. The North Korea might not view it as being

168) "India Raises Nuclear Nonproliferation Issue With North Korea," *Livemint*, July 1, 2013, <<http://www.livemint.com/Politics/LODdydiXBZ0K64pBqL27xJ/India-to-hold-nuclear-talks-with-North-Korea.html>>.

169) "India Cautions Reclusive North Korea Against Further Isolating Itself," *The Hindu*, July 30, 2013, <<http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-cautions-reclusive-north-korea-against-further-isolating-itself/article4971068.ece>>.

170) "India Sees Pakistan Imprint in North Korean Nuclear Test," *The Hindu*, February 13, 2013, <<http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-sees-pakistan-imprint-in-north-korean-nuclear-test/article4408406.ece>>.

beneficial. Unlike the German unification, North Korea might want a confederated government whereby the existing political system is not replaced nor imposed. South Korea might want to gradually develop North Korean economy before putting in efforts to absorbing or unifying the two Koreas.

India however has not shown any interest in Six-Party Talks. If the integration phase of the unification process is observed under multilateral framework of concerned countries, India could play a role in preserving the democratic structures of the process.

d. Implications for Korea

President Park, in her speech in Dresden, gave a push for Korean unification. In the speech, she stressed that the increasing people-to-people interaction and cooperation before the unification as being crucial for the success of the German unification and the emulating this success for Korea.

South Korea has started the Preparatory Committee for the unification and has started the process of planning for unification by laying the foundation of social, economic framework. South Korea has also been intent on creating public discussion for allowing “all levels of society” participate in the process. If South Korea offers to relieve the burden of North Korea and its reliance on China by offering economic packages that encourages free trade between the two Koreas, it would result in economic contact

between the populace, reduce cultural and social misperceptions present within the population, and encourage greater people's support for the process. For instance, the Kaesong agreement has facilitated economic cooperation and it remains one of President Park's "trustpolitik" approach.

There are however several criticism regarding the future of unification of both Koreas. The criticism is levelled against the improbability of Korean unification to follow the German experience and the North Korean acquiescence towards South Korean plans. However, it is equally imperative that policy and public opinion are gathered as to the possibility of a unification process in case of ripe conditions. Korean scholarship has largely focused on the German example of unification therefore suggesting an interest in following the German example. President Park has followed a more nuanced policy than her predecessors towards her policy on unification taking positions on economic, social and psychological costs of South Korea on unification. South Korea's policy is contingent on several factors: North Korean regime survival and reformative stance, engagement with South Korea on unification, the U.S. role in South Korea, the Chinese position in North Korea and domestic pressures on South Korea towards unification. Each of this case affects South Korean foreign policy towards North Korea and its foreign policy towards unification ultimately rely on South Korean flexibility in dealing with North Korea and unification. The flexibility on conditions on North Korea, for example, de-

emphasis on its denuclearization in exchange for dialogue and cooperation would increase South Korea's chances at reconciliation.

e. Observation

Korean Unification would be fraught with challenges from several quarters. India support for the Korean unification would depend on several factors. India's support would depend upon the following factors:

If the unification follows legitimate procedures and acquires the consent and mandate of the people of both Koreas. If the unification allows the process of denuclearization to take place in the Korean peninsula. The unification process is achieved through dialogue and cooperation that observes international standards and procedures. If unification is forced through regime change or non-democratic processes. If use of force is used as a tool for unification.

8 Indonesia

a. Overview

People of Indonesia just elected their new president in July 2014, Joko Widodo (or Jokowi) and his vice president, Jusuf Kalla, who will begin their term in October 20, 2014. The new government seems to prioritize domestic issues over regional or international issues. Some of the domestic priorities relate to food security, energy security and maritime issues. Mr. Jokowi said, for instance, that Indonesia must have food security after three years of his term by reducing import of food and agricultural products.¹⁷¹⁾

Focusing more on domestic matters does not mean that Indonesia is not interested in regional and international dynamics. However, there must be a strategy which can maintain Indonesia's international performances. The Yudhoyono's administration has gained significant achievements internationally by maintaining national unity of Indonesia, and bringing Indonesia to be one of the emerging economic powers in the world.

The biggest challenge for Indonesia is to have global strategic

171) Jokowi delivered public lecture on building research base policy by empowering national research and development institution (LIPI Jakarta, September 16, 2014).

view to understand and anticipate geopolitical trends, which have more interlinking issues, number of actors with multi interests and complex relations. As an emerging power, Indonesia could play more roles in sharing Indonesia's experience in the context of democracy, such as mediating peace talks and agreements, facilitating discussion forums and informal meetings for conflict resolution and political transition, and the United Nations special rapporteurs for certain cases, including human rights in North Korea.

In the context of Korean unification, there are two major questions. First, does the unification matter for Indonesia? Second, has Indonesia experienced dealing with a similar case? The answers depend on Indonesia's global strategic view. If the new government does not come up with a grand strategy, Korean unification will not be in the top priority. More importantly, Indonesia should first calculate its capacity in dealing with the unification process.

b. Expected Effect

(1) Security Dimension

As discussed in Richard Haas's book, "Foreign Policy Begins at Home," for a big country like America, managing domestic issues could be separated from regional or global issues.¹⁷²⁾

172) Richard N. Haas, *Foreign Policy Begins At Home, the Case for Putting America's House in Order* (New York: Basic Books, 2013).

Domestic stability supports the country to handle regional and global issues more confidently. As an emerging power and one of the global swing states, Indonesia must prioritize its domestic affairs regardless of its will. By doing so, Indonesia may overlook the importance of the regional and global dynamics, which often times affect domestic situations, and vice versa. Moreover, global and domestic interlinks are factual, and almost impossible to hinder.

The dynamics of Indonesia's politics and economy since the last election have given more credit on Indonesia's global performance. At the same time, this will also create more expectations that Indonesia will play key roles in shaping regional and global architectures. The Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), initiated by President Yudhoyono, is a forum to discuss democracy in many different countries. Indonesia has put great effort to maintain principles of democracy, but also to share Indonesia's experience in practicing democracy. However, approaching his end of presidential term, Yudhoyono's leadership has been challenged by political regression because the "Merah-Putih coalition" refused to accept their lost in presidential election, and accused the legitimacy of the Yudhoyono government.

(2) Economic Dimension

Indonesia is the largest archipelagic state in the world, has rich of natural resources and market access. Indonesia's macro

policy relies on four pillars: pro growth, pro job, pro poor and pro environment. However, the policy implementation has not been integrated, and not managed under strong coordination. Referring to national vision of the coming government, Indonesia will develop ocean (blue) economy and green growth concept to be more applicable, viable and workable. In terms of operationalization, political and economic institutions need to have proper understanding and knowledge on how to implement the concepts. This must come from intellectual leaderships to be able to change the mindset and give clear direction for implementing the policies and programs.

Economically, Indonesia has been participating in many regional and international occasions, such as in ASEAN, APEC, East Asia Summit (EAS), Regional Cooperation of Economic Partnership (RCEP) and G-20. Indonesia is representing the developing countries in the G-20. As an emerging economic power, Indonesia has potential roles in shaping global economic order. However, its domestic economy, trade, and investment face three major problems, which are corruptions, red tape of bureaucracy, and poor infrastructure. Furthermore, Indonesia is still struggling to reduce unemployment and poverty in its territorial islands.

c. Potential Roles

(1) Country Level

Indonesia has stable democracy. The government commits to provide political freedom, peaceful election, and anti-corruption. Combating terrorism is a great achievement of Indonesia not only in ASEAN, but also in the world. The new administration is likely to continue the existing policies, including anti-corruption, and consider for providing welfare, building adequate infrastructure, creating bureaucratic efficient, changing mentality (mentality revolution), and dealing with political and security problems in Papua through a peaceful dialogue.¹⁷³⁾

Indonesia has successfully dealt with internal and communal conflicts in different places in Indonesia, such as in Aceh, Poso and Maluku. One success story is the Aceh peace agreement (MOU Helsinki) between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/GAM). However, there still remains minor problems between the two. The new leadership has to develop a strategy to be able to resolve the Papua conflict in simultaneous and comprehensive approaches. Otherwise, the longest violent conflict will remain in “the forgotten land.”

With all the domestic priorities, the Indonesian government

173) Liputan, “Ini Bocoran Program Prioritas Kerja 100 Hari Jokowi-JK,” (Liputan6), <www.Liputan6.com> (accessed: September 27, 2014).

will presumably be very selective in engaging with regional and international roles. As long as the regional and global dynamics have no direct impacts to the national priorities of Indonesia, the government will probably ignore them. Another scenario, if there is certain condition that needs Indonesia's response, it must not be done for a vanity or political gimmick, but should contribute solutions for creating regional peace and stability, such as Korean unification.

Indonesia has diplomatic relations with both South Korea and North Korea. If Indonesia is willing to facilitate peace talks in Korea unification, is it for the sake of North Korea or South Korea? This is rather a difficult and sensitive issue, but one thing is clear. Indonesia and South Korea has bilateral relations and a strategic partnership, which consists of traditional and non-traditional cooperation. In contrast, Indonesia and North Korea have only limited cooperation. Moreover, Indonesia and South Korea have shared values such as democracy, human rights, good governance, rule of law, and fundamental freedom, although, they are different in history of colonialism, political and economic systems, and socio-cultural structures.

When financial crisis hit Asia in 1997, Indonesia was badly affected. Domestically, multi crisis rose up and anti-government power grew wider and stronger. Dissatisfaction accumulated and culminated. Political movement successfully forced President Suharto to step down after 32 years in power. The end of the New Order regime was just the beginning of national

instability. Violent conflicts occurred throughout the country. Separatism in Aceh and Papua, and grievances from several provinces put more pressures to the government in Jakarta.¹⁷⁴⁾ Indonesia's economy also declined badly.

Unlike the situations in Indonesia, South Korea is relatively free from domestic problems. However, tensions and conflicts between South Korea and North Korea have continued. Numbers of initiative, dialogue, trust building and cooperation have been taken to reduce conflicts in the Korean Peninsula, but the problem remains. Korean unification becomes more difficult to materialize. Indonesia has no experience in dealing with the unification, but with its outward looking policy orientation, Indonesia gained international performance and recognition in mediating and facilitating conflicts in ASEAN, and assisting political transition in Myanmar. In the case of South China Sea, Indonesia has been facilitating more than 20 workshops to prevent any open conflict in that area. Regarding the Korean Peninsula, the UN special rapporteur from Indonesia—Marzuki Darusman—representing Indonesia's deeply concern about the situation of human rights in North Korea.

Democracy in Indonesia is very dynamic, but it needs to be more substantive by producing effective government that is able to provide basic needs for the people, and protect human rights, including fundamental freedom, empowerment of the

174) Vertical conflict between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/GAM) was concluded by the signing of peace agreement under the MoU Helsinki. Meanwhile, Papua peace land is still in the process.

rule of law, and build good corporate governance. All the domestic priorities will impact Indonesia's regional and global roles as a significant player, but cases, which have no direct impact for Indonesia's national interests may be in the last consideration of the new government.

(2) Regional/Global Level

Regional security issues in East Asia, especially the conflict between North Korea and South Korea has global resonance. For Indonesia, regional stability of East Asia has direct and indirect impacts. Bilaterally, Indonesia has diplomatic relations with both North Korea and South Korea. Particularly with South Korea, Indonesia forms a strategic partnership.

As a founder and member of ASEAN, Indonesia's foreign policy towards ASEAN remains very important. ASEAN is the first concentric circle for Indonesia's foreign policy. Since the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, the longest regional association has contributed to the regional peace and stability by keeping the region free from direct conflict in South East Asia. Indonesia shows strong commitment to promote democracy within and beyond ASEAN. The ASEAN Charter asks political commitment of each ASEAN member to implement democracy, good governance, human rights, rule of law, and fundamental freedom.¹⁷⁵⁾

In terms of the ASEAN Community in December 2015,

¹⁷⁵⁾ See the ASEAN Charter.

Indonesia initiated the ASEAN Institution for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR). It was launched in November 2011. The main objective is to produce regional model or home ground initiative that is useful not only for ASEAN, but also for other regions. Therefore, ASEAN is still relevant for Indonesia. However, the credibility of ASEAN mechanism has not yet been able to settle bilateral conflicts between the members and also regional conflicts between the members and extra-ASEAN, such as in the South China Sea (or South Seas). By calculating this dynamism, Korean unification is not going to be an urgent agenda for ASEAN, and also Indonesia.

Geographically, Indonesia is located in South East Asia, while South Korea is in East Asia, but Indonesia and South Korea have been do engaging in regional contexts, primarily as the ASEAN dialogue partners, the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) together with Japan and China, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the EAS, and the RCEP. Although South Korea has been very active in many regional forums, as part of East Asian countries, South Korea has to face some critical situation in the Korean Peninsula not only tensions between North Korea and South Korea, but also human rights violation in North Korea, which brings impact to its neighboring countries, such as South Korea and China. Besides, East Asia's regional security also consists of border disputes between Japan and China, Japan and Korea, and also China and South Korea.

Economically, ASEAN has become more attractive. The

ASEAN Plus Three (South Korea, China and Japan), the ASEAN Plus Six. Recently, there are the EAS where the external powers agree with the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). ASEAN considers to the APEC, current development of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the RCEP. Indonesia has decided not to join the TPP.

d. Implications for Korea

(1) Pre-unifying process

Indonesia conducts both soft and smart diplomacy. As one of the global swing states, Indonesia could play more actively in creating regional stability, including the case of Korean unification.¹⁷⁶⁾ However, the case is very complicated. It needs some stages or road map. First, leaders should evaluate previous efforts comprehensively, for example, towards the initiative for peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia or “Seoul Process” (broader meaning of the “Korean Peninsula trust Process”). It is an obligation to create harmony between Seoul and Pyongyang through dialogue and exchanges to reduce tensions and rebuild trust between the two Koreas.¹⁷⁷⁾

Second, both countries should map the root of problems. North Korea and South Korea have no agreement over the Korean

176) According to Daniel Klimens, there are four global swing states: Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey.

177) Taeshik Kim, “Park’s Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative,” *Vantage Point, Developments in North Korea*, Vol. 36, No. 6 (June, 2013), p. 14.

War. Each goes to an extreme direction with different ideology, political and economic systems, and interests. The tensions between North Korea and South Korea increased because of the involvement of external powers, starting from U.S. and later China as well.

Third, South Korea should take bilateral approach. South Korea could probably ask third party to engage in the peace process. Perhaps, North Korea and South Korea could ask Indonesia, but Indonesia has limitations in terms of experience and capacity in dealing with such kind of conflict. What Indonesia could do is sharing democracy, particularly towards North Korea.

Conceptually, if the pre-unifying process has similar process with peace process in Papua, there are several steps that must be considered.¹⁷⁸⁾ First, preparatory stage is very important because this is where the process will begin, such as providing public consultations with many different elements to get comprehensive information and inputs or feedback towards the urgency of the unification. Second, conducting close meetings to explore and discuss any issue that causes tensions, prejudice, and distrust between the conflicting parties. Third, developing programs to build confidence and make the parties for dialogue, including the government and the civil society. Fourth, conducting public campaigns. This is to create public opinion and build common understanding about the urgency of peaceful dialogue for reconciliation.

178) Muridan S. Widjojo, et al., *Papua Road Map, Negotiating the Past, Improving the Present and Securing the Future* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2009).

(2) Unifying process

In the context of human security, human rights violation in North Korea is extremely serious. The situation in North Korea is totally different from Indonesia where political freedom is provided widely, even if Indonesia is struggling to fulfill basic needs of the people. The condition of human rights in North Korea is a negative orientation for political security policy in reducing or eliminating political violence, state violation, human rights abuse, marginalization, and discrimination policies.

Korean unification is an unresolved problem. It covers regional security, human rights, ideology and political rivalry. It will take long process and very costly. Korean unification is a reflection of real condition of human rights in the Korean Peninsula, where at the same time, regional security of East Asia is leading to a potential war or open war between North Korea and South Korea in particular, and among regional countries and extra-regional country, that is the U.S., which has been collaborating with South Korea as its alliance. North Korea is seriously developing nuclear weapon to be part of its “military first policy.” This indicates that North Korea is strong and confident to face regional powers and the world. Under the Juche ideology and “military first policy,” North Korea deliberately ignores human rights violation towards its own people. It is almost impossible to discuss the condition of human rights in North Korea with the government. However, the world

has already known about the worst condition of the North Korean people until now.¹⁷⁹⁾

Instability in the Korean Peninsula could slow down regional and global economy. Korean unification is also costly. The pre-unifying and unifying process need good financial supports. In terms of political budgeting, there must be “special fund” for supporting the process, and this will reduce other funds, such as domestic expenditures for research and development, or foreign aid and other international contributions of South Korea and North Korea.

The unifying depends on the political will and confidence of the Governments of North Korea and South Korea. Indonesia would probably able to mediate or facilitate, but it does not have capacity to decide the result. What Indonesia is able to contribute in the Korean unification is to share Indonesia’s experience in democracy and political transition as it did in Myanmar. The most important step of sharing and promoting democracy in North Korea is by opening access for family reunion.¹⁸⁰⁾ By providing family reunion, North Korea will gain political credits for being more open to the global trends and will reduce its isolation from the global world. Family reunion

179) Marzuki Darusman, “Pelanggaran Berat Hak Asasi Manusia (HAM) di Korea Utara, Sebuah Catatan Diskusi,” (April 28, 2014); Riefqi Muna, “discussing the ‘Unknown’: Obscurity dan Hak-hak Asasi Manusia di Korea Utara,” *North Korean Human Rights Week, Seminar on Jalan Panjang Penegakan dan Penghormatan Hak Asasi Manusia di Korea Utara*, Jakarta: LIPI, Citizens’ Alliance, and Kontra S.

180) Yonhap News Agency, “Development in North Korea,” *Vantage Point*, Vol. 37, No. 4, (April 2014).

will also mean of respecting to human rights by promoting, protecting and fulfilling rights of the two nations. Although North Korea and South Korea are different in political ideology, political and economic system, there is a fact about the people who have relatives in both places, because they come from the same ancestors.

e. Observation

Complexity of the Korean unification lies on the fact that it is a residual of the unfinished war (unresolved problem), which separates the two nations in a very extreme condition. The North Korea policy orientation is highly unpredictable. The government has been running the country extremely different from universal principles, norms and values. At the same time, unilateralism of the U.S. and its alliance with South Korea is clear, and these are the main obstacles for North Korea.

The expectations and roles of Indonesia for Korean unification must be on experience and capacity of Indonesia in dealing similar case. Indonesia's involvement in Korea unification will depend on the current Indonesia's policy orientation, and to balance between Indonesia's domestic priorities and foreign relations. Indonesia must have the capability to encourage the Government of North Korea to be able to communicate openly. This is part of Indonesia's outward looking policy orientation in managing international issue.

Expectations and roles of Indonesia in the East Asian region, in particular in Korean unification are something logic with all the Indonesia's achievements at the national, regional and global levels. In other words, there is a great respect towards Indonesia's reputation and experience in numbers of peace talks or process, including conflict mediation and facilitation, political transition, and human rights cases. Indonesia has also international responsibility as the third biggest democratic country in the world to share its ability and capability to change or shape the regional and global architecture to be more stable, peaceful, and prosper. The future of Korean unification also depends on the regional interests of the U.S. and China. All parties that have interests in Korean Unification may have moral responsibility to find the best solution for the people of the two Koreas, and also maintain the peace and stability of the region.

9 Italy

a. Overview

It is becoming more and more important to reflect critically on the meaning so as on the practical steps underpinning the possibility to implement some unification mechanism, involving the two Koreas. Is there any possibility to establish a sort of “two-State solution,” an Asian version of a Helsinki process, which was established between the Former Soviet Union and the European Union at the end of the Cold War?¹⁸¹⁾ Or is it realistic to conceive any other arrangement granting, at least, a peaceful cooperation between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)?

At the time being, the political conditions to establish a road-map towards a unification arrangement between the two Koreas still have to be put in place: for this reason some innovative way of thinking is needed in order to prepare a win-win conducive environment between Pyongyang and Seoul and to create concrete bases to pave the way to a new approach.

181) For a brief overview of the Helsinki process that led to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the creation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). <<http://www.osce.org/who/history>>.

b. Expected Effect

The relationship between the two Koreas is indeed multilayered and results from the interaction and combination of different aspects: security, social, economic, political, geopolitical and military. The Economic Dialogue with the DPRK pursued by the ROK and EU/EU MSs has to be considered in a geopolitical international context, where key strategic and security dimensions have to be always taken into consideration and where this approach could become an element to change perspective.

The strategic presence of the U.S. plays evidently an important role, in particular considering the coexistence of the so-called “strategic patience” policy towards DPRK and the “pivot or power rebalance to Asia,” both pursued by Washington.¹⁸²⁾

The strategic patience places the DPRK return to the nuclear negotiation table as a condition before any other possible deal and, while waiting, foresees to keep pressure on the country through economic sanctions. On the other side the pivot, as previously hinted, aims at enhancing the U.S. role and presence, within regional multilateral institutions so as at military level, in the Asia-Pacific region, including the ROK. This inevitably impacts on the perception of Pyongyang to be ‘surrounded’ by enemies, causing signs of ‘strategic impatience’ through

182) Among other see Charles L. Pritchard, John H. Tilelli Jr., and Scott A. Snyder, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” (Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010); “North Korea tests U.S. policy of ‘strategic patience,’” *Washington Post*, May 27, 2010, <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/26/AR2010052605047.html>>.

provocations and in this play of (re)positioning also Beijing is involved.

Between these two approaches a third way could represent a challenging possibility for the Peninsula: a 'resilient engagement' that should be brought forward primarily by ROK and supported by other key stakeholders.

In this perspective the Economic Dialogue could represent a concrete tool for the ROK to engage directly DPRK on economic issues: it could be embodied in a comprehensive strategy, through a pure inter-Korean relation. This will give the ROK a new opportunity of interaction, a path non-biased by other stakeholders, independently managed and without questioning its actual strategic alliances. It could be used as a technical table, detached from other dynamics and not linked to possible changes in future strategic South Korean positioning and in the DPRK-ROK relationships. This direct exchange could have clearly positive implications in terms of improving relations either in the case of a progressive rapprochement of the two Koreas leading to a possible unification or in the case, feared by some analysts, of a sudden collapse of the regime.¹⁸³⁾

Of course a great deal of flexibility, or better resilience, is necessary to concretize this approach, especially in order to manage the sudden provocations and unforeseeable changes in strategy, to which DPRK has used the world to.

183) See among the latest publication, B. Bennet, *Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2013), <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR331/RAND_RR331.pdf>.

Economic dialogues could be important preparatory tools to link the two Koreas and ultimately have positive effects also on other countries once the peninsula reaches the final goal of the unification. In the case of Italy some economic impact could be envisaged in some specific sector such as machinery, textile and agriculture, the trade and the exchanges in these sectors could be progressively extended to the Peninsula also in the light of the recent Free Trade Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Korea (EU-Korea FTA), an ambitious trade agreement aimed to foster bilateral trade and economic growth in both the EU and Korea, but also conceived to have a wider impact in Asia.¹⁸⁴⁾

But an hypothetical unification between the two Koreas will also require an “out of the box” economic and trade approach from Italy towards the Korean Peninsula, since it cannot be based, at least in the inception phase, on the import-export of standard commodities due to the initial structural and regulatory economic difficulties existing between the two Koreas in the aftermath of the unification and between the Korean Peninsula, as a whole economic/trade stakeholder, and Italy. However, there is a “special commodity” that could be almost immediately exchanged between the DPRK and Italy: the “brain potential” in atomic/nuclear physics. In the following it shall be proposed an innovative and intrinsically non-proliferating

184) European Union, *The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement in Practice* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2011).

nuclear/atomic initiative that could “employ” part of the nuclear weapon experts of the DPRK in a purely civilian activity.

The idea is to establish, in a location to be agreed in the Korean Peninsula, an “Italian-Korean Peninsula Synchrotron Radiation Laboratory.” The rationale of this idea is essentially two-fold:

The synchrotron radiation is used worldwide for industrial applications, nanotechnologies, photolithography, spectroscopy, and so on, by using this kind of radiation emitted by a special accelerator of elementary particles. It is worth to notice that this kind of machine has no-proliferation potential and the machine itself could be a sort of “gift” by the ROK Government to a dedicated laboratory established with the expertise of an homologous Italian laboratory in the S&T area of Trieste, the Italian Synchrotron Light Laboratory “ELETTRA.”¹⁸⁵⁾

ELETTRA uses the synchrotron and free electron laser sources to produce light ranging from ultraviolet to X-rays—is today a center of excellence in all the EU for the civilian application of this special type of ion radiation.

Once established, the Italian-Korean Peninsula Synchrotron Radiation Laboratory could become a hub of excellence for the entire Asian-Pacific region, similarly to the role played by the CERN laboratory in Geneva/Switzerland for the international (not only European) particle-physics community and by the SESAME laboratory in Al-Balqa, Jordan, for all the Middle East

185) For further details see <<http://www.lightsources.org/facility/elettra>>.

atomic physics community.

Last, but not least, on the basis of the Italian case, it could be estimated that this new Synchrotron Radiation Laboratory in the Korean Peninsula could employ several scientists and technicians coming from the ROK and DPRK.

In this framework, the sensitive issues linked to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, should be discussed separately in specific forums such as the so-called “Six Parties Talk” process among the DPRK, ROK, U.S., Russia, China and Japan and other broader dialogues towards a permanent peace mechanism could also be discussed in other formats as, for example, an Helsinki-like process, aimed at creating trust and confidence.¹⁸⁶⁾

c. Potential Roles

It is important to underline the different roles that both the European Union (EU) and Italy could play in the Korean Peninsula, in a mutually reinforcing way.

The European dimension could indeed amplify the impact of the action: a unique European policy could result in a stronger and more effective political and financial leverage, especially in the presence of multifaceted global scenarios with diversified stakeholders. Other than that, the long experience of the Italian

186) Among other see Chung-in Moon, “The Six-Party Talk and implication for peninsular and regional peace and security,” R. Franck and J. Swenson Wright (eds.), *Korea and East Asia, the Stony road to collective security* (Euronext: BRILL, 2013), pp. 217~240.

official and track II diplomacy which acted in the past to facilitate negotiations with the DPRK could represent, of course, an added value.

A possible challenging proposal endorsed by the EU could be the elaboration of a Plan of Action (PoA) including an enhanced Economic Dialogue with the DPRK: this should parallel and foster the economic rapprochement between the two Koreas suggested above.

The EU Dialogue should enhance the economic and social development of the DPRK, without entering into strict political and security dimensions. The plan should be elaborated within a traditional EU framework: on the basis of the outcome of a first round of discussion within the European Council, the European Commission (EC) would be invited to formulate a more operational proposal, such as the EU PoA. In particular, the EC could built up on its experience developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, to elaborate a phased basket approach, at least in terms of possible actions of medium-term “technical assistance” in the three priority sectors of DPRK, already highlighted, for example, energy, agriculture and infrastructures. In particular, the rehabilitation of energy sectors of North Korea is definitely one of the most important social needs and it requires technical assistance both from the EC through its cooperation programs and from the EU Member States (MSs).

This cooperation would also contribute to a progressive

normalization of the diplomatic relations between the EU and the DPRK, step taken by Italy in January 2000, first among the G-8 and EU countries.

There are three main reasons for EU's engagement with the DPRK:

After more than 60 years the state of war, there is a need to promote peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula, as well as security in the region. The DPRK bargaining of military provocations in exchange of aid and economic assistance from the international community, especially from the ROK, has to come to an end, this attitude only increases isolation that will only lead to further radicalization of the DPRK positions and more human sufferings in the country. Promoting regional and international security is consistent with the EU Strategic policy.

The DPRK urgently needs assistance for its social and economic development. The EU and the EU MSs cannot simply ignore it, even if the founding democratic principles and civil rights underpinning the DPRK governance system may be dismayed by some policies of the regime and by its human rights violations records.

The EU has an interest in taking a stake in the development of the DPRK economy, which could be enhanced after some formula of "reconciliation," even before a formal unification process, with a combined population of approximately 74 million people. The economic vibrancy of the region as a whole should also be taken into consideration.

Given the DPRK's public commitment of January 2014 to reconciliation and to end "hostile military acts," the EU/EU MSs policies towards the DPRK should move beyond their present scopes, which are essentially limited to humanitarian assistance, mostly food aids.¹⁸⁷⁾

The EU should consider throwing in its economic weight in order to strengthen the ROK and international efforts towards the DPRK progressive integration in the international community.

Given the economic situation in the DPRK and taking Pyongyang's own priorities as a starting point, EU support in one or more of these sectors could be crucial. As hinted above a strong case could be made for the up-grading and the rehabilitation of the energy sectors, especially for the power generation and the DPRK electrical power grid, rural energy systems, renewable energy and/or assistance in the field of energy efficiency and saving.

There are two reasons for this preference. First, power is rightly viewed as a DPRK priority for its domestic needs, since its economy urgently needs to up-grade its installed generating capacity. Second, the restoration of the energy sectors is mandatory if Pyongyang wants to attract foreign investments and open the possibility to set foreign industries on, at least, part of its territory. Lack of reliable power has brought down

187) "The Rodong Sinmun Calls for Establishing Climate for Improved North-South Relations," *KCNA*, January 14, 2014, <<http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201401/news14/20140114-07ee.html>>.

the economic development and accounts for social disruption.

Moreover since Pyongyang has repeatedly acknowledged in the past that there is a serious energy problem and it lacks the funds to undertake such a large infrastructural project, this could be an interesting element for the North Korean government.¹⁸⁸⁾

In this frame, the EU should also co-ordinate closely with other countries that hold political leverage on the DPRK and have already shown to be ready to support economically, such as China and Russia. Indeed, involving regional countries in a Plan of Action for the DPRK's economic rehabilitation could serve as an important regional confidence-building measure which could eventually induce Pyongyang to amend the course of its Foreign Policy.

The approach could then become two-pronged: the re-launch of the dialogue on economic matters could be extended to engagement on security issues through concrete projects dealing, for instance, with global and regional “cooperative risks reduction” initiatives and non-proliferation efforts.

In this perspective an asset could be represented by the Italian

188) As a starting act, the EU could contribute supporting a specific energy focused feasibility study, namely the preparation of an “energy sector data base review,” which is essential to develop tailored power grid rehabilitation projects given that DPRK's data cannot be relied upon to ascertain the technical condition of the grid. For further financial assistance to fund properly the rehabilitation, international financial organization could be involved, given that some political criteria are met. For a recent and deep analysis of the energy sector see D. Von Hippel and P. Hayes, “Energy Needs in the DPRK, and Opportunities for Collaboration on Energy Sector Engagement and Redevelopment,” (Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, August, 2014), <http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/2014-5_Workingpaper_Hayes_Hippel0.pdf>.

past experience in the engagement towards DPRK. During the 2000s, in fact, Italy has been committed to an effort to denuclearize the Korean peninsula and to normalize the relations with the DPRK in the international scenario, either through official initiatives carried out by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs or track II unofficial meetings.¹⁸⁹⁾

Italy has played the role of facilitator, acting as an accepted and non-biased stakeholder, interested in keeping an open space for dialogue even during tense periods and the DPRK has recognized this role, considering it as a link to the international community. The presence of a non-regional partner in the evolving multilateral process could still be very important for the DPRK establishment.

This role could be resumed in the framework of a renewed EU strategy based on an economic and social dialogue that could become a lever to begin and foster the process of the DPRK engagement on concrete issues, showing the positive effects of interaction and exchange, especially with the ROK.

The Italian role as a facilitator could be resumed and, once its feasibility verified the possibility for Italy to act as a referent can be explored to foster a platform of exchange among the

189) International workshops and round tables have been organized by the Landau Network-Centro Volta, an Italian think-tank working in international security, focusing on disarmament and non-proliferation. Hereafter the proceedings (M. Martellini and R. Redaelli editors) of the last events are listed: Cooperative Stability in North-East Asia: denuclearization and Economic Cooperation in the Korean Peninsula, December 1, 2008, Como, Italy; Cooperative Stability in North-East Asia in the aftermath of the latest Round of the Six-Party Talks, March 26, 2007, Como, Italy; Cooperative Stability in North-East Asia: towards a Political Process. Different Roles for Different Players, October 28, 2005 Como, Italy.

two Koreas through the organization of ad hoc forums. Italy could also collect potential requests and possible financial synergies between Europe and the peninsula.

To be a real confidence building measure and to be conducive, this approach should not include, at least at the beginning, sensitive and security elements and (pre)conditions, for instance, the nuclear issue: the DPRK is well aware that the nuclear issue represents a powerful tool in bargaining and negotiation and for this reason has been used in a brinkmanship based on the dichotomy “nuclear-restrains-versus-international-aid.” This approach has to be changed in order not to enter, as happened in the past, in a vicious cycle made of “do ut des.”

Thinking in terms of models, the Italian experience shows that it is possible to be a NPT Non Nuclear State and enjoy the technical advantages stemming from the management of no nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and other non-proliferating atomic energy technologies. Some examples of these advantages could include works with particle accelerator physics, nuclear medicine and ionizing radiation applications for industrial sectors and even the possibility to become an international stakeholder in nuclear safety without having any nuclear energy generation.

Indeed, the actual main economic and R&D developments from atomic physics are beyond the military dimensions and are more based on smart applications within the atomic physics remit.

Italy is a proactive stakeholder of all International Treaties

and Conventions banning the development, use and storage of WMD and this model could become, in a foreseeable and auspicious future, the “modus operandi” of the DPRK.

d. Implications for Korea

During the end of the 1990s, the ROK embarked in an ambitious project of “defusing” the DPRK’s perception of South Korea as an adversary, by starting the so-called Sunshine Policy.¹⁹⁰⁾ The pillars of this policy were sound and, in that period, there was a concrete hope to move towards a reconciliation process, a preliminary step in light of a unification arrangement. Unfortunately, the Sunshine Policy of Seoul was very marginally reciprocated by Pyongyang, whose Songun Policy was confirmed and strengthened, and collapsed in a short time-span.¹⁹¹⁾ After the closure of this cooperative possibility, the Korean Peninsula has seen three nuclear weapon tests, launches of different kind of ballistic missiles and several “military incidents” along the water borders of the two countries.

Indeed, three main facts have to be taken into consideration when thinking of future developments of the region:

The absence of a stable Peace mechanism in the Korean Peninsula, which is still under the Armistice Agreement signed

190) Among the different publications, see Chung-in Moon, *The Sunshine Policy: In Defense of Engagement as a Path to Peace in Korea* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2012).

191) Han S. Park, “Military-First Politics (Songun): Understanding Kim Jong-il’s North Korea,” Academic Paper on Korea, Korea Economic Institute (2008).

on July 27, 1953 by the UN Command, the DPRK and China at the end of the Korean War;

The U.S. “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia, as the strategic foreign policy towards the Asia Pacific region, which is perceived by Beijing as an attempt to contain and balance China’s rising influence in the area. The effect of the renewed attention on this policy makes again the DPRK a “buffer zone,” as it was during the Cold War, but within a new geopolitical scenario: namely between China and the U.S. ring of strategic alliances in the region—especially centered on tightened relationships with the ROK and Japan.¹⁹²⁾

The current reality that the DPRK is a de facto Nuclear Weapon State outside the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and that it is very difficult to envisage how this nuclear deterrent capability by Pyongyang could be communal with the ROK in the aftermath of any unification arrangement—except to achieve firstly a complete, irreversible and verifiable nuclear weapon disarmament of the DPRK.¹⁹³⁾

Considering this framework conditions, there are some

192) For a deep analysis see M. E. Manyin, et al., “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Towards Asia.” (CRS Report for Congress, March, 2012); K. Campbell and B. Andrews, “Explaining the U.S. ‘Pivot’ to Asia,” (Chatham House, August, 2013).

193) The DPRK signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985. After many years of ups and downs with the international community, especially with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) joined in 1974, and U.S. Governments, in 2003 the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Treaty, act which makes it the first and only country up to now to withdraw from the NPT since its entry into force in 1970. The capability to produce nuclear warheads, formally announced by the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2005, has been demonstrated by different tests carried out in October 2006, May 2009 and February 2013.

practical issues that can and should be solved between the two Koreas. This approach should be pursued independently by the existence of any institutional process toward the future unification of the Korean Peninsula—even if these steps could be conducive and foster the unification process itself.

First of all, it would be important for the ROK to adopt a set of measures aimed to improve the daily life conditions of North Korean population in a way that it is not challenging the DPRK government or perceived in such way by its establishment. In other words, Seoul should operate to ensure that the access to all potential economic development opportunities and ventures launched by ROK remain routed through the DPRK government, and hence not be perceived as an attempt to “change the regime.” The most effective way to operate is to invest in “rehabilitation initiatives” whose ownership remains of the DPRK, focusing on its key sectors that are essentially the following:

- Energy, in particular, could support renewable energies, the rehabilitation of the electric power grid and up-grading of the power generation capabilities through a modular approach.
- Agriculture could be important for fostering the development, among others, of conservative measures, such as organic agriculture, to improve yields and the use of GMOs.
- Infrastructures (for example railways) to facilitate the exchange of commodities, as well as persons’ movements, at least for

enhancing the South Korean tourism in some “special zones” of the DPRK.

Seoul should explore the possibility to launch a sort of “Market-First” policy towards the DPRK, not constrained to any security Agenda, asking Pyongyang to cease any kind of military provocations. For this purpose, a sort of Economic Dialogue—to set priorities and foresee concrete cooperative actions within the Energy-Agriculture-Infrastructures sectors—so as an Economic Joint Commission should be established between the North and the South within a specific time agenda.

This scenario is based on the experience maturated by the European states in the 50’s with the famous Schuman Plan and further pursued by Konrad Adenauer.¹⁹⁴⁾ The pillar of this thinking is that, before any “political” unification between the two Koreas, it is key to improve the economic exchanges between these two countries that, in any case, share also the same cultural and linguistic background.

For instance, the European Economic Community (EEC) was created in the 1957 by the Treaties of Rome and was initially composed of 6 countries, namely Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Considering the nuclear military dimension, among the ECC countries only France, in February 1960, had tested an independently developed nuclear weapon under Charles de Gaulle’s

194) For a deeper presentation see “The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950,” (European Union), <http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm>.

government and this before the enter into force of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in March 1970. Thus, *mutatis mutandis*, a similar Korean Economic Community (KEC) system could be envisaged, where only the DPRK has developed and tested nuclear explosive devices and has a nuclear deterrent.

This scenario does not exclude, but can support, the possibility that the KEC could foster a complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the aftermath of a Peace Treaty mechanism between the two Koreas, by the re-accession of the DPRK to the NPT as a Non Nuclear Weapon State (as it was before the 2003) and then, eventually, to pave the way to further stages of the “unification.”

Decoupling economic, political, and security agendas could open new possibilities to make the two Koreas closer.

e. Observation

To critically reflect on the possible unification of the Korean Peninsula, it is important to be realistic and concrete, taking into consideration the complexity of the context, with particular attention to the absence of a stable Peace mechanism in the Korean Peninsula, the strategic foreign policy of key stakeholders, such as the U.S. and China, so as the DPRK nuclear issue.

For a rapprochement of the two Koreas it is important to start from a concrete plan, an economic agenda including

rehabilitation initiatives in three key North Korean sectors: energy, agriculture and infrastructures development. This Economic Dialogue could be aimed to establish the main pillars of KEC, something analogous of the European Economic Community of the 1950s. The KEC should operate outside of any political and security agenda for the Peninsula, and develop thematic targets in a phased and incremental approach, to cover different aspects of the economic development of the DPRK.

The project does not need an institutional unification process in place to be implemented, since a reconciliation framework between the two Koreas is enough. However, it could represent an important step to pave the way for further rapprochement and finally reach the ultimate goal of the unification.

This initiative should remain purely economic, at least in its first phases, since decoupling economic, political, and security agendas could open new opportunities for the two Koreas. Moreover, if the dialogue is built and managed only by the two Koreas, in a genuinely Korean fashion, which is unbiased by the influence of other strategic stakeholders, it could be an important confident building measure. This will require a significant capacity of resilience, especially from the Republic of Korea.

In this context the role played by Italy as dialogue facilitator in the last decade, could be renewed together with another possible opportunity: the creation of an “Italian-Korean Peninsula Synchrotron Radiation Laboratory” to favor the

exchange of “brain potential” in atomic or nuclear physics among the DPRK and Italy.

The paper advocates for the time being, a sort of “peaceful non-unification” between the two Koreas through an economic dialogue acting as a conducive environment supported by the two main players: the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

10 Mexico

a. Overview

Unquestionably, the unification of the Korean peninsula is a very much longed aspiration for many Koreans. Notwithstanding this undeniable truth, the inter-Korean relations have evolved in such a complex way that it seems obvious that unification needs more than the willingness of two parts to become a reality. I believe there is where the relevance of the KINU's initiative lays: to show the interest to listen other voices from the international community. To what extent our views would help to formulate appropriate approaches to the Korean issues is difficult to say; the assessment depends on the issue area, each country's degree of involvement, the level of stakes, and the position in relation to the regional security complex. Besides, if the two Koreas are ready to become one country is unknown; we will only discover that when the process takes off. Perhaps, like in a marriage, you never know until you live it.

If in North Korea is emerging a reformative regime is certainly a controversial assumption, as well as assuming that South Korean initiative to engage in political talks with the North will bear fruits, or that the unification would follow a

preconceived staged pattern. I do not have any particular disagreement with the idea that some steps have to be taken prior to others, conceivably following certain functional logic of economic and political convenience or capacity and trust accumulation. However, I notice that the denuclearization issue is not considered at any stage of the unification process according to the proposal (not so from the current government policy). It is surprising also by the fact that the North Korean nuclear program is apparent and the regime does not seem to be planning any substantial reform. Despite that, I think denuclearization demands from the international community lead by United States have being more an obstacle for political talks than a factor that serves the trust building process—the trustpolitik as it is called now. And trust building is a delicate and complicated matter, one that would be served with sincere listening. Therefore, after I explain Mexico’s role in the Korean process and what can be expected from this country, in the second part of this paper I would elaborate on my thoughts on the content and sequence of the peace and unification process.

b. Expected Effect

A popular and useful security theory is to study the Korean peninsula and understand Mexico’s role is that of Regional Security Complex (RSC), developed by Barry Buzan and colleagues.¹⁹⁵⁾ As the concept tells by its very name, the RSC

basic argument is that geography still matters, and it matters more the closer agents are from the source of conflict. Of course, certain conflicts or tensions may have greater impact on international relations than others, much beyond its apparent geographical limits, due to the relative power in the global system and the extension of linkages weaved throughout monetary, financial, commercial, and security regimes. The Korean peninsula is a potential source of a major disruption not only to Northeast Asia but to the international system, especially because the nuclear program is fated to spring further involvement of several rival regional powers and United States. Therefore, North Korean nuclear weapons program is already a central issue of the security agenda and it is indeed a global concern.

Mexico and its foreign policy is not directly influenced by the developments in the Korean peninsula political economy, be the nuclear issue or the unification process, the two major issues of the inter-Korean relations. On the one hand, if some security breach occurs in the peninsula, there is not fear that Mexican soil would be a target of North Korean missiles so the government is not immediately expected to react beyond the usual diplomatic politeness to encourage a peaceful rapport, unless it is temporary member of the Security Council of the United Nations (UN-SC).¹⁹⁵⁾ A stronger position can be expected

195) Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

regarding nuclear weapons developments and tests, but again under diplomatic grounds. On the other hand, unification usually focuses on its societal and political aspects but not so much on the economic potential which may imperil Mexican manufactures to its favorite market and deviate foreign investment. However, as a middle income country and due to its closeness to the United States, a prime stakeholder in almost any issue concerning Northeast Asia, Mexico eventually gets the reverberations of whatever comes about in such a geographically distant territory. The problem is that not everybody feels those waves or may confound their origin to emanate from other epicenters, usually up from north of Rio Bravo.

The Mexican relationship with the Korean peninsula is young and it has been quite friendly. Mexico recognizes the existence of two states in the peninsula and currently has diplomatic relations with both. It first established relations with South Korea in 1962 and with North Korea up until 1980. The story of formalizing diplomatic relations is well narrated by Mexican scholar Jose Luis León Manríquez.¹⁹⁷⁾ He argues that while the two Koreas engaged a frenzied diplomatic campaign to compete for international community recognition since their formal split

196) The reader can check all communiqués from the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs <<http://www.sre.gob.mx/en/index.php/archived-press-releases>> (accessed: June 9, 2014), Title filter: Korea See also UN SC Resolutions 1874 (June 2009) and 1928 (June 2010) <<http://www.un.org/en/sc/>>.

197) José Luis León Manríquez, "Formal Friendship, Real suspicions: Diplomatic Relations between Mexico and South Korea, 1962-1987," *Mexico y la Cuenca del Pacífico*, Vol. 13, No. 38 (2010), pp. 19~36.

in 1948 until the following two decades, the Mexican government's geopolitical concerns were of particular importance to delay the establishment of formal diplomatic ties with the Asian counterparts. Mexico had to deal simultaneously and effectively with various fronts of international politics during that historical period, without compromising its foreign policy autonomy and the "anti-imperialist lineages of its revolution." León Manríquez suggests that, in most cases, recognizing either one Korea or the other could be perceived as tantamount to take sides with capitalist or communist blocks in a sort of zero-sum game.

Mexican post-revolutionary governments were neither pro-Washington nor anti-communist. Therefore, the South Korean diplomatic missions sent to Latin America in the early 1960s, eventually put Mexican diplomacy in a complicated situation because it was eager to show autonomy from United States but at the same time did not want to antagonize its neighbor. Consequently, for a decade or so, the Mexican government avoided to commit any unilateral stance beyond the United Nations' recognition of South Korea as the legitimate representative of the state. Even after the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1962, Mexico kept a "friendly distance" from South Korea and the Korean peninsula issues, aided discursively and in practice by its traditional foreign policy principles.¹⁹⁸⁾ Meanwhile, Mexico rejected Pyongyang's

198) *Ibid.*, p. 21.

approaches in search of recognition on grounds of the diplomatic and legal status of North Korea according to the United Nations.

Such distant relationship has been excused with arguments based on geographical detachment or different priorities on the orientation of interests (i.e., United States and Europe rather than Asia). Only when global issues such as nuclear weapons proliferation are at stake, Mexico draws back its ever cautious indifference and impartiality and places unequivocal emphasis on rejecting such aims, even if they come from United States. More recently, in early 2000s when Mexico changed the ruling party for the first time in more than 70 years, foreign policy became more assertive and perhaps more openly involved in international affairs, very much against its traditional ways.¹⁹⁹⁾ Criticism and praise was to be expected, but such approach did not last long because it created more tensions than contributing to improve Mexico's international image as a relative neutral partner of the international community. Besides, it could not back up its leadership intentions with an original proposal of international order, but instead separate itself further from the Latin American weakening brotherhood by joining arms with the U.S. interests. The next president in turn, although from the same political party, to some extent recovered the traditional cautiousness. The current government, led again by the PRI since 2012, has retrieved the original basis of foreign

199) From the Institutional Revolutionary Party (better known as PRI) to the National Action Party (known as PAN).

policy, but more active in economic affairs.

In this policy context, Mexico is visible when defending global security issues, mainly nuclear and mass destruction weapons, but less active when it comes to specific regional affairs, especially those perceived to be alien to its interests or concerns such as the unification of the peninsula.

Overall, I think that the expected effect of Korean unification on Mexico is yet unknown by relevant policy and economic actors. There is no specific study on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Economy that assess the economic repercussions and, according to documents from the Mexican Embassy in Korea and conversations with Ministry of Foreign Affairs' officers, it plainly assumes that regional stability and security will be assured with unification. In a broader societal spectrum, as with many other issues, Mexican people's international awareness and activism is somewhat shielded by two factors: a passive foreign policy and the United States preeminence. By and large, the effect on Mexico would be marginal in terms of its general political stance, although it may bear some significance in the economic realm.

As hinted above, Mexican foreign policy has traditionally and consistently sided with the causes of peace, non-intervention, self-determination, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. To some political realists, Mexican government's position to privilege dialogue over any sort of bellicose means may seem timid, and generally a safe way to avoid foreign interference

in its domestic affairs, which is a legacy of its colonial and post-independence history, as well as the inward-looking postwar political economy; however, it must be understood that this country is in a permanent struggle to balance prestige and national interests while concurrently dealing with the tensions of its geopolitical situation.

Historically, Mexico has tried to resist the United States' pressures to get more involved in its international crusades—whether military or ideological—by not dedicating military resources or military assistance, even for the United Nations Peace Corps.²⁰⁰) Mexico has not sent a troop to any international conflict since the United Nations was founded, including the Korean War. In its foreign policy regarding the Korean peninsula, it has invariably stated that it wishes to see a unified Korea but privileging dialogue and negotiation as prevailing means to achieve such a goal.²⁰¹) With this, Mexico is in the safe side—both in terms of not compromising its foreign policy to the United States concerns on international security and avoiding external military presence in national territory, which is an outcome from the historical traumas of being a constantly invaded country. At the same time, Mexico's allegiance to non-

200) A recent proposal of Mexican President, Enrique Peña Nieto, before the UN General Assembly on September 24, 2014, to participate in Peacekeeping Operations “providing humanitarian aid, security and post-conflict reconstruction” may suggest a significant shift to that policy, although it still has to undergo the applicable Mexican policy and legislative processes. See full speech at <http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/meetings/gadebate/pdf/MX_en.pdf> (accessed: September 29, 2014).

201) See Comunicados 141 and 383 (2010); 368 (2011); 013 and 105 (2012); 028 and 079 (2013), <<http://saladeprensa.sre.gob.mx/index.php/es/comunicados>> (in Spanish) (accessed: June 9, 2014); <<http://www.sre.gob.mx/en/index.php/archived-press-releases>> (English versions).

proliferation of nuclear weapons and its leadership role on that particular issue is enough for the United States as far as Mexico's involvement in security affairs is concerned.

(1) Security Dimension

Mexican people and government are surely sympathetic to the idea of a unified Korea. However, ordinary citizens may not be aware or concerned with the regional or global security implications. For the general public, Korea is regarded a remote and exotic place; even the well-educated may not know much about its history or since when it was divided. Some may not even know where Korea is geographically located. Therefore, it is difficult for many Mexicans to grasp why Korea is and remains divided; for many it is simply beyond logic, especially because it is generally assumed that the partition of the peninsula was an outcome of the Cold War, which no longer exists. Against such backdrop of unfamiliarity and prejudice, the understanding of Korean issues in the security dimension tend to be too simplistic referring to some sort of mental illness of North Korean leaders or stubbornness from their southern counterparts, which result in mere pity sentiments for the despair of Korean people in both sides. Apart from that, there is no fear or even worry about homeland security in the event that something goes wrong in the unification process, at least of any threat from the Korean issues.

This is probably because ordinary Mexicans' may consider

international politics, security, and economic affairs as fragmented and unrelated processes. Since Mexico's involvement in major international conflicts is circumscribed to intergovernmental structures (i.e., United Nations) for institutional design, Mexicans' mind set is somewhat framed by the idea that things that happen beyond their immediate borders are someone else's problem. The non-interventionism principle and the advocacy to let everything be settled by international law and formal instruments (such as UN-SC resolutions) have placed international issues away from everyday concerns. Besides, the overwhelming omnipresence of United States in global affairs has fixed the perception that as long as we can trade with our neighbor, the great power will take care of its own business whether we agree with their methods or not. Mexicans take for granted that United States will look after its security, which includes Mexico and, to a larger extent, Latin America.

In part given by this lack of perceived threat, the Mexican public would not demand from its government any other action but to respond with public statements to the events that periodically attracts the attention of the media. Nuclear tests, six-party talks, sporadic families' reunions, North Korean refugees and human rights, or incidents such as shootings at the western sea border and major political purges occupy only marginal sections of media coverage and are seldom analyzed and put into context. The simplistic view of Korean problems

leads to produce some morbid fascinations (ideal for national and international media), as well as pockets of citizens' indignation and heartfelt solidarity, but any sort of mobilization is rather considered not worth pursuing.²⁰²⁾ With such apathy and indifference, consequently, the Korean unification process cannot expect from Mexico more than a consistent call for dialogue, verbal solidarity for a peaceful solution of controversies, and condemnation of nuclear weapons development and tests. Most of Mexico's enunciations and activism would be preferably undertaken through multilateral forums and mechanisms such as UN's Security Council or General Assembly, as well as relevant specialized agencies. No military support or assistance would be provided by Mexico in the remote event of war.²⁰³⁾ Actually, it can publicly oppose military intervention, although it may choose abstention if international voting is required.

Security wise, Mexico may react to any violent event in the Korean peninsula in a similar collaborative fashion as it has in the so called war against terrorism. Being the contiguous neighbor of the greatest military power in the world, Mexican borders would be specially guarded and screened, causing some troubles or significant delays to regular peoples' mobility, at

202) "Protestan frente a embajada de Corea del Norte en México (Protest in front of North Korean Embassy in Mexico)," (Notimex, March 24, 2013). The note was reproduced in many electronic media sites, see <<http://www.aztecanoticias.com.mx/notas/seguridad/149327/protestan-frente-a-embajada-de-corea-del-norte-en-mexico>> (accessed: August 29, 2014). According to the report, the protesters were members of the Korean Association (in Mexico) and the National Council for Korean Unification in Central America and the Caribbean, and their spokesmen were all Korean nationals.

203) Although this may change or, at least, will be a debated issue; see footnote 200.

least for a while. However, this is already a fact in the bilateral relationship.

(2) Economic Dimension

The economic dimension of unification would have, in my view, the most relevant effect on Mexico. However, the lack of awareness or concern from the Mexican public also applies in the economic realm. The impact of economic integration of the peninsula would be significant in terms of developing an additional competitor in Mexico's favorite market and the possibility that Korean and foreign investment may wish to move to the Korean peninsula to take advantage of an ideal complementarity of production factors (land, labor, and mineral resources for capital and technology).

South Korea already has a free trade agreement with United States, which may promote exports once the integration process is well under way. This process, however, is expected to take quite a while to become a real economic threat for Mexico. The astronomical economic and cultural difference among the two Koreas will be a severe hindrance to a smooth economic integration process. How long it would take and how much it would cost? Nobody knows for sure.

In a more optimistic view, the Mexican government believes that a unified Korea will mean regional economic growth, a larger market, and an opportunity for expanding its presence. In contrast with my view, some government officials that I talked

to think that Korean government will insist to negotiate a partnership agreement—or something alike—and that we should take advantage of it. Despite the small relevance of South Korean market for Mexican exports (not to mention to North Korea), Korean unification will bring new and larger opportunities for trade, investment and cultural exchanges, although there is no precise road map from the Mexican side on how to go about.²⁰⁴⁾

c. Potential Roles

(1) Country Level

The role Mexico can play in the unification process is limited in the current security and economic level of stakes. Security wise, as has been said, Mexico may not be in a position to do much. It may at most collaborate with intelligence feedback and provide diplomatic input and support for institutional building of the regional security regime through multilateral organizations. The meager conflict of interests can be, however, an advantage in case the relevant parts may want to form a neutral committee to oversee or mediate the unification process. Mexican diplomats are often skillful on those matters. Nevertheless, Mexican presence can be tainted by the perception of being too close an ally of United States, which may turn

204) Notwithstanding South Korea is Mexico's 6th trade partner (Mexico is the 22nd partner of Korea), it is still far away from the previous 5 countries. United States alone concentrates around 75% of all economic relations, including trade and investment. Of course, triangular trade and investment can be a deceiving factor, but it is difficult to quantify.

to be a significant hindrance in such a role.

As can be inferred, Mexico's foreign policy is generally not at odds with the United States' stance, particularly in the case of the Korean peninsula. This is different to the Japanese case, which its institutionalized dependence to United States security leaves little room to pursuing its own security and political objectives.²⁰⁵⁾ Albeit the Korea peninsula security affairs have been a rather alien issue in Mexico's direct security concerns, the nuclear program in North Korea has drawn the attention and involvement of Mexico. Nuclear weapons capabilities certainly turn a regional problem into a global problem. And in that particular issue, for Mexico's credit, the country is usually participative and does not remain indifferent. So, in the scenario of a unified Korea, Mexico's position and concerns are aligned with most of international community's concerns, which are to keep the peninsula free of nuclear weapons.

In the diplomatic realm, Mexico can also contribute to improve communication between the parts because it has ambassadorial relations with both countries. Notwithstanding the limited exchanges between North Korea and Mexico, the fact that a channel is open brings a chance for Mexico to step up its involvement. Recently, the South Korean government launched an interesting initiative called the Korean Peninsula Club, and Mexico was invited.²⁰⁶⁾ I think the creation of such

205) Sachio Nakato, "Japan's Responses to the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Responsive Engagement Perspectives," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2013), pp. 47~73.

206) "Seoul launches international diplomatic council on N. Korean issues," *Yonhap News*,

a grouping is a positive initiative to complement other existing dialogue mechanisms. Although a similar group already existed by the name of “Pyongyang club,” now it can gather a good momentum with MOFA’s push, although pushing too hard may produce unwanted consequences.

Since the members of this network cover both South and North Korea, several of them can help providing additional or new communication conduits along with Mexico. Communication between North and South Korea is often triangulated, but the messages can be delivered in a more direct, coordinated, and systematic way through such a network. It is a great chance for both Koreas to improve their relationship and it would enhance international community’s understanding by getting more parties actively and explicitly involved. Hopefully the trustpolitik would be well served and raise the potential of countries like Mexico, as the policy coincides with Mexican official position that trust building by means of cooperation should be the primary method to improve relations. Hence, the diplomatic linkages can help a lot in smothering the path for cooperation and stimulate constructive participation in trust-building and the peace process. Within the network, countries such as Mexico, in tune with its traditional non-interventionist stance, may want to advocate gradual reforms respectful and appropriate to North Korea’s economic and social realities, for

February 2, 2014, <<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2014/02/18/20/0401000000AEN20140218004051315F.html>> (accessed: June 12, 2014).

example, in their own pace. All being well, for the benefit of the network's reputation and strength, the group should try to keep itself simple, flexible, informal, and autonomous.

For the reasons I expound in the last part of the paper, I would respectfully suggest to be cautious when dealing with specific issues such as denuclearization and unification in order to keep this medium open as a group and free from antagonist positions. Hence, focusing on communication and cooperation would be the most gainful mission of the Club, as long as the forum members are not perceived as bearers of sticks. If so, Pyongyang would see it with suspicion and perhaps could be reluctant to engage with members. Instead, participants of the group should be led to organize by themselves and use them, including Mexican officials, as regular consultants-informants.

Economy wise, Mexican government has been a fervent advocate of free trade and open markets for nearly three decades. Under such an approach, Mexico can be expected to remain open to Korean trade and investment activities. In reports from the Mexican Embassy there is a view that Mexico can also contribute by sharing its experience on structural reforms, which, for neoliberal supporters, is exemplar. However, it may not be feasible for Mexico to present itself as an example of economic reforms for North Korea, because the path that has been followed pertains to a quite different reality. Nonetheless, Mexico can advocate reforms that might be attractive in the process of engaging with the international economy and its experience on

integrating with a larger and stronger neighbor economy may be valuable (both in conveying the bright and dark sides of the process).

According to some backup documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to diplomatic missions in Korea, in the bilateral domain, Mexico could propose Pyongyang a specific cooperation program, for instance involving garment, footwear, food processing, or pharmaceutical firms to engage in co investment with or in North Korea. The document also proposes that the Mexican government can share its experience on public policy, starting with structural change strategies, social assistance platforms, debt management, and hunger relief programs. These modest cooperation initiatives have the potential to soften North Korean position towards western non-rival parties and would certainly help to improve knowledge about both parts.

(2) Regional/Global Level

Besides the limited outreach of Mexican diplomacy on the Korean peninsula there are many other areas where Mexico can provide valuable input, mainly in the multilateral sphere. As mentioned earlier, Mexico has many problems and limitations given its geopolitical location and the somewhat related foreign policy self-imposed narrowness in extent and scope. Through 300 years of colonial subjugation and having been subject of several invasions and occupations after independence during the XIX century, Mexico forged an identity predisposed to

distrust and defensiveness. This stance has nonetheless contributed with two great doctrines in international law and diplomacy: the Benito Juárez (1806~1872)²⁰⁷⁾ celebrated phrase “Among individuals, as among nations, respect for the rights of others is peace”; the other contribution is the Estrada Doctrine, coined after Genaro Estrada (1887~1937)²⁰⁸⁾ then foreign affairs minister, which challenged the international practice that for a country to be considered a legitimate actor it must be recognized by other countries; such practice is extremely interventionist and Mexico was a constant sufferer, so has consistently rejected it. Both ideas not only have shaped Mexican foreign policy as “leave alone” principle, but also was utterly appealing to newly independent countries after the Second World War, giving them arguments to achieve international legitimacy and sovereignty in a peaceful manner. Whether the defensive nature of such doctrines and implicit neutrality is still valid or rather outdated in a globalization era is not at issue here, but can be reviewed elsewhere.²⁰⁹⁾ Consequently, as stated in Mexican Embassy reports and backup documents, Mexico would adopt a wait-and-see attitude during the unification process, and will not produce any opinion or declare any preference for any ruler who may declare as the legitimate government of the Korean peninsula.

207) Benito Juárez was president of Mexico from 1851 to 1872.

208) Genaro Estrada was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1930 to 1932.

209) Jorge Palacios Treviño, “La Doctrina Estrada y el Principio de la No-Intervención,” *Diplomáticos Escritores*, No. Junio (2012); Rafael Velázquez Flores, *Factores, Bases y Fundamentos de la Política Exterior de México* (Mexico: Plaza y Valdés, 2007).

But one thing is sure: Mexico is a worldwide champion of antinuclear weapons movement. It led and hosted the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in 1967, also known as Tratado de Tlatelolco, and it is a devoted watchdog and a consistent advocate of the complete elimination of such weapons of mass destruction. As a member-state of the International Atomic Energy Agency²¹⁰⁾ since 1958, Mexico is active partner in the regulation-and code of conduct-making process and the scientific community; it is also a well-known advocate of peaceful use of nuclear energy, non-proliferation, and nuclear-test ban initiatives and treaties. This puts Mexico in a position to contribute to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. However, a tension remains as long as the major powers still possess, develop and upgrade nuclear weapons. Despite Mexico's unequivocal stance, its power ranking in every other aspect of international politics is rather low. It can only hope that the great powers, especially the so called original nuclear-weapon States²¹¹⁾ do eliminate their stock of nuclear devises, which is unlikely.

In short, regardless of this reality, Mexico contributes substantially-although rather indirectly-to Korean unification

210) North Korea, which joined the IAEA in 1974, withdrew its membership in 1994.

211) The original nuclear-weapon states are China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States. Though Timerbaev, one of the authors of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), recognized that the world's nuclear regime that comprises NPT and many other legal frameworks has been a reasonable success, he also regrets that restraints on non-proliferation still "have not lived up to their NPT undertakings and do not seem to be intending to fulfill their part of the NPT 'grand bargain'-the commitment to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons." Roland Timerbaev, "What Next for the NPT? Facing the Moment of Truth," *IEAS Bulletin*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (2005), p. 5.

process in two ways: one, by providing a consistent argument on peaceful resolution of conflicts and respect for sovereignty in internal affairs; two, by supporting a constructive regional regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction. Both Koreas can identify themselves with Mexico at least with the non-intervention tradition, particularly because the Korean peninsula has historically been subject of invasions and foreign occupation, just like Mexico. Mexico's government and public surely feel empathy with both Koreas concerns. However, regarding the nuclear issue, we may find striking differences, specifically with Pyongyang's resolve to continue its nuclear program, which may somewhat eclipse Mexico's contribution.

Finally, Mexico and South Korea as emerging economies are active members of groupings that advocate international cooperation. For example, they are both members of the OECD and have been hosts of the G-20 summits, as well as the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, which is a collective initiative that may at contribute to smoothen North Korea's attitudes towards cooperation. This is very much in line with Seoul's current method of improving inter-Korean as well as North East Asian relations through cooperation as the cornerstone of trust building approach. Mexico can certainly contribute significantly in this area; perhaps both countries can come up with triangular cooperation projects to ease political tensions of direct cooperation.

d. Implications for Korea

(1) Pre-unifying Process

Today, more than 60 years after the truce in Panmunjom and living in a completely different context, there is no peace treaty to embed or nest the unification process; without formal peace a unified Korean nation is unviable unless it comes about by force. That is by all means an undesirable method and unlikely path. At the end of the Cold War, the unification of the peninsula was believed to be imminent, but it has not happen so far. Now, after nearly a quarter of a century from the collapse of the Berlin wall and all what it meant for the international relations, North Korea struggles to keep the dictatorial and autarkic regime, as well as its hostile and provoking rhetoric.

Why there is no peace agreement in the Korean peninsula? We should consider that since the end of the Second World War and the Korean War the international context has changed, as well as the internal conditions of each Korean State. The circumstances that raised the conflict are not the same; nevertheless, the problem remains, which drive to the hypothesis that perhaps the strategies to secure peace as a basis for nonviolent unification have been inadequate or ineffective.

There have been many approaches and proposals from the involved parties, always deriving into failed or incomplete attempts to reunite.²¹²⁾ Despite the change of approach towards

212) Jong-Chul Park, "Lee Myung-Bak Administration's North Korea Policy: Challenges and Tasks,"

engagement since the late eighties, peace has not being cemented; what is worse, in the nineties the problem got more complex when the North Korean nuclear program was added to the agenda. In this section I will not try to answer why North Korea decided to keep on its longed-for nuclear program, although part of the explanation could be precisely North Korea's mistrust towards her counterparts, especially given the decay and eventual collapse of the communist bloc. That is to say, the lonelier North Korea felt, the more they admitted the need to establish a negotiation token for the regime survival.

Even though, North Korea could have other reasons to pursue the nuclear program, it seems to me that the mistrust has a lot for it and I will take it as a given fact. So, in addition to the regime secrecy in general and the nuclear program in particular, a spiral of distrust emerged and spread everywhere. Hence, trust is apparently the reason why there has not been a peace treaty just yet. When mistrust prevails between States, communication channels are inefficient, agreements lack sustenance and the feeling of threat remains constant. Any dialogue or cooperation attempt, being in terms of reciprocity or not, stays marked by this perception and the immutable suspicion that both Seoul and Pyongyang will insist in assuming the peninsula's hegemony.

In this context, I wonder if this state of affairs can be modified by identifying the factors that constitute the source of distrust,

The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2008) pp. 39~61.

which directly affect the peace process, hence the unification prospects. One is, of course, the nuclear issue. However, in my view, the main problem is how the nuclear issue plays in the overall dialogue process. This is, the exigency of North Korean denuclearization has been a fundamental component of South Korean and United States policy since the late eighties and has become the main path of the inter-Korean relationship. It also has been the main source of tension. Paradoxically, as suggested above, it is plausible that the main reason for North Korean nuclear program is the perception of threat based on Pyongyang's understanding of the international system and the behavior of the world powers (for instance, in Middle East and North Africa). In either of the two points of view (North and South) the nuclear program is the cornerstone and consequence of mistrust. How can it be reverted so any progress towards unification can proceed? The problem is, I think, that denuclearization has become a request sine qua non to move forward in the peace process and even in the dialog initiatives, but, paradoxically, has halted both.

The second factor I perceive as an obstacle is the unification goal itself. This is, understandably, a very controversial statement and easily disregarded if we take an emotional stance. The unification has turned into a nostalgic dream present in almost all the peace proposals, coming from academics and official approaches. Sometimes, both peace and unification concepts overlaps being necessarily the second a result of the

first one. However, here I contend that this conceptual “symbiosis” has raised both parties’ mistrust, as the unification represents a zero-sum game.

(2) Unifying Process

The zero-sum logic would seem to belong to the Cold War era; however, if the actual conditions of the North Korean regime are revised, we can see only minimal changes of their structure, ideology and dynamics from that period, a “mini-cold war” as Roy called it.²¹³) But, don’t we see a similar pattern in South Korea and United States in terms of containment and insistence on only one “right track?” As a consequence, being North and South Korean incompatible regimes with opposed interests, the merge of them necessarily means the victory or imposition of one over the other. It would be self-destructive to join in a dynamic that would lead to the collapse of either of the systems, and therefore no one will fully commit.

To be clear, I am not speaking in favor of the North Korean regime; that is for sure. But given the above, I would rather suggest separating both the peace process concept from the unification process concept. In this way, the engagement approach of both parties would not follow a self-destructive logic. trust building among North and South Korea should be the first target and cooperation might be the driving choice,

213) Denny Roy, “Denuclearization Negotiations with North Korea are Worth Pursuing,” (Asia Pacific Bulletin, 2010).

being economic, socio-cultural or humanitarian, to set the foundations for subsequent advances. Seoul is apparently following such approach, but still showing a stick larger than the carrot. With a fortified relationship and, above all, easing the nuclear weapons tension, negotiations towards peace building may find a richer ground. The unification could be an option for the future; this would not be the merge of mutually exclusive regimes, but of two entities that cooperate and trust each other and that, after integrating their economies in a long term basis are capable of sharing the power, which entails the existence of a wholly different political system for both parts.

To this already complex, delicate and problematic situation must be added the historical political-military alliances and rivalries, as well as the geopolitical buffer role of the peninsula. Therefore, keeping the peninsula divided indefinitely could lower the tension and meddling of foreign power, raise trust and take significant steps towards the consolidation (formalization) of peace. Separated states can still cooperate and trade, integrate their economies and prosper together. People can travel across countries and regimes can respect each other. Even human rights can be improved. But now, because there is no trust, none of that is foreseeable in the near future.

e. Observation

Although Mexico is a distant and marginal actor in the Korean peninsula processes, it can play several small but important roles within the international community to improve things out. It can contribute to the peace process by its congruent and unconditional commitment to denuclearization and to improve economic environment by cooperation and promoting open markets. In the event of war in the Korean peninsula, Mexico can be expected to provide humanitarian assistance and a consistent call for peace; but it should not be expected to contribute with troops or any other military means just yet.

If the unification is to come about anytime soon, Mexico would be interested in keeping its attractiveness for Korean investment, which may be diverted due to the new opportunities open in the northern territory or South Korean perhaps companies will be asked to contribute to finance the costs of unification. I do not think it is realistic to expect Mexican investment in Korea, especially given the uncertainty, but especially the unfamiliarity with the region. It has not happen so far in a more or less stable environment and there is no reason to believe it would happen with a unified Korea.

Trust and the inter-Korean relationships

At first sight, it seems that there are no peace conditions, so not a single State wants to commit on agreeing on something

that the other party will not conform with. A deeper analysis highlights that uncertainty is due to the mistrust between the actors of the inter-Korean conflict. Mistrust does not provide the commitment conditions, quite the opposite: it feeds the conflict factors (the nuclear program, the American presence, the hardline positions from the powers; all this increases the tension). Therefore, peace is not to be consolidated.

Kwak wrote in 1985, “Since 1948, South-North Korean relations have been characterized by mutual distrust, high conflict, virtually no cooperation, and lack of empathy.”²¹⁴⁾ Except for some occasional cooperation, most of those characteristics remain unchanged today. This perennial lack of trust has voided the ideal conditions for peace. In late 1990s trust could develop when South Korean policy took the risk of engaging with few and reasonable conditions (although not without reserves) and agreed to a unification formula that respected each other’s regimes.²¹⁵⁾ Denuclearization and unilateral proposals for unification, the more delicate issues, were put off until trust and cooperation consolidated. Nevertheless, this cooperation and trust building cycle was broken due to the reoccurrence of hardline policies in both South Korea and United States.²¹⁶⁾

214) Tae-Hwan Kwak, “The Stalemate in Inter-Korean Unification Dialogue: Issues and Perspectives,” *Korea Journal*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1985), p. 4.

215) Ministry of Unification, “June 15th Joint Declaration,” *2001 Whitepaper on Korean Unification* (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2001), pp. 191-192; Chung-In Moon, *The Sunshine Policy: In Defense of Engagement as a Path to Peace in Korea* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2012).

216) Critics of the Sunshine Policy often omit to say that such approach had to coexist with the United States hard line policies which became even harder after the terrorist attacks in

The interruption of a conciliating approach has delayed the necessary engagement by attaching nearly every other issue to Pyongyang's denuclearization. In exchange to denuclearization, North Korea demands the United States' troop withdrawal from region, among other exorbitant exigencies. This keeps the peace negotiations stalled, because both actors demand non-negotiable stances. Pyongyang will not get involved in any negotiation or process that puts its main goal at risk (the regime survival) even if the rewards might seem appealing. Furthermore, it is unlikely that North Korea would delegate its vital bargaining chip to a third party in which they do not trust. In fact, it would be rather irrational if they do so.

Moreover, despite the staged approach and the explicit intention to build trust through cooperation, ultimately it aims at regime change in North Korea by overtly stating that "unification is both the means and the end," which implicitly signifies zero-sum logic.²¹⁷⁾ Being two incompatible regimes, one of them would need to give in. For its current circumstances, North Korea is more prone to the collapse, so there is no incentive to commit to unification.

Many believe that Pyongyang is not trustworthy, so isolation and unilateral disarmament are the solution. That is too narrow and evidently unhelpful. I think North Korea would be willing to cooperate, as long as their vital interests and survival are

September 2001. Therefore, qualifying South Korea's engagement policy as a failure is biased and we cannot know if the policy was the right one or not.
217) "Preface" in 2013 Whitepaper on Korean Unification, p. 2.

not affected, plus some respect is shown as Roy notes.²¹⁸⁾ The nuclear topic has to be solved gradually at the same time that trust is developed. The most important question lies on who would have to step up first for cooperation. By its capabilities and economic conditions, South Korea and United States seem to be the ones to move first, because North Korea does not have another card but the nuclear, which they might not expose in a single-shot game. Hence cooperation must provide an infinite-shots game. It is likely that United States will not engage Pyongyang, given its anti-terrorist discourse and commitment, the conservative groups' pressures in the U.S. domestic politics, as well as the nuclear weapon non-proliferation stance. In this case, South Korea trustpolitik could play pivot role in trust building, shifting actors' perceptions and worldwide public opinion. I think KINU's project can contribute greatly to this goal and countries like Mexico can be good partners to implement trust conditions.

Nonetheless, many contradictory signals cause confusion to both professional and occasional observers. On the one hand, the inter-Korean relations have been locked to the denuclearization issue and reciprocity is the only credibility-test accepted; on the other hand, humanitarian aid keeps flowing, with ups and downs, and the main inter-Korean cooperation project, the industrial park of Kaesong, has been preserved, Thus keeping the regime unchanged. That is, the claim to stop

218) Denny Roy, "Denuclearization Negotiations with North Korea are Worth Pursuing."

the North Korean nuclear program and the reticence to agree on that requirement are no obstacles for engagement and even for cooperation. This could lead us to a theoretical-conceptual discussion in which trust and its opposite, mistrust, are dynamic and flexible components in the international relations. That is to say, trust does not necessarily precede cooperation; it is the constant cooperation, even if it comes from unilateral initiatives, what eventually could generate the settings that make it difficult to refuse cooperation and could create incentives for reciprocity. In the case of the inter-Korean relations and the peace process, that could be improved if the centrality nuclear disarmament is removed or relaxed, since North Korea is clearly not yielding to the external pressure or international sanctions.

To finish, in the introduction I suggested that the unification process may resemble a marriage in which the choosing of a partner always faces the uncertain fact that you probably won't know if your partner is the right one until you commit to live with that person; and like marriage, it is never about becoming one, but being the best one for the other.

a. Overview

The June 15th North-South Joint Declaration concluded in August 2000, underpins South Korea (ROK—Republic of Korea) and North Korea’s (DPRK—Democratic Republic of Korea) commitment to future unification, reconciliation and nation building. The Joint Declaration committed both South and North Korea to work towards a negotiated and peaceful future unification. Two distinctly different state entities, underpinned by different political systems and economic ideologies are committed to finding a way to unification and nation building. This common commitment makes unity inevitable and over time, increasingly more imminent. North Korea’s economic challenges, combined with South Korea’s economic success and promising future provides the foundation for national unity. The ROK’s economic miracle, ongoing innovation and development is a natural attraction to the people of the DPRK who seek a better life and greater freedom.

Despite the past difficulties and hurdles ahead, both South and North Korea still dream of a common prosperous future, free of conflict and external intervention. The challenge is to craft a new framework and a convincing road map for Korean

unity, informed by the experiences of other similar political integration and reform processes. South Africa's recent political history offers Korea some suggestions which could inform a new unification dialogue with the DPRK. South Africa, a nuclear armed and racially divided country in a state of limited civil-war was transformed through peaceful negotiation into a "rainbow nation" committed to a harmonious common future. South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons programme and abandoned its hostile foreign policy in favour of regional co-operation and economic integration. The impact on South Africans and the Southern African region more broadly has been significantly positive, while future prospects are encouraging.

Bruce Cumings has aptly observed that the "Korean War itself solved nothing except to make another war an impossible route to unification."²¹⁹⁾ The only rational future path for Korean unification is through comprehensive negotiation and nation building. In 688 AD, an alliance with the Tang Dynasty allowed the Silla Kingdom to unify the Korean Peninsula. Future unification would also need support from China (and the U.S.), but if the pre-conditions for unity and the political support for a common future is in place, the Korean people will certainly be able to determine their own destiny.²²⁰⁾

219) B. Cummings, *Korea's Place in the Sun* (New York City, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), p 457; M. Hastings, *The Korean War* (London: Pan Books, 1987), Chapter 18.

220) E. G. Hwang, *The Search for a Unified Korea* (Tokyo: Springer, 2013), pp. 123~148.

b. Expected Effect

In terms of security, South Africa's distance from the Korean Peninsula excludes it from any direct peace dividend. But South Africa and the rest of the world would benefit indirectly from increased peace and a harmony in North East Asia generally, while a Korean denuclearization process would make a very positive contribution to the NPT, making the world a safer place. A unified non-nuclear Korea would be a natural partner for South Africa in further promoting and strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and advancing arms control more broadly. South Africa has a strong interest in advancing global arms control and would welcome a united, nuclear free Korea as a partner. Moreover, South Africa and Korea could work together in building a nuclear-free zone for the whole of North East Asia which would strengthen peace and prosperity throughout Asia.

Economically, South Africa is expected to benefit from increased commercial engagement with a united Korea as well as with a peaceful and prosperous North East Asia. Over the last twenty years, the most important aspect of South Africa's global trade has been a dramatic increase in two-way trade with China. South Africa's Department of Trade and industry (DTI) report that since 2001, South Africa's imports from China have increased tenfold while exports expanded at double that rate. Currently, South Africa's trade with China makes up 55% of

South Africa's trade with North East Asia (63% if Taiwan and Hong Kong are included), with Japan in second place at 27% and South Korea a significant 10%. In recent years, trade with South Korea has shown rapid expansion, suggesting that a compatibility of the South African and South Korean economies holds significant promise for the future. Prospects will be expanded and augmented by a united Korea.

In terms of South Africa's overall global trade, North East Asia (China, Japan and Korea) make up almost 25% of the total and continues to show strong growth. In terms of South Africa's imports from South Korea, the main items include: passenger vehicles (43%); boilers (16%); minerals and fuels (8%); plastics (8%) and electrical & electronic items (7%). South Africa's key exports to South Korea include: iron and steel (22%); iron ore (21%); mineral fuels and oils (18%); copper and copper articles (14%).²²¹ Korean unity is expected to increase South Africa's exports of key minerals to Korea as a urbanization and industrialization accelerate. A united Korea will increase demand for South Africa's and Africa's commodities, expanding economic activity for mutual benefit. A larger more robust Korean economy would be a stronger attraction for South African exporters and investors.

The expected major expansion of road and railways in a post-unification Korea, linking markets to China, Russia and

221) S. Cornelissen, "South Africa's Economic Ties with North-East Asia," G. Khadiagala, et al., *New South African Review 4* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2014), p. 232.

ultimately Europe via a trans-Siberian railway, will accelerate growth and demand in North East Asia for South Africa's mineral exports. A united-Korea offers the Korean peninsula as the gateway to East Asia and (by rail) to central and western Europe. Expanded transport links would link East Asia to China's growing silk road connecting Europe, opening a range of opportunity for new commercial ventures. Expanded transport links and inter-connectivity will inevitably stimulate economic growth and act as an attraction for foreign direct investment and trade.

A larger Korean manufacturing base and consumer market will translate into more trade with South Africa and more opportunities for mutually beneficial investment. Given that almost 25% of South Africa's trade is with North East Asia and trade volumes are growing rapidly, any beneficial change in the region, such as positive progress towards Korean unity, is expected to have a positive impact on South Africa. Moreover, as new investment options emerge, more and more South African entrepreneurs are likely to investigate inventive options on the Korean peninsula.

Korean unity will open new opportunities for positive South Africa-Korean engagement. In this context, suggestions for improving a united Korea-South Africa co-operation agenda include:

Korea-South Africa business forum—an Internet-based business forum would be helpful in promoting communication among business (A specific focus on Korea-Africa trade and

investment could be decisive in promoting business links). South African companies, especially mining companies are expected to show a strong interest in new investment opportunities in North Korea; Trade fairs, focussing on specific and appropriate products for the Korean and South African market could help to stimulate trade. A united Korea will offer a larger and more diverse market, stimulating broader economic activity; business school programmes—a business school programme focussing specifically on Korea's economic miracle and the potential for improved Korea-South Africa relations could play a key role in advancing post-unity Korean commercial co-operation; Academic exchanges could be used to develop more comprehensive people-to-people Korea-South Africa interaction. Visiting Korean academics should be encouraged to engage with the South African media and think-tanks to provide information on the unification process and impact; Think-tank joint research—Joint research between a South African and Korean think-tanks could identify areas for future co-operation and build closer Korea-South Africa interaction. Increased Korea-South Africa think-tank co-operation (with a business development focus) would help to stimulate new Korea-South Africa business; A Korea-South Africa innovation centre could help to identify leapfrog technologies appropriate for South Africa's and Korea's continued economic development. The sharing of knowledge, such as poverty reduction strategies would be very helpful to both sides; Set up a Korea-South Africa Friendship Society—the

Society could be used to promote understanding and co-operation between Korea and South Africa. The Society could also be used to mobilise support for Korean unity on the African continent; Establish a Korea-South Africa Website which will provide detailed information on both countries and help to identify new opportunities for commercial and cultural engagement. At the same time, more Korea-South Africa focussed conferences would be helpful to stimulate debate and information sharing; Specific Korea investment incentives should be developed such as dedicated Korean SEZs (special investment zones) in South Africa and Africa. Korea-South Africa, or Korea-SADC specific projects should be identified, developed and offered for financing and investment (SADC is planning a number of major projects); Encourage South African companies to invest in a united Korea—a large number of South African companies have been very successful in investing in China; Encourage African Union (AU) support for a Korea-Africa development partnership—the AU should be encouraged to support and promote the Korean unity and the Korea-Africa Forum;

Key areas where a united Korea and South Africa could work together include:

Quality basic education—Korea’s outstanding education system could offer guidance, suggestions, or joint projects with South Africa; Improved health care—Exchanges between Korean and South African health care specialists could be helpful; Decent

employment—Korea’s own experience in economic growth and job creation offers a model for South Africa; A skilled workforce—Training for South Africans in Korea would be helpful;

Improved infrastructure—Korean construction companies should bid for projects in South Africa; Food security—Korea and South Africa could co-operate in increasing food production; Environmental protection—Korean companies could provide extensive green solutions for South Africa’s environmental challenge; Generally, South Africa’s current priorities include job creation, skills transfers, technology transfer, minerals beneficiation and development co-operation. Any agreement which could assist South Africa in this regard would be welcomed by South Africa’s leadership. A united Korea would offer new avenues for co-operation and new possibilities for expanding current interaction.

Other areas where a united Korea and South Africa could pursue common opportunities include:

Green technologies—especially low-cost solutions Water management—especially irrigation for increased agricultural output Forestry—increasing re-forestation is a priority in South Africa Bio-diversity—South Africa has significant bio-diversity requiring development Science and technology—numerous areas of potential co-operation exist Minerals Beneficiation—this is now a priority for South Africa IT solutions—assisting South African government departments would be helpful Communications—Korea’s cutting-edge communications technologies could

contribute significantly Infrastructure—a wide range of construction projects are possible Railway lines—upgrading of existing lines, as well as new lines In return, South Africa could offer insights and experiences from Africa to benefit post-unification development in Korea for mutual benefit. A united Korea would open a new range of possibilities for mutually beneficial interaction.

c. Potential Roles

(1) Country Level

Paul French has suggested that “the starting point of any unification of the Korean people must depend on the will of the people involved, although it seems unavoidable that a unified peninsula will look a lot more like South Korea than North.”²²²⁾ Significantly uplifting the North Korean economy would be a priority before any unification strategy could be attempted. Without a stable, growing and vibrant economy in the North, the costs of unification for the South would be excessive. The German model may be the best way forward for both Koreas towards a united and prosperous country.²²³⁾ While German unification offers a good model for Korea, the South African experience also suggests guidance and possibilities for Korean

222) French, P., *North Korea - State of Paranoia* (London: Zed Books, 2014), p. 379.

223) “Park Says Once-Divided Germany is Model for Korean Unification,” *Bloomberg*, March 27, 2014 (accessed: August 28, 2014).

unification. In this context, two South African experiences, the country's negotiated political dispensation and nuclear weapons disarmament offer inspiration.

After World War II, South Africa introduced a political system based on racial discrimination and separation (Apartheid). White South Africans, numbering less than 20% of the total population dominated political and economic affairs, while the Black majority were denied political rights. The roots of Apartheid are to be found on the Afrikaner (Dutch settlers) attitude to race relations, developed in the context of frontier communities, based on territorial separation (to prevent being swamped by larger numbers) and domination (in Africans baasskap) which ensured control over labour.²²⁴⁾ Many years of peaceful protest against Apartheid turned into an armed struggle when the White government refused to make any meaningful concessions.²²⁵⁾

South Africa was characterized by three decades of armed struggle, domestic protests, sanctions and international isolation. By the late 1980s it had become clear that Apartheid could not be maintained by force, or removed by armed struggle without massive loss of life and damage to the country.²²⁶⁾ Moreover, Apartheid was universally condemned by the international community.²²⁷⁾ South Africa's intelligence

224) T. R. H. Davenport, *South Africa a Modern History* (London: MacMillan, 1991), Chapter 20.

225) B. Turok, *The ANC and the Turn to Armed Struggle* (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2010); B. Turok, *The Historical Roots of the ANC* (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2010); S. Ellis, *External Mission - The ANC in Exile* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2012).

226) A. Borain, *What's Gone Wrong?* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2014), Chapter 2.

structures realized that Apartheid could not be maintained in the long run and began to engage with the leadership of the main liberation force, the African National Congress (ANC). Interactions between South Africa's intelligence agency and the then-imprisoned ANC leaders Nelson Mandela continued for five years before formal negotiations commenced.

Major changes in the global arena and the region promoted moves towards a negotiated political settlement in South Africa. The decline of the USSR, the fall of the Berlin Wall and decisive battles in the Angolan civil war provided a strong motivation for a solution to South Africa's political difficulties. Ronnie Kasrils, a senior ANC leader suggests the following:

“There is a view that had the Soviet Union continued to exist we might have followed a more confrontationalist approach. The fact is that from the time of the SADF's defeat at Cuito Cuanavale (in Angola) in 1988, both the Soviet Union and Cuba encouraged us to seek a negotiated settlement. The ANC itself, as early as 1987, discerning a positive shift in the balance of forces, resolved to intensify the armed and mass struggle whilst preparing for the possibility of negotiations ... the changes in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev led the Western powers to regard the ANC as less of a revolutionary threat to their interests than before ... and they accordingly influenced De Klerk to negotiate a settlement.”²²⁸⁾ Sanctions and an international

227) M. Coleman, *A Crime Against Humanity - Analysing the Repression of the Apartheid State* (Johannesburg: Human Rights Committee, 1998).

228) R. Kasrils, *Armed and dangerous - From Undercover Struggle to Freedom* (Johannesburg: Jonathan

boycott of South Africa also contributed significantly to pressuring the ruling party towards negotiations. While the impact of sanctions was debated, the outcome was clearly to push the Apartheid government to the negotiating table. Graham Leach explains:

“The boycott supporters believe that nothing is to be lost by applying pressure. It is the only effective way of forcing Pretoria to change course, they declare. If it means that the blacks will be heart it is unfortunate but necessary ... Bishop Tutu has stated that it is perhaps time for blacks to suffer for a generation, to make a sacrifice to win their political rights. The bishop is not convinced that the blacks would be the ones to suffer in the event of sanctions. As he once put it: ‘When the ladder is falling over, surely it’s those at the top who will get hurt most, not those at the bottom?’²²⁹⁾

Besides changes in the international environment, civil protest had significantly strengthened and matured by the 1990s. Mokgethi Motlhabi had earlier signalled the importance of this process when he wrote in 1984:

“It seems probable that change in South Africa will ultimately depend on the maturity of ‘Black power,’ if this is understood as a direct, lasting challenge to the system by Blacks after summoning their strength and uniting in unrelenting action against it for better or for worse. All Black South Africans hope

Ball, 1998), p. 383; M. Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (London: Bantam Books, 1995), Part IV. 229) G. Leach, *South Africa: No Easy Path to Peace* (London: Methuen, 1986), p. 284.

that this will come about peacefully. At this stage, however, very few Blacks have categorically ruled out of consideration other solutions which may be less peaceful.”²³⁰⁾

In February 1990, Nelson Mandela was released from prison after 27 years of incarceration and the process of formal negotiation to find a political solution and national unity began. Many observers have suggested that Mandela’s unique leadership skill, patience and commitment to a negotiated settlement and reconciliation was the key to ensuring the success of South Africa’s political negotiations.²³¹⁾ Mandela explained his own vision for liberation as follows:

“It was during those long and lonely years that my hunger for the freedom of my own people became a hunger for the freedom of all people, white and black. I knew as well as I knew anything that the oppressor must be liberated just as surely as the oppressed. A man who takes away another man’s freedom is a prisoner of hatred, he is locked behind the bars of prejudice and narrow-mindedness. I am not truly free if I am taking someone else’s freedom, just as surely as I am not free when my freedom is taken from me. The oppressed and the oppressor alike are robbed of their humanity.”²³²⁾

The signing of the Groote Schuur Minute committed the

230) M. Motlhabi, *The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid* (Johannesburg: Skotaville, 1984), p. 270.

231) M. Du Preez, *A Rumour of Spring - South Africa After 20 Years of Democracy* (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2013), Chapter 2; B. Gilder, *Songs and Secrets - South Africa from Liberation to Governance* (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2012).

232) N. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom* (Randburg: Macdonald Purnell, 1994), p. 617.

South African government and the ANC to reduce political violence in the country and to strengthen the climate for negotiations by releasing political prisoners and granting immunity for returning liberation fighters. Two other agreements followed soon thereafter, the Pretoria Minute which terminated the ANC's armed struggle and the National Peace Accord which committed all South African political parties to participate in a broad-based negotiation process intended to determine the political future of South Africa.

The formal negotiation process was initiated on 20 December 1991 with the establishment of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). Nineteen separate political parties were represented at CODESA, incorporating the vast majority of political players in South Africa at that time. White minority support for a negotiated political settlement was confirmed in 1992, when close to 70% voted in support of a referendum to proceed with CODESA. A second round of the CODESA process took place during 1992, despite significant social unrest within the across the country. ANC civil protests based on a programme of "rolling mass action" led to the loss of lives and increased the urgency for negotiations to reach a conclusion.

The Apartheid government sought a two-phase transition based on a transitional government and a rotating presidency. The ANC rather favoured a quick transition to majority rule and the installation of a new government. Outside the CODESA process, the ruling National Party (NP) and the ANC set up

a second negotiation channel to address key outstanding issues. Roelf Meyer from the NP and Cyril Ramaphosa representing the ANC were able to build a positive personal relationship and made a significant contribution to advancing negotiations. Disagreement over power sharing, or immediate transfer of power to a majority government was resolved through the intervention of the leader of the South African Communist Party (SACP), Joe Slovo who proposed a “sunset clause” for a coalition government.²³³) This implied that NP government officials would retain positions and benefits for a ten year period after the first democratic elections. This turned out to be the key to unlocking the negotiations and the ruling government signed on to a short-term coalition government, leading to formal majority rule at a later stage.

In his book entitled “Tomorrow is Another Country—The Inside Story of South Africa’s Negotiated Revolution,” Alister Sparks compared National Party leader F. W. de Klerk with Gorbachev and he concluded:

“But at least in one respect De Klerk was critically different from Gorbachev. He stayed with the changes, he did not try to freeze the process. He came to recognize that you cannot reform an oppressive system, that if you start to relax it you have to go the whole way. There cannot be perestroika, only abolition. He accepted that when it became evident. His own

233) D. Tutu, *The Rainbow People of God - South Africa's Victory over Apartheid* (London: Bantam Books, 1991).

process of change kept pace with events, which is what saved him—and South Africa.”²³⁴⁾

A key element of the post-democratic election period was the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.²³⁵⁾ Through this process, all parties to South Africa’s domestic conflict were able to openly admit past failings and request forgiveness and reconciliation. Bishop Desmond Tutu, one of the key players in this process, suggested that a process of “retributive justice … could have left South Africa lying in ashes—a truly Pyrrhic victory if ever there was one.”²³⁶⁾ The negotiated end to Apartheid and the establishment of a unified and democratic South Africa was a significant event in the twentieth century and serves as an inspiration for others seeking political reconciliation, unity and nation building.²³⁷⁾

Nelson Mandela is famous for negotiating revolutionary change in South Africa and in so doing avoiding conflict and building a new peaceful, united and harmonious rainbow nation consisting of eleven distinct ethnic groups. Part of Mandela’s

234) A. Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country - The Inside Story of South Africa’s Negotiated Revolution* (London: Heinemann, 1995), p. 108; F. W. De Klerk, *F W de Klerk - The Autobiography* (London: MacMillan, 1998).

235) T. Bell, *Unfinished business - South Africa, Apartheid and Truth* (Johannesburg: Redworks, 2001); E. De Kock, *A Long Night’s Damage - Working for the Apartheid State* (Johannesburg: Contra, 1998); J. Pauw, *Into the Heart of Darkness-Confessions of Apartheid’s Assassins* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1997); C. Schutte, et al., *The Hidden Hand - Covert Operations in South Africa* (Pretoria: HSRC, 1998).

236) D. Tutu, *No Future Without Forgiveness* (London: Rider, 1999), p. 27; K. Asmal, et al., *Reconciliation Through Truth - A Reckoning of Apartheid’s Criminal Governance* (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1996).

237) P. Waldemeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle - The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa* (London: Viking, 1997).

success relates to his negotiation philosophy which guided his approach to problem solving. His negotiation approach is encapsulated in the following statements:

“Negotiations and discussion are the greatest weapons we have for promoting peace and development”, “Our experience has taught U.S. that with goodwill a negotiated solution can be found for even the most profound problems”, “In negotiations there should be no winners and no losers”, “South Africa continues to be an example of what can be achieved in circumstances of conflict if there is the will and commitment to finding peaceful solutions.”²³⁸⁾

Lessons from Nelson Mandela’s political reform/transformation of South Africa, which may be appropriate to the current reform challenges faced by Korea include²³⁹⁾:

use a gradual step by step approach—make corrections where necessary. South Africa’s negotiated revolution was advanced over a number of years, based on a cautious and deliberate approach. Enough time was allocated to make policy corrections and adjustments.

Increase dialogue and discussion with key players—During South Africa’s negotiation process, key players from all sides increased dialogue processes to broaden mutual understanding and to search for appropriate compromises. Mandela argued that “the most powerful weapon is not violence, but it is talking

238) N. Mandela, *Nelson Mandela By Himself* (London: MacMillan, 2013).

239) N. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom* (London: Macdonald Purnel, 1994).

to people.” He further stated that “conflicts can and must be resolved peacefully through dialogue.”

Key decision makers should develop a habit of co-operation—Key negotiators from the respective political parties made an effort to get to know each other and to spend time together. This helped to build new friendships and new patterns of co-operation on which broader negotiations could be built.²⁴⁰)

Promote a clear vision of the future—Early in the negotiation process, Nelson Mandela began to propose a positive and constructive future vision for South Africa. The vision was intended to motivate negotiators and advance constructive co-operation towards a common goal. Mandela stated that “ours is a vision of a just and democratic South Africa in which all its peoples will enjoy a full and rewarding life.”

Construct a vision for all participants—All participants in South Africa’s negotiation process were incorporated into Mandela’s long-term vision. Hence the building of a rainbow nation with high levels of social harmony and constructive interaction.

The vision should make place for all participants—no winners and losers. From the start of negotiations, Mandela adopted an inclusive approach, encouraging all stakeholders to find a place at the negotiation table. To this day, a wide range of smaller political parties are still represented in Parliament advancing minority viewpoints.

²⁴⁰) P. Waldmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle* (London: Viking, 1994), Chapter 6.

All sides should be expected to make some compromises. Mandela made compromises on behalf of the ANC and he encouraged other participants to do the same. The negotiation process was presented as a joint project which would have to include some compromises if it was to be successful over the longer term. Those early compromises on all sides underpin today's united and peaceful South Africa.

Experiment and adapt at all times along the road to your objective—any negotiation or reform programme requires extensive experimentation and adaptation. Complex change requires investigation and analysis to advance towards a common, win-win outcome. Often the road of reform is not straight, or clear, Thus adaptations and determination to complete the task are required.

Encourage hardliners to change—one of the greatest challenges to South Africa's negotiated revolution was the challenge of hardliners who threatened violence and civil war to derail the process. Mandela spoke directly and convincingly to the hardliners, taking time to encourage them to accept compromise and adaptation to the new South Africa. Over time, the conservatives came to respect Mandela and accepted the process without escalating violence.²⁴¹⁾

Outline the consequences of failure—participants in the process need to fully understand that the consequences of failure would be a disaster and would undermine future stability and

241) F. W. De Klerk, *The Last Trek - A New Beginning* (London: MacMillan, 1998), Chapter 26.

prosperity. In South Africa's case, the negotiation parties soon came to realize that excluding themselves from the process would be far more damaging than participating and making some compromises.

There has been an extended discourse on the reasons why South Africa began to develop a nuclear enrichment programme and subsequently a nuclear weapons programme. Research suggests that South Africa had no clear plan for military use, but rather saw nuclear weapons as a powerful political instrument which could deter a major Soviet offensive, avoid a major Africa-backed conventional invasion and black-mail Western powers into maintaining commercial and diplomatic interaction. Thus in the face of a growing regional threat, South Africa's nuclear strategy was essentially inexplicit and ambiguous. Given the indiscriminate destructiveness of nuclear weapons, and the irrationality of their use, South Africa's strategists chose a policy of contrived nuclear blackmail, rather than target identification and actual use.

South Africa's nuclear weapons programme began in the early 1960s and continued until 1991. During this time, South Africa produced secure and deliverable weapons, but were only able to manufacture two bombs per year. Had the programme continued during the 1990s, South Africa could have produced miniaturized nuclear warhead for delivery by medium-range missiles. Initial assistance was provided by the U.S. to establish a nuclear research facility in South Africa. Thereafter, South

African scientists interacted regularly with colleagues in the U.S., Europe and later Israel. When international sanctions were imposed on South Africa, nuclear scientists were obliged to conduct their activities in secret. During the mid-1980s, escalating costs associated with nuclear weapons production and maintenance encouraged the South African government to limit weapons production to seven in number and to slow plans for more advanced weapons and production systems. In December 1988, South Africa, Angola and Cuba were able to conclude a treaty ending the conflict in Angola and facilitating the withdrawal of over 50,000 Cuban combat forces from Southern Africa.²⁴²⁾ A year later the Berlin Wall fell, confirming that the USSR would no longer pursue the Cold War in Africa. A regional peace agreement, the end of an external super-power threat, the escalating cost of nuclear weapons production and South Africa's increased international isolation were the key drivers for South Africa to terminate its nuclear weapons programme.²⁴³⁾ The former Chief of South Africa's military forces and later Defence Minister, General Magnus Malan described the decision to terminate South Africa's nuclear weapons programme as follows:

242) C. A. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa - Making Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1992).

243) J. Geldenhuys, *A General's Story - From an Era of War and Peace* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1995), Chapter 15; J. Geldenhuys, *At the Front - A General's Account of South Africa's Border War* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1994); W. Steenkamp, *Borderstrike - South Africa into Angola* (Durban: Butterworths, 1983); J. Greeff, *A Greater Share of Honour* (Johannesburg: Ntomeni Publications, 2001); C. Wilsworth, *First in Last Out - the South African Artillery in Action 1975-1988* (Durban: 30 Degrees South Publishers, 2010).

“The collapse of the Soviet Bloc and world-wide communism, symbolized by the tearing down of the Berlin Wall at the end of 1989, resulted in the Soviet Union withdrawing its nuclear war potential from Southern Africa. The physical military threat against South Africa diminished markedly thereafter and consequently an ad hoc Cabinet committee could order the ending of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme in 1990.”²⁴⁴⁾

On 26 February 1990, South Africa’s President Frederik Willen de Klerk gave instructions for the termination and dismantling of all nuclear weapons and related production facilities. De Klerk’s key challenge in this context was to convince his senior military commanders that South Africa no longer needed a nuclear deterrent.²⁴⁵⁾ By the end of 1991, all HEU had been removed from the weapons and placed in storage. South Africa joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 10 July, 1991 with an IAEA Safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/394) coming into force on 16 September 1991. An IAEA inspection team arrived in South Africa in November 1991 to formally conclude the country’s accession to the NPT. The inspection team found a stockpile of 400 kg of weapons-grade enriched uranium which had been removed from weapons systems. During the period 1992 to early 1994, destruction of nuclear related equipment, plans and components was carried

244) M. Malan, *Magnus Malan: My Life with the SA Defence Force* (Pretoria: Protea, 2006), p. 217.

245) H. Hamann, *Days of the Generals - The Untold Story of South Africa's Apartheid-era Military Generals* (Cape Town: Zebra, 2001).

out to the full termination of the programme.²⁴⁶⁾

South Africa's accession to the NPT and the complete termination of its nuclear production and weapons programme was a major success for international efforts to terminate world-wide nuclear weapons production. Sanctions, international isolation, a major border war and the threat of a major military intervention by the USSR encouraged South Africa to secretly produce nuclear armaments to be used as a bargaining chip, or a weapon of last resort. However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union's retreat from Africa, South Africa was able to enter a period of comprehensive negotiation and political reform leading to a fully democratic state in 1994. Besides the clear reduction of an external threat, the high cost of building and maintaining a nuclear arsenal, along with the international isolation which would result from this, convinced South Africa's decision makers to sign on to the NPT and to end all nuclear weapons production.

The democratic government of South Africa after 1994 adopted nuclear non-proliferation as a key element of its foreign policy and has focussed on extending the scope and duration of the NPT.²⁴⁷⁾ Moreover, South Africa has been a key driver of the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (also known as the Treaty of Pelindaba) which has established a nuclear-

246) D. Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," (ISIS Report, May, 1994).

247) G. Shelton, *South Africa and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Bridging the North-South Divide on Nuclear Weapons*, Seminar Report: *Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: the Role of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty* (Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2000).

weapons free zone in Africa. The treaty was opened for signature in 1996 and came into effect with the 28th ratification on July 15, 2009. The treaty prohibits the manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition of nuclear weapons by parties to the agreement and has played a key role in keeping the continent free of nuclear weapons and nuclear production programmes. South Africa's experience in promoting the African nuclear free zone could be helpful in developing a similar zone in North East Asia.²⁴⁸⁾

The complete termination of South Africa's nuclear weapons programme established a precedent for nuclear disarmament in other countries, including North Korea. The reasons for South Africa's decision to end weapons production are instructive, while the dismantling and destruction of nuclear materials and South Africa's accession to the NPT with a full IAEA safeguards agreement offers an instructive and inspirational model for others. Moreover, the government's "gradual realization that its nuclear weapons were not only superfluous but actually counterproductive to achieving South Africa's political, military and economic objectives may be the most important lesson of all."²⁴⁹⁾

248) G. Evans and Y. Kawaguchi, "Eliminating Nuclear Threats," *Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament* (Canberra, 2009), p. 157.

249) J. W. De Villiers, R. Jardine, and M. Reiss, "Why South Africa Gave up the Bomb," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December 1993), p. 199.

(2) Regional/Global Level

South Africa has full diplomatic relations with both the ROK and the DPRK, making it possible to fashion a positive contribution to the process of unification. South Africa could make use of diplomatic channels to Pyongyang to encourage progress towards reducing tensions and greater economic interaction across the DMZ. South Africa has in the past encouraged the DPRK to give up nuclear weapons arguing that a nuclear deterrent is unnecessary, unusable and very costly. South Africa was unable to maintain even a small nuclear deterrent because of rising costs, while the indiscriminate destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes their use irrational. South Africa has encouraged the DPRK to institute economic reforms with a view to building a stronger base for Korean national unification and long-term prosperity.

To promoting a constructive engagement with North Korea, South Africa should step-up diplomatic engagement and should broaden existing dialogues with a view to developing regular high-level exchanges. Through a process of this kind, South Africa could possibly influence policy and decision making in Pyongyang, towards a more positive and stabilizing direction. South Africa should emphasize the potential benefits and rewards for the DPRK if progress is made towards greater stability and unification. As a developing country of the Global South with strong sympathies for the Korean people, South Africa

can play the role of mediator, encourager and neutral go-between to advance a constructive unification and post-unification process.

South Africa's own historical experience can inform and inspire positive diplomatic engagement with the DPRK towards a favourable and constructive outcome. As a fellow member of the Global South, South Africa could play a key role in convincing the DPRK to accelerate unification and to build a co-operative, and creative post-unification system. South Africa can promote the advantages of a peaceful, negotiated settlement and can contribute to promoting new ideas and new proposals for Korean co-operation towards unification. South African think-tanks should be mobilized to support South Africa's diplomacy and an informal Track 2 process can be used to build appropriate knowledge and policy options.

Other areas where South Africa could support the unification process include:

Mobilizing international support, especially support from the Global South for unification; Encouraging Africa and the African Union (AU) to promote Korean unity; Playing a key role in the United Nations (UN), General Assembly and Human Rights Committee to strengthen global public opinion towards Korean unity Encouraging Global South multilateral forums, such as the G-77 + China, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the New Africa Asia Strategic Partnership (NAASP) to support and promote the unification process; Within BRICS (Brazil, Russia,

India, China and South Africa), South Africa can play the role of mobilizing other members in support of unification; South African think-tanks can be mobilized to support Korean unification through seminars, conferences and information exchanges. South African think-tanks could take the lead to motivate and mobilize African think-tanks across the continent to the common end of strengthening and advancing the unification process; South African NGOs have been active in Africa and the Middle East to provide assistance and focussed support. These NGOs could make a positive contribution to assisting with humanitarian aspects of unification; South Africa could take the lead in promoting a united Korea's membership of BRICS, transforming BRICS into BRICKS. Korean membership of BRICKS could have a very positive impact on strengthening and supporting unification as well as boosting economic growth.

At the diplomatic level, Korean unification will require the full participation and support of the international community. As an emerging Middle Power, with aspirations for a permanent seat on a restructured UN Security Council, South Africa could contribute in the following areas:

Offering South Africa's own historical experience as a positive model and inspiration. South Africa's denuclearization process offers pointers and guidelines for a similar process in the DPRK. As a strong and vocal supporter of the NPT and arms control regimes in general, South Africa could offer support and encouragement for full participation in disarmament processes.

Within the G-20, and especially within Africa, South Africa could lobby other emerging powers to support Korean unification. The Korea-Africa Forum is over time expected to become a far more important multilateral process for Africa. Korean unification would strengthen this process and offer new and positive opportunities for both sides.

A unifying Korea should seek to build a support group within the G-20 to help advance this process. South Africa can play a positive role in advancing this process. Full G-20 support will be required to underpin Korean unification, especially in its early stages. Loans, investment and new trade agreements by G-20 countries will be crucial in providing economic impetus to Korean unification and post-unification economic growth. As the 'voice of Africa' within the G-20, South Africa's contribution could be decisive in advancing broad support for unification. Moreover, South Africa can strengthen its role as a gateway to Africa for Korea's African diplomacy and Korea's corporate interests. Over time, the Korea-Africa Forum is expected to grow in importance and in content. South Africa is an ideal strategic partner with Korea in opening a new framework for co-operation in Africa which will in turn enhance prospects for successful Korean unity.

d. Implications for Korea

It is now clear that the catalyst for national unification must depend on the will of the Korean people. A lack of information and independent consideration undermines public opinion in the North, while the South's main concern is economic. The high costs of a successful unification process would place an excessive burden on the tax payers of the South. Over the longer term, the inevitable decay of the DPRK's military capacity and economic vitality, would make unification a more attractive option for the North. In the South, an aging population has pointed to the growing need for a more youthful labour force to reinforce future economic growth.

Thus the mobilization of the North's human potential becomes more attractive. A process of controlled labour migration from North to South could be the key to initiating the unification process and strengthening both economies. The general perception in the South is that unification cannot be rushed but should rather follow an economic transformation in the North, making integration less costly. The long-term future suggests a united Korea, with political and economic institutions largely mirroring those of the South, but as many Koreans lament, "unification is inevitable, but not imminent." Until unification, the challenge for both South and North is to avoid a major confrontation which would threaten the survival of Korean culture, history and civilization.²⁵⁰⁾ Many published

papers suggest how Korean unification could take place, with the German model often proposed as the best choice. However, this model indicates absorption by West Germany of the East, and is thus likely to be rejected by the DPRK which would rather favour integration based on equality and mutual respect. Arguably, a new composite model of unification based on a range of international experiences and case studies would be better suited to advance this process. As Victor Cha has suggested, the current unification discourse is more about ideas than about measuring military power.²⁵¹⁾

New thinking suggests that smart power (new ideas, approaches and paradigms) is now more important than (hard power) military force, or military dominance. Moreover, opportunities and possibilities should motivate debate and problem solving rather than threats, power measurements and preparations for conflict. The key challenge to convince the DPRK's leadership that unity would hold specific guaranteed rewards for them and would be in their best long-term interests.²⁵²⁾ The positive outcomes of unity for the people of the DPRK are obvious and will be immediate, but for the leadership, incentives are less clear.

250) M. Shaw and W. Taylor, "East Asia's Ultimate Geopolitical Puzzle: Korean Unification," *The National Interest* (September-October 2014) (accessed: August 28, 2014).

251) V. Cha, *The Impossible State - North Korea, Past and Future* (London: Bodley Head, 2012), p. 415.

252) P. French, *North Korea - The Paranoid Peninsula* (London: Zed Books, 2005), Chapter 11; M. O'Hanlon and M. Mochizuki, *Crisis on the Korean Peninsula* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006); J. Becker, *Rogue Regime* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); G. Chang, *Nuclear Showdown* (New York: Random House, 2006).

The stages of future negotiated Korean unification are Thus expected to include a pre-negotiation phase during which time both Koreas expand and deepen dialogue and exchange. Moving towards a mutually beneficial negotiated unification agreement is likely to be complex and time consuming, but given the immense economic opportunities which would flow from this process a favour conclusion would be a welcome prize. A phased economic integration process is expected, using the Gaesong industrial Complex as the model for co-operation.²⁵³⁾ Political integration is expected to flow naturally from functional economic co-operation and a new shared prosperity. Over the longer term, nation building would be the key characteristic grounded in a common unified history, single language and culture.

The ROK's current unification policy is based on a number of key principles, intended to strengthen prospects for peace, co-operation and a shared destiny. Creating appropriate pre-conditions for unification is the current challenge. Building a positive negotiation environment and identifying mutually beneficial short and long-term goals could accelerate progress towards a positive outcome. The key elements of the current pre-negotiation phase thus, include:

Trust-building-(“trustpolitik”) stronger South-North Korean trust could promote a more direct dialogue and positive

253) Sun-Nyung Heo, *Perspectives on South Korea's Strategic Options in the 21st Century* (Saarbruchen: Lambert, 2010).

diplomatic interaction, essential for mutual problem solving and long-term planning;

Family reunions of those divided by the Korean War offer a reminder of Korea's past unity and a promise of future oneness;

Plans for DMZ World Eco-Peace Park is a good opportunity for both South and North Korea to work together on a joint project highlighting the need for mutual harmony and peace;

Promoting a new round of Six-Party Talks offers the prospect of moving towards negotiated solutions for common problems;

Motivating the South Korean population to continue and broaden support for unity is a key concern. The advantages of unity should be identified and the positive economic prospects fully identified.

President Park has offered encouragement to the people of the DPRK by pointing out that unification offers a "bonanza," a grand opportunity, or a jackpot which will raise living standards and significantly improve the lives of all Koreans.²⁵⁴⁾

South Africa is a strong supporter of peace and stability in North East Asia and by extension, fully supports Korean national unity. Any move towards closer Korean co-operation will have a positive impact on South Africa's diplomacy with the region and South Africa's growing trade with Asia. South Africa fully supports and encourages the pre-negotiation processes and activities. In diplomatic engagements with the DPRK, South

254) V. Cha, "Five Theories of Unification," *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*, July 22, 2014 (accessed: August 20, 2014).

Africa has encouraged Pyongyang to make the necessary compromises on nuclear weapons and human rights to help advance the unification process.

The longer term objective is Korean unity, a new Korean Peninsula in a peaceful North East Asia, contributing to a stable and peaceful world.²⁵⁵⁾ While advancing a new drive for unity, the ROK government is maintaining and strengthening its deterrent capacity, Thus ensuring stability and a positive security environment which would be essential for meaningful political negotiations. At the same time, planning and preparations for a future, united Korea are being made.²⁵⁶⁾

Since April 2003, Beijing has hosted the Six-Party Talks (U.S., China, Japan, Russia, South and North Korea) in an effort to return North Korea to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty's (NPT) safeguards framework. The early phases of the Six-Party Talks showed little flexibility on the part of either Washington, or Pyongyang, with slow progress towards an outcome.²⁵⁷⁾ Given the complexity of finding a compromise among six competing national interests, in a process which includes up to 120 diplomats, negotiators and their support teams in the room at any one time, the Six-Party Talks has proved to be cumbersome conflict-management tool (see Table 3). Moreover, differing

255) "Korean Unification and Peace," *The Japan Times*, June 6, 2014 (accessed: August 28, 2014).

256) E. Liston, "North and South Korea: Can Seoul's Plans for unification Work?" *North Korea Network*, July 12, 2014 (accessed August 20, 2014).

257) For a detailed account of North Korea's nuclear programme, see J. Wit, et al., *Going critical: the first North Korean nuclear crisis* (Washington: Brookings Institute, 2004); L. A. Niksch, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Programme," *Issue Brief for Congress* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2003).

policy objectives have first slowed negotiations and now frozen further discussions in this framework. Thus the pre-unification process would require a renewal of the Six-Party Talks, or a new diplomatic process to advance co-operation.

Table 3 Major Priorities and Bargaining Chips by Country in the Six-Party Talks with North Korea

Country	Priority	Bargaining Chips
United States	Complete, verifiable, and irrevocable scrapping of nuclear weapons; non-proliferation; human rights; peace treaty	Guarantee security and regime, economic aid, normalized diplomatic and trade relations
North Korea	Guarantee security and regime; establish diplomatic relations with the U.S. and Japan; unification with South Korea on own terms; peace treaty	Scrap nuclear weapons and missiles, reduce tensions along DMZ
South Korea	Set framework for peaceful resolution and prosperity on the peninsula; unification; access to North Korean labour and markets, non-nuclear Korean peninsula; human rights; peace treaty	Economic support, energy, business investment
Japan	Scrap nuclear weapons program and missiles; resolve abductions of Japanese citizens	Normalized diplomatic relations, economic support
China	Non-nuclear Korean peninsula, non-proliferation; continued influence on peninsula, weakening the U.S. alliance with Japan and with South Korea; peace treaty	Economic support, alliance support
Russia	Scrap N. Korean nuclear weapons; non-proliferation; promote stability in N.E. Asia	Buffer diplomacy, energy assistance, business investment

Source: *The Seoul Economic Daily*, 22 August 2003, cited in Hong Soon-Jick, "North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Prospects and Policy Directions," *East Asian Review*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Autumn 2003), p. 31.

Some progress has been made in advancing North Korea's denuclearization, but a completely verifiable termination of Pyongyang's nuclear programme is still a long way off.²⁵⁸⁾ The process of verification is strongly contested by North Korea, especially the scope, timing and extent of inspection procedures. Unannounced, on-site inspections are considered a threat to the DPRK's sovereignty and remains an anathema to the DPRK authorities. Pyongyang has sought a verification regime which covers only issues included in its written declarations and is attempting to avoid intrusive inspections. There remain many unanswered questions on the road to North Korea's full denuclearization.

Solving the North Korean nuclear issue would Thus require adequate security assurances for Pyongyang.²⁵⁹⁾ Professor Kim Sung-han has suggested that the DPRK's denuclearization should be pursued with the long-term aim of establishing a regional "peace regime" which would provide Pyongyang with the necessary security assurance to pursue denuclearization (see Table 4). Observers have concluded that a successful verification of North Korea's denuclearization process would require an "unprecedented level of co-operation" with the authorities in Pyongyang.²⁶⁰⁾

258) Yongho Kim and Myung Chul Kim, "China in the North Korean Quagmire: Rethinking Chinese Influence on North Korea," *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (2008).

259) G. Chang, *Nuclear showdown-North Korea takes on the world* (New York: Random House, 2006).

260) L. V. Sigal, "Efforts for a nuclear-free North Korea ae bearing fruit," *Global Asia*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2008), pp. 53~57.

Table 4 Four-Stage Approach to Denuclearization and Peace Regime

	Six-Party Talks	U.S.-North Korea Relations	U.S.-South Korea Relations	Peace Forum
1st Stage: Shutdown	Formation of peace forum	Security guarantee	Resumption of food and fertilizer aid	Agreement on method of discussing a peace regime
2nd Stage: Declaration of all nuclear facilities	discussion of large-scale economic and energy aid	Removal of NK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism	Reopening of high-level inter-Korean talks	Debate on parties to peace pact and its contents
3rd Stage: Verification	Large-scale economic and energy aid	Lifting of economic sanctions against NK	Inter-Korean summit talks	Agreement on contents of peace pact
4th Stage: Disarmament (completion of nuclear dismantlement)	Endorsement of peace agreement; conversion to NEA security system	Normalization of U.S.-NK relations	Conclusion of peace agreement	U.S. and China guarantee inter-Korean peace pact

Source: Kim Sung-han, “Achieving Nuclear Disarmament,” *Korea focus*, Spring 2007.

Two possible scenarios for the emergence of a reform regime in the DPRK suggests the following. A “regime collapse” or “power vacuum” scenario predicts the disintegration of North Korea as a consequence of ongoing economic difficulties. This scenario suggests that civil uprisings will prevent the government from exercising effective control over society and maintaining an effective authoritarian structure. A second possibility, “systems change” suggests a military take-over as a consequence of economic decline followed by economic reforms and opening to the world, based on the Chinese model.²⁶¹) This scenario

is based on the assumption that reform-minded military personnel favour gradual, controlled economic transformation which would open Korea to the world and induce economic growth.²⁶²⁾

There is a growing consensus among foreign observers that North Korea's long-term prosperity depends on an economic reform process which will strengthen industrial capacity, food production and poverty reduction.²⁶³⁾ Former ROK president, Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy was intended to create suitable conditions for future unification by expanding co-operation, dialogue and economic engagement. However, Sunshine met with only limited success and progress towards unity has been slow. Some suggested that Sunshine merely strengthened the DPRK's determination to maintain the status quo, while others suggest that a longer period of dialogue and engagement would have produced a more positive outcome.²⁶⁴⁾

The ROK has completed its own economic miracle and is well placed to promote and ensure a successful unification process. As Myung Oak Kim and Sam Jaffe point out:

“Korea's rightful place on the global stage is alongside the most advanced countries in the world. This tiny country has proved time and again that it is capable of competing with the best and

261) P. French, *North Korea The Paranoid Peninsula* (New York: Palgrave, 2005), Chapter 12.

262) Interview with In-kon Yeo, Director, Korea Institute for National Unification (Seoul), September 1, 2008.

263) Chung-in Moon, *Understanding regime dynamics in North Korea* (Seoul: Yonsei University, 2000).

264) S. C. Kim and D. C. Kang, *Engagement with North Korea* (New York: Suny Press, 2009), Chapter 11.

the brightest. The nation has succeeded through sheer willpower, hard work and an emphasis on education and setting ambitious goals. The country's list of achievements is stunning and there is ample reason to believe that Korea will continue to be successful, while holding on to its rich history and culture."²⁶⁵⁾

Korean unity is expected to create a new miracle as North Korea's vast mineral wealth and un-tapped labour is incorporated into a modern, advanced and highly innovative industrial economy. A united Korea is expected to become one of the biggest economies in the world, surpassing Japan within twenty years. Both North and South Korea would benefit enormously from unification, with a boost in economic growth for the South and significant raising of living standards for the North. Both North and South Korea can expect more than a bonanza from unity, as longer term peace and economic prosperity will benefit both participants in the process. A united Korea will be one of the world's leading nations with international influence and prestige. Koreans from both North and South will be able to realize their dreams, while a positive destiny of the Korean nation will be assured.

265) Myung Oak Kim and S. Jaffe, *The New Korea - An Inside Look at South Korea's Economic Rise* (New York: Amacom, 2010), p. 271; R.M. Steers, *Made in Korea - Chung Ju Yung and the Rise of Hyundai* (New York: Routledge, 1999); S. Winchester, *Korea, A Walk Through the Land of Miracles* (London: Paladin, 1990); T.W. Kang, *Is Korea the Next Japan?* (New York: Free Press, 1989); Won-chol O, *The Korea Story* (Seoul: Wisdom Tree, 2009); J. E. Campos and H. L. Root, *The Key to the Asian Miracle* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1996).

e. Observation

The ROK and the DPRK face economic and political challenges in the future, but the possibility of greater unity offers common long-term peace and prosperity. Both stand to benefit significantly from increased co-operation and economic interaction.²⁶⁶⁾ Countries which have strong economic links with the ROK, such as South Africa, stand to benefit significantly from an economically stronger and more vibrant Korea. Increased trade, investment and cultural exchange are likely to flow from Korean unification.

Moreover, a unified Korea, finally at peace, will resonate positively throughout North East Asia opening the way for increased trade and investment. South Africa's negotiated political settlement paved the way for reduced defence expenditures, positive economic growth and social stability. The South African case study confirms that strategic compromises can produce a significantly positive outcome for all participants. The Korean people, from both North and South, stand to benefit enormously from unification as both will share in a long-term bonanza of peace, social stability, economic growth and prosperity. Given the combination of available skilled labour in the North and rich mineral deposits, along with technology and capital in the South post-unification accelerated economic growth is inevitable. Continued division undermines the fortunes

266) M. J. Seth, *A Concise History of Modern Korea* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), Chapter 9.

of the Korean people and prevents Korea from taking its place as one of the world's leading powers.

South Africa can play a positive and constructive role in Korea's unification by offering its own experiences as a model, example or inspiration. In this context, South Africa's negotiated political settlement contains a number of key elements which may be relevant to the Korean case:

Both sides rejected violence as an irrational means of solving problems;

Smart power (new ideas, methods and new approaches) were applied to find creative solutions to long-standing problems; A change of heart (rejection of violence on the part of the ANC and rejection of further oppression by the Apartheid government) by both parties to the conflict was important; The legitimate economic and security concerns of all were taken into account in the final settlement.

The suggested lessons of South Africa's denuclearization process include the following.

A reduced threat environment is important in motivating disarmament (in South Africa's case, reduced regional conflict and the collapse of the USSR); Decision makers need to acknowledge that the high costs of a nuclear programme outweigh its benefits (South Africa realized this by the mid-1980s); There should be clear incentives for disarmament (South Africa was seeking an end to isolation and re-entry to the international system); Decision makers need to acknowledge

that nuclear weapons are unusable and irrational as any use would result in a similar response (South Africa's decision makers were unable to identify possible nuclear targets, or to craft a nuclear-use strategy).

Although geographically far from Korea, South Africa can contribute positively to the process of Korean unification by promoting its own negotiated political dispensation as a model and its denuclearization process as a guide. Based on South Africa's experience, suggestions for South Korea in the pre-unification and unification process include the following.

Increase inter-Korean dialogue with a view to developing a positive environment for constructive problem solving; Increase personal interaction between key policy makers to build confidence and reassurance that agreements will be fully implemented; Find new ways of reducing uncertainty, lack of trust and misunderstandings. Improve communications to eliminate ambiguity and disagreement; Create a detailed positive vision for a united Korea and a peaceful North East Asia which will win the support of the entire Korean people and regional powers as well; Develop plans for a new regional security framework which will ensure that regional powers and the U.S. do not perceive a united Korea as a new security challenge.

With full diplomatic representation in Seoul and Pyongyang, South Africa has the ability to engage fully with both sides in the unification process and to promote a positive outcome. Increased South African engagement in this context could be

helpful in contributing to unification. Moreover, as the voice of Africa and Africa's only representative in BRICS, South Africa could be key player in supporting Korean unification within the developing world. Mobilizing African support for a unified Korea could be important in driving the process and encouraging the DPRK to participate fully in the unification project.

As an active participant in global affairs especially in promoting the NPT, South Africa can be a useful partner along the road to a peaceful and prosperous united Korea. As a G-20 and BRICS member, South Africa has influence in the global arena and especially in Africa. Thus while South Africa is geographically remote from the Korean Peninsula and has not played a direct role in Korean affairs, it has the potential to be a stronger participant by advancing its own experiences and by representing Africa's views on the international stage. South Africa's vibrant economic engagement with East Asia suggests that there will be significant benefits from a united, peaceful and prosperous Korea. South Africa has a strong interest in promoting Korean unity and could Thus play a larger and more constructive role in contributing to this process.

12 Turkey

a. Overview

In this section, the question of in what ways can Turkey contribute to opening North Korea to the outside world, boosting inter-Korean dialogue, and accelerating the unification process, will be put under scrutiny. Within such a framework, the first thing to keep in mind will be Turkey's foreign policy principles. Turkish foreign policy principles shape its foreign policy-making and implementation processes, just like in other countries.

Turkey's guiding foreign policy principle is "Peace at Home, Peace in the World" as set out by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the Republic of Turkey. Within this perspective, Turkey works to expand the sphere of peace and prosperity in its region and the world, and to help establish an order that paves the way for human rights, democracy, rule of law and social equity. Traditional security issues as well as new and evolving threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cross-border organized crime and illegal immigration have continued to be a challenge towards international peace and stability. In this regard, Turkey has added a relatively new aspect to its foreign policy in recent years which indeed complements its global vision via helping third countries in resolving their

domestic as well as bilateral problems through facilitation and reconciliation.²⁶⁷⁾

Again, assessing the accumulated experience that Turkey attained by implementing these foreign policy principles becomes crucial. Turkey took part in joint efforts by the international community aimed at catalyzing the process of free-market economy and democratic transition for Central and East European countries in the post-Cold War period, especially right after the Eastern Bloc collapsed. It was also involved in the former Soviet and Yugoslavian republics' integration process to the international system after they gained independence. The policies developed by Turkey towards those countries, right after they experienced regime change or gained independence, need to be analyzed in-depth in order to predict in what ways Turkey will take advantage of its accumulated experience in these fields in the future. Turkey generated successful policies of humanitarian and developmental aid towards countries in Asia-Pacific and Africa, alongside those located in Eurasia, in the last decade. Analyzing Turkey's specific policies in this regard bears importance for being able to identify which policy tools and foreign policy perspectives will Turkey utilize in the case of North Korea.

Another point we need to pay attention within such a framework is Turkey's relations with both North and South

267) MFA, "Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy," (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>>.

Korea. Taking the Korean War as a starting point, Turkey developed a different model of relationship with North Korea than the one it did with the South. Analyzing policies formulated and implemented by Ankara towards Seoul and Pyongyang in a comparative manner will also be helpful in determining what kind of a role Turkey can play with regard to inter-Korean dialogue.

From this point forth, the effects of developments in the Korean Peninsula on Turkey will be evaluated in this section with special emphasis on the economic and security dimensions of the subject. Secondly, how Turkey can promote North Korea's opening to the outside world and inter-Korean cooperation on a bilateral as well as multilateral basis will be discussed. Lastly, suggestions regarding the appropriate steps that should be taken during the pre-unification and unification processes will be shared.

b. Expected Effect

(1) Security Dimension

The peaceful unification of Korea is going to eliminate a security problem that has both regional and international repercussions; therefore it will comfort Turkey. If potential tensions can be prevented between the U.S. and China, China and Japan, ROK and Japan, as well as the ROK and China

during the unification process that will be in Turkey's best interests. Turkey has direct and strong bilateral relations with the U.S., Russia, China, Japan, and the ROK; all of which are directly involved as parties to the Korean dispute.

Turkey has supported the alliance between the U.S. and ROK since the Korean War. Ankara will side with Seoul in case it is compelled to choose a side during a potential conflict in the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, Turkey has complex economic relations with Russia and China, both of which are the historical allies of North Korea. In this respect, the unification of the Korean Peninsula through peaceful means and a compromise between all regional parties will create an atmosphere in which Turkey will find itself well-positioned.

A consensus to be reached between the U.S., China and Japan will also make it easier for the Taiwan dispute to be resolved in a peaceful manner if it is not already resolved by then. In this respect, the mood of optimism in which the resolution of the Korean dispute will culminate and contribute positively to the determination of Taiwan's final status. Turkey wishes to build strong economic ties with Taiwan while avoiding deterioration in its relations with China.²⁶⁸⁾ Beijing's attitude to date has not been encouraging with respect to Turkey improving its economic relations with Taiwan. The elimination of the uncertainty with regard to Taiwan's final status will allow

268) "New perspectives on Turkey-Taiwan relations," *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, November 12, 2013, <<http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3807/new-perspectives-on-turkey-taiwan-relations.html>>.

the elimination of a potential source of friction between China and Turkey as well.

One of the greatest security challenges which emerged following the Cold War is the potential acquisition of WMDs and missiles by terrorist groups. The risk of Pyongyang transferring nuclear weapons and missiles to terrorist groups will be eliminated if a reformist regime comes to power in North Korea. Turkey will support such a reformist regime's coming to power in North Korea because it is concerned that terrorist groups active in its own neighborhood such as the PKK, Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and ISIS can also acquire such weapons one day.

(2) Economic Dimension

The Korean unification will boost opportunities for cooperation throughout the region. First and foremost, North Korea is the closest regime in the world and its opening to global markets will definitely help rejuvenate the regional economy. Turkey's economy can benefit from such a scenario. Turkish firms can bear a role in the reconstruction of North Korea's physical infrastructure and restructuring of its domestic economy as they are known to be competent in various sectors including the construction of housing, infrastructure, textile industry, and food processing industry. Turkish construction sector can cooperate with South Korean firms in order to realize collective housing projects as well as other large infrastructure projects.

Korean unification will also give momentum to pro-integration efforts between other regional countries. The establishment of a regional organization based on the ASEAN model but covering Northeast Asia is also a possibility under such a scenario. Integration in Northeast Asia will essentially contribute to the rising economic potential of the region at large. because Turkey has solid economic links with each of the parties to be involved in such a process, it will deeply benefit from further opportunities.

c. Potential Roles

(1) Country Level

Turkey, while attaching importance to its relations with the ROK, neglected North Korea thus far. Turkish governments and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have long perceived North Korea as a country which Turkey should keep at arm's length due to Ankara's historical friendship and solidarity with Seoul. Ankara has not changed this policy much since 1953.²⁶⁹⁾ If Seoul wants to encourage Pyongyang to follow a reformist policy-line by the medium of Ankara, it needs to step in to facilitate such dialogue. Seoul needs to get in contact with Ankara and clearly convey the message that if Turkey improves its economic and

269) Heechul Lee, "An Analysis of Korean-Turkish Relations: Rising Trade Partnership and Deepening Integration," *USAK Yearbook of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 5 (2012). pp. 228~229.

political relations with North Korea, this will catalyze the process of a reformist government coming into power in Pyongyang.

Diplomatic relations between Turkey and North Korea were established with the Memorandum of Understanding signed on January 15, 2001 in Beijing. Turkey's Embassy in Seoul is also accredited to North Korea and North Korea's Embassy in Sofia is accredited to Turkey. The Turkish-North Korean Political Consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs were held on 8 September 2011 in Ankara with a view to contributing to peace and stability in the region.²⁷⁰⁾

With reference to the MOU in question, Turkey can take steps which will enhance bilateral relations with North Korea. The most concrete step which would help improve bilateral relations will be setting up reciprocal embassies in Ankara and Pyongyang. Such a step will significantly clear the way for Ankara to take initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue and potential cooperation between the two parties on the Peninsula. Again, North Korea can increase its international communication and facilitate the process of opening out through channels to be provided by Turkey thanks to an improvement in bilateral relations between Ankara and Pyongyang. North Korea's further integration with the global economy will expedite the adoption of a more reformist strategy by Pyongyang.

Currently, economic ties between Turkey and North Korea

270) MFA, "Relations between Turkey and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea.en.mfa>>.

are utterly weak and insufficient. Turkish companies are unwilling to get into contact with North Korea when they have a significant trade partner like South Korea right next to it. As a matter of fact, while South Korea ranked 16th among Turkey's largest trade partners with a bilateral trade volume worth 6.6 million USD, North Korea was ranked 179th on the same list with the trade volume between Ankara and Pyongyang remaining at the level of 10 million USD (see Table 5). The trade volume between Turkey and South Korea has been increasing persistently for the last 23 years, in sharp contrast with the trade volume between Turkey and North Korea which dropped below its level in 1990 in the meantime. If we want Turkish firms to open up to the North Korean markets, Turkish and South Korean experts can organize joint technical meetings and determine a strategic roadmap in this regard.

Table 5 Turkey's Trade with South Korea and North Korea

(million USD)

Years	South Korea			North Korea		
	Export	Import	Total	Export	Import	Total
1990	109	302	411	26	1	27
2000	130	1,181	1,311	2	9	11
2010	304	4,764	5,068	1	4	5
2013	460	6,088	6,548	6	4	10

Source: Turkish Ministry of Economy

Significantly, on August 13, 2014, Kim Yong Nam, the President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, sent a congratulatory message addressing Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was elected the President three days before the message was delivered. This move can be considered an important one which can serve the rejuvenation of bilateral relations. As a matter of fact, Kim Yong Nam expressed his belief in his congratulatory message that bilateral relations would grow stronger in accordance with the common interests and desires of the two peoples, and wished the president-elect success in the work for the development and prosperity of the country and the promotion of the people's wellbeing.²⁷¹⁾

The relationship and partnership model developed between Turkey and former socialist countries in the last 24 years can be taken as a reference point in the case of Turkey's engagement with North Korea. Turkey immediately recognized the newly emerging states throughout Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia in early 1990s when Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union dissolved. All of these successor states, except Serbia and the Russian Federation, embarked on a state-building process starting over from scratch. Those states initially lacked essential organizational structures such as a police force, a ministry of foreign affairs, a banking system etc., and Turkey supported their endeavors in this manner.

271) "Congratulations to Turkish President-Elect," *Korean Central News Agency of DPRK*, August 13, 2014, <<http://www.kcna.co.jp/indexe.htm>>.

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs shared its experience with those countries and allowed them to utilize its own institutional channels. Turkish embassies were accredited to represent some of the newly independent states in various countries and under the roof of various international organizations until these formerly socialist states established their own diplomatic offices. Diplomats from those countries were trained by the Diplomacy Academy under the auspices of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, Turkey supported those formerly socialist states in improving their relations with Western countries and institutions after decades of relative isolation. At the end of the day, all those Central Asian and Eastern European states became members of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Turkey provided active support to Eastern European and Balkan countries during their accession negotiations to NATO. In this respect, Turkey can share its diplomatic accumulation of knowledge and experiences with a reunified Korea, and cooperate in several relevant fields such as the liquidation of the socialist regime in the North and its integration with the rest of the world.

Turkish Armed Forces (TSK—the Turkish military) provided with technical and military guidance to the militaries of newly independent states in the past. Turkish War Academy hosted and trained groups of military personnel from those states on a regular basis after their independence. Turkish Police Academy

also contributed to the training of security personnel from those countries. Thereby permanent grounds for cooperation between the security forces (police and military corps) of the newly independent states and Turkey were established.

Mutual exchange of students under military and police academies, as part of a multivectoral endeavor for cooperation between such educational institutions in question, can be realized. The Turkish military and the Turkish police had the chance to get familiar with police and military corps of post-socialist countries in the past, and successfully established a dynamic relationship with high-level authorities in those countries. The Turkish military and the Turkish police gained such an experience over two decades of hard work, and they can share such an experience with their “North Korean” counterparts during unification. Their contribution will be important in the sense that the military and police corps of an open regime are much more advanced nearly in all aspects in comparison with their counterparts under a totalitarian regime which has never been exposed to the necessities of contemporary security practice.

In the past, Turkey provided with military and police troops to various conflict zones all over the world under the auspices of the UN, NATO, EU and OSCE for maintaining peace and stability.²⁷²⁾ Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia& Herzegovina, Chad,

272) Turkish National Police, “Peacekeeping Missions,” (Turkish National Police), <http://www.egm.gov.tr/EN/Pages/peacekeeping_missions.aspx>.

Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, Georgia, Haiti, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Macedonia, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tajikistan are among these countries.²⁷³⁾ In this respect, Turkey can take part in peace missions and police force missions to North Korea when necessary, in case the subject of unification gains currency.

Turkish Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock previously contributed to efforts aimed at developing the agricultural infrastructure in newly independent states.²⁷⁴⁾ Since North Korea's agricultural output is insufficient and its relevant infrastructure has been neglected for a long time, Turkey will be able to provide assistance to North Korea conducive to boosting productive capacity during and after unification. While the Turkish Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock signed bilateral cooperation protocols with relevant ministries of various countries including ROK Thus far, it did not establish any contact with North Korea. In this respect, Turkish and North Korean ministries of agriculture can sign a bilateral cooperation protocol which will mark a fresh start for further cooperation in the future.

Turkish universities provided scholarships to thousands of

273) Turkish Armed Forces, "Contributions of Turkish Armed Forces to Peace Support Operations," (Turkish Armed Forces), <http://www.tsk.tr/ing/4_international_relations/4_1_contribution_of_turkish_armed_forces_to_peace_support_operations/contribution_of_turkish_armed_forces_to_peace_support_operations.htm>.

274) MFAL, "Bilateral Relations," (Turkish Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock), <<http://www.tarim.gov.tr/Konular/EU-And-Foreign-Relations/Bilateral-Relations>>.

students who came from newly independent states right after those countries gained independence to receive higher education in Turkey. The number of countries and students, which are provided with scholarship opportunities by Turkish universities, increased over time. As of 2014, Turkey grants scholarship to 12,000 students from 166 countries.²⁷⁵⁾ Moreover, over 4,000 students from all over Europe come to study at Turkish universities each year thanks to the Erasmus exchange program between Turkey and the European Union.²⁷⁶⁾ Likewise, the public sector as well as the private sector in Turkey inaugurated various educational institutions, including primary schools and universities, in those newly independent countries. Thousands of students received education and graduated from Turkish-sponsored schools and universities located either in Turkey or elsewhere up to date.

Turkish Ministry of National Education and relevant educational institutions can provide assistance for the transformation of North Korea's educational infrastructure during and after the unification process. To start with, Turkey can build and then donate new educational facilities in North Korea in order to increase the schooling rate. Likewise, North Korean students from different levels of education can be hosted by Turkish schools and universities, and granted scholarships.

275) Türkiye Scholarships, "Record Number of Applications to Türkiye Scholarships," (Türkiye Scholarships), <<http://www.turkiyeburslari.gov.tr/index.php/en/haberler/686-turkiye-burslarina-rekor-basvuru>>.

276) Turkish National Agency, "Erasmus Programme Mobility Statistics 2010-2011," (Turkish National Agency), <http://www.ua.gov.tr/docs/halkla-ili%C5%9Fkiler/erasmus_istatistikleri.pdf?sfvrsn=0>.

It is also an option for Turkey to support Turkish educational institutions to establish schools and universities in North Korea and provide students there with a modern education.

Turkey established TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency) in 1992 in order to contribute to the state-building efforts of newly independent states in Central Asia and the Balkans.²⁷⁷ TIKA contributed to numerous infrastructure projects in those countries throughout 1990s.

Turkey utilized its field experience from Central Asia and the Balkans in order to contribute to the state-building process in Afghanistan in the post-2001. The Turkish military and the Turkish police corps provided equipment and training to the Afghan military and police forces respectively. TIKA was involved in projects in order to ameliorate Afghanistan's physical infrastructure. Moreover, Turkish construction firms took part in many projects throughout Afghanistan. Turkish firms have invested in various sectors and started to carry on substantial businesses aimed at Afghan markets. Turkey constructed numerous hospitals and schools which it later on granted to the Afghan government.

TIKA concentrated its activities on numerous African countries and developing countries in Asia by the 2000s while continuing with its activities in Afghanistan. Therefore TIKA can utilize its field experience, which it gained from active

277) TIKA, "About TIKA," (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), <<http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/about-us/1>>.

participation in the infrastructural reconstruction processes all around Central Asia, the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa, for the future development of North Korea.²⁷⁸⁾ It can generate dynamism in multiple investment projects and come up with new ones aimed at rebuilding North Korea's infrastructure.

Both the Turkish Red Crescent²⁷⁹⁾ and various non-governmental relief organizations (Cansuyu²⁸⁰⁾, Deniz Feneri²⁸¹⁾, IHH²⁸²⁾, KimseYok Mu²⁸³⁾, and etc.) helped people all around the world during natural disasters and armed conflicts which occurred in 2000s. Post-disaster aid was provided to countries in various continents which experienced earthquakes, flood, tsunami, and drought. These zones of disaster were located within the borderlands of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines in Asia; Peru and Haiti in the Americas, and many African countries. Turkey organized disaster-relief campaigns on a larger scope especially towards East African countries which were hit by drought and famine in 2011. Somali came to the fore among those countries which received the largest amount of Turkish aid. Turkish state institutions and NGOs strived for the elimination of the downside effects of the drought, while also pioneering many projects aimed

278) TİKA, "TIKA's Field of Activity," (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), <<http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/fields-of-activity/2>>.

279) Turkish Red Crescent, <<https://www.kizilay.org.tr/>>.

280) Cansuyu Charity and Solidarity Organization, <<http://www.cansuyu.org.tr/en/index.php>>.

281) Deniz Feneri Association, <<http://www.denizfeneri.org.tr/en/>>.

282) IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, <<http://www.ihh.org.tr/en>>.

283) Kimse Yok Mu Association, <<http://www.kimseyokmu.org.tr/?lang=en>>.

at re-establishing statehood in Somalia.²⁸⁴⁾ The modernization of the airport in Mogadishu, the restoration and expansion of the maritime port in Mogadishu, and the re-construction of the physical infrastructure necessary for state institutions in Somalia are among the major projects carried out by Turkey which are worth mentioning in this regard. As a matter of fact, Turkey was ranked the 4th largest donor country in 2012, providing over 1 billion USD worth of foreign aid.²⁸⁵⁾

Turkish relief organizations provided with post-disaster relief, assistance in combating poverty, and material support in reinforcing infrastructure facilities to various African and Asian countries in the 2000s. Likewise, state-sponsored Turkish Red Crescent and other non-governmental relief organizations based in Turkey can contribute to the prevention of further humanitarian crises and the elimination of poverty in North Korea. With the emergence of a reformist government in Pyongyang, Turkish relief organizations can be coordinated in order to assist North Korean authorities during instances of flood, drought, famine, and other natural disasters. They can be activated both for search and rescue operations, and for the provision of shelter as well as food for the victims. Turkish relief organizations can provide training and equipment to their North Korean counterparts in this regard.

284) "Why Turkey is Coming to Somalia's Aid," *International business Times*, March 8, 2012, <<http://www.ibtimes.com/why-turkey-coming-somalias-aid-214244>>.

285) Pinar Tank, "Turkey's new humanitarian approach in Somalia," Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) Policy Brief, December, 2013, <http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/bbea860140d9140ccbcb6c5d427b4f28.pdf>.

As a matter of fact, Turkey provided similar humanitarian aid to North Korea when the latter was hit by a disastrous flood in 2012. A total of 100 tons of food was provided by TIKA to kindergartens affected by the flood which hit regions surrounding southern Pyongyang and Kangwon, in accordance with the demand of North Korea conveyed by the medium of its Embassy in Sofia.²⁸⁶⁾ From this point forth, cooperation based on humanitarian aid can be promoted further between Ankara and Pyongyang and this can set the scene for improving political relations between the two capitals in general terms.

Turkey began providing aid to regions such as the Black Sea region, the Balkans, and Central Asia by the 1990s. By the 2000s, it began providing aid to Afghanistan as well as various countries spread all around developing Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The construction and donation of fully-equipped hospitals, alongside the provision of scholarships for medical students from those countries to come and study at Turkish universities, were crucially important steps taken in this regard. The Turkish Ministry of Health, healthcare institutions, and hospitals can contribute to the betterment of physical conditions related with public-healthcare in North Korea, the amelioration of the sector at large, and also the efforts aimed at increasing the number of hospitals and enhancing their technical capacity. Likewise, North Korean medical students can be granted various

286) TIKA, "Türkiye, Kuzey Koreli Yetimleri Unutmadı," (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, January 25, 2013), <<http://www.tika.gov.tr/haber/turkiye-kuzey-koreli-yetimleri-unutmadi/476>>.

forms of scholarships for them to continue their education at Turkish universities.

Turkish media can closely cooperate with North and South Korean media outlets during the process of unification. Exchange of reporters, co-productions, and the formation of shared news databases are potential fields in which cooperation seems most viable in this regard. Turkish media outlets can function in a way encouraging and culminating public support for unification in Korea through their broadcasts and publications, which will jointly reinforce a pro-unification sentiment within Turkey's close neighborhood on an international scale as well. Likewise, Turkish TV channels, newspapers, and news agencies can coordinate their efforts through various channels with their North Korean counterparts for the creation of an independent and free media there. Mutual exchanges of reporters, the education of North Korean journalists in Turkey, and the provision of technical support by Turkish media outlets to their North Korean counterparts are the first potential steps that spring to the mind in this regard.

(2) Regional/Global Level

Turkey can take regional and international initiatives for sustaining a rather smooth unification process between the two Koreas. Turkey already has bilateral relations with the parties to the Six-Party Talks.

Turkey is a NATO ally together with the U.S., and the two

countries' military cooperation has culminated in strong political and strategic ties since the initial years of the Cold War.²⁸⁷⁾ Turkey was involved in close cooperation with the U.S. during and after the NATO operation in Afghanistan which started in 2001. The close military relationship between Ankara and Washington was recently embodied during NATO operations in Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011).²⁸⁸⁾

While Turkey has historically amiable relations with Japan as well, there is no single political problem between the two countries. Japanese investment started entering Turkey by 1960s and Japanese firms carried out numerous significant projects in Turkey up to date.²⁸⁹⁾

Turkey's relations with China gained pace especially with the 2000s in terms of political and economic cooperation. China has been Turkey's third largest trade partner since 2008. Both countries share a strong sentiment of sensitivity with regard to the essentials for a peaceful global order, such as giving priority to the resolution of international disputes through diplomacy, and respecting countries' territorial integrity and sovereignty.²⁹⁰⁾

The cope of Turkey's relations with Russia as well has been broadened lately. Russia has been Turkey's second largest trade

287) Mehmet Yegin and Eyüp Ersoy, "Turkey-U.S. Relations: Towards a Multidimensional Partnership," (USAK report, No. 13-05, May 2013), p. 29.

288) Turkish Armed Forces, "Contributions of Turkish Armed Forces to Peace Support Operations," (Turkish Armed Forces).

289) Scott Morrison, "Japan and Turkey: The Contours and Current status of an Economic Partnership/Free Trade Agreement," *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring 2014). p. 183.

290) Selcuk Colakoglu, "Turkish Perceptions of China's Rise," *USAK Report*, No. 39 (March 2014), p. 32.

partner since 2008. The intensity of people-to-people exchanges, alongside the intensity of economic relations between them, allowed the two countries to maintain a successful public diplomacy in recent years. Turkey and Russia have the potential to coordinate their efforts even with regard to regional and international issues over which their attitudes run counter.²⁹¹⁾ Turkey played the role of a constructive mediator, a viable channel for communication between Western countries and Russia during the latest crisis in Ukraine. A Turkish ambassador was appointed as the head the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine by the OSCE in order to establish a functioning diplomatic channel between the West and Russia.²⁹²⁾

Turkey has successfully maintained strong military, political, and economic relations with the ROK since the Korean War. Turkey has always backed South Korea's stance and policies with regard to disputes over the subjects of Korean unification and North Korean aggression. Turkey will act in accordance with South Korean preferences in case the unification of the peninsula is seriously brought to the agenda.²⁹³⁾

Among the members of the Six-Party Talks, the only country with which Turkey does not have tangible relations is North Korea. While the two countries are not confronted with any

291) Habibe Ozdal, Hasan Selim Ozertem, Kerim Has, and Turgut Demirtepe, "Turkey-Russia Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," (USAK Report, No. 13-06, July 2013), p. 7.

292) OSCE, "Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine: Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan," <<http://www.osce.org/node/117726>>.

293) Selcuk Colakoglu, "Turkey's Evolving Strategic Balance with China, Japan and South Korea," *Asia Pacific Bulletin*, No. 235 (October 8, 2013).

direct dispute in terms of their bilateral relations, Turkey refrained from establishing vibrant relations with North Korea as a sign of its strong solidarity with the ROK. Diplomatic offices were not established in each other's capitals between Ankara and Pyongyang despite the latter's occasional demands. While Turkey's embassy in Seoul is accredited to North Korea, North Korea's embassy in Sofia is accredited to Turkey. Ankara will rapidly normalize its relations with North Korea in case a reformist government willing to overhaul its relations with the South comes to power in Pyongyang. Turkey's contribution to the unification process will be boosted in case relations between Ankara and Pyongyang are fully normalized in advance.²⁹⁴⁾

Turkey does not have vital interests vested in the Korean Peninsula, contrary to regional countries. Therefore Turkey can qualify as one of the rare countries that the two Koreas, as well as the other actors involved, can put their trust in. In this respect, Turkey can play a constructive role for the generation of long-lasting political and economic dynamism with region-wide repercussions, which will be the case during the unification process. Multilateral security mechanisms pertaining to a reunified Korea, border security, and internal as well as external migration are subjects which will come to the fore in such a scenario and which may require international assistance. In this respect, Turkey can play a key role in averting potential risks

294) Selcuk Colakoglu, "Turkey's East Asian Policy: From Security Concerns to Trade Partnerships," *Perceptions*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Winter 2012), p. 151.

rising out of a complex unification process, and render the process rather healthier from an international perspective.

Turkey can side with North Korea by the medium of those international organizations in which Turkey is represented as a member state. Turkey, as an IAEA member, opposes nuclear proliferation and supports the argument that nuclear energy should be utilized only for peaceful purposes. In this respect, Turkey met North Korea's suspension of all cooperation with IAEA in 2009 with concern, and still expects North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks and fulfill its obligations under the IAEA.²⁹⁵⁾ If Turkey can develop close relations with North Korea in the process, it can contribute to IAEA's efforts and negotiations associated with North Korea in a more constructive manner. During its non-permanent membership to the UN Security Council in 2009~2010, Turkey assumed chairmanship of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee, which helped it become acquainted with, and gain experience concerning discussions on Pyongyang's nuclear missile program.²⁹⁶⁾

Turkey is aware of the necessity to foster the linkages between political stability, economic welfare and inter-cultural harmony in order to achieve sustainable global peace. Within this framework, Turkey is committed to further enhance political dialogue with all countries, search for new economic areas of

295) IAEA, "57th General Conference," Statement by Ambassador Tomur Bayer, (International Atomic Energy Agency, September 19, 2013), <<http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC57/Statements/turkey.pdf>>.

296) Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), August 10, 2010, <<http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/pdf/Implementation%20Assistance%20Notice.pdf>>.

cooperation and increase its humanitarian aid and assistance to the developing countries. In this regard, Turkey hosted the Fourth UN Conference on Least Developed Countries (LDC) in May 2011 in Istanbul and contributed to the adoption of the Program of Action for the decade 2011~2020.²⁹⁷⁾ Even though North Korea is not included in the LDC grouping, it can make use of similar developmental aid programs and projects under the UN.

d. Implications for Korea

The potential implications of unification over the ROK and the whole peninsula at large will be determined by under what sort of circumstances such a complex process will take place. Indeed, there are two different scenarios under which ideologically-polarized "twins" of the Cold War such as Vietnam, Germany, and Yemen pursued different paths to unification. The same fork in the road will probably be valid during Korean unification.

First, a formula implying unification on an equal basis can be the case. Yemen's unification in May 1990 occurred under such circumstances. One side annexing the other is not the case under such a formulation. In Yemen, the two sides agreed upon all political, economic and administrative rules to govern

297) MFA, "Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy," (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>>.

a unified state. In the unification of Yemen which took place in 1990, South Yemen only renounced socialism and consented to a free market economy together with a democratic system which would govern the newly established state.

The precedent of Yemen can be adopted as a guideline for the unification of the two Koreas. unification can be carried into effect by abolishing the socialist regime in North Korea and articulating its economy to a free market economy. Other headlines can be negotiated between the two parties on an equal footing. A federal system in which the two capitals will retain some level of autonomy can be adopted. If the national flag of a 'United Korea' is designed to be different than the flags of North and South Korea, then the two countries' flags can be adopted as the flags of the two autonomous states to be formed. Relative autonomy can psychologically comfort North Koreans in the initial stage of unification as these people live under backward economic conditions and have a smaller population in comparison with that of the South. A united military force can be composed gradually, and the national police force can be established by putting into practice a multi-level differentiation between federal and local corps.

While the two federal units will not require visas from each other's residents, limitations and regulations can be implemented over the acquisition of residence permits. Declaring the northern part of a 'United Korea' as a priority area for development will allow the preferential treatment of

the north in tax rates, government subsidies, investment, and social security funds. Likewise, foreign investors can be granted preferential treatment involving exceptional incentives in case they decide to invest in the north.

North and South Korea can come to an agreement with regard to their international liabilities. Some guarantees may be required in order to convince major neighboring states in the benefits and with regard to the security-related repercussions of unification. An official emphasis on the notion that a 'United Korea' will be under neither American nor Chinese guidance will serve as a vital guarantee at this juncture. Moreover, 'United Korea' can give the guarantee to its neighbors and major global powers that it will not harbor nuclear weapons, and it will never form a military alliance with another country.

The second method through which unification can occur involves one party abolishing itself, either peacefully or by coercion. In this case, one side annexes the other. During Vietnam's unification, North Vietnam invaded the South via military force before it annexed the latter. South Vietnam did not have any bargaining chip under such circumstances. 'United Vietnam' retained all the characteristics of the former North Vietnam, including its socialist regime.²⁹⁸⁾ The peaceful unification of Germany in 1990s was another case involving the annexation of one side by the other.²⁹⁹⁾ Socialist East

298) Melanie Beresford, "Vietnam: Northernizing the South or Southernizing the North?" *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (March 1987), pp. 261-275.

299) Myoung-kyu Kang and Helmut Wagner, *Germany and Korea* (Seoul: Seoul National University

Germany voluntarily repealed its political sovereignty and agreed to reunify with the capitalist West Germany. Even though the German unification was carried out peacefully which renders it rather different from the case of Vietnam, the result was the same: annexation of one side by the other. Likewise, North Yemen militarily defeated and then invaded South Yemen in 1993 when the latter intended to leave 'United Yemen.' After its annexation by the North in 1993, South Yemen lost all the rights and privileges it obtained as part of the unification consensus of 1990.³⁰⁰⁾

In case unification takes place through the annexation of one side by the other, and ruling out the option of military invasion, either the regime in North Korea or in South Korea will need to dissolve itself voluntarily. Considering the current international context and the political as well as economic discrepancy between the two Koreas' capacities, South Korea's dissolving itself for unification with the North is an extremely slight possibility. Therefore unification based on annexation through peaceful means will be possible only by North Korea dissolving itself like East Germany did two and half decades ago. After North Korea voluntarily dissolves itself, conditions to be set for unification will be essentially different.

Under such a scenario; South Korea's flag, currency, political and administrative system, judicial system, international

Press, 1995), pp. 221~227.

300) Stephen Day, "Updating Yemeni National Unity: Could Lingering Regional Divisions Bring Down the Regime?" *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Summer 2008), pp. 417~436.

commitments and liabilities will be valid. For instance when East and West Germany reunified, the international legal personality of 'United Germany' was the same with that of West Germany; for example, it was recognized as West Germany's successor. Therefore East Germany became only a region under NATO's clout and part of the European Community (EC). Likewise, a 'United Korea' after annexation of the North by the South will probably maintain security cooperation with the United States.

(1) Pre-unifying Process

The two countries can join forces in the field of education before unification. Short-term student exchange programs can be organized. Academic curriculums in the two countries can be harmonized, and equivalence in course credits can be jointly accepted. Reciprocal student exchanges can be precipitated in accordance with the projected timing of unification by consent. Sister school and sister university agreements can be reached which will enable educational institutions in South Korea to assist those in the North in terms of quality of education and international adaptation.

People from all walks of life, from all ages and professional backgrounds, can be encouraged to meet with each other. Thereby people from similar age brackets can form peer groups through which they can relate to each other and develop a new understanding. Moreover, vocational schools and occupational

groups in the South and in the North can be encouraged to organize cooperative programs involving exchanges between colleagues (teachers, engineers, lawyers, doctors, etc.)

Municipalities can be encouraged to make common cause and exchange their experiences through coordinated projects involving sister cities. South Korean municipalities can assist those in North Korea in project development and infrastructure investment. Joint projects can be developed with the aim of managing potentially rapid movements of people from rural to urban areas in the North which is expected to take place in case unification occurs.

Grounds for efficient cooperation between media outlets (newspapers and TV channels) from both sides of the border can be established. Joint broadcasts which will prepare people from both countries for unification can be designed with special emphasis on potential changes in people's everyday lives. International funds can be secured, in order to take advantage of technical and vocational assistance aimed at carving out an independent and free media in the North which will function in accordance with the necessities of a unified, democratic Korea.

On the assumption that North Korea will adopt a democratic system after unification, the establishment of democratic institutions in the country can be given priority. The foundation of NGOs and their empowerment, as well as the emergence of independent media outlets, are among such preliminary measures.

(2) Unifying Process

The whole international public, with Koreans in the North and in the South at the outset, needs to be well-informed on how unification will take place before such a process is actively initiated. Under which circumstances unification efforts will proceed, the projected schedule for unification, and the economic and social programs which will be implemented throughout the process need to be determined accurately, and explained to the public clearly. The emergence of a blurry or even chaotic atmosphere during unification can be prevented only by throwing the process and its schedule into sharp relief.

The most noteworthy headline, which will inevitably come to the fore during the unification process, is the prevention of massive and rapid immigration from rural to urban areas or from one city to another within North Korean borderlands. A greater risk is massive and rapid immigration from North Korea to the South. Considering that the discrepancy in incomes and the levels of development between North Korea and South Korea will not be obviated until the latter stages of unification, wide-scale waves of immigration will be the natural inclination of North Korean people. The experience gained during Germany's unification needs to be thoroughly analyzed at this juncture.

A sensitive balance needs to be maintained between efforts aimed at the preservation of South Korea's solid economic outlook, and those aimed at thwarting the emergence of a

widespread feeling of alienation among North Koreans who may believe they are exposed to discrimination. At the end of the day, South Korea will be the main financier of the unification process notwithstanding international assistance. In this respect, South Korea needs to stick to its basic macroeconomic indicators. On the other hand, the unification process needs to be adjusted carefully in order not to treat North Korean people as second-class citizens and to maintain some degree of balance in the redistribution of wealth. A Korean unification which will cause North Koreans to feel marginalized can lead to catastrophic social repercussions for South Korea.

e. Observation

Ankara and Seoul need to decide whether Turkey will intensify its relations with North Korea before or after a reformist government comes to power in Pyongyang. In the current situation, Ankara is acting slowly in improving its relations with Pyongyang due to two basic reasons. Politically, Turkey is concerned that Seoul may not welcome a possible improvement in Ankara's relations with Pyongyang, therefore such a move can be detrimental to the historical friendship and solid ties between Seoul and Ankara. Secondly, Turkey does not consider North Korea as an economically attractive partner either. However, political concerns are more decisive than economic considerations over Turkey's policy toward North Korea. As a

matter of fact, Turkey has been improving its relations with countries like Gambia and Nepal lately, via setting up embassies in their capitals and providing these countries with developmental and humanitarian aid in various forms; despite the fact that it is not expecting any tangible economic reward by doing that. Turkey can harvest a similar relationship with North Korea, and Ankara can gradually become a new channel of communication between Seoul and Pyongyang in case ROK encourages Turkey in this direction.

Turkey can be helpful on several issues while improving its relations with North Korea. Improving North Korea's physical infrastructure of schools and educational institutions, and accepting North Korean students in Turkish universities are the primary contributions that can be made by Turkey in terms of education. Turkish Ministry of Agriculture and humanitarian aid organizations can provide training and technical assistance for increasing the productivity of Korea's agricultural sector, and provide relief and rescue operations in case natural disasters such as flood and famine occur. Likewise, Turkish Ministry of Health can provide technical assistance to North Korean hospitals and ensure groups of medical personnel from North Korea receive medical training in Turkey. In case a reformist government comes to power in Pyongyang, Turkey can support the training of North Korean army and police forces.

It is possible for Turkey to embark on certain initiatives on a bilateral level before each member-state to the Six-Party

Talks in the process of North Korean reform and improving inter-Korean dialogue. Turkey has long-established, solid ties with the U.S., Japan, Russia, and China based on a history of economic and political familiarity. Therefore all parties to the Six-Party Talks will support any initiative to be undertaken by Turkey with a focus on North Korea.

Another stepping-stone for Turkey in supporting inter-Korean dialogue and convincing North Korea to pursue reformist policies will be international organizations to which Turkey is a party. UN, NATO, G-20 and IAEA are some major international platforms over which Turkey can exert a certain amount of influence. Likewise, Turkey and ROK can bring up issues related to North Korea to the agenda of G-20, and therefore form a basis for multilateral cooperation. The unofficial grouping named MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia), which was formed under the G-20, can serve as a primary channel for relevant multilateral efforts in this regard.³⁰¹⁾ Within this framework, Turkey can take steps under various international organizations in the direction of North Korea's opening to the outside world and the improvement of constructive dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang.

301) MFA, "The first meeting of MIKTA Foreign Ministers was held on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly," (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-first-meeting-of-mikta-foreign-ministers-was-held-on-the-sidelines-of-the-un-general-assembly.en.mfa>>.

13 United Kingdom

a. Overview

In a speech in Dresden in Germany in March 2014, Park Geun-hye, President of the Republic of Korea (ROK-South Korea), set out her hope for Korean unification.³⁰²⁾ Germany was an understandable choice for such a speech, given the history of German division after 1945, the emergence of two German states and the eventual unification of the country. For many Koreans, there was a poignancy in the fact that Germany, a country only united in 1871, was now re-united, while Korea, which had existed as a separate state for over 1,000 years, and which had remained united even in colonial days, continued to be divided.

The speech works on the assumption that unification is almost at hand, and that when it comes it will bring great benefits. In this scenario, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK-North Korea) might collapse at any moment and while there will undoubtedly be problems from such a development, if the right approach is taken, unification of the two separated parts of Korea can be achieved.³⁰³⁾

302) "Full text of Park's speech on Korea," *Korea Herald*, March 28, 2014, <<http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140328001400>>.

Expectations of the imminent collapse of the DPRK have existed almost from the day it was established. So far they have been proved wrong. This is not to say that the DPRK has no problems; clearly it has. Yet despite famine, leadership changes and major economic problems, it continues. In spite the bad publicity that it attracts, it remains a functioning state in an unstable world. And for the elite who run it, it is hard to see what appeal unification as now proposed by the ROK would have; they could expect to get little benefit from it. In contrast to the government's expectation of an early date for unification, a recent report by Korea University's Ilmin International Relations Institute, which surveyed 135 scholars and former government officials from the ROK, the United States, China, Japan, Russia, Europe, and a large number of unspecified origin, concluded that unification was at least ten years off, with one-third believing that it was even further off. Only 1.5% thought that it was likely within five years.³⁰⁴⁾

For most people outside the Korean peninsula, the issues of the Korean peninsula, including unification, are seen as something that concerns a small number of countries: the two Koreas, obviously, then the United States, China, Japan, and

303) See the discussion by Victor Cha, the Georgetown University professor of government and former director for Asian security in the U.S. National Security Council, "Five Theories of Unification," *Joongang Ilbo*, July 22, 2014, <<http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2992317>>; an updated version also appeared on the Center for Strategic and International Studies website see <http://csis.org/files/publication/140722_Five%20Theories%20of%20Unification_0.pdf>.

304) Ilmin International Relations Institute, *Future of North Korea: Experts Survey Report* (Seoul: Ilmin International Relations Institute, 2014), p. 16.

Russia. Writing on the Korean War, the Japanese scholar Wada Haruki, calls it a “Northeast Asian War,” involving “North and South Korea, the USSR, China, the United States, Taiwan and Japan,” despite the fact that other countries were involved.³⁰⁵ Few studies on the subject look beyond this small circle, which has become even smaller with the changed position of Taiwan since it lost the China seat at the United Nations in 1971. Indeed, most see the countries that might have a real direct influence on unification as the two Koreas, China and the United States.³⁰⁶ If other countries are mentioned, it is because like Germany, Vietnam or the Yemen, they have gone through a process of unification that might merely have some relevance to the Korean case. Curiously enough, although the European Union (EU) could be considered to be one of the great modern experiments in creating a new political entity while also preserving the separate existence of individual states, it is rarely if ever considered as a model. Perhaps its well-known tensions and problems are seen as too much of a negative example.

The British involvement with Korea

It is not only the European Union that is missing; most individual European countries are also absent. In the past, the omission of European countries such as the United Kingdom and France from the list of those interested in the Korean

305) Wada Haruki, trans. by Frank Baldwin, *The Korean War: An International History* (Lanham MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2013), pp. xxvi-xxvii.

306) Ilmin Institute, *Future of North Korea: Expert Survey Report*, *passim*.

peninsula would have seemed unthinkable. After all, France lost several of its citizens during the persecution of Roman Catholics in the nineteenth century and as a result fought a small war with Korea in 1866, an event recently brought back to mind with the return of the Uigwe (Royal ceremonial books) in December 2011.³⁰⁷⁾

The United Kingdom's involvement was also traumatic and dramatic. Although it lacks martyrs apart from the Rev. Mr Thomas, who died on the SS General Sherman at Pyongyang in 1866, Korea mattered to it in the nineteenth century and after. Britain's concern over what it saw as the growing threat posed to its interests in Asia by the increasing power of Russia led it to establish diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Korea in 1883~1884. It also led to the occupation of the Geomun islands (Komundo, often known as Port Hamilton in Western writings) off the south coast of the peninsula for strategic reasons in the 1880s. It later concluded an alliance with Japan in 1902 that paved the way for both the protectorate that Japan proclaimed in 1905 and for the complete takeover of Korea in 1910.

Britain was involved in more positive ways as well, including running the Korean Customs Service and helping to create the modern city of Seoul.³⁰⁸⁾ British links with Korea did not end

307) "Looted Korean royal texts return home," Korea Herald, December 6, 2011, <<http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20111206000810>>; Pierre-Emmanuel Roux, *La Croix, la baleine, et le canon: La France face à la Corée au milieu du XIXe siècle* (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 2012).

308) There is no full history of British-Korean relations in either English or Korean, a defect I hope to remedy one day. The nearest I have got to it so far is J. E. Hoare, "The Centenary

in 1910. Britain maintained a professionally staffed consulate-general in Seoul until 1941, and British businesses and missionaries also operated in the country until forced out by the Japanese. As Japanese colonial rule became more oppressive, the Foreign Office used reports from consular staff and from the English Church Mission as the basis of protests to the Japanese government.³⁰⁹⁾ Yet British interests in Korea were never as strong as those of the United States, and although a number of prominent Koreans were educated in Britain,³¹⁰⁾ to most Koreans, the United States was the place to go and was most important foreign power. In Britain, Japan and, above all, China remained the main focus of political, diplomatic, commercial and missionary interest in East Asia right up to the Pacific War. That war, of course, saw Britain and other Western powers spectacularly driven from the region.

These developments did not, however, end British interest

of Korean-British Diplomatic Relations: Aspects of British interest and Involvement in Korea 1600-1983," *Transactions of the Korea Branch Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 58 (1983), pp. 1-35; J. E. Hoare, *Britain and Korea 1797-1997* (Seoul: British Embassy, 1997). In 1984, the Korean History Compilation Committee produced a volume of essays to mark the centenary of diplomatic relations, which remains the fullest account in Korean but is a pale shadow of the work produced the year before on the centenary of relations with the United States. See National History Compilation Committee (eds.), *Han-Yong sugyo 100nyon shi* (100 Year history of Korean-British relations) (Seoul: National History Compilation Committee, 1984).

309) Detailed for the 1919 March First Movement in Ku Dae-yeol, *Korea under colonialism: the March First Movement and Anglo-Japanese Relations* (Seoul: Seoul Computer Press for the Royal Asiatic Society Korea Branch, 1985). British protests were made at other times as well.

310) The best known today is probably former President Yun Po-sun, who studied archaeology at the University of Edinburgh in the 1920s. In 2013, the University established a regular Yun Po-sun Memorial Seminar in his memory. See Kim Myung-koo, *Nationalism, Religion and Democracy: Political and Ideological Conflicts in Post-War South Korean Politics* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2013).

in Korea. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, Britain accepted the idea that Korea would be freed from Japanese control and would, in due course, reappear as an independent state, a position that was reaffirmed at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945.³¹¹⁾ Early post-war planning assumed that Britain (and the Republic of China) would take part in the administration of Korea. That did not happen, of course, and Korea became an issue mainly concerning the Soviet Union (USSR) and the United States. But Britain's immediate preoccupations were elsewhere; restoring its imperial position in India, Burma, Southeast Asia and Hong Kong, and re-establishing its economic presence in China. Korea was not completely neglected. The consulate-general reopened in 1946, becoming a legation in 1949 after the establishment of the Republic of Korea, and then an embassy in 1957. Like other Western countries, Britain did not recognize the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.³¹²⁾ British Anglican (Episcopalian) missionaries returned, as did British businesses. All this was relatively small scale but it showed a continued wish to be involved with the future of the peninsula; Britain still considered itself a world power, with an interest in all the major post war issues.

The Korean War reaffirmed this. Britain condemned the

311) James Hoare and Susan Pares, *Conflict in Korea: An Encyclopedia* (Santa Barbara California: ABC-CLIO, 1999), p. 17.

312) For a detailed account of British diplomatic involvement with Korea from the 1880s to the late 1990s; J. E. Hoare, *Embassies in the East: The Story of the British and their Embassies in China, Japan and Korea from 1859 to the Present* (Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 1999). The post-World War II period is to be found from p. 195, *et seq.*

North for attacking the South and despite extensive military commitments elsewhere, responded to the United Nations' call for international assistance. By July 1950, British warships were in action off the North Korean coast and the first ground forces, shipped from Hong Kong, arrived at Busan on 29 August 1950. In the years of the war, 81,084 British troops served in Korea, 1,078 were killed, 2,674 wounded, and 1,060 became prisoners of war. There were also civilian casualties. After the ROK and the United States, Britain made the biggest contribution in terms of personnel of any of the countries involved in the UN action.³¹³) A substantive British military presence remained in Korea until 1957. While the Military Armistice Commission still functioned up until the early 1990s, the British defence attaché, a one-star general, was a member. Britain also regularly supplied a small military contingent from Hong Kong for the United Nations Command Honour Guard until the impending reversion of Hong Kong to China in 1997 meant that there were no more British troops in East Asia.

After the end of the Korean War, the reconstruction needs of the Republic of Korea were massive. Most of these were met by the United States, but the British were not slow to respond, whether through international agencies such as the United Nations, international aid organizations such as the Save the Children Fund or on a more personal basis, such as Susie

313) The official British history of the war was written by one who participated and was a prisoner of war: Anthony Farrar-Hockley, *The British Part in the Korean War* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1990, 1995). There are many other accounts.

Younger's work with orphans in Daegu in the early 1960s.³¹⁴⁾ From the late 1960s onwards, as the ROK economy began to take off, Britain was involved in that development also. Strong links developed especially between Hyundai and British companies in both shipbuilding and automobile manufacturing, with British banks providing finance. The University of Ulsan, a Hyundai initiative, had a strong British element.

The other support that Britain gave was political. From the early days of the Korean War, Britain took a leading role on Korean issues at the UN, drafting resolutions and guiding them through the appropriate channels. This included the important resolution that authorized UN forces to cross the 38th parallel and take the war in to the North. This was a role that the British would take up again in the 1970s, seeing through the UN General Assembly pro-ROK resolutions that might well have ran into difficulties if the U.S. had taken the lead.³¹⁵⁾ Although Britain was not formally part of the organization that helped defuse the first DPRK nuclear crisis, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in the 1990s, it supported the idea both diplomatically and financially. Regular visits and exchanges between Britain and the ROK, the most

314) Susie Younger, *Never Ending Flower* (London: Collins and Harvill, 1967), was one such. She worked with, among others, Father Stephen Kim, later better known as Cardinal Stephen Kim Sou-hwan (1920~2009); W. D. Reeve, *The Republic of Korea: A Political and Economic Study* (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1963). Reeve worked as an economic adviser in the ROK from 1952 to 1957.

315) Chonghan Kim, "Korean unification: UN perspectives," Tae-Hwan Kwak, et al., (eds.), *Korean Unification: New Perspectives and Approaches* (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1994), pp. 413~420.

recent being that by President Park Geun-hye in November 2013, testify to the continued links between the two countries. The British decision to establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK in 2000 was only made in support of the policies favoured by the then government of the ROK. Since its establishment in July 2001, one of the major roles of the British Embassy in Pyongyang has been to impress on the DPRK government the need to improve relations with the ROK.³¹⁶⁾

Britain and Korean Unification

Like other countries involved, Britain did not envisage a permanent division of Korea in 1945; neither did it anticipate the emergence of two separate states on the peninsula. Once that had happened, British policy was to encourage the unification of the Korean people. Given the firm anti-communism of Britain's Labour government in those years and its successors, it was no surprise that Britain hoped that such unification would be led by the ROK government, recognized by Britain in 1949, even though many in Britain thought that the North, backed by the Soviet Union, was more likely to absorb the South than vice versa, a view shared by General MacArthur.³¹⁷⁾ Despite this belief, when the Korean War began, Britain supported the United

316) J. E. Hoare, "A brush with history: Opening the British Embassy Pyongyang 2001-2002," J. E. Hoare and Susan Pares, *North Korea in the 21st Century: an interpretative guide* (Folkestone, Kent, UK: Global Oriental, 2005), especially pp. 201-203.

317) Peter Lowe, "The Frustrations of Alliance: Britain, The United States, and the Korean War, 1950-1951," James Cotton and Ian Neary, et al., (eds.), *The Korean War in History* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1989), p. 80.

Nations' principle that disputes should be settled by peaceful means and came to the support of the government that it had recognized and with which it had established diplomatic relations. While accepting that not all was perfect with the ROK government under President Rhee Syngman, British Prime Minister Clement Atlee made it clear that Britain did not accept that a divided Korea should be reunited by war, a position that was endorsed by both the Conservative opposition and the more left-wing side of his own party.³¹⁸⁾ As the war developed, the British position changed, and its hope, as set out in a telegram drafted to be sent to the British mission in Beijing in early October 1950, was that the fighting would end soon and that "a unified, independent and democratic Government for the whole of Korea" should be achieved "as soon as possible."³¹⁹⁾ Reality proved to be different and the objective was not achieved then or subsequently.

Britain's other concern was that the war in Korea should not spread, and much effort was put into making sure that did not happen. There were many reasons for this approach. Britain saw the main threat from "communist aggression" in Europe, not in East Asia. Given the country's dependence on international trade, it saw a wider war as threatening trade routes and Britain's and other countries' widespread economic

318) David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (London: Macmillan Press, 1964), pp. 33-34; Peter Lowe, *Britain in the Far East: a Survey from 1819 to the Present* (London: Longmans, 1981), p. 205.

319) Telegram from the Commonwealth Relations Office, October 7, 1950, quoted in Farrar-Hockley, *British Part*, 1, p. 228.

interests in Asia. These views were widely shared including by many in the United States, and in the end, the war in Korea was contained and the two Koreas continued to exist.³²⁰⁾ Concerns about such knock-on effects remain very much part of contemporary concerns about the destabilizing effects of tensions on the Korean peninsula.

Ever since the conclusion of the armistice in 1953 and the subsequent Geneva Conference of 1954, the British approach to the future of Korea has been that it was primarily for the two Koreas to solve the problems of the peninsula. If they wanted division, so be it; if they wanted unification, that was a matter for them, although any form of unification should be brought about by peaceful means. As a consequence, Britain has always condemned the use of violence on the peninsula and encouraged efforts to solve the issue of unification in a peaceful manner. But Britain was not entirely neutral. For many years, successive British governments declined to recognize the DPRK because of the existence of the United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), originally set up during the Korean War, which was seen as endorsing the idea that there was only one legitimate Korean state. When UNCURK was abolished in 1973, Britain did consider recognizing the DPRK but what was seen as continued DPRK belligerency led to a political decision that such a move might be detrimental to the ROK. Thereafter, recognition of the DPRK was no longer

³²⁰⁾ Lowe, *Britain in the Far East*, *passim*.

treated as a purely legal matter but was postponed on political grounds. Only when the ROK government expressed a strong wish that countries should establish relations with the DPRK did Britain change its position.³²¹⁾ This is clear evidence of British long-term support for the ROK, which has been and remains the basis of successive British governments' position on the future of the Korean peninsula.

And while Britain may no longer be the world power that it was in the past, it is still important. As noted, it is a major trading nation and what happens in any part of the world can have an adverse effect on its trade. It is a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council and a major European Union member, with a world-wide diplomatic presence. It is a member of the G-20 and numerous other international organizations. It has been a major campaigner on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and is concerned at the DPRK's pursuit of a nuclear weapons programme. DPRK violation of international human rights values is condemned by British ministers, and a number of North Korean refugees have settled in Britain. Britain's long and close relationship with the ROK and its more recent links to the DPRK means that these tools can be used to help it achieve the ultimate goal of a reunited peninsula by mutual agreement rather than by conflict.

Thus Britain, like the European Union (EU) with which it closely co-ordinates its foreign and humanitarian policies, has

321) Hoare, "A Brush with History," gives the background.

a considerable interest in what is happening and what might happen in the future on the Korean peninsula.³²²⁾ Nonetheless, until the issue of unification moves beyond the expression of hopes to a more practical action level, it is not easy to see the precise role that Britain might take. Whatever its past interests in the peninsula, today Britain sees the principal players as the ensemble of the countries of the region and the United States. Economic problems at home have led Britain, as they have led many other countries, to impose strict prioritization on how limited aid and assistance resources are allocated. Britain would expect to contribute to assist a unifying Korea through the normal EU and UN channels, and would no doubt respond to any specific humanitarian appeal, as it did in the 1990s when the DPRK suffered from famine. Currently, Britain provides a limited amount of assistance to the DPRK, mainly in the form of training. From 2000, a number of British teachers have worked in various DPRK universities, primarily training North Korean teachers of English. This programme has been successful and it has just this year been agreed to continue it at least until 2017, to increase the number of teachers, and to move into new establishments including some outside the capital, Pyongyang.³²³⁾ Selected groups of North Korean officials whose

322) On the broader EU policy, see Maria Castillo Fernandez, "Korean security dilemmas: European Union policies," Hazel Smith, et al., (eds.), *Reconstituting Korean Security: a policy primer* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007), pp. 213-229.

323) British Council, "British Council forges new UK/North Korea cultural ties," (British Council Press Release, July 15, 2014), <<http://www.britishcouncil.org/organisation/press/british-council-forges-new-uk-north-korea-cultural-ties>>.

work requires them to use English have been brought to Britain for intensive language training. These include officials from various ministries, such as foreign affairs, health, foreign trade and education. There was even a moment in 2002 when two North Korean officials received training in human rights issues at the University of Essex. There have also been scholarships in other fields, including economic training. It seems likely that this type of assistance would continue in a uniting Korea, providing there was no danger to those involved and it was what was wanted. To what extent Britain would go beyond such involvement is impossible to say at this stage

There is one particular area where Britain might be able to provide help. Like a number of other former colonial powers, Britain has considerable residual knowledge of how conflicts can be ended and of the reconciliation processes that may be required to do so. In Northern Ireland, an integral part of the United Kingdom, this is still an active process involving the people of Northern Ireland, the people of the rest of the United Kingdom, and also those of the Irish Republic. Since the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which was the result of long and difficult negotiations, Britain has acquired much experience in bringing together communities previously bitterly divided and, for all practical purposes, at war with each other. Such experience, which has already played a part in other areas such as the Philippines and the Middle East,³²⁴⁾ where conflict

324) Although no longer in government, Jonathan Powell, who as the former chief of staff to

resolution is an important element of a peace process, might well be valuable if the two Koreans begin to come together. The ROK of course has its own recent experiences of truth and reconciliation processes, but this is an area where one can always learn from others' experiences.³²⁵)

How far the issue of Korean unification would affect the wider British population is not an easy question to answer. The Korean peninsula is a long way from Britain. Outside think-tanks such as the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House), government itself, a small number of parliamentarians in both Houses of Parliament, and a few academics and journalists, the Korean peninsula and its problems attract little attention, except when there is a crisis. These organizations and people tend to see the ROK in a positive light as an economic and democratic success and many of them see unification under ROK auspices as the only likely outcome for the peninsula. At the same time, all of them to a greater or lesser extent have developed or tried to develop links with the DPRK, hosting conferences and meetings involving resident diplomatic staff from the DPRK's London embassy, established in 2003, or in the case of Russia,

British Prime Minister Tony Blair, played a major role in the Northern Ireland peace process from the late 1990s to 2007, has established a small non-governmental organization, InterMediate, to provide just this type of advice. See "Ex-Blair aide advising Bahrain on conflict resolution," *The Guardian*, October 30, 2012, <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/30/blair-aide-bahrain-conflict-resolution>>.

325) Jae-Jung Suh, et al., (eds.), *Truth and Reconciliation in Korea: Between the Present and the Future of the Korean Wars* (London: Routledge, 2013).

hosting international relations specialists from the DPRK as visiting scholars on one occasion.³²⁶⁾ Korean War veterans have always taken an interest and have a generally positive image of the ROK, and are likely to be supportive of a ROK-led unification process. After all, it was what they fought for over 60 years ago. They are a dwindling group, of course, as the years pass. Their families, however, often take an interest in things Korean and are likely to favour the ROK position. The success of South Korean films, the “Korean Wave,” and “Gangnam Style” are creating a positive image of the ROK among younger people, although there is little evidence that such developments transfer over into an interest in political issues.

The emergence of a new and younger leader in the DPRK has perhaps led to an increased awareness of North Korea and its society, as have the periodic crises that have occurred on the peninsula in recent years. North Korean human rights is one of the areas where there is much activity, especially in parliament and among some NGOs. In parliament, the issue attracts cross-party support. Two members of the House of Lords, Baroness Cox and Lord Alton, have been particularly active on this issue, as has Fiona Bruce, a Conservative MP.³²⁷⁾ One British newspaper, *The Guardian*, has this year begun to provide regular coverage of developments in the DPRK, drawing on a wide variety

326) One published a paper, appropriately enough on the issue of unification, in *The RUSI Journal*. See Ri Il Tong, “unification of Korea and Security in North East Asia,” *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 147, No. 1 (February 2002), pp. 35-37.

327) Amongst much literature on the human rights issue, a recent publication is David Alton and Rob Chidley, *Building Bridges: Is there hope for North Korea?* (Oxford: Lion Books, 2013).

of sources.³²⁸⁾ However, except among some left-wing political activists, mostly belonging to very small groups, this interest does not translate into support for the DPRK.

British commercial and economic circles have a different take on Korea. There are considerable South Korean investments in Britain and British investments in the ROK, going back many decades. In recent years, ROK direct investment peaked at some 810 million GBP in 2008 and then fell back somewhat to 616 million GBP in 2012. In 2011, the total British investment in the ROK amounted to 4,436 million GBP and produced net earnings of 612 million GBP. South Korean goods have established a strong hold throughout Europe; Britain is no exception. The Europe-ROK Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force in 2011, is already leading to increased trade for all EU countries, including Britain. Bilateral trade has been steadily increasing year on year.

There is always a slight edginess, however, because of the security situation. Many business people would like to see an end to the uncertainty caused by the Korean division and what are seen as the destabilizing policies of the DPRK. But they would also prefer that any solution should not bring further conflict to a part of the world that has enough tensions already, with disputes in the South China Sea, between Japan and China and between Japan and the two Koreas, already threatening

328) "North Korea Network: inside the secret state," *The Guardian*, April 17, 2014, <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/17/north-korea-network-guardian-welcome>>.

peace and trade. In the long term, it is to be expected that British companies would welcome the wider opportunities that a unified Korea would bring. Like the British government, they accept that unification is primarily a matter for Koreans. But they know that the enormous costs of such an undertaking, as was shown in the German case, mean that Koreans will look to outside assistance. In such circumstances, the many British companies already involved in South Korea, and the small number that have or had economic links with the North, will look for new opportunities.

b. Observation

How unification might be achieved

What is set out above is an account of why Britain would want to be involved in the Korean unification process and what the British government and people might bring to such a process. Advising the ROK government on what it should do is a far more difficult subject.

One day the Korean peninsula will probably be unified. History, culture and geography all point to that, although they are not necessarily guarantees that it will happen and certainly no guide to how or when it will happen. Since the beginning of the division in 1945, followed by the emergence of separate states, and then by the Korean War, the two Korean states have constantly stressed that Korea should be unified. The reality

is that the two Koreas have grown further and further apart. It is true that both sides have put forward proposals for how unification might be achieved. But little has come of these proposals, since they have seemed more designed to garner favourable attention than to really achieve the stated goal of unification. One eminent Korean scholar, Suh Dae-sook has noted that since the division of the peninsula, “... the two sides have seldom compromised and have rarely co-operated in the interests of reuniting the country,” while the Japanese Wada Haruki says that at the beginning, “[t]he two Korean governments shared a common goal, but it was an antagonistic one: to remove the other by any means available.”³²⁹⁾ One can argue that despite the occasional hopeful sign, this is still the real position.

To achieve real unification, therefore, is going to require changes of attitude on both sides that will not be easy to bring about. Korea is more complicated than Germany: the two Germanys did not fight a war against each other. The Korean War exacerbated the problems caused by the political division of 1945. There are not just issues over land and property confiscations, as there were in Germany, but also question of the killings and other atrocities perpetrated by both sides during the years of war. Some in the ROK see unification as an opportunity to seek revenge for the events such as the 1968 attempted raid on the Blue House, the 1983 Rangoon bombing,

329) Dae-sook Suh, “Leadership transition in Korea and its significance for the region,” *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies*, No. 7 (2000), p. 1; Wada, *Korean War*, p. 3.

and the sinking of the Cheonan in 2010. Truth and reconciliation are not going to be easy in such circumstances, especially given the way both Koreas have handled education on such matters.

The difficulty of reconciling the two very different political and social systems that have developed on the peninsula must also be faced. President Park rightly alluded to this in her Dresden speech. The North's authoritarian system has its roots in Korean history and the Japanese colonial period as well as in Marxism-Leninism. The South's system in the past had echoes of the first two but the third element was liberal democracy, which eventually triumphed after long years of struggle. Bringing these together into one system will not be easy but the issue will have to be faced if a new workable synthesis is to be put into place. Failure to bring about such reconciliation could mean that the process of reuniting the peninsula would be more like a conquest than a genuine attempt at bringing together.³³⁰⁾ Suggestions of a semi-colonial relationship, with the ROK's know-how being used to exploit the DPRK's resources, are likely to fall on very deaf ears. The DPRK was quick to reject former President Lee Myung-bak's "Vision 3000" proposal in 2008, which had such echoes.³³¹⁾ It was equally dismissive of similar

330) I have examined these issues in a number of places. See James Hoare, "Unification of Korea may not be inevitable," *NK News.Org*, November 12, 2013, <<http://www.nknews.org/2013/11/unification-of-koreas-may-not-be-inevitable/>>; J. E. Hoare, "Human rights and engagement with North Korea," paper prepared for the conference "Peaceful Unification on the Korean Peninsula and Human Rights in North Korea," organized by the National Unification Advisory Council, London, November 19, 2013.

331) Sabine Burghart and James E. Hoare, "Relations between the two Koreas in 2008," *Korea Yearbook: Politics, Economy and Society*, Vol. 3 (2009), p. 59.

proposals in President Park's Dresden speech. Koreans are a proud people, and the pride does not all lie on one side of the Demilitarized Zone.

Such complexities point to a slow process rather than a quick rush to get things done. South Koreans pride themselves on being a "can-do" people, but this may not be the best approach. In a sense, the ROK has already won the contest. Whether the DPRK survives for a shorter or a longer period, nobody now sees it as the future. It will be the ROK that dominates the peninsula and it will be ROK systems and approaches that mark any future Korea. But that means that undoing the years of division needs patience and care. It may also mean that some issues that arouse much emotional feeling have to be put to one side. My view is that the engagement policy that operated from 1997 to 2008 was a sensible approach, although it was not without its problems. It was asymmetrical; the early advantages were perhaps too heavily in the DPRK's favour; but the benefits were by no means all on one side. The ROK learnt much about the DPRK and began to develop a wide range of contacts within certain areas. Thousands visited the North, not just the tourists who went to the Diamond Mountains and Kaesong but people conducting real business. One met them in the hotels and bars of Pyongyang but also further afield. Family reunions became possible. It was not, as Victor Cha argues, that this was just postponing unification.³³²⁾ It was laying

332) Victor Cha, "Five Theories of Unification."

the ground for a stable relationship between the two Koreas and providing reassurance that if unification came, it would not be perceived as a conquest but a combined enterprise. That seems a sensible approach.³³³) Before there is real progress on bringing the two Koreas together, something like that policy, no doubt under a different name and with tighter controls over funding, will need to be implemented.

In the end, no matter how many or how much other countries are willing and able to help in the process of Korean reconciliation and eventual unification and are able to give advice and practical assistance, it will be the Koreans who will make it work or make it fail. Koreans are a capable and resourceful people; how else have they remained Koreans when surrounded by larger and more powerful neighbours? But they will also need to be wise.

³³³) James E. Hoare, "Why the Sunshine Policy Made Sense," *38 North*, April 29, 2010.

III. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

KOREA INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL UNIFICATION



1 Expected Effect

Thirteen countries—Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Britain, Germany, Indonesia, India, Italy, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey—are literally different in many aspects. While, as members of G-20, they may serve as multilateral steering group for coordinating global economic issues, their individual national attributes are all so unique such that it may not be even plausible to expect any convergence of national interests or even like-mindedness in understanding broader international affairs. However, when it comes to the Korean unification issue, especially the unifying process, it is observed that their concerns are mainly converging on three issues to a substantial degree: emergence of non-traditional security threats in and out of the Korean peninsula, fluctuation of economic exchange, and the instability of Northeast Asia. While the depth of their concern seem to vary with their proximity to the Northeast Asia, this section discusses such commonly shared concern over the unifying process and examine implications that South Korea should integrate into the unification policy.

a. The Instability of Northeast Asia

Most of those thirteen countries expect that the unifying process would be inevitably accompanied with instability or conflict either between two Koreas or possibly among neighboring countries surrounding two Koreas. Furthermore, they also predict that such regional destabilization is likely to resonate at the global level as well, threatening international peace and prosperity. However, their evaluations on how such instability would impact their countries seem to vary with their geographical proximity to the Korean peninsula. For instance, Australia as a Pacific country concerns that any conflict on the Korean peninsula will weaken its national security not only in traditional but also in non-traditional security domains. On the other hand, in case of South Africa and Latin American countries such as Brazil or Mexico, it is expected that they would hardly feel any direct threat or insecurity from the looming instability in Northeast Asia while they would acknowledge that such conflict may destabilize global order to a certain degree. Even Canada, who perceives itself as an Atlantic power rather than a Pacific power, expects that instability during Korean unification is less likely to exert a direct effect on its security.

However, those countries with a geographical distance perceive weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems possessed by North Korea as a direct threat to their national security. Besides, it is predicted that as North Koreans might

attempt to seek financial gain in the middle of chaotic unifying process, for instance, with nuclear smuggling and trafficking in nuclear intelligence. In this regard, Turkey considerably concerned a possibility of North Korean nuclear proliferation during the unifying process toward terrorist groups such as the Islamic States (IS) and Hezbollah, as those groups are operating around the South Asia. Related to this concern, India, who confront ever-present threat from nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Pakistan, emphasizes a condition of the Korean unification that the unifying process should incorporate denuclearization of Korean peninsula. South Africa similarly mentions that a Korean denuclearization would strengthen the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its legitimacy, and also it will promote peace dividend across the international community.

In sum, most of thirteen countries, despite their varying proximity to the Korean peninsula, are aware of the possible instability that might occur during the unifying process. However, the geographical proximity to the Korean peninsula seem to determine different domains and levels of threat each country perceive over the unifying process.

b. Non-traditional Security threats from the Unifying Process

Non-traditional security threats are another commonly expected effects generated from the unifying process on the

Korean peninsula. Researchers from thirteen leading countries diagnose that such non-traditional security threats will not be suddenly sprang up during the unifying process. Instead, they acknowledge that such non-traditional security threats are already inherent in North Korea even at this moment and will be intensified during the pre-unifying process. Their concerns also seem to get stronger as their geographical locations are closer to the Korean peninsula. Among many non-traditional security threats, the followings are frequently pointed out.

First, maintaining the food security within the Korean peninsula is pointed out as a critical condition to successfully manage the unifying process. As the persistent shortage of food within North Korea has been identified as a reason behind North Korea's provocative behavior, maintaining food security is expected not only to reduce anxiety and dissatisfaction among North Korean elites and population in general, but also to relax tension and prevent deadlock in any negotiation between two Koreas, which will make a permissive condition for inter-Korean dialogue. In addition, maintaining food security is also expected to serve as an economic asset for the economic growth in North Korea and smooth transition toward unification on the peninsula. In fact, pre-unifying process requires to accumulate wealth for two Koreas to successfully enter the unification stage. As securing food demand within the North Korea is the first step to shape the fundamental foundation for economic growth and accordingly accumulate wealth, this type of non-traditional

security threat should be immediately engaged.

Related to the food security, lack of energy security within North Korea is also highlighted as a potential threat that might render North Korea provocative during the unifying process. As the restoration of the energy sector will enable two Koreas to achieve detente and economic growth and to possibly attract foreign investment in the future, urgency of reconstructing and upgrading the energy sector is highlighted. Also some countries emphasize that such process or recovering energy sector should integrate the green technology or energy-saving technology for the peninsula's sustainable development in a long-term perspective.

Third, as unifying two Koreas necessitates opening of North Korea, movement of North Koreans as immigrants or refugees are expected to become a primary social security issue, which might raise ethnic integration issue and related domestic conflict. In this regard, for instance, Australia states that it may tighten its visa rules for Korean nationals in case of sudden rise of Korean immigrants flowing into Australia.

Biohazard that threatens humans and animals, especially agricultural biohazard is raised as a fourth type of non-traditional security threat. For instance, foot and mouth disease endemic in North Korea is expected to pose a threat to countries nearby the Korean peninsula, as North Koreans would migrate out of the peninsula during the unifying process.

In sum, a number of non-traditional security threats are

delineated by many researchers in the sense that not only will they appear imminently as the unifying process begins, but also they have already existed within North Korea as an obstacle for two Koreas to enter the unifying process. Therefore, as such non-traditional security threats are the very constraint that might derail any unification scenario South Korea conceives at this moment, it should be preemptively engaged with a long-range policy.

c. Fluctuation of Economic Exchange

Last but not the least, the economic factor has been addressed by most of thirteen countries. Countries who have already maintained tight economic relations with South Korea expressed their concern that they will be troubled by any occurrence of any instability that might occur during the unifying process. Their primary concern was that any instability would interrupt diverse economic transactions among countries, but also it would slow down the regional and global economic development. Specifically, those countries who are currently negotiating or finalizing free trade agreements with South Korea, such as European Union as exemplified in the EU-South Korea Free trade agreement which has entered into force in 2011, concern with a possible fluctuation of economic exchange in northeast Asia. Furthermore, those countries who has intense economic exchange with Japan and China as their main regional economic partner prefer a more stable progress of the unifying process, which will reduce any

economic uncertainty in the region of Northeast Asia.

Obviously, few countries mentioned on the expected effect of a sudden suspension of economic exchange with the isolated North Korea. Indeed, North Korean economy has been closed and centrally planned for a long time. Furthermore, the trade between North Korea and international community decreased with the end of the Cold War, and since then the main format of economic relations with other countries has been development assistance or humanitarian relief. Such coarctation and centrality is less likely to be changed as the new leadership under Kim Jong Eun is rather interested in the Vietnamese model of market reform, in which a certain domestic company is selected as a recipient of investment by the government. Therefore, at this moment no leading countries are able to incentivize North Korea with any economic instrument to liberalize its own economy as well as to engage the unifying process in a peaceful manner.

However, once the unification between two Koreas successfully is achieved, countries mostly expect that two Koreas will enjoy a more prosperous and vibrant economic environment, which will provide more economic opportunities and widened economic market with neighboring countries in this region.

2 Potential Roles

As much as thirteen countries exhibited diverse understandings over the expected effects out of the unifying process, they are conceiving corresponding roles in engaging numerous domains of the unifying process. However, their overall willingness to take a proactive role during the unifying process was not so strong because they mostly conceive this unification issue as an “American issue.” Indeed, since South Korea has long been included in the U.S. defense perimeter of the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S., as a major combatant during the Korean War and ally of South Korea, have engaged numerous regional issues including the Six-Party Talks, territorial disputes, and free trading agreement, etc. There is no doubt that the U.S. has been one of the direct stakeholders over the Korean peninsula. For this reason, most of leading powers in the international system have taken one step backward over the Korean issue. Those enumerated roles are therefore less than intervention, mostly converging on the role of supporters. Besides, their roles seem to be mostly limited to the stage leading-up to unification, which would mainly include immediate humanitarian relief and maintaining human security and planning for the unification stage. Implementing the actual

unification plan is regarded as a matter for the Korean people alone.

a. Bilateral Level

(1) Sharing Experience of Transforming National Systems

Some countries who have already undergone system transformation suggest that they are willing to share their experience in those regards, especially in the domains of conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction, denuclearization, and designing a new constitution.

For instance, Argentina highlights its own unique experience throughout the sequence of the Malvinas War (the Falkland War), democratic transition, and post-conflict reconstruction including the experience of managing the truth and reconciliation committee. Particularly the truth and reconciliation committee established at the grass-root level, was inductive to generate new social fabric for national instability. South Africa is also willing to share its own experience of establishing the truth and reconciliation committee and to provide insight from its own story of overcoming the practice of apartheid in the past, which may be replicated among Koreans after the unification.

When it comes to conflict resolution, Britain mentions that its own experience with Northern Ireland will be helpful in

designing the unifying process on the Korean peninsula. Besides, South Africa suggests an innovated method of conflict resolution, expressing its interests in providing advice in building a peace park along the demilitarized zone on the Korean Peninsula. South Africa indeed has an experience of constructing a transboundary frontier protection area, which is called 'Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park' with Zimbabwe and Mozambique as a 'green' demilitarized zone.

In addition to that, as demonstrating its own experience in disabling nuclear tension and avoiding nuclear proliferation with Brazil, Argentina also shows its willingness to share such experiences with two Koreas as the unifying process progresses. South Africa also shows its interests to share the lesson from denuclearization such as a threat reduction, also condition for a successful denuclearization including providing an incentive for disarmament, acknowledging the irrationality of possessing nuclear weapon, etc.

Finally, countries of a confederation system such as Canada suggests that they can provide advice in designing a new governance system in the Korean peninsula that will be implanted after the unifying process. Canada in particular mentions its own experience of designing a new legal system in post-soviet states as well as framing a post-Apartheid constitution in South Africa. Similarly, India indicates that as it has expertise in international law and has contributed to international disputes, it could be involved in ending the

armistice agreement resulting in an unification between two Koreas.

Miscellaneous roles includes the one as a facilitator during any negotiation. Italy, for instance, suggests that as it has played the role of facilitator in numerous occasions in the past, it may be act as an accepted, non-biased stakeholder over the Korean peninsula, who will constantly open a space for dialogue even during the period of conflict. Italy further argues that the existence of non-regional power could be instrumental over the negotiation during the unifying process. Similarly Turkey also indicated that as it established its recent diplomatic relation with North Korea, it is willing to share its diplomatic channels and help liquidating the North Korean regime and integrating it with the international community.

(2) Providing Humanitarian/Development/Technical Assistance

Almost all thirteen countries state that they are willing to provide various types of assistance during the unifying process, emphasizing the lack of human security and human resources in the North. First and foremost, as most of countries concern over social conditions and human rights violation, they are eager to play a proactive role in delivering humanitarian relief, capacity building in public sector as well as training and educating North Korean populations during the unifying process. In addition to humanitarian relief, many countries are motivated to provide

development assistance. For instance, Turkey is willing to develop the agricultural infrastructure in a unified Korea. Particularly North Korea's output has been chronically insufficient and its agricultural infrastructure is substantially outdated, Turkey will provide its assistance to boost productive capacity.

Second, many countries are willing to accommodate North Koreans during the unifying process or even after the unification to educate them in various fields. Australia and Britain underline in this regard that they already have experience in training North Korean bureaucrats, showing their confidence in this task. Such education and training assistance are expected to internationalize North Korean elites and make them internalize international norms in many domains, such as human rights, technology, and governance, etc. This process itself is significant in engaging North Koreans, but also it will transform the unified Korea as a reliable partner in the international community, which will ease and facilitate interstate exchanges and economic transactions in particular.

A number of countries also suggest that they are willing to offer technical support in monitoring and negotiating process over denuclearization in North Korea. Particularly Canada, emphasizing its expertise and international mandate for de-mining, it is eager to contribute de-mine the demilitarized zone across the Korean peninsula. Canada also demonstrates its willingness in integrating currency systems between two Koreas.

(3) Dispatching Military Forces

Only a few countries, including Turkey, Australia, and Germany mentioned that they are willing to send their military force should the unifying process be accompanied with any conflict or instability in the Northeast Asia. In case of Australia, as exemplified numerous cases of Australian peacekeeping operation including East Timor in 1999 and 2006, it shows its confidence in restoring peace and security and However, it has its own regional stake across the Korean peninsula. Not only will they be sending their peacekeepers under the UN mandate or at the invitation of South Korea, but also they will contribute their forces in a way that the unification will not lead to conflict between two major stakeholders over the Korean peninsula—the U.S. and China. As Australia maintains close economic ties with China and the military alliance with the U.S. through Australia-New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS) alliance system, its core interests is to maintain peaceful and prosperous China-U.S. relationship over the Korean peninsula. In case of Germany, it might be willing to send military forces to the Korean peninsular only in condition that the U.S., its NATO ally, asks for support, or is attacked by North Korea with its longer-range ballistic missiles.

(4) Sharing Soft Power

Interestingly, Argentina expressed that the role of the Argentine Pope might serve as a binding and bonding agent for the trust-building during the pre-unifying process. Indeed, transformation of any system is liable to be associated with disruption of existing identities and frames of references, which will consequently generate a state of anomie or a state-wise social fragmentation. People during the transforming process will be confused over how to behave one another and what to expect from their interim government. If such situation gets continued without any swift recovery within, it will discontinue the very unifying process. However, as shown during the Pope's latest visit to South Korea in 2014, a sense of unity and shared destiny among Koreans can be molded with the existence of the Pope. In fact, the Pope's visit in 2014 intend to foster reconciliation between two countries, not the unification per se. It was simply a gesture of peace and also it is the very precondition two Koreas accept before moving forward to the unifying process. And such role of reconciliation is indeed indispensable throughout the unification process. While most of potential roles suggested by thirteen countries is to providing tangible support such as development assistance, the role of the Argentine pope is intangible and ideational, which make the Argentina's suggestion substantially unique and valuable, as Argentina is willing to share its soft power during the unifying process in the Korean peninsula.

b. Regional/ Global Level

(1) Eliciting Regional Support for the Unification

Most of thirteen countries suggest that they can contribute to garner international support for the unification between two Koreas. because of geographical distance and lack of direct stakes they conceive in Northeast Asia, they are less willing to, or less able to directly intervene in the Korean peninsula on a bilateral basis. However, they are willing to gather allies on a regional base, for instance, of Latin America, Europe, and others, or in a multilateral functional organization. For instance, as those thirteen countries are members of G-20, they mentioned that they can work through G-20 as an international forum. Other functional organization they mentioned include Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP). Also other regional organization such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Union of South American Nations (UNARSUR), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the East Asian Summit (EAS), Shangri-la Dialogue, and African Union (AU). Also some middle powers recommend to mobilize their groups—such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia) for supporting the unifying process.

Also it is suggested to develop a North Korea regional

development fund at the global level. Should this be accomplished, it is expected to serve as a source of finance for developing North Korea during the unifying process and ultimately toward the unification stage. Other countries such as Canada also insist that it would willing to development assistance from multilateral or regional development bank such as Asia Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank. This is not only because of the general recognition that the entire cost of unification cannot be afforded by South Korea alone, but also because of understanding that North Korea need to be multilaterally engaged in the path of liberal-democracy and market economy.

(2) Garnering Global Support for Non-proliferation

Many countries pointed out the threat of nuclear proliferation out of North Korea even at this moment and display its willingness to support or join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). For this reason, they emphasize the importance of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula during the unifying process, including renunciation of manufacturing, possessing, or controlling over nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. However, while many expressed their concerns over nuclear proliferation of North Korea, their willingness to engage this issue remain passive as thirteen countries mentioned in this research are not the party to the Six-Party talk. Hence, most of their potential roles on this issue remain at the level of diplomatic support, or even worse, they conceive their roles as ‘bystander.’

3

Classification of Leading Countries

While many factors may influence the thirteen leading countries' expectation on the unifying process, including expected effect of the unifying process upon each leading country and each leading country's potential roles within, this section explore four national attributes as prime exploratory variables as followings: geopolitical distance, diplomatic relations, economic exchange, and domestic factors. Then this section categorizes each leading country's expectation over the expected role by their willingness to intervene in the Korean unification process with different formats of statecrafts as followings: Bystander, supporter, and intervener.

a. National Attributes

(1) Geopolitical distance

While the geography of a state is the most constant factor from which the national interests is shaped, the relevance of geography in national interests has been arguably faded due to the technological development of transportation, communication and warfare. That is indeed why thirteen leading countries in

this research concern over nuclear proliferation and missile delivery system of North Korea, which would nullify the deterrent power or stopping power of geographical distance in warfare. However, if geography, which is a static understanding over the location of a state, is understood in terms of space and a state's relation with surrounding countries, it will develop into geopolitics. In fact, geopolitics indicate not only the physical location of a country on the world map, but also the substantial implications emanated from the location. In the context of the Korea unification issue, the position of thirteen leading country vis-a-vis the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia, which are the four surrounding powers around two Koreas and stakeholders on the Korean peninsula.

In this regard, geopolitical distance between a leading country and 4 surrounding powers seem to wield a valid influence over a leading country's expectation over the Korean issue, especially during the unifying process. For instance, the German case demonstrate such a point. Germany, while it clearly addresses its position that 'the European Union and Germany are by and large "bystander" regarding specific North Korean issues' as it is not a direct stakeholder in the Korean peninsula, it also suggests that it may consider german engagement in a Korean war during the unifying process on the condition that the U.S., one of its NATO ally, is attacked by North Korean ballistic missiles. Such German's expectation as a intervener, therefore, originate from its geopolitical thinking or its relation with the U.S.

As demonstrated by this example of Germany, geopolitical distance, especially four surrounding powers, is significant when leading countries shape their expectation over the unifying process.

(2) Diplomatic Relations and the History of Cooperation

While diplomatic ties may be regarded as simply a cursory relationship between countries, its role as a national attribute might influence a leading country's expectation over the unifying process. Indeed, diplomatic relations during the Cold War was important as it clearly indicates which sides of bipolarity a country belongs to. Furthermore, such manifestation used to determine which country one can recognize officially and make a diplomatic relation in the future on the basis of Hallstein doctrine. However, with the end of the Cold war, such doctrine is no longer valid. Any country can make a diplomatic relations without any structural constraint as it used to be. However, the history of maintaining the diplomatic relationship still matters in the sense that those countries have gradually accumulated a history of cooperation.

For instance, Turkey and South Korea has maintained a diplomatic relations since the Korean War. Turkey supported the U.S.-South Korea alliance during the Korean War, and ever since then it has attached importance to its relations with South Korea and neglected North Korea Thus far. The reason was that Turkey's historical friendship and solidarity with South

Korea prevent itself from establishing a close relationship with North Korea.

(3) Economic exchange

Economic factors are the most obvious linkage between a leading country and its expectation over the unifying process in the Korean peninsula. In fact, most of countries who already has a tight economic transaction including international trade or investment expressed their concern over what the unifying process would bring to their own country.

Particularly Australia whose two-way trade with Asia is greater than its trade with the rest of the World combined, display its strong concern over the potential instability that may be triggered during the unifying process on the Korean peninsula. Not only does Australia concern over the interruption of economic transaction vis-a-vis South Korea, but also it consider that given more than a quarter of Australia's agricultural exports are destined to Japan and China, it expects that the unification process that leads to wider regional stability would be of significant concern.

b. Categorization of Roles

This research categorizes thirteen leading countries as follows: Bystander, supporter, and intervener. This categorization reflect

the assertiveness of each country, or coercive level of each country’s assistance instrument toward two Koreas during the unifying process.

Table 6 Categorizing the Potential Roles by the Assertiveness

Type	Roles	Examples
Bystander	Provide diplomatic support for the unification, including within a multilateral institution	France, Indonesia, Mexico
Supporter	Provide non-coercive assistance, including education and economic assistance Sharing previous experience on system transformation, denuclearization and conflict resolution	Argentina, Brazil, Canada, India, Italy, South Africa, Britain
Intervener	Provide military assistance during the unifying process and directly engage the Korean Unification issue	Australia, Germany, Turkey

The expected role each research presumes in his/her chapter does not necessarily correlate with numerous national attributes as discussed earlier (see Table 6). For instance, France as an European power, does not expect any assertive role during the unification process, simply preferring the status of bystander. On the other hand, Turkey, whose economic standing is relatively lower than the rest of leading countries in this research, even prefers to use of forces during the unifying process, as emphasizing its continuous contribution to peacekeeping missions for decades. However, it should be also noted that when it comes to the use of force or dispatching military forces to the Korean peninsula during any emergency of the unifying process, it was conditional

for all three interveners. They are willing to dispatch their forces only in condition of the request of South Korea or the U.S., or under the mandate of the United Nations.

Cognitive disparity between the actual national attribute and the potential roles seems to originate from two sources: First, the researcher's bias on their countries' capability and standing at the international community. Some researchers seem to not have any comprehensive understanding over the Korean issue as well as their own countries' position in numerous international affairs at this moment. Second, the researcher's lack of assertiveness seem to develop out of the calculation that the Korean issue is an American issue, which allow the rest of leading countries to enjoy relative freedom of action or shortage of engagement in Northeast Asia.

'Bystander' Group

As these countries are willing to advocate the necessity of the Korean Unification at the international level including within a diverse set of multilateral international organizations, it is then necessary to make them consistently internalize the 'guiding type of Korean unification' scenario in the first place and conduct a public diplomacy toward them. This strategy will enable us to diffuse the idea of 'guiding type of Korea unification and generate a more permissive condition in which system transformation can occur.

'Supporter' Group

These countries' contributions are sincerely valuable in the sense that their support will be a part of diplomatic, economic or political asset with which South Korea can smoothly transition to a unified process. Based on the assumption that Korean unification cannot be undertaken by South Korea alone, it is then critical to mobilize the source of physical asset on which South Korea can financially depend. Furthermore, as many countries within this 'Supporter' category are willing to provide non-coercive support including education or to share their experience, it should be understood that South Korea needs to establish a network for North Korean assistance, which coherently voice their opinion and effectively operate during the actual unifying process.

'Intervener' Group

As countries belonged to this group share the willingness to contribute in Korean unification issue through an use of force, it seems imperative to include them into the discussion of North Korean contingency among four major powers in Northeast Asia and start coordination with regional stakeholders. While it may not be plausible to include them in the setting of the U.S.-South Korea alliance institution, still it may be important to periodically coordinating each potential intervener's role during the unifying process.

IV. CONCLUSION

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The current research on the global expectation on the Korean unification is purported to sound out the views of the leading countries excluding the Four Powers. This chapter is devoted to suggest some policy considerations for the policy community based on our final analysis. In addition, their advices on the do's and don'ts in developing and implementing unification strategy are summarized as a final point for the reference.

<Diversification of Unification Diplomacy>

Amongst the thirteen prominent scholars requested to report on the potential effects of a peaceful unification led by South Korea, some proposed their ideas on the assumption of a collapse of the North Korean regime. This displays these scholars' lack of understanding of the so-called 'guiding-type of unification.' Their ideas include the followings: the possibility of a massive outflow of North Korean refugees, and the proposed dispatch of peacekeeping forces into the North. Other scholars who understand the unification formula claim their countries will not be significantly influenced due to the geopolitical distance and Thus, their potential roles will only be limited to the indirect or symbolic. Such roles take the form of economic contributions or diplomatic supports through international organizations such as United Nations, European Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Asian Development Bank, International Monetary Fund.

Furthermore, almost all the scholars fail to suggest any roles in the pre-unifying stage even though they enumerate roles to play during the unifying process. These results are assessed to be caused by our unification diplomacy having been persistently focused on the Four Powers. In this context, such findings lead the U.S. to deliberate on the needs to diversify the unification diplomacy to the other leading countries around the world. Diversified diplomacy creates an amicable international environment for unification policies beyond the power politics of the Four Powers.

Then what would be the directions of the diversified diplomacy toward the leading countries? Three points must be considered in this regard. First, it is advisable to emphasize the beneficial aspects of a peaceful unification that leading countries can enjoy rather than solicit their roles, Thus encouraging their voluntary engagement. Second, the positive effects they advocate are mainly focused on economic aspects. In this vein, it would be effective to employ an economic logic that the more investment, the more dividends they can derive from the unification. Third, we can convince these countries that their participation in the pre-unifying stage is just crucial as during the actual unifying stage. It is during the pre-unifying stage a reformative regime in Pyongyang emerges to recognize the benefits of unification and partake in the political talks initiated by South Korea for a bilateral agreement. This stage can be labeled the ‘unification-making process’ which will involve a series of sensitive negotiations requiring international support.

<Activation of Leading Countries' Roles>

The leading countries mainly suggest positive effects unlike the Four Powers' expectation for both positive and negative effects the unification entails in a geopolitical game in East Asia. They propose the followings: the elimination of insecurity in trading with an unstable regime in the North, expectation for stable and strong economic ties with unified Korea, the elimination of nuclear and terrorism threats by achieving denuclearization and expulsion of state-sponsored terrorism. Regarding their roles, the leading countries delineate various forms of assistance in the fields of humanitarianism, economics, and education/training as well as the sharing of expertise and experience in denuclearization and social integration.

Against this backdrop, it is strategically advantageous to activate the meaningful roles of these leading countries to minimize the Four Powers' concerns. Three points are studied to this effect. First, if leading countries especially the 'Supporter Group' countries decide to assume their roles in providing valuable support, then the cost perceived by the Four Powers would be significantly reduced. At the same time, such participation of these countries will eventually lead to the diversification of trading partners for unified Korea. Regarding the issue of refugees, although peaceful unification by consent will not cause a disastrous outflow of refugees, residents of the North may voluntarily migrate from the northern part of unified Korea as we have witnessed in the German case. In

this case, Canada and Australia reputed as generous to foreign asylum seekers would play a constructive role in lessening China's worries of about massive immigration across the border.

Second point addresses the probable concerns of a potential pro-China proclivity of unified Korea by the United States. Japan and Russia could share the concerns to a certain degree. Such apprehension could mitigate by South Korea's strengthening of strategic ties with specific priority countries such as Australia, India and Turkey which have stakes in the Korean issue. Australia's interests increases with the recent signing of FTA with South Korea, India has security concern about the nuclear and military ties between Pakistan and the North Korea, Turkey has terrorism concern due to the possible sales of North Korean nuke and missiles to the terrorist groups in its neighboring countries. In this context, it could be diplomatically advisable to strengthen MIKTA framework for the purpose of upgrading its status as a serious stakeholder in the Korean issue including the unification. If we promote closer ties with the specific countries (MIKTA and India) to parallel our enhanced relations with China, such worry on the part of the United States would be somewhat assuaged.

Third, China could have concern that it will lose a buffer state in the North and at the same time, unified Korea will lean towards the U.S. Russia could share the worry to some extent. That is, China and Russia are particularly concerned that all the military assets in the North including nuclear arsenal

will fall under the control of the U.S. and South Korea. This is the most sensitive issue in the Four Powers' strategic balance sheet regarding the Korean unification. Therefore, it must be seriously addressed. The Four Powers' apprehension over the possible strategic imbalance will be relieved if an international consensus can be reached on the following issues: the northern part of unified Korea be verifiably denuclearized, all the components of Weapons of Mass Destruction including missiles systems be dismantled permanently and finally, any foreign military presence be limited. If the countries with willingness to share experience of denuclearization such as South Africa, Brazil and Argentine in addition to the 'Intervener Group' countries could join with the Four Powers to make an international consensus on such a military status, then it is more likely to find a common ground on strategic balance of unified Korea.

<Emphasis on Formation of Multilateral System>

There is probable concern that the conflict of interests among the Four Powers regarding the Korean unification could be an obstacle in seeking solutions for the Korean conundrum. In an environment where the Four Powers possess a kind of 'exclusive rights' status in the path of the Korean unification, it would be virtually impossible to foster an international consensus favorable to the realization of unified Korea. In this context, we have all the more reason to invite leading countries

with newly perceived stakes in the peninsula to the forum of the Korean unification. This is a sensible strategy for the purpose of finding a common ground for a peaceful unification to the benefit of all the participating countries.

As Korea now remains the only divided country in the world, unified Korea will bear the historical significance of eradicating remnants of the Cold War. In addition, the establishment of unified Korea will be conducive to the formation of multi-polar system in Asia, creating more strategic autonomy to major Asian countries such as India with their foreign policies. This would provide leading countries with an additional motivation to actively participate in the unification process. Furthermore, multilateral efforts to achieve the Korean unification are also expected to contribute to the furtherance of democratic element in the dynamics of international relations as a whole.

<New Public Diplomacy for Unification>

Now we are living in a world where governance becomes as important as government, which naturally follows that public diplomacy takes on no less importance than the official diplomacy. China, one of the key players in the Korean issue, illustrates such rising significance of public diplomacy. Recently, discussions on the unification in China have become relatively open and frequent than ever before, creating real sense of public opinion that could hold influence to the policy makers. This is a prevailing trend across the globe, which makes the concept of people-to-people

diplomacy more relevant to the international relations. South Korean government has spent vast resources for the official-level diplomacy with foreign governments for a long time to serve the cause of unification. Given the recent trend as detailed above, it is now high time for us to conduct more public diplomacy by devising new and creative methodologies. The global research project of this kind could be one of the most effective public diplomatic tools. It is expected that if this project could be repeated on a regular basis, then we could see global interests in and expectations on the unification deepening and widening amongst international audiences. This will, then, facilitate constructive participation in the process of unification by leading countries and in turn, expediting the process itself as well.

<Consideration of Collective Advices>

The unification between two Koreas is no longer considered as a regional issue within Northeast Asia. As shown in this chapter, leading countries do conceive their national interests along the process of unification on the Korean peninsula in diverse ways. Although those leading countries may be geographically located far away from the Korean peninsula, any instability on the Northeast Asia is expected to generate negative effects at the global level, weakening international peace and prosperity. Widening recognition of the Korean issue indicates that it is likely to create more stakeholders who may serve either as an diplomatic asset or as an constraint that will shape South

Korea's latitude in planning the unification policy.

Researchers participating this project provided a number of important points that South Korea should incorporate in building strategies of promoting the Korean unification. While numerous points are highlighted, this chapter introduces those that are commonly mentioned by researchers. First, the followings are the things that South Korea needs to incorporated:

- Accept that the unification process will be a long and slow process.
- Encourage Koreans to learn from what other countries have experienced.
- Harness the support of 'neutral' or 'disengaged' allies. International community has important role in pressuring the government of North Korea.
- Burden-sharing with the international community is crucial.
- South Korea need to focus more on non-sensitive issues, such as joint development program in relations with a green growth concept and sustainable development.
- Engage actors at different levels in the North Korea and create multi-stakeholder coalition for legitimacy and for stability, preventing regressions and assuaging hardliners.
- Communication and transparency are key elements for legitimacy.

The followings below are the points that South Korea needs to avoid:

- Do not lose patience or confidence. Korean unification will be carried out gradually.
- Do not focus on the result such as ‘unification’ and ‘denuclearization’ as they may be a process.
- Do not demonize the North Koreans or treat them as second-class citizens.
- Do not directly undermine the North Korean leadership through criticism.
- Do not develop a vision for a united Korea which ignores the concerns of the current leadership.
- Do not force North Korea to shift its political system to be more democratic, which will create more aggressiveness of the government towards its own people.
- Do not focus only on the Six-Party Talks.

Most of points highlighted by researchers are considerably similar to those made by U.S., Russian, Chinese and Japanese researchers in the previous project. However, these researchers from the thirteen leading countries provide more specific recommendations that are motivated by their own experiences or status in the international system. For instance, a recommendation not to demonize North Koreans or treat them as a second class citizen seems to be the one that only non-Great Powers can present. Furthermore, these leading countries, who

are not so much direct stakeholders, emphasize that South Korea needs to engage ‘neutral’ or ‘disengaged’ allies and to rely on beyond the existing negotiating framework not only because they are the assets from which South Korea can collectively and legitimately press the North, but also they can share economic burden to carry out any unification policy.

Overall, thirteen countries’ recommendations underline the significance of collective efforts in addressing the unification process and suggest South Korea to learn lessons from the experience that they have undergone in the past.

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연구총서

2012-01	미국의 對韓 핵우산정책에 관한 연구	전성훈	14,000원
2012-02	북한부패와 인권의 상관성	김수암 외	11,000원
2012-03	보호책임(R2P) 이행에 관한 연구	이규창 외	11,000원
2012-04	EC/EU사례분석을 통한 남북 및 동북아공동체 추진방안: 유럽공동체 형성기를 중심으로	손기웅 외	14,000원
2012-05	김정은체제의 권력엘리트 연구	이교덕 외	13,000원
2012-06	독재정권의 성격과 정치변동: 북한 관련 시사점	박형중 외	11,000원
2012-07	북방삼각관계 변화와 지속: 북한의 균형화 전략을 중심으로	허문영, 유동원, 심승우	10,000원
2012-08	북한 핵문제의 전망과 대응책: 정책결정모델(Decision Making Model)을 이용한 전략 분석	홍우택	8,000원
2012-09	중국의 한반도 관련 정책연구기관 및 전문가 현황분석	전병근, 양갑용	6,000원
2012-10	2000년대 대북정책 평가와 정책대안: '동시병행 선순환 모델'의 원칙과 과제	박종철 외	12,500원
2012-11	리더십교체기의 동북아 4국의 국내정치 및 대외정책 변화와 한국의 통일외교 전략	배정호 외	11,500원
2012-12	김정은 정권의 정책전망: 정권 초기의 권력구조와 리더십에 대한 분석을 중심으로	최진욱, 한기범, 장웅석	7,500원
2012-13	신정부 '국가전략 DMZ 평화적 이용'	손기웅 외	8,000원
2013-01	남북러 가스관과 동북아 에너지 협력의 지정학	이기현 외	6,000원
2013-02	한국의 FTA전략과 한반도	김규륜 외	8,500원
2013-03	김정은 체제의 변화 전망과 우리의 대책	박종철 외	10,000원
2013-04	EC/EU사례분석을 통한 남북 및 동북아공동체 추진방안 - EC기 분석을 중심으로 -	손기웅 외	12,000원
2013-05	오바마·시진핑 시대의 동북아 국가들의 국내정치 및 대외정책과 한국의 대북 및 통일외교	배정호 외	11,000원
2013-06	북한사회 위기구조와 사회변동전망: 비교사회론적 관점	조한범, 황선영	6,000원
2013-07	인도적 지원을 통한 북한 취약계층 인권 증진 방안 연구	이규창 외	12,500원
2013-08	새로운 세대의 탄생: 북한 청소년의 세대경험과 특성	조정아 외	15,000원
2013-09	북한의 핵·미사일 대응책 연구	홍우택	6,000원
2013-10	북한에서 국가재정의 분열과 조세 및 재정체계	박형중, 최사현	7,000원
2013-11	북한경제의 비공식(시장)부문 실태 분석: 기업활동을 중심으로	임강택	11,000원
2014-01	북·중 간 인적 교류 및 네트워크 연구	이교덕 외	7,500원
2014-02	북한변화 촉진 및 남북친화성 증대: 이론발굴과 적용모색	박형중, 박영자	7,500원
2014-03	북한 비공식 경제 성장요인 연구	김석진, 양문수	9,000원
2014-04	신동북아질서 시대의 중장기 통일전략	성기영 외	7,000원
2014-05	'행복한 통일'로 가는 남북 및 동북아공동체 형성을 위한 통합정책: EC/EU 사례 분석을 통한 남북 및 동북아공동체 추진방안	손기웅 외	6,000원

2014-06	탈북청소년의 경제 경험과 정체성 재구성	조정아, 홍민, 이희영, 이항규, 조영주	14,000원
2014-07	한국의 대북 인권정책 연구	한동호	6,000원
2014-08	법치지원과 인권 증진: 이론과 실제	이금순, 도경옥	8,000원
2014-09	신뢰정책의 과제와 추진전략	박영호, 정성철 외	11,000원
2014-10	대미(對美)·대중(對中) 조화외교: 국내 및 해외 사례연구	김규륜 외	10,500원
2014-11	북한의 핵전략과 한국의 대응전략	정영태, 홍우택 외	12,000원
2014-12	중국의 주변외교 전략 연구: 중국의 대북정책 결정에 대한 함의	이기현, 김애경, 이영학	7,000원

학술회의총서

2012-01	The Outlook for the North Korean Situation & Prospects for U.S.-ROK Cooperation After the Death of Kim Jong-il		6,000원
2012-02	김정은 체제의 북한 인권문제와 국제협력		19,000원
2012-03	해외 이주·난민 지원제도의 시사점		12,000원
2013-01	유엔 인권메커니즘과 북한인권 증진방안		20,000원
2013-02	한반도신뢰프로세스 추진전략		19,000원

협동연구총서

2012-11-01	북한 경제발전을 위한 국제협력 프로그램 실행방안(총괄보고서)	임강택 외	11,000원
2012-11-02	북한 부패실태와 반부패 전략: 국제협력의 모색	박형중 외	10,000원
2012-11-03	북한 경제발전을 위한 국제협력체계 구축 및 개발지원전략 수립 방안	장형수 외	8,000원
2012-11-04	북한의 역량발전을 위한 국제협력 방안	이종무 외	8,000원
2012-11-05	북한의 인프라 개발을 위한 국제사회 협력 프로그램 추진방안	이상준 외	8,000원
2012-12-01	한반도 통일 공공외교 추진전략(I) - 공공외교의 이론적 조명과 한반도 주변4국의 對한국 통일 공공외교(총괄보고서)	황병덕 외	13,500원
2012-12-02	공공외교의 이론적 조명과 주변4국의 한반도통일 공공외교 분석틀	김규륜 외	8,500원
2012-12-03	미국의 對한국 통일 공공외교 실태	박영호 외	9,500원
2012-12-04	중국의 對한국 통일 공공외교 실태	이교덕 외	7,500원
2012-12-05	일본의 對한국 통일 공공외교 실태	이진원 외	8,000원
2012-12-06	러시아의 對한국 통일 공공외교 실태	여인곤 외	7,500원
2013-26-01	한반도 통일 공공외교 추진전략(II) - 한국의 주변4국 통일공공외교의 실태 연구(총괄보고서)	황병덕 외	14,000원
2013-26-02	한국의 對미국 통일 공공외교 실태	박영호 외	8,000원
2013-26-03	한국의 對중국 통일 공공외교 실태	전병곤 외	7,500원
2013-26-04	한국의 對일본 통일 공공외교 실태	이기태 외	8,000원
2013-26-05	한국의 對러시아 통일 공공외교 실태	조한범 외	6,000원

논문

통일정책연구, 제21권 1호 (2012)	10,000원
<i>International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2012)</i>	10,000원
통일정책연구, 제21권 2호 (2012)	10,000원
<i>International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2012)</i>	10,000원
통일정책연구, 제22권 1호 (2013)	10,000원
<i>International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2013)</i>	10,000원
통일정책연구, 제22권 2호 (2013)	10,000원
<i>International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2013)</i>	10,000원
통일정책연구, 제23권 1호 (2014)	10,000원
<i>International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2014)</i>	10,000원
통일정책연구, 제23권 2호 (2014)	10,000원
<i>International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2014)</i>	10,000원

북한인권백서

북한인권백서 2012	김수암 외	19,500원
<i>White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2012</i>	손기웅 외	23,500원
북한인권백서 2013	조정현 외	24,000원
<i>White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2013</i>	조정현 외	23,000원
북한인권백서 2014	한동호 외	24,000원
<i>White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2014</i>	한동호 외	23,000원

기타

2012	탈북자 관련 국제조약 및 법령	이규창 외	19,500원
2012	북한인권 이해의 새로운 지평	북한인권연구센터 편	20,500원
2012	알기쉬운 통일교육: 해외한인용	허문영 외	30,000원
2012	통일대비를 위한 대북통일정책 모색(통일대계연구 12-01)	박형중 외	15,000원
2012	통일한국에 대한 국제적 우려해소와 편익: 지역 및 주변국 차원 (통일대계연구 12-02)	박종철 외	14,000원
2012	Korean Unification and a New East Asian Order (Grand Plan for Korean Unification 12-03)	최진욱 편저	6,000원
2012	Korean Peninsula Division/Unification: From the International Perspective Kim Kyuryoon, Park Jae-Jeok		13,000원
2012	중국의 국내정치 및 대외정책과 주요 국가들의 대중국 전략	배정호, 구재희 편	22,000원
2012	China's Domestic Politics and Foreign Policies and Major Countries' Strategies toward China	Bae Jung-Ho, Ku Jae H.	22,500원

2012	통일 비용·편익의 분석모형 구축(통일 비용·편익 종합연구 2012-1)	김규륜 외	11,500원
2012	'선도형 통일'의 경로와 과제(통일 비용·편익 종합연구 2012-2)	김규륜 외	9,000원
2013	유엔 인권메커니즘과 북한인권	북한인권사회연구센터 편	18,000원
2013	중국 시진핑 지도부의 구성 및 특징 연구 (중국 지도부의 리더십 분석과 한중정책협력방안 2013)	전병곤 외	9,000원
2013	통일 이후 통합을 위한 갈등해소 방안: 사례연구 및 분야별 갈등해소의 기본방향	박중철 외	13,000원
2013	한반도 통일에 대한 동북아 4국의 인식 (통일외교 컨텐츠 생산(1))	배정호 외	16,500원
2013	알기 쉬운 통일교육III: 북한이탈주민용	조정아 외	11,000원
2013	알기 쉬운 통일교육III: 북한이탈주민용 수업지침서	조정아 외	6,000원
2013	민주화 및 양질의 거버넌스 수립: 북한 변화와 통일을 위한 시사점 (통일대계연구 13-01)	박형중 외	13,500원
2013	시장화 및 빈곤감소형 경제질서 수립: 북한 변화와 통일을 위한 시사점 (통일대계연구 13-02)	임강택 외	12,500원
2014	The Trust-building Process and Korean Unification (통일대계연구 13-03)	최진욱 편저	8,000원
2013	통일대계연구: 4년 연구 종합논의 (통일대계연구 13-04)	박형중 외	8,000원
2013	정치·사회·경제 분야 통일 비용·편익 연구 (통일 비용·편익 종합연구 2013-1)	조한범 외	17,500원
2013	The Attraction of Korean Unification: Inter-Korean and International Costs and Benefits (통일 비용·편익 종합연구 2013-2)	김규륜 외	15,500원
2013	한반도 통일의 미래와 주변 4국의 기대 (통일 비용·편익 종합연구 2013-3)	김규륜 외	10,500원
2013	전환기 중국의 정치경제 (통일대비 중국에 대한 종합적 전략 연구: 통일시대 한중관계 전망 2013-1)	배정호 외	15,500원
2013	China's Internal and External Relations and Lessons for Korea and Asia (통일대비 중국에 대한 종합적 전략 연구: 통일시대 한중관계 전망 2013-2)	Bae Jung-Ho, Ku Jae H.	17,500원
2013	중국의 대내외 관계와 한국의 전략적 교훈 (통일대비 중국에 대한 종합적 전략 연구: 통일시대 한중관계 전망 2013-3)	배정호, 구재회 편	16,500원
2014	중국 권력엘리트와 한중교류 네트워크 분석 및 DB화 (중국 지도부의 리더십 분석과 한중 정책협력방안2014)	전병곤, 홍우택, 신중호 외	9,000원
2014	북한의 시장화와 인권의 상관성 (「북한인권정책연구」 2014)	북한인권연구센터	11,000원
2014	동북아 4국의 대외전략 및 대북전략과 한국의 통일외교 전략	배정호, 봉영식, 한석희 외	9,500원
2014	2014 통일예측시계	박영호, 김형기 편	9,500원
2014	통일한국의 국가상과 한중협력 (통일대비 중국에 대한 종합적 전략 연구 2014-01)	배정호 외	15,500원

2014	China's Strategic Environment and External Relations in the Transition Period (A Comprehensive Strategic Study on China in Preparation for Korean Unification 2014-02)	Bae, Jung-Ho et al.	18,000원
2014	Global Expectations for Korean Unification (Research on Unification Costs and Benefits 2014-01)	Kyuryoon Kim et al.	19,000원
2014	Lessons of Transformation for Korean Unification (Research on Unification Costs and Benefits 2014-02)	Kyuryoon Kim et al.	15,500원
2014	한반도 통일의 효과 (통일 비용·편익 종합연구 2014-3)	김규륜 외	14,500원
2014	2014 남북통합에 대한 국민의식조사 박종철, 허문영, 송영훈, 김갑식, 이상신, 조원빈		12,000원

연례정세보고서

2012	통일환경 및 남북한 관계 전망: 2012~2013	7,000원
2013	통일환경 및 남북한 관계 전망: 2013~2014	7,000원

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비매품

2012-01	통일재원 마련 및 통일외지 결집 관련 국민의 인식	김규륜, 김형기
2012-02	2012년 상반기, 북한 정책동향 분석: 북한 매체의 논조를 중심으로	박형중 외
2012-03	러시아의 극동개발과 북한 노동자	이영형
2012-04	오바마 2기 행정부의 대 한반도 정책 전망	김장호 외
2012-04(E)	The Second Term Obama Administration's Policy towards the Korean Peninsula	Jangho kim
2012-05	중국 18차 당대회 분석과 대내외정책 전망	이기현 외
2013-01	북한 지하자원을 활용한 DMZ/접경지역 남북 산업단지 조성방안	손기웅 외
2013-02	박근혜정부의 대북정책 추진 방향	최진욱 외
2013-03	박근혜정부의 통일외교안보 비전과 추진 과제	최진욱 외
2013-04	유엔조사위원회(COI) 운영 사례 연구	김수암 외
2013-05	Trustpolitik: 박근혜정부의 국가안보전략 - 이론과 실제 탐색연구 -	박형중 외
2013-06	서독의 대동독 인권정책	안지호 외
2013-07	2013년 북한 정책 논조 분석과 평가	박형중 외
2013-09	김정은 정권의 대남 긴장조성: 2013년과 향후 전망	박영자 외
2013-10	국내불안과 대외도발: 북한에 대한 적용 가능성 탐색	정성철
2013-11	2013년 북한 핵프로그램 및 능력 평가	김동수 외
2013-14	유라시아이니셔티브 구현을 위한 한러 협력 방안	조한범 외
2014-01	농업분야의 지속가능한 대북지원 및 남북 협력방안 모색	임강택, 권태진

북한인권: 국제사회 동향과 북한의 대응		비매품
2012	북한인권: 국제사회 동향과 북한의 대응, 제7권 1호	손기웅 외
2012	북한인권: 국제사회 동향과 북한의 대응, 제7권 2호	손기웅 외
2013	북한인권: 국제사회 동향과 북한의 대응, 제8권 1호	이금순 외
2013	북한인권: 국제사회 동향과 북한의 대응, 제8권 2호	이금순 외
2014	북한인권: 국제사회 동향과 북한의 대응, 제9권 1호	이금순 외

Study Series		비매품
2012-01	Study of Disciplinary Problems in the North Korean Army	Lee Kyo Duk, Chung Kyu Sup
2012-02	The Quality of Life of North Korean: Current Status and Understanding	Kim Soo Am et al.
2012-03	Basic Reading on Korean Unification	Huh Moon Young et al.
2013-01	Study on the Power Elite of the Kim Jong Un Regim	Lee Kyo Duk et al.
2013-02	Relations between Corruption and Human Rights in North Korea	Kim Soo Am et al.
2013-03	Easing International Concerns over a Unified Korea and Regional Benefits of Korean Unification	Park Jong Chul et al.
2013-04	'Peaceful Utilization of the DMZ' as a National Strategy	Son Gi Woong et al.
2014-01	Korea's FTA Strategy and the Korean Peninsula	Kim, Kyuroon et al.
2014-02	The Perceptions of Northeast Asia's Four States on Korean Unification	Bae, Jung-Ho et al.
2014-03	The Emergence of a New Generation: The Generational Experience and Characteristics of Young North Koreans	Cho, Jeong-ah et al.
2014-04	Geopolitics of the Russo-Korean Gas Pipeline Project and Energy Cooperation in Northeast Asia	Lee, Kihyun et al.
2014-05	Fiscal Segmentation and Economic Changes in North Korea	Park Hyeong Jung, Choi Sahyun

기타		비매품
2014	북핵일지 1955~2014	조민, 김진하

■■ 통일연구원 定期會員 가입 안내

통일연구원은 민족공동체 실현을 위한 국민 역량을 축적하고 통일환경 변화에 적극적 주도적으로 대응할 수 있도록 통일문제에 관한 제반 사항을 전문적, 체계적으로 연구하고 있습니다. 본원의 연구성과에 관심이 있는 분들에게 보다 많은 정보와 자료를 제공하고자 연간 회원제를 운영하고 있습니다.

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Global Expectations for Korean Unification

