

East Asian Community Building: Issue Areas and Perspectives of Regional Countries


Kyuryoon Kim · Zhe Jin · Mitsuhiro Mimura ·
Byung-Duck Hwang · Han-Bum Cho · Young-Ho Park




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Kyuryoon Kim · Zhe Jin · Mitsuhiro Mimura ·
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□ The analyses, comments and other opinions contained in the this monograph are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Korea Institute for National Unification.

Editor's Note

There have been numerous efforts for global liberalization through regional cooperation. Primarily, the institutionalization of regional cooperation in Europe, has been completed by the launch of the European Union (EU). Efforts to deepen regional cooperation are not limited to continental Europe and there exist similar attempts in Latin America and Asia. However, those attempts were not successful until the end of the Cold War. In the mid-1990s, the new phenomenon of regionalism re-emerged and started to spread out throughout the world. In Asia, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) began to deepen regional cooperation among member countries at that time. Meanwhile, there had been many suggestions for regional cooperation among Northeast Asian countries.

As the interdependence among the countries is increasing, East Asian countries had been trying to solve the problems mainly by bilateral consultations. For an effective management of a rapid growth of interdependence, however, those countries are showing their interests in configuration of multilateral consultative body. East Asian countries are strongly agreed about the necessity of multilateral cooperation not only for management of economic issues, but also for security reasons. However, unlike Southeast Asian countries, which have a formal regional institution, there is no official regional organization in Northeast Asia. Even after the Cold War, it have been

difficult to derive an agreement about regionalism since there have existed so many obstacles such as existence of various forms of political ideologies, political and economic regimes, the power conflict between China and Japan, the global strategy of the United States, and so on, in Northeast Asia. Despite those disturbances, however, Northeast Asian countries also started to share the same goals for economic development and resolution of security concerns. To achieve those goals, they have been actively participated in broader levels of East Asian multilateral regional cooperation.

In East Asia, there exist regional organizations that deal with various issues. Among them, ASEAN is the oldest organization of regional cooperation. ASEAN also extends its areas of regional cooperation by embracing non-Southeast Asian countries and holds annual meetings under the name of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN+3 Summit. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is regional organization with participation of East Asian countries as well as countries in North America and South America. Moreover, East Asian Summit (EAS) gains an attention in the way of a new attempt for regional cooperation, despite its low level of institutionalization. This book will look at the regional cooperation among East Asian countries based on issue areas and regional countries' perspectives.

First, Dr. Kyuryoon Kim will take a look at the past efforts and current state of regional cooperation in East Asia. Next, after examining multilateral security cooperation in East Asia (Dr. Byung-Duck Hwang), peace (Dr. Han-Bum Cho) and human security (Young-Ho Park) issues will be discussed. In addition, experts from neighboring



countries will assess their respective government's policies about East Asian regional cooperation. Dr. Mitsuhiro Mimura from Japan will deal with Japanese perspective on East Asian community building. Dr. Zhe Jin from China will discuss Chinese position on East Asian community.

It is true that there exist fundamental question about the possibility of forming a solid East Asian community based on exclusiveness because the current regional organizations do not claim to become an multilateral institution which aims at an ultimate integration. Rather, they play a role of additional consultative mechanism that complements bilateral methods of problem solving among the nations of East Asia. However, the existing multilateral institutions have a certain potential to become a East Asia's own regional organization. In this vein, this book is the result of hard work and efforts made by scholars from South Korea, Japan, and China, and our hope is that it becomes a useful guide to portray a future shape of East Asian community.

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I . Regional Cooperation in East Asia: Past Efforts and Current State

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Senior Research Fellow
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1. Introduction

There have been many efforts, to increase international economic transactions through trade liberalization at the end of the Second World War. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international organization founded in 1995 to signify an institutionalization of global trade liberalization. This does not mean, of course, the efforts for the global trade liberalization came to an end. In the past, the global trade liberalization had been mainly focused on goods and services. At present, however, the efforts forged ahead with establishing international free trade regime, which covers areas of environmental and labor issues. Meanwhile, the Asian financial crisis of the late-1990s and the global financial crisis at the end of the first decade in the 21 Century caused a serious doubt about the future of the world capitalist system. Accordingly, the past structure of the global financial system, which had been monopolized by the G-7 countries, now face a new era of change. In other words, the new forms of global governance, which was triggered by the recent financial crisis, could be pursued through the G-20 summit.

There have been numerous efforts for global liberalization through regional cooperation. Primarily, the institutionalization of regional cooperation in Europe, has been completed by the launch of the European Union (EU). Since then, regional integration in Europe has been accelerating and expanding by embracing the former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, but efforts to deepen regional cooperation are not limited to continental Europe. Rather,



there exists a similar attempt in Latin America and in Asia too. However, those attempts were not successful until the end of Cold War. It was not until after the Cold War, in the mid-1990s, that the new phenomenon of regionalism finally emerged and started to spread throughout the world. Moreover, in Asia, mainly with “Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)”, regional cooperation was in progress with the former communist countries. Meanwhile, there had been many suggestions for close tying of regional cooperation among Northeast Asian countries mainly with South Korea, China or Japan. In practice, however, those proposals were not able to achieve a substantial institutionalization.

Asian countries are devoting their efforts for accelerating exports in order to achieve economic development. As the interdependence among the countries is increasing, East Asian countries have been trying to solve the problems with economic cooperation by bilateral consultations. For an effective management of a rapid growth of interdependence, however, those countries are showing their interests in configuration of multilateral consultative body.¹ Today’s Asian countries are strongly agreed about the necessity of multilateral cooperation not only for management of economic issues after the Cold War, but also for security reasons. However, unlike Southeast Asian countries, which have a regional cooperation, ASEAN, there is no official regional organization in Northeast Asia. Due to the severe conflict between the capitalism and communism during the Cold War, it was not even possible to form a cooperative institution in Northeast Asia.

Even after the Cold War, in Northeast Asia, it is difficult to derive

an agreement about regional cooperation since there are so many obstacles such as existence of various forms of political ideologies, political and economical regimes, the power conflict between Japan and China, the global strategy of the United States, and so on. Despite those disturbances, however, Northeast Asian countries also started to share the same goals for economic development and resolution of security concerns. To achieve those goals, they have been actively participated in broader levels of Asian cooperation.

As described above, regionalism started from the continental Europe, and those cooperative bodies of which related to East Asian regional cooperation are APEC, ASEAN and EAS. ASEAN is the oldest organization of regional cooperation in East Asia; APEC is regional organization with participation of East Asian countries as well as countries in North America and South America. Moreover, EAS gains an attention in the way of a new attempt for cooperation, despite its low level of institutionalization. This paper will analyze the characteristic trends through an historical analysis of the developmental progress of East Asian regional organizations.

2. Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

APEC is a loose forum type of cooperative body, which has its purposes at active conversation in policies and consultations. The Secretariat, which was established in 1993, performs a supporting role to hold various meetings. Especially, the regularity of annual summit itself has its own important implication since it includes attendance of



the United States, China, Japan, and Russia. In practice, when WTO was introduced, the leaders of APEC pursued their opinions for liberalization of trade and also the leaders adopted a statement against terrorism after the September 11 attack. Indeed, these examples have been evaluated as APEC summit exerted its influence worldwide.

Unlike those regional organizations which promote exclusive regionalism, APEC pursues open regionalism, encourages voluntary participation among the Members under the principles of respect for the diversity of the Member States. Simultaneously, APEC emphasizes partnerships with private sectors, and is a leader of liberalization of global trade.

Recently, APEC declares its will against terrorism in related to safe and secure Asia-Pacific region. Additionally, APEC also decided to strengthen health security and disaster response such as Avian influenza. And this means that APEC is on expanding their agenda to non-economical issues such as anti-terrorism, public health, environment, corruption and so on.

APEC was established in 1989 at the initiative of Korea and Australia with 12 Asia-Pacific countries aiming at facilitation and liberalization of trade and investment, and also at economic and technical cooperation. Since APEC's virtual target area is Asia-Pacific region, it was introduced initially as an extensive regional cooperative body. Its basic motivation was to enhance close economic cooperation among Asian-Pacific countries against acceleration of regional integration in continental Europe since the end of the Cold War. The founding 12 members were: South Korea, the United State, Japan,

Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and ASEAN 6 countries, (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines and Brunei).² Then, so-called “Three China”, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan joined in 1991 at the Seoul conference. In 1993, a Summit was held, and since then, APEC upgraded its status as summit-kind meeting body rather than Asia-Pacific regional cooperation. Afterwards, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Chile, Russia, Vietnam, Peru joined, which took the membership to 21 countries.

During the fifth APEC Ministerial Meeting and the first Summit held in Seattle in 1993, by signing on “APEC Leader’s Economic Vision Statement”, the Members agreed to stand away from initial simple and passive motivation to accelerate to economic cooperation within a year, instead, the Members agreed to hold an annual Summit and to promote liberalization of regional trade and investment for their ultimate goal of becoming Asia-Pacific economic community.³

At the second APEC Summit in 1994, APEC sets the Bogor Goals of, “free and open trade and investment in Asia-Pacific by 2010 for developed economies and 2020 for developing economies.” However, its substantive progress has not been achieved due to a disagreement between the United States who wants fundamental openness of the Asian market and Japan who wants to reserve it.⁴

During the seventh Ministerial Summit in Osaka, Japan in 1994, APEC adopted the Osaka Action Agenda (OAA) for trade and investment liberalization. At the following meeting in Manila in 1996, the Manila Action Plan (MAPA) was confirmed as an action plan of



Osaka Action Agenda.⁵

After the September 11 attack in 2001, APEC adopted a Counter-Terrorism Statement led by the United States and began to deal with non-traditional security issues. Whether APEC could become a security cooperation body is still questioned. Recently, as a discussion begins to form EAFTA mainly with ASEAN+3 countries, APEC may also be reviewing the plan for APFTA, but it is still in discussion.⁶ APEC started as a regional cooperation for the early expansion of trade among Asia Pacific countries, is in ongoing progress. Indeed, it was expected to show a potential for new developmental formation of regionalism by being against Close Regionalism, but for Open Regionalism. However, due to the nature of the Open Regionalism there is no distinctive line between members and non-members, which led a question of solidarity and binding force agreement. Thus, upgrading the level of institutionalization for regional integration seems at a standstill. A brief summary of the historical development of APEC and their agreement are shown below.

Table 1-1 History of APEC-Summit

Dates	Names of the Summit	Contents
1989.1	Korea-Australia Summit	▶ Suggest an official consultative mechanism for cooperation in Asia-Pacific region



Dates	Names of the Summit	Contents
1989.11	The 1 st APEC Ministerial-level Meeting (Canberra, Australia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Establish APEC and adopt principles
1993.11	The 1 st APEC Summit (Blake Island, United States)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Adopt a statement of economic vision -Outline APEC's vision, "stability, security and prosperity for our peoples." -Agree to do best efforts in reaching agreement for Uruguay Round within a year
1994.11	The 2 nd Summit (Bogor, Indonesia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Adopt the Bogor Declaration -Set target date to liberalize trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific: developed economies by 2010, developing economies by 2020 ▶ Select focused cooperative area: TILF and ECOTECH
1995.11	The 3 rd Summit (Osaka, Japan)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Adopt the Osaka Action Agenda -Suggest a framework for achieving the Bogor goals ▶ Adopt 9 principles related to TILF
1996.11	The 4 th Summit (Manila, The Philippines)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Adopt 'Manila Action Plan for APEC(MAPA)' -Specify actual action plan for achieving the Bogor goals ▶ Launch the implementation phase of free and open trade and investment agenda
1997.11	The 5 th Summit (Vancouver, Canada)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Prepare an intra-regional cooperation to mitigate Asian financial crisis ▶ TILF: Approve 15 sectors of EVSL ▶ ECOTECH: Vancouver initiative for intra-regional Developmental Cooperation

Dates	Names of the Summit	Contents
1998.11	The 6 th Summit (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Look for innovative ways to promote the recovery of the capital flows into the region ▶ TILF: transfer 9 sectors of EVSL to WTO ▶ ECOTECH: approve action plan for functional development and cooperative agenda for developing 21st century industrial science
1999.9	The 7 th Summit (Auckland, New Zealand)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Assess the status of the liberalization of trade and investment -Strengthen the role of APEC in Global economies -Support new multilateral negotiation of WTO
2000.11	The 8 th Summit (Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Adopt ‘Action Agenda for the New Economy’ ▶ Share the awareness of needs to cooperate on a global scale in order to expand benefits of information network ▶ Pursue a shared effort for reducing gap among member countries regarding information industry ▶ Strengthen multilateral framework for trade: early launch of WTO’s new round
2001.10	The 9 th Summit (Shanghai, People’s Republic of China)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Adopt the Shanghai Accord for accelerating to achieve the Bogor goals-Prepare a specific guidelines to implement the Bogor goals ▶ Adopt a separate statement on Counter-Terrorism ▶ Agree to share the benefits of New Economies and globalization
2002.10	The 10 th Summit (Los Cabos, Mexico)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Adopt the declaration on “Expanding the benefits of cooperation economic growth and development” ▶ Adopt the declaration on trade and investment facilitation action plan and counter-terrorism and human security -Specify facilitation of investment in e-business and high speed internet ▶ Adopt a separate statement on North Korea



Dates	Names of the Summit	Contents
2003.10	The 11 th Summit (Bangkok, Thailand)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Re-energize multilateral negotiation process, DDA(Doha Development Agenda) ▶ Adopt a separate statement on Health Security ▶ Utilize APEC to share the benefits of globalization amongst countries and its people
2004.11	The 12 th Summit (Santiago, Chile)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Adopt Santiago Initiative for expanded trade in APEC ▶ Enhance human security ▶ Promote good governance and a knowledge-based society
2005.11	The 13 th Summit (Busan, Korea)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Promote liberalization of trade and investment ▶ Re-confirm the agreement to achieve Bogor Goals ▶ Construct regional security environment for safe and transparent Asia- Pacific region. ▶ Share the techniques and innovation for better benefits to the future members
2006.11	The 14 th Summit (Hanoi, Vietnam)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Promote liberalization of trade and investment ▶ Enhance human security ▶ Build stronger societies and a more dynamic and harmonious community
2007.9	The 15 th Summit (Sydney, Australia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Adopt a separate Sydney Declaration on “Climate change, energy security and clean development” ▶ Adopt a separate statement on the WTO negotiations ▶ Examine the options and prospects for the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP)
2008.11	The 16 th Summit (Lima, Peru)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Endorse the 2009 work plan for the APEC Regional Economic Integration(REI) Agenda ▶ Strengthen international cooperation to overcome the global financial crisis ▶ Address the social dimension of globalization -Promote corporate social responsibility

Dates	Names of the Summit	Contents
2009.11	The 17 th Summit (Singapore)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Adopt a separate statement on “A New Growth Paradigm for A Connected Asia-Pacific in the 21st Century” ▶ Foster inclusive growth and promote sustainable growth ▶ Accelerate regional economic integration
2010.11	The 18 th Summit (Yokohama, Japan)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Adopt a separate Leaders’ statement on “210 Bogor Goals Assessment” ▶ Envision the way forward for APEC -Economically-integrated, robust and secure community

Source: <http://www.apec.org/apec/about_apec/history.html>

3. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

When the leaders of Southeast Asian countries - Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand - founded ASEAN in 1967, they had far-reaching initiative to promote regional cooperation towards peace, stability and prosperity.⁷ At that time, Southeast Asian countries were suffering instability in terms of security, and also economically. During the first 10 years after the establishment of the ASEAN, there had been existed confrontations against the communist states in the Indochina Peninsula. Under those circumstances, due to different opinions among member states over neutrality of the organization and the domestic situation of each country, ASEAN could not achieve significant progress. The end of Vietnam War in 1975 still did not help for development of ASEAN, and the regional conflicts

over Cambodia in the late 1970s became a stumbling block to regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. As Vietnam joined, all countries in Southeast Asia became a member of ASEAN. Since then the ASEAN summit has been playing the crucial role for the development of regional cooperation. Especially, resolving the “2003 ASEAN Community”, where the leaders agreed to construct ASEAN Security Community (ASC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), it is noteworthy in a way that it shows an implicated picture of the development.

Thus the process of development of Regionalism in Southeast Asia gets its attention as regional cooperation among developing countries. However, ASEAN stands alone as the means of the regional cooperation in East Asia in a way that it proved the international security and political unrest can be a major obstacle for the development of regional cooperation. Furthermore, ASEAN acts as a catalyst for regional cooperation in East Asia by holding a regular meeting of ‘ASEAN+3 Summit’ and ‘ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)’. Indeed, it seems worth to pay continued attention on the future development of ASEAN since it has ability to perform due roles as a member of East Asian cooperative body.

A. *ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)*

ARF was established by ASEAN, in 1994, to discuss about multilateral security cooperation issues in the Asia-Pacific region with ASEAN dialogue partners (South Korea, the United States, Japan, Canada,



Australian, E.U., etc.). From this context, ARF started as a Foreign Ministerial meeting body as well as the only inter-governmental security consultative mechanism in the region. Afterwards, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Mongolia, North Korea joined, to take the total to 26 countries. By eradicating the uncertainty of security in the Post Cold War era, ARF is looking for the stable order. Moreover, on the basis of a comprehensive security concept, ARF has been in the discussion for a joint response against newly emerging transnational security threats.⁸

The second Meeting of ARF, held in Brunei in July 1995, adopted ‘the Concept of Guide’ which is an important guideline for the operation. The contents include the main purposes of ARF and the three steps of future governing direction; ① the promotion of confidence-building, ② the development of preventive diplomacy, and ③ the approach of the conflict issues.⁹

At the meeting ARF Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in 1996, ARF confirmed principles and criteria for the new participating countries and discussed about ‘1995 Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty’ and the comprehensive ‘Nuclear Test Ban Treaty’. In addition, ARF urged to resolve the South China Sea dispute by peaceful means such as the international law and UN Convention of the Law of the Sea and emphasized the importance of dialogue between South and North Korea for the peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. During the fourth meeting in 1997, ARF asked for nuclear powers to sign on the Additional Protocol of the “Southeast

Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone” which starts to be activated in 1997. ARF also proclaimed to sign ‘the Mine Ban Treaty,’ which was planned to be held in Ottawa, Canada in December of 1997. It also reaffirmed the importance of peace and instability in the Korean Peninsula, and discussed about food shortage in North Korea, the Four Party Talks, and support for Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The fifth meeting in 1998 expressed the regret for Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests and urged the two countries to sign an international agreement on the prevention of nuclear proliferation. During the sixth meeting that was held in 1999, the members of ARF showed concerns about North Korea’s missile issue and the Foreign Ministers expressed their hope for ARF to move from step-1 of foreign confidence-building into step-2, the preventive diplomacy stage. At the seventh ARF meeting, the Member States submitted the application of North Korea which was applied in May the same year, and its members became 23 countries in total. Indeed, participating of North Korea in ARF is an important as the discussion about the nuclear problem of North Korea can now be made as a key and even public subject. At the eighth meeting, ARF supported the peaceful turnover of political power in Indonesia and the construction of the country in East Timor. And for the future development, ARF adopted 3 governing documents; ① the concepts and principles of preventive diplomacy, ② strengthening the role of the Chairman, ③ registering of experts and celebrities and so on.

At the ninth meeting in 2002, ARF expressed a firm commitment on counter-terrorism by adopting ‘the ARF Statement of blocking the



terrorists' funds,' and agreed to hold 'cross-conference session on counter-terrorism and transnational crime,' to strengthen cooperation on terror in the region.

The 10th meeting was held in 2003 in Phnom Penh Cambodia with attendance of all members of 23 Asian Pacific countries which includes South Korea, the Foreign Ministers of the United State, Japan, China, and Russia and so on. At the meeting the Member States discussed about the regional situation of the Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asia, counter-terrorism cooperation, directions of ARF's future development. During the meeting, 22 countries except North Korea retained a strong oppositional stance against North Korean nuclear weapons program, support denuclearization, encourage the collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and urged to drop the decision of North Korea to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT). Indeed, ARF reaffirmed its importance, in terms of discussion to plan cooperation terrorism, as a counter-regional cooperation against terrorism and its related issues. Moreover, ARF adopted two statements - 'ARF Statement on Cooperative Counter-Terrorist Action on Border Security' and 'ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threat to Maritime Security' - for the border management among the countries of Asia-Pacific region and for strengthen the cooperation in maritime security.

The 11th meeting was held in Jakarta, Indonesia in 2004, adopted a presidential statement of 44 clauses which includes North Korean nuclear issues and the affairs of the Korean Peninsula. Also the number of members has been extended by 24 as Pakistan joined. In 2005, there was the 12th ARF Foreign Ministerial meeting held in

Vientiane, Laos and the Member States announced a presidential statement mainly about the peaceful resolution of North Korean nuclear issue and the discontinuance of terrorism. Indeed, ARF highlighted the importance to find of a peaceful solution of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through mutual trust and dialogue which based on the principles of mutual respect of the sovereignty and equality. At the 13th ARF meeting held July 2006 with all 26 members which includes North and South Korea and discussed about countermeasures of ARF against new security threats such as terrorism and transnational crimes etc., and also discussed the future developmental direction of the ARF. At this meeting, the Member States showed serious concern about the North Korean missile issue and the conflict between the armed forces between Israel and Libya, and stressed the need of joint efforts of the international community for a peaceful resolution through dialogue. At the 14th ARF meeting in 2007 which held in Manila, Philippine, the Members agreed to further acts for diplomacy efforts, research and collaboration between Member States to strength the preventive diplomacy acts in Asian Pacific region where the existing regional security is inactive. Moreover, they also consented to strength the cooperation for newly emerging problems such as non-traditional or transnational problems and agreed to encourage the talks among civilizations to overcome the conflicts which due from religious and cultural differences.¹⁰ At the 15th Meeting in 2008 held in Singapore, ARF discussed about the recent regional issues such as the gap between rich and poor, food and energy crisis, response to Myanmar cyclone as well as international



issues includes North Korean nuclear problems. Moreover, in presidential statement, ARF forced early resolution of incident of the July 11th at Mt. Geumgang and encouraged the peace talk between North and South Korean based on 10.4 North-South Summit Declaration.¹¹

On July 23, 2009, the 16th meeting was held in Phuket, Thailand. The Member States unanimously made a decision to charge Vietnam as the ARF Chair from January 2010, and encouraged to solve newly forming problems (which) threatening the security such as natural disasters, Influenza A (H1A1) and so on. Furthermore, effective and viable agreements were written to maintain peace and stability in the area.¹² The statement focused on Southeast Asian friendships agreement and activities of the countries around East Sea and also stressed that the needs of ARF to construct the system to solve the problems of epidemic, natural disasters, energy and food security, terrorism and transnational crime and also to share the benefit among the members.

On July 23, 2010, the 17th meeting was held in Hanoi, Vietnam. This session provided an opportunity to self-check of ARF's confidence-building and preventive diplomacy, and also redirect the future of the meeting. The Member States reconfirmed above approach and adopted "Hanoi Action Plan" for further embodied results of ARF key collaboration areas includes disaster relief, counter-terrorism, transnational crime, maritime security and nonproliferation disarmament and so on.¹³

B. ASEAN+3 (South Korea-China-Japan) Summit

The ASEAN+3 Summit was founded in 1997, it started by

Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahthir, as he invited leaders of the three countries (South Korea, China, Japan) for the very first time to the ASEAN Informal Summit (Kuala Lumpur) at the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the ASEAN. In other words, ASEAN+3 was launched when the members of ASEAN found the needs of regional cooperated action against East Asian financial crisis, and also in terms of strengthening cooperation with South Korea, China and Japan. Plus, they maintained their close political and economical relationship with the members of ASEAN. In December 1998, at the second ‘SEAN+3’ Summit, there was a formation of consensus for a joint response at the level of East Asia over the current proliferation of the currency crisis in Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia. Moreover, in November 1999, at the third ‘ASEAN+3’ Summit, the strong political will of East Asian regional cooperation was expressed and also the basic direction of sectoral cooperation in the region was presented by setting the regularity and adopting ‘A Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation.’¹⁴ As it has shown above, follow the strengthening of solidarity of the ASEAN+3 Summit, the joint strategies within the regional countries, in a case of financial crisis, was suggested by agreeing on ‘Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)’ at the ‘ASEAN+3’ Financial Ministerial Meeting in May 2000.¹⁵ In November of the same year, at the fourth ‘ASEAN+3’ Summit in Singapore, a plan for promotion of East Asian regional cooperation was discussed. In 2001, the fifth Meeting was held and adopted the report from “East Asian Vision Group (EAVG)” that stressed the



ultimate goal of East Asian cooperation among ASEAN+3 countries is to form 'East Asian Community'. To achieve the goal, the switch of the system from "ASEAN+3" Summit to "East Asia Summit" was proposed.¹⁶ At the sixth meeting in 2002, the system change from "ASEAN+3" to "East Asian Summit (EAS)", which was presented by EASG (East Asian Study Group), was reaffirmed that it's one of the important long-term subjects. Indeed, the Member States urged to pursue it progressively.¹⁷ In October 2003, the seventh Summit was held, the due performance of the EASG report was called and the efforts for the ASEAN integration and constructing East Asian free trade areas were reaffirmed. Moreover, for the first time in history, the three leaders of South Korea, China, Japan, adopted a joint declaration to strengthen cooperation and agreed to set three-party committee.¹⁸ The eighth meeting was held in 2004 and the agreement had been made to hold the first East Asian Summit (EAS) at Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia.¹⁹ At the ninth Meeting in 2005, by adopting 'Kuala Lumpur Declaration,' a common commitment to realization of a long-term goals of East Asia Community was reaffirmed. Indeed, to achieve the goal, the leading role of the ASEAN and taking advantage of the system of ASEAN+3.²⁰ At the 10th meeting in 2007, the previous nine years' astonishing achievements of ASEAN+3 cooperation in multi-dimensional area includes politics, security, economy, society, and cultural were assessed and an agreement was made about the multilateral efforts to achieve the long-term goal to form East Asia regional cooperation.²¹ The 11th

meeting was held in 2008 and ‘the second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation’ and its implementation for a ‘business plan’ were adopted. The 10 years of growth and expansion (1997~2007) was evaluated and the direction of future cooperation for consolidation and integration (2007~17) was discussed.²² At the 12th meeting that was held in October 2009, ‘Hua Hin Statement,’ which considers the issues about food security and bio-energy development cooperation, was adopted and wills for joint efforts to cope with global financial crisis with ASEAN+3 was confirmed. Furthermore, the intention to guarantee the global food and energy security was identified.²³ At the 13th meeting in 2010, President Lee Myung-bak mentioned that systematic enhancement of ASEAN+3 system seems inevitable for further regional cooperation in East Asia and for this he proposed configuration of the second East Asian Vision Group (EAVG II). The leaders of “ASEAN+3” agreed that the system needs to be checked to fit the recent environmental change in East Asia. The leaders welcomed the proposal of EAVG II and promised active cooperation for the further movement.²⁴

C. East Asian Summit (EAS)

The first issue is the concepts and the basic policy direction of EAS had been made through “East Asia Vision Group (EAVG)” which was led by South Korea, and through the “East Asia Study Group (EASG)” report.²⁵ The EASG report, which was adopted at the fifth ASEAN+3 Summit in 2001, stressed that the initial goals of East Asia



regional cooperation based on the cooperation of “ASEAN+3” is to form “East Asia Community (EAC)” and suggested that the system of “ASEAN+3 Summit” has to be switched to “East Asia Summit” to achieve its initial goal.²⁶ The EASG report, which was adopted at the sixth ASEAN+3 Summit in 2002, confirmed that the switching of system from “ASEAN+3 Summit” to “East Asia Summit” is very important as a long-term task for the East Asian cooperation and recommended a gradual promotion.²⁷ At the eighth ASEAN+3 Summit held in Vientiane in 2004, with consideration of the next ASEAN+3 Summit, which was planned to be held in 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to be the first EAS meeting.²⁸ In fact, Malaysia devoted all their strength to hold the first EAS to concrete its further status in East Asia since Malaysia advocated EACE in the early 1990s and launched ASEAN+3 Summit in Kuala Lumpur. Indeed, this early holding of EAS was caused by the diplomatic force of Malaysia and China.

However, during the promotion and agreement process for the early host of EAS among ASEAN+3 countries, there were incompletely filtered internal disagreements and different strategic relationship of advantages and disadvantages. Indeed, it eventually led to an unexpected political result, the membership enlargement. Accordingly, at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ informal meeting held in Cebu, Philippines in April 2005, the issue of membership enlargement was decided as follows. ASEAN agreed EAS’s New Partners as firstly, ASEAN’s dialogue partner, secondly, to tie a practical cooperation with ASEAN, and

thirdly, the affiliated countries of “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East Asia (TAC)”.²⁹ Following these standards, at the annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting held in Vientiane in July 2005, ASEAN practically confirmed its new members of India who already fulfilled their requirement and New Zealand who signed on TAC at that time and Australia who agreed to sign on TAC by December 2005.³⁰

At the first EAS in 2005, “Kuala Lumpur Declaration” was adopted, and EAS’s ultimate goals were confirmed which were promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia.³¹ Simultaneously, unlike “ASEAN+3”, EAS has its purpose on activating to form the East Asia Community (EAC), the ultimate goal of East Asia cooperation, as a new structure of summit where the three countries of Korea, China, Japan can equally to hold the meeting with Southeast countries. At the second EAS in Cebu in 2006, the Member States co-signed on “Cebu Declaration on Energy Security”, checked the five priority areas (① Energy, ② Financial, ③ Education, ④ Avine influenza, and ⑤ Disaster Response) and agreed to enact an detailed cooperation project in those areas.³² At the third East Asia Summit in 2007 (Singapore), the leaders adopted the “Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and Environment”, which embodies the mutual desire to focus on four major agenda - climate change, environment, energy, and sustainable development - and also focus on exchanging the view of major political changes, tackling the climate change, and protecting environment.³³ At the fourth East Asia Summit in Thailand in 2008, ASEAN’s integration efforts, the evaluation of



G20's efforts and a plan for the conquest of economic, financial crisis was discussed. Moreover, EAS agreed to strengthen the cooperation for climate change, environmental cooperation and energy unit. Additionally, EAS adopted 'Disaster Management Statement' and discussed its direction of development and other regional cooperation initiatives.³⁴ The fifth East Asia Summit was held in Hanoi in October 2010, which confirmed the joining of U.S. and Russia and the "EAS fifth Hanoi Declaration" was adopted by the leaders. Clinton, the Secretary of State and Foreign Minister of Russia Lavrov, attended at the second half of the meeting as "Special Guest of Chair" and made the speech about their joining.³⁵

4. Character of East Asian regional cooperation

The underlying fact is that economic relations in East Asia must go beyond regional cooperation schemes or themes that are outlined in the EAS. This will enable the Southeast region cooperation to secure the status-quo for political benefits and the concomitant economic gains through "ASEAN+3" and APEC.

Together with those activities of practical meeting bodies, there has been numerous initiative of regional cooperation suggested by regionalism experts and policy makers. In other words, Northeast Asia-oriented, initiative of Northeast Asia co-operational body, Yellow Sea Economic Block and East Sea Economic Block, which are limited at more sub-regional level, can be examples. Moreover, the practical development

projects such as Greater Mekong Sub-regional Programme (GMS) and Tumen River Area Development programme are also for the close regional cooperation.

The first feature of East Asian regional cooperation can be seen from the recent Member States of promoting formal cooperation bodies. Except for ASEAN, majority participations from outside regional countries includes the United States are participated in East Asian regional cooperation. In other words, it shows the supra-regional trends of enlargement of the members due to flexibility of requirements.

Secondly, rather than to aim at regional integration, it proposed the multilateral approach as complementary dimensions of bilateral approach in order to solve the problems derived from natural regionalization. Therefore, there is a fundamental question arising, with base of homogeneity and exclusiveness, whether the solid East Asia Community can really be formed. Those various East Asian cooperation bodies do not aim for regionalism, but rather, it adds the multilateral approach as an instrument for further systematization of cooperation.

Thirdly, the agenda is becoming diversified. The meeting bodies such as ASEAN+3, EAS, APEC, etc. play the roles as forums to discuss about various agendas, despite the low levels of institutionalization. In other words, although the starting point of those meeting bodies was laid at economic motivation, the meetings are discussing future-oriented topics based on human security concept, which covers environment and non-traditional security factors, as well as military and security issues in the region.

Since these characteristics of East Asian regional cooperation there



is a serious doubt that if the existence of exclusive East Asia community can possibly be formed. It means that according to the concept and the path of the typical model of community building, which derived from the analysis of the European integration process, the formation of an East Asian community may seem impossible. However, if the efforts to form East Asia community are presented as a new concept and framework by pioneers and if countries in the region can have an agreement then, there should be a realistic chance to form East Asia community. In other words, by complementing and developing European regionalism, a type of 21st century regionalism can be implemented in East Asia. To accomplish this, the most important thing is to establish the identity of the region.

In conclusion, a lesson learned from European history that the foreign policy based on power was the main cause for the two World Wars. Indeed, based on its economic dynamism, East Asian countries are leading the global economic development. Therefore, East Asian countries should be at the forefront, by using their accumulated economic power together, to lead a balanced and sustainable economic development for the world to see.

From this context, in international relations, it seems important to stay away from the dichotomous thinking and to see the world as a conflict between powerful and weak countries or developed and developing countries. Indeed, it will also be necessary to emphasize that, by expanding the existence of middle-power countries based on middle-class concept in domestic politics, making a more cooperative international order in East Asia seems essential.

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II. *The Position of China in East Asia Community*

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East Asian Community Building:
Issue Areas and Perspectives of Regional Countries

1. Introduction

The East Asia Community can be understood as being in a close form through the process of long-term integration and cooperation within geographically contiguous countries in East Asia. The form is based on the common interests and the recognition (decisions) of countries in the region but, it is neither being an exclusive group nor aiming at a particular country in non-East Asian community. In addition, the East Asia Community, is based on the economic integration, as they are moving towards high stability from low as in the form of a free trade district, economic community, or monetary union etc., can be implicated each other, interconnected and their profits can be mixed. Then, it will become an economic community. Afterwards, this should move progressively into the direction of safety community and social community.

The initial concept of East Asia Community was by the former Malaysian President Mahathir Mohamad in 1990. Afterwards, in 2001, at the “East Asia Vision Group” which was established by delegation leaders of “ASEAN+3”, a report was proposed to build an East Asia Community then, a vision of the East Asian development had arisen. However, this was not to be discussed as a major subject until September 2009, when the Hatoyama Cabinet launched the East Asia Community. Afterwards, at the China-South Korea-Japan Summit (October 10, 2009), three countries announced a coalition statement and pointed out they have to contribute for the special goal to construct an East Asia Community under the principles of open,



transparent and inclusion. Promoting the East Asia Community as a starting point, cooperation became a trend of development in the region. Moreover, the fact that the potential key players - China, South Korea and Japan - made a positive agreement on building the East Asia Community; seems very encouraging. However, it seems obvious that since the East Asia Community is only a regional organization, as in detail, there needs to be mutual understanding in different perspectives amongst the countries. In this context, based on the recent study, this paper will research the position of China in the East Asia Community.

2. Position of China on East Asian Community

At the first news briefing (September 16, 2009) after official launching of Hatoyama government, Japan mentioned about the Asian community. Instantly China gave a positive response. Jiang Yu said China would going in the direction to build the East Asia Community by strengthening cooperation with the East Asian countries. Afterwards, from a consistent perspective, all of the Chinese leaders and the Foreign Ministers of China have been expressing a positive attitude about the East Asia Community.

At the China-Japan Summit on September 21st 2009 in New York, Japanese Prime Minister, Hatoyama, formally presented to the Chinese President, Hu Jintao a plan about the Asian community with adoption of the forms of the EU. As an answer, Chinese President, Hu Jintao, suggested 5 proposals such as enhancing

economic cooperation exchanges between the two leaders and the private sector and so on.¹ Eventually, China showed a positive and proactive attitude about the will to strengthen cooperation within the East Asian countries.

On September 28th 2009, at the talks between Yang Jiechi, the Chinese Foreign Minister and Katsuya Okada, the Japanese Foreign Minister, China made clear that she has always been a pioneer for building an East Asia Community, been one of those actively supportive countries and been actively participated in the process of cooperation and integration. Further on, by promising to drive forward East Asian cooperation, with continuous and open attitude, China agreed for the realization of East Asia Community through interdependent cooperation along with other countries.

At the 4th East Asia Summit (October 25th, 2009), Chinese Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao proclaimed the specific principles of China for building the East Asia Community in detail; he stressed that the countries in the region, with the principles of mutual respect and good-neighbourly and friendly relationship with next door countries, should seek the common ground while accepting the existing differences, and resolve the differences in the proper way. Indeed, the countries should collect the recognition under the principles of open, inclusive and sequential progress, enrich the cooperation and move constantly towards the greater good to establish the East Asia Community.

Just before to visit Japan in December 2009, Chinese Vice-president, Xi Jinping, had an interview with Japanese and Korean



journalists in the Beijing branch and announced that the East Asia Community building is very important and essential. Indeed, Asian Community is the common goals of Japan and China. The East Asia Community building, as it was suggested by the Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama's, indicated their active attitude over the issue. Their ideas coincided with the trend of the Asian integration. Indeed, this is the common goals of other countries in the region such as Japan and China to pursue. Since building an East Asia Community is a systematic project, thus it has to be based on reality as well as look out for the future. The most prioritized issue is bringing common awareness by strengthening their dialogue and communication among the countries in the region.

On April 12 2010, at the China-Japan Summit, Washington welcomed the Chinese President, Hu Jintao and the Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama. At the Summit, Hu Jintao presented four proposals² to promote the relationship between China and Japan and to upgrade the strategic reciprocal relations and suggested an interdependent cooperation in the process to Asian integration. Indeed, China promised to promote the collaboration in various areas such as regional trade, finance, infrastructure etc. with Japan through dialogue, communication and harmony and to make every effort for constant substantial progress of Asian integration.

3. Future Challenges of East Asia Community building

As described above, China's position about East Asia Community can be summarised as follows; first, China stands on the position for supporting the East Asian community; second, the East Asia Community long-term goal is to achieve; third, the most important problems facing is bringing the common recognition by strengthening dialogue and communication with the countries in the region. To achieve the goal, the countries in the region, with the principles of mutual respect and good-neighbourly and friendly relationship with next door countries, should keep looking the common ground while accepting the existing differences, and collecting the recognition under the principles of open, inclusive and sequential progress, and enriching the cooperation. Therefore, in order to build an East Asia Community there are many challenges still ahead.

A. The current state of East Asian cooperation

<ASEAN : the pioneer of East Asian cooperation>

Starting with cooperation, in the 60's of the last century, in terms of politics, ASEAN already had all the nations of Southeast Asia as member of a unified regional cooperational organization. By doing this, ASEAN could shift from disorder such as war or conflict to peace, stability and cooperation. And, economically, ASEAN established ASEAN Free Trade Zone and by co-operating in economics it could eventually construct the ASEAN market. Based on this, ASEAN adopted "ASEAN Charter", and set a goal of building the ASEAN Community by 2015.



<There has been different compositions coexisted
in East Asian Cooperation>

After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the structure of East Asia cooperation beyond ASEAN has risen. However, this configuration is consisted with a 3-axis. They are ASEAN, ASEAN+1 (ASEAN+China, ASEAN+Japan, ASEAN+ South Korea), ASEAN+3 (ASEAN+China +Japan+South Korea). East Asian cooperation has driven on those 3-axis, as ASEAN is at the heart, and develop the relationship with different sides from the axis. Moreover, once “ASEAN+3” was established, the concept and perception of East Asia region had been introduced. Indeed, with active efforts of China, Japan and South Korean “East Asia Vision Group” had been established and it proposed a vision that the long-term goal of East Asian cooperation is constructing East Asia Community. The key components of the East Asia Community are mechanism of local political cooperation (the Summit), regional market integration (Free Trade Zone) and mechanism of the local currency and financial cooperation. In addition, the “East Asian Summit” was departed which has the strategic dialogue as a main feature with members of India, Australia, and New Zealand. Eventually there two political cooperational compositions coexisted in East Asia.

<“Competitive Cooperation”, the distinctive features
in East Asia cooperation>

The most distinctive feature of the countries in East Asia is the

diversity in various areas such as the nation size, population, economic, indeed political structure, tradition and culture and so on. Due to this diversity, the participating countries are expressing high levels of independence in the cooperation process; often some countries give priority to themselves against others and also would want to exert their influence over all the aspects. Eventually, East Asia cooperation represents a very strong “competitive cooperation “as a distinctive feature. Indeed, due to this character the synergic effects in the process of cooperation can be weakened.

At first, as an actuator, ASEAN takes the position as the leader in East Asia Cooperation. However, the most prioritized purpose of ASEAN promoting East Asia Cooperation is laid on constructing ASEAN itself. Therefore, the status and the role of ASEAN in the process of East Asian Cooperation should be strengthened not weakened. In this point of view, a multiple (the plural) structure of “ASEAN+” can be seen as the most advantageous. Moreover, to ASEAN, every kind of great integration can be challenge against ASEAN. Indeed, ASEAN itself has its own difficulties in many ways. Under this circumstance, the East Asia Cooperation through leading of ASEAN seems unlikely. However, in the current situation, it is necessary for ASEAN to participate and play a leading role in East Asia Cooperation. Without the active participation and the positive effort of the ASEAN, East Asia Cooperation will lose the most basic and stable axis.

The next most developed countries in East Asia are Japan with huge economic power and influence. The strategic goals of Japan by the active participation in East Asia Cooperation is perhaps due to



their strategic decision of maintaining their dominance and status as the most important one. Therefore, for Japan, the ideal type of East Asia Cooperation would be the establishing a regional mechanism where she can play a leading role in regulatory, standardization and management and so on. From this strategic consideration, Japan is embodying an Asian terms of OECD which based on “East Asia Summit.” The suggestion of Japan to construct East Asia Community under composition of the “East Asia Summit” seems to have intention to offset the emerging influence of China as well as to restraint the construction speed of East Asian Free Trade Zone. Since opening of agricultural market is the weakest link of Japan, she might feel that composition of the Greater East Asia with its core component as governing economies will offer a bigger activity area.

South Korea advocated the establishment of the “East Asia Vision Group.” Indeed, South Korea is deserved to be called as the ideal country of promotion in East Asia Community when she leads the research about the validity of “ASEAN+3” Free Trade. Nevertheless, South Korea seems not interested in East Asia cooperation, because she has to pay all effort for FTA with the U.S. Moreover, South Korea is not satisfied with Japanese claim of “East Asia Summit” based on the East Asia Community. In addition, with the situation of the present government blockaded the relationship with North Korea which eventually leads the exhaustion of national resources, South Korea seems to have many limitations in East Asia Cooperation.

The participation of India, Australia and New Zealand extends the scope of “East Asia Summit.” Furthermore, they also joined from the

interests of their own benefits and expected that the landscape of “ASEAN+6” would lead a substantial progress. This seemed to be interlocked with Japanese strategy. However, promoting the institutionalization of a broad East Asia region will be a lot more difficult to “ASEAN+6” than “ASEAN+3.” In fact, in constructing East Asia Community, being “ASEAN+6” or “ASEAN+3” is an essential turning point to China and Japan. And China is more in favor of the “ASEAN+3.”

B. Challenges for East Asia Community building

< The Strategic consideration of China in construction of East Asia Community >

In the process of the East Asia Community building, the basic principles of China are to construct common prosperity and constant peace in East Asia. Not to mention that the forms of the community, adherence the batch of goals, methods and explanation for a positive effort of the community building and to demonstrate an active role for it. China’s aim for the East Asia Community is not that they want to play a leading role over regional affairs, but rather want to be actively involved in the community and to achieve peaceful and equitable deal with other member states as a member of regional cooperation mechanism.³

China’s strategic considerations in the establishment of the East Asia Community are the fast construction of the Free Trade Zone with periphery regions based on China-ASEAN Free Trade Zone and gradual forming of a global free trade network by selecting core



countries and radiating into America, Africa, and Europe.⁴

The selection standards of target countries of the Free Trade Agreement includes firstly, the significance of strategic sense, the strong economic interdependence, a large market size, rich in natural resources and distinctive driving force for harmonious development. China can make an integrated judgment in terms of general, industrial, offensive and defensive benefits as well as make a balance between gains and costs. At the same time, by giving and gaining, China will be eventually attained win-win cooperation.⁵

<The problems of leadership in the process
of East Asia Community building>

Wu Jianmin, a member of International Advisory Committee of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argued that Germany and France, the core countries in Europe, did not play a leading role in the construction process of the EU. Indeed, no matter the size (power) of the country, as long as their interests and insistences are favorable to the formation of the community, it all had been taken into consideration. Likewise such an example, he argued, due to “ASEAN+3” is originally good negotiation machinery; detailed problems are not necessarily to be questioned. From the same perspective, about the issue of leadership, China argued that “East Asia Summit” ought to be led by ASEAN, and the East Asia Community should be constructed on the basis of composition of “ASEAN+3.”

At the same time, Chen Haosu, Chairman of Chinese People’s

Foreign Friendship Association and Deputy Director of National Affair Committee Political Consultative Conference, argued that, in the future East Asia Community, the concept of ‘subject’ will be used instead of ‘leading’ and once East Asia unified, all the countries in the region should become the central bodies.⁶

<Progressive realization of an East Asia Community>

East Asia Community should be built upon the foundation of regional economic integration. Likewise, the Free Trade Zone, the Economic Community, and the Monetary Union and etc., in terms of structure, it has to go from low to high to be inter-diffused, to be formed a single economic community by the profits mixing, to be gradually developed and should finally become a safety community and social community.

The East Asian Free Trade Zone ought to be started from “ASEAN+1.”⁷ In 2000, China proposed firstly to set up China-ASEAN Free Trade Zone. Afterwards, followed by Japan and South Korea, ASEAN continuously signed a series of “ASEAN+1” Free Trade Agreements with Australia, New Zealand, India and the EU. Since 2004, following the direction of “ASEAN+3” Economic Ministers’ Meeting, a research team with experts was organized to review the validity to build of EAFTA. Until 2009, the team submitted two research reports. And its major suggestions were EAFTA should be based on “ASEAN+3” and should be completed by adjusting and integrating the existing “ASEAN+1 (ASEAN+China FTA, ASEAN+Japan FTA, ASEAN+Korea FTA).”

Considering the problems of recent distributed Free Trade Zone can



cause new market barrier factors, EAFTA should be established as soon as possible. However, due to the differences of the opinion over the issue, this has not been significantly progressed.

<Characters of the East Asia Community⁸>

In the current situation, to promote cooperation in East Asia, an accurate concept of East Asia Community should firstly be introduced. Considering the diversity, East Asia Community cannot directly stimulate the forms of the EU, but there must be its own features and methods. ASEAN already has found the methods for their own situation, so-called “ASEAN Way.” Indeed, the unique features of “ASEAN Way” are flexible, gradual, joint progression by negotiations. The character of diversity in East Asia will need to absorb the experiences from ASEAN.

However, East Asia is more diverse and larger, when compared to ASEAN. With this reason, East Asia Community will take a much longer time; more difficult to establish and will has its own distinctive features. Therefore, East Asia Community should be a long-term goal and explore the ways and models in the developing process. Unlike Europe, perhaps, East Asia Community can be a co-operational system with frame of multiple compositions as a regional value rather than being built on one united regional organization. Basic functions of this system are stabilization and guaranteeing the security and development in East Asia.

In the context above, by putting the focus of East Asia cooperation in various areas of functional cooperation, the cooperation in various

areas can be deepened and be substantial. Indeed, in terms of selection of the members and composition of cooperation could be also take more open and flexible strategy. If this could be happen, ASEAN could solve the concerns to be taken by larger regional organizations and many sub-regional organization and cooperation areas would be more activated. Undoubtedly, many cooperation composition and the relationship between organizations should be complementary to each other not be a conflict. “ASEAN+1, +3, +6 (or even more)” should exert all of each function and should develop in parallel. For the question of whether these must be integrated into one single unit should wait to be answered.

From the perspective of economic cooperation, constructing of a free trade zone is not the only but, seeing the newly facing situation is also the most important.

During the past 20 years, the rapid economic development in East Asia is due on the adoption of open developmental strategy of countries in the region. That is to attract capital and technology to develop an export-oriented manufacturing industry, which led the economic development and formed regional production networks based on foreign demand. This was main engine of East Asian economic integration and basis of the profit of regional economic cooperation. However, as the recent international financial crisis has been shown, East Asian development model is no longer survivable; it must consider a developmental approach to lead domestic-oriented economic development by finding a new economic development power. If the future East Asia cooperation want to play an important role to control



such strategies to promote industrial structure as an important point in economic cooperation and also want to switch the direction to improve of regional developmental condition (such as improvements of infrastructure, promoting personnel flow in the region, regional development of capital market development, regional financial support for corporate, and increasing people's income and purchasing power etc.), the control of East Asian cooperation dialogue and further practical cooperation among many countries in the region will be required for economic and social development. In the process, there will be a decline of political conflicts in East Asian cooperation and enhancement of internal dynamics. Therefore, East Asia Cooperation will be developed in depth.

<The power structure in East Asia and construction of East Asia Community>

After the Cold War, there were two significant changes in East Asian regional power structure. The first one was the significant changes of regional power structure which caused by the collapse of the conventional bipolar structure and the emergence of China. The other one was an increasing power of regional cooperation with a constant growth of regional economic dependence. In other words, on the one hand, with a comparison of the regional relationship under the shadow of superpowers during the Cold War, a developmental power in East Asia had been activated and economic-oriented regional cooperation also had been accelerated. On the other hand, there was a constant

growing influence of the U.S. with their active intervention in East Asia. At the same time, Japan also paid a lot of effort to take the leading role and the rapid emergence of China changed the power relationship within major countries in the region. And these circumstances led serious concerns of the countries in the region such as U.S., and Japan. With objectified perspective, this situation brought significance of difficulties about the safety and conflict between the superpower in East Asia. However, if Chinese economic development stops, there is no doubt that under the current situation East Asia Community is only an imbalanced multilateral organization. Therefore, in the new era, the efforts for the realization of East Asia Community seem necessarily. So to speak, a harmonious East Asia Community has to make a best use of the following characters.

The first, fair, reasonable and equitable negotiation framework: In today's East Asia, a signs of political hegemony is remained as the late symptoms from the Cold War era. The future East Asia Community should leave the consideration of their sizes, strength and command, establish equal, fair and reasonable order and should be opposed against hegemony (using power to dominate the world) and political coercion. Indeed, East Asian countries should have equal voice over regional affairs, which should also be resolved by equal negotiation between them

Second, peaceful co-existence and multilateralism: Defence for international morality and justice will be only possible with adherence for the principles of peaceful co-existence. To keep this, growing the international capacity and understanding multilateralism is essential.



East Asia should not be dominated by any one particular country. Currently, there are 5 major competencies, China, Japan, South and North Korea, ASEAN, and so on. This kind of picture reflexes the complexity of power structure in East Asia. China and Japan are the most capable countries in East Asia, South Korea is comparatively a weak country, North Korea is under the restriction of the U.S. and Japan, ASEAN is exerting its role as an organization, and the United States and Russia are non Asian countries. Due to this situation, a relatively consistent perspective accepts the ASEAN as a leader.

Third, cooperation and Seeking common ground while accepting the existing differences: Cooperation is the most efficient method of the mankind to respond to the common challenge. Indeed, it is today's demand of development of era. Communication would only be possible by cooperation and this would promote the common safety and development in East Asia. And also the cooperation will build mutual understands and trust. Participating in East Asian affair and handling the relationships between the countries can only be possible with an attitude of collaboration, which could lead the realization to achieve the goal of development of regional peace and safety in East Asia. East Asia should be a legal world in terms of politics, win-win world in terms of economics and cross- supplemental and pluralistic world in terms of culture.

Forth, Joint Development and harmonious East Asia: Without development there is no harmony. And without harmony, the development will be hindered. East Asian development is the foundation for the progress of civilization and is also the foundation

to achieve harmony. The harmony in East Asia would guarantee a promotion of universal development in East Asia and an attainment of co-prosperity. Today's existence of inharmonious phenomenon eventually roots in the imbalance of development. Therefore, for the harmonious East Asia, co-share of performance of regional development seems necessarily.

4. Conclusion

Today is the era of globalization and it seems the unification of Asia as one single unit, which includes East Asia, is an unstoppable trend. The problems is depends on how actively the countries in East Asia take advantage of the developmental trend. The trends should stands for providing a place for joint development and cooperation. If it is used by countries as exercising initiative or used as means of containment against other countries, the trend will lost its initial meaning. To achieve the initial meaning, strengthening the dialogue between communication and bringing out the common recognition is essential.

Of course, supporting common development does not mean to deny the core roles of each country. At this point, a great coordination roles and missions of China, South Korea and Japan will be expected. In this sense, an understanding, openness and tolerance of those three countries means more important than ever before.



NOTES

- 1_ 5 proposals: 1. Extend the visits of both sides of the high-level officers.
2. Promote the activation of private exchange., 3. Strengthen the development of bilateral economic relations. 4. Cooperation in Asia and global problems. 5. Handle the divergent problems between the two countries at the huge dimensional - level by strategically methods.
- 2_ 1. Maintain the political visits of high-level officers. Maintaining of the two leaders continue to take advantage of several opportunity to contact and increase the mutual trust through the dialogue and exchanges with the government, political parties, Congress and so on.
2. Strengthening (Deepening) the win-win cooperation. By taking full advantages of mechanism such as dialogue with economic executives, actively work for the stabilized development of economic cooperation.
3. Development of the cultural exchange.
4. Strengthened cooperation in the process of Asian integration.
- 3_ Wu Huaizhong, "East Asian community building is not a Japanese patent," *Global Times*, International Forum Edition.
- 4_ "The first step of East Asia Community is the FTA," Shanghai Security News, access on January 13, 2007.
- 5_ *Ibid.*
- 6_ "The future direction of 'East Asian Community'," <www.chinanews.com>, accessed on November 18, 2009.
- 7_ Zhang Yunling: "East Asia cooperation needs new ideas," *China Economic Weekly (Bei Jing)* accessed on January 5, 2010.
- 8_ *Ibid.*

Ⅲ. *Japan's Position on an East Asian Community*

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to examine Japan's position on an East Asian Community on the basis of: ① A historical review of Japan's approach to cooperation with the Asian countries ② The development of Japan's economic relations with the East Asian countries (with focus on the ASEAN countries, Korea and China) and ③ The changes in international relations since the end of the Cold War, the enhanced possibilities of international cooperation and other factors such as the economic development of Korea and China and the ripening of realistic conditions for the formation of an East Asian Community.

2. Japan's approach to cooperation with East Asia before World War II

Even before World War II, Japan continuously debated how its diplomacy should be orientated. There were two schools of thought, one of which upheld "internationalism" stressing the relations with the Western countries, particularly the United States. The other school upheld the so-called "Asianism" which emphasized alliance with the Asian nations and opposed invasion from the Western countries.

The intensified invasion of China by Japan resulted in the Manchurian Incident, which led Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations in 1933. The withdrawal from the League of Nations brought about Japan's isolation from the international community.



Japan's relations with the Western countries deteriorated, the only option left for Japan was to seek a breakthrough in Asia. Amid the rapidly spreading anti-Japanese sentiments triggered by Japan's unimpeded invasion of China, Japan began to propose, from the late 1930s, an "East Asian Community" based on anti-imperialism, a revised capitalism and an anti-bloc policy.

However, Japan's proposal was flatly rejected by the Kuomintang of China. This was because the government of the Kuomintang regarded the Japanese proposal as a disguise to conceal Japan's intentions for invasion. After Japan declared war on the United States in 1941 and joined World War II, the idea of an East Asian Community degenerated into that of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", which justified the Japanese invasion aimed at securing Asia as its lifeline. Due to Japan's acts of invasion, its Pan-Asianism failed to secure the support of the intellectuals and grassroots of the Asian countries, whom it wanted to unite.

Since the defeat of Japan in August of 1945, accompanied by the collapse of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", "Asianism" has been regarded as something with imperialistic overtones.


3. Re-establishment of Japan's relationship with East Asia after World War II

Japan regained its independence on September 8, 1951, after signing a Treaty of Peace with the Allies of World War II. On the

same day, it also signed the Japan-United States Security Treaty, which reinstated Japan as a member of the capitalist camp and the international community in general. China and the Soviet Union did not sign the treaty.

Japan concluded a separate peace treaty with the Republic of China, which was based in Taiwan. It treated the Taiwanese government as the legitimate government of China until it normalized its relationship with mainland China in 1972. Although the relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union was normalized in 1956, no peace treaty was concluded with the Soviet Union due to a territorial dispute. The dispute still remains unresolved and a peace treaty has not been concluded, even after the Soviet Union was replaced by Russia.

Figure III-1 Percentage of Trade with East Asia to Japan's Total Trade (From the 1960s to the 1980s)




Source: Ministry of Finance, Trade Statistics



Japan’s policy on East Asia from the 1950s to the 1960s was conducted basically from a Western or a capitalist standpoint. In this context, it proceeded to normalize relations with the Asian countries in the capitalist camp. Economic cooperation was provided to the East Asian countries, except China and North Korea, through payment of reparations or quasi-reparations. With Korea, the relationship was normalized in 1965, when the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea was signed.

Japan continued to strengthen its trade relations with the entire East Asian region. And from the 1950s, it began to make direct investment in areas such as the natural resources sector. Since the 1960s, direct investment has been drastically increased in labor-intensive and manufacturing industries such as those for production of electrical and electronic products. In the 1970s, direct investment was expanded to

●Figure III-2 Direct Investments by Japan



Source: Ministry of Finance

the ASEAN countries, effectively bringing Japan back to the East Asia, which it invaded in the 1930s and 1940s. Direct investment was also made in China after it adopted an open policy in 1978. In the 1990s, investment was accelerated both for China and for ASEAN. Also during this time ASEAN expanded its total membership.

Despite the economic advance of Japan into the East Asian countries (see above), there was little public discussion of “Asianism” in Japan, although it was occasionally brought up by some intellectuals such as Mr. Takeuchi (1963). One reason for the lack of a public debate was the fact that the world order of the past era characterized by an East-West confrontation made it difficult to enter into a comprehensive cooperative relationship with socialist countries such as China, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Another reason was that the social atmosphere in Japan at the time was such that Asianism was associated with an aggressive policy reminiscent of Japan’s involvement and defeat in World War II.


4. The End of the Cold War and the Enhanced Possibilities of Cooperation with East Asia

The Cold War came to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the East European countries towards the end of the 1980s. This change had a great impact on Japan’s relationship with the East Asian countries. One important outcome at the end of the Cold War was the weakening of the confrontation between the two political



ideologies that had theretofore divided the world in a dichotomy. This led China to implement an aggressive reform policy, putting an end to its isolation from the international community, in which it had found itself since the Tiananmen Incident of 1989.


●Figure III-3 GDP of China and Its Per Capita GDP



Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook

During the time, when Deung Xiaoping gave his 1992 speech and his “southern tour of China”, Japan’s direct investment in China has phenomenally increased. In the same year when the speech was made, Korea normalized its relations with China, setting the stage for a substantial increase in the trade and investment between the two countries. China’s economic growth since has made it a principal economic partner in the East Asian region.

Figure III-4 Percentage of Trade with East Asia to Japan's Total Trade (From the 1990s to the 2000s)



Source: Ministry of Finance, Trade Statistics

Japan continued to strengthen its economic ties with China throughout the 1990s. Amid such a progress in economic relations with China, some people, including Mr. Nakasone who was Japan's Prime Minister in the 1980s, foresaw China's potential as the world's major economic power and stressed the need to pay attention to China as well as to the United States. Based on such a view, a discussion began to develop about an East Asian Community.

5. Discussion of an East Asian Community under the Government of the Liberal Democratic Party

A discussion of an East Asian Community was proposed mostly by conservative politicians including Mr. Yasuhiro Nakasone who served



as Japan's Prime Minister in the 1980's. However, as the Liberal Democratic Party regarded the alliance with the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as the basis of Japan's diplomatic relations, it was generally passive towards a discussion on an East Asian Community for fear of irritating the United States.

Nevertheless, East Asia became increasingly important in terms of its trade and investment relations with Japan due to the economic growth of China, a need was raised in Japan for an organization to handle cooperation with Korea, China and the ASEAN countries in a comprehensive manner. The discussion for such a need was partly motivated by a sense of wariness against a rapidly growing China, which was bent on promoting economic ties with its neighboring countries and the region as a whole. The Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) concluded in 1997 (becoming effective on January 1, 2004) between Hong Kong and China after Hong Kong was returned to China. Thus, this served as a good indicator of events that may take place as a result of the expansion of China's economic ties with East Asia.

In 2004, the Council for East Asian Community was inaugurated in Japan with a view to comprehensively coordinate the activities of domestic and foreign research institutes and business enterprises in the private sector. The Council, chaired by former Prime Minister Mr. Nakasone, is designed to pursue research activities on an East Asian community and has published various reports including "Plans for an East Asian Community and the Current Situation."

Despite such activities and the growing interest on the part of some

politicians in an East Asian Community, it was not included in the major political agenda of the Japanese government, because it was the basic policy of the Liberal Democratic Party not to irritate the United States.

6. The government of Hatoyama and the discussion of an East Asian community in Japan

Prior to the elections for the House of Councilors in 2009, Mr. Yukio Hatoyama, who was President of the Democratic Party of Japan, released a paper entitled My Political Philosophy. In the paper, he stated:

“How should Japan maintain its political and economic independence and protect its national interest when caught between the United States, which is fighting to retain its position as the world’s dominant power, and China which is seeking ways to become one? The future international environment surrounding Japan does not seem to be easy. This is a question of concern not only to Japan but also to the small and medium-sized nations in Asia. They want the military power of the U.S. to function effectively for the stability of the region, but want to restrain U.S. political and economic excesses. They also want to reduce the military threat posed by our neighbor China while ensuring that China’s expanding economy develops in an orderly fashion. I believe these are the instinctive demands of the various nations in the region. This is also a major factor accelerating regional integration.”



The Democratic Party of Japan, whose President is Mr. Hatoyama was officially expressing an interest in an East Asian Community, secured a parliamentary majority in the general election in August of the year, accomplishing a change of government for the first time since 1955. When Mr. Hatoyama resigned as Prime Minister later on; an East Asian Community still found its way into the political agenda of the Japanese government.

7. Conclusion

Since the 1920s, two schools of thought have co-existed in Japan: one upholding internationalism which stresses the relations with the international community and the other upholding Asianism which stresses cooperation with Asian countries. Due to its defeat in World War II, internationalism focusing on the relations with the United States dominated Japan's foreign relations between the 1950s and the 1980s. However, the ending of the Cold War followed by the rapid economic growth of China gave rise to Asianism and a discussion of an East Asian Community.

The change of governments in Japan provided an opportunity for the issue of an East Asian Community to be integrated into the official foreign policies of Japan. Now that China has become the second largest economy of the world, Japan is going through a process of trial and error exploring ways to deal with a powerful China while honoring the alliance with the United States.

The economic reality of Japan and the changes surrounding the security of East Asia will require Japan to establish the principles of its Asian diplomacy based on realistic requirements. In this context, a discussion of an East Asian Community is bound to be an important issue on the political agenda of Japan regardless of the degree of importance Japan attaches to it.



*IV. The Current State and Prospects
for East Asian
Multilateral Security Cooperation*

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1. Foreword

In order to institutionalize and stabilize multilateral security cooperation in East Asia, it is important first and foremost to maintain and control regional order according to international law, norms, and rules based on mutual trust rather than inter-state relations swayed by power. In particular, every state as a member of the security community must pursue common security initiatives to transform preemptive military strategies, allocations of military power, and weapons systems into a defensive mechanism, while also developing a common interest for collective identity based on common interests, and must work together towards preventive diplomacy in order to prevent the occurrence of accidental conflicts. Contrary to these expectations, the East Asian region at present has accomplished dynamic economic progress, where as its regional security order remains unstable due to issues arising from past historical legacies, security issues surrounding the Cross-Straits and the two Koreas, and U.S.-China rivalry in vying for regional leadership in East Asia.

Conflicts surrounding the sovereignty of intra-regional territorial islands and seas, Japan's distortion of contents in history texts and visits of political leaders to the Yasukuni shrine are in the context of the rise of nationalism destabilizing East Asian regional security order. Unstable peace in the Korean peninsula, North Korean nuclear issues, and Cross-Straits relations are legacies of the cold war era that immensely affects the future directions of East Asian security order. Accordingly, the evolution and development of East Asian security



order in the future will be based on the course of compromise and conflict due to strategic interests of the states. In the midst of the increasing possibilities of a global scale conflict, the Korean peninsula remains divided into North and South, and North Korea's nuclear issues - which will determine the fate of the peninsula - seem difficult to be resolved via the vehicles of U.S.-China hegemonic rivalry.

The United States in the global order established after the Cold War has played a hegemonic role in acting as the pivotal player in maintaining international order based on its strong military and economic power. As the sole global hegemonic state in world history, the U.S. apparently does not want to see another regional hegemonic state in Europe and Asia due to security concerns. In the past, the U.S. had taken a wait-and-see attitude on the balance of power mechanisms of other regional leaders Great Britain, France, and China, towards the rise of European and Asian regional hegemonic states - including Germany under Emperor Wilhelm, Germany under Hitler, Imperial Japan, and the former USSR - and in the event of failures of anti-hegemonic policies, the U.S. had played the role of an offshore balancer to contain and deter via military intervention the rise of a regional hegemonic state.¹

In the aftermath of the Cold War, China's remarkable economic progress has destroyed the preexisting balance of power mechanisms of multipolarity, and a new form of international order is anticipated. Simply put, from the U.S. perspective, Asia's regional balance of power is reconstructed due to the rise of China as a regional hegemonic state. Accordingly, China is the sole state within the East Asian

region and in the world that could contest and challenge the United States with its rapid development. As of late, the U.S. initiated debates on the ‘China Threat’, while with these debates the reinforcement of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the development of missile defense to tackle security threat could also be attributed to the U.S.-China power rivalry.

As the post-cold war East Asian regional order likely to be formulated in accordance with the U.S.-China power balance structure in the future is a vital factor in the security environment of the Korean peninsula, research on the prospects strategies for future East Asian security order is necessary and required for Korea’s national interest. Regarding the U.S.-China power rivalry and future East Asian order, the Administration has sought to transform the characteristics of the U.S.-Korea Alliance from its preexisting traits based on the conditions of the Cold-War era, while pursuing internal balancing strategy via self-defense to effectively respond to the rapidly changing East Asian order, through the establishment of the ‘Concept Plan 5029’, official government stances on the strategic flexibility of the U.S. Forces, and the development of an East Asian stability theory. Also, it has sought to peacefully manage and resolve North Korean nuclear issues, which may be downgraded as a byproduct of the U.S. China hegemonic conflict, and in the event that North Korean nuclear issues could be resolved to a certain extent, the Administration seeks to develop the current six-party-talks into a Northeast Asia Multilateral Consortium to address intra-regional security issues and to change the current state of cease fire to a peaceful mechanism in the in the Korean peninsula.



Given such background, this research seeks to first diagnose the current issues of East Asian security according to the steadfastly changing East Asian security environment owing to the U.S.-China hegemonic contest, and as a case study by the Government and the academia to control for East Asian regional security, analyze the conditions of formation of the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). A large part of the literature on East Asian multilateral security system approaches the possibility of East Asian multilateral security cooperation from a constructivist view that with the change of perception from the pursuit of absolute security of states to a pursuit for common and cooperative security which also takes the security of other states into consideration. However, this research seeks to stress that the realist basis of multilateral security cooperation lies in a “balanced bipolarity” in which a military balance has been established; and provide evaluations that since in the case of East Asia, multipolarity is gradually being transformed into an “unbalanced bipolar system”, the possibilities for an East Asian multilateral security cooperation are very low at the present stage. In the analysis, it is argued that in order for absolute security to be transformed into cooperative security, various factors of power balance and cultural homogeneity are required. In particular, the paper addresses the positions of China and the U.S., the main players in the bipolar spectrum in East Asian interstate relations, thereby forecasting the possibilities limitations of East Asian multilateral security cooperation.

In this context, this paper argues that as a strategy to form an East Asian Security Community, transforming East Asia’s unbalanced

bipolarity into a balanced bipolarity is suggested by changing the U.S. strategy of destroying the status quo of East Asian regional order to a status-quo oriented strategy. Also, the paper argues that we should work towards transforming East Asia's "hostile power balance" into a "friendly power balance" by facilitating exchanges and cooperation and uniting civil societies among the East Asian states.

2. The State of East Asian Multilateral Security Cooperation

A. Proposals from States for Multilateral Security

Proposals regarding multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific were mainly brought up by Russia in the course of the breakdown of the Cold War. In May of 1985, Gorbachev, the then General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, proposed for the establishment of an 'All-Asian Security Forum'.² In extension of this proposal, he proposed for the establishment of a 'Pacific Security Conference' in 1986, the 'Vladivostok Declaration' in the same year, and the 'Krasnoyarsk Declaration' in order to lead the proposal for a multilateral security dialogue. In 1990, Shevardnadze, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union proposed for an East Asian Security Cooperation Initiative.³ In July 1990, Gareth Evans, the then Foreign Minister of Australia proposed for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) modeled after the CSCE of Europe at the ASEAN-PMC (Post Ministerial Conference), and in July



of 1991, former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Cecil Clarke called for a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD).⁴

Korea's efforts for multilateral security started when former President Roh Tae-woo proposed for the establishment for a Consultative Conference for Peace in Northeast Asia for six Northeast Asian countries in his keynote address at the 48th U.N. General Assembly. In 1993, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Han Sung-joo proposed for the establishment of a security cooperation entity at the small regional level modeled after the CSCE of Europe. Also, in May 1993, the Korean Government officially proposed for a Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASD) at the 26th Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) and the 1st ASEAN Regional Forum Senior Official Meeting (ARF-SOM) in Bangkok.⁵

In July 1991, former Foreign Minister Nakayama of Japan proposed for a multilateral security dialogue to be established within the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC), and in extension of the proposal, former Prime Minister Miyazawa of Japan in January 1993 presented the 'Miyazawa Doctrine' in Bangkok, Thailand, urging for a multilateral security dialogue among countries of the Asia-Pacific region at the event of his ASEAN tour. In this regard, Japan contributed significantly to the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).⁶ Also, there were movements to develop the six-way-talks into a Northeast Asia Security Cooperation Entity during the Roh Moo-hyun Administration era to resolve North Korea's nuclear issues.

These proposals for multilateral security at the East Asian regional

level were based on the notion that East Asian national security still remained in the domain of realist perspectives, and were in attempt to lessen and alleviate arms race and intra-regional security instability arising from territorial disputes, North Korea issues, and hegemonic rivalry. In an effort to partially address these issues, a multilateral security dialogue and cooperation council has been established for intra-regional security issues, but successful results of these efforts remain minimal.

B. Various Institutions and Dialogues

Instigated by an agreement at the ASEAN+Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN+PMC) in July 1993 and promulgated at the Thailand Conference in July 1994,⁷ the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the sole mechanism for inter-state level multilateral security dialogue, and addresses issues regarding the establishment of mutual trust, increasing transparency, and expanding the areas of cooperation among the states in the region. In overall assessment, the ARF is seen to be in the transition from its primary stage of building trust to its second stage of preventive diplomacy.⁸ Within the ARF, there is the ARF-FMM (Foreign Ministers Meeting) as the final decision making entity, and the ARF-SOM (Senior Official Meeting) at the vice-ministerial level, and the Inter-Session Support Group (ISG) for mutual trust building issues.⁹

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) is a non-governmental multilateral cooperation entity established by the consortium of think-tanks and research institutes of 10 government



- related states in the Asia-Pacific region since June 1993. It is the main multilateral security cooperation entity at the non-governmental level in which security cooperation at the government level is facilitated by government officials and researchers from 21 countries in the Asia-Pacific who take part in the council as individuals and provide research presentations and policy suggestions to the governments regarding security cooperation every year. CSCAP not only supports mutual support the ARF with policy issues regarding mutual trust building mechanisms and preventive diplomacy, but also formally and informally reports to the ARF for policy suggestions regarding its results from the working groups and seminars.¹⁰ Informal dialogues within the CSCAP include the North Pacific Working Group (NPWG) and the North Pacific Cooperation for Security Dialogue (NPCSD). Since its first meeting in Tokyo in April 1995 to its reestablishment of its preexisting working group into a new research group, the NPWG has sought to facilitate dialogues and security cooperation focusing on Northeast Asian security issues, particularly on the Korean Peninsula. The NPCSD, which was promulgated with the proposal of former Canadian Foreign Minister Clarke in 1990 started off with its first meeting in April 1991 covering a wide range of issues including non-traditional security, regional trust building, and history and culture and prospects for regional security cooperation.¹¹

The Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), established in May 1993, is a non-governmental security dialogue centered at the UC Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, which discusses

issues regarding the two Koreas and the surrounding four major powers (Japan, China, United States, and Russia) with participants of the civil society.¹² It is a useful venue in which North Korean delegates participate and express their governmental positions regarding North Korean nuclear issues, and the dialogue also commits itself to issues outside the traditional security realm, including non-traditional security issues of trade, investment, and technology for enhancing economic cooperation, environmental protection, drug trafficking and terror.¹³ The Asia Pacific Roundtable is a meeting hosted by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, held in Kuala Lumpur every June since 1987. It deals with issues regarding intra-regional conflict prevention and trust building as main agenda and covers various issues on maritime cooperation and non-traditional security cooperation.¹⁴

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization established with its secretariat in Beijing in January 2004, was formed in accordance with the St. Petersburg Summit Meeting in Russia in June 2002, and was modeled after the annual summits of the Shanghai Five Group consisting of five states excluding Uzbekistan.¹⁵ In June 2001, the SCO was established by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, with the addition of Uzbekistan as a new member, in pursuit of a new regional multi-dimension cooperation entity in the Eurasia region, and covers issues of bilateral and multilateral cooperation of member states including terror and military issues.¹⁶

The Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) was established in 1993 for mutual trust building



and conflict prevention at the government level by the proposal of Former President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan at the 47th U.N. General Assembly in October 1992, for a regional security cooperation entity resembling the OSCE.¹⁷

The Asia Security Conference, as known as the Shangri-La Dialogue is a non-governmental senior level defense official conference which was established by the agreement of Great Britain's International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Singaporean government, and held its first meeting in June 2002. Currently, incumbent defense ministers and vice ministers and other relevant defense officials from 27 countries including Asia-Pacific states such as ASEAN, Korea, United States, Japan, China, Russia, and western European states including Great Britain, France, and Germany are participating in the conference.

East Asian multilateral security dialogue is mainly centered on trust building in order to relieve security threats, but due to the disparities among major powers and states in the region and the experiences and legacies of imperial wars, hegemonic rivalry stunt the institutionalization of a government-level security cooperation entity despite the various efforts and proposals for multilateral security cooperation that are put into at the governmental and civil society level, with the exception of the ARF. With the dynamic economic development of the East Asian region and the increasing interdependence, states in the region have come to realize the necessity for a multilateral security cooperation entity to better economic development; however, the economic strains of the current Global Financial Crisis has decreased the motivations of states for multilateral security cooperation.

C. East Asian Multilateral Security Concerning North Korean Nuclear Issues

Before and after 1990, there have been continuous attempts to establish a multilateral security entity on issues surrounding the Korean peninsula. The first of these is the four-way-talks established by a proposal in the Korea-U.S. Summit Meeting in April 1996. The four-way-talks was a product of willingness of the two Koreas, the U.S. and China to resolve issues of peace in the Korean Peninsula, and eventually developed into the six-way - talks including new members Japan and Russia, to function as a tool framework to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear crises.¹⁸

Meanwhile, the Limited Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone for Northeast Asia, a non-governmental conference established in February 1995, has been the venue of exchange of views on evaluations of nuclear threats and current status of security, with Korea, the U.S., Japan, China, Russia, and Mongolia as the official participating states and Finland, Argentina, and France as observers. However, North Korea has not taken part in this conference since its participation in the preparatory meeting held in Beijing in 1992.¹⁹

The ARF has provided for a multilateral institutional framework regarding East Asian security, but it still remains as a loose cooperative entity to this day, and lacks the capacity in effectively addressing sensitive security issues confined to the East Asian region.²⁰ But North Korea shows particular interest in the ARF among all multilateral security dialogues. In September 1999, during



the U.N. General Assembly period, North Korea at the foreign ministers meeting with the Philippines and Australia specified its intent to join the ARF as a member after normalizing its diplomatic relations with ARF member states that it has not established official ties with, and applied for membership to the ARF in April 2000. The assessment on the reasons for North Korea's joining the ARF is that it felt the urge to counter and respond to the criticisms on North Korea adopted in ARF chair statements regarding North Korea's nuclear missiles development and security threats. Also, perceiving ARF as a cooperative entity in a relatively free from the U.S. influence, North Korea may have sought to establish a peaceful image to alleviate pressures from the U.S. With these actions of gaining membership to the ARF, North Korea seems to have improved its relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors and may have anticipated economic aid from them.²¹

What is worthy of attention first and foremost, is that North Korea is consistently participating at least intermittently in the ARF foreign ministers meeting, seminars on trust building, ARF-SOM, trust building seminars, and inter-session working group meetings of the ARF. In these meetings, North Korea has stressed on the summit meetings of the two Koreas and the 6.15 Joint Declaration to show that it is striving to improve its relations with South Korea, and that it is seeking to promote opening up its economy and normalizing relations with western nations, thereby seeking for better relations with the rest of the international society.²² However, it is difficult to interpret these actions as a behavior taken by North Korea with full understanding

of the intents and benefits of the multilateral dialogues at this point.²³

From the perspectives of international politics, the six-way-talks raised positive expectations as a starting point for East Asian peace community formation, being a multilateral mechanism utilizing tools of trust building and reconciliatory cooperation to avoid North Korean threats and to establish common security and peaceful order in East Asia.²⁴ The six-way-talks in the East Asian security environment draw particular attention owing not solely to the significance of North Korean nuclear issues, but also to the fact that its methods of resolution are based on the first government-level multilateral talks ever and that members to the talks had the willingness to develop the talks into an East Asian multilateral security cooperation entity.²⁵ In actuality, the possibilities for a multilateral security cooperation can be traced back to the 9.19 joint statement, in which an agreement was reached ‘to search for methods and tools to promote Northeast Asia’s security cooperation and to strive for perpetual peace and stability’, and also in the 2.13 Agreement at the 5th meeting of the talks in which five working groups (Northeast Asia Security System Working Group) were established.²⁶

Nevertheless, the main crux of the problem lies in whether denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will be feasible through the six-way-talks. Up to this point, it appears that North Korea is consolidating its will to possess nuclear power, but should North Korea have any will at all to negotiate, it is apparent that negotiations will be held in North Korea’s possessive state of nuclear weapons.



The notion that North Korean nuclear issues may be resolved through the six-way talks paradoxically implies that possibilities for an intra-regional mutual security cooperation at the Northeast Asian level are bigger, and moreover, that the establishment of a multilateral security cooperation entity is possible. However, if we regard North Korean nuclear issues not solely as North Korea's self defense issue, but as a symbol of mutual power struggles among Northeast Asian states, resolving North Korean nuclear issues at this point will be difficult and therefore envisioning the development of the six-way-talks into a Northeast Asian multilateral regional cooperation entity would also be difficult.

3. Issues and Prospects on the East Asian Multilateral Security Cooperation

A. Transitions in the East Asian Security Environment

Since entering the post-cold war era, the East Asian region has accomplished dynamic economic progress in the 21st century, but has also witnessed important changes in the strategic environment. Accordingly, as the East Asian architecture to be established in the course of the formation of the U.S.-China hegemonic rivalry structure, is a vital factor to the security environment in the Korean peninsula. And therefore, the U.S.-China hegemonic contest is highly likely to significantly influence the formation process of the East Asian multilateral security cooperation. Considering the differences in

the security atmospheres of Europe and East Asia, Europe is in transition to the post-modern era, East Asia is still burdened in the triple-tasks of transitioning from the modern era, going through modernization and heading towards post modernization.²⁷ The realist national security paradigm in the 21st century in East Asia still remains a dominant theory. Contest among the East Asian regional actors due to power transitions, sovereignty issues and unresolved territorial disputes, lack of common understanding on history are factors that compel power stability theory to be the crucial element for regional peace and stability.²⁸ In particular, sovereignty conflicts with unresolved issues of state building and ethnic establishment in the transitional period to the modern era is intertwined with the power stability system which complicates East Asian international politics even further.²⁹

The East Asian region, which consists of militarily and economically strong actors, is the region retaining the highest potential for conflict. In 2007, defense spending ranks were in the order of the following: the United States (1st), China (2nd), Russia (3rd), Japan (6th), Korea (11th); Gross National Income (GNI) ranks were in the following: the United States (1st), Japan (2nd), China (4th), Russia (11th), and Korea (13th). In terms of economic and military capacity, East Asian states rank around 10 in comparison to the world. In this context, the relative power struggle between the U.S. and China appears to be the most striking event in the changes in East Asian international order, and the reactions to this event from surrounding neighbors also



demonstrate conflictual dimensions within the system of power struggles.³⁰ In addition to this phenomenon, East Asian states are reinforcing their military capability in an effort to enhance their defense capability. While defense spending in Western Europe has been maintained status-quo or decreased in recent years, East Asian states have steadily increased the amount of defense spending and states surrounding the Korean peninsula have sought for modernization of its military capability in an effort to maintain and expand their influence on one another.³¹

East Asian regional security order has shown relative instability due to historical legacies, issues regarding the Taiwan Straits and North Korea, and U.S.-China contest over regional security leadership. The East Asian regional security environment primarily derived from past legacies. Moreover, past history issues appear to be directly linked to trust, identity, and regional group identity issues among regional actors. Factors of regional instability are the remnants of the foreign policies that were formulated based on past political, economic, and socio-cultural fundamentals in East Asia and also imperialism and the Cold War. Therefore, East Asian security order is not simply a result of policy-making efforts of actors in the region, but results of mutual reaction of resources and actors at the regional and global level. Conflicts over sovereignty on maritime and intra-regional islands, Japanese history textbook issues and so forth are the remains of the imperialist era that destabilize regional security in East Asia to this day, and instability in the Korean peninsula, North Korean nuclear

issues, cross-straits issues are the remnants of the Cold-war era that greatly influence the directions of East Asian regional security order.³²

Accordingly, the evolution and development of East Asian regional security order will be based upon these historical legacies as a result of compromises and conflicts of intra and extra-regional strategic interests of states. Variables at the higher level including conflicts at the global level, intermingled with variables at the lower level including regional conflicts will thus create East Asian regional security environment and order. For instance, the Korean War broke out as an outcome of East-West bloc conflicts at the global level and ideological conflicts of the two Koreas at the regional level following the end of WWII. Though the linkages between conflicts at the global level and the regional level may have been weakened to a certain extent, it is reborn in the name of U.S.-China hegemonic contest at present. While the possibilities of conflict at the global level are augmenting, the Korean peninsula remains divided in two systems, and solutions to resolve the North Korean nuclear issues, a pivotal point in deciding the fate of the peninsula, via the U.S.-China hegemonic struggle, remains unclear.

As the United States, the only global hegemonic state in world history in the international order formed in the aftermath of the Cold War, does not want to see a rise of regional hegemonic state in Europe and Asia due to security reasons, it has strategically observed the power balancing policies of England, France, and China on the rise of regional hegemony in the past including Emperor Wilhelm, Hitler of Germany, Imperial Japan, and the former USSR, and played



the role of an offshore balancer through containment and deterrence or military intervention in the event that their anti-hegemonic policies failed to suppress the rise of regional hegemons.

Following the Cold War, owing to China's rapid economic development, the multipolar balance of power was broken in East Asia and the Asian continent as a whole, and a different form of international order is taking place. This could be seen as China's rise constructing new regional order in East Asia for the United States. Accordingly, China is considered as the sole nation that could challenge the United States not just in the East Asian region, but in the whole world, and is thus bringing about the 'China Threat' debate along with issues on U.S.-Japan alliance reinforcement, missile defense development, the Cheonan Ship incident, and security threats and U.S.-China conflicts involving South China Sea island territory. These debates and issues could be understood in the common context of U.S.-China hegemonic rivalry.

B. Positions of States on the Creation of an East Asia Multilateral Security Community (Forum)

(1) United States

The East Asian identity following the WWII was only understood within the context of America's anti-communist containment strategies. East Asia at the time was perceived in the same context as U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea multilateral defense treaties centering on the U.S., and

multilateral defense alliance systems such as the SEATO in the Southeast Asian region.³³ The U.S. generally takes a half-hearted approach regarding groups of countries situated on the west of the Pacific Ocean claiming independent regional identity. Rather, the U.S. has employed a more expansive term ‘the Asia Pacific’ other than ‘East Asia’, thereby obstructing communist expansion in the Cold War and expanding the fundamentality of democracy. In the post Cold War era, the U.S. has emphasized a regional concept including itself in order for continuous development of free market economy. The East Asia Strategic Review (EASR), the most specific report on America’s strategy on pan-East Asia designates its object of report as ‘East Asia and the Pacific region’, demonstrating perceptions on East Asia of the United States.³⁴

In general, policy makers of the U.S. have had doubts regarding the multilateral approaches on Southeast Asian regional security issues. This is also owing to negative perceptions on failed multilateral security organizations such as the SEATO and SENTO, and also past experiences of leaders of the former USSR who supported multilateral initiatives in Asia during the Cold War. All in all, the U.S. has regarded a large part of the East Asian multilateral security discussions as an effort to minimize or exclude U.S. influence in the region.³⁵

However, in the aftermath of the post-cold war era, in the course of globalization have come about issues that require multilateral efforts which cannot be solved solely by the U.S., and this naturally allowed for the role of regional organizations to grow. According



to the perceptions on these situations, the U.S. while consistently maintaining the East Asian regional security order through its traditional bilateral alliances has gradually begun to show interest in multilateral security cooperation entities in order to prevent the minimization of its influence in the region and also to expand its national interest.³⁶ The U.S. has come to realize that threats to its national security are not lonely limited to military threats from enemies but also comprehensive threats involving politics, economics, society, culture, science and technology, and also that national security threat is not confined to a certain nation's boundary but also 'supranational threats' that arise across national borders issues of terror, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental destruction, depletion of resources, AIDS, and SARS,³⁷ and therefore has decided to maximize interests and lessen burdens of maintaining East Asian security by employing a multilateral security system as a complementary trait to bilateral security systems.

An example of active U.S. involvement and participation in East Asian regional and multilateral entity would be the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). The U.S. had a lukewarm attitude towards the entity in the establishment stage but changed gears since 1993 with a proactive attitude, turning the APEC into a summit meeting and strengthening the functions and roles of the APEC. Above all, the reasons for this gear change on APEC for the U.S. appears to be that it has come to the fact that since the breakdown of the USSR, the main area of rivalry and competition in the international order has

changed from military to economic areas. Active U.S. involvement on East Asia's economic issues thus provide different meanings other than its involvement in Europe and the Americas, as on East Asia it has the purpose of dominance and maintenance or expansion of its influence.³⁸

The U.S. gradually expanded its involvement starting from multilateral dialogue regarding the initiatives on East Asian multilateral security. Multilateral forum regarding military issues has been going on since the 1970s with considerable success.³⁹ America's strategies on the Asia-Pacific still had a focus on bilateral alliance structures with main actors in the region in the early 1990s. In the documents on the East Asia Strategic Initiatives (EASI-90, EASI 92) and Bottom Up Reviews (1993), the U.S. makes its position clear that it retains its preferences on maintaining the strategic alliances with countries in the Asia-Pacific and its dispatch of armed forces, while multilateral security system remains only complementary to the U.S.⁴⁰

In November 1991, former Secretary of State James Baker mentioned the necessity to form Asia-Pacific community initiatives at the APEC summit meeting and proposed for the six-way-talks for multilateral discussions on the North Korean nuclear issues, expressing official positions of the U.S. regarding East Asian multilateral security cooperation.⁴¹ He basically retained opposition on institutionalizing multilateral security cooperation, stating "at the premature stage it is important to find a way to take multilateral actions rather than dwelling on structural approaches, and functionality is more important than formality in the Asia-Pacific."⁴²



The U.S. interest on multilateral security cooperation became clearer in the Clinton Administration's foreign policy. In July 1993, President Bill Clinton through the New Pacific Community Declaration based on 'common power, common prosperity, and democratic values' took a proactive approach anticipating that a multilateral approach will complement the existing security policy of the United States.⁴³ Also, Deputy Secretary of State for Asia-Pacific Affairs Winston Lord stated at the House of Senate hearing for approval that the central basis of the Asia-Pacific region is to develop a multilateral forum for security cooperation in parallel with strategic alliance maintenance. The U.S. agreed to push for the establishment of a Regional Security Forum at the ASEAN Expanded Foreign Ministers Meeting in May 1993, and the then U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that this forum will be able to develop into Asia's CSCE.⁴⁴

Since the 9.11 terror attacks, the Bush Administration acknowledged the need for multilateral cooperation for regional security while maintaining the basis of emphasis on alliance and expressing limited supportive stance on multilateral cooperation. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) assumes multilateral cooperation at the transnational level but the U.S. is not keen to multilateralization that may restrict U.S. activity realms. The U.S. has preferred 'selective multilateralism' by selectively applying unilateralism and multilateralism to secure national interest and international justification.⁴⁵ Simply put, the basic strategy of the U.S. is to reinforce existing bilateral relations based on treaties with its Asian allies, and to maintain balance of power in

Asia through promoting multilateral security dialogues without allowing China, Russia, or any other state to rise into a regional hegemonic status.⁴⁶

A large number of experts anticipated that the Obama Administration would take an embracing approach in foreign policy rather than the militarily oppressive approach taken by the Bush Administration, with a multilateral approach rather than a unilateral one, and as there are growing perceptions on the necessity for an effective regional framework in order to counter transnational threats in East Asia, expected that a multilateral network would be emphasized far more than by any other past administration. Nevertheless, contrary to these expectations, the U.S.-China rivalry has quickly unfolded following the Global Financial Crisis, with China rising as an economic power and the U.S. reinforcing bilateral alliances and improving its relations with Southeast Asian states.

The Washington Post reported an exemplary case in which the U.S. resumed its security cooperation with Indonesian Special Forces Kopassus, which had been banned for the last 12 years based on the fact that the entity had been involved in human rights violations and slaughter of civil military forces. In the analysis, the Post evaluated that in order to balance China; the U.S. is actively embracing not only Japan and South Korea, but also Southeast Asia, which had grown distant during the Bush Administration. The U.S. is steadfastly improving its relations not only with Indonesia, but also with Malaysia, a country of which it had shaky relations with while the former Prime Minister Mahathir was in office. Additionally, on the 13th, the U.S. also held a foreign ministers summit meeting with the socialist state



Laos in Washington, D.C., the first ever at the highest official level since the Vietnam War (1960-1975). The two states had never severed diplomatic relations, but had retained uncomfortable relations after the U.S. dropped hundred-thousands of bombs on Laos to soil in an effort to block supply routes of the Viet Minh during the Vietnam War.

Actions taken by the U.S. in 2009 to resume dialogues with Myanmar, which was rated as a 'rogue state' by the Bush Administration, could be interpreted in the same context, although the meaning of the actions taken have faded as the U.S. has recently raised issues on suspicions over Myanmar's nuclear cooperation with North Korea. Also, at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting held in Vietnam on July 20, 2010, ASEAN decided to accept the U.S. as a new member of the East Asian Summit Meeting, and the U.S. on the 23rd announced to invite ASEAN heads of states to Washington D.C. this fall. U.S. news reports say that with regard to the U.S. foreign policy on Asia, the Obama Administration has taken the approach to strengthen its relations with Asian countries other than China for a stronger voice on China's human rights issues.⁴⁷ A turn-over from past policies of 'patience' and 'quiet engagement' on China to 'saying one's piece', while at the sometime conducting a feint operation to pressure China by targeting China's 'base' ASEAN.

At least up until the point when President's Obama delayed meeting with the Dalai Lama, which had been originally planned to be held in the summer in order to create an atmosphere prior to the U.S.-China summit meeting last November, the Obama Administration appeared to be seeking for quiet diplomacy on China's human right

violation issues, but changes in the U.S. foreign policy on China were revealed starting with the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's criticisms on China's restrictions on the use of the internet, the Washington Post said.

In conclusion, the U.S. position on East Asian multilateral security cooperation is double-faced. As aforementioned, the main forms of security cooperation were based on alliances in East Asia, and the U.S. has sought to propose for multilateral security cooperation with a complementary dimension to the existing alliance systems as a fundamental basis in order to maintain international order, rather than having to resolve regional security issues through the construction of a multilateral security cooperation entity.

According to these facts, the positive actions taken by the U.S. on multilateralism can be summarized as follows: first, the U.S. is well aware of the expansion and potential of China's influence and its possibilities far better than any other state, and therefore seeks to embrace China, the biggest threat to U.S. interests in the region, while utilizing multilateral security dialogue as a surveillance mechanism to control for other potential threats within the region. Lastly, the U.S. is allowing for a multilateral approach as long as the U.S. is a part of it or within the range that the U.S. can exercise absolute influence over the entity. Accordingly, in the event that a multilateral security cooperation entity is established in East Asia, the U.S. will show only negative attitudes if it's the grounds for its active participation is not guaranteed.⁴⁸



(2) China

China's perceptions on East Asian multilateral security cooperation had been very sincere and reserved compared to its attitudes and behavior in other areas. This is owing to China's past experiences as a victim of imperialism and also fixed ideas on non-intervention since the establishment of the Chinese communist regime, compelling the Chinese government to prioritize bilateral relations rather than multilateralism as a security strategy for a very long time. China has expressed wariness on East Asian multilateral security cooperation, particularly on issues regarding Taiwan, South China Sea Islands, and fishing areas being discussed at a multilateral security forum, in that it can solidify the status of the U.S. and Japan.

However, these positions have changed since China has become an active member of the international society, and as China evolved into a rising economic power. In 1971, along with China's gaining membership in the UN and also a permanent seat in the Security Council, China was endowed with the responsibility and the rights to engage in multilateral forums and international regimes. Also, China's push for industrial and agricultural modernization policies served as a catalyst for its participation in multilateralism or multilateral agreements. Since 1984, with Deng Xiaoping's approval of the special economic zones, China expanded its trade and diplomatic relations with the ASEAN group of countries. Debates on the 'China Threat', which came about since the mid-1990s, also provided for an opportunity for Chinese leaders to participate in multilateral security forums. Apparently,

China was apprehensive of the fact that the ‘China Threat,’ which contended that neighboring states were wary of China’s rise and that Chinese superiority could lead to military expansion on surrounding areas - could actually serve as a factor for the setup of a coalition of anti-China association.⁴⁹

China is seeking for a constructive relationship for cooperation in establishing a stable security order in East Asia, amid its various conflictual encounters with the U.S. in prioritizing its national economic development. China is playing an active role in the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, while also actively participating in the ASEAN+3.⁵⁰ China regards the ASEAN+3 and the SCO as a new multilateral model retaining the values of its motto “accommodating varieties”, and is putting in all its efforts to elevate its status to a leading state in proposing for issues and rules at the regional multilateral level.⁵¹ Besides these, China is also actively participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).⁵²

After the mid-1990s, China has begun to break away from its security perceptions centered on military alliances, and in July 2001, stated the need for a new security concept with the main components of ‘mutual trust, common interest, equality, and cooperation’.⁵³ The crux of this new security concept is that states would seek for national security, security of other neighboring states, regional security, and onto global security leading to common security via cooperation among states based



on multilateralism. China's position abiding by its principles is that East Asian regional security cooperation must be promoted on the basis of cooperative security, common security, and comprehensive security.⁵⁴ In transitioning its perceptions to a new security concept, the following factors appear to be in the background. First, in the 21st century, cooperative security serves as an effective tool as a security strategy to secure national interests, rather than armed superiority based on military alliances. Second, international disputes and conflicts among various states maybe prevented through reciprocal arrangements. Third, East Asian states are the only official regional multilateral security dialogue and forum, and seeking for mutual trust and conflict prevention through the ARF is necessary. Fourth, there are apprehensions regarding the U.S.-Japan Alliance and perceptions that there is need to alleviate America's balancing of China beforehand.⁵⁵

Since the 2nd Plenary Session of the 8th National People's Congress in 1994, China has consistently reported the necessity to participate in regional multilateral security cooperation in the 'government maneuver reports', and has thus been actively participating in multilateral security cooperation frame works such as the ARF.⁵⁶ In November 2002, ASEAN and China agreed on a common declaration on cooperation in non-traditional security issue areas. Ever since, China has considered ASEAN+3 as a significant platform and route in strengthening cooperation and exchanging opinions with East Asian leaders.⁵⁷ In 2003, China signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation which stipulated trust building issues with ASEAN, and in October 2006,

China invited 10 heads of states of ASEAN member countries to Nanning and carried out a declaration of ASEAN denuclearization and an agreement on military exchanges and cooperation. In addition to this, China also adopted a joint declaration on the South China Seas, in an effort to alleviate tensions and lesson conflicts that may arise from territorial disputes in the South China Seas.⁵⁸

China also actively participated in the process of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), led by Kazakhstan. China sees that the objectives of the conference are in accordance with Asia's security objectives and that it will develop in stages catered to Asia's specificities and varieties. In 1996, China joined the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and established at the China committee in 1997. Since the establishment of the East Asia Cooperative Dialogue in 1993, China has been attending all the conferences and meetings.⁵⁹

As of present, China is an active moderator in the six-way-talks, but during the first North Korean nuclear crisis from 1993-1994 emerged as a major security issue, China did not volunteer as a main actor involved in the issue nor did it surface as a moderator. However, since the second North Korean nuclear crisis, China started to take North Korean nuclear issues seriously. China was alarmed that in the event that North Korea's nuclear development advances to a stage in which it becomes evident that North Korea possesses nuclear power, the security impact that it can have on China and other neighboring countries could possibly lead to war, which will bring about massive



inflows of North Korean refugees into China across the border, and at that point a U.S.-China military conflict is unavoidable. China exercised its diplomatic power to successfully launch the three way talks in consideration of the stances of the U.S. and North Korea, and developed it into the six-way-talks. As the host of the six-way-talks, China is seeking to establish an institution in which comprehensive security issues such as issues on proliferation of WMD, terror, drug trafficking, and international crime could be discussed.⁶⁰

All in all, China's active participation and push for East Asian multilateral security cooperation may be characterized as the following two points. First of all, it is stressing the need for multilateral security cooperation, but is also emphasizing the limitations and problems deriving from the U.S.-led military alliances. Bilateral military alliances led by the U.S. (i.e., U.S.-Korea security alliance) is not effective in addressing issues of international terror, proliferation of WMD, leaving these issues to be considered as remnants of the cold war.⁶¹ China also points out that it is China rather than Korea or Japan that played the crucial role in resolving North Korean nuclear issues. Another important point is that China's diplomatic tasks in creating surrounding international atmospheres favorable to its economic development matches its initiatives for East Asian multilateral security cooperation. These diplomatic tasks include non-traditional security instability factors including terror, drugs, and refugees, as well as security dilemmas deriving from perceptions on the China threat, and balancing behavior from the U.S. and Japan.

In particular, China sees the U.S. and Japan as a countering object and a cooperative partner at the same time. China has come to understand that it cannot rise into power having conflictual relations with the U.S., and therefore is seeking for multilateral security cooperation as it seeks to weaken and balance the bilateral alliances of the U.S. In other words, China is pushing for East Asia multilateral security cooperation in order to create an environment for its further rise. Also, by proactively pushing for East Asian multilateral security cooperation, it is seeking to wipe out the concerns on the China Threat, and stabilize issues on security dilemma, thereby seeking to rise as a peaceful superpower. It is not pushing for East Asian multilateral security cooperation because it is deemed plausible, but because it is seeking to alleviate tensions and lower security anxiety levels that has come about due to China's rise. Also, it also implies its strategic considerations in that China will take over the leadership in the process of restructuring East Asian regional order via stressing for East Asian multilateral security cooperation.

However, China is seeking for common leadership with the U.S., an extra-regional hegemonic state by taking into consideration the strategic interests of the U.S.⁶² Through the multilateral security cooperation mechanisms, it seeks to strengthen strategic communication and dialogues with the United States, ultimately leading to stable U.S.-China relations. China's seeking to develop the six-way-talks into an East Asian security cooperation mechanism in the past could be understood as an example of this effort.



(3) Other States

Russia's interest in East Asia can be attributed to the past transitions in Russia's geopolitical and geo-economics realities. The significance of Russia's foreign policy on the Northeast Asian region has increased with time, and security interests involved can be categorized into the following three: first, regarding territorial issues, it has the objectives to secure safety in the northeastern borders and to preserve territorial integrity. This is to resolve potential border disputes with China and the Northern Territories (Kuril Islands) dispute with Japan, and onto pursue denuclearization of the Korean peninsula as a solution to the neighboring nuclear issues in North Korea. Second, in terms of economic issues, there are issues regarding the development of natural resources distributed in Siberian and Far Eastern regions. These issues include development of lagging industries, attracting foreign investment and establishing a free economic zone, and in order to achieve these goals, close economic cooperation with neighboring states is essential. Third, from strategic perspectives, Russia seeks to play a balancing role in the triad of the U.S., Russia, and China. This is ultimately for Russia's elevation of its international status and also for balancing U.S.-led influence, in order to counter hegemonic rivalry among superpowers including China and Japan.⁶³

Regarding regional security cooperation, Gorbachev sought to lessen political and diplomatic burdens by implementing a new thinking (*novoe mushlenie*) in Russia's foreign relations, through promoting multilateral security cooperation instead of improving war deterrence

and arms race, which involves high costs. Starting from the establishment of the All Asian Forum proposed in India in May 1985, Gorbachev's ideas were revealed in the 1986 Vladivostok Declaration and the 1988 Krasnayarsk Declaration.⁶⁴

As Russia took over the former USSR in the 1990s, its strategy on multilateral security cooperation entity began to change fundamentally. The biggest among these changes was that Russia came to realize the fact that it no longer was the superpower USSR. Put in other words, the judgments' for national interests during the reigning era in which a socialist bloc had been constructed from Eastern Europe to the Pacific were no longer applicable after the breakdown of the USSR, and transitions on the perceptions of national interests were unavoidable in the midst of severe economic difficulties.⁶⁵ Ultimately, Russia is seeking for maximization of economic interests in East Asia, and in order to develop the Russian Far East, launching Korean and Japanese capital was deemed an important task.⁶⁶ In these respects, East Asian multilateral security cooperation was perceived as a mechanism that may reflect Russian interests.

Meanwhile, Japan traditionally has considered its bilateral security alliance with the U.S. as the first and foremost priority for its national security, while it has considered multilateral security cooperation as unrealistic and not a main agenda for its foreign security policy. The U.S.-Japan security alliance guaranteed national security for Japan with certainty and there was no need for other alternative security systems. However, in the aftermath of the cold war, when intra-regional traditional



threats were lessened to a great extent and various potential factors of conflict surfaced, and the U.S. began to pursue a new East Asia strategy, Japan had no choice but to reevaluate its existing security strategy.⁶⁷

It was around the middle of 1991 that Japan shifted its policy gears from half-hearted attitudes to proactive positions regarding East Asian multilateral security cooperation. In June 1991, after dispatching Yukio Sato, then Director of Intelligence of the MOFA, to a meeting in which directors of institutes of strategy from five ASEAN states participated, Japan came to realize that participating in intra-regional multilateral forums would be beneficial for its national interest. In the following month of July, Japan's transition of policies were specified by the then Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama, who expressed interest regarding multilateral security cooperation at the ASEAN-PMC.⁶⁸ Meanwhile, former Foreign Minister Ikeda proposed that the NEACD (then conducted at the civil level among Korea·United States·Japan·China·Russia) be elevated to a multilateral security dialogue organization at the government level at the ASEAN Regional Forum on July 24, 1996.⁶⁹ Though Japan had been rather isolated in the process of resolving regional security issues including issues on the Korean peninsula, it has sought to gain a permanent seat in the UNSC, expanded its PKO activities, and has become more proactive in multilateral security issues such as maritime security, thereby seeking for initiatives to lead international order through East Asian cooperation to stabilize the economy, resolve security issues, and reinforce political power.⁷⁰

However, the proactive actions taken by Japan regarding multilateral

security cooperation do not necessarily mean abandonment or weakening of the U.S.-Japan alliance relations. Japan as well as the U.S. still sees the U.S.-Japan Alliance as an essential stability factor in Northeast Asia, and perceives that it provides the foundations of a ‘sound multilateralism’.⁷¹ In this respect, Japan also retains the position of regarding East Asian multilateral cooperation as a complementing element to the U.S.-Japan alliance system.

C. Limitations and Prospects of East Asian Multilateral Security Cooperation

(1) The European Experience: CSCE/OSCE

The initial ideas regarding multilateral security in the European region derived from the proposal of former USSR Foreign Minister Molotov in 1954 to hold a Pan European Security Conference on Europe’s security assurance, which aimed at organizing a Pan-European Security System.⁷² Since the mid-1960s, the former USSR had consistently been requesting to the NATO to hold a pan-European security conference. The intent behind such requests of the USSR was to obtain justification from the West for its vested interests in Eastern Europe and territorial claims in Central Europe after the WWII, thereby excluding the U.S. influence in the European region. In particular, having two war fronts due to involvement in a border dispute with China, the former USSR sought to grow out of the security dilemma to maintain status quo in Europe by pushing for eternal divide of the



East and West Germany and neutralization. Regarding the former USSR's proposal to hold a pan-European security conference, western states showed different reactions due to various security interests. Maritime powers such as the U.S. and the U.K. showed careful and sincere attitudes anticipating that such a conference may weaken power rivalry between continental powers, which may diminish ideological divides and lax the operations of the NATO, ultimately bringing about a change in the European status quo. On the other hand, Germany showed negative attitudes to the former USSR request up until the latter part of the 1960s before Chancellor Willy Brandt of the Social Democratic Party of Germany took office, but changed into a favorable position after Brandt's New Eastern Policy (Neue Ostpolitik).

As the former USSR consistently requested to hold a pan-European security conference, NATO member states upon the WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organization)'s requests of the holding of the conference adopted the Harmel Report in 1967,⁷³ which provided the foundations for deterrence and containment oriented security policies and combining dialogues for alleviating tensions, and based on this report proposed for a Mutual Balanced Forces Reduction (MBFR) with positive signals to the WTO's requests. NATO's MBFR was basically intended to weaken elements of war threat, but also implied economic meanings to deter increases in military spending for arms race. As President Kennedy took transitions on the U.S. policy on the former USSR into a 'Flexible Response Strategy', western states responded to the requests of the USSR to organize a pan-European security conference to reduce traditional military spending.

In response to the NATO's proposal to reduce traditional disarmament, the WTO through the Budapest Declaration of 1970 stressed for the establishment of a 'foreign military disarmament committee and economic ·trade·science·technology·culture exchanges and cooperation committee' which allowed for the U.S. and Canadian participation, diminishing suspicions of the Western bloc on U.S. exclusion. Furthermore, in May 1971, USSR General Secretary Brezhnev expressed intent to accept the MBFR proposal by the NATO on the Central European region, increasing the possibilities for the formation of the CSCE. NATO in 1971 at the Brussels Cabinet Ministers meeting confirmed early hosting of the CSCE, and laid out proposals to improve areas on security issues, immigration, information sharing and cultural relations, cooperation in the academic fields and areas of economy·science·technology, and humanitarian issues. Amid this atmosphere, after preparatory meetings from November 1972 to June 1973, 35 states including the European states and the U.S. and Canada adopted the Helsinki Final Act, launching the CSCE at the Helsinki Summit Meeting in 1975.

The factors that led to the formation of the CSCE cannot simply be explained by functionalism or neo-functionalism theory. The functionalist explanation is that increasing interdependence of states allows for the formulation of an economic community, and when mutual exchanges and cooperation are customized through the economic community, spillover effects will occur that may relieve political and military issues among states. On the other hand, the neo-functionalist explanation states that increasing economic interdependence and exchanges and



cooperation naturally does not lead to establishment of a political and military security cooperation entity, and that factors of political and military obstacles must be removed via political will and institutional mechanisms in order to formulate a security cooperation entity.⁷⁴

However, realist theories provide far better explanations of the CSCE formulation than these (neo) functionalist theories. That is to say, the intents to formulate the CSCE, a multilateral security cooperation entity based on pursuits of common and cooperative security, could be found the Eastern and Western bloc foreign policy changes, from deviating from establishing a balance of power system through absolute security pursuits via arms buildup, to lesson military spending and maintain balance of power of status quo. The U.S. and the former USSR had established a “balance of terror” during the Cold War through infinite arms race, and came to the understand that further arms race is insignificant, so while seeking to maintain an appropriate scale of military power they also worked towards common security for balance of power of status quo. Accordingly, in generalizing the European experience, it can be said that a multilateral security cooperation entity among superpowers can be formed on the condition that at least a balance of power of status quo strategy is pushed for joint survival by the superpowers. Moreover, the backgrounds of the Western bloc including the U.S. to enforce articles on human rights stipulated in basket one of the CSCE and humanitarianism with cooperation in other fields stipulated in basket three, can be interpreted as its security strategy to avoid the exercise hard power such as mutually assured destruction based on mutual distrust in the past, which may lead to

destruction of Soviet socialism, and instead exercise soft power on democracy, human rights, and welfare.

The European Cold War order, which began just before the end of the WWII was transitioned into a period of alleviating tensions in the 1960s. The U.S. and the USSR fought an indirect war in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, and felt severe threats of nuclear war from 1958 to 1962 through the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis. In this process, the USSR was deeply concerned about the actions taken by the Western bloc to destruct status quo, which would minimize Soviet influence in the Eastern European region by taking the unresolved status of Germany as an excuse. In the 1960s, as the ideological conflicts between China and the USSR led to border disputes and possibilities of military conflict arose, the USSR would face two war fronts, one with Europe and another with China. Furthermore, the arms race with the Western bloc would further deteriorate the already limited economic capabilities lagged further behind the Western bloc, and for the economic development of the USSR and Eastern Europe, economic cooperation with the Western bloc was necessary, and in doing this, alleviating tensions with the U.S. was desperately needed. Accordingly, after the 1960s, the USSR with the changes in its domestic and external conditions, sought to alleviate tensions with the U.S. for a balance of power strategy for status quo.

During the 1960s, the U.S. also needed to alleviate tensions with the USSR according to the changes in its surrounding security environment. Due to the prolonged Vietnam War in the latter part of the 1960s, the U.S. greatly suffered from losses and costs in warfare. In addition,



excessive military spending due to arms race had weakened drivers for economic development at the civil level, and the U.S. saw its leadership in the world economy fade away as it faced challenges from Western Germany and Japan. Also, as France stressed the need for a *détente* in the 1960s, leaving the NATO and causing factions to the Western bloc, the U.S. felt an immediate urge to actively cover up the fragmentations within the bloc, and needed to control for the USSR's influence on Western Europe beforehand.

Accordingly, the U.S. and the USSR saw issues in expansive security policies based on containment and deterrence, and therefore sought to avoid arms race pursuing absolute security, and instead pursued a balance of power of status quo with the intent to alleviate tensions. The alleviation of tensions between the U.S. and the USSR contributed considerably to lowering the walls of the European divide during the cold war and also to European integration. Kennedy's unilateral concessions to the USSR. At the time of the Berlin Crisis, his peace strategies (1963) along with appeasement policies on the USSR, and an array of alleviation of tensions in Europe including the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty among the U.S., the USSR, and the UK (1963), the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT, 1968), SALT- I (1969-1972), SALT-II (1972-1974), the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement (1973), all meant that both Eastern and Western blocks presumed the status quo of Europe.⁷⁵ The alleviation of tensions between the U.S. and the USSR contributed to the formation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a multilateral security cooperation entity that seeks objectives of common security between

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

The factor that led to the successful formation of the CSCE in the Europe region as a multilateral security cooperation entity is the existence of NATO and the WTO. Originally, the backgrounds of the USSR's proposal of the pan-European security conference was in dissolving all kinds of alliances and establishing a European security system excluding the U.S., but these Soviet proposals were denied by the Western bloc. Even within the Western bloc, there were divided opinions on arranging the relations between the NATO and the CSCE. The divided arguments were a perspective that saw the CSCE as a subordinate to the NATO and another perspective that sought to initiate the CSCE as a complementary function of the NATO and to elevate the CSCE to the same level as the NATO, but the former view was adopted.⁷⁶ Similarly, the Eastern bloc responded to the Western bloc's NATO by maintaining the WTO as its collective defense mechanism.

One thing to note here is the hegemonic balancer roles that the U.S. and the USSR played in the NATO and the WTO collective defense mechanisms. As the two countries provided intra-regional hegemonic stability in Western and Eastern Europe, collective bipolar systems were constructed. After the WWII, the U.S. established the NATO as a tool to defend against Eastern European socialist threats and to control for regional security order and prevent the rise of a hegemonic state in Western Europe. Likewise, the USSR in defense against the Western alliances, established the WTO as a defensive alliance Had



these balanced bipolar systems not been constructed in Europe, the European region may have seen the appearance of an imbalanced multipolar system that may have expanded the potential of conflicts due to miscalculations and the rise of potential hegemonic states.⁷⁷ Furthermore, owing to a balanced bipolar system that retained the traits of minimizing accidental conflicts and the CSCE as a common security mechanism that maintained balance of power of status quo, the European region not only achieved maintenance of peace but also led the power rivalry of the two blocs to peaceful transitions, bringing about regime changes of the USSR and Eastern Europe.

Therefore, the necessary condition for the formation of a multilateral security cooperation entity would be the existence of a balanced bipolar system,⁷⁸ and the sufficient condition for the construction of the multilateral security cooperation entity would be the existence of a balanced bipolar system that aims to maintain status quo. The internal construction of the bipolar systems could be divided depending on the existence of a collective defense system such as the NATO, or military alliances with a superpower that constructs bipolarity. If a balanced multipolarity is in place with the existence of a balance of power of status quo within the system, intra-regional security order will be maintained only if the multilateral security cooperation entity retains the capacity and traits of collective security with enforcement mechanisms on acts of invasion, and not solely seek common or cooperative security focusing on preventive diplomacy. This is owing to the fact that while the bipolar rivalry structure of two hostilities can be alleviated by a

collective defense system or a deterrence strategy of defense alliances and the cooperative characteristics of the multilateral security cooperation entity, a multipolarity consisting of several hostile relations requires a stronger collective security mechanism to decrease security threats.

(2) The Limitations and Prospects of the Formation of East Asian Community

The CSCE played a crucial role in peaceful regime transformation from communist regimes led by the former USSR, by alleviating the conflicts between the East-West blocs in Europe. In the steadfastly changing East Asian political atmosphere, Korea should seek for advancement in respective areas while carrying out the task of peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. However, if a peaceful security order is not constructed in East Asia, Korea's national objectives of peace and prosperity may also go astray. Therefore, Korea's first and foremost important security task is to create an East Asian security community resembling the CSCE in the 21st century.

However, as mentioned in the prior analysis, Europe's security community is an outcome of various security factors. So the question inferred here is whether there is a possibility to apply Europe's CSCE model to East Asia for stable regional security order. If such possibilities exist, what kind of conditions should be met? In fact, deriving from these perspectives, there have been various proposals in the past 5 to 6 years in order to implement the structure and policies of the CSCE in the Asia-Pacific region. But difficulties in the



implementation have been pointed out since this region not only retains disparities in the areas of history, culture, military structures, domestic politics, and economic development, but different perspectives are in place regarding hostility and rivalry among states, tendency of miss contacts among states, and different views on threats, which makes it difficult to implement the CSCE mechanism.⁷⁹

The difficult factors in implementing the CSCE multilateral security cooperation into East Asia are as follows: The U.S. and the former USSR during the cold war had a realized the balance of terror and mutual assured destruction through infinite arms race, and had established the balance of power through traditional security race in Europe, enabling the law of diminishing returns and the status of strategic balance in which no further arms race would matter. Accordingly, the East and West blocs shared a common initiative for the formation of the CSCE by changing its foreign diplomacy policy to lessening military spending and seeking to maintain status-quo and the balance of power, rather than pushing for absolute security via increased military spending. Generalizing the European experience, it is understood that at least a strategic push by superpowers for balance of power for status quo with a focus on joint survival is needed for the establishment of multilateral security cooperation mechanisms.

Of course, as we have seen in the European case, regional security may be peacefully maintained and managed as long as a collective defense system which includes a hegemonic moderator such as the U.S., which goes in tandem with a multilateral security cooperative entity which controls military relations with other collective defense

systems. On the other hand, it is more difficult to establish a multilateral security cooperation entity in a bipolar system, in which regional actors and a superpower are linked via bilateral military alliances. It is difficult to realize a collective defense system in this case because intra-regional actors have hierarchical relations via alliances with the superpower, but equal and parallel relations are difficult to be constructed due to historical legacy and conflicts of interests. Therefore, if a collective defense system did not exist, taking common action principles and decision-making on the counterparts will be difficult, and creating a multilateral security cooperation entity as a venue for discussion and communication is again in jeopardy. In this respect, having the U.S.-China moderating hegemons as representatives of the regional collective defense system is a sufficient condition for the formation of an East Asia security community.

Applying this case to East Asia, the region is on the rise for arms race and balance of power with status quo does not exist in the region. In addition, the current East Asian security environment involves a lot of instability and uncertainty due to the changes in the international security environment following the post-cold war era, and this makes it far more difficult to pursue common security interests. After the post-cold war, East Asia has experienced pivotal changes in the strategic security environment, i.e., the breakdown of the former USSR, colonial experiences, the rise of China, North Korean issues, Japan's extreme rightism, and American unilateralism. East Asia under a unilateral system has the two faces of cooperation and conflict, agreement and opposition with the main traits of intra-regional



increase of state-of-the art military capability and military spending, and instability and uncertainty. America's unilateral global strategies, instability on the Korean peninsula and military tensions surrounding the North Korean nuclear issues, Japan and China's intra-regional competition, Cross-Straits conflicts between Taiwan and China, and territorial and maritime disputes on islands and the seas compel the East Asian region to fall out of the status quo in managing its security environment.

As East Asia's regional security instability factor and the U.S.-China hegemonic rivalry at the as a global interest gets intermingled, the East Asian region will be subject to severe security threat, contrary to the libertarian optimistic perspective that economic interdependence will bring about peace and stability in the region. The policy directions of countries in the region in resolving these perceived security threats, especially the strategies of the U.S.-China relations will have a critical impact on the formation of an East Asian security community.

The East Asian security order formation in the coming years will be directly intact with the foreign policies on East Asia of China and the United States. In particular, China, currently at a defensive position in terms of economic and military respects, will passively react to the East Asia policies of the U.S., rather than proactively lead future East Asian regional order, seeking for a balanced strategy for economic development and military buildup with multifaceted strategies in policy making based on the developments. In this respect, the most favorable environment for the formation of an East Asian security community will be a circumstance in which the U.S. and China pursues

a balance of power strategy based upon the formation of U.S.-China strategic balance, and hegemonic rivalry is not based on the exercise of hard power consisting of military and economic power but on the exercise of soft power based on democracy, human rights, and welfare.

But the reality as of late demonstrates the strategic imbalance with the U.S. at the center, and a strategic balance between the U.S. and China is absent. Further economic rise and military build-up of China will gradually balance the strategic imbalances between the two countries, but at the present stage, the U.S.-China strategic imbalance adds more difficulties in the formation of an East Asian security community. The strategic imbalance between the U.S. and China is revealed in their positions regarding an East Asian economic cooperation entity.

For instance, the U.S. in order to deter and contain the potential regional hegemon China, is utilizing multilateral security cooperation to complement its basis of bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea, to expand transparency on China's military policies and resolve North Korean nuclear issues on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. position regarding an East Asian multilateral security cooperation entity stipulated in the EASI-90 and the EASI-92 shows that it prefers the maintenance of bilateral alliances with states in the region and the dispatch of U.S. armed forces in the region, while a multilateral security cooperation entity is fairly minimal in U.S. policy.⁸⁰ In a region like East Asia, contrary to the case of Europe in which a hegemonic moderator such as the NATO as a collective defense system exists, the U.S. will have to suffer its loss of influence over the region in terms of agenda setting and decision making as well as loss of control over its existent bilateral



alliances in the event that a multilateral security cooperation entity is established as an international regime. Adding to this is the incentive that the U.S. seeks to deter China's rise to hegemonic status not only through its bilateral alliances but also via a multilateral security cooperation entity in which the U.S. retains a superior position of national power.

For instance, the U.S. is seeking to minimize threats deriving from uncertainties by promoting transparency on defense policies of potential threats in the region at multilateral security dialogues such as the ARF.⁸¹ It also seeks to change the status quo in the Korean Peninsula by denuclearization of North Korea in the six-way-talks, a multilateral cooperative framework.⁸² It is apparent that the U.S. seeks to utilize a multilateral security cooperation entity to destruct the East Asian status quo; the U.S. proposal to transform the six-way-talks into an East Asian multilateral security cooperation entity should the six-way-talks be successful in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis to deal with North Korean human rights issues reveals this intent. In addition to such intent, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an example of U.S.-led multilateralism, which presumes multilateral cooperation, directly targets North Korea while also targeting destruction of East Asian status quo.

The U.S. prefers selective multilateralism, in which it shies away from a multilateral framework where its strategic objectives of balancing China could be restrained, and is aiming to adopt unilateral multilateralism, in which it can have a strong leading influence in a multilateral platform deemed necessary.⁸³ These multilateral intents of

the U.S. are distant from the European multilateral security cooperation entity. Originally, common or cooperative security pursued by a multilateral security cooperation entity is to commonly manage and control security order via trust-building, preventive diplomacy, and limits to defense spending.

The asymmetrical U.S.-China power relations are reflected in China's position on the formation of an East Asian security cooperation entity. Seeking for a strategic balance with the United States through military build-up based on economic development, China is seeking to diminish the China Threat debate and to alleviate the preemptive character of U.S. military strategy on China, by turning to (North) East Asian multilateral security dialogues and cooperation. Not only is there an evident need to address increasing security threats such as the U.S. military containment of China, the reinforcement of the U.S.-Japan alliance, pushes for missile defense, enablement of rapid reaction forces of the U.S. armed forces overseas, and territorial disputes involving Southeast Asian states and Japan over fishing areas and the Spratley Islands, but also concerns of neighboring states regarding China's rise of power may provide the incentives for countries including the U.S. and Japan to form an anti-coalition against China. In order to wipe out these concerns, China is approaching East Asian multilateral security dialogues and cooperation.

China will accept at an extremely limited level the requests to increase transparency on its defense policy and reciprocity resulting from strategic competition with the U.S. in East Asia. Even if China become s a part of the multilateral security cooperation entity in the



future, it will only allow limited disclosure to its defense policy information and is currently showing half-hearted attitudes on accessing defense policy information of the U.S. and Japan.⁸⁴ Also, China is adamant on retaining the principles of non-intervention regarding sovereignty issues regarding Taiwan and Tibet, and on territorial and sovereignty issues regarding Spratly Islands, it strongly maintains principles to abide by multilateral dialogues or emphasizes on the positions of the countries directly involved.

China is seeking to take advantage of East Asian multilateral dialogues or cooperation favorable to make up for the strategic imbalance in its hegemonic rivalry with the U.S. This is because contrary to the positions of the U.S., which seeks to destruct the current East Asian status quo favorable to the U.S. interests; China's positions are an effort to maintain the current East Asian status quo in tandem with its initiatives for multilateral security cooperation.

The U.S. and China positions on East Asian multilateral security cooperation entity reflects U.S.-China hegemonic rivalry; the U.S., currently in a strategically superior position, is seeking to utilize a multilateral security cooperation entity to address North Korean nuclear issues, territorial disputes, and Tibet-Taiwan issues; on the other hand, China seeks to utilize a multilateral security cooperation entity to maintain status quo for countering the U.S. Accordingly, even in the event a multilateral security forum is constructed in the future, tensions may be alleviated through trust-building, controls on defense spending, and disarmament and East Asian peace and stability may be facilitated, but hegemonic competition will make envisioning a multilateral

security cooperation forum with similar functions of the CSCE exercising soft power difficult. Due to the asymmetrical power relations of the U.S. and China, abusing the multilateral security cooperation entity for power rivalry in the process of agenda setting and agreement will be inevitable until there is a strategic balance between the two states.

According to Muthiah Alagappa's patterns of international order,⁸⁵ East Asia retains a realist and instrumental order. Instrumental order is constructed in a Hobbesian hostile anarchy where maximization of national power and influence is pursued for survival, using hegemony, power balance, and cooperation among superpowers as the basis and international regimes as a complementary tool. East Asia's realist instrumental international order must be transformed into a normative-contractual order. A normative international order is fundamentally based on national survival, but pursues peace and prevention of war, while emphasizing comprehensive management of power and abiding by norms, rules and international law based on facilitating economic integration, constructing collective security cooperation entity, cooperative system among superpowers and a managed balance of power system.

In order for an East Asian multilateral security cooperation mechanism to be formed, a normative-contractual order based on "friendly balance of power" must be realized; the necessary conditions of policies for such realization of international order would be a strategic balance to overcome the imbalanced bipolar system at the present stage for the Korean government; and the sufficient conditions would be to facilitate exchanges and cooperation among East Asian regional states and to foster coalitions of civil society in developing and promoting various policy agenda.



NOTES

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- 4_ Lee, *ibid.*, p. 21.
- 5_ Sung, *ibid.*, p. 237.
- 6_ Lee, *ibid.*, p. 48.
- 7_ Sung, *ibid.*, p. 229.
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- 9_ Yong-sup Han et al., *Northeast Asian Security Community* (Seoul: NaNam, 2005), p. 44.
- 10_ Lee, *ibid.*, p. 23.
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- 12_ Sung, *ibid.*, p. 229.
- 13_ Lee, *ibid.*, p. 24.
- 14_ Sung, *ibid.*, p. 229.
- 15_ Lee, *ibid.*, p. 22.
- 16_ Sung, *ibid.*, p. 229.
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- 20_ Lee, *ibid.*, p. 85.
- 21_ Han et al, *ibid.*, pp. 55-56.
- 22_ Han et al, *ibid.*, p. 56.
- 23_ Han et al, *ibid.*, pp. 67-68.
- 24_ Sung, *ibid.*, p. 243.

- 25_ Gap-shik Kim, "Northeast Asian Regional Security Paradigm and North Korean Nuclear Issues," *Unification Issues Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Institute of Peace Studies, 2009), p. 26. At the First Six-Party-Talks in August 2003, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Yoon Young-gwan and Special Adviser for National Security Ra Jong-il at the Blue House pointed out the need to develop the current Six-Party-Talks into a Northeast Asian Multilateral Security Cooperation Entity, and American policymakers including former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Michael Armacost, former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, former U.S. Ambassador to Korea James Laney proposed for the development of the Six-Party-Talks into a Regional Security Forum in which six Northeast Asian states could collaborate in security affairs.
- 26_ Kim, *ibid.*, p. 27.
- 27_ Bo-hyuk Seo, "The Pathways of Multilateral Security Cooperation Institutionalization: Experiences of the C/OSCE and its Application Methods on Northeast Asia," *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (The Korean Association of International Studies, 2009), p. 21.
- 28_ Kim, *ibid.*, pp. 16-17.
- 29_ Kim, *ibid.*, p. 15.
- 30_ Kim, *ibid.*, p. 13.
- 31_ Kim, *ibid.*, pp. 17-18.
- 32_ Byung-duck Hwang, *U.S.-China Hegemonic Competition and Korea's Responsive Strategy* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2004).
- 33_ Han, *ibid.*, p. 74.
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- 35_ Han, *ibid.*, p. 87.
- 36_ Han, *ibid.*, p. 89.
- 37_ Han, *ibid.*, pp. 71-72.
- 38_ Han, *ibid.*, pp. 83-85.
- 39_ Han, *ibid.*, pp. 87-88. This refers to the 'Pacific Armies Senior Officer Logistics Seminar' (PASOLS) among high military officials of armed forces in the Pacific region led by the U.S. Armed Forces in 1971 and the 'Pacific Region Armed Forces Management Seminar' set up under the auspices of the U.S. WESTCOM in 1978. Nevertheless, these remained only a dialogue at a low policy level with primary objectives in enhancing dialogues among military officials for mutual understanding, and were not encompassing the purposes of a multilateral security cooperation entity



including delicate security issues and trust building.

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- 41_ Han et al, *ibid.*, p.90.
- 42_ Lee, *ibid.*, p. 40.
- 43_ Han, *ibid.*, pp. 90-91.
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- 46_ Sung, *ibid.*, p. 233.
- 47_ *The Washington Post*, 2010.7.22.
- 48_ Han et al, *ibid.*, pp. 96-98.
- 49_ Han et al *ibid.*, pp. 111-113.
- 50_ Sung, *ibid.*, pp. 234-235.
- 51_ Lee, Dong-ryul, "China's Perceptions and Strategies toward East Asian Multilateral Security Cooperation," *Journal of Chinese Studies*, Vol. 45 (Association of Chinese Studies, 2008), p. 306.
- 52_ Han et al, *ibid.*, p. 122.
- 53_ Kim, *ibid.*, p. 29.
- 54_ Lee, Dong-ryul, *ibid.*, pp. 312-314.
- 55_ Han et al, *ibid.*, pp. 134-135.
- 56_ Lee, *ibid.*, p. 43. At the 8th ARFF Foreign Ministers Meeting held in 2001, China declared that it is ready to support the efforts by the ARF for gradual development of dialogue and cooperation in non-traditional security areas, and emphasized the proposals regarding reports on multilateral joint military exercise and dispatch of observer groups to these exercises. In May 2002, China submitted a document on its positions on non-security cooperation reinforcement to the ARF senior official meeting. In July 2002, China submitted another document on its position regarding China's new definition of security to the 9th ARF Foreign Ministers Meeting.
- 57_ Han et al, *ibid.*, pp. 122-123.
- 58_ Lee, Dong-ryul, *ibid.*, p. 306.
- 59_ Han et al, *ibid.*, p. 124.
- 60_ Han et al, *ibid.*, pp. 131-133.

- 61_ Lee, Dong-ryul, *ibid.*, pp. 309-310.
- 62_ Lee, Dong-ryul, *ibid.*, p. 321.
- 63_ Lee, Shin-wha, *ibid.*, p. 50.
- 64_ Han et al, *ibid.*, pp. 189-190.
- 65_ Lee, Shin-wha, *ibid.*, p. 49.
- 66_ Sung, *ibid.*, pp. 235-236.
- 67_ Lee, Shin-wha, *ibid.*, pp. 46-47.
- 68_ Han et al, *ibid.*, pp. 143-144.
- 69_ Lee, Shin-wha, *ibid.*, p. 48.
- 70_ Sung, *ibid.*, p. 236.
- 71_ Lee, Shin-wha, *ibid.*, p. 48.
- 72_ Son, Ki-woong, *The Analysis of the CSCE/OSCE and lessons learned for the Northeast Asian Security Cooperation* (Seoul: Korea Institute of National Unification, 2004), p. 11.
- 73_ James Macintosh, *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective* (Ottawa, Canada: Department of External Affairs, Canada, 1985), p. 40; Son, *ibid.*, p. 13.
- 74_ Hong, Yong-pyo, *Theoretical Framework of the East Asian Security and Economic Cooperation*; Park, Jong-chul et al, *Forming the East Asian Security and Economic Cooperation Entity* (Seoul: Korea Institute of National Unification, 2003), pp. 10-11.
- 75_ Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, *Promoting the link age between East Asian Diplomatic/Security Cooperation and Economic Cooperation* (Seoul: Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, 2005), p. 18.
- 76_ *Ibid.*, p. 20.
- 77_ Mearsheimer, *ibid.*, pp. 638-639. Among the structures of international politics such as unbalanced bipolarity, balanced bipolarity, unbalanced multipolarity, balanced multipolarity, unbalanced multipolarity is said to be the unstable structure of international politics. Unstable multipolarity can bring about much more security threats than in bipolarity.
- 78_ The claim that multilateral security cooperation entities can be borne out of a multipolarity system is a misleading statement overlooking the points that the CSCE was borne out of a balanced bipolarity system, and that the reason why CSCE was transformed into OSCE under the U.S.-Soviet unbalanced bipolarity system was for the U.S. and Europe to maintain regional security order while countering the Soviets as a military superpower.



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- 82_ On September 7, 2005, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick stated that since the U.S. would be taking defensive measures not only against North Korean nuclear issues but also other criminal acts, no further maintenance of status quo in the Korean Peninsula is possible. Zoellick also added that he was very interested in developing the six-party-talks into a Northeast Asian multilateral security cooperation entity. *Yeonhap News*, September 7, 2005. Afterwards, Zoellick stated that if North Korea chooses the Chinese reform model, its relations with the U.S. would be improved. *Yeonhap News*, 2005.9.21.
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V. East Asian Community and Culture of Peace

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East Asian Community Building:
Issue Areas and Perspectives of Regional Countries

1. Introduction

East Asia is a region where ASEAN countries continue to achieve rapid economic growth. Korea, China and Japan intimately relate to each other geographically, making up one of the key axes of the world economy. East Asian countries are gradually forming a consensus at the political, social and cultural levels as well as through economic cooperation. Examples of this integration can be seen by the impact of Korean Wave on other East Asian countries and the reality that Korea is becoming a multi-cultural society. In other words, the concept of an East Asian community is evolving, based on cooperative relations and increased homogeneity.

East Asian cooperation is based on mutual economic relations, so that it is unimaginable for any of this region's countries to go it alone. At the same time, the intensity of human resources exchange among countries is growing. For example, the Indonesian Cia-cia Tribe that decided to use Korean as their official alphabet can be viewed as a Korean status symbol of today's East Asian interchange and cooperation. Especially, in Northeast Asia, Korea has become recognized as one of the world's top ten economies. Korea is recognized as a key agent in the world economy as symbolized by its presidency in the Group of Twenty (G20), forming close interrelations with Japan, a traditional economic power, and with China, aiming at being part of a Group of Two (G2).

However, in spite of such exchange and expansion of East Asian cooperation, it should be pointed that there exists an emotional and social distance among countries. Especially the conflicting relations



among the Northeast Asian countries negatively affect the formation of the East Asian community. Despite close economic and human exchanges, exclusive national sentiments and hostile expressions toward opponents are repeating Northeast Asia phenomena. The recent conflict between China and Japan around the Senkaku Islands (Daowidao) symbolizes this point. In spite of the deepened economic and human resource interdependence, underlying conflicts lie below the surface so that nationalist public sentiment outpourings are repeatedly and easily triggered.

East Asia consists of a dual structure of cooperation and conflict. The latter is the result of unsolved stemming from modern history, making it difficult to form substantial economic relations in the region. These underlying conflicts have created barriers in form a cultural community based on other, East Asian intimate interrelations - in spite of a commonality in culture and economics. The failure to achieve a substantial cultural community has weakened a common cultural intimacy among East Asians despite shared economic, diplomatic and security communities.

The solution may be to try refracted modern history, the origin of conflicts in East Asia, through the formation of a Northeast Asian peace culture. Given the distortions of modern history is a cause of Northeast Asian conflict, modern history needs to be re-examined with the aim for peaceful Northeast Asian coexistence. Accordingly, it is important to resolve the problems of refracted modern history so as to form a culture of peace aimed at coexistence by forming a Northeast Asian cultural community

2. Peace and Culture of Peace

There are many definitions of peace. Basically, however, peace means a state in which there is no violence and armed conflict among nations, races, groups and countries, including individuals as social beings. The concepts of negative peace and positive peace suggest the important need to understand peace.¹

Negative peace basically means a state in which there is no war and violence. Peace at a negative level refers to the non-existence of violence, poverty, and lack of freedom, etc., and it can be said that the experiences of the two World Wars have affected that concept's formation. However, in the concept of a negative peace, with its attaching importance to the occurrence of wars, there is no difference between peace and armistice, and it limits itself to the maintenance of existing international orders as being justified unless there is a war.

A positive concept of peace, beyond the war occurrence criterion, attaches importance to the realization of social justice and democratic mediation and to the cooperation among countries as well. The existence of social justice, democratic order and cooperation among countries means the elimination of violent situations. Thus, a positive peace is a state in which the positive conditions for peace, such as human rights security, economic development, and democratic participation, etc. are prepared. Factors obstructing positive peace can be ones more threatening to the achievement of the peaceful state by contemporary society. Conflicts exist in many countries where there are differences among races, nations, and religions. Fundamental rights and human



rights are seriously restricted by the exercise of dictatorships and authoritative systems. Contemporary society faces new factors of conflicts, such as opposition around essential resources to maintain industrial society and environmental issues, in addition to the traditional security issues among countries.

The positive peace concept factors in threats to peace, including structural violence as well as wars. Structural violence when referring to social injustice is a concept extended beyond violence at a physical level. It includes various factors in contemporary society threatening life stability. Structural violence includes famine and malnutrition, infringements on human rights, such as torture, unlawful arrest, imprisonment, assassination, and restriction of various fundamental rights by non-democratic authoritative regimes, etc. Judging from this perspective, it is difficult to view contemporary society is at a peaceful state following World Wars I and II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and Yugoslavian Civil War, plus international scale wars are in progress in Afghanistan and Iraq, etc. Moreover, in fact, negative peace at the level of the global village has not been accomplished given the constant possibility of a nuclear war, which can threaten the entire human civilization. At the same time, long-term civil wars continue in many countries which make up the global village.

Based on this interpretation of peace, the culture of peace can be defined as “a form of civilization of society in which actors who have abilities to form peace remove violence, mediate conflicts, and create peace through processes, contents, structures, and effects.” This definition

of culture of peace means that the state in which, and ability with which, conflicts are peacefully solved are important to whether culture of peace exists or not.

For the formation of the culture of peace to be possible, conditions at a few dimensions should be met. First, at the level of norms, the culture of peace should have a characteristic of controlling violence as a general guideline and a universally valid criterion of value. At the level of structure, in organizations concentrating the formation of the conditions of peace should have values and norms of the culture of peace. In addition, at the level of process, the culture of peace should be able to be obtained globally and in everyday life. At the level of function, the culture of peace should have effects and functions that stimulate peace with the continuous development of civilization.²

3. The Formation of the East Asian Community and Northeast Asian Culture of Peace

Today, capitalism is facing a new change in globalization, which means capital is securing a free area of actions beyond the countries' boundaries. The emergence of this new environment created a new globalized time flow beyond the borders. At the same time, globalization relates to the flow of localization, the combination of closely related states. Despite the existing basic framework, the idea of nationalism should be changed for the most part. A considerable number of



developed countries choose globalization and localization for their survival and prosperity. Europe has been forming a huge community in the EU, regardless of a history of conflicts. The EU can be understood as a new change that has weakened the borders of modern states. This recent change may require a post-modern perspective beyond the modern paradigm which formed modern states.

A developing East Asia based on rapid economic growth also faces time pressure for the formation of a local community. Through economic growth, East Asian countries gradually emerge as important players in the global society. Japan, a traditional economic power; China, establishing a status of G2; and Korea, which has reached the world's top 10 economic level, symbolize East Asia's international status. In addition, ASEAN countries' economy also shows a remarkable trend of growth. Today, exchange and cooperation are expand a sense of community among East Asian countries.

In spite of the expansion of such cooperative relations, emotional distance and internal conflicting structure in the region's countries region are obstacles to the development of an East Asian community. While aiming for a shared community, a considerable number of East Asian countries have considerable differences compared to Europe in that they are not free from the modern East Asian historical distractions. The post-modern can result from reflective recognition of the modern. However, compared to Europe, quite a few East Asian countries are limited in how far they can reflective on modern history.

The contradictory duality of conflict and cooperation primarily results from the structure of conflicts based on the modern history of

East Asian countries. And this structure has not been solved in a harmonious way but has been forming a structure reproduced in individual countries. Northeast Asia can be said to be a region that shows this issue implicitly. In Northeast Asia, there are experiences and impacts of Japan's militaristic modernization and occupation of the Korean peninsula by force, the China-Japan War and the World War II, the division of the Korean peninsula, and the Korean War and subsequent acute Cold War conflicts, which affects negatively the formation of the East Asian community beyond individual countries. Since the distorted progress of modern history and the influences have not been solved peacefully, in spite of exchange and expansion of cooperation, a situation arrives where the expansion of emotional consensus among related countries and their peaceful coexistence are difficult.

Northeast Asia, one of the three axes of the world economies followed by North America and Europe, is an important region of the East Asian community. The Northeast Asia region is a cooperative space where Japan, an economical power; China, rising rapidly as a key agent of the global economy based on its population of 1.3 billion; and Korea, maintaining the volume of trade at the world's top 10 trade are deepening their mutual economic relations. In terms of economy, Korea, China and Japan are deepening their mutual relations so that it is unimaginable for them to break away with the other parties. At the same time, the exchange of human resources among the countries also is intensified. However, at the same time, the three countries, Korea, China and Japan repeatedly show examples in which



they rapidly spread conflicting sentiments among their people, even over trifle conflicts among the countries. This symbolically shows the unbalanced aspects of Korea-China-Japan relations. In spite of deepened economic and human resources interdependency, the relations among individual Northeast Asian countries are being formed with underlying deep structure of conflicts. Thus, repeatedly, even a trifle matter can trigger a worsening of the people's sentiments against the other countries.

China is Korea's major export market and its economic partner; however, the issue of the distortion of Goguryeo history forces Koreans to rethink the fundamentals of Korea-China relations. In spite of intimate, cooperative relations between the Korean and Japanese economies, the enforcement of the Japan Prime Minister's Shinto Shrine Worship or the issue of the distortion of history textbooks, etc. provide opportunities for rapidly aggravation of conflicting sentiments between the two nations' people. Along with this, territorial issues such as Dokdo Island and Senkaku Islands (Daowidao) are potential topographical conflicts that can be actualized anytime. Northeast Asian region shows the phase of repetition of symbolic conflicting relations along with the expansion of the cooperative relations.

This reality primarily results from conflicting modern history among Northeast Asian countries of attack and invasion, and is a serious problem in that the conflicting relations of modern history can be reproduced in each country so long the past is not solved in a harmonious way for the future. Japan's militarist modernization and occupation of the Korean peninsula by force, China-Japan War, the

World War II, the division of the Korean peninsula, the Korean War, and the subsequent acute Cold War conflicts are the core and important causes of Northeast Asian modern historical distortions. This distorted progress of modern history has made it difficult for a peaceful coexistence among Northeast Asia's countries.

In Northeast Asia, the distorted progress of modern history is a factor of the past. At the same time, it is difficult to say that each Northeast Asian country is active in attempting to solve conflicting relations and to form good-neighborly and friendly relations. While the issues of modern history to be resolved remain intact in each country, the nations have shown exclusive nationalism and affinity, and the formation of cultural topography aiming at harmonious existence in each country in Northeast Asia has relatively been delayed. As a result, Northeast Asia has been at a contradictory status where it is hard to find generous national sentiments aiming at coexistence with other parties, in spite of the spread of cooperative relations among these nations. In this sense, in the relations among Northeast Asian countries, or even in the inside of individual countries, efforts to aim at coexistence with others falls into a minority whenever a conflicting event took place, and the national sentiments have displayed greater affinity to acute adversarial situations against the other countries.

The intact preservation of the conflicting structure reinforces competition and oppositional structure at the level of diplomacy and security, and consequently, causes the incurrence of unproductive expenses. 'China's hegemonic tendency,' 'Japan's becoming a military power,' and 'the emergence of a new military power after the unification



of the Korean peninsula,' etc. are discourses dealt with from the perspective of tension and caution toward the other parties. The existence of the contradictory dual structure of cooperation and conflict in Northeast Asia can be said to result from the fact that there is not any recognition of being a community, and at the same time, the formation of a culture of peace that aims at coexistence and co-prosperity has been delayed. Unless an agreement of peaceful coexistence of the nations of Northeast Asia is presumed, the expansion of economic relations cannot but face a fundamental limitation.

As confirmed in the example of Northeast Asia, that there is a sense of distance between countries despite increasingly intimate interconnectedness in East Asia, is related to the essential problem from the lack of efforts to form a community at the cultural level. Despite they are forming a huge economic community along with the exchange of human resources, there is a sense of distance among Korea, China and Japan, meaning that they cannot fundamentally resolve mutual distrust. As a result, East Asia is ultimately unable to secure a regional cultural homogeneity. A cultural community can be said to be a key element that completes North Asian local community along with their economic community. Economic communities, and those of diplomacy and security, are not in parallel with the formation of a cultural community. This means cultural intimacy among the countries' people cannot help from being weak, which cannot maintain a long-term life force. The intact preservation of conflicting structures reinforces competition and oppositional structures at the diplomacy and security level, which consequently incurs unproductive costs.

Such an issue, ultimately, can be solved through an attempt to correct the modern East Asia historical distractions. That is, an effort for the formation of East Asian culture of peace is needed. Due to past factors, the distortions of modern history have formed the internal conflicting structure of East Asia. Therefore, these distortions should be resolved by an effort from the perspective of forming a peace culture that promotes coexistence of East Asia. The significance of the formation of a peace culture can be found in that the expansion of the regional co-operations within East Asia. A peace culture's characteristics of community have also a very important significance in forming the East Asian community.

4. East Asian Culture of Peace and the Korean Peninsula

For Korea, situated in a status of long-term division, the formation of a peace culture is a realistic issue that has practical implications. In terms of aiming at the construction of a peaceful system in the Korean peninsula where Cold War system has not ended, a pursuit of converting the Cold War culture fixed in the Korean peninsula to a culture of peace is necessary, which ultimately can be completed through the formation of a culture of peace at the Northeast Asia and East Asia levels, beyond the Korean peninsula.

In spite of the dissolution of the Cold War, the Korean peninsula still cannot convert its armistice system into a peace system, and thereby Korea is not free from the influences of the Cold War. The Cold



War is an international issue consisting of surrounding non-Korean countries interests, being of international significance that cannot be solved solely by Koreans' efforts. The Cold War culture of the Korean peninsula also is connected to the international politics and regional history, and has multi-layered meanings. An expansion of the cooperative system at the regional level to solve Korean peninsula issue is necessary, which requires changes at a more fundamental level of the formation of a peace culture beyond the development of quantitative relations. Upon the opening of the 21st century East Asian community era, regional cooperation rejecting the history of opposition and conflict, and aiming at reconciliation and cooperation is rising to be a key task. Consequently, concerned nations need to face up to the situation in which effort to create a peace culture s necessary. A culture of peace can be an important driving force in forming an East Asian community.

In addition, the solution for the Korean peninsula division and the Cold War culture with their multi-layered local and an international issues should be sought or in a more inclusive frame of a peace culture within Northeast Asia, or possibly further within East Asia. In this sense, now is the time when strategies to promote international cooperation for the formation of an East Asian peace culture are necessary. The Korean peninsula still is at an unstable status due to the armistice where threats of war have not been ultimately resolved. And as the North Korean nuclear issue symbolizes, continuous military conflict exist. This means that the achievement of a peaceful status is the most important task on the Korean peninsula, for which multi-level efforts are necessary.

The continued systems of division and Cold War have a symbolic meaning in international cooperation for the formation of East Asian culture of peace. It is because the Korean peninsula issue is complex in which various subjects, interests, and both domestic and foreign influences overlap beyond South Korea and North Korea. The complexity of Korean peninsula issues can be summarized as follows:³

First, non-state agents involved in the issue over the Korean peninsula became very diverse so that they are already beyond the control of South/North Korea and the neighboring countries.

Second, the issue over the Korean peninsula appears as interactions among private enterprises, civil organizations and North Korea, beyond the governmental relations between South Korea and North Korea, expanding itself to an international one.

Third, the issue over the Korean peninsula extends with interrelations beyond the issue of security to economic cooperation and humanistic supports.

The Korean peninsula system consists of not only relations among the governments but also among non-governmental relations, concerning various factors ranging from issues of security to humanitarian, and from the domestic level to the international level. Such a characteristic means the necessity of forming harmonious cooperative relations and cooperation among various subjects and domains in solving the issues over the Korean peninsula. This is because among the issues of North Korea, nuclear development has been dealt with as a matter that affects neighboring East Asian countries and as a joint concern of the entire global village. Nuclear development is an area of issue, which



involves government and international organizations beyond the national borders, including new agents, multi-national enterprises and domestic and foreign Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as well as the traditional players.

The concept of governance could have methodological significance to solve the multi-layered complex of the issues over the Korean peninsula.⁴ For solving the North Korea issue, a paradigm at the level of governance, an approach including cooperative relations among actors and domains, is required. In this sense, Korea should play an important role in constructing governance for the formation of the Northeast Asian culture of peace.

Korea's peace movements have had limitations in activities in that they started from anti-dictatorship fight, and developed mainly centering around direct issues of peace, such as anti-war and disarmament, with regards to the issue of unification. However, it should be noted that peace of the Korean peninsula can be achieved only through active efforts to simultaneously solve long-term structure of division from inside and outside. Especially, paying attention to the reiteration of the issue around the Korean peninsula, expanding international cooperative relations over the issue of peace should be concentrated.

The Cold War culture of the Korean peninsula also has a multi-layered meaning linked to historical experiences at the regional level. In addition, on the opening of the 21st century East Asian era, the cooperation of Northeast Asia in rejecting history of opposition and conflict and aiming at reconciliation and cooperation is brought into relief as a key task. Efforts at the cultural level are required. It should be noted that the

formation of an East Asian peace culture should be pursued. The Cold War culture on the Korean peninsula issue should also be solved in a more inclusive frame, through the formation of an East Asian peace culture of peace, recognized by the East Asian community.

5. East Asian Culture of Peace and NGOs

The achievement of the peaceful status of the Korean peninsula is not completed by the resolution of the issues of diplomacy and security at the government level. It is because Korean society has passed through a long-term structure of division that has routinized opposition and conflicts. In this sense, spontaneous peace movements of civil societies have a very important practical significance. The most important problem in the settlement of the Korean peninsula peace is to resolve current lack of trust. That requires reflecting on the memories of abnormal modernization which include operating under the system of division, which is the origin of that distrust. This includes not only efforts at the institutional level but also at internal civil societal level, which can be concretized through reflective efforts to recognize and solve the abnormality germinated in the process of modernization under the structure of division.

The Cold War culture of the Korean peninsula has a deep structure that cannot be solved at the governmental or institutional levels in that it has been routinized through its long-term existence. This means civil societies are important in overcoming the Cold War



culture of the peninsula and forming a culture of peace. Reunification should be 'reflective one' that includes efforts to recognize and solve the Koreans' own problems. The South-North combination process needs to be interpreted in an inclusive meaning of efforts to normalize the distorted modernization of Korean society and to form a community between South Korea and North Korea. For this purpose, Korean civil society should be faithful to its given roles. In this sense, the roles of NGOs in the formation of the East Asian culture of peace should be noted.

The activities and roles of the NGOs related to peace movements in each country in East Asia are influenced by the country's historical characteristics and realities. In Korea and Japan, compared to other East Asian countries, activities of their peace-related NGOs are remarkable. Japan has a historical experience of defeat in WWII and destruction from atomic bombs while Korea still has the division and the Cold War. The current statuses and challenges of peace movements in Korea and Japan are somewhat different. In Korea, as in general, the influence of civil society and NGOs critical at the government and existing orders increased, peace-related NGOs rapidly grew in the early 2000s. In contrast, in Japan, activities of NGOs critical of the existing orders are not active, and it is possible to judge that the promotion of interests in peace and influence on the people in the trend of conservative or rightist of the entire Japanese society are not great. In China, as most private organizations have properties of institutions subsidiary to the state, they may not be viewed as true NGOs. The properties and limitations of each country act as

limiting factors in forming the cooperative relations among NGOs for peace at the level of Northeast Asia, and further of the East Asian community spirit.⁵

In spite of such limitations, cooperative relations among the East Asian NGOs are growing. Cooperation among NGOs in each East Asian country over the Japanese army comfort women issue and Japanese history textbooks' distortions has been made, and international cooperative relations among the NGOs for peace tend to be more active centering around the Northeast Asian Committee of the GPPAC (Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict) compared to the past.⁶

NGOs as civil powers rapidly are expanding their influences at a global level, and the NGOs related to East Asia and the Korean peninsula have already established their status as key agents. Regarding the formation of the East Asian culture of peace, as NGOs can be said to be alternatives that can overcome the limits of Governmental Organizations (GOs), plans to utilize the potentialities of the NGOs actively to realize peace in East Asia and Korean peninsula need to be sought. This is because a new situation in which various subjects are involved in solving international issues, unlike that of the past, is developing.⁷ Conflicting relations based on East Asian modern history are somewhat difficult to be resolved in international relations and within official organizations. This can be seen in Northeast Asian examples. For example, issues of distortions in history and textbooks are difficult to be discussed for



problem-solving at the government level due to the limitations of domestic politics in each country and the rigidity of official diplomatic relations. A cooperative effort among the countries may be possible in that civil societies are relatively free from such limitations.

In this context, expanding the cooperative relations among the East Asian peace-related NGOs can be considered, and a form of East Asian NGO Peace Alliance may be sought. Especially Korea has a symbolic meaning in the pursuit of peace, as it has history of pain due to the division, may be considered to take leading roles to promote the East Asian NGO Peace Alliance. Along with the East Asian peaceful cooperative relations in the public sector, a goal to induce cooperation for the peaceful solution of the issues of and the reunification of the Korean peninsula at the East Asia level should be set. Along with this, plans to cooperate among the East Asian Peace NGOs should be sought in various ways. Concretely, detailed plans to promote such as the regularization of private-led peace conferences, the enactment of Northeast Asia Peace Prize, and the organization of the Foundation of Northeast Asia's Peace Cooperation can be taken into account.⁸

6. Conclusion

East Asian expansion correlates to its rapidly growing economic relations based on geopolitical conditions. It is not too much to say

that the major Northeast Asian countries of Korea, China and Japan have already entered on to a stage of advanced economic community. In spite of this expansion of cooperative relations, there is a contradictory duality in that conflicts and distrust structure are embedded in these nations' people's emotional distance among countries within the region. In spite of the increase of intimate mutual interchange, distrust and hostility exists toward other parties. Consequently corroboration for the formation of an East Asian culture of peace aimed at coexistence is necessary.

The formation of the East Asian community and culture of peace can be a complex process of solving the distorted experiences and impacts of modern history, requiring organizing at the multi-lateral councils of diplomacy and security of East Asia, and making joint efforts for peace by the states and private sectors necessary. Each country has unique properties regarding the formation of East Asian culture of peace, which largely resulted from its own unique historical experiences. For quite some time East Asia shares common historical memories of conflicts and cooperation. Thus, the most important question for forming the East Asian culture of peace is to solve the memories of modern history, to consider today's distrust in a reflective way: this is beyond the level of solving the modern history of imperialist attack and invasion. It means that each country needs internal efforts to resolve its aberrant elements of modernization by itself. This can be concretized through recognizing their own aberration they have germinated in the process of modernization by themselves and the international reflective efforts among East Asian countries must be based on this.



What can be noted in this sense is civil society's efforts. The examples of the EU show that the formation of local community can be completed at the state level, which means the importance of the state. However, East Asia has a difficulty in coming a starting point to form a peace culture given the domain of the state is not free from the political influences and the structures of diplomacy and security within modern history. Civil society has more autonomy than the state in pursuing jointly for the efforts to form the East Asian culture of peace, and will be able to act as the base of stimulating cooperation among the countries.

The formation of an East Asian culture of peace is complex and requires long-term efforts. This confirms that first the deepening of research on the formation of East Asian culture of peace via the expansion of concrete effort is necessary. Comparative sociological recognition of each country's peace culture in East Asia can be said to have meaning as a starting point of the formation of East Asian culture of peace. Based on this, preparing a concrete plan to promote the formation of East Asian culture of peace is necessary. An efficient plan to promote the formation of East Asian culture of peace should be based on the cooperative role of the government and private sector, along with the necessary revitalization of civil society's roles.

NOTES

- 1_ Galtung J., “Peace Research; Past Experiences and Future Perspectives” in *Essays in Peace Research* (1990), p. 3.
- 2_ Han-bum Cho, et al., *Comparison Research of North East Asian Peace Culture* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2004), pp. 13-15.
- 3_ Han-bum Cho and Sung-chul Kim, et al., *Study on the method expanding exchange-cooperation of South and North Korea through NGO* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2000), pp. 7-8.
- 4_ As prerequisite of the concept of Governance requires building up effective cooperation system between Nation and NGO, enterprises, and between foreign and domestic organization. Therefore, the Governance to achieve peace environment of Northeast Asia may be conceptualized to be a comprehensive method to manage, control resource, execute power on the common subject of East Asian peace by concerned parties with various interest of local or foreign subject differ in range of it. Han-bum Cho, et al., *Study on the method expanding exchange-cooperation of South and North Korea through NGO* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2000), pp. 12-13.
- 5_ Han-bum Cho, et al., *Comparison on North East Asian Peace Culture* (Seoul: Korea National Institute for Unification, 2004), pp. 202-204.
- 6_ Byong-duck Hwang, et al., *Method to vitalize NGO exchange cooperation within North East Asian region* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2006), pp. 185-212.
- 7_ Han-bum Cho, et al., “North East Asia Peace Community & NGOs,” *North East Asia NGOs study series* (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2005), pp. 9-12.
- 8_ Han-bum Cho, “Method to build North East Asia Peace culture,” Song Hwa Choi and Yong-sul Kwon eds., *Considering Building North East Asia Culture community* (Seoul: Bobmunsa, 2004), pp. 131-134.



VI. *East Asian Community and Human Security*

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East Asian Community Building:
Issue Areas and Perspectives of Regional Countries

1. Raised Issue

At the end of 2010, the last year of the first decade of the 21st century, a number of international conferences have been held with participation from major nations in the Asia-Pacific region. On October 23, 2010 in Gyeongju, Korea the G20 Council met with the Secretary of the Treasury and Central Bank President near the G20 Leaders' Meeting in Seoul. Soon after, a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and three other nations (Korea, China and Japan), took place at the East Asian Summit (EAS). On November 5th in Yokohama, Japan the APEC session of finance ministers was held and shortly after, on November 10th and 11th, a two-day G20 international summit meeting took place in Seoul. An APEC summit meeting was also held on November 13th and 14th in Yokohama, Japan.

This series of conferences implies that the unilateral dominance of one super power nation or power group of a few nations no longer appears to be accepted in the process of international politics or economy. Such conferences represent, eloquently, the importance of communal discussions with the participation of concerned major countries. Even in the midst of such a global trend, the United States does not want to lose its hegemony over the rest of the world, as China emerges as new global economic power house, the European Union (EU) expands to 27 member countries, and the BRICs countries—with its vast territory and resources such as Brazil, Russia, & India—compete to maximize their own interests while emphasizing international cooperation. Under the circumstances, the issue of Chinese Yuan value



adjustment emerged to be one of the core issues not only between USA and China but also to the global economy. In fact those issues regarding finance, economy and trade have serious effects by on their own and with relation to global security matters as well.

Today's world is affected by issues remaining from the Cold War era and is influenced by complex relationship structures between local and foreign countries. The 21st century with such characteristics may be defined as “the era of comprehensive change”.¹ It may be noted that the East Asian region has been strongly s affected with the tide of technological advancement, especially in terms of computerization or becoming an information technology and technology-oriented society. The tide of such changes affects to the international order and bilateral relations between countries with the traditional concept of being a nation at the centre of all affairs. It also affects the international order with bilateral or multilateral relations, which presents the tendency of the emergence of multi-dimensional complicated network system.

Transnational issues such as non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), environmental issues of natural calamity, climate change, terror, refugees, human rights issues or financial crisis require cooperation between countries or regional communities of beyond national border. This is because all countries, not only traditional super power but also newly emerging power nations, newly industrialized countries, and underdeveloped countries are also affected directly or indirectly by the system. The East Asian nations accepted these changes in the 21st century and unfolded the policies to maximize their own interests in the process.

Being proposed are a few major frameworks in search of expanded national interest through multilateral cooperation for the purpose of regional cooperation. There are number of frameworks of cooperation in the East Asian region while additional new frameworks are under investigation. The most representative frameworks are the cooperation systems of the East Asian Summit (EAS), APEC, ASEAN, ASEAN+ 3 (Korea, China and Japan). For the dimension of security, a number of cooperation bodies already exist, such as ARF forums between nations as well as tracks 1.5 cooperation forums such as CSCAP. However, the issues on how they operated as an effective international organization or cooperative system remains to be resolved. Also an issue is raised regarding the effectiveness as a mechanism to implement adjustment of interest among member countries, while addressing the interests of developing nations and meeting the interests of super power nations eventually as well. In the changes of the dynamic international situation, Korea is also taking the position of actively utilizing the multilateral frame in the process of unfolding active diplomacy to leap into an advanced country. Korea has grown into a country that can play a meaningful role in the operation of a multilateral system which can bring the powerful and the weak nations together. Based on such view point, it is quite meaningful with regard to human security issue that Seoul Development Consensus” proposed by Korea in the G20 Summit held in Seoul Nov 2010 the principles & guidelines to assist poverty alleviation and development gap of developing countries.

This article is aimed to discuss the issues of the East Asian



community in terms of human security. To this end, first of all, an overview of the political environment will be reviewed, and then the position of countries that surround Korean peninsula will be reviewed next. A proposal is to be made with regard to a policy agenda to be assumed by the East Asian Community based on the dimension of Human Security.

2. Assessment of the East Asian Regional Situation

A. East Asia in the Perspective of Geopolitics and Strategies

First, the definition of the regional concepts of East Asia is necessary in dealing with the international situation of East Asia. The problem of the geographical awareness and its range on East Asia still remains unresolved. Therefore, it is necessary to have an agreement or share a common understanding with regard to geographical, geopolitical or geo-economics concept of East Asia to be dealt with in this study. In general when discussing the East Asian community, the three nations, Korea, China and Japan become the main focus. Russia, the Far East and North Korea were also considered. The USA is an outsider country in the geographical aspect but in view of the degree of participation in terms of international relationship of this region, politics, economy, order & security, and social security and its influence as well as deployment capability, it is regarded to be a constant factor. In this point of view, East Asia traditionally is referred to as the realm of Northeast Asia.

From the Korean perspective the preferred partners for the promotion of the East Asian community formation are China, Japan, Russia, (Far East) and the United States as the primary participants; other nations outside the area are also expected to join. North Korea is expected to become a future participant. Korea, China and Japan are already promoting policies to realize the formation of the East Asian community and are especially interested in the community formation in the economic field such as expanding and deepening economic cooperation and contracting FTA.

Further tasks still exist beyond the Korean stance which cannot ignore the relations between Korea and the United States such as the competition for the leading position between China and Japan, and FTA between Korea and the United States, the degree of participation of the United States and other nations, and the level of attention. In this perspective the East Asia discussed here geographically means the traditionally mentioned Northeast Asian region, but it sometimes is used to imply Asia and the Pacific region in the geo economics and strategic perspective as shown in the structure of the recent East Asia Summit, APEC and ARF.

B. Features of the East Asian Situation

The 21st century's North East Asian Regional Order may be distinguished from that of Cold War era in the global perspective. However, no framework or rules of guidelines to replace or govern such order is yet established.



In fact there are some status changes among the super powers, including United States, China, Japan and Russia, that surround Korea but they still remain as being super power nations, while Korea based on its increased capability in politics or economy has been promoting mutual relationships to create a new order matching with the changing time & generation as a medium power nation. The isolated nation, North Korea is not succeeding in escaping from the restraints of the Cold War era.

The factors such as economic capability, military force, intellectual capability, scientific and technical capability and democratic features are the major variables in the background to judge the current situation of this region. Northeast Asia is already forming 21.5 % of the international gross national products (GNP) based on the data from 2004 with only three nations, Korea, China and Japan exceeding the United States by 21.3 percent and the EU by 21 percent. Northeast Asia is maintaining dynamic economic activities, and the economic development situation of the three nations, Korea, China and Japan is expected to reach 30 % in 2020. China is already assessed as the second greatest economic power in the world exceeded by the United States; and assessed as exceeding Japan by a small difference in the second quarter of 2010 with also a nominal GDP.² Russia and the Far East are also considered as a part of the Northeast Asian region in the aspect of economic cooperation and trade, geographical location, energy resource development and the pipeline connection project. Also in the Northeast Asian region the cultural invasions, such as the Korean Wave fever in China and Japan and the China fever in Korea, as well as the increase in trade and mutual investment outside of the

area and the movement of the workforce are also active.

On one hand the role of the United States in this area after 9/11 showed the following changes.³ Firstly, the strategic position of the United States in the East Asian region has changed in an unpredicted direction. In detail China has emerged in the economic and geopolitical aspect, but the economic dynamic of Japan has been noticeably reduced and the strategic value of Japan towards the United States tended to decrease. Secondly, Korea came to promote firm and more independent diplomatic policies with its rapid economic growth, democratization progress and shift in generations. Thirdly, Taiwan has been pushed to the periphery in the international scene while its economy is incorporated gradually into Chinese economy which appears to be very near to the peaceful reconciliation between the straits.

The changes outside of the Asian region also influenced the role of the United States. The prospective of war on terror became more important than the traditional concerns of the United States on peace and stability. The question of the vitality of the pledge of the United States on the long alliance in Asian and other regions was raised with its changes in priorities, the war prosecuting the ability of the United States and the reconsiderations of the demand of the American troops stationed abroad. Due to these changes in Asia the United States could not help but re-examine the strategies of the 1990s. In the past, the idea that stability and prosperity of East Asia depended on the basic “hub and spokes,” namely the bilateral relation between the USA and the major nations of the area, was highly influential. The tripartite relations of the United States, China and Japan formed a



basis, but the United States started to take a step backward at its unique role as a balancing power and instead the relationship with China started to be strengthened. In spite of the strategic difference between the United States and China, a new unimaginable relationship is being unfolded and the nations outside of this area also began to take an important role.

The following is the summary of the situational features of the Northeast Asian region in these structural changes: First, though there exist factors of dispute around the eruption of nationalist tendencies with regard to history, or territory disputes (especially related to energy), the common understanding of the 4 countries surrounding Korean peninsula is that no factor should be provided to cause regional instability in securing the strategic interest of economy or politics for their own countries. In this respect the North Korea nuclear issue is a matter that all nations of Northeast region have interests in; and the North Korea missile issue is also connected to the North Korea nuclear issue. Second, the rivalry structure among the 4 super power countries surrounding the Korean peninsula, between USA & Japan vs China & Russia, has not disappeared completely from the Cold War era. At the same time no fresh rivalry structure is yet fixed so far and based on the related interest in respective fields such as politics, security, economy, trade or energy, Cooperation or restraint relationships are being formed. On the dimension of politics and security, the strategic cooperation between China and Russia has been strengthened (implementation of the bilateral cooperative military drills and SCO) The conflicts at the alliance after the appearance of the Democratic

Party in Japan in 2009 was generated between the United States and Japan, but the basis of the security alliance between the United States and Japan is not changing.

Third, The United States and China emerged as the two influential nations (G2) to deal with international issues and became the core factor to decide on the order of the Northeast region in this respect. In the economic aspect the relationship between the United States and China are being deepened as the terminology “Chiamerica” expresses.⁴ The relationship between the United States and China has been changed to an achievable relationship in the cooperation and the collaboration in the issues of global level as well as the issues of the East Asian region.⁵ Also, the United States and China launched high level strategic dialogues and are having a sufficient stake in the mutual importance in spite of the conflicts in terms of politics and security. The strategic dialogues have been developed as the 2-plus-2 Strategic and Economic Dialogue that the Secretary of State (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and the Secretary of the Treasury (the Minister of Commerce) participates in.

While both USA and China requires the development of mutual cooperation, at the same time they are trying to check each other to the initiatives of hegemonies. The United States is holding China in check from emerging as a “hegemon” like the Soviet Union in the past. China is considering the lasting role of the United States as a “hegemon” as a challenging factor when China emerges as a “hegemon” and lasts for a long period. China is reinforcing aggressive diplomacy



to increase the impact of the economic power rated number two in the world. China is not showing the strategic tolerance as much as the United States and their possibility of replacing the United States and emerging as a “trustworthy superpower” is questionable.⁶ The conflicts surrounding trade issues such as the issues of China’s Yuan value still in existence are recognized as a subject for mutual containment and competition, but the necessity of cooperation is large. The United States, experiencing relative decline in national power, needs to responsibly treat China as one of the G2 nations to recover its dignity as an authority in the international order and build a stable international peace and prosperity. Especially from the China’s perspective, the development of a cooperative relationship with the United States is the only way to emerge as a “true” power.⁷

Four, Japan, experiencing a relatively long-term economic recession, has sought the expansion of the political, military and international role in the background with the cooperation of the United States, but is not accomplishing much. Japan recently showed a tendency of “hegemony pursuit” by pushing their agenda in the direction of “China’s Peaceful Rise Diplomacy” in the background of rapidly expanding economic influences. The dominant position in the competition between China and Japan are changing in the region and the changes in the dynamics of the two nations are expected to become another major factor in the regional order.

The competition between China and Japan to rule East China Sea with the Senkaku Islands (Chinese name Diaoyudao) is continuing as

the importance of the marine resources highlights the ability to secure energy sources. In September 2010, there was a conflict surrounding the Senkaku Islands between Japan and China. In this process the conflict between the people of the two nations was rising, but the conflict at government level was sealed at a certain level. Both, China and Japan were attempting to continue the development of a practical relationship recognizing that the intensification of the conflict did help each side. This problem still contains a potential conflict between the two nations. In the process of the conflict between Japan and China, the United States is clearly taking the side of their ally, Japan, and a large-scale cooperative maritime drill was scheduled between the U.S. and Japan in November 2010.

Five, The core cause for the conflicts in the Northeast region is the difference of opinion on the North Korea problems including the North Korea nuclear issue. Korea and the United States showed conflicts under the Roh administration. The relationship with Japan was not smooth either. Korea set up the recovery and the intensification of the alliance between Korea and the United States after the establishment of the Lee Myung-bak administration, and the development of the relationship with Japan became a major diplomatic policy. The intensification of Korea's relationship with the United States inversely caused worries and containments. A series of conflicts appeared in China's relationships.

Six, The nations in the Northeast Asian region prefer stable management of the political system of North Korea to prevent the instability factors in the region which can be generated from North



Korea. They are persuading and pressuring North Korea for the resolution of the North Korea's nuclear issue and supporting North Korea at the same time. The strategic choice of pressuring and supporting North Korea appear as a condition that Korea, the United States and Japan, and China and Russia on the other side show cooperative positions.

Seven, North Korea is pursuing the system maintenance strategy through the improvement of relation with the United States, but not discarding the policies against the United States through the medium of the nuclear issues. After the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis in October 2002, the framework of the agreement was prepared by the September agreement, but North Korea did not give up the strategy of nuclear weapon development. After the appearance of the President Obama administration in the United States in January 2009, North Korea unfolded the aggressive diplomacy and carried out the second nuclear experiment in May 2009. Afterwards North Korea has been promoting the strategy to act as a nuclear power nation.

The table below is the comparison of major indexes of the national powers of four nations surrounding the Korean Peninsula and South and North Korea. These indexes of the national powers will be utilized as a standard to judge the future development direction of East Asia.

Table VI-1 The comparison of major indexes of the national powers

Nation	Nominal GDP① (US\$)	National Competitiveness (World Ranking)	Scientific Technical Theses World Percentage (%)	Globalization Index Ranking (Among 62 Nations)	National Defense Expenditure (US\$)	Overall National Power Ranking ②
U.S.	13.8440 trillion	100 (1)	27.3	4	0.3485 trillion	1
Japan	4.3840 trillion	71.915 (23)	7.5	28	0.0395 trillion	7
China	3.2510 trillion	70.725 (24)	4.1	54	0.0510 trillion	6
Russia	1.2900 trillion	52.140 (50)	2.4	52	0.0508 trillion	3
South Korea	0.9570 trillion	62.201 (35)	1.9	30	0.0131 trillion	9
North Korea	0.0256 trillion ③	—	—	—	0.0050 trillion	—

① Nominal GDP is based on the market exchange rate.

② The ranking of overall national power is the ranking assessed by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences considering the factors such as technical skills, human resources, capital strength, information and communications, natural resources, military power, GDP, diplomatic power, government control power, etc. England was assessed as the 2nd ranking, France as the 4th, Germany as the 5th, Canada as the 8th, Korea as the 9th and India as the 10th. *Joongang Ilbo*, 2006.1.7.

③ The nominal GDP of North Korea was replaced with the nominal GNI estimated by the Bank of Korea (2006). <<http://www.bok.or.kr/index.jsp>>

※ Base Year: Nominal GDP (2007), National Competitiveness (2004), Scientific Technical Theses World Percentage (2003), Globalization Index (2003), National Defense Expenditure (2002), Overall National Power Ranking (2005)

※ Data: Ministry of National Defense, Military White Book (2004); the Bank of Korea, the Research Bureau, "Year 2005 World Economy Trend and Year 2006 Prospect" (2005.12); Competitiveness Valuation International, Inc., "IMD 2004 World Competitiveness Ranking Data" <www.cvikorea.snet>; *Chosun Ilbo*, 2005.4.28. IMF Year 2007 Economic Scale, *Joongang Ilbo*, 2008.4.24.



3. Each Nation's Perspective on the Northeast Asia Regional Cooperation

A. *South Korea*

Korea has taken an active position in the multilateral security cooperation at the levels of governments and non-governments such as suggesting the establishment of 'Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED)' in 1990s since Korea suggested the conception of North-East Asia Peace Consultation in October, 1988. At the same time, Korea has declared the active promotion of the multilateral security dialogue in the region through Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), etc. and showed enthusiasm in the regional cooperation through active participation in ARF, etc.

The Roh administration suggested, 'the Establishment of the North-East Asia Economic Hub' as a national project and held the 13th APEC Summit in November, 2005. Busan Declaration announced then is called the 'Busan Road Map', an action plan with the contents such as expansion of multilateral trade system, trade and investment liberalization measures, etc. However, it did not succeed due to the approaches without considering the regional dynamics, Korea's status and ability as shown in 'Balancer in Northeast Asia'.

The Lee Myung-bak administration is suggesting and promoting the establishment of the new Northeast Asian cooperation system on the firm basis of the alliance of Korea and U.S. and the establishment of the strategic partnership and the community of economy, security and



culture in the East Asian region. The main contexts are first, to restore and strength the alliance of Korea and U.S., which forms an international foundation of the strategies in the security and the national development of Korea. Second is to build a cooperation system to intensify the cooperation with major nations in the Northeast Asian region. The balanced developments of the cooperation of Korea/U.S./Japan and Korea/China/Japan are being promoted. For the trilateralism of Korea, China and Japan, the expansion of the cooperation in each field is aggressively approached by cyclically opening the summit meetings and the meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs, promoting the FTA contracts among Korea, China and Japan and improving the environment, aviation/distribution and investment environment. Also, by promoting the intensification of the bilateral cooperation with four powers surrounding Korea and the trilateralism of Korea, China and Japan, Korea is attempting to build the Northeast Asian regional community and embody the ‘new Asian cooperative diplomacy’ beyond the Northeast Asian region based on the cooperative relationships.

Korea endeavored to form a consensus in relation to a major agenda such as financial reform or the proper balance of trade surplus for the sustainable economic development to recover the international economic recession in 2007 to 2009 as a host nation of the G20 Summit opened in Seoul on 11th to 12th, November, 2010. The G20 nations form 90 percent of the world GDP, about 80 percent of the world trade, and about 2/3 of the world population. G20 was established in 1999 including G8.

Korea’s high interest in the cooperation in the East Asian region

and active promotion of the new Asian diplomacy are important also in the level for settling and announcing the nuclear free peace zone in the Korean Peninsula. The creation of the new peace zone in the Korean Peninsula also has a relation to the formation of the multilateral security cooperation system in the Northeast Asian region.

B. The United States

In promoting ‘intervention and expansion’ strategies in 1990s, U.S. has recognized the necessity of the regional cooperation of security, promoted the multilateral approaches, participated in APECT and ARF, and supported NEACD in the level of Track-II. Still, with the concerns about the development of multilateral cooperation, which could impact homeland security, the Bush administration strongly exposed their inclination towards unilateralism that resulted in criticism from the international society.

The Obama administration is embracing international efforts to promote more effective development in the manner of multilateral cooperation, under the consideration of the reality of financial crises, along with the recovery of its tarnished prestige and to rebuild its global leadership. Also, international cooperation is critical for the smooth closures of Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

In the Northeast Asian region, U.S. is basically taking a stance to utilize the multilateralism on the basis of bilateralism, but still maintaining the alliance of the friendly relations between the two parties. Not to mention that the U.S. has expressed their interests on

the issues of the intensification of bilateral alliances such as Korea-U.S. or U.S.-Japan. Also the U.S. has shown precedence on the matters of the resolution of North Korea's nuclear issue, the acquisition of a stable market, the strategic cooperation with China and the containment of China's becoming a 'hegemony' nation in the region.

U.S. is attempting to take on the role of a regional balancer in Northeast Asia, but also recognizing that their strategic position is changing according to the China's *raison d'être*, Taiwan is becoming a peripheral and while Japan relatively losing its power in the region. The intensification of the public strategic cooperation of U.S. is connoting the containment strategy towards China in the level of mid to long term measures, and is aiming to prevent the impact of U.S. becoming weakened in the process of dynamic power structure change in the Northeast Asian region.

In fact, the U.S. has paid attention to the expansion of the export market and the sphere of action for the U.S. enterprises in Northeast Asia at the economic level, and taken a stand to beware of the formation of economic cooperation in this region. Due to the relatively loose cooperative system of APEC, the U.S. will preclude itself in the region, although they are still actively participating on the core issues in Northeast Asia. The reason for this is that the U.S. sees the expansion of bilateral or multilateral economic cooperation of Northeast Asian nations can conflict with the interests of U.S. within the region. Namely because the U.S. sees that the promotion of Korea-Japan, Korea-China, Korea-China-Japan FTA contracts can encroach the impacts on Northeast Asia and the market interests of



U.S. For example NEADB in the past was interpreted as a potential risk for the welfare of the U.S. The environment of cooperation in Northeast Asia would not provide any direct importance to the U.S. either. This is because the U.S. personified itself as a third party. U.S.'s view on the regional cooperation in Northeast Asia is to maintain bilateral relations, mix with multilateral relations and eventually utilize them for the promotion of international strategies to prevent the expansion of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), block potential terrors, secure the consistent approach to the Northeast Asian market, and contain China's emergence as a 'hegemony' nation.

Nevertheless, U.S.'s point of view is changing along with the relative decline of their national power. U.S. is adjusting their policies in the direction of actively participating in the multilateral organization in the Asia-Pacific region. The Obama administration clarified their position that they want to actively participate in the discussion on vital issues of U.S. security, politics and economy. As a matter of fact, the U.S. officially joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and established the U.S. representative in ASEAN to improve the relationship with ASEAN in 2010. On top of that, the U.S. is participating in the 2011 APEC Summit as the chair country. U.S. employed "mini- lateral" efforts, as well. In 2009, the Lower Mekong Initiative was launched for the purpose of supporting education, health and environment programs of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and is expanding the supports for weak countries in the Asia Pacific region through its United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

In relation to the issue of building a peace regime in the Korean

Peninsula, U.S. could not succeed in controlling the North Korea's development of nuclear weapons, but is still taking a stand to seek the resolution of the North Korea nuclear issue as the main topic for the six nation talks. They consider that if the North Korea nuclear problem is resolved, the nations in the region can possibly be developed into a Northeast Asian security cooperation.

C. China

Since the 1990s, China has expanded its economic power on international organizations, taking an active stand on the multilateral economy and the security cooperation. The reason for it is that they are recognizing the necessity of multilateral cooperation to build a stabilized environment for foreign policies, which in turn will enforce their national development.

However, China is valuing multilateral cooperation by implying the strategy to hold the U.S. impacts in check, and the intensification of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Also, China is recognizing the usefulness of multilateral cooperation as a method to dispel the concerns of the surrounding nations on China's vast military strength.

China is also having an interest in the expansion of their impacts through the multilateral frame, which is based on their enormous economic ability to become the second world power. Plus China is expanding their diplomatic, political and economic impacts through bilateral and multilateral FTA contracts. As an active participant in regional economic cooperation of various kinds, China is working to



promote a ‘Chinese economic capability’ in the East Asian region. However, to build a security regime in Northeast Asia is a relatively new development. This is due to the fact that in the Northeast Asia region, traditionally multilateralism is poorly developed, and effects of the Cold War still lingers. Thus, China is destined to be entangled in, so as an official agenda the Chinese Community Party decided to implement the ‘North-East Promotion Plan’. Against that backdrop Korea and Japan are taking a similar standpoint as well.

On the issues of the Korean Peninsula, China is fundamentally taking a stand that South and North Korea must resolve their own issues. However, China is recognizing that the multilateral framework is also useful in order to hold the impacts on the Korean Peninsula in check, but indirectly China is supporting the North Korea’s side too. It was clearly revealed that China is properly utilizing their role as a chairman country of the six nation talks to sway interests in their favor. China is laying emphasis on the economic cooperation between the two Koreas at the government level, which will give more weight to resolve the issues on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, China is considering the resolution of North Korea’s nuclear issue and the Korean Peninsula issues by multilateral talks as a measure to minimize the causes of uneasiness about security, and simultaneously expand the impacts of China. On top of that, closer economic ties alone do not enhance the possibility of successful settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue, because the major challenge in its resolution is how to narrow down the fundamental differences of positions between North Korea and the U.S. They are taking a standpoint that the Northeast

Asian multilateral security cooperation must be promoted on the basis of successfully preceding the six nation talks.

Several Chinese scholars are expressing their opinions on the matter for it is not easy to deal with non-traditional or super national issues such as climate change, environment, infectious diseases and so on. The standpoint of Northeast Asia is to see the formation of trust between the regional nations, the resolution of North Korea's nuclear issues, the improvement of South and North Korea relations, the development of U.S.-China relations, the formation of trusts among the three nations (China, Japan and Korea), as the premises of the formation of diplomatic, security cooperation in Northeast Asia region. Nevertheless, China emphasized their stand that the multilateral cooperation cannot be discussed within China on the issues of human rights and about Taiwan.

D. Japan

The Japanese security concern is focused mainly on North Korea, therefore Japan is taking an active position on the multilateral meetings to utilize the chance to discuss the implications of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, mid to long distance missiles and the emergence of this region as an epicenter of nuclear proliferation.

Upon establishment of Hatoyama's Democratic government there are movements to re-adjust the relationship with USA but considering the political situation of Korean peninsula as well as the relationship between USA and Japan, it appears to be difficult for Japan to proceed



independently East Asian Multilateral community or Security cooperative body against will of USA.

Regarding regional economic cooperation, Japan has put its importance to the whole East Asian region including South east Asian region where it has close relationship of interest with high profile rather than North east Asia where China has strong influence.

Japan tried to use the energy of the Asia economy for the vitalizations of its own nation's economy under the Liberal-Democratic Party, and promoted the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). Also, they utilized the ODA as the main means to modify trade-investment environment through the intensification of material, systematic infra of the developing countries in Asia. Under this structure, the Japanese government and private organizations declared 'East Asia business zone', 'East Asia economic cooperation plan', 'Okuda vision', and so on.

The Hatoyama Democratic Party government suggested the East Asia community plan as a political vision and emphasized that Korea, China and Japan must mutually collaborate for the realization of the plan. Also, they are not excluding the participation of U.S. The Hatoyama government is emphasizing on Asia-focused policies for economic cooperation of Korea and China.

Furthermore, Japan is experiencing a long-term economic recession and witnessing the active internalization and globalization policies of Korea and China. It becomes a reason for Kan Naoto's (prime minister of Japan) electrical declaration that Japan would actively participate in the economic cooperation in the Pacific Rim. Therefore this year, Japan will chair the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, which was

held in Yokohama on November 13 and 14. In recent years, Japan has monitored the course of North Korea-Japan relations because Japan plays a potentially critical role in addressing the military threat posed by North Korea, particularly its nuclear weapons program. Also regarding this matter, Japan has showed a positive perspective on the issue of developing the six nation talks to the Northeast Asian security cooperation. However, Japan also provided a bit of an obstacle for the policy coordination in dealing with the issue of the hijacking of Japanese people, which was irrelevant to the core issues at the six nation talks. It was the expression of Japan's standpoint to consider their domestic politics, but it is hard to deny that it was a factor of adverse effects for the firm solidarity of policies towards North Korea.

E. Russia

Boris Yeltsin, former president of Russia suggested the establishment of the 'East Asia multilateral security cooperation' among the Asia Pacific countries. Therefore, if the East Asia multilateral security cooperation operates primarily as a consultative mechanism, a general meeting can be helpful in addressing certain type of security goals in the Pacific Rim, such as proliferation management and in reducing tensions in great power interaction. Given the fact than the more inclusive multilateral security institutions in the Asia Pacific are likely to remain weak and ineffectual at least for the foreseeable future, the major powers in the Asia Pacific region are unlikely to forsake some type of balancing. Against this backdrop, Russia watches the U.S. and



NATO countries in entering Central Asia in the post Cold-War era, and in concert with China in configuring the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in order to react to it.

Russia takes the position in that they cannot be excluded in the issues of the Korean Peninsula, and has endeavored to secure the diplomatic impacts by having the opportunity to participate in the six nation talks. Russia expresses their standpoint that they attempt to promote the establishment of a bridgehead in entering the economy of the Northeast Asian region and the Korean Peninsula after the resolution of North Korea's nuclear issue. 'Russia is performing the role of a chair country of the Northeast Asian multilateral work-level group of the September agreement.' Furthermore, Russia will probably take an active position for the multilateral cooperation of the East Asian region for the development of Siberia, and the Far East in the relation to the regional economic cooperation. To actively embody these perspectives, Russia plans to hold the APEC Summit 2012 that will take place in Vladivostok on September 8th and 9th.

F. North Korea

The potential for a five-versus-one dynamic continues to remain, if one country detaches itself too much within this process, and to know this possibility may act as a hindrance to such self-imposed isolation. In this way, the six nation talks strive as a working-level group of multilateral dialogue, negotiation, and mediation forum. One could consider, the basic stance of North Korea is that when the political,

military distrust between the nations in the region are resolved, a new ‘peace assurance system’ can be built through the North Korea-U.S. peace agreement contract for the Korean Peninsula. North Korea is participating in the multilateral dialogues such as the ARF between the non-governments, but may lead to a negative perspective on the Northeast Asian multilateral security cooperation. North Korea agreed on the promotion of Northeast Asian security forums at the September agreement, but it is considered that North Korea has a negative perspective on the development of six nation talks to the ‘Northeast Asian security organization’. North Korea insisted to exclude U.S. and Japan from the discussion of regional security issues and “discuss the (Northeast Asian) regional security issues only by the nations who share the territory borders.”

North Korea and China are already starting economic cooperation projects in the border area across China’s northeast and the North’s Rajin-Sonbong region through the Tumen River Area Development Program (TRADP). The TRADP is being publicized as the “future Rotterdam” for Northeast Asia. Together they have created the Najin-Seonbong Economic and Trade Zone for the purpose of openness and reform. On top of that North Korea has its sights on Siberia, the Far East-Russia energy development and the TSR-TKR connection projects. For North Korea these expectations could not succeed without having any actual accomplishments as no supports were found due to their practical promotion of open economic and reform policies. North Korea needs the promotion of open economy and reform policies to become a ‘strong power’ in Northeast Asia by 2012. Despite this, this



is not appearing as concrete policy choices as they consider the negative effects on their system. Namely, the desires of mobilizing the resources from outside through multilateral cooperation are not exceeding the desire to guard the system for the continuation of the system.

4. The Concept of Human Security and Major Issues

As the inter-dependency between the nations deepened, as the emergence of super-national factors came into being, contentions have been raised that traditional concept of security centered by respective country is regarded to be weak in preserving stability of the nation, region, or the world at large. As a result, a new concept has appeared in that the security issues must be understood in the human approach to resolve such weakness and that is Human Security concept. The background of the human security can be found in the multidisciplinary understanding of security such as development and research, international relation, strategy researches in the setting of the post Cold War era.

In 1994, in the human development report, the United Nations Development Programme raised the necessity of new understanding on the security claiming that guaranteeing the ‘freedom from want’ and the ‘freedom from fear’ to all people. The appearance of such concept reflects a profound approach to resolve dispute by observing the shape of conflict that have arisen in many parts of the world after the close of Cold War era. Most of the conflicts occurred after the Cold War showed the tendency of internal conflict, and the most

victimized are not soldiers but civilian children and women, in particular. For example, the tragic civil war in Sierra Leone symbolically revealed horrible images of many women and children whose limbs were cut off by the rebel forces. Child soldiers, who shoot to his people, never know the reason why they shoot, or human lives being killed everyday by mines that were buried in the conflict zone everywhere; these are the tragedies that cannot be ignored. These types of heartbreaking tragedies are the core issues of human security along with the destruction of the environment, poverty, nuclear expansion, and domestic and international terrorism threatens human existence and dignity. In other words, the concept of human security is expanded from the traditional ideas of security such as security from nuclear threats, security from outside attacks, security of national interests to the security of each individual's experiences.

In a broad perspective, human security comprises human right, secure governance, access to education & health, guarantee of opportunities and choices for the realization of self-potential of humans in addition to the non-existence of violent dispute. Approaching in this direction means marching towards decline of poverty, accomplishment of economic growth and prevention of conflicts. Therefore, freedom from poverty and threats, freedom inherited from a healthy natural environment is considered a core area of human security. In short, Human security intends to promote human development and enhance human rights by complementing traditional concept of National security.

UNDP especially emphasizes that human security must be separately considered from the concept of military security such as protecting the



country from foreign invasion. In other words, human security should focus on an individual's security that is defined by food, employment, health, environment and crime.⁸ Under such a perspective, although the concept of human security is simple, it is expected to revolutionarily change society in the 21st century.⁹

By the end of the Cold War, as structural changes of international politics and economy have occurred, human security was understood in the context of globalization. The critics of globalization insist that globalization causes enormous poverty in the third world, which causes protesting, which in turn leads to the control of capital of powers, and results in authority groups taking all the military power in some nations. This type of globalization can become a structural cause of violence and war, and damages human security.¹⁰ In other words, the realm of security has expanded to include the individual life quality, security and the individual interests and need.

Furthermore, human security on the world stage was integrated to the foreign policy of Canada, Norway and Japan. The International Human Security Network was formed, and Australia, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, Netherlands, Slovenia, Swiss, Thailand, South Africa (observer) and others are the participating members.¹¹

Human security was included to the 2001 report of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Also, it was discussed at the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) for Africa development, and the scholars in international relation and

development are defending the benefits of using the concept of human security.¹²

The impacts of human security have influenced international organizations and nations, and most literature on human security can be found in prioritizing the development goals.¹³ In the case of Canada, it is specified that capital is supported in strengthening the capability of the global community and Canada ① to react to the threats on human security, and ② to aid the peace agreement. Also, the Lower Mekong Initiative that U.S. initiated for the purpose of supporting education, healthcare, and environment programs of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam may be regarded as an example of Human security.

The U.S. provides assistance to be able to resolve various challenges and issues that the Pacific island nations are confronting from climate change to the freedom of navigation through the Pacific Island Forum. The subject of these acts is the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID is playing a core role in the post-conflict reconstruction after the disputes in nations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The core issues of human security are as follows;

- ① protecting humans from violent disputes
- ② protecting humans from armaments
- ③ protecting and empowering refugees and involuntary immigrants
- ④ empowering the humans under the situation after disputes
- ⑤ economic stability (economic security)



- ⑥ providing guarantee on fundamental medicine (healthcare)
- ⑦ providing opportunities of universal basic education and information, knowledge acquisition

5. The Directions to forming East Asia Community through the Sphere of Human Security

The source of human security is in securing the freedom from terror for each individual. In fact, going back in history, the issue of human rights has been addressed. However, the concept of human rights these days goes beyond the traditional notion of human rights, revealing the traits of both development and security. Accordingly, it is more imperative that all ordinary civilians placed under far more insecure circumstances be taken into consideration.

The majority of governments in advanced nations view that people can enter into the situation of enjoying their “freedom from indigence” once they are free from terror. Accordingly, this has been a major focus in resolving the issue of traditional security. Yet the substantial reality of international security revealed that this is not the case at all times. That is, the elimination of physical violence does not necessarily secure the life as precious human beings that we ought to be.

The prevention of direct or systematic violence may serve as a condition to provide the circumstance where human life can be improved, but fails to serve as the sufficient condition to enable freedom from deficiency. The view among East Asian nations is that

the matter of human security should be driven simultaneously to resolve the fear from violence and the fear from deficiency. As reviewed through the analysis of the position among the major nations upon the regional cooperation in East Asia, these nations are at least forming a shared opinion on economic affiliation. The basic subject of economic cooperation will extend to the entire people who comprise the political community of each country. Therefore, the means to secure the fundamentals of cooperation among these nations by propelling shared approach in setting up strategies will be the practical application of human security.

With regard to the position of Korea, it will be more practical to consistently practice the tasks to expand the range and degree of mutual reliance and transactions in multiple dimensions upon the common issues that go beyond the boundaries of regional nations. And therefore to put more emphasis on the factors that will dominate the economic cooperation in the 21st century. The basic directions in dealing with the issue is to establish the strategy to form networks that trigger less checks from other nations and earning shared opinions with the countries in the region, which should be practiced on the foundation of understanding the systematic reality of international public order in Northeast Asian. However, the nations still need to understand the capacity of Korea.

The first approach is to utilize the concept of ‘mutual prosperity’, ‘peace’, ‘mutual economic reliance’, ‘civilization’, and ‘cultural coexistence’ in regarding values or causes. Such causes will be actively accepted and implemented on the concept of human security.



Second, in deciding the specific tasks for propulsion, it is more beneficial to make use of tasks such as climate change, natural disasters, education, hygiene, humanitarian support and human rights. In dealing with North Korea, such an approach will allow closer access to gradual changes in the North Korean society through the concept of human security without direct conflict triggered by nuclear problems.

Third, in deciding the means to drive the movement, it is wiser to expand cooperation among governments and establish loose solidarity among various practitioners of each nation in the region, and subsequently elevate the bond and intensity of regional cooperation. The nations of Korea, China, and Japan are not only geographically adjacent, but also similar in cultural characteristics. Therefore, it is more beneficial to consider cultural traits as the factor to further drive regional cooperation.

Fourth, the activity between knowledge communities and civil societies should be set more systematically to be utilized more actively. In other words, this will enable expansion of affiliated activities among public and private civil society's practitioners. According to the human security network experience launched in 1999 by 11 nations including Norway and Canada, the practitioners of civil societies will recognize the fact that it has the capacity to motivate changes in the directions of the nation, which will facilitate participation and influence the nation to form more creative policies.¹⁴ The sphere of human security in regard to Korea's position, it will be an effective measure to offer a creative partnership among East Asian countries to settle the potential strategic conflicts triggered by nuclear problems in North Korea.

6. Conclusion

The concept of human security has expanded the area of security however; the fundamental content has existed in the human society from long time ago. Since the nation has assumed the fixed role being a major actor of the international politics and economy, it has regarded the area of national security as a separate matter from the basic needs in human life. However, it should be highlighted that the fundamental goal of national security is to guarantee the opportunity for happiness in human life. From this perspective, Human security contributes in spreading the recognition that the security and happiness of every individual of human community should be a fundamental value that extends beyond the boundaries of nations.

The threat toward individual security is triggered from not only military factors, but also from extensive non-military factors such as the destruction of the environment, exacerbations of economic and social conditions, and abnormal government or governance. The countries in East Asia have accomplished different degrees of development, as well as historical experiences, but it is recommended that the concept and sphere of human security be actively utilized as the facilitator to enable regional cooperation.

Korea has the experience of successful transitioning from an aided poor nation to an aiding nation. The experience of such development may be utilized in the concept and sphere of human security in promoting formation of a regional community of East Asia. While the Korean Peninsula is still regarded as the worst ‘powder kegs’ in the



world due to the break away nation of north Korea from international community, the Korean peninsula, surrounded by super powers with different levels of development, is positioned in the center as well. It is well positioned to actively implement a partnership beyond the borders of various nations to promote common prosperity and development and increase security of every participant from the perspective of Human Security.

NOTES

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