
KINU Unification Survey 2021

- Executive Summary -

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I. Introduction

1. Research Objectives

- Through face-to-face surveys, KINU Unification Survey seeks to:
 - (1) Research changes in the South Korean public's perception on reunification, policy towards North Korea, North Korean defectors, inter-Korean integration, and security;
 - (2) Identify various factors that determine and influence such perception; and
 - (3) Contribute to establishing unification and North Korea policies that are supported by public opinion and consensus based on the above research findings.

2. Cohorts in Korean Society

- Categorization of Cohorts
 - Based on literature reviews of major studies on cohorts in Korean society, the KINU Unification Survey of the Korea Institute for National Unification encodes cohorts as follows. This surveys uses the same coding rules for cohorts.

Cohort	Year born	Frequency (this survey)	% (this survey)
War generation	Before 1950	102	10.2
Industrialization generation	1951-1960	167	16.7
386 generation	1961-1970	194	19.3
X generation	1971-1980	194	19.3
IMF generation	1981-1990	161	16.1
Millennials	After 1991	185	18.4
Total		1,003	100.0

3. Overview of the Survey

Population	South Korean adults over 18
Sampling frame	South Korean Resident Registration Data (the Ministry of the Interior and Safety, March 2020)
Sampling method	Stratified Random Sampling (by gender, region, and age)
Sampling unit	1,003
Sampling error	Assuming random sampling, sampling error is $\pm 3.1\%$ at the 95% confidence level.
Survey Method	Face-to-Face Interview with structured questionnaire
Survey Period	April 26 th - May 18 th , 2021
Research Institute	Hankook Research

4. Summary of Findings

Perception toward Unification and North Korea

- The response that unification is necessary has significantly increased by 6.0%P from 52.7% in 2020 to 58.7% in this year's survey.
- The perspective toward the future of inter-Korean relations is polarizing into “peaceful coexistence” and “unification.” (‘Prefers peaceful coexistence’: 56.5%)
- Positive responses to the question “If North Korea open the borders to each other and cooperate on political and economic matters, such a state can be considered unification even if the two Koreas are not one country” have reached 63.2%.
- For the first time since this question started in 2018, the responses that inter-Korean relations would be worse than they are now outpace those that it would improve (“will be worse” 20.3%; “will be better” 13.0%). Most people predict that inter-Korean relations will be maintained at the status quo rather than worsening or improving (66.7%).
 - There is a growing tendency to be indifferent to North Korea and to give up expectations rather than a negative view for the future of inter-Korean relations.
- The IMF generation and millennial generations clearly show a high level of indifference toward North Korea compared to the older generations. (IMF generation 68.3%, Millennial generation 74.1%).

North Korea policy and US-ROK Relations

- 67.7% of survey respondents agreed to the statement “The agreements between the two Koreas should be continued regardless of the government's change”
 - It also suggests that public support can weigh in for the continued pursuit of a peace policy on the Korean Peninsula regardless of government change.
- To the question “Do you believe that U.S.-ROK Alliance will still be necessary in the future?”, 93.8% of respondents replied necessary.
 - Also in the three previous surveys, more than 90% of respondents perceived that the ROK-U.S. alliance is necessary in the future.
- 90.3% of the respondents said ‘necessary’ to the question “Do you think that U.S. Armed Forces in Korea is needed now?”

- However, the survey result of the same question but with the different period, “after unification,” showed that the proportion of agreeing to the necessity of the USFK troops decreased greatly (47.9%).
 - To the question “How do you evaluate Korea-US relations over the past year?”, 70.3% responded that it did not change, which is 16%p higher than the November 2020 survey.
 - In contrast, the number of those who said it got worse was 25.9%, a decrease by 12%p.
 - To the question “Recently, the South Korean government and the US government agreed to raise Korea's defense cost share by 13.9%, reflecting the annual increase in defense cost over the next four years. What do you think about the defense sharing cost that Korea has agreed to increase?”, 74.5% of respondents said ‘Pays too much.’
 - Regardless of political party identifications, the evaluation on the perception of the defense cost sharing was similar.
 - 69% of respondents showed a positive attitude toward the question “Do you think U.S. President Biden should hold a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un?”
- Identification of Fake News related to North Korea
- It appears that people under 30 are more vulnerable to fake news than those over 40.
 - Income level, residence area, political ideology, and party identification seem to influence the reception of fake news on North Korea and unification issues.
- Perception of Fairness and Unification
- Among the fairness perception types, Meritocracy type, which emphasizes the proportionality of effort (ability) and reward, was the least unification-oriented and was especially contrasted to universal equality. However, it is difficult to conclude that Meritocracy perceives unification itself negatively from the above results alone.
 - Meritocracy showed a clearly more positive attitude toward resumption of Mt. Geumgang tourism than other types, while universal equality showed a relatively negative attitude. Since the primary responsibility for the burden caused by Mt. Geumgang rests with the tourists, Meritocracy seems to have no reason to oppose the resumption of its tourism as it emphasizes proportionality.


□ Favorability on Neighboring Countries

- The favorability toward all neighboring countries declined in 2021, and the favorable sentiment toward Japan was especially lower than in 2019 when anti-Japanese sentiment reached its peak. This seems to reflect the disappointment of the Korean public as Korea-Japan relations have not changed from the days of Prime Minister Abe despite hope for improvement as Prime Minister Suga took office.
- Negative sentiment toward China also increased significantly. Considering the results of regression model that controlled gender, age, region, ideology, and the evaluation of president's government administration, such negative sentiment seems to have reflected the anti-Chinese sentiments of the younger generation (especially the millennial generation).
- Favorability toward Biden increased significantly after he was elected as president and declined in the 2021 survey, but the level still exceeds that of other countries' leaders by more than 20 points. Given that this survey was conducted prior to the US-ROK summit, it can be concluded that Koreans has huge expectations and favorability toward President Biden of the U.S.
- On the other hand, while the favorability level toward Prime Minister Suga of Japan has not yet decreased to the level of former Prime Minister Abe, it has decreased by more than 13 points from the November 2020 survey. The largest decrease in favorability among the leaders of neighboring countries, this reflects the deadlock in Korea-Japan relations.

II. Perception toward Unification and North Korea

1. Necessity of Unification

<Figure 1> Necessity of Unification 2007-2021



“How much do you think the unification is necessary?”

- KINU¹⁾: 4-point scale (1=Strongly unnecessary, 2=Somewhat unnecessary, 3=Somewhat necessary, 4=Absolutely necessary)
- IPUS²⁾: 5-point scale (1=Strongly unnecessary, 2=Somewhat unnecessary, 3=Neutral, 4=Somewhat necessary, 5=Absolutely necessary)

Changes in 2021

- The response that unification is necessary has significantly increased by 6.0%p from 52.7% in 2020 to 58.7% in this year’s survey.
- The necessity of unification is closely connected to changes in inter-Korean relations. After the failure of the US-DPRK Summit in Hanoi in 2018, responses that unification is necessary continued to decline, but the 2012 result shows that new expectations for inter-Korean dialogue have been reflected since the Biden administration took office.

1) Korea Institute for National Unification

2) Institute for Peace and Unification Studies of Seoul National University.

2. Unification vs Peaceful Coexistence

<Figure 2> Unification vs Peaceful Coexistence 2016-2021



“If South and North can peacefully coexist without war, the unification is not necessary.”

Measured on a 5-point scale (1=Strongly disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Neutral; 4=Somewhat agree; 5=Strongly agree)

Positive responses (Agree, Strongly agree) for this question were coded into “Prefers peaceful coexistence” and the negative responses (Strongly disagree, Disagree) into “Prefers unification”, and were shown on the above graph

Trends and Changes in 2021

The ratio of preference for peaceful coexistence has continued to increase since 2016, when the survey on this question began. This trend is continuing as the percentage of ‘Prefers peaceful coexistence’ increased from 55.0% in the June 2020 survey to 56.5% in the April 21 survey.


On the other hand, the ratio of ‘Prefers unification’ has somewhat increased (22.3% → 25.4%).

The percentage of preference for ‘Neutral,’ which is the midpoint between the two opinions, recorded the lowest at 18.1% since the survey.

Such change shows the trend that the perspective toward the future of

inter-Korean relations is polarizing into “peaceful coexistence” and “unification.”

<Figure 3> Comparison of ‘Prefers Peaceful Coexistence’ by Cohort 2020-21



□ Comparison of ‘Prefers peaceful coexistence’ by cohort

- The percentage of ‘Prefers peaceful coexistence’ has increased among the millennial, IMF, and industrialization generations over the past one year.
 - Millennial: 63.6% → 71.4%
 - IMF: 55.9% → 61.5%
 - Industrialization: 51.3% → 56.9%
- The percentage of ‘Prefers unification’ has decreased among the millennial and industrial generations.
 - Millennial: 17.9% → 12.4%
 - Industrialization: 32.1% → 24.6%
- The gap between ‘Prefers unification’ and ‘Prefers peaceful coexistence’ is very huge in the millennial generation. In the 2021 survey, the percentage of ‘Prefers peaceful coexistence’ was 71.4% and the percentage of ‘Prefers unification’ was 12.4%, showing a difference of 59%P.
- Thus, the trend that younger generations view North Korea as the subject of coexistence and not unification will become stronger in the future.

3. Nationalistic Unification


<Figure 4> Nationalistic Unification: 2017-2021 Trend



- Just because North and South Koreans are one people does not mean they must form one country.
 - Measured on a 5-point scale (1=Strongly disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Neutral; 4=Somewhat agree; 5=Strongly agree)
 - The negative responses on the above sentence were coded into “nationalistic unification view” and positive responses into “post-nationalistic unification view” to generate the above graph.
- Slight rebound in nationalistic unification view
 - Since the survey started in 2017, the post-nationalistic view that the two Koreas do not need to form one country because they are one people is continuously increasing.
 - Post-nationalistic unification view recorded 49.3% in the Nov. 2020 survey and maintained a similar level at 48.8% in this survey.
 - On the other hand, the nationalistic unification view was 19.6% which was the lowest after the November 20 survey, but it somewhat rebounded and increased by 23.0% here.
- Clear changes in the unification view
 - Nearly half of South Koreans do not agree with the idea that the same ethnicity is a sufficient condition for unification.
 - However, it is necessary to continuously track and examine the response to this question since it began to be measured in 2017 so it may change when the inter-Korean relationship improves again and the peace process on the Korean Peninsula resumes.


4. Definition of Unification

<Figure 5> Unitary State System vs Confederations 2020-21



- If South and North Korea open the borders to each other and cooperate on political and economic matters, such a state can be considered unification even if the two Koreas are not one country.
 - Measured on a 5-point scale (1=Strongly disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Neutral; 4=Somewhat agree; 5=Strongly agree)
 - Negative responses were interpreted as “Prefers unitary state system”, and positive responses as “Prefers confederations” to be coded.
- Increase in preference for confederations
 - This question was designed to compare the EU model with the view toward national unification as the traditional unitary state system.
 - The flexible unification view that inter-Korean exchanges and political/economic cooperation is considered unification, even if the two Koreas are not fully integrated into a single government or country, has reached 63.2%.
 - Increased by 8.8%P from the Nov. 2020 survey (54.4%)

<Figure 6> Comparison of Unitary State System vs Confederations by Cohort: 2020-21 Cross-sectional Analysis




Comparison by cohort

- A cross-sectional analysis was performed on the survey data from June 2020, Nov. 2020, and April 2021 to compare the preference by cohort.
- The preference for unification in the unitary state system, which is the traditional unification view, was relatively high among the war generation (17.8%). However, more than half of the War generation (52.1%) preferred confederations.
- The younger generation tends to loosely favor confederations. The Millennial generation most actively preferred confederations and has the lowest percentage of preference for unitary state system at only 6.5%.
- Such difference by generation is probably related to the increased perception of international relations such as the European Union due to the influence of overseas travels and globalization.

5. Benefits of Unification

<Figure 7> National and Individual Benefits of Unification: 2014-2021 Trend



National and individual benefits of unification


- National benefits of unification: “How much do you think unification would benefit the entire nation of South Korea?”
- Individual benefits of unification: “How much do you think unification would benefit yourself?”
 - 4-point scale for each (1=No benefit at all; 2=Not too much; 3=Somewhat beneficial; 4=Very much)
 - The positive responses for the two questions were coded into “national benefits of unification” and “individual benefits of unification.”

Perception that unification is beneficial to the nation but is somewhat not beneficial to individuals.

- This question has been measured steadily since 2014 is maintained at the same level without major changes although it is affected to some extent by changes in inter-Korean relations.
- In the 2021 survey, 64.5% of the respondents said that unification is beneficial to the whole country, and 29.0% said that it is also beneficial to the individual respondents themselves.
- In other words, most of the people perceived that unification is necessary at the national level but is not necessary or advantageous for individuals.
- Individual benefits of unification continued to decline after the failure of the Hanoi summit, but rebounded slightly in this survey. (39.5% in Sept. 2019 → 26% in Nov. 2020 → 29% in April 2021)

6. Five-year Prospect on inter-Korean Relations


<Figure 8> Five-year Prospect on inter-Korean Relations 2018-2021



- What do you think will happen in the next five years for the relationship of South and North Korea?
 - Measured on a 5-point scale (1=It will be much worse; 2=It will be somewhat worse; 3=It will be the same; 4=It will be somewhat better; 5=It will be much better)
 - Negative responses were coded into “It will be worse” and positive responses were coded into “It will be better.”
- Negative prospects overtook positive prospects for the first time
 - For the first time since this question started in 2018, the responses (20.3%) that inter-Korean relations would be worse than they are now (20.3%) outpace those that it would improve (13.0%).
 - This seems to be the effect of the current situation as strained inter-Korean relations continue and North Korea is unlikely to engage in a forward-looking dialogue.
 - However, most people predict that inter-Korean relations will be maintained at the status quo rather than worsening or improving (66.7%).
 - If analyzed in connection with “Disinterest in North Korea” in the next part, there is a growing tendency to be indifferent to North Korea and to give up expectations rather than a negative view for the future of inter-Korean relations.


7. Interest or Indifference in North Korea

<Figure 9> Interest or Indifference in North Korea 2015-2021



- “How much are you interested in North Korea?”
 - Measured on a 4-point scale (1=Not interested at all; 2=A little disinterested; 3=Somewhat interested; 4=Very interested)
 - “Not interested at all” and “A little disinterested” were coded into “Disinterested” in the graph.
- 61% of South Koreans are disinterested in North Korea
 - Contrary to general perception, most South Koreans do not pay much attention to inter-Korean relations or North Korean issues.
 - Even when inter-Korean relations reached the brink of war in 2017, 54.2% answered that they were not interested in the North Korean issues. Even when inter-Korean relations improved later in 2018, 52.4% still answered that they were indifferent towards North Korea.


<Figure 10> Comparison of Disinterest toward North Korea by Cohort 2015-2021



- 74.1% of Millennial generation are indifferent to North Korea.
- Interest toward North Korea can be analyzed by cohort as in the above graph.
- The IMF generation and millennial generations clearly show a high level of indifference toward North Korea compared to the older generations.
 - April 2021: IMF generation 68.3%, Millennial generation 74.1%
- Compared to the younger generations, the mid-aged generation is relatively more interested in North Korea. However, even 52.9% of the War generation were indifferent to North Korea.
- This indicates that the perception that unification and North Korea no longer greatly impact individuals' everyday life is continuing to spread.

8. Image of North Korea


<Figure 11> Trends in the Image of North Korea 2014-2021



- “What do you think North Korea is to us?”
 - Suggested “a target to provide support,” “a target of cooperation,” “a target of caution,” and “a target of hostility” as the images of North Korea.
 - Measured on a 11-point scale. 0=Strongly disagree. 5=Neutral. 10=Strongly agree.
 - This 11-point scale was converted into a 3-point scale, and positive responses were collected to visualize into the above graph.
- Continued increase of negative images
 - The percentage of respondents who view North Korea as a target of hostility or caution has continued to increase after the failure of the Hanoi Summit (since the survey in April 2019).
 - In contrast, the positive image (“a target to provide support” and “a target of cooperation”) is declining overall. However, the image of cooperation rose by 7.8%P between November 2020 and April 21 (43.0%→50.8%).
 - The rise in the image of cooperation may be because North Korea has relatively refrained from provocations since the election of President Biden and that inter-Korean and US-DPRK relations remained at the status quo, with a prospect for inter-Korean relations to improve in the future.

- However, the image of the object to provide support has declined despite continued reports of North Korea's food shortage and economic difficulties caused by COVID-19. This is possibly due to the decoupling the image variables of the target for cooperation and target to provide support.


<Figure 12> Comparison in the Image of North Korea by Supporting Political Party (2021)



- Clear difference in the image of North Korea by supporting political party
 - Respondents supporting the Democratic Party had a strong tendency to view North Korea as a partner (68.1%).
 - In contrast, supporters of People's Power Party consider North Korea as a target of caution (74.6%).
 - However, this figure cannot be said to be low as 60.7% of the supporters of Democratic Party view North Korea as a target of caution and 43.6% of People's Power Party supporters responded that North Korea was the target of cooperation.
 - In other words, there are clear differences in the way people view North Korea depending on the party they support, but this difference does not need to be exaggerated for interpretation.

9. Dialogue with Kim Jong Un's Regime


<Figure 13> Trust or Pursuit of Dialogue and Compromise with Kim Jong Un 2016-2021



- Trust for Kim Jong Un: “Do you think the current Kim Jong Un regime is a possible partner for dialogue and compromise?”
- Pursues dialogue and compromise: “Regardless of your answer to the previous question, do you think we should pursue dialogue and compromise with Kim Jong Un?”
 - Both questions were measured on a 5-point scale (1=Strongly disagree; 2=Somewhat disagree; 3=Neutral; 4=Somewhat agree; 5=Strongly agree)
- Low trust but effort for conversation is necessary.
 - The percentage of responses that Kim Jong Un’s regime is possible for dialogue was only 14.3% in the 2021 survey. No major changes since 2020.
 - However, 38% of the respondents said that the South should pursue dialogue and compromise with North Korea regardless of such low trust, which is nearly twice that of trust toward Kim.
 - As an impact of the strained inter-Korean relations, both trust as well as the pursuit of dialogue and compromise are trending downwards. However, the evaluation of Kim Jong Un’s regime and the evaluation of inter-Korean dialogue policies are perceived separately.

10. North Korea's Intention


<Figure 14> North Korea's Intention 2019-2021



- Regime stability and economic development: “What North Korea wants is regime stability and economic development rather than communist unification.”
- Pursuit of peace: “North Korea wants peace with South Korea than conflict.”
 - Both questions were measured on a 5-point scale (1=Strongly disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Neutral; 4=Somewhat agree; 5=Strongly agree)
 - Positive responses on each question were combined together and coded into “Regime stability and economic development” and “Pursuit of peace” to visualize into the above graph.
- Doubts about North Korea's hostile intentions increased.
 - As inter-Korean relations began to strain after these two survey questions began in 2019, the tendency to view North Korea's intentions as negative rather than positive is deepening.
 - However, despite this trend, 43.9% still believe that North Korea wants regime stability and economic development rather than unification, and 38% believe North Korea also wants peace.

11. Perception of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program

<Figure 15> Perception toward North Korean Nuclear Weapons 2016-2021




- Questions on perception of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program
 - “Do you think North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons program?”
 - Measured on a 3-point scale: 1=North Korea will give up nuclear weapons soon; 2=North Korea will give up nuclear weapons in the long run; 3=North Korea will not give up nuclear weapons.
 - The percentage of respondents saying “3=North Korea will not give up nuclear weapons” were shown on the above graph
 - “To what extent are you concerned about the North Korean nuclear threat?”
 - Measured on a 5-point scale: 1=Not concerned at all; 2=Somewhat not concerned; 3=Neutral; 4=Somewhat concerned; 5=Very concerned
 - The percentage of respondents choosing “4=Somewhat concerned” or “5=Very concerned” were marked as “Concerned about North Korea’s nuclear weapons” on the above graph.
 - “How much impact does North Korea’s nuclear threat have on your life?”
 - Measured on a 5-point scale: 1=It has no impact at all; 2=It has little impact; 3=Neutral; 4=It has some impact; 5=It has strong impact
 - The percentage of respondents choosing “4=It has some impact” or “5=It has strong impact” were marked as “Has impact” on the above

graph.

- Despite the ebb and flow of inter-Korean relations, the perception toward North Korean nuclear weapons is relatively stable.
 - Skepticism that North Korea will abandon its nuclear weapons deepened. 90.7% predict that North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons.
 - However, 42.5% are not concerned about North Korea's nuclear weapons despite pessimistic prospects for solving the North Korean nuclear weapons problem.
 - In addition, only 18.6% answered that North Korean nuclear issues had an impact on their lives.
 - The reason may be that inter-Korean relations are relatively managed as North Korea refrains from serious provocations after blowing up of the Gaeseong Liaison Office in 2020, despite the severance of inter-Korean relations dialogue and strained relationship.

12. COVID-19 Support for North Korea

<Figure 16> Opinions on COVID-19 Support for North Korea




- “COVID-19 may be spreading in North Korea. What is your opinion on supplying medical products to the DPRK to help tackle COVID-19?”
 - Measured on a 4-point scale: 1=South Korea should supply products to North Korea proactively regardless of whether there is any request from the North; 2=South Korea should supply the products to North Korea only if there is a request from the North; 3=South Korea should supply the products to North Korea upon the North’s request only after the North Korean government makes a pledge on denuclearization, economic cooperation and other matters; 4=South Korea should not supply the products to North Korea even if there is a request from the North.
 - Respondents who chose #1 and #2 were coded into “actively support” and respondents who chose #3 and #4 were coded into “little support or cannot support” to show on the above graph.
- Spread of negative perception on providing COVID-19 related support to North Korea
 - Despite reports of economic difficulties in North Korea and the possible the spread of COVID-19, the percentage of respondents agreeing to provide active support to North Korea fell sharply to 43.5% from 70.3% in the June 2020 survey.
 - On the other hand, 56.5% chose passive support or no support.
 - Despite the Korean government’s support policy announced several times so far, North Korea’s consistent non-response may have had an impact

on the survey responses.

- That North Korea carried out a military parade during COVID-19 must have raised doubts about the necessity of support.

<Figure 17> COVID-19 Support to North Korea by Political Party 2020-21




- Clear difference in providing COVID-19 support to North Korea by political party
 - Supporters of the Democratic Party want to provide more active support to North Korea than supporters of People Power Party.
 - However, even among supporters of Democratic Party, the percentage of responses to provide active support fell from 78.9% in June 2020 to 58.7% in this year's survey, a decrease of 20.2%p.
 - If North Korea continuously fails to respond to the ROK government's request for dialogue and inter-Korean relations continue to strain, public support for improving inter-Korean relations may become unstable.

III. North Korea policy and US-ROK Relations

1. Continuing the inter-Korean Agreement


<Figure 18> Continuing the inter-Korean Agreement



- 67.7% of survey respondents agreed (Strongly agree, Somewhat agree) to the statement “The agreements between the two Koreas should be continued regardless of the government’s change” (4-point scale, 1=Support strongly and 4=Oppose strongly).
- No huge change has been observed as about 3%P has increased compared to the result of 2014 survey that asked the same question.
- This survey result reflects that South Korean public’s wish for the inter-Korean agreement to be continuously implemented is strongly stable.
- It also suggests that public support can weigh in for the continued pursuit of a peace policy on the Korean Peninsula regardless of government change.


2. Continued Support for North Korea

<Figure 19> Continued Support for North Korea




- 21.5% of respondents agreed (Strongly agree, Somewhat agree) to the statement “Even though North Korea is developing nuclear weapons, support for the North should continue.” (4-point scale, 1=Support strongly, 4=Oppose strongly).
- This is 1/3 of the percentage 78.6% opposing support to North Korea.
 - Compared with the 2014 survey results, the negative response rate increased by 9.6P%.
 - In other words, South Koreans’ support for aid to North Korea while the North pursues nuclear development has decreased.
- The percentage agreeing to support has decreased regardless of the supporting party. <Fig. 20>
- This result suggests that if North Korea continues to develop and test nuclear weapons, it may be difficult for the ROK government’s policy to help North Korea to gain public support.

<Figure 20> Continued Support for North Korea: Supporting Party



3. Improving inter-Korean Relations vs Strengthening US-ROK Alliance


<Figure 21> Improving inter-Korean Relations vs Strengthening US-ROK Alliance



- 71.3% of respondents agreed to the statement “Strengthening ROK-US alliance is more important than improving inter-Korean relations.” (4-point scale, 1=Support strongly, 4=Oppose strongly).
 - This is an increase of about 20%p from 51.9% in the 2014 survey. As of 2021, South Koreans prefer strengthening the ROK-US alliance rather than improving inter-Korean relations.
 - The ongoing nuclear development and testing in North Korea, the Korea-China conflict over the THAAD deployment, and the intensifying U.S.-China competition that occurred between the two survey periods have increased the necessity of strengthening the US-ROK alliance felt by people.
 - That is, while improving relations with North Korea is important, the reality experienced by Koreans in the rapidly changing security and economic environment of Northeast Asia must have reinforced the perception that strengthening the relationship with the US is a more feasible and practical choice.
 - According to the survey, such perception change has occurred across all generations, especially in the Millennial generation. <Fig. 22>
 - Possible causes are the pragmatic tendency and the weakening inter-Korean relations based on nationalism of the Millennial generation.
 - The high ratio of sympathizing with the necessity of strengthening the


ROK-US alliance rather than improving inter-Korean relations across all generations is confirmed by the high support rate of South Koreans for the continuing necessity of the ROK-US alliance, which will be discussed next. <Fig. 22>

<Figure 22> Improving inter-Korean Relations vs Strengthening US-ROK Alliance: By Cohort



4. Necessity of US-ROK Alliance

<Figure 23> Necessity of US-ROK Alliance




- To the question “Do you believe that U.S.-ROK Alliance will still be necessary in the future?” (4-point scale, 1=Not necessary at all, 4=Absolutely necessary), 93.8% of respondents replied necessary.
- Also in the three previous surveys, more than 90% of respondents perceived that the ROK-U.S. alliance is necessary in the future.
- By political party, People Power Party supporters and independents agree to the necessity of the ROK-US alliance at a consistently higher rate than Democratic Party supporters.

<Table 1> Necessity of US-ROK alliance: Supporting party (%)

	Nov. 2019	April 2020	Nov. 2020	April 2021
Democratic Party	93.5	88.9	93.6	90
People Power Party	92.3	92.3	95.2	96.4
Independent	92.7	91.1	93	95.2

5. Necessity of US Armed Forces in Korea

<Figure 24> Necessity of US Armed Forces in Korea: Present




- 90.3% of the respondents said ‘necessary’ to the question “Do you think that U.S. Armed Forces in Korea is needed now?” (4-point scale, 1=Not necessary at all, 4=Absolutely necessary).
- To interpret this result in relation to the high support rate for the necessity of US-ROK alliance, South Koreans perceive the USFK as a key element of the current ROK-US alliance.
- However, the survey result of the same question but with the different period, “after unification,” showed that the proportion of agreeing to the necessity of the USFK troops decreased greatly.
- To be specific, 47.9% of the respondents replied ‘necessary’ to the question “Do you think that U.S. Armed Forces in Korea will be needed even after the Unification of Korea?” (4-point scale, 1=Not necessary at all, 4=Absolutely necessary). <Table 2>
 - This is about 43%P lower than the 90.3%percentage of respondents who said that US armed forces in South Korea are necessary.

<Table 2> Necessity of US armed forces in Korea after unification (%)

	Sept. 2019	April 2020	Nov. 2020	April 2021
Needed	54.1	41.6	54.4	52.2
Not needed	45.9	58.4	45.7	47.9

- Such results imply that South Koreans judge the necessity of the US military presence in both nationalist and practical terms.
 - It is interpreted that South Koreans view unification in connection with nationalist self-defense.
 - At the same time, this also implies that South Koreans judge the US military presence in Korea by paying a huge cost for stationing after unification is not in Koreans' real interest.
 - Such large difference in the perception of the necessity of US military presence on the Korean Peninsula depending on unification shows that Koreans perceive the necessity of USFK from the perspective of security issues due to North Korea rather than regional security.


<Figure 25> Presence of US armed forces in Korea after unification: By generation



- However, it should be noted that in the two surveys conducted after the April 2020 survey, the ratio agreeing to the necessity of US military presence after unification has increased. <Table 2>
 - These changes are witnessed across all generations. <Fig. 25>
 - The stronger U.S. global leadership, intensifying US-China conflicts, and straining inter-Korean relations recently have stimulated South Koreans' sense of security crisis, while strengthening their perception of the necessity of the US military.
 - This suggests the high expectations of South Koreans for the US roles on the Korean Peninsula, along with the increase in the number of respondents agreeing to the necessity of fortifying the ROK-U.S. alliance rather than improving the inter-Korean relations discussed above.


6. Evaluation of the U.S. Sanctions against North Korea

<Figure 26> Evaluation of the U.S. Sanctions against North Korea



- The ratio of ‘Neutral’ responses is high in the question “The South Korean government is working hard to improve inter-Korean relations by solving the sanctions against North Korea by international community such as the United States. Do you think the US economic sanctions against North Korea are an obstacle to improving inter-Korean relations?” (5-point scale, 1=Not at all, 5=Strongly agree).
- In other words, the percentage of ‘Neutral,’ reservation is high.
- Such high percentage of reservation is also spread to the prospect on Biden administration’s North Korea sanctions.
- To the question “How do you think the U.S.’s Biden administration should impose economic sanctions on North Korea?” the percentage of response that ‘Economic sanctions against North Korea should remain at the current level’ was strongly high at 44.7%. <Fig. 10>
- Regardless of the supporting party or cohort, the percentage of responding ‘Should remain at the current level’ was the highest as in the 2020 November survey.
 - Compared to the survey conducted last November, the proportion of respondents who said ‘Remain at the current level’ decreased by 2.2%p while the proportion of respondents who said ‘should be strengthened’ increased by 4%p.
 - By supporting party, the percentage of ‘should be eased’ increased from 25.2% to 32.2% in the Democratic Party supporters while ‘should be strengthened’ increased from 22% to 33.6% in the People’s Party supporters. <Table 3>

<Figure 27> Prospect on Biden Administration's Sanctions against North Korea



- The percentage of Democratic Party supporters is significantly higher in the respondents who said 'Must alleviate.'

<Table 3> Prospect on Biden administration's economic sanctions:
Supporting party - Should be eased (%)


	Democratic Party	People Power Party	Independent
Nov. 2020	48.4	21.7	29.9
April 2021	54.6	13.6	31.8

* Number of respondents saying 'Should be eased': Nov. 2020 survey - 184 people, April 2021 survey - 176 people

- The survey results that the expectations for the Biden administration to ease sanctions against North Korea varied depending on the supporting party implies that conflicts may arise among the people depending on the supporting party in the future, if the South Korean government begins to push the U.S. to ease the sanctions against North Korea.
- However, since there are many people who want to "maintain the status quo" in the reserved position, it is necessary for the government to come up with measures to ease the sanctions against North Korea that will draw the public support.

7. Declaration of an End to the Korean War

<Figure 28> Declaration of an End to the Korean War



- 73.3% of the respondents agreed to the question “The Korean government must persuade the U.S. government to officially end the Korean War, which remains in a state of armistice, through a declaration of an end to the Korean War.”
- Absolute majority of Koreans wished the U.S. to officially declare an end to the Korean War.
- Such wish by the South Korean public did not have characteristic differences according to the supporting party. <Table 4>

<Table 4> Declaration of an end to the Korean War: Supporting party (%)

	Democratic Party	People Power Party	Independent
Agree	73.8	71.8	73.7
Oppose	26.2	28.2	26.3

- Cohort analysis showed that more than 70% across all generations want the South Korean government to persuade the U.S. government for official declaration of an end to the Korean War.


<Table 5> Declaration of an end to the Korean War: Cohort (%)

	War generation	Industrialization generation	386 generation	X generation	IMF generation	Millennial generation
Agree	75.5	71.9	73.2	73.2	72.7	74.1
Oppose	24.5	28.1	26.8	26.8	27.3	25.9

- The analysis showed that the Millennial generation, along with the War generation, wished the South Korean government to persuade the U.S. government for Declaration of an end to the Korean War at the highest ratio. <Table 5>

8. Evaluation of the US-ROK Relations

<Figure 29> Evaluation of the US-ROK Relations




- To the question “How do you evaluate Korea-US relations over the past year?”, 70.3% responded that it did not change, which is 16%p higher than the November 2020 survey.
- In contrast, the number of those who said it got worse was 25.9%, a decrease by 12%p.
- 43.9% of the respondents who responded it got worse said that the reason is attributable to both the U.S. and South Korea. <Table 6>
 - This is in contrast to the fact that the percentage of respondents who responded “Because of the U.S.” was the highest at 50.3% in the Nov. 2020 survey.
 - This is an influence by stronger U.S. roles as an international leader with the inauguration of the Biden administration and return to normal diplomacy, which led to active communication between the U.S. and South Korea on Korean Peninsula issues.
 - It is especially due to the diminished perception of holding the U.S. accountable for worsening the US-ROK relations, as issues such as defense cost sharing negotiations have been resolved.

<Table 6> Reasons US-ROK relations deteriorated (%)

	Because of the U.S.	Because of South Korea	Because of both the U.S. and South Korea	Because of the international environment
Nov. 2020	50.3	8.6	31.4	9.7
April 2021	28.9	17.3	43.9	10

9. Evaluation on the Defense Cost Sharing

<Figure 30> Evaluation on the Defense Cost Sharing



- To the question “Recently, the South Korean government and the US government agreed to raise Korea’s defense cost share by 13.9%, reflecting the annual increase in defense cost over the next four years. What do you think about the defense sharing cost that Korea has agreed to increase?” (5-point scale, 1=South Korea pays too much, 5=South Korea pays too little), 74.5% of respondents said ‘Pays too much.’
- No person responded that ‘South Korea pays too little.’
- Regardless of supporting party, the evaluation on the perception of the defense cost sharing was similar. <Table 7>

<Table 7> Evaluation of defense cost sharing: Supporting party (%)

	Democratic Party	People Power Party	Independent
Pays too much	76.5	73.7	73.7
Reasonable amount	22.2	25.5	25.5
Pays somewhat little	1.3	0.9	0.9

- The evaluation on the perception of defense cost sharing was similar even by cohort. <Table 8>


- However, it is interesting that the distribution of the Millennial generation's responses on the evaluation on defense cost sharing was the most similar to that of the War generation.

<Table 8> Evaluation of defense cost sharing: Cohort (%)

	War generation	Industrialization generation	386 generation	X generation	IMF generation	Millennial generation
Pays too much	71.6	77.3	75.3	75.8	76.4	69.7
Reasonable amount	26.5	21.6	22.7	21.7	23.6	29.7
Pays somewhat little	2	1.2	2.1	2.6	0	0.5


10. Prospect on Biden's US-DPRK Summit

<Figure 31> Prospect on Biden's US-DPRK Summit



- 69% of respondents showed a positive attitude toward the question “Do you think U.S. President Biden should hold a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un?”
- However, about 50% of the respondents who responded positive said that North Korea should resume if it makes some substantial progress on denuclearization.
 - That is, the majority of respondents wanted a ‘conditional summit’ to be held.
 - This is almost twice the rate of the respondents who responded, ‘The U.S. should not resume the summit until North Korea completely gives up its nuclear weapons.’
- That 75% of all respondents said that the North Korea-U.S. summit should resume, when North Korea makes progress on the nuclear weapons or gives them up completely, shows that most South Koreans perceive solving nuclear issues as the prerequisite to the US-DPRK summit.
 - Thus, unless there is some progress on the North Korean nuclear weapons issue, the South Korean government should be wary of putting excessive efforts to hold the US-DPRK Summit.
 - Such results enable the prediction that South Koreans will be positively evaluating the Biden government’s approach to North Korea, a ‘bottom-up method based on practical results’.


<Figure 32> Prospect on US-DPRK Summit: Supporting Party



- Regardless of the supporting party, the ratio of responding ‘Should resume under conditions’ was the highest.
- However, the percentages of other responses varied according to supporting party.
 - Specifically, for Democratic Party supporters, the response with the highest ratio after ‘Should resume under conditions’ was “Resume without conditions (32%)”, and for People Power Party supporters, it was “The U.S. should not resume the summit until North Korea completely gives up its nuclear weapons (37%).”
 - 29%, nearly one-third, of the Independents said that US-DPRK Summit should be held when North Korea completely gives up its nuclear weapons.
- Such results imply that the ROK government should put in effort to arrange US-DPRK Summit while considering the relevant public opinions based on the supporting party.
- It was investigated that the higher ratio of Millennial generation than the War generation opposed resuming the summit before North Korea completely gives up its nuclear weapons. <Fig. 33>
- This seems to be related with the fact that the War generation that experienced the Korean War feels the strongest sense of crisis and threat from North Korean nuclear weapons.
 - As in the previous survey, the War generation was most concerned (52.9%) about the North Korean nuclear threats.


- In contrast, it is judged due to the pragmatic tendency that the Millennial generation, who was not too concerned about North Korean nuclear weapons than other generations, perceives North Korea's abandonment of nuclear weapons as a condition for US-DPRK dialogue at a higher ratio.
- Instead, along with the War Generation, the Millennial generation is skeptical of the possibility that North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons at the highest ratio. (April 2021 survey: Millennial generation - 92.4%)
- * Nevertheless, that the Millennial generation chose giving up on North Korea's nuclear weapons as a condition for resuming the US-DPRK Summit at the highest percentage is due to the perception that holding the US-DPRK Summit without substantial progress on the nuclear issues has high costs (time, diplomatic power, etc.).

<Figure 33> Prospect on US-DPRK Summit: By Cohort



11. Perception on the U.S. - Participation in Quad

<Figure 34> Participation in Quad



- To the question “The United States, Japan, Australia, and India formed the “Quad”, an informal strategic dialogue of four countries to contain China. Some argue that South Korea should also participate in this quad to strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance and contain China, while others argue that South Korea should not because it can unnecessarily provoke China and threaten the security of the Korean Peninsula. Do you think South Korea should participate in the Quad? Or do you think you should not participate?”, 42% of the respondents showed a reserved stance of ‘I’m not sure.’
- Such result indicates that the South Korean government’s dilemma toward participation in the Quad has been reflected in the public perception.
- The survey results that many people have a reservation about South Korea’s participation in Quad imply that how the ROK government reaches a consensus with the U.S. regarding Quad may determine the future direction of the public opinion.

<Table 9> Participation in Quad: Supporting party (%)


	Democratic Party	People Power Party	Independent
Must participate	27.2	36.4	29.3
Must not participate	37.6	24.1	22.1
I'm not sure	35.2	39.6	48.6

- Preference towards participation in quad varies according to the supporting party.
 - Specifically, the Democratic Party supporters' response rate for 'must not participate' is 36.7%, which is higher than the response rate for 'I'm not sure' (35.2%).
 - The response rate of 'I'm not sure' is the highest for the supporters of People Power Party and Independents.
 - However, the response rate of 'Must participate' was also high at 36.4% also for supporters of the People Power Party.
- Therefore, the South Korean government must caution that a conflict may arise between the supporters of different political parties if it becomes necessary to formalize ROK's participation in quad or if US-ROK relations become uncomfortable in relation to it.

IV. Spread of Fake News on North Korea

1. Identification of Fake News

<Figure 35> Identification of Fake News




○ “Below are the headlines of recent media articles or Internet news related to North Korea. Please determine whether these statements are close to false or true in your opinion.”

- 1) According to the Ban on Anti-North Korea Leaflet Act, even sending a USB of Korean drama across the border between North Korea and China will be punished.
- 2) North Korea demanded 200 trillion won of South Korean National Pension.
- 3) The North Korean national anthem was played at the 70th anniversary of the Korean War.
- 4) North Korean special forces intervened during the 5.18 Gwangju Democratization Movement.
- 5) The children in the Blue House Children's Day video are a North Korean boy band.
- 6) North Korea released uranium waste, which led the radiation levels to soar in Yeongjongdo

- 7) Tried to support North Korea by issuing government bonds in deficit.
- 8) President Moon Jae-in's brief crossing of the Military Demarcation Line is a violation of the National Security Act.
- Eight headlines were selected from the news items identified as fake news by the SNU Institute of Communication Research Fact Check Center (<http://factcheck.snu.ac.kr/>). The survey asked the respondents if they considered each news items as fake news and measured their responses on a 5-point scale (1=False; 2=Mostly false; 3=Half false half true; 4=Mostly true; 5=True).
- Individual questions on fake news identification were recoded into a 2-point scale (1 to 2=Do not believe; 3 to 5=Believe)

<Figure 36> Identification of Fake News: 2-point Scale Recording



□ 2021 Trend

- The percentage of identifying “The children in the Blue House Children’s Day video are a North Korean boy band” as fake news is the highest (83.1%), followed by “The North Korean national anthem was played at the 70th anniversary of the Korean War” (79.5%) and “North Korean special forces intervened during the 5.18 Gwangju Democratization


Movement” (75.0).

- Only the proportion of those not believing “According to the Ban on Anti-North Korea Leaflet Act, even sending a USB of Korean drama across the border between North Korea and China will be punished,” i.e., those identifying it correctly, did not have a majority (43.9%). The proportions of responses actively believing this as a fact (9.1%) or mostly as a fact (21.7%) were the highest.
- The percentages of identifying “North Korea released uranium waste, which led the radiation levels to soar in Yeongjongdo” (61.4%) and “Tried to support North Korea by issuing government bonds in deficit” (62.1%) as fake news identification were relatively low.

2. Identification of Fake News by Major Groups


- The number of correctly identifying (“Do not believe”) 8 individual fake news was defined as fake news identification, measured from a minimum of 0 points (if the respondents failed to identify all 8 cases as fake news) to a maximum of 8 points (if they succeeded in correctly identifying all 8 items).

<Figure 37> Identification of Fake News by Age




- It appears that people under 30 are more vulnerable to fake news than those over 40.
- The 18-29-year-old respondents had the lowest average (4.7), and those in their 40s and 50s had the highest average of identifying the fake news correctly (5.8).

<Figure 38> Identification of Fake News by Gender




- The average number of correct answers shows that females (5.2) are more vulnerable to fake news than males (5.6).

<Figure 39> Identification of Fake News by Educational Level




- The higher the educational level was, the less people believed fake news on average, but the difference seemed insignificant.

<Figure 40> Identification of Fake News by Average Monthly Household Income




- The relatively low-income class with an average monthly household income of 3 million won or less was the least vulnerable to fake news (5.7).
- It turned out that middle class people with an income of 401-5 million won seemed to believe fake news more on average (5.0).

<Figure 41> Identification of Fake News by Subjective Income Level




- Fake news identification of respondents who said that their subjective income level was “Much higher than average” was much higher (7.0) than other groups. The fake news identification of respondents who said their income level was “About the same with average” was the lowest (5.2), and the difference in the other groups was not significant.

<Figure 42> Identification of Fake News by Residence Area: Youngnam-Honam Regions




- The fake news identification was very high (6.9) among respondents from the Honam region, who had been traditionally supported the North Korean engagement policy, while it was quite low among the respondents from Daegu/Gyeongbuk region, which are known to have a relatively large number of conservative voters (4.7).
- Since the average number of correct answers exceeds the majority regardless of residence area, there is no need to interpret the differences by area of residence.

<Figure 43> Identification of Fake News by Political Ideology



- Respondents viewing themselves as progressive are relatively less vulnerable to fake news (6.0), and there is little difference in identification between moderateness and conservatives (5.2).
- This suggests that South Korea's political ideology is still divided by socioeconomic dimension, which has recently become prominent, and the policy toward North Korea.

<Figure 44> Identification of Fake News by Supporting Party



- Fake news identification of respondents supporting the Democratic Party, which is regarded as a party succeeding the Sunshine Policy, was relatively high (6.3). The average number of correct answers by respondents supporting the People Power Party, a conservative party, was relatively low at 4.7. ap.
 - The fake news identification of Democratic Party supporters is higher than that of respondents evaluating their political ideology as progressive (6.0), and the identification of People Power Party supporters is lower than those evaluating their political ideology as conservative (5.2).
 - The identification of respondents without a supporting party (5.1) is close to that of moderates or conservatives.

V. Perception of Fairness, Unification, North Korea policy, and Neighboring Countries

1. Classification of Fairness Perception Type: Two Questions on Salary Differences

<Table 10> Classification of Fairness Perception Type

		Same work/same salary	
		Agree	Disagree
Difference in salaries between large companies and SMEs	Agree	Meritocracy	Discrimination acceptance
	Disagree	Universal equality	Inconsistency

- “The difference in salaries between large companies and SMEs is natural because it is due to differences in individual abilities”; “It is natural to receive the same salary for doing the same level of work in the same amount of time.”
- 1=Strongly disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Agree; 4=Strongly agree.
- The positive responses (Agree, Strongly agree) on each question were coded into ‘Agree,’ and negative responses (Strongly disagree, Disagree) were coded into ‘Disagree’ to show on the table.
- The types of fairness perception were divided based on the perception on salary differences that can appear in South Korean society.
 - Discrimination acceptance: Believes that salary difference is inevitable in reality and accepts discrimination.
 - Meritocracy: Believes that it is fair to receive the salary proportional to effort and ability.
 - Universal equality: Generally negative toward salary difference.
 - Inconsistency: Does not agree to the salary difference between large companies and SMEs, but admits that there can be a salary difference even for the same level of work.
- Preceding study: Bon-sang Ku (2020)
 - Meritocracy is more likely to feel that North Korea does not deserve the benefits of unification, which thus confirms that this type is the most negative for unification with North Korea.
 - An analysis of regression model using the evaluation of the Moon Jae-in

administration's North Korea policy as a dependent variable confirmed that 'universal equality' is more positive toward the government's North Korea policy.

- However, the limitations are that this survey was conducted online, 50% of the respondents were concentrated in people in their 20s at the time, and that the survey used a response of a simple preference on unification of North Korea as the dependent variable.
- In contrast, since the KINU Unification Survey was conducted as face-to-face interviews and contains various refined items on unification and North Korea policy, it provides an opportunity to analyze the relationship between these items and fairness perceptions from various angles.


○ Distribution of fairness perception type (KINU 2021)

<Table 11> Distribution of Fairness Perception Type

		Same work/same salary	
		Agree	Disagree
Difference in salaries between large companies and SMEs	Agree	Meritocracy 35.6%	Discrimination acceptance 19.9%
	Disagree	Universal equality 34.0%	Inconsistency 10.5%

- The distribution of fairness perception type appeared in the order of Meritocracy > Universal equality > Discrimination acceptance > Inconsistency.

<Figure 45> Fairness Perception Type by Generation



○ Fairness perception type by generation

- As shown in the graph, the ratios of discrimination acceptance and meritocracy are high in the War generation and Industrialization generation over age 60, and the ratio of universal equality is relatively low. In other words, these generations are familiar with discrimination in wages.
- Universal equality occupies the highest ratio in 86, X, and IMF generations. In particular, the ratio of discrimination acceptance is the lowest and that of universal equality is the highest. That is, 86 generation is the most negative toward wage discrimination and pursues equality.
- In contrast, the ratios of discrimination acceptance and meritocracy are higher in Millennial generation than the IMF and 86 generations.

2. Perception of Fairness and Unification: Pursues Peaceful Coexistence vs. Unification

<Table 12> Fairness Perception Type and Peaceful Coexistence

	fairness perception type				Total
	Discrimination acceptance	Meritocracy	Universal equality	Inconsistency	
Does not pursue unification	143 (71.5%)	287 (80.4%)	137 (69.5%)	81 (77.1%)	748 (74.6%)
Pursue unification	57 (28.5%)	70 (19.6%)	104 (30.5%)	24 (22.9%)	255 (25.4%)
Total	200 (100%)	357 (100%)	341 (100%)	105 (100%)	1003 (100%)

“If South and North can peacefully coexist without war, the unification is not necessary.”


○ 1=Strongly disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Neutral; 4=Agree; 5=Strongly agree.

○ The negative responses (Strongly disagree, Disagree) in the question were coded into ‘pursues unification’ and the remaining responses (Neutral, Agree, Strongly agree) were coded into ‘Does not pursue unification,’ and shown on the table.

- Overall, the percentage of responding ‘Pursues unification’ was only 1/4.
- Among the fairness perception types, meritocracy was the least favorable of unification which was in contrast to universal equality. However, it is difficult to conclude that meritocracy views unification itself negatively.

3. Perception of Fairness and Unification: Confederate Unification


<Figure 46> Perception of Fairness and Unification: Confederate Unification



- If South and North Korea open the borders to each other and cooperate on political and economic matters, such a state can be considered unification even if the two Koreas are not one country.
- 1=Strongly disagree; 2=Somewhat disagree; 3=Neutral; 4=Agree; 5=Strongly agree.
- The negative responses (Strongly disagree, Disagree) in the question were coded into 'Disagree' and the positive responses (Agree, Strongly agree) were coded into 'Agree' to show on the figure.
 - Overall, the majority (63.2%) agreed to the concept of confederate unification.
 - The proportion of agreeing to confederate unification is the highest in universal equality. That is, universal equality has the most relaxed unification concept. In contrast, the ratio of agreeing to the unitary is the lowest in the meritocracy type. There is a difference of 15.0%p in the ratio of agreement between the two types.

4. Perception of Fairness and Unification: Trust on Kim Jong Un

<Figure 47> Perception of Fairness and Unification: Trust on Kim Jong Un



- “Do you think the current Kim Jong Un regime is a possible partner for dialogue and compromise?”
- 1=Strongly disagree; 2=Somewhat disagree; 3=Neutral; 4=Agree; 5=Strongly agree.
 - The negative responses (Strongly disagree, Somewhat disagree) were coded into ‘negative’ and positive responses (Somewhat agree, Strongly agree) into ‘positive’ to show on the figure.
 - Overall, the majority (62.0%) is negative toward dialogue and compromise with Kim Jong Un’s regime.
 - Compared to other fairness perception types, meritocracy is presently the least negative on the trust toward Kim Jong Un’s regime, and excluding Inconsistency, universal equality showed the most negative tendency.

5. Fairness and North Korea policy: Willing for Armed Conflict

<Figure 48> Fairness and North Korea Policy: Willing for Armed Conflict




“If needed, even with a bit of sacrifice of life, South Korea can choose to have armed conflict with the North.”

○ 0=Oppose very strongly; 5=Neutral; 10=Support very strongly

○ The negative responses (0~4) in the question were coded into ‘Oppose’ and positive responses (6~10) were coded into ‘Agree’ to show on the figure.

- Overall, the absolute majority (77.0%) opposed armed conflict with North Korea at a risk of human casualties. The percentage of hardliners agreeing to armed conflict was 12.7%.
- However, the percentage of meritocracy opposing armed conflict was low compared to other fairness perception types.

<Figure 49> Fairness and North Korea Policy: Armed Conflict
by Regression Model Analysis




□ Result of Regression Model Analysis

- Opinions on the inevitability of armed conflict may vary according to age, region, and ideology. To confirm this, a regression model that controlled the respondents' gender, age, region, ideology, evaluation of the South Korean president's state administration, etc. was performed to verify the marginal effect.
 - Meritocracy showed an attitude that armed conflict will be inevitable, compared to universal equality or discrimination acceptance. This reflects the strong tendency of meritocracy, which stresses the proportionality of effort or responsibility, to argue that North Korea should be held responsible for its unilateral provocations.

6. Fairness and North Korea Policy: Resumption of Mt. Geumgang Tourism

<Figure 50> Fairness and North Korea Policy: Resumption of Mt. Geumgang Tourism




“The tour of Mt. Geumgang should be resumed.”

○ 0=Oppose very strongly; 5=Neutral; 10=Support very strongly

○ Negative responses (0~4) in the question were coded into ‘Oppose’ and the positive responses (6~10) were coded into ‘Support’ to show on the figure.

- Although the percentage was less than half, agreement to the resumption of Mt. Geumgang tourism (45.7%) was higher than opposition (33.4%).
- Meritocracy showed a distinctly positive attitude toward the Resumption of Mt. Geumgang tourism than other types (54.6%). Since tourist parties are primarily responsible for the burden arisen by touring Mt. Geumgang if the tour resumes, meritocracy does not appear to have any reason to oppose the resumption of tourism as it values proportionality.
- Relatively, universal equality has a more negative attitude toward the resumption of tour.

<Figure 51> Fairness and North Korea Policy: Resumption of Mt. Geumgang Tourism by Regression Model Analysis




□ Result of Regression Model Analysis

- Opinions on North Korea policy such as the resumption of Mt. Geumgang tourism may vary according to age, region, and ideology. To confirm this, a regression model that controlled the respondents' gender, age, region, ideology, evaluation of the president's state administration, etc. was performed to verify the marginal effect.
- The results of the regression model showed that meritocracy had a clearly positive attitude toward the resumption of Mt. Geumgang tourism than universal equality, even when variables explaining policy attitudes were controlled.


7. Fairness and North Korea policy: Providing More Support for North Korean Defectors

<Figure 52> Fairness and North Korea Policy: Providing More Support for North Korean Defectors



- “We should provide more supports for North Korean defectors.”
- 0=Oppose very strongly; 5=Neutral; 10=Support very strongly
 - The negative responses (0~4) in the question were coded into ‘Oppose,’ and positive responses (6~10) were coded into ‘Support’ to show on the figure.
 - Overall, responses of agreement (32.9%) and opposition (33.4%) are divided almost equally.
 - If more support is provided to North Korean defectors, South Koreans will have to bear certain levels of tax and other burdens unlike Mt. Geumgang tourism. Universal equality has relatively less negative attitudes toward this than discrimination acceptance.

<Figure 53> Fairness and North Korea Policy: Providing More Support for North Korean Defectors by Regression Model Analysis




□ Result of Regression Model Analysis

- Opinions on policy may vary according to age, region, and ideology. To verify this, a regression model that controlled the respondents' gender, age, region, ideology, evaluation of the South Korean president's state administration, etc. was performed to confirm the marginal effect.
 - The results of the regression model controlling gender, age, region, and ideology showed that statistically significant differences in marginal effect by fairness perception type disappeared. However, attitudes toward policies with different beneficiaries and responsibilities, such as the resumption of Mt. Geumgang tourism and providing more support to North Korean defectors, may differ depending on the type of fairness perception.


8. Fairness and North Korea policy: Supplying COVID-19 Medical Products to North Korea

<Figure 54> Fairness and North Korea Policy: Supplying COVID-19 Medical Products to North Korea



- “COVID-19 may be spreading in North Korea. What is your opinion on supplying medical products to the DPRK to help tackle COVID-19?”
- 1=South Korea should supply products to North Korea proactively regardless of whether there is any request from the North; 2=South Korea should supply the products to North Korea only if there is a request from the North; 3=South Korea should supply the products to North Korea upon the North’s request only after the North Korean government makes a pledge on denuclearization, economic cooperation and other matters; 4=South Korea should not supply the products to North Korea even if there is a request from the North.
- Responses 1~2 in the questions were coded into ‘positive’ and 3~4 into ‘negative’ to show on the figure.
- Overall, the majority (56.5%) held a negative attitude of placing strong conditions on providing medical supplies to North Korea or entirely opposing it.
 - Negative attitudes (66.5%) were also clearly high in accepting discrimination, while positive attitudes (51.3%) were rather high in universal equality. This confirms that the more generally discrimination is accepted, the more negative the attitudes are in providing COVID-19 medical supplies to North Korea.

<Figure 55> Fairness and North Korea Policy: Supplying COVID-19 Medical Products to North Korea by Regression Model Analysis




□ Result of Regression Model Analysis

- To control the relevance with other variables, this survey performed a regression model that controlled respondents' gender, age, region, ideology, evaluation of the South Korean president's state administration, etc. and verified the marginal effect.
 - The results of performing a regression model controlling gender, age, region, and ideology confirmed that universal equality had a clearly positive attitude toward providing COVID-19-related medical supplies to North Korea than discrimination acceptance and meritocracy. This seems related to universal equality's negative attitude toward discrimination.

9. Perception of Fairness and Neighboring Countries: Countries that most do not want inter-Korean Unification

<Figure 56> Countries that Most Do Not Want inter-Korean Unification




□ “Which of the following country do you think will most not want unification of the two Koreas?”

○ 1=U.S.; 2=China; 3=Japan; 4=Russia

- The overall response rate after 2018, when this question was included in the survey, is in the following order: China > Japan > USA > Russia.
- However, Japan (44.2%) exceeded China (38.7%) in the second survey in 2019, conducted during the Japanese government’s unilateral export control measure, the ROK government’s consideration of terminating the GSOMIA, and a strong citizens’ boycott of Japanese products.
- However, as the Japanese government’s export control was evaluated as unsuccessful and as the Japanese government and people showed helplessness in COVID-19 response during 2020, the percentage of choosing Japan as the country that least wanted inter-Korean unification has decreased significantly (44.2% → 26.9%).
- It is worth noting the huge decrease in the perception of Japan’s military threat in the June 2020 survey. This is because the more Japan is felt as being helpless, the higher the view that Japan will exert little influence Japan on the inter-Korean unification.


<Figure 57> Perception of Fairness: The Country that Least Wants Korean Unification



- Proportion of selecting Japan by fairness perception type
 - The overall percentage is 31.8%, but it somewhat varied by fairness perception type.
 - This shows there is lower possibility that discrimination acceptance, which easily accepts salary difference, will choose Japan as the country that least wants Korean unification, than universal equality which is negative toward salary difference.
 - Such tendency is confirmed in the result of regression model controlling gender, age, region, ideology, and evaluation of the president's state administration.

10. Perception of Neighboring Countries: Favorability on Neighboring Countries

<Figure 58> Trends in Favorability on Neighboring Countries



□ “How much do you like or dislike _____? Please rate each of the following countries on a scale of -5 to 5, where -5 is “strongly dislike”, 0 is “neither like or dislike”, and 5 is “strongly like.”

○ This question was included after the 2018 survey.


- Based on the average value of the responses, there is clearly high favorability toward the U.S. among all neighboring countries: it is the only country that continues to have a positive value.
- Other countries generally show negative values, and Japan especially shows low favorability.
- In the November 2020 survey, favorability toward the U.S., China, and Japan rose altogether. This reflects the expectations of South Koreans that the security environment of the Korean Peninsula can improve with the election of President Biden of the U.S. and the resignation of Prime Minister Abe of Japan.
- In the 2021 survey result, the favorability toward all neighboring countries decreased, and the favorable sentiment toward Japan was especially lower (-2.87) than in 2019 (-2.52), when anti-Japanese sentiment reached its peak. This seems to reflect the disappointment of the Korean public as Korea-Japan relations have not changed from the

days of Prime Minister Abe despite hope for improvement as Prime Minister Suga took office.

- Negative sentiment toward China has also increased significantly (-0.69 → -1.65). Considering the results of regression model that controlled ideology and the evaluation of the president's state administration, this seems to have reflected the anti-Chinese sentiments of the younger gender (especially the Millennial generation) to a certain level.

11. Perception of Neighboring Countries: Favorability on Leaders of Neighboring Countries

<Figure 59> Favorability on Leaders of Neighboring Countries



□ “How would you rate your favorability towards political leaders of nations surrounding the Korean Peninsula?”

○ 0=Extremely unfavorable; 50=Neutral; 100=Extremely favorable

- The favorability toward Biden increased significantly in the November 2020 survey after he was elected as the U.S. president. Although the level declined in the 2021 survey, the score still shows as outpacing the leaders of other countries by more than 20 points on average. Given that this survey was conducted prior to the US-ROK summit, it can be concluded that Koreans has huge expectations and favorability toward President Biden of the U.S.
- While the favorability toward Prime Minister Suga of Japan has not yet decreased to the level of former Prime Minister Abe, it has decreased by more than 13 points from the November 2020 survey. The largest decrease in favorability among the leaders of neighboring countries, this reflects the deadlock in Korea-Japan relations.

12. Summary and Conclusions

- This chapter sought four types of fairness perception with two questions about salary differences. As of 2021, the Meritocracy type had the highest percentage in Korea regarding fairness perception (Meritocracy (35.6%)>Universal equality (34.0%)>Discrimination acceptance (19.9%) > Inconsistency (10.5%)).
- Among the fairness perception types, Meritocracy, which emphasizes the proportionality of effort (ability) and reward, was the least unification-oriented and was especially contrasted to universal equality. However, it is difficult to conclude that Meritocracy perceives unification itself negatively from the above results alone.
- The percentage of agreeing to eased confederate unification was the highest in universal equality and was the lowest in the meritocracy type. In other words, meritocracy has stricter standards for unification than universal equality.
- While most respondents (62.0%) view Kim Jong Un's regime as a not possible partner for dialogue and compromise, meritocracy was the least negative for trust toward Kim Jong Un's regime, and university equality showed the most negative tendency, excluding a small number of Inconsistency.
- Meritocracy was less opposing to the argument that an armed conflict with North Korea would be unavoidable if necessary than universal equality or discrimination acceptance. This result is because Meritocracy emphasizes the proportionality of effort or responsibility and thus believes that North Korea should be held accountable for making a unilateral attack or provocation.
- Meritocracy showed a clearly more positive attitude toward resumption of Mt. Geumgang tourism than other types, while universal equality showed a relatively negative attitude. Since the primary responsibility for the burden caused by Mt. Geumgang rests with the tourists, Meritocracy seems to have no reason to oppose the resumption of its tourism as it emphasizes proportionality.
- On the other hand, South Koreans will have to bear a certain amount of tax burden even if they do not want it if there is stronger support for North Korean defectors. While discrimination acceptance is negative towards this, the universal equality type showed a relatively less negative attitude.
- Overall, there are many negative attitudes toward providing COVID-19-related medical supplies to North Korea, but positive attitudes are somewhat higher in universal equality, because this type has a negative

attitude toward discrimination.

- To summarize the above results, it is necessary to pay attention to the difference between universal equality and meritocracy among fairness perception types. Moreover, it is premature to expect that certain fairness perception types can become active supporters of the current government's policy toward unification and North Korea just because they have a positive view of unification and North Korea policy. For example, meritocracy can actively support the resumption of Mt. Geumgang tour, but it may not be positive toward providing support for North Korean defectors or sending COVID-19 related medical supplies to North Korea. It is also difficult to expect that meritocracy will show a unification-oriented attitude, and rather, this type is likely to sympathize with the assertion that an armed conflict against North Korea is unavoidable if necessary. Accordingly, efforts must be made to recognize and approach that public evaluation of unification and North Korea policy is intricately entangled in multi layers with the types of fairness perception.
- Since the 2018 survey, favorability toward neighboring countries except Russia has continued in the order of the US > China > Japan. However, changes in favorability were detected due to changes in the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and the governments in neighboring countries. With the election of President Biden and the resignation of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan before the 2020 survey, Koreans' expectation that the security environment of the Korean Peninsula will be improved was reflected, increasing favorability toward neighboring countries. However, the favorability toward all neighboring countries declined in 2021, and the favorable sentiment toward Japan was especially lower than in 2019 when anti-Japanese sentiment reached its peak. This seems to reflect the disappointment of the Korean public as Korea-Japan relations have not changed from the days of Prime Minister Abe despite hope for improvement as Prime Minister Suga took office.
- Negative sentiment toward China also increased significantly. Considering the results of regression model that controlled gender, age, region, ideology, and the evaluation of president's government administration, such negative sentiment seems to have reflected the anti-Chinese sentiments of the younger generation (especially the millennial generation).
- Favorability toward Biden increased significantly after he was elected as president and declined in the 2021 survey, but the level still exceeds that of other countries' leaders by more than 20 points. Given that this survey was conducted prior to the US-ROK summit, it can be concluded that Koreans has huge expectations and favorability toward President Biden of the U.S.
- On the other hand, while the favorability level toward Prime Minister Suga

of Japan has not yet decreased to the level of former Prime Minister Abe, it has decreased by more than 13 points from the November 2020 survey. The largest decrease in favorability among the leaders of neighboring countries, this reflects the deadlock in Korea-Japan relations.