South Koreans' Perception on Peace:

With a Focus on Peace, War, the Way Peace is Realized, and the Attitude for Inter-Korean Reconciliation

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1. Representation of Peace

A. Background of Research

What is peace in the eyes of South Koreans? To answer this question, a word association task was cpeace is perceived in the minds of the public in the Republic of Korea (ROK). Questions were asked to people about the first three words that come to their minds when thinking of a word "peace." This word association task presupposes that words, either highly relevant in meanings or important are linked with one another and thus represented in one's memory. In short, words highly relevant in meanings are strongly connected in proximity and in intensity. Therefore, a cluster of reactive words reflects people's (sub)conscious understanding of the concept of words presented to them.[1] Most research focuses on the analysis of words that immediately come to people's minds in a survey(hereinafter referred to as "the first-group word"). However, sometimes a certain research requires many reactive words to presented words depending on its goal.

B. Analysis of the Level of Words

Overall, South Koreans and North Korean defectors have a common sense of perceiving "peace" in that their view of the peace highly relates to dove, freedom, and happiness. In more detail, the most frequently recorded words associated with peace for South Koreans are dove, unification, happiness, and stability. Such an order of association was also witnessed among the first-group word

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1) Kiss, G R. An associative Thesaurus of English: structural analysis of a large relevance network, in Studies in long term memory eds. Kennedy, A. And Wilkes, A.(London: Wiley, 1975), pp. 103-121).

as well as the first-, second-, and third-group words combined. An order of the first-group word for North Korean defectors when thinking of the word "peace" is unification, followed by dove, freedom, happiness, and no-war. When combined the first-group word with the second- and third-group words, the order goes as unification, freedom, happiness, dove, stability, and no-war.

However, a difference was identified in the intensity of associated reactive words between South Koreans and North Korean defectors —how strongly those words are linked to peace. While "dove" is the most strongly related words to peace for South Koreans (Table 1), unification is the most closely related word for North Korean defectors (Table 2). Such tendency stands out the most among the first-group word although it was also witnessed among the first-, second-, third-group words all combined.

Another commonality revealed between the two groups is that peace and economic value are not associated. Words that represent economic prosperity were hardly recorded such as the economy, prosperity, and affluence. Words that could fall into a category of economic prosperity merely account for 1.2%, 36 words out of 3,000 (economy, money, prosperity, affluence, and wellness). Such a result indicates that peace is not perceived within the context of economic value at least in South Korean society.

The biggest difference found between the two groups, aside from the intensity of how words "dove" and "unification" are associated with peace, is that North Korean defectors mentioned no-war when thinking of peace while South Koreans did not. Such a difference illustrates that North Korean defectors are more sensitive toward negative peace which perceives peace as the state of no-war than South Koreans. South Koreans also associated war

with peace at 2.7% among the first-group word and at 2.0% among the first-, second-, and third-group words combined. A distinct characteristic that distinguishes North Korean defectors from South Koreans is that the former mentioned the word "war" (first-group word: 2.5%) and at the same time explicitly associated the state of no-war with peace.

<Table 1> Percentage and Frequency of Words Perceived by South Koreans When Thinking of Peace

1st+2nd+3rd Group (3000 words)		First-group Word (1000)		Linden, etc. (2011) (2418)	
word	percentage (frequency)	word	percentage (frequency)	word	percentage (frequency)
dove	13.0(389)	dove	21.1(211)	freedom	7.9(192)
unification	9.9(297)	unification	17.5(175)	happiness	6.4(154)
freedom	7.0(210)	freedom	8.0(80)	harmony	5.8(141)
happiness	5.9(176)	happiness	4.9(49)	love	5.4(130)
stability	3.8(113)	stability	3.8(38)	prosperity	4.8(116)
love	2.5(76)	safety	2.8(29)	cooperation	3.1(76)
comfort	2.4(73)	war	2.7(27)	United Nations	3.0(73)
harmony	2.4(72)	love	2.6(26)	security	2.6(62)
safety	2.2(66)	comfort	2.3(23)	equality	2.4(59)
war	2.0(59)	harmony	2.1(21)	no-war	2.3(56)

<Table 2> Percentage and Frequency of Words Perceived by North Korean Defectors When Thinking of Peace

1+2+3 Group (1200word)		First-group word (400)		Linden, etc. (2011) (2418)	
word	percentage (frequency)	word	percentage (frequency)	word	percentage (frequency)
unification	16.3(195)	unification	27.0(108)	freedom	7.9(192)
freedom	7.1(85)	dove	10.8(43)	happiness	6.4(154)
happiness	6.3(75)	freedom	10.5(42)	harmony	5.8(141)
dove	4.9(59)	happiness	5.0(20)	love	5.4(130)
stability	3.2(38)	no-war	4.5(18)	prosperity	4.8(116)

1+2+3 Group (1200word)		First-group word (400)		Linden, etc. (2011) (2418)	
word	percentage (frequency)	word	percentage (frequency)	word	percentage (frequency)
no-war	3.2(38)	stability	4.0(16)	cooperation	3.1(76)
peace	2.8(34)	war	2.5(10)	United Nations	3.0(73)
love	2.3(28)	harmony	2.3(9)	security	2.6(62)
democracy	2.2(26)	peace	2.0(8)	equality	2.4(59)
comfort	2.2(26)	pleasure	1.8(7)	no-war	2.3(56)

The Tables 1 and 2 above show a rather surprising result: not a significant difference of demographic variables on the perception of peace was found among South Koreans. A series of surveys on unification perception, annually conducted by various organizations, suggest how unification is perceived differently per generation, region, and ideology. In particular, every year the attention in society has been given to survey findings on the public perception that reveal a lack of interests in unification among the younger generations. However, not much change on the perception of peace was identified among South Koreans. A difference, by contrast, was shown depending on ideology and a period of stay in South Korea for North Korean defectors. The more conservative they are, the more likely they mention unification. In the same token, the more progressive they are, the more likely they mention freedom. The longer they live in South Korea, the more likely they mention happiness and stability and the less likely they refer to unification and dove.

C. Analysis at the Level of Classification

An analysis was conducted by classifying the most frequently mentioned words into groups. Such an analysis suggests that South

Koreans perceive peace as a symbol, positive sentiment of an individual, public rights, relations, social order, peace of mind, violence, and no-violence.[2] The order for North Korean defectors is unification, relations, positive sentiment, public rights, physical stability, a symbol, no-violence, and violence (Table 3).

More distinct difference between the two groups was revealed when classifying peace-associated words. It was observed that while South Koreans perceive peace centering on an individual aspect, such as a symbol and happiness, North Korean defectors focus more on unification and relational aspect.

<Table 3> Results of Classification of Words Associated with Peace

	South Koreans		North Korean Defectors	
	1st+2nd+3rd group (3000)	1st group (1000)	1st+2nd+3rd group (1200)	1st group (400)
symbol	23.8(713)	29.4(294)	6.9(83)	11.0(44)
positive sentiment	14.7(440)	10.4(104)	12.5(149)	9.0(36)
unification	9.9(297)	17.5(175)	16.4(196)	27.0(108)
public rights	9.3(279)	9.4(94)	11.5(137)	13.3(53)
relations	7.8(234)	5.2(52)	15.1(181)	12.3(49)
physical stability	7.2(217)	7.1(71)	7.1(85)	7.2(29)

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2) Symbol: dove, DMZ, Moon Jae-in, Kim Jong Un, Trump, Nobel Peace Prize, olive, Olympics, Panmumjeom, nature, etc.
   Positive sentiment: pleasure, warmth, smile, softness, love, beauty, comfort, room, joy, happiness, etc.
   Public rights: effort, democracy, human rights, freedom, justice, equality, etc.
   Relations: family, co-existence, dialogue, belief, communication, understanding, respect, one-ethnicity, cooperation, harmony, reconciliation, etc.
   Social order: security, relief, safety, stability, etc.
   Peace of mind: tranquility, sereneness, ease, serenity, etc.
   No-violence: no-conflict, no-worry, denuclearization, no-war, armistice, etc.
   Violence: June 25, war, separated family, nuclear, etc.
   Negotiation: inter-Korean dialogue, peace agreement, negotiation, summit, meeting, etc.

	South Koreans		North Korean Defectors	
	1st+2nd+3rd group (3000)	1st group (1000)	1st+2nd+3rd group (1200)	1st group (400)
peace of mind	6.1(183)	4.4(44)	3.3(40)	2.0(8)
no-violence	3.7(112)	2.6(26)	4.9(59)	5.5(22)
violence	3.1(94)	3.6(36)	2.8(33)	3.3(13)
wealth	1.8(55)	1.1(11)	2.4(29)	1.5(6)
negotiation	2.3(70)	2.3(23)	.7(8)	.3(1)

The result of classification showed no difference per a demographic variable when viewed from a large framework. South Koreans in their 60s exhibited strong tendency to identify peace with physical stability than other age groups. Those in their 40s and 60s are less likely to associate peace with unification. The percentage of people who chose a symbol was higher in Gwangju/Jeolla than other regions. The number of people who picked unification was higher in Incheon/Gyeonggi and Gangwon/Jeju than other regions. The longer North Korean defectors (based on the first-group) reside in South Korea, the more likely they adopt the individual perspective rather than the collective perspective when it comes to perceiving peace. The percentage of referring to a symbol, unification, and relations becomes lower and that of the positive sentiment and physical stability becomes higher.

D. Sub-conclusion

What are the characteristics of word association task on how South Koreans and North Korean defectors perceive peace? In particular, what are the implications of the two groups' strong tendency of recognizing peace as dove? Is it universal tendency that peace is perceived as dove? Although varying in degree, South

Koreans are more likely to perceive peace as dove than North Korean defectors. In other words, the perception of peace differs depending on the social and cultural context both among an individual and a group according to this research. In fact, South Koreans' tendency of perceiving peace as dove is not universal. Perceiving peace to be as abstract as dove is in stark contrast to the findings of research conducted abroad. In a study utilizing word association task for the word "peace" targeting 812 people in the U.S. and Denmark,[3] no symbolic word was identified among the frequently used words associated with peace.[4] Dove was mentioned as a peace-associated word only 24 times, representing a mere 1%, showing a stark contrast to South Koreans' case. The most frequently cited words associated with peace among Americans and Danish men and women were freedom, followed by happiness, harmony, love, and prosperity. The result of classification suggests that words linked to "public rights," such as freedom, equality, and democracy, represent a majority at 12.6%.

The tendency of how South Koreans embrace peace as a symbolic meaning such as dove is typically witnessed among members of a conflict-ridden society, in which chronic conflicts occur on a daily basis. The generations born and raised amidst a chronic conflict have been accustomed to a conflict-ridden life marred by a sense of

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3) Van der Linden, Nicolas, Boris Bizumic, Rune Stubager, and Scott Mellon. "Social representational correlates of attitudes toward peace and war: A cross-cultural analysis in the United States and Denmark," *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 17, no. 3 (2011): 217-242. There were 33 words that were mentioned more than 14 times out of the total 2,408 words and 425 words that were mentioned more than once. The percentage was calculated based on a total of 2,408 words in this research.

4) UN could be considered to be a symbol. But this research excludes UN as a symbol.

hostility and indignation toward an enemy. They naturally see it as part of their daily life and hardly know any other way than a life of a conflict.

A country and a group under chronic conflicts usually set peace as a goal of the community. At the end of dark tunnel of conflicts, peace acts as a goal and symbol implying the very end of the tunnel. It serves as an impetus to provide a sense of optimism and hope to members of a society suggesting that the end of conflicts is within their reach. However, peace as a goal with no-interim process is nothing more than an empty promise and rather utopian in nature. It does not help that such an approach is not rooted in reality and that there is not enough discussion on how to achieve such a goal. That is why South Koreans equate peace with dove.

There exists a similarity of perception on peace between South Koreans and Westerners. The two groups both recognize public rights and positive sentiment as an important meaning of peace although South Koreans referred to positive sentiment more than Westerners. Another common trait is that those words are followed by social order and relations and that words, such as violence and no-violence, were relatively used less. Linden's analysis on a difference of peace perception between Denmark and the U.S. suggests that South Koreans' perception of peace is similar to that of Americans than Danes aside from the difference described above.

How South Koreans' perception of peace should be interpreted, which exhibits dual characteristics of a perception of peace in a conflict-ridden society on the one hand and that of Northern European nationals who relatively experienced no war on the other hand? It can be interpreted as evidence that people are no longer inconvenienced by structural social contradictions caused by the

division, especially the so-called "violence from division." "Violence" and "no-violence" account for little in how people perceive peace in a community, which has been in a prolonged state of division for over 70 years after a war and military clashes of small and large. Such findings illustrate that the division has now become a variable in our society. We have come to recognize violence of division not as something uncomfortable but as something that has always been around and has to be tolerated, and thus becomes a part of daily life. At the end of the day, the state of no-peace, as it prolongs, has become a part of "normal daily life," not "abnormality." Our society had already become abnormal given the very fact that it perceives the proposition of "peace equals dove" as abnormal.

It is noteworthy policy-wise that there is low relevance between peace and economic prosperity. There recently emerges propositions along the lines of "peace equals economy." However, the result of this research at least suggests that the efforts of translating peace into economic prosperity or recognizing peace in light of economic perspective are not likely to be effective. That is attributed to South Koreans' tendency of recognizing peace abstractly and their perception of peace that mostly focuses on stability and positive sentiment of an individual. Therefore, efforts will be required to transform peace as a symbol into tangible peace that could be felt in people's everyday life.

This section has so far illustrated an analysis of the findings of word association task on peace. The next chapter will present an analysis of the results of the survey composed of preceding research-based questions addressed to South Koreans and North Korean defectors as follows: attitudes for peace and war, the way peace is realized, and inter-Korean reconciliation.

South Koreans' Perception on Peace:
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2. Outline of Peace and War on the Korean Peninsula, The Way Peace is Realized, and Attitudes on Inter-Korean Reconciliation

A. Background of Research

This chapter summarizes the survey findings of a cluster of questions: attitude toward peace on the Korean Peninsula (6 questions), attitudes toward a war on the Korean Peninsula (6 questions), peace through cooperation (8 questions), peace through a military force (8 questions), inter-Korean reconciliation (4 questions), tendency of perceiving inter-Korean relations as zero-sum relations (4 questions), competitive victim mentality (4 questions), and forgiveness (6 questions). An additional question was asked of South Koreans on peace and war and how peace can be realized in general. However, the result of that additional question is not presented in this chapter[5] for the purpose of providing findings of North Korean defectors and South Koreans altogether. Another consideration is that peace and war and the way peace is achieved in general do not show much of a difference compared to peace and war, and how peace is achieved on the Korean Peninsula.

Even an analysis of the average of questions on measuring the attitudes reveals the overall attitudes of North Korean defectors and South Koreans, which is what this research sets out to aim. Despite that, an analysis per a question is provided in this research because of how North Korean defectors tend to react. Although it will be stated in later part of this paper, there are many instances where a meaningful, statistical difference is identified between South Koreans and North Korean defectors on average terms. However, such an observation cannot be generalized and classified as a simple difference between the two groups. North Korean defectors, in

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5) An example of a general question is "war cannot be justified under any circumstances." An example of a question concerning the Korean Peninsula is "war cannot be justified under any circumstances on the Korean Peninsula."

particular, tend to show a radical response to the attitudes on peace and war and the way peace is realized. For example, on a scale of 1 to 9, more North Korean defectors gave 9 points than South Koreans. This led to patterns of increased average of North Korean defectors even though their percentage of agreement to a given question is similar or lower than South Koreans. That is why the two authors who wrote this chapter came to a conclusion that presenting both average-based analysis and question-based analysis will bring about more objective perspective. Therefore, it would be desirable for readers to pay more attention to a difference of the level of demographic variables within South Koreans and within North Korean defectors rather than between the two groups.[6]

B. Attitudes on Peace and War

Questions were already laid out in the introduction part. But for the convenience of readers, questions are elaborated on once more as follows: 6 questions each for attitude on peace (P) and attitude on war (W) on a scale of 9. The findings are presented in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Table 4. Below are the detailed questions.

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6) It should be emphasized that a difference observed between the two groups in terms of the overall average and the average of demographic variables should not be generalized as a fundamental difference. As the findings of a difference of peace perception between the two depending on the types of personality in chapter 4 suggest, the two groups may not show a difference in psychological, social, and cultural variables. The tendency in stark contrast to the result of this chapter could also be witnessed.

\<Attitude on Peace (P)\>

P1. A priority task of South Korea should be to realize peace on the Korean Peninsula.

P2. Efforts for promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula sometimes hinder the development of a society.

P3. Those in support of war on the Korean Peninsula are more courageous than those in favor of peace on the Korean Peninsula.

P4. Inter-Korean conflicts should be resolved through peaceful means.

P5. Peace on the Korean Peninsula brings out the enhanced quality of society to the maximum extent.

P6. There are many aspects in life more important than peace.

\<Attitude on War (W)\>

W1. Sometimes a war can be the best policy to resolve inter-Korean conflict.

W2. Positive results stemmed from an inter-Korean war do not receive the attention that they deserve.

W3. A war on the Korean Peninsula cannot be justified under any circumstances.

W4. A war on the Korean Peninsula is nothing but a meaningless, self-destructive conflict.

W5. Any benefits of an inter-Korean war never outweigh calamities of a war under any circumstances.

W6. A war can be necessary to realize justice on the Korean Peninsula.

The findings suggest that the attitude on peace of both sides hovers above the median point of 5 showing the overall favorable attitude toward peace with South Koreans at 5.7 point and North Korean defectors at 6.5. What is noticeable is that North Korean defectors distinctly agree to propositions (P1, P4, P5) that illustrate the positive aspects of peace compared to South Koreans. Meanwhile, not much difference between the two was shown for propositions (P2, P3, P6) that describe the negative aspects of peace. It is possible that benefits and costs could also play out independently even when it comes to peace. In short, while North Korean defectors are more positive toward the value of peace than South Koreans, there may not be a significant difference between the two in terms of the costs for peace. This part necessitates further research in the future.

There existed no difference of demographic variables in the attitude toward peace between the two groups, similar to representation of peace. By contrast, progressives and centralists among North

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7) The total average was calculated by counter-grading P2, P3, and P6.

Korean defectors show a higher percentage of favorable attitude for peace than conservatives. There was not a statistically meaningful difference in the level of other variables. It is fair to state, therefore, that at least the national consensus was built for superficial peace. However, the consensus on superficial peace may be more rightly fit into the "peace illiterate." The proper interpretation would be that the South Korean society has a low sense of sensitivity toward peace to the point that does not interactively reflect the social and cultural background of an individual.

<Figure 2> The Average of the Attitude on War on the Korean Peninsula between South Koreans and North Korean Defectors[8])

<Table 4> Average of the Level of Demographic Variables for Peace and War on the Korean Peninsula between South Koreans and North Korean Defectors[9])

South Koreans			North Korean Defectors		
Classification	Peace	War	Classification	Peace	War
Total(1,000)	5.7(.03)	3.7(.04)	Total(400)	6.5(.07)	3.6(.09)
Men	5.7(.04)	3.8(.06)	Men	6.5(.15)	3.5(.18)
Women	5.7(.04)	3.7(.06)	Women	6.5(.08)	3.6(.10)
Those in their 20s(173)	5.7(.08)	3.7(.11)	Those in their 20s(35)	6.5(.25)	3.2(.30)

8) The total average was calculated by counter-grading W3, W4, and W5.
9) Variables illustrating statistically meaningful difference was shaded.

South Koreans			North Korean Defectors		
Classification	Peace	War	Classification	Peace	War
30s(171)	5.5(.07)	3.8(.10)	30s(38)	6.5(.25)	3.5(.30)
40s(203)	5.8(.06)	3.6(.10)	40s(115)	6.6(.14)	3.3(.16)
50s(201)	5.8(.06)	3.7(.10)	50s(98)	6.5(.15)	3.5(.18)
60 or over(252)	5.7(.05)	3.9(.09)	60 or over(114)	6.3(.13)	4.0(.17)
Conservative(233)	5.6(.07)	3.9(.10)	Conservative(157)	6.2(.12)	4.0(.15)
Centralist(371)	5.7(.04)	3.8(.07)	Centralist(124)	6.7(.11)	3.2(.14)
Progressive(396)	5.7(.05)	3.7(.07)	Progressive(119)	6.8(.13)	3.3(.17)
-3 million won(160)	5.6(.07)	4.0(.11)	-3 year(81)	6.8(.16)	3.3(.19)
3-5 million won(513)	5.7(.04)	3.7(.06)	3-6 year(100)	6.3(.14)	3.8(.18)
5 million won+(325)	5.7(.05)	3.7(.08)	6-9 year(100)	6.6(.14)	3.6(.19)
			9 year+(119)	6.5(.13)	3.5(.16)

No difference was identified in the attitude toward a war between South Koreans and North Korean defectors with a statistically meaningfully less point than the median value of 5. The percentage of attitude for peace among the two groups was statistically meaningfully higher than that of war. For South Koreans, those with the income level of less than 3 million won showed more favorable attitude toward a war than that of over 3 million won. No difference was found per ideology, age, and gender. The older North Korean defectors are and the more conservative their ideological leaning becomes, the more favorable attitude toward a war they tend to have. There was no difference among progressives and centralists.

C. The Way Peace is Realized

The attitudes toward peace through cooperation (C) and peace through a military force (M) were measured on a scale of 9 with

eight questions for each. The findings are presented in Figure 3, Figure 4, and Table 5. Questions on peace through cooperation/war consist of six questions each based on the preceding studies and two questions selected through advisory meetings and meetings with co-researchers. Those two sets of questions (C7, C8, M1, and M2) did not show distinct positive and negative features and were thus exempted from an analysis. Each question is as follows.

<div align="center"><Peace through Cooperation (C)></div>

C1. Strengthening inter-Korean cooperation is a way of achieving peace.

C2. It is necessary to strengthen the role of organizations and institutions, designed to facilitate cooperation between the government and the public both in South and North Korea, in order to achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula.

C3. Inter-Korean conflict cannot be resolved in a way that guarantees the interests of both South and North Korea.

C4. It is crucial to enhance the quality of life of North Korean residents for promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula.

C5. Inter-Korean conflict cannot be resolved through mutual understanding and enhanced communications about society and culture of the other party.

C6. Since peace on the Korean Peninsula is an ultimate goal, employing non-peaceful means to a certain degree could be justified.

C7. Peace on the Korean Peninsula could be realized if North Korea becomes democratized.

C8. The state of peace will not come even if there is no war on the Korean Peninsula.

<Peace through a Military Force (M)>

M1. The most effective way of achieving peace on the Korean Peninsula is to maintain a strong military power.

M2. Striking a military balance between South and North Korea will not guarantee peace.

M3. The use of force on the Korean Peninsula will be an unfortunate event but sometimes is the only way to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula.

M4. Collective security based on the military alliance will not guarantee peace on the Korean Peninsula.

M5. The balance of horror through a military threat could be the best option to maintain peaceful relations with North Korea.

M6. Peace on the Korean Peninsula cannot be realized by the two Koreas reducing their military force and establishing a joint arms control regime.

M7. All the options should be considered including military attacks on North Korea to realize peace on the Korean Peninsula.

M8. Peace on the Korean Peninsula cannot be achieved as long as North Korea keeps holding onto nuclear weapons.

<Figure 3> Average of the Attitude on Peace through Cooperation between the Two Groups[10]

<Figure 4> Average of the Attitude of Peace through a Military Force between the Two Groups[11]

Both South Koreans and North Korean defectors show a higher percentage of favorable attitude toward peace through cooperation than through a military force. However, the percentage of difference between achieving peace through cooperation and through a military force is lower than that between the positive attitude toward war and toward peace. It has significant implications in that South Koreans and North Korean defectors are neither negative nor

10) The total average was calculated by counter-grading C2, C3, and C6.
11) The total average was calculated by counter-grading M2, M4, and M6.

positive toward the use of military force on the Korean Peninsula. Also notably some believe that a military force is necessary for achieving peace (M1, 5.4 point) while a vast majority believes that a war will never be tolerable on the Korean Peninsula (W3, 6.9 point). It can be interpreted as having to restrain (deter) North Korea through a military force amidst prevailing mistrust toward North Korea.

South Koreans exhibit a conflicting attitude on whether peace or a military force should be deployed to achieve peace depending on their ideological orientation. The more progressive they are, more likely they are in favor of cooperation for peace. The more conservative they are, more likely they favor a military force as a means of achieving peace. Such a difference depending on ideology was also found among North Korean defectors. The older they get, the more favorable they become toward the use of military force. No difference was identified depending on gender and the duration of stay in South Korea.

<Table 5> An Average of the Way Peace is Achieved between the Two Groups per Demographic Variables

South Koreans			North Korean Defectors		
Classification	Cooperation	Military Force	Classification	Cooperation	Military Force
Total(1,000)	5.8(.03)	4.9(.02)	Total(400)	5.9(.07)	4.9(.07)
Men	5.8(.04)	5.0(.04)	Men	5.7(.16)	5.0(.14)
Women	5.8(.04)	4.9(.03)	Women	5.9(.08)	4.8(.08)
Those in their 20s(173)	5.9(.08)	4.9(.06)	Those in their 20s(35)	5.8(.23)	4.2(.22)
30s(171)	5.7(.07)	5.0(.05)	30s(38)	5.6(.24)	4.6(.19)
40s(203)	5.9(.07)	4.9(.05)	40s(115)	6.0(.15)	4.6(.14)
50s(201)	5.8(.06)	4.9(.05)	50s(98)	6.0(.13)	5.1(.13)
60 or over(252)	5.7(.05)	4.9(.05)	60 or over(114)	5.8(.12)	5.1(.11)

South Koreans			North Korean Defectors		
Classification	Cooperation	Military Force	Classification	Cooperation	Military Force
Conservative(233)	5.7(.06)	5.1(.05)	Conservative(157)	5.5(.13)	5.3(.10)
Centralist(371)	5.7(.04)	4.9(.04)	Centralist(124)	6.1(.11)	4.6(.11)
Progressive(396)	5.9(.05)	4.8(.04)	Progressive(119)	6.2(.12)	4.5(.14)
-3 million won(160)	5.7(.06)	4.9(.05)	-3 year(81)	5.8(.12)	4.7(.15)
3-5 million won(513)	5.8(.04)	4.9(.03)	3-6 year(100)	.0(.00)	4.8(.13)
5 million won+(325)	5.8(.05)	4.9(.05)	6-9 year(100)	.0(.00)	4.9(.14)
			9 year+(119)	.0(.00)	4.9(.13)

D. Reconciliation, Perception of Zero-sum, Competitive Victim Mentality, and Forgiveness

The existing survey-based research was mostly conducted on images of how people perceive North Korea. The most general question is about whether people view North Korea as an object for hostility, vigilance, cooperation, and assistance. In more detail, this research raises questions on whether respondents regard North Korea as an object for reconciliation (R), whether they view inter-Korean relations as zero-sum relations (Z), which side (the South vs. the North) is more of a victim in the history of inter-Korean relations (V), and whether they intend to forgive North Korea (F). All those questions were measured on a scale of 7. Detailed questions are as follows.

<Reconciliation (R)>

R1. North Korea is mostly responsible for inter-Korean conflicts.

R2. It is North Korea's provocative actions that have sustained a

repeated cycle of inter-Korean conflicts.

R3. North Korea does not appear to be ashamed of the actions they committed in the past.

R4. North Korea is poised to harm South Korea.

<Perception of Zero-sum (Z)>

Z1. The benefits that North Korea gains from inter-Korean relations are a loss in general to South Koreans.

Z2. Inter-Korean relations are similar to a tennis match. One side can claim a victory only when the other side loses.

Z3. If one side accommodates the needs of the other side in inter-Korean relations, the former will inevitably face the loss.

Z4. Interests of South and North Korea in inter-Korean relations are in conflicts with each other in most cases.

<Competitive Victim Mentality (V)>

V1. South Korea suffered more damage than North Korea in the course of history of war and division.

V2. South and North Korea are all victims in the history marred by war and division.

V3. Conflicts between the South and the North cause suffering to both Koreas.

V4. The trauma (psychological wounds and suffering) left by war and division is more severe for South Koreans than North Koreans.

<div align="center"><Forgiveness (F)></div>

F1. I try not to harbor a sense of hostility for the wrong doings committed by North Korea.

F2. It is important to take revenge on North Korea for what they did in the past.

F3. I am ready to forgive North Korea for their wrongdoing.

F4. I feel enraged for the wrongdoing perpetrated by North Korea.

F5. There is no meaning in achieving harmony between the South and the North.

F6. I can respect the North Korean regime.

South Koreans show a higher level of intention for reconciliation with North Korea than North Korean defectors. However, such a rate of the two groups is still lower than the median value of 4 indicating that South Koreans are assessed as not being ready for reconciliation with North Korea.

<Figure 5> The Average of Intention for Reconciliation between South Koreans and North Korean defectors[12)]

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12) The total average was calculated by counter-grading all the questions.

However, it is noteworthy that there exists a significant difference of attitude for reconciliation per the demographic level (Table 2-25). South Koreans show a differing attitude of reconciliation depending on age, ideology, and the income level except for gender. In more detail, more positive attitude toward reconciliation was observed with younger age, more progressive class, and those with the higher income level. What is particularly noticeable is that those in their 20s show the highest level of intention for reconciliation with North Korea, a generation known as having possessed the most negative perception for unification.

<Table6> Average of Reconciliation, Zero-sum Perception, Victim Mentality, and Forgiveness of the Two Groups per Demographic Variables

|	South Koreans					North Korean Defectors			
Classification	Reconciliation	Zero-sum	Victim	Forgiveness	Classification	Reconciliation	Zero-sum	Victim	Forgiveness
Total(1,000)	3.3(.04)	4.1(.04)	4.9(.02)	4.2(.02)	Total(400)	2.6(.08)	4.6(.08)	5.4(.05)	3.8(.05)
Men	3.3(.05)	4.1(.05)	4.9(.04)	4.1(.03)	Men	2.7(.16)	4.5(.16)	5.3(.09)	3.6(.10)
Women	3.4(.05)	4.1(.05)	4.9(.03)	4.2(.03)	Women	2.6(.09)	4.7(.10)	5.5(.05)	3.8(.06)
Those in their 20s(173)	3.6(.09)	4.0(.09)	4.8(.05)	4.2(.06)	Those in their 20s(35)	3.9(.26)	4.0(.26)	5.1(.12)	4.4(.18)
30s(171)	3.4(.10)	4.1(.08)	4.9(.06)	4.2(.06)	30s(38)	3.0(.24)	4.2(.24)	5.2(.15)	3.6(.16)
40s(203)	3.3(.08)	4.0(.08)	4.8(.05)	4.2(.05)	40s(115)	2.7(.14)	4.6(.16)	5.4(.08)	3.8(.11)
50s(201)	3.3(.09)	4.1(.07)	4.9(.05)	4.2(.05)	50s(98)	2.4(.16)	4.8(.17)	5.4(.10)	3.7(.12)
60 or over(252)	3.1(.07)	4.3(.07)	4.9(.05)	4.0(.04)	60 or over(114)	2.1(.13)	4.9(.16)	5.7(.10)	3.7(.09)
Conservative(233)	3.2(.08)	4.2(.08)	4.9(.05)	4.0(.05)	Conservative(157)	2.1(.11)	5.1(.13)	5.6(.08)	3.3(.08)
Centralist(371)	3.3(.06)	4.1(.06)	4.9(.04)	4.2(.04)	Centralist(124)	2.9(.14)	4.3(.14)	5.4(.08)	4.1(.08)
Progressive(396)	3.4(.05)	4.0(.05)	4.8(.03)	4.2(.03)	Progressive(119)	2.9(.15)	4.4(.16)	5.4(.08)	4.0(.10)
-3 million won (160)	3.1(.08)	4.4(.09)	5.0(.07)	4.0(.06)	-3 year(81)	3.0(.21)	4.6(.19)	5.3(.11)	4.0(.14)
3-5 million won(513)	3.3(.05)	4.1(.05)	4.9(.03)	4.1(.03)	3-6 year(100)	2.6(.15)	4.4(.16)	5.4(.11)	3.7(.09)
5 million won+(325)	4.6(.07)	3.9(.07)	4.8(.04)	4.2(.04)	6-9 year(100)	2.4(.16)	4.8(.18)	5.6(.08)	3.7(.12)
					9 year+(119)	2.5(.13)	4.7(.15)	5.4(.08)	3.7(.09)

Before presenting the findings of the tendency of viewing inter-Korean relations as zero-sum relations, it should be mentioned that the difference of the attitude for reconciliation observed depending on the level of demographic variables has implications on the findings of war and peace and how peace is achieved. Some may think that no difference identified per the level of demographic variables on questions of peace, war, and how peace is achieved is attributed to respondents' uncandid attitude. If that were true, then it could not be explained that there was a difference per the level of demographic variables on the tendency of viewing inter-Korean relations as zero-sum relations, the competitive victim mentality, and the attitude toward peace, all of which will be presented in the following sections. Rather, no difference revealed per the level of demographic variables could be rightly interpreted as the findings that affirm South Koreans' tendency of being peace illiterate as shown in a question of peace, war, and how peace is achieved.

For North Korean defectors, the younger and the more progressives they are, the higher their intention becomes to seek reconciliation with North Korea. An interesting aspect observed is that an attitude toward reconciliation with North Korea becomes negative as the duration of their stay in South Korea prolongs. One possible explanation for this phenomenon would be that during a prolonged stay, a sense of hostility toward North Korea increases with an accumulated practice of comparison of South Korea to North Korea. However, another possibility is that there could have been an effect of the timing, at which they left North Korea. More sophisticated follow-up study is required on the intention of reconciliation.

A zero-sum relationship could be viewed as an indirect index

illustrating how one demonizes the other, rather than a question of the relationship. In fact, South Koreans tend to view inter-Korean relations as zero-sum relations more than North Korean defectors. While South Koreans' percentage was not statistically different from the median value, North Korean defectors' rate was statistically meaningfully higher than the median value. The more conservative both South Koreans and North Korean defectors are, the more they tend to regard inter-Korean relations as zero-sum relations. For South Koreans, the lower their income level is, for North Korean defectors, the older they get, the more likely they tend to view inter-Korean relations as zero-sum relations.

<Figure 6> The Average of Tendency of Viewing Inter-Korean Relations as Zero-sum Relations of the Two Group

To a question of who is more of a victim in inter-Korean relations, both South Koreans and North Korean defectors responded that South Koreans are. The two groups' percentage was statistically meaningfully higher than the median value. Even with the hardships they went through, North Korean defectors responded that South Koreans suffer more damage. That response might come as something

Figure 7 bar chart:

	V1	V2	V3	V4	Average of Total
South Koreans	4.3	5.5	5.5	4.1	4.9
North Korean Defectors	4.8	5.9	6.4	4.6	5.4

Legend: South Koreans, North Korean Defectors

unexpected. One possibility is that North Korean defectors said so under the implicit pressure or under the pressure of what is desirable in the social context. Another possibility is that North Korea relatively emphasizes more of a sense of hostility and victim mentality toward the U.S. than the damage caused by South Korea. In the same context, during their stay in South Korea, they could be more frequently exposed to the information that stresses the damage caused by North Korea. This is also in line with the findings that the perception of competitive victim mentality grows as North Korean defectors' duration of stay in South Korea prolongs. For South Koreans, the higher the income level, the lower the competitive victim mentality.

Are South Koreans ready to forgive North Korea? South Koreans' answer to that question was statistically meaningfully higher than the median value and for North Korean defectors lower than the median value. South Koreans show statistically meaningful difference across all the demographic variables. Women, the younger, more progressive, and those with the higher income level have more forgiving attitude toward North Korea. It is noteworthy that those

in their 20s are most likely to forgive North Korea compared to other age group as with the case of attitude of reconciliation toward North Korea. This contradicts the general assessment that those in their 20s and 30s have been more exposed to negative information about North Korea over the last decade. The findings of this research necessitates a detailed analysis in that people in their 20s and 30s are more active toward reconciliation and forgiveness for North Korea in spite of their frequent exposure to the negative image of North Korea. For North Korean defectors, women, the younger, and more progressive have a higher forgiving attitude toward North Korea.

South Koreans' Perception on Peace:
With a Focus on Peace, War,
the Way Peace is Realized, and
the Attitude for Inter-Korean Reconciliation

3. Summary and

Policy Implications

This paper primarily delves into what is the representation of peace for South Koreans via the world association task. The findings revealed some common trait that peace perceived by both South Koreans and North Korean defectors in general is highly related to dove, freedom, unification, and happiness. In more detail, the order of South Koreans' associated words with peace is dove, unification, happiness, and stability. The order for North Korean defectors is unification, dove, freedom, happiness, and no-war. However, there is a difference in the level of intensity of word association between the two groups—in other words the degree strongly associated with peace. For South Koreans, dove is the most strongly associated word with peace. For North Korean defectors, unification is the most strongly associated word.

Another commonality identified between the two groups is that peace is not associated with the economic value. Words related to economic prosperity are rarely found, such as the economy, prosperity, and affluence. Words that could be classified into economic prosperity (economy, money, prosperity, affluence, wellness, etc.) account merely for 1.2%, 36 out of 3,000 words. This result indicates that at least in South Korean society peace is not recognized as economic value.

The biggest difference between the two groups except for the intensity of word association of dove and unification with peace is that North Korean defectors mentioned no-war in terms of peace in contrast to South Koreans. It illustrates that North Korean defectors are more sensitive than South Koreans toward the so-called negative peace that recognizes peace to be no-war.

An analysis of classification of words suggests that the order for South Koreans' perception of peace is symbol, positive sentiment of

an individual, public rights, relations, social order, peace of mind, violence, and no-violence. The order for North Korean defectors is unification, relations, positive sentiment, public rights, physical stability, symbol, no-violence, and violence.

A difference between the two groups becomes more distinct when classifying peace-associated words. It was revealed that while South Koreans focus more on the individual aspect, such as a symbol and happiness, North Korean defectors emphasize unification and relations more.

No difference per a demographic variable was identified. In other words, the perception of peace being equal to dove is a universally accepted concept in our society. South Koreans' perception that peace is recognized in a symbolic meaning is a typical phenomenon for members of a certain type of society, in which chronic disputes and conflicts become a part of life for people. Countries and groups marred by chronic disputes set achieving peace as a goal of their community. Inside the dark tunnel called conflicts, peace marks both a goal and symbol hinting the end of the tunnel. It serves as a driver providing a sense of optimism and hope to members of a society that disputes could come to an end. However, peace as a goal without any interim process amidst chronic conflicts is not tangible and highly utopian in nature. Such peace is far from everyday life of people. There is a lack of discussion on how to achieve a tangible goal. That is why South Koreans perceive peace as dove. At the same time, South Koreans' peace perception is similar to that of the West in that there is a lack of mentioning war and violence.

South Koreans have peace perception that is mostly shown in a society rooted in chronic conflicts and is similar to that of Northern

European countries relatively with a lack of war experience. How should that duality be interpreted? It can be analyzed that South Koreans no longer feel the inconvenience stemming from social structural contradictions caused by the division, the so-called "violence caused by the division."

This study also looks into attitudes toward peace and war along with the representation of peace. An analysis of responses to survey questions, formulated based on preceding studies, suggests that both South Koreans and North Korean defectors have a negative attitude toward war and positive toward peace. Such findings are not that surprising. An agreement to a value of peace and a disagreement to a value of war is an ethical common law to some extent. Rather striking result is that there was no difference revealed per the level of demographic variables on attitude for peace and the attitude for war. It could be interpreted as that there is an overall consensus built in our society on the peace orientation. However, results could inevitably be derived from the findings of word association task of peace being a superficial and symbolic representation: the overall consensus in our society was built on viewing peace in a superficial and symbolic context. The authors refer such an attitude on peace in South Korean society to "the peace illiterate."

In terms of realizing peace, South Koreans and North Korean defectors both favor achieving peace through cooperation over through a military force. However, the range of difference between achieving peace through cooperation and through a military force was smaller than the gap between the positive attitude for war and that for peace. It suggests significant implications in that both South Koreans and North Korean defectors are neither in agreement

nor disagreement to the use of military force on the Korean Peninsula.

There was a big difference on the attitude toward inter-Korean relations at the level of demographic variables. The average of support for inter-Korean reconciliation for South Koreans was less than the median value of 4 at 3.6, for North Korean defectors at 2.6. In other words, South Korean society could be rightly assessed as lacking psychological preparations for inter-Korean reconciliation. For South Koreans, the younger and the more progressive and the higher the income, the more active attitude toward reconciliation. For North Korean defectors, the longer they stay in South Korea, the less they tend to reconcile with North Korea. Such findings require a thorough research on whether this is a result of the duration of stay in South Korea at play or the timing of defection.

North Korean defectors have a stronger perception of zero-sum relations than South Koreans, an indirect index showing how one demonizes the other. For South Koreans, the percentage was not statistically different from the median value, but was statistically meaningfully higher than the median value for North Koreans. The more conservative both South Koreans and North Korean defectors are, the more likely they tend to perceive inter-Korean relations as zero-sum relations. The lower the income level for South Koreans and the older for North Korean defectors, the stronger perception of zero-sum relations they possess.

To a question of who is more of a victim in inter-Korean relations, both responded that South Koreans are more victimized. The two groups both responded that South Korea suffered more damage in spite of both Koreas being the victims of war and division.

Similar to an attitude for reconciliation toward North Korea, the two groups appeared unwilling to forgive North Korea just yet. Women and the younger and the more progressive and those with the higher income have more forgiving attitude toward North Korea. It is once more notable as witnessed in the attitude for reconciliation with North Korea that those in their 20s showed the highest rate of intention for forgiveness toward North Korea.

Such findings have the following policy implications. First, it definitely requires an in-depth contemplation on the direction of peace education. Although it is urgent to promote and strengthen peace education on a massive scale to be able to promote the tangible perception of peace, it cannot solely be resolved by a simple reform of curriculum or its simple expansion. Findings of this research that South Koreans have an abstract, utopian, symbolic perception of peace, distant from reality poses fundamental questions to the effects of peace education. The basic propositions of peace education is that ① conflicts and violence are prevalent in every corner of the society and that ② there is a way to transform conflicts and violence.[13] The results of this study indicate that South Koreans are not aware of the conflicts and violence caused by the division and the Korean War. In other words, South Koreans perceive the South Korean society to be at peace. Peace education is about conflicts and violence.[14] To those not aware of conflicts and violence, peace education is effectively no use.

More serious problem is that South Koreans' perception of being at a peaceful state is a result of prolonged conflicts and

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13) Ian M Harris; Mary Lee Morrison; translated by Jungwon Park; Peace Education: Education for Peace, Vision for the World (Seoul: Publisher Orum, 2003), pp. 51-52.
14) Ibid., p. 27.

violence—in other words chronic conflicts. In a society where self-deception of perceiving the current non-peaceful state as being peaceful exists, peace education should be conducted in a way that could be painful but accompanies self-disclosure. Peace education in South Korean society rooted in chronic conflicts should be based not on a discourse of peace but on a discourse of conflicts and violence. Presenting benefits and costs of peace to people already at peace has no effect. The tasks of the current peace education in South Korea should be to raise the awareness on how a society is currently exposed to conflicts and violence.

The process of transforming symbolic peace into tangible peace that could be felt in everyday life should start from a task of revealing violence caused by the division, which is so inherent in our life that is not recognizable. Such a process will be a painful and uncomfortable journey. Given that peace education could easily be viewed as uncomfortable and disturbing education, more meticulous and sophisticated curriculum should be developed.

In areas explored in this study, such as inter-Korean reconciliation, forgiveness, competitive victim mentality, and zero-sum perception of inter-Korean relations, violence and conflicts caused by the division are inherently at play. Those are the areas that intensively capture the division, causes of the Korean War, and the subsequent structure of conflicts and violence rooted in our society. For example, as long as inter-Korean relations are recognized as zero-sum relations, inter-Korean agreement and economic cooperation of any kind will be viewed as South Korea being at a loss, hindering the advancement of inter-Korean relations and the settlement of peace. It is because North Korea's benefits from win-win agreement and economic cooperation between the two Koreas will be perceived as

South Korea's loss, which in turn offsets South Korea's benefits. A zero-sum perception is generally a by-product of "demonization." There needs to be a deliberation and self-reflection of the conflict structure of our society that has condoned and accepted "demonization" as a usual practice. Without such a process, peace in the form of mutual acknowledgment and respect will never be realized, as stipulated in Article 1.1 of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement.

Peace education should go beyond simply disseminating the legitimacy of inter-Korean co-existence and co-prosperity. Inter-Korean co-existence and co-prosperity should also not be used as an excuse to argue for justifying peace on the Korean Peninsula. A starting point should be to remind ourselves of how a zero-sum perception of violent nature is prevalent in our society. It is necessary to have a discussion and debate on the roots of zero-sum perception and the subsequent results. Looking squarely at such violence will be the beginning of the peace education. The follow-up tasks would be to identify cases of win-win perception, not a zero-sum perception, and build the public consensus on that.

Second implication regarding peace education is that it should be conducted concurrently with security education. Both South Koreans and North Korean defectors were neither positive nor negative to the maintenance of peace through the use of military force according to this research. Considering the social taboo on the use of military force, it could be interpreted that South Koreans are not entirely negative toward the use of military force.

Peace education is not to replace the security education.[15] It

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15) Ian M Harris; Mary Lee Morrison; translated by Jungwon Park; Peace Education: Education for Peace, Vision for the World (Seoul: Publisher Orum, 2003), pp. 56-57, pp. 110-113.

rather actively embraces the security education. An active, open discussion is required on what is the proper level of military force required for realizing peace through such a force and what is the nature of arms race—a subject that will inevitably surface in such a discussion. At the same time, by making education on arms control available, it is necessary to implement education that would help people on the receiving end of the education contemplate and thus make a choice when it comes to achieving peace through a force.

At the end of the day, a discourse on peace should go hand-in-hand with a security discourse. It is necessary to seek the public agreement on what is the proper military defense capability and persuade the public of and build the consensus on the direction and discourse of security. To that end, it is required to primarily share the current status of security and relevant materials with the public, minimize the hidden aspect, and make available as many relevant data as possible to the people so that the public rights to be informed could be fulfilled. In the meantime, more open environment should be created that enables more professional and candid approach on the national defense by involving as many scholars as possible in an analysis and studies of the defense sector.

The third implication regarding peace education is about a subject for peace education. There was no generational gap in the attitude for peace and war and the way peace is realized. The subject of existing unification education is mostly younger generations represented by those in their 20s and 30s. The biggest reason is that those younger generations saw less of a need for peace education compared to the older generations. A rationale behind that argument is the results of existing survey or research on unification perception. However, this research found no generational

gap in the attitude for peace and war and the way peace is achieved indicating that the peace education is not a matter of the younger generation but a matter of our society as a whole. Therefore, the peace education should be approached in line with the life-long learning process as part of the civic education across the entire sector of our society going beyond the scope of school education.

To that end, efforts are required to decrease the instances of social conflicts and establish an institution aimed at building peace-oriented society. A case in point could be introducing an incentive system to formulate conflict-adjustment mechanism and resolve conflicts. In addition, it will also be necessary to create the governance system to spread the peace discourse that involves the government, local authorities, and the private sector.

Korea Institute for
National Unification